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*Language*, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Dec., 1990), 764-805.

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Mon Apr 19 01:05:20 2004

# QUOTATIONS AS DEMONSTRATIONS

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The theory developed here is that quotations are demonstrations that are component parts of language use. Demonstrations are unlike descriptions in two main ways. They are nonserious rather than serious actions. A person demonstrating a limp isn't actually or really limping. And they depict rather than describe their referents, though they depict only selected aspects of the referents. The demonstrator of the limp depicts some but not all of its aspects. Quotations, we argue, have all the properties of genuine demonstrations. They too are nonserious actions and selective depictions. For evidence we appeal to a wide range of phenomena in spontaneous spoken and written quotations.*

**1.** Quotations are a special form of language use. Compare two reports, one by Matt and the other by Beth, of a customer talking to a clerk selling ants (in a Monty Python skit):[1]

(1) she says 'well I'd like to buy an ant'
(2) and she tells him uh that she wants to buy an ant

In 1 the words *well I'd like to buy an ant* aren't really Matt's. He isn't using *I* to refer to himself, nor is he saying that he'd like to buy an ant. He is speaking much as if he were the customer talking to the clerk. But in 2 all of the words are truly Beth's. She too is reporting what the customer said, but entirely from her own perspective. The speech report in 1 has variously been called direct quotation, direct speech, direct discourse, or oratio recta, and in 2, indirect quotation, indirect speech, indirect discourse, or oratio obliqua. Our interest is in direct quotation, or simply quotation. What is it, and how does it differ from other types of language use?

The theory we will develop is that quotations are a type of demonstration. Just as you can demonstrate a tennis serve, a friend's limp, or the movement of a pendulum, so you can demonstrate what a person did in saying something.[2] What Matt does in 1 is demonstrate what the customer did in talking to the ant clerk. In 2 Beth DESCRIBES what the customer did. Demonstrations and descriptions are fundamentally different methods of communication. Demonstrations depict their referents—what is being demonstrated—whereas descriptions do not. Most theories of language use take for granted that all language use is description. If our proposal is correct, demonstrations are as

* We are indebted to many colleagues for discussions on the issues presented here, especially Eve V. Clark, Jean C. Liittschwager, Geoffrey Nunberg, Michael F. Schober, and Elizabeth Wade. The research was supported in part by Grant BNS 83-20284 from the National Science Foundation.

[1] We will appeal mostly to naturally-occurring examples of spoken and written quotations. Many of the spoken examples come from our own data on people retelling narratives or reporting conversation. The rest come from the sources identified, except for the invented examples marked 'I'. We have added quotation marks to all the spoken quotations.

[2] We will use the term DEMONSTRATE in its everyday sense of 'illustrate by exemplification' and not in its technical linguistic sense of 'point to' or 'indicate' (as in demonstrative reference). Indeed, we will distinguish demonstrating from indicating.

much a part of ordinary discourse as descriptions are, and they too must be accounted for in any general theory of language use.

We will begin, in §2, with an analysis of demonstrations. Then, in §3, we will present the theory of quotations we wish to build on that analysis. In the remaining sections we will consider evidence for the theory, several complications in the theory, the functions of quotations, and how the demonstration theory contrasts with alternative theories.

**2.** DEMONSTRATIONS. By what methods do people perform communicative acts—acts by which they mean something (Grice 1957, 1968)? Face to face they have three fundamental methods: indicating, describing, and demonstrating.[3] Suppose Alice wants to get Ben to know how John McEnroe serves in tennis, how George limps, or how a pendulum swings. (1) Alice can INDICATE, or point at, an actual serve by McEnroe, a limp by George, or a pendulum swinging. Ben grasps what she means by recognizing her intention to locate the serve, limp, and pendulum and by perceiving them directly—by what we will call DIRECT EXPERIENCE. He would be misinformed if she got him to locate the wrong things. (2) Or Alice can DESCRIBE the serve, limp, and swing. Ben grasps what she means by recognizing her intentions in uttering what she did (Grice 1957, 1968). Everything he learns is mediated by her intentions, and he will be misinformed if she lies or distorts. (3) Or Alice can DEMONSTRATE the serve, limp, and swing. She would perform certain actions like those that McEnroe, George, and the pendulum would perform. This time Ben grasps what she means by recognizing her intention to depict certain aspects of the serve, limp, and pendulum. He would be misinformed if she demonstrated a Chris Evert serve, the wrong limp, or the actions of a wheel. Some communicative acts rely on just one of these methods, and others, on a combination.

So demonstrations differ first of all from indications—e.g. pointing at something. Indications work by locating things; their primary function is to designate things. Demonstrations work by enabling others to experience what it is like to perceive the things depicted. The contrast is illustrated in this utterance by a nine-year-old boy in the noise of a waterfall:

(3) Herb! [points to Eve] + [puts an imaginary camera to his eyes and clicks the shutter].

With his first gesture he refers to Eve by locating her, and with his second, he denotes the action of taking a photograph by depicting it. The first gesture is an indication, and the second, a demonstration.[4] What he means is 'Herb, Eve is taking a photograph.'

But our main interest is in how demonstrations differ from descriptions.[5] We

[3] These methods correspond roughly to Peirce's division of signs into indices, symbols, and icons.

[4] Demonstrations might be thought of as containing indications. When Alice demonstrates McEnroe's serve, she is in effect pointing at her own actions as a means of locating what Ben should be attending to. If she had pointed at Connie demonstrating McEnroe's serve, the indication and demonstration would be separated: the first would be by Alice, and the second, by Connie.

[5] These two modes can be traced back to Aristotle's notions of mimesis and diegesis (see Sternberg 1982).

will suggest that demonstrations, unlike descriptions, are nonserious as opposed to serious actions, and that they depict rather than describe.

**2.1.** DEMONSTRATIONS AS NONSERIOUS ACTIONS. Human actions, according to Goffman 1974, divide into two broad types—serious and nonserious. When two people fight, their actions are serious. The actions 'are said to be real or actual, to be really or actually or literally occurring' (47). But when two people PLAY at fighting, as in make-believe, their actions are nonserious. The fight is 'not literally or really or actually occurring,' although the play itself is. For Goffman, nonserious actions are 'transformations' of serious actions: 'a given activity [e.g. fighting], one already meaningful in terms of some primary framework, [is] transformed into something [e.g. mock fighting] patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to be something quite else' (43–44; see also Bateson 1972, Walton 1973, 1976).

By this criterion, demonstrations are nonserious actions. When Alice demonstrates George's limp, she isn't 'really or actually or literally' limping. Her actions are 'patterned on' a real limp but are 'seen by the participants to be something quite else', a demonstration of a limp. Demonstrations belong to a family of nonserious actions that includes practicing, playing, acting, and pretending.

Demonstrations are performed as parts of serious activities. When Alice demonstrates George's limp, she does it for a purpose as part of some more inclusive activity. She might be explaining why George is late or how to identify him, where the explanations themselves are serious activities. This process is recursive. A third person, Connie, could demonstrate how Alice was demonstrating George's limp, and a fourth person could demonstrate Connie's demonstration. This recursion is limited only by what demonstrators can do and get their recipients to understand.

Demonstrations must be distinguished from the serious actions they are parts of. Their boundaries—their beginnings and ends—must be clear. When Alice demonstrates George's limp, if all she did was limp, Ben might think SHE had the limp. She must mark it as a demonstration. She might note her entry with 'This is how George walks' and her exit with 'That's it.' Many actions are identifiable as demonstrations only from their relation to surrounding activity.

Demonstrations can play two roles in the serious actions they appear with. They may be COMPONENT PARTS. In describing George, Alice might say 'George walks like this', limp, and then resume her description, embedding her demonstration within the description. Or they may be CONCURRENT with the serious actions. Alice might limp while saying 'George has been walking oddly recently.' Here she is describing and demonstrating in parallel, and the demonstration is concurrent with the description.

What do people demonstrate? They demonstrate what in part it looks, sounds, or feels like to a person for an event, state, process, or object to be present. By depicting how a thing looks, sounds, or feels, they can refer to the thing itself. So people can demonstrate a cough, the rhythm of part of a Chopin prelude, the sound of a car engine, the sound and action of a jackhammer, the length of a fish, the size and shape of a platter, the speed of a snail, or the

appearance of a chimpanzee, palace guard, or cripple. The referents of these demonstrations may be events (e.g. the cough), states (the length of the fish), processes (the working of the jackhammer), or objects (the chimp, guard, or cripple). It is odd, however, to point at a house, newspaper, or sunset and speak of 'demonstrating' the house, newspaper, or sunset. Those are acts we have called indicating. We will continue to treat demonstrating as different from indicating. Furthermore, the events, states, processes, and objects we can demonstrate can be either generic or specific—either types or tokens. Alice can demonstrate either a generic McEnroe serve, or a specific one—say, his final serve at Wimbledon in 1981.

To begin with, then, (1) pure demonstrations are nonserious actions; (2) they come marked as nonserious actions; (3) they can be recursive; (4) they are either component or concurrent parts of serious actions; (5) their referents can be events, states, processes, or objects; and (6) their referents can be generic or specific, i.e. types or tokens.

**2.2.** DEMONSTRATIONS AS SELECTIVE DEPICTIONS. Demonstrations are also special in the way they represent their referents: they depict rather than describe. Alice's demonstration of George's limp doesn't merely stand for, denote, or symbolize the limp. It depicts it. It differs from the assertion 'George limps by cocking his left knee each time he steps', which describes the limp instead.

The difference between depicting and describing is fundamental, however it is to be captured theoretically. The commonsense idea is that depictions, such as paintings and sculptures, resemble their referents, whereas descriptions do not. But mere resemblance isn't enough, since descriptions may resemble their referents in certain ways too. According to Goodman 1968, depictions differ from descriptions syntactically. Depictions are formed from what he calls dense, or nonarticulated, symbol systems, such as the analogical representations of painting or sculpture. Descriptions are formed from articulated symbol systems, such as the discrete words and sentences of a language. So density of symbol system may be one component. For Walton 1973, 1976, depictions also differ from descriptions in the process by which they are to be interpreted. We are to interpret Breughel's painting 'Haymaking', for example, by looking at it in such a way that we make believe we are actually looking at the haymaking scene pictured in it. We wouldn't look at a DESCRIPTION of 'Haymaking' in that way to interpret it. In our terms, people interpret depictions in part through direct perceptual experience.

As depictions, demonstrations too are to be interpreted in part through direct experience. When Alice demonstrates George's limp, Ben isn't intended to identify a string of symbols and determine what she means by them. He is to inspect her demonstration in certain respects as if he were inspecting George's limp itself. The perceptual experience may be auditory or tactual—imagine a demonstration of an ambulance siren or a child pinching—or, indeed, any combination of senses.

Demonstrations usually depict their referents from a vantage point. When Alice demonstrates a card trick, she can do it with the cards facing herself so

that Ben would experience the trick as the audience would, or with the cards facing Ben so that he would experience it as the prestidigitator would. Most events can be demonstrated from more than one vantage point. In demonstrations of a person's actions, the demonstrator usually takes that person's role, and the recipients experience them as if they were observing that person. For the limp, Alice takes George's role, and Ben views her in certain ways as if she were George.

Demonstrations are selective in what they depict of their referents. To see how, let us consider how demonstrations divide into aspects.

**2.3.** ASPECTS OF DEMONSTRATIONS. Imagine Alice demonstrating to Ben how McEnroe serves aces. She stands holding an imaginary ball and racket. Then, in slow motion, she tosses the ball above her head, brings her right hand over her head, hits the ball with her imaginary racket, and follows through. If Alice is to get Ben to see how McEnroe serves aces, she must pick out McEnroe ace serves in contrast to other possible events, states, processes, or objects she could be demonstrating, such as Ben's own serve. How does she do this? We assume that demonstrators intend recipients to recognize that their demonstrations divide into four parts:

(i) DEPICTIVE ASPECTS. Only some aspects of a demonstration are intended to depict aspects of the referent—to be used for distinguishing the intended referent from other possible referents. In Alice's demonstration, let us suppose, these include her initial stance, the trajectory of her arms, head, and body, and the positioning of her feet.

(ii) SUPPORTIVE ASPECTS. Other aspects of a demonstration are not themselves depictive aspects, but are necessary as support in the performance of the depictive aspects. In Alice's demonstration, let us say, these include her use of slow motion, the lack of a real ball and racket (so she could slow down her actions), and the use of her right hand, McEnroe being left-handed.

(iii) ANNOTATIVE ASPECTS. Still other aspects of a demonstration are added as commentary on what is being demonstrated. Alice, for example, might talk, smile, sneer, or snort during her demonstration in comment on McEnroe's style. She expects Ben to see that these are NOT part of McEnroe's way of serving aces.

(iv) INCIDENTAL ASPECTS. The remaining aspects are incidental to the demonstrator's purpose in demonstrating, aspects he or she has no specific intentions about. They are what is left over once the depictive, supportive, and annotative aspects have been chosen. In our example, these might include the way Alice steps up to the base line, holds her fingers, and works her jaw.

It isn't enough for Alice to know which aspects of her demonstration are depictive, supportive, and annotative. She must get Ben to recognize which are which:

DECOUPLING PRINCIPLE: Demonstrators intend their recipients to recognize different aspects of their demonstrations as depictive, supportive, and annotative.

Alice can help engineer that recognition by a combination of techniques. She might be explicit: 'This is how McEnroe stands and moves his head, arms, body, and feet, except that he does it with ball and racket, quickly, and left-handed.' Or she might let Ben infer which is which from viewing her performance against their common ground. Ben should see, for example, that her imaginary ball and racket are contrary to reality and, therefore, are supportive aspects.

So demonstrators face a practical problem: how to DECOUPLE the depictive, supportive, annotative, and incidental aspects from one another. In our example, Alice decoupled the trajectory of her actions from their speed. She treated the trajectory as depictive and the speed as supportive. She also decoupled her commentary from her other actions and treated it as annotative. When two aspects are impossible to decouple, they must both be assigned to the same category. Decoupling aspects is required in the performance and interpretation of every demonstration.

The depictive aspects of a demonstration have a privileged status: they form what we will call the DEMONSTRATION PROPER. Although we might describe Alice as demonstrating how McEnroe serves aces, that is a broad description. A narrower description is this: Alice is demonstrating how, in serving aces, McEnroe stands, moves his arms, head, and body, and positions his feet. She is NOT demonstrating how quickly he moves, how he spins the ball and twists his racket, what hand he uses, or other aspects of his ace serves. There are two principles here:

> PARTIALITY PRINCIPLE: Demonstrators intend the depictive aspects of a demonstration to be the demonstration proper, the primary point of their demonstration.
>
> SELECTIVITY PRINCIPLE: Demonstrators intend their demonstrations to depict only selective aspects of the referents under a broad description.

Partiality and selectivity are two sides of the same coin. Only part of Alice's demonstration is depictive, and it depicts only selective aspects of McEnroe's ace serves. Her primary point is to get Ben to recognize those aspects.

Demonstrations, then, also have these properties: (1) they depict rather than describe their referents; (2) they are understood partly through direct experience; (3) they depict their referents from a vantage point; (4) they require the depictive, supportive, and annotative aspects to be decoupled from each other; and (5) they are selective in what aspects they depict.

**3.** QUOTATIONS AS DEMONSTRATIONS. Our proposal is this: quotations are demonstrations that are component parts of language use. The prototypical quotation is a demonstration of what a person did in saying something. So when Alice quotes George, she may depict the sentence he uttered. She can also depict his emotional state (excitement, fear, shyness), his accent (Brooklyn, Irish, Scots), his voice (raspy, nasal, whiny), and even the nonlinguistic actions that accompanied his speech (gestures, frown, head angle). Furthermore, she can depict nonlinguistic events by themselves. Quotations should display all the properties of genuine demonstrations and, we will argue, they do.

To fix some terminology, let us return to ex. 1 in which Matt quoted the woman in an ant store: *she says 'well I'd like to buy an ant'*. Here we can identify two domains, the CURRENT DOMAIN, associated with Matt, and the SOURCE DOMAIN, associated with the woman quoted. Each domain is specifiable with six (or more) parameters: speaker, addressees, place, time, vantage point, and action. The current domain has these values: Matt; his addressee; Stanford; 1989; Matt's vantage point; and an assertion of what a woman said. The source domain has these values: the woman buying ants; the ant clerk; a fictional place; a fictional time; the woman's vantage point; and a request for service.[6]

What counts as evidence for our proposal depends on what is taken to be a quotation. Indeed, the border between quotations and nonquotations isn't sharp, and that fact is itself accounted for by the demonstration theory. We will begin with the central case of quotation—direct speech in spontaneous discourse—and go from there to less central cases. We turn first to the two distinctive properties of demonstrations—that they are nonserious actions, and that they are selective depictions.

**3.1.** QUOTATIONS AS NONSERIOUS ACTIONS. If quotations are demonstrations, they too should be nonserious actions. When Matt in 1 utters the words *well I'd like to buy an ant*, he isn't 'really or actually or literally' making a request. Rather, his actions are 'patterned on' or 'transformations of' a serious action that is 'already meaningful in terms of some primary framework', in this case a customer making a request of an ant clerk. Story telling, joke telling, play acting, teasing, irony, overstatement, and understatement are also nonserious uses of language, but only quotations qualify as a type of demonstration. We will argue that they arise as component parts of serious actions, are recursive, denote events, states, processes, or objects, and allow for both generic and specific referents.[7]

Demonstrations that are components of language use contrast with those that are concurrent with it. Iconic gestures in story telling, for example, are often used to demonstrate aspects of what is being described (McNeill 1985, McNeill & Levy 1982), but are performed in parallel with utterances rather than as component parts of them. Still, concurrent demonstrations, like deictic gestures, may play an essential role in what speakers mean even though they are not syntactically part of the sentences uttered. Component and concurrent demonstrations have much in common, but only the component ones are called quotations.

Quotations, we will argue, arise as one of two types of components. Pure

[6] The two domains bear an asymmetrical relation to one another. Roughly speaking, information in the source domain is accessible from the current domain, but not vice versa. Precisely what that relation is goes beyond this paper (see Clark 1987:15).

[7] So-called nonserious language use has been excluded from most philosophical, linguistic, and psychological accounts of language. In *How to do things with words*, Austin (1962:22) said: 'Language in such circumstances [e.g. play acting, practice] is in special ways—intelligibly—used not seriously, but in ways PARASITIC upon its normal use ... All this we are EXCLUDING from consideration' (Austin's emphasis). Austin's descendants, with few exceptions, have followed suit. But see Clark & Gerrig 1984 and Isaacs & Clark 1990.

quotations are demonstrations that are EMBEDDED in language use. Certain mixed quotations are INCORPORATED into language use. Pure quotations are the commonest form of quotation—the garden variety of direct speech. The mixed quotations are rarer, more specialized, and found mostly in formal writing. We will take up pure quotations here and the mixed ones only later.

How are quotations embedded in language use? When Matt in 1 utters *well I'd like to buy an ant*, he is producing a strip of depicting behavior. He does this to demonstrate an event—broadly, what the customer said to the ant clerk—and, thereby, to refer to that event. He can treat the strip of depicting behavior as if it were a novel linguistic expression referring to that event, assign it to the category noun phrase, and EMBED it as a direct object of *say*. This works because *say* takes as direct objects noun phrases with just such denotations. In conversation, indeed, quotations generally look like this:

(4) a. and uh he said 'well . go along and talk to them'
b. then she says 'well are these the only ones you have'
c. and he tells her 'no I can't guarantee these ones'
d. and she asks 'are these– how do I take these'

The prototypical quotation is the direct object of *say, tell,* or *ask* in the present or past tense, and it follows its embedding structure.

Matt's depicting strip of behavior in 1 really has two faces. Externally, it is a noun phrase that Matt uses to refer to an event. Internally, it depicts a sentence being uttered by a customer to make a request of an ant clerk. The noun phrase belongs to Matt's description, a serious use of language, but the sentence belongs to his depiction, a nonserious action. An essential property of embedded quotations is that their external and internal structures are, in a certain way, independent of each other.[8] The fact that Matt is depicting a sentence doesn't interact with the fact that he is using the demonstration as a noun phrase—as long as the demonstration has the right denotation. The same internal structure can be embedded in a variety of external structures, and vice versa, and they will be structurally independent.

The demonstration of the utterance of a sentence, for example, can be embedded in many types of external structures. Here are a few written examples:

(5) a. That's not a Twinkie, that's 'I want it, I need it, and I'm going to have it.' That's not a breakfast cereal, that's 'I'm worried about colon cancer.' [Jon Carroll, *San Francisco Chronicle*]
b. These are not 'I really should' radishes; these are not 'I've been meaning to dig out that old recipe for Romanian radish stew' radishes. [Jon Carroll, *San Francisco Chronicle*]
c. Show-me State [official nickname of the State of Missouri]
d. A donnish, twinkly 'Let me take you to a place where cash can be exchanged for alcohol'? A frank yet slightly literary 'Why not let me take you to the pub'? A casually speculative 'Coming

[8] We will not take up the precise form of this independence since our primary interest is in quotations as demonstrations.

over to The Crown'? An abruptly plebeian 'Fancy a drink?'? [Martin Amis, *Success*]

e. His speech abounded in I think so's. [cited by Jespersen 1924:96]

Internally, these quotations depict utterances of sentences. Externally, they are predicate nominals, modifiers, nouns, and even noun stems. Or consider these spoken speech reports:

(6) a. she goes 'well what's the most expensive ones you have'
b. and she's like 'well that doesn't make sense'
c. and uh and he's 'oh oh what does that have to do with it'[9]

Internally, the quotations again depict sentences, but externally they are a manner adverb and predicate nominals or adjectives.

Embedded quotations like this don't need to be components of sentences at all. In narratives, speakers often use free standing quotations for referring to events in a sequence, as in this conversational narrative about the speaker's daughter and husband:[10]

(7) she got up in the morning – 'tooth's not gone, there's no money' . 'there' ((he)) said 'well there you are you see, you you said, you didn't believe in fairies, so how can you expect the fairies to come and see you if –' 'oh, but I do believe in fairies, you know, I really do,' so Edward said 'well . try again tonight' – so that night thank goodness we remembered [Svartvik & Quirk 1980]

Every time the narrator quotes her daughter, she uses a free-standing quotation. So these quotations are embedded in the narrative, but not in any sentence of the narrative. Free-standing quotations are common. In one study (Tannen 1989), quotations of dialogue were found to be free standing 26% of the time in conversational narratives and 16% of the time in literary stories. Quotations can even appear as complete narratives. In the first chapter of *A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court*, Mark Twain tells how a curious stranger he met in Canterbury Cathedral gave him a manuscript. The rest of the book is a quotation of that manuscript.

Still, it is generally misleading to speak of the internal structure of quotations as only linguistic. With *well I'd like to buy an ant* in 1, Matt may be depicting not only the sentence the customer uttered, but the request she made, the excitement in her voice, the look in her eyes. As we will argue, many quotations depict noises, gestures, or other things with no linguistic structure at all. The internal structure of a quotation is really the structure of what is being depicted, and that can range from the raging of a person to the racket of a machine.

Another property of demonstrations is that they can refer to events, states, processes, or objects. Quotations should be able to too, and they do. In the typical speech report, they refer to events. But consider these examples:

[9] The use of the copula alone, as illustrated here, is a form we have recorded many instances of.

[10] In our examples from Svartvik & Quirk, we retain the following notation: '.' for a brief pause (of one light syllable); '–' for a unit pause (of one stress unit or foot); ',' for the end of a midturn tone unit; '(laughs)' or single parentheses for contextual comments; and '((words))' or double parentheses for incomprehensible words.

(8) a. Don't you 'wee, tim'rous beastie' me. [One mouse to another in *New Yorker* cartoon]
b. Jack Anderson pooh-poohs that assumption, but Jack Anderson pooh-poohs everything these days. [Richard K. Morse, *San Francisco Chronicle*]
c. He let it obsess him, for all the irritated now-nowing of his wife and the confusion and unease of his children. [Martin Amis, *Success*]
d. On television again last night old 'Read my lips' said that he was still against new taxes. [I]

These quotations refer to an event (the mouse's use of a vocative), a state (Anderson's being skeptical), a process (the wife's saying *Now now*), and an object (the person who uttered *Read my lips*). Quotations follow demonstrations in this respect too.

Demonstrations can also be embedded recursively. And just as Connie can demonstrate Alice demonstrating George's limp, speakers should be able to quote one person quoting another, and they can:

(9) Ralph's saying 'no but you're different you're you the rest of us don't go around everyday saying "oh I don't like you today"'

Recursion like this can, in principle, go on forever. In Henry James' 'The Turn of the Screw', the first narrator quotes a story told to him by Douglas, who quotes a story told to him by a governess, who in turn quotes a child named Miles. There is similar multiple recursion in Washington Irving's *Rip Van Winkle* and in many other stories and novels (Bruce 1981).

Finally, if demonstrations allow both specific and generic referents, so should quotations, and they do. The quotations in 1, 4, 6, 7, and 9 have specific referents, and those in 5 and 8 have generic ones. Most speech reports have specific referents, but not all, as illustrated here (see also Tannen 1989: 110–14):

(10) Many people have come up to me and said, 'Ed, why don't you run for the Senate?' [KCBS television news, speech by Representative Ed Zschau.]
(11) I think she thought I was a career woman, who would be only too glad, or would say 'oh well he's got to go into a hospital,' you know [Svartvik & Quirk 1980]
(12) 'They [people at the United Nations] made me very cranky with their evasions,' Archer recalls. 'They'd say, "The information is for member states only." And I'd reply, "As far as I know, the United States is a member state." Then they'd say, "We can't afford the Xeroxing."' [*San Francisco Chronicle* news story]

Certainly not everyone, and perhaps no one, who came up to Zschau used the words he depicts in 10. Zschau is denoting a generic request as way of claiming that many people asked him to run for the Senate. In 11 the quotation denotes nothing the current speaker actually said, but only the type of thing she would say. And surely not every conversation Archer had with people at the U.N. went as in 12. He is only claiming that this is the type of thing that happened.

So far, then, there is evidence that quotations are nonserious actions, can arise as embedded parts of serious actions, are recursive, may denote events, states, processes, and objects, and allow both generic and specific referents. Along the way, we have also seen how quotations are marked as nonserious actions. When they are embedded as sentence constituents, they are marked by their syntactic relation to the rest of the sentence. Otherwise, they are identifiable as quotations because speakers have made it manifest that they are depictions and not descriptions. To see how they do that, let us turn to quotations as depictions.

**3.2.** QUOTATIONS AS SELECTIVE DEPICTIONS. The heart of our proposal is that quotations, like demonstrations, depict rather than describe. As demonstrations, they should follow these versions of the decoupling, partiality, and selectivity principles:

DECOUPLING PRINCIPLE: Speakers intend their addressees to recognize different aspects of their quotations as depictive, supportive, and annotative.

PARTIALITY PRINCIPLE: Speakers intend their addressees to take the depictive aspects to be the quotation proper, the point of their quotation.

SELECTIVITY PRINCIPLE: Speakers intend their quotations to depict only selective aspects of the referents under a broad description.

Suppose Alice, in reporting what George said, chooses to depict only the question he asked and the timidity with which he asked it. If she speaks in English (instead of George's French) and in her own pitch (instead of a male pitch), these would be supportive aspects. And if she titters and smirks during her quotation, these would be annotative aspects. The remaining aspects would be incidental. By the first principle, Alice intends Ben to see this division. By the second, she intends him to take only the question and timidity to be depictive, the quotation proper, as the point of her quotation. And by the third principle, she intends to depict only two aspects of what George said—his question and his timidity.

The practical problem is for speakers and addressees to coördinate on which aspects of a quotation are which. One method they have can be expressed this way:

MARKEDNESS PRINCIPLE: Whenever speakers mark an aspect of a quotation, they intend their addressees to identify that aspect as nonincidental—that is, as depictive, supportive, or annotative.

Suppose Alice is speaking with Ben in English. If she quotes George in French, she MARKS the language used as a nonincidental aspect. Depending on the circumstances, she may intend it to be depictive (George spoke in French), supportive (she doesn't want overhearers to know what George said), or annotative (she is commenting on George's urbanity). The markedness principle is simply Grice's 1975 maxims of quantity and manner applied to demonstrations. To mark an aspect is to imply that it has a recognizable purpose and, therefore, isn't incidental.

What can people quote? Demonstrators can demonstrate anything they can

depict through their actions, as long as they can get their recipients to recognize what they are doing. The same should go for quotations: speakers should be able to quote anything they can depict and get their addressees to recognize. If so, quotations should come in as many forms as there are useful, recognizable ways of decoupling aspects.

In the next three sections we will take up evidence that quotations are selective depictions. We will first consider spontaneous spoken quotations—the central examples of quotation—then written quotations, and finally cases of mixed depiction and description.

**4.** SELECTIVE DEPICTION IN SPOKEN QUOTATIONS. Face to face, people can demonstrate many things. When Alice demonstrates for Ben what George said, she can easily depict the words he uttered. But using her voice, face, arms, and body, she can also help depict George's language, dialect, drunkenness, indignation, hesitancy, arrogance, flamboyance, stuffy manner, and a variety of other things. What she chooses to depict depends on the experience she wants Ben to have.

What CAN people depict? The possibilities are endless. Still, the prototypical quotation is a report of a speech event, and speech events have aspects such as these (with examples in parentheses):[11]

(i) DELIVERY: voice pitch (male, female, child), voice age (adult, child, oldster), voice quality (raspy, nasal, slurred), speech defects (lisp, stutter), emotional state (anger, sarcasm, excitement), accompanying gestures (pointing, smiling, frowning)

(ii) LANGUAGE: language proper (English, Dutch, Japanese), dialect (British English, Bostonian English), register (formal, informal)

(iii) LINGUISTIC ACTS: illocutionary act (question, request, promise), propositional expression (the proposition expressed), locutionary act (the sentence uttered), utterance act (the utterance issued with repairs, etc.)

If people are selective in depicting speech events, they can choose from among aspects like these, and they do.

**4.1.** DELIVERY. Speakers often mark aspects of delivery, usually to make them depictive. Consider the mother in 7 who quotes her child as saying, 'Oh but I DO believe in fairies'. According to McGregor (1986:180), this utterance 'is not only "slower" and "louder" but also makes use of wide fall rises, extra strong stress on DO and is accompanied by the paralinguistic features "whisper," "tremulousness" and "giggle"'. Listeners hear the mother as marking the age, speed, voice quality, emotion, and other aspects of her delivery. They take these as depictive aspects, part of her quotation proper. There are many depictive effects that can be marked with the voice, as in these examples characteristic of ones we have heard from children six to ten years old:

(13) a. And so she said '[whispering] What are we going to do?' [I]

[11] These categories aren't intended to be definitive, but are offered more for convenience of exposition.

b. But then she went '[singing off key] On top of Spaghetti, all covered with cheese.' [I]
c. So her mother said, '[whiny voice] No, you can't go out until you make your bed.' [I]

These children are depicting a conspiratorial tone of voice, another child's lack of singing talent, and a mother's bossiness.

People reading aloud often mark aspects of delivery. For 'Little Red Riding Hood' they may do different voices for Little Red Riding Hood, the wolf, the grandmother, and the wolf as grandmother. They are depicting the characters' voices, treating these aspects as parts of the quotations proper. Professional readers of novels and short stories on commercial cassette tapes do the same. In tapes we have listened to, they often mark: (1) voice pitch, e.g. speaking in a higher voice for women than men; (2) voice age, e.g. using a tremulous voice and slower rate for older speakers; (3) voice quality, e.g. stuttering; (4) emotion, e.g. speaking in an angry, excited, or contemptuous tone of voice; and many other things. They can do with quotations anything that a professional actor would do on stage.

Face to face, speakers can also include gestures. In the next example, Kate is telling friends about the time she had been in the hospital, on an intravenous (I-V) system, and had been offered something to eat:

(14) I went out of my mind and I just screamed I said 'Take that out! That's not for me!' ... And I shook this I-V and I said 'I'm on an I-V, I can't eat. Take it out of here!'

As part of her quotation Kate 'shakes her arm as if shaking the I-V and shouts in the conversational setting as she shouts in the story' (Polanyi 1989:92). She depicts not merely the original emotion, but the original gestures. She enables her audience to experience a single Gestalt of anger and frustration. Other quotations we have noted depict smiles, head shakes, head nods, shoulder shrugs, pointings, thumbs up, and many other such gestures.

But in 14 just what is Kate trying to depict? It might be her original loudness, intonation, and gestures. It might be her original anger and frustration. It might be both. These two sets of aspects are at different levels of description, and it matters which sets Kate is trying to depict. If it is only the lower level, she is claiming to represent the loudness, intonation, and gestures of the original speech, but not necessarily its anger and frustration. If it is only the higher level, she is claiming to represent its anger and frustration, but not necessarily its loudness, intonation, and gestures. The two claims are different. If she could recall that she had been angry and frustrated but not how she had spoken, she would want to make her claim at the higher level of description, but not at the lower one.

Level of description is at issue for every demonstration. Consider a story, recorded and transcribed by Tannen (1989), that was told in conversation by a physician about a patient he had treated in the emergency room of a hospital. According to Tannen (122), 'There are at least five different voices animated in this narrative, and each of these voices is realized in a paralinguistically

distinct acoustic representation: literally, a different voice.' Despite the emphasis on acoustic representations, Tannen's transcripts mark the narrator's quotations with such high-level descriptions as '[sobbing]', '[innocent voice]', '[upset voice]', '[hysterically pleading voice]', and '["bored" voice]'. Presumably Tannen chose '"bored" voice' over (let us assume) 'flat intonation' precisely because that was what the narrator seemed primarily to be trying to depict. He did the '"bored" voice' by means of a flat intonation, but wasn't necessarily committed to the flat intonation being accurate. Throughout his story, the narrator was trying to get 'in character' for each quotation, and this is an even higher level of description.

**4.2.** LANGUAGE. By the demonstration theory, speakers have a choice of language, dialect, and register to use in each quotation: their current one or the source speaker's. The expected one is usually their own. To choose some other language, dialect, or register is to mark it as depictive, supportive, or annotative. Suppose Alice speaks to Wolfgang in German, and later, speaking English, reports their talk to Ben. Her report can take these forms (among others):

(15) a. Wolfgang asked 'Are you hungry?' and I answered 'Yes, I am.' [I]
b. Wolfgang asked 'Hast du Hunger?' and I answered 'Ja.' [I]
c. Wolfgang asked in German 'Are you hungry?' and I answered in German 'Yes, I am.' [I]

If Alice intends the language in her quotations to be incidental, she will use 15a. To use 15b is to mark language as NOT incidental—to imply she has a recognizable reason for using German instead of English. If she has engineered the situation correctly, Ben will see that language is depictive and that the source language was German. If she uses 15c, she DESCRIBES the source language and then treats language as a supportive aspect. All three uses follow the markedness principle.

Dialect, like language, can be marked as a depictive aspect, but is generally left unmarked as an incidental aspect. Consider this example of a Scot named Gemmill talking about his first visit to London with his daughter:

(16) so we're stauning [i.e. standing], looking at this, when this wuman came along and said, what were we looking for, and we're looking for somewhaur to stay the night, 'Where do you come fae?' 'Scotland,' 'You're no feart of coming here withoot somewhere to stay,' so she gi'en us half a dozen addresses [Macaulay 1987:19]

As Macaulay noted, 'Gemmill is reporting informal speech in the form that is normal for him and not for the [London] speaker to whom the remarks are attributed' (19). Macaulay goes on: 'The woman's form of speech is not integral to the story. On the contrary, it is her friendly behavior that is important. Attempting to imitate her form of speech might have implied a critical attitude to that kind of speech or appeared to mock her. Instead, Gemmill employs the most neutral form of speech, his own, regardless of the realism of the quoted

speech' (19). In line with the markedness principle, dialect is therefore taken as incidental.

Register in quotations also follows the markedness principle. In polite conversation, for example, speakers may alter the obscenities of the source utterance when quoting it, as in this written quotation:

(17) John Molinari, .., vowing to cooperate fully with the next mayor: 'The last thing I want to be is the pain in the neck that Kopp was to George Moscone,' only he didn't say neck. [Herb Caen, *San Francisco Chronicle*]

Here the change was self-conscious, but it need not have been. In a debate during the 1988 American presidential campaign, Senator Lloyd Bentsen said to then Senator Dan Quayle 'You're no Jack Kennedy.' In the next few days, several people quoted him as having said 'You're no John Kennedy', using a more formal register. They may or may not have been aware of the change in register.

**4.3.** LINGUISTIC ACTS. In speech events, people perform several linguistic acts simultaneously (Austin 1962, Bach & Harnish 1979, Clark & Schaefer 1989, Levinson 1983, Searle 1969). Consider this transcription of an actual utterance by Ralph:

(18) and of course the right wing in– in Chile . accuses the left wing of putting the . um . poison in the . cyanide in the . fruit so that it'd ruin the . fruit . um [Ellen: industry] ahem [Ellen: industry] . industry . thank you

Here we can distinguish at least five linguistic acts:

(i) ILLOCUTIONARY ACT. An illocutionary act is 'the making of a statement, offer, promise, etc. in uttering a sentence' (Levinson 1983:236). In 18 Ralph asserts that the Chilean right wing is accusing the left wing of poisoning fruit to ruin the fruit industry.

(ii) PROPOSITIONAL EXPRESSION. This is the act of expressing a particular proposition or propositional content. In 18 Ralph expresses the proposition that the Chilean right wing is accusing the left wing of poisoning fruit to ruin the fruit industry. This proposition would be the same whether it was expressed in German, Japanese, or Swahili. According to Searle 1969, 1975, an illocutionary act consists of expressing a proposition plus specifying an illocutionary force—i.e. whether the act is a statement, offer, promise, or whatever.

(iii) LOCUTIONARY ACT. A locutionary act is 'the utterance of a sentence with determinate sense and reference' (Levinson 1983:236). In our case, Ralph utters the sentence *And of course the right wing in Chile accuses the left wing of putting the cyanide in the fruit so that it'd ruin the fruit industry*. The sentence uttered is what remains after all the self-corrections and completions have been made. It is not the same locutionary act to utter this sentence in a German, Japanese, or Swahili translation.

(iv) UTTERANCE ACT. An utterance act is the issuing of 'any stretch of talk, by one person, before and after which there is silence on behalf of that person' (Lyons 1977:26). It contains all of the hesitations, repetitions, *um*'s, and self-corrections that are excluded from the locutionary act. It is not the same utterance act to issue Ralph's sentence without his hesitations, repetitions, *um*'s, and self-corrections.

(v) COLLABORATIVE ACT. This is Ralph and Ellen's collaborative act of constructing the total speech event (Clark & Schaefer 1989, Goodwin 1981). It includes both Ralph's and Ellen's utterance acts plus their temporal coördination.

In quotations, we suggest, speakers can consider these five linguistic acts to be distinct aspects of a speech event and treat them as depictive, supportive, or incidental. For example, they might treat the illocutionary act as a depictive aspect and the other three as supportive or incidental. The only limit is imposed by what speakers are able to do: speakers can divide a quotation any way they are able to so long as they can get their addressees to recognize what they are doing.

Most quotations depict illocutionary acts, including the propositions expressed, and treat the other acts as supportive or incidental. Here is an actual quotation of 18 by Ann:

(19) okay Ralph's talking to someone again and he's saying, 'well of course . the right wing uh . of the government is– is uh – is blaming the left wing for putting the uh . cyanide poisoning in the fruit'

Ann isn't trying to depict Ralph and Ellen's collaborative act; there is no mention of Ellen's contributions. Nor is she trying to depict Ralph's utterance act with its *uh*'s, self-corrections, and *thank you*. The self-corrections in 19 are hers and not his. But she IS trying to depict Ralph's assertion (an illocutionary act), including both its propositional content and its illocutionary force. She may also be trying, however badly, to depict the sentence Ralph used (a locutionary act). So Ann is demonstrating his illocutionary and locutionary acts, but not his utterance or collaborative acts.

But utterance acts can be treated as depictive. Compare Ralph's utterance and Ann's quotation of it here:

(20) what no– why–y do you wanna– why do you want– I mean . what I want to do is to find– h– so I don't want to hear that answer again I want to hear some alternative answer

(21) Ralph goes 'w– why do wanna . w– why do you wanna . why do you want a particular answer . tuh s–' that's exactly what he said

In 21, Ann tries explicitly to depict Ralph's self-corrections and stuttering, parts of his utterance act, even though she doesn't depict the rest of the utterance with any accuracy. She largely ignores the sentence Ralph uttered, *I don't want to hear that answer again I want to hear some alternative answer*, although she manages to depict part of its propositional content and illocutionary force. So Ann demonstrates selected elements of Ralph's utterance act, propositional expression, and illocutionary act decoupled from his locutionary act.

The aspects we have labeled language, dialect, and register are generally parts of locutionary and utterance acts. When Alice quotes Wolfgang in 15c as having asked 'Are you hungry?' she is trying to depict the proposition he expressed along with its illocutionary force. She is using the English sentence *Are you hungry?* only as a supportive aspect. She doesn't intend her locutionary act to be depictive in any way. This is true of most translated quotations.

**4.4.** QUOTATIONS WITHOUT PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT. By the decoupling principle, speakers should also be able to treat the proposition expressed in a quotation as supportive, annotative, or incidental. At first this seems impossible. How could Alice quote George without depicting what he asserted, asked, or promised? But she can. One way is with *blah blah blah*:

(22) Ralph and Greg are . talking about something and uh Ralph says 'is that the idea that you get? blah blah blah' and . Greg says 'nah well another idea's you get multiple traces' – ((really interesting))

(23) In the studio, [Country Western singer Gail Davies] says, 'a lot of young guys don't understand what I'm tellin' 'em. I don't want you to play blah blah blah and all the notes are there and you got out in time. That's not the point. Give me some ATTITUDE. Give me some LIFE. Give me a little bit of what you ARE.' [*Newsweek*]

(24) And so the kid would say, 'Blah blah blah? [tentative voice with rising intonation]' and his father would say, 'Blah blah blah [in a strong blustery voice],' and they would go on and on like that. [I]

When Max says 'blah blah blah' in 22, he isn't trying to demonstrate Ralph's illocutionary act, but merely the fact that Ralph had uttered some words. Much the same goes for Davies' quotation in 23. Indeed, an entire quotation can consist of *blah*'s, as in 24, where the speaker demonstrates that the kid asked a question but not what it was, and so on. With *blah blah blah* speakers can depict the source speaker's intonation entirely decoupled from its propositional content.

A related phenomenon is illustrated in these three quotations:

(25) a. 'and the sixth battalion ((of)) the so and so regiment which was uh territorials – – – have had a lot of trouble' [Svartvik & Quirk 1980]

b. 'what do you want sir we can get the aen we get the English papers – delivered at such and such a time – what can I offer you – .' [Svartvik & Quirk 1980]

c. and I said . 'well it seemed to me to be an example of this this this this this this and this and this' . which it was you know [Svartvik & Quirk 1980]

In these quotations the current speaker isn't claiming the source speaker used *so and so, such and such*, and *this this this*. These are simply supportive aspects, stand-ins for information the current speaker cannot or doesn't feel the need to provide (see also Tannen 1989:118).

Second, speakers can depict other aspects of delivery or language decoupled from illocutionary and locutionary acts. Here is one such example:

(26) well, being an Irishman hasn't he, with a – not very distinctive, but a distinctive – what's the word, – regional, – snatch ((hasn't he)), rolling the Rs and all this . like some Irish chaps, ((are)) always sound like Berkshire men to me, old Jim Paisley goes, 'oh dear oh dear it must be the beer,' he always says that, . and I've noticed Derry does that [Svartvik & Quirk 1980]

When Gwyn quotes Paisley as going 'oh dear oh dear it must be the beer' he doesn't seem to imply that Paisley uttered these words or expressed the proposition that it must be the beer. Gwyn is merely demonstrating how Paisley rolls his Rs.

As a final example, consider the narrative tactic called MARKING in which 'the marker attempts to report not only what was said but the way it was said, in order to offer implicit comment on the speaker's background, personality, or intent' (Mitchell-Kernan 1972:176). In the following exchange, several activists are talking about a black delegate to the convention of a large corporation (Mitchell-Kernan 1972:178):

(27) S1: What did he say?
S2: [Drawling] He said, 'Ah'm so-o- happy to be here today. First of all ah want to thank all you good white folks for creatin so many opportunities for us niggers....'
S1: Did he really say that?
S3: Um hum, yes he said it. Girl, where have you been.
S1: Yea, I understand, but what did he really say?
S4: He said, 'This is a moment of great personal pride for me. My very presence here is a tribute to the civil rights movement....' In other words, he said just what [S2] said he said. He sold us out by accepting that kind of tokenism.

S2 demonstrates a special aspect of the delegate's actions—how he was behaving like an Uncle Tom. She makes no attempt to depict his illocutionary or locutionary acts.

**4.5.** NONLINGUISTIC QUOTATIONS. If demonstrations can depict anything recognizable—whether linguistic or not—quotations should be able to too. In the prototypical quotation, the direct object of *say* is a linguistic action. According to Hudson (1985:235), *go* works precisely as *say* does except that it 'allows as complement any kind of noise or even noiseless action performed by the speaker', as in these examples of Hudson's:

(28) a. The car engine went [brmbrm], and we were off. [I]
b. The boy who had scratched her Rolls Royce went [rude gesture with hand] and ran away. [I]
c. Whenever he sees a pretty girl he goes [wolf whistle] without really thinking about it. [I]
d. When you've finished, just go [belch] and I'll know you've had enough. [I]

As these examples suggest, speakers can embed under *go* anything they can demonstrate.[12]

Do speakers consider the actions within the square brackets in 28 to be genuine quotations? Two lines of evidence suggest they do. First, in informal American English, *go* can take both linguistic and nonlinguistic actions, as 6a and 21 illustrate. The two types of actions are equivalent in this respect, so if one is a quotation, the other must be too. And second, the nonlinguistic parts of 28 can themselves be part of a quotation, as in these examples:

(29) Ed said, 'The car engine went [brmbrm], and we were off.' [I]

(30) Charlotte said, 'When you've finished, just go [belch] and I'll know you've had enough.' [I]

The complements of *say* here contain both linguistic and nonlinguistic actions. To exclude the nonlinguistic actions would be to miss part of what was 'said' and misrepresent what was meant.[13]

Finally, just as linguistic quotations can be embedded as constituents other than NPs, so can nonlinguistic quotations, as here:

(31) a. I got out of the car, and I just [demonstration of turning around and bumping his head on an invisible telephone pole].

b. He gave a [demonstration of raspberry sound] to every policeman he saw. [I]

c. So I walked softly up to the door. [Demonstration of three gentle taps at the door]. 'Who is it?' 'It's me.' 'Well, then, please come in.' [I]

Nonlinguistic demonstrations as in 31c aren't generally considered part of 'the discourse.' If they aren't only because they aren't linguistic, the argument is circular: the only nonserious actions that truly belong to a discourse are linguistic, hence quotations must be linguistic. But if we include the nonlinguistic parts of 14 and 28 through 30, then pure quotations can be any kind of demonstration that one can embed in language use (cf. §6). And that is precisely what demonstration theory claims.

Spoken quotations, therefore, offer good evidence for demonstration theory. They show that speakers can quote anything they can recognizably demonstrate, from intonation and dialect to nonlinguistic actions of all sorts. They show how speakers decouple aspects of their quotations and treat each aspect as depictive, supportive, annotative, or incidental. And they reveal some of the aspects speakers can select for their quotation proper. These include aspects of delivery, language, speech acts, and nonlinguistic acts.

**5.** SELECTIVE DEPICTION IN WRITTEN QUOTATIONS. Written English is limited in what it can depict. Through its orthographic conventions, it can represent

[12] *Go* and *say*, however, appear to differ syntactically. One could ask 'What did he say?' Yet one would not ask 'What did the car engine go?' but rather 'How' or 'In what manner did the car engine go?' *Say* takes a direct object, but *go* takes a manner adverb.

[13] Examples 29 and 30 go against Hudson's claim (1985:249) that 'every part of the complement of *say* is a word'. Parts of the complements of *say* in 29 and 30 are not linguistic at all.

such things as sentences, words, phonetic segments, and some temporal and intonational information, but not tone of voice, voice pitch, nasality, many speech defects, singing, or gestures. Nor can it depict wolf whistles, belches, head nods, or faces. Of course, any aspect that cannot be demonstrated must then be described. Otherwise, the same principles apply to written quotations as to spoken ones.

**5.1.** DELIVERY. Aspects of delivery are difficult to depict in orthography, yet some do get depicted, as in these examples:

(32) 'Nothingth *changed*!' he yelled. 'By God, Thally, you're the meaneth, thtubborneth, bitchieth, mule-headedeth, vengefulleth cold-blooded therpent in the Thtate of Vermont.' [John Gardner, *October Light*]

(33) 'People mutht be amuthed. They can't be alwayth a learning, nor yet they can't be alwayth a working. They an't made for it' [Charles Dickens, *Hard Times*]

In 32 Gardner exploits spelling to depict a lisp caused by the lack of false teeth and italics to represent an accented word. Dickens does much the same in 33. Other devices for depicting delivery include: all capital letters for shouting; repeated vowels ('He's so-o-o picky') for lengthened sounds; and ellipses (...) for silences. Yet most aspects of delivery are impossible to represent. In 32, Gardner has to say rather than demonstrate that the man yelled. In print the quotation proper rarely refers to aspects of delivery.

**5.2.** LANGUAGE. The markedness principle applies to the way language, dialect, and register are handled in written quotations too. In most quotations, narrators speak in their own language, dialect, and register, treating them as supportive or incidental aspects. Yet they can also depict these aspects. One way is by giving an impression of the word choice and syntax of the dialects quoted. Dickens is a master of this technique, as illustrated in 33. So is Naipaul, as in this depiction of a Trinidadian English dialect:

(34) One day he said, 'Leela, is high time we realize that we living in a British country and I think we shouldn't be shame to talk the people language good.' [V.S. Naipaul, *The Mystic Masseur*]

Some authors work in phonological aspects as well, as here:

(35) 'How old are they, Roxy?'
'Bofe de same age, sir—five months. Bawn de fust o' Feb'uary.' [Mark Twain, *Pudd'nhead Wilson*]

(36) 'Mahnin, sweet-hot,' Lewis said, looking at her forehead as if afraid he might offend. [John Gardner, *October Light*]

(37) 'Held in a sorter castle. Just like a horror film, wonnit?' she said to Basil. 'Suits of armour and stuffed animals' heads and everyfink.' [David Lodge, *Nice Work*]

The narrators in 35 through 37 depict selected aspects of white and black Missouri dialects, a Vermont accent, and a Cockney accent. They do so for narrative purposes they could not otherwise achieve.

The source language can be dealt with in several ways too. Here is a con-

versation reported by Robert Louis Stevenson between some boating-men in Belgium (the first and third quotations) and Stevenson (the second and fourth):

(38) 'You must leave all your wet things to be dried.'
'O! *entre frères*! In any boat-house in ENGLAND we should find the same' (I cordially hope they might.)
'*En Angleterre, vous employez des sliding-seats, n'est-ce pas?*'
'We are all employed in commerce during the day; but in the evening, *voyez vous, nous sommes sérieux.*' [R. L. Stevenson, *An Inland Voyage*]

Although the conversation was in French, Stevenson depicted it in English (for his English readers), but not everywhere. When he did mark the language as French, it was to make a point, just as the markedness principle requires. Earlier, Stevenson had noted that the Belgians' talk 'was interlarded with English boating terms'. He left the talk about sliding-seats in French presumably to illustrate that point. There is a similar explanation for the French in the last quotation. When authors choose the language for a quotation, they must accommodate to their own and their audience's abilities. Yet, consistent with the markedness principle, they leave words untranslated when it serves a purpose.

How language is decoupled from other aspects of a speech event is even more complicated in full translations. Take these English translations of Thomas Mann:

(39) 'Ah, there you are at last, Hans,' said Tonio Kroger. [Thomas Mann, 'Tonio Kroger']

(40) Aschenbach answered: 'Yes, I am. But I only took the gondola to cross over to San Marco.' [Thomas Mann, 'Death in Venice']

(41) 'We wish you a pleasant sojourn,' he babbled, bowing and scraping. 'Pray keep us in mind. *Au revoir, excusez et bon jour, votre Excellence.*' [Thomas Mann, 'Death in Venice']

In 39 and 40, although the narration and quotation are in English, we assume they were originally in German. Yet we also assume that while Tonio Kroger spoke in German, Aschenbach spoke to the Venetian gondolier in Italian. In 41, however, we assume that 'Pray keep us in mind' was originally in Italian (though written in German by Mann and translated into English), but that the last sentence was originally in French. The narrator marked it as French to show not just that it was originally in French, but that the gondolier was being obsequious.

Narrators, and the writers behind them, have no qualms about decoupling the depictive aspects of a quotation from the language it is expressed in. Here are two very different examples:

(42) 'Lunch,' Edwards said to the slender native girl, using his hands. 'And bring the Thermos.' [Margaret Truman, *Murder in the CIA*]

(43) One day, when there was a good deal of kicking, my mother whinnied to me to come to her, and then she said: 'I wish you to pay attention to what I am going to say to you...' [Anna Sewell, *Black Beauty: The Autobiography of a Horse*]

In 42 the narrator depicts Edwards' requests to the deaf girl but renders Edwards' hand signals in English, making English a supportive aspect. And in 43 neither Black Beauty nor his mother, two fictional horses, spoke English, but 'whinnied' to each other. Still, Black Beauty, the narrator, depicts his mother's command in English, decoupling it from the language it was expressed in.

**5.3.** LINGUISTIC ACTS. For newspapers, magazines, and scholarly articles, the convention is ideally to depict the utterance produced and, thereby, the proposition originally expressed. The convention works well for quotations of written documents. Indeed, quoting poetry, such as e. e. cummings' lines, spelling, and punctuation, may demand even more. But it doesn't work well for quotations of spontaneous speech. Newspapers regularly 'clean up grammar' and 'take out profanities' (Anderson & Itule 1984:65, see Lehrer 1989), so that utterance acts and even parts of the locutionary content are treated as incidental.

It is also conventional in newspapers to depict speech, whatever its dialect and register, in the standard language and in a formal register. To do otherwise is to mark it for some purpose. So when the mayor of Washington, D.C., in 1990, was quoted in the *Los Angeles Times* as saying, for example, 'Jesse don't wanna run nothing but his mouth' in nonstandard dialect, he didn't deny the quotations, but complained (in a letter to the *Times*) that they were 'denigrating'. 'People who do not know me would think I leaped from the screen of the "Amos 'N' Andy Show".' The point is, the convention is to treat dialect and register as supportive and not depictive aspects of a quotation.

Linguistic acts other than locutionary acts and content expression, however, CAN be depicted in print. In many of our own citations we have tried to depict selected aspects of utterance acts. In 18, we show self repairs ('in– in Chile'), silent pauses ('.'), filled pauses ('um'), and interruptions ('[Ellen: industry]'). The transcription system devised by Gail Jefferson (see Atkinson & Heritage 1984) also includes overlapping speech, in-breaths, pause lengths, laughing, and some features of pronunciation; the one devised by Svartvik & Quirk (1980) includes tone groups, intonation, and pitch accents. In principle, many more aspects of speech performances can be depicted than is ordinarily done.

**5.4.** NONLINGUISTIC EVENTS. Written quotations can also depict nonlinguistic states, events, and processes (see Chapman 1984). These three examples depict nonlinguistic actions:

(44) a. The pounding of the cylinders increased: ta-pocket-pocketa-pocketa-pocketa-pocketa. [James Thurber, 'The Secret Life of Walter Mitty']

b. The room reeked of camphor. 'Ugf, ahfg,' choked Briggs, like a drowning man, for he had almost succeeded in stopping his breath under the deluge of pungent spirits. [James Thurber, 'The Night the Bed Fell']

c. Everywhere you went you could hear the awful *brrrppp-brrrpppbrrrppp* of their saws. [Charles McGrath, 'Id']

Although writers are free to create their own spellings, they are quite limited in the auditory effects they can depict. They can also depict certain visual states, as here:

(45) The notice is headed 'ONE DAY STRIKE—WED. JANUARY 15TH'. [David Lodge, *Nice Work*]

From 45 we infer that the headline was in all caps, that Wednesday was abbreviated 'Wed.', and that 'fifteenth' was written '15th'. But the quotation is still selective in what it depicts. We don't infer that the headline was typeset in the 10/12 Linotron Plantin that the Penguin book was typeset in.

To summarize, written quotations too divide into depictive, supportive, incidental, and, perhaps, annotative aspects. Typically, illocutionary acts are treated as depictive and most other aspects, by default, as incidental. But in the right circumstances, almost any aspect that can be represented in print can be treated as depictive.

**6.** SPECIALIZED QUOTATIONS. Not all quotations, we have noted, are speech reports embedded under *said*. Here we consider three types of specialized quotation—free indirect quotation, conventional sound quotations, and incorporated quotations—that differ considerably from prototypical quotations. Some aren't considered quotations at all. But we will argue that they are component demonstrations and therefore belong to the extended family of quotations.

**6.1.** FREE INDIRECT QUOTATION. It is often stipulated that quotations must take the vantage point of the source speaker (e.g. Li 1986). By vantage point we mean the I, here, and now from which the expressions are chosen—what Bühler 1982 called the *origo*. In 1, when Matt reports what the ant customer said, he chooses the words 'Well I'd like to buy an ant' from her vantage point and not his. But this stipulation is no more than that—a stipulation. If the vantage point can be a supportive aspect in demonstrations—and it can—then it should be able to play the same role in quotations. Quotations should be able to depict from a vantage point other than the source speaker's. Such quotations occur. One major variety has variously been called free indirect quotation, *style indirect libre, erlebte Rede*, free indirect style, free indirect discourse, narrated monologue, represented speech, and even independent form of direct discourse (see Banfield 1973, Cohn 1978, Curme 1922, Jespersen 1924, Ullmann 1957). We will use the term free indirect quotation.

Free indirect quotation contrasts with both direct and indirect quotation. Suppose June, a college president, asks Helen if she would be prepared to come into the college regularly, and Helen responds, 'Do you mean for lunch or dinner?' Later Helen can report the question to others in three ways:

Direct quotation: And I said 'Do you mean for lunch or dinner?' [I]

Indirect quotation: And I asked her whether she meant for lunch or dinner. [I]

Free indirect quotation: And I said #Did she mean for lunch or dinner?#

(We will mark free indirect quotations with #'s in place of quotation marks.)

These reports differ in vantage point. In the direct quotation, the vantage point is Helen's original one, and it dictates the choice of *you* and the present tense of *do*. In the indirect quotation, the vantage point is her current one, which leads to *she* and the past tense *meant*. In the free indirect quotation, the vantage point is also her current one, as reflected in *she* and *meant*, but the embedded clause is interrogative ('Did she ...') rather than an indirect question ('whether she ...'). As Jespersen (1924:292) noted, person, tense, and mood get shifted in both fully indirect and free indirect quotations, but questions, commands, and requests change form only in fully indirect quotation. These forms remain unchanged in free indirect quotation. Put differently, #Did she mean for lunch or dinner?# depicts the interrogative form of Helen's request; 'whether she meant for lunch or dinner' (along with *asked*) only describes it. Free indirect quotations demonstrate aspects of things that indirect quotations only describe.

Our proposal is this: free indirect quotations, like direct quotations, are demonstrations that are components of language use. It is just that free indirect quotations take the vantage point of the current instead of the source speaker. This proposal is consistent with demonstration theory. The vantage point of a quotation can be a supportive rather than a depictive aspect. When it is, the result is called a free indirect quotation.

Free indirect quotations aren't common in face-to-face conversation, but they do occur. Take these three examples, the first of which is the one we began with:

(46) a. and I said . #did she mean for lunch or dinner# – – and she said 'oh either' – – and I said 'well I ((would)) be' . you know . 'willing to come in every day for lunch' – – [Svartvik & Quirk 1980]

b. I'd given an example of Chaucer's visual description in The Knight's Tale and . in . thi – – Reeve's Tale – – #well what ((do)) I think the difference was# and I said '((well)) one was s . stylized description and the one was much more realistic description' – – #how did uh how would I explain this in literary terms# and I said '((well you've got a)) difference in literary kind you know the romance and the fabliau and so on' [Svartvik & Quirk 1980]

c. so we're stauning [i.e. standing], looking at this, when this wuman came along and said #what were we looking for# and 'we're looking for somewhaur to stay the night' 'Where do you come fae?' 'Scotland,' 'You're no feart of coming here withoot somewhere to stay,' so she gi'en us half a dozen addresses [Macaulay 1987:19]

Note that in 46a and 46b the passages marked as direct quotation may well be free indirect quotation, but it is impossible to tell. The same goes for the first direct quotation in 46c. These suggest that free indirect quotations are a close relative of direct quotations. Indeed, they often appear in stories where speak-

ers are moving from indirect to direct quotations. And, finally, consider this example with *go*:

(47) And he goes to her, he goes, #HE don't think she's gonna die. She's gonna live#. [Polanyi 1985:160]

Note that *go* accepts direct and free indirect quotations, but NOT indirect quotation; it cannot take *that*-clauses. This too shows the close kinship between direct and free indirect quotations.

Free indirect quotations are more common in novels, where they are generally used for representing the protagonist's thoughts (Cohn 1978):

(48) a. #The picture! How eager he had been about the picture! And the charade! And a hundred other circumstances; how clearly they had seemed to point at Harriet! ...# [Jane Austen, *Emma*]

b. She gazed toward the distant sea... And while she gazed her heart went pitapat. #Yes, it was her he was looking at and there was meaning in his look. His eyes burned into her as though they would search her through and through, read her very soul...# [James Joyce, *Ulysses*]

In many novels the narration moves easily in and out of free indirect quotation. If free indirect quotations such as these are demonstrations, they should also be able to depict intonation, emotion, dialect, and register. In commercial recordings of novels and short stories, we have heard professional readers add these aspects.

Two issues about vantage points have yet to be resolved. Why are direct quotations so much more common than free indirect quotations? Apparently, it is easier, more comprehensible, or more useful to take the source speaker's vantage point than the current speaker's. Also, why is the vantage point for a quotation almost always treated as a unified aspect of a quotation? Its parts could be decoupled, for example, into the I and here of the source speaker and the now of the current speaker, but they rarely are.

**6.2.** SOUND QUOTATIONS. English has many conventional expressions for quoting sounds, as illustrated here:

(49) a. And while she gazed her heart went pitapat. [James Joyce, *Ulysses*]

b. So we have these Trident 2 missiles fall down and go boom. Up they come out of the water, kablooey they go thereafter and the constituent elements fall into the ocean. [Jon Carroll, *San Francisco Chronicle*]

The onomatopoetic words *pitapat, boom*, and *kablooey* are used here to depict the sounds that hearts and missiles make. They appear with *go*, which is characteristic for quoting nonlinguistic sounds and actions. English has a remarkable number of such expressions. They cover animal sounds (e.g. *quack quack, cockadoodle doo, meow, moo*), inanimate sounds (*thud, clunk, clop, boom, choochoo, whir, hum*), repeated sounds (*dingdong, ting-a-ling, rat-a-tat-tat, ticktock*), and many other auditory phenomena.

How do these sound quotations work? When the narrator of 49 quotes a heart as going 'pitapat', he doesn't mean that it produced this sequence of sounds. Like all quotations, only some of its aspects—here, roughly its rhythm—are depictive of the heart's sound. The narrator could equally well have used *blugablug* or *boom-de-boom*. It is just that *pitapat* is a conventional way of depicting it. The rhythm of *pitapat* is the depictive aspect (the quotation proper), and the rest of its phonological features are merely supportive.

But sound quotations sometimes carry descriptive content as well. Imagine these examples as spoken:

(50) a. Murphy went 'knock, knock, knock, knock [spoken loudly and deliberately in a slow rhythm]' on the door, but I didn't answer. [I]

b. And we all went 'whisper whisper [whispering]' when he came into the room. [I]

c. I went 'chew chew [demonstrating difficulty chewing]' on my first mouthful—the meat was as tough as leather. [I]

The speakers of 50 are depicting selected aspects of a sound or action, but each depiction is carried by a verb that describes the action as well. In 50a the rhythm, timing, and loudness of the quotation are depictive, and the words *knock, knock, knock, knock* are supportive. The difference is that these words also DESCRIBE what Murphy did. Or consider this literary example:

(51) Then she walked off the lawn to the meadow whose corner to the right I can just see. Trail trail, went her long dress over the sopping grass. [E. M. Forster, *Howard's End*]

In our analysis, 'trail trail' is a quotation in which the rhythm is a depictive aspect and the term *trail* itself is a supportive aspect. But these words simultaneously describe what the dress did. So sound quotations can nevertheless include descriptive content.

**6.3.** INCORPORATED QUOTATIONS. Demonstrations can also be incorporated rather than embedded within serious actions. Suppose Michael wants to demonstrate to Susan the rhythm of the first two measures of a Chopin prelude. He can have her listen to him perform the prelude in a recital. So as he plays the first two measures, he is both (1) performing the prelude for his audience and (2) demonstrating the rhythm of the first two measures for Susan. This way his demonstration (2) is incorporated directly into his recital performance (1).

Demonstrations incorporated into language use are indeed called quotations. Compare these two utterances by Alice to Ben:

(52) a. You seem to forget the old saw 'Haste makes waste.' [I]

b. You seem to forget how 'haste makes waste.' [I]

In 52a, 'haste makes waste' is an embedded quotation, but in 52b it is an incorporated quotation. In 52a Alice merely depicts the proverb. In 52b, she depicts the proverb, but also she appropriates the words depicted as part of the assertion she is making (cf. Davidson 1984). So whereas the internal struc-

ture of the quotation is largely irrelevant in 52a, it isn't at all irrelevant in 52b. There the depicted words must have a structure that Alice can appropriate as part of the incorporating utterance. She could replace 'haste makes waste' by 'waste not want not' in 52a but not in 52b. In 52b, the words wouldn't fit the incorporating syntax.

With incorporated quotations, it often takes careful engineering to get the quotation to mesh with the incorporating utterance. Take these examples:

(53) a. Her actions are 'patterned on' a real limp but are 'seen by the participants to be something quite else,' a demonstration of a limp. [this paper, §2.1]

b. Acknowledging the legacy of the Enlightenment, Kolakowski cautioned against converting political commitments into moral principles, thus 'fabricate(ing) gods for an ad hoc use in a political power game.' [Program notes, 1990 Jefferson Lecture in the Humanities]

c. It wasn't until Franklin D. Roosevelt's second term that the clause in the Constitution to raise taxes 'to provide for the ... general welfare' was first construed by the United States Supreme Court, in a decision upholding the Social Security Act, as meaning what it said. [*New Yorker*]

d. Journalists in the United States 'risk little more than a snub or an uncomfortable moment should we encounter authorities we have offended,' Mary McGrory observes in her preface to 'Attacks on the Press 1989,' and most of them realize how lucky they are to be practicing their craft here. [*New Yorker*]

In 53a, we quoted the nonconstituent 'patterned on' instead of a longer passage precisely because it fit the assertion we wanted to make. In 53b the writer shows explicitly, by misspelling *fabricating* and adding the parentheses, how Kolakowski's words had been adapted for the assertion. In 53c, the writer omitted part of the quoted phrase to be able both to use the words depicted and to refer later to the phrase as abridged. But in 53d, the writer retained the *we* in the quotation (even though it conflicts with the *they* later in the utterance) apparently for the sake of accurate reporting. When there is a potential confusion, most writers will alter the original, placing the alteration in brackets.[14]

Although incorporated quotations come up in essays, scholarly reports, and news stories, they are rare in conversation. There are probably several reasons. Suppose Alice tells Ben 'Veronica mentioned that she was "sneaking out to" a movie "before Susan got back".' To get Ben to see precisely which words she is quoting she must mark them. Without devices like *he said*, she has to make precise use of intonation or voice, and that isn't easy. Also, incorporated quotations can only depict wording that can be appropriated into the syntax of the current utterance, and that severely restricts what can be quoted. They cannot, for example, be used for nonlinguistic actions or noises. And, finally,

[14] Pronouns sometimes remain unaccommodated in incorporated quotations like this, but tense, aspect, and mood rarely do, probably because unaltered they would be confusing.

it may be difficult in the press of conversation to plan an utterance that simultaneously depicts words and appropriates them syntactically and semantically.

Our proposal, then, is that incorporated quotations depict, but what they depict is simultaneously appropriated for use in the containing utterance. They both demonstrate and describe, which makes them unlike pure quotations. It also limits their use and, likely, makes them difficult to formulate.

**6.4.** HYBRID QUOTATIONS. Ultimately, quotations don't fall into neat categories. The essence of quotation is demonstrating something rather than describing it, and demonstrations come mixed with descriptions in hybrids of many forms. Take these examples:

(54) I kept up, and anxious not to lose him, I said hurriedly that I couldn't think of leaving him under a false impression of my—of my—I stammered. The stupidity of the phrase appalled me while I was trying to finish it, ... [Joseph Conrad, *Lord Jim*]

(55) To which Mr. Bailey modestly replied that he hoped he knowed wot o'clock it wos in gineral. [Charles Dickens, *Martin Chuzzlewit*]

Indirect quotations, as we have noted, are generally assumed to be purely descriptive. And yet in 54 the narrator depicts rather than describes the stammer of his original utterance. And in 55 the narrator depicts the sound, vocabulary, and grammar of Mr. Bailey's cockney (see Sternberg 1982). This type of hybrid is found in many forms (Coulmas 1985).

It is more common to use indirect quotation with CONCURRENT demonstrations. Contrast these two constructed examples:

(56) And then Mrs. Dewlap said that he [raising voice] COULD JUST WAIT FOR HIS TURN WITH THE REST OF THEM [lowering voice] and so he did. [I]

(57) And then Mrs. Dewlap said, [raising voice] 'Well, you can just wait for your turn with the rest of them,' [lowering voice] and so he did. [I]

In 56 the speaker, say David, demonstrates Mrs. Dewlap's yelling by raising his voice, even though he is describing what she says. In 57, in contrast, he demonstrates both as part of a single Gestalt. Note that he can demonstrate her yelling even without reporting the content of her speech, as here:

(58) And then Mrs. Dewlap [raising voice] YELLED AND SCREAMED AND HOLLERED [lowering voice] at William and so he decided to leave. [I]

David's demonstration of Mrs. Dewlap's voice in 56 and 58 are concurrent demonstrations in that they are performed in parallel with his description. In conversation there are many types of concurrent demonstrations, including iconic gestures (McNeill 1985, McNeill & Levy 1982), facial expressions, tone of voice, and nasality.

There are, in short, quotations that deviate from the prototypical embedded quotation. Free indirect quotations take the vantage point of the current speaker instead of the source speaker. Sound quotations depict, but with conventional

depictions. And incorporated quotations not only depict but appropriate what they depict into descriptions. In the end, there is no sharp division between expressions that depict and those that describe. Some do both.

**7.** FUNCTIONS OF QUOTATION. Over the years quotations have been credited with diverse functions, some even incompatible with each other (Sternberg 1982). If quotations are demonstrations, some functions should arise because demonstrations are nonserious actions and others because they depict rather than describe. We will label these two classes of functions DETACHMENT and DIRECT EXPERIENCE.

**7.1.** DETACHMENT. When speakers describe, they take responsibility for their wording except in opaque contexts. But when they quote, they take responsibility only for presenting the quoted matter—and then only for the aspects they choose to depict. The responsibility for the depicted aspects themselves belongs to the source speaker. So with quotations speakers can partly or wholly detach themselves from what they depict. That makes quotations useful for several purposes, including verbatim reproduction, dissociation of responsibility, and solidarity.

(i) VERBATIM REPRODUCTION. Suppose you want to represent a person's locutionary acts verbatim. If you use indirect quotation, your addressees cannot be sure what sentence really was uttered. The mapping from your words to the source sentence is undecidable. What you need is direct quotation. Even that isn't enough, since the locutionary act need not be a depictive aspect of the quotation. You must also say or imply that your wording is verbatim.[15] It is CONVENTIONALLY implied that the wording is verbatim in newspapers, law courts, and literary essays, but, as we later argue, not elsewhere.

(ii) DISSOCIATION OF RESPONSIBILITY. Many attitudes that are impolite or inappropriate for speakers themselves to express are quite acceptable in the mouths of others. For these, speakers can use direct quotation. Consider this narrative from a young Scots speaker:

(59) and –eh – when I was waiting on the milk eh– the farmer came oot and he says 'That you left the school noo Andrew?' say I 'It is' he says 'You'll be looking for a job' says I 'Aye' he says 'How would you like to stert here?' [Macaulay 1987:2]

As Macaulay suggested, the speaker, barely fourteen, used the direct quotation to show the farmer's respect for him, something it would have been presumptuous to say straight out. Quotations enable a speaker 'to convey information implicitly that it might be more awkward to express explicitly' (5).

[15] But consider this item from the *Oakland Tribune*, April 25, 1909:

> The following is exactly what his holiness, Pius X, said on Wednesday, April 12, to a delegation of the Union of Italian Catholic Ladies: 'After creating man, God created woman and determined her mission, namely, that of being man's companion, helpmeet and consolation ... How mistaken, therefore, is that misguided feminism which seeks to correct God's work.'

Is this 'exactly what Pius X said' if he spoke in Italian?

Speakers can also dissociate responsibility for the language used. People who wouldn't ordinarily utter taboo words can do so as long as they attribute them to others (Goffman 1974). Such a person could say *The boss said that I should get busy* or *The boss said, 'Move your ass'* but not *The boss said that I should move my ass*. The narrator of this next passage, Sherman, makes this point explicitly:

(60) 'I made a deal,' he said. 'I said, "Okay, I'll let you show your buddy how I set off the alarm, but you've got to do something for me. You've got to get me out of that fucking"'— he said *fucking* very softly, to indicate that, yes, he knew it was in poor taste but that under the circumstances the verbatim quote was called for—'"hog pen."' [Tom Wolfe, *Bonfire of the Vanities*]

(iii) SOLIDARITY. To quote is to depict only part of a more extended event. This property allows direct quotations to serve well in the expression of solidarity, or positive politeness (Brown & Levinson 1987:122):

> 'Where S [the speaker] is trying to stress common ground that he shares with H [the hearer], we would expect him to make only the minimal adjustment in point of view when reporting... Hence we would expect a preference for direct quotes with uninterpreted referring expressions, names, and so on, even where this may result in loss of clarity.'

When speakers demonstrate only a snippet of an event, they tacitly assume that their addressees share the right background to interpret it the same way they do. In essence, they are asserting, 'I am demonstrating something we both can interpret correctly,' and that implies solidarity.

**7.2.** DIRECT EXPERIENCE. Quotations also differ from descriptions in the experience they give addressees. When we hear an event described, we interpret the speaker's words and imagine the event described. But when we hear an event quoted, it is as if we directly experience the depicted aspects of the original event. We perceive the depictive aspects partly as we would the aspects they are intended to depict. So quotations should be useful for any purpose that is well served by such a direct experience.

(i) INEFFABILITY. Many things are easier to demonstrate than describe. Imagine trying to describe how to tie a shoe, parry a lunge in fencing, or knit purl. These you are almost forced to demonstrate. It is also generally easier to demonstrate: emotion, urgency, indecision, and sarcasm in tone of voice; gestures, facial expressions, or other body actions; level of formality; and disfluencies. If speakers and addressees try to minimize effort in communication, as generally assumed (Brown 1958, Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs 1986, Horn 1984, Levinson 1987), whether speakers describe or demonstrate an aspect should depend, all else being equal, on which is easier. Ineffability is a strong reason for quoting instead of describing.

(ii) ENGROSSMENT. Direct and indirect quotation contrast in whose perspective the addressees are to get ENGROSSED in. When Alice tells Ben, 'George said, "I've had it up to here [Alice raises her hand to her forehead] with this goddam job"', Ben is to experience part of what it would be like to hear George face to face. He is to get engrossed in George's actions and not hers. But when

Alice says, 'George said that he was really fed up with his job', Ben cannot see what it would be like to hear George face to face. He cannot get fully engrossed in George's actions. On the speaker's side, to demonstrate an event is to reenact or revivify it. On the addressee's side, to become engrossed in an event is to reexperience it vividly. This generally makes direct quotation more vivid than indirect quotation (see Tannen 1989).

Engrossment is crucial for novelists. If their goal is to engross readers in the characters' world, that might demand direct quotation. If it is to engross readers in the narrator's thoughts and actions, they should use indirect quotation. If it is to engross readers in a character's mental world but from the vantage point of an outsider, that would call for free indirect quotation. The best choice depends on a variety of rhetorical considerations (Cohn 1978, Sternberg 1982).

(iii) IMPOSSIBLE DEMONSTRATIONS. Some events are impossible to demonstrate in their entirety, yet speakers can depict some of their aspects. Thoughts cannot literally be put on display, yet are often the subject of quotation, as here:

(61) a. and I thought 'well I'll get it on Tuesday – it's a bit silly cos I need it' [Svartvik & Quirk 1980]
b. I thought 'well a . I'm not going to' – you know . 'produce any sort of – functional gaffes –' [Svartvik & Quirk 1980]
c. and I thought 'well you know life goes on in spite of these ladies' [Svartvik & Quirk 1980]
d. so I thought '[slapping his forehead] egads, this is really awful'

Are these four speakers claiming they actually said these words to themselves? Probably not. This is suggested by the use of 'you know' in 61b (see §8.3), and by the slap on the forehead in 61d, which is clearly not possible as part of a thought. The speakers were depicting only selected aspects of their thoughts—e.g., their plans, excuses, and sense of surprise—and they used the analogous speech events as supportive aspects.

Analogous speech events can be used as supportive aspects in demonstrating a variety of things, as these examples attest:

(62) a. A senator has to look the part. After all this is the world's most exclusive club. Senatorial body language says 'power.' Senatorial hair, flaring over the ears in authoritative gray waves, says, 'Put me on Nightline.' (*Roll Call*, 1987)
b. The problem is this guy [the speaker's ring finger] will say, 'I'm gonna curl,' and then this guy [the pinky] will say, 'Yeah, I'm gonna curl too!' But then it goes, 'Aaaaaugh!'
c. There's this damn ligament in the bottom of my foot that's saying, 'Screw you, Chris.'

Hair, pinkies, and ligaments don't talk. So speakers depict certain of their aspects by presenting analogous speech events and treating most of the linguistic acts merely as supportive aspects.

So people use quotations for purposes they can best achieve by demonstrating selective aspects of events. The principal uses of demonstrations, in turn,

follow from the fact that they are nonserious actions and selective depictions. We have examined only some of these uses.

**8.** VERBATIM REPRODUCTION. There is a long tradition of assuming that quotations are NECESSARILY verbatim reproductions of what is being quoted (Sternberg 1982). According to Bally (1914:422), direct quotation is 'a phonographic reproduction of the thoughts and words', and according to Lips (1926:34) it matters to the speaker 'that he reproduce exactly the words of the speaking subject, that he make a copy, so as to render them in substance and form'. For Genette (1980:172), a quotation must have 'literal fidelity' and 'documentary autonomy', and for Li (1986:40) it 'involves reproducing or mimicking the speech of the reported speaker'. What these and many other characterizations take for granted is the VERBATIM ASSUMPTION: in direct quotation 'the reporter commits himself to repeating the actual words spoken' (Leech 1974:353) or 'he commits himself to faithfully rendering form and content of what the original speaker said' (Coulmas 1985:42).

But almost every argument we have adduced for the demonstration theory is also an argument against the verbatim assumption. By our account, what speakers commit themselves to in a quotation is the depiction of selected aspects of the referent. Verbatim reproduction per se has nothing to do with it. The verbatim assumption has three principal defects. It rests on an undefined notion of verbatim reproduction. Whatever the definition, it doesn't allow for the selective depiction that is characteristic of quotation. And, more fundamentally, it is expressed in terms of linguistic structures (e.g. 'the actual words spoken'), and that is a category error. We will take up the three defects in turn.

**8.1.** WHAT IS VERBATIM REPRODUCTION? What would count as a verbatim reproduction, as 'reproducing or mimicking the speech' (Li), 'repeating the actual words spoken' (Leech), 'faithfully rendering form and content' (Coulmas), or producing 'the surface structure of the quoted sentence' (Partee 1973:418)? Take this actual utterance:

(63) I– I've only been– we've only been to like . four of his l– five of his lectures, right?

It might be reported in any of the following ways:

(64) a. Sidney says 'I– I've only been– we've only been to like . four of his l– five of his lectures, right?' [I]
b. Sidney says 'We've only been to, like, five of his lectures, right?' [I]
c. Sidney says 'We have only been to five of his lectures.' [I]

In 64a what is reproduced is the utterance issued, in 64b the sentence uttered, and in 64c the sentence uttered but in a more formal register. Which is the verbatim reproduction? By most of the criteria just mentioned (e.g. 'the actual words spoken'), it is 64a, although by the criterion 'the surface structure of the quoted sentence' it is 64b, and by newspaper conventions, it is 64c.

Spontaneous quotations rarely fit any of these patterns, even under ideal circumstances. Consider a study in which ten people each listened to 72 brief

tape-recorded exchanges (usually two sentences long) extracted from spontaneous conversations; immediately after each exchange, they reported what they had heard to a partner who hadn't heard it.[16] One exchange consisted of Sidney uttering 63 followed by Stan uttering *no we've been to more than that something like seven eight*. Here are four reports of the first half of that exchange:

(65) a. Sidney says . 'we've only been to what, five of his lectures?'
b. Sidney goes 'well you've only been to like . four or five of his lectures'
c. Sidney said 'well I've only been to like four or five of his lectures'
d. Sidney says 'oh I've only been to like . what . four . or five or something like that of his lectures'

Although the conditions are about as ideal as one gets for quoting verbatim, none of these quotations resembles 64a or 64c, and they all deviate from 64b. Of the 720 reports collected, none was precisely verbatim by any of the three criteria.

What were the speakers in 65 trying to do? One's impression is not that they were trying to get the words right. They were trying to give a general picture of or feel for what Sidney meant. They could accomplish this best in their own idiom or style. To reproduce Sidney's exact words would be to foreground the MANNER in which he formulated his utterance, and that wasn't their goal. Although 21 shows a speaker trying to depict manner of formulation, these examples are rare.

**8.2.** MEMORY. It is no surprise, of course, that speakers can't reproduce utterances verbatim. Empirical research shows that people can't recall an utterance word for word, even after a few seconds, without taking special pains to rehearse and memorize it (Isaacs 1989, Hjelmquist & Gidlund 1985, Lehrer 1989, Stafford & Daly 1984). People's performance is even worse when they try to reproduce not just the sentence uttered (as in 64b) but the utterance issued (as in 64a) with all its pauses and self-corrections (Martin 1971).

We suggest that speakers and addressees tacitly recognize this limitation. Consider an informal study in which people in everyday conversation were interrupted just after they had used a quotation.[17] They were asked to judge how close to the exact words they had got in their quotation and then to give their best guess of the exact wording. Most people judged that their quotation had NOT been verbatim, and their second versions usually differed from their first. Next consider these two quotations of the same event within a single telling of a story (from Polanyi 1989):

(66) a. I remember (chuckle) saying to myself 'there is a person over there that's falling to the ground' and that person was me

[16] Unpublished research by Herbert H. Clark and Jean Liittschwager. Other examples from this study are cited in 18 through 22.

[17] Unpublished data by Elizabeth Wade and Herbert H. Clark, with help from forty Stanford University undergraduates.

b. I said my a*ware*ness was such that that I said to myself 'gee wizz there's a *per*son over there, falling *down*' and that person was me

The speaker felt no need to indicate why the second quotation differed from the first, if she even noticed that it did, nor did her audience object to the change.

Speakers sometimes don't reproduce an utterance verbatim even when they could. In one experiment 16 people each memorized a brief scene from a movie (*Breakfast at Tiffany's*) until they could recite it perfectly word for word.[18] Eight of these people were then asked to recount the scene to a partner 'as accurately as possible', and, as expected, 99% of the words in their quotations were verbatim repetitions of the original. The other eight people were asked simply to tell the story of the scene to a partner. They produced verbatim quotations only 62% of the time. They seemed to accommodate their quotations to their ongoing narratives, to their own idiom or style, even if that meant violating verbatim reproduction. Clearly, they weren't committed to 'repeating the actual words spoken'.

**8.3.** REPAIRS. What speakers are committed to is also evident in their self-repairs. Self-repairs fall into several distinct types (Levelt 1989). Two of these are APPROPRIATENESS REPAIRS and ERROR REPAIRS. As illustration, imagine little Vivian trying to recite Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, and she begins:

(67) a. 'Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers'—you know 'our ancestors'—'brought forth ...' [I]

b. 'Fourscore and seven years ago our ancestors'—I mean 'our fathers'—'brought forth ...' [I]

c. 'Four score and seven years ago our ancestors'—you know 'our fathers'—'brought forth ...' [I]

(As all Americans know, the address goes 'Fourscore and seven years ago our FATHERS brought forth ...') The repair in 67a is an appropriateness repair: Vivian replaces one word or phrase with a more felicitous or interpretable one. The repair in 67b is an error repair: She replaces an incorrect word or phrase with the correct one. Now, appropriateness repairs can be signalled with *you know*, and error repairs with *I mean*, but not vice versa. As 67c shows, *you know* cannot be used for error repairs—e.g., repairs of verbatim reproduction. Its use in 67c would imply that Vivian was merely clarifying what *ancestors* meant.

If people are committed to verbatim reproductions, any repair they make in a quotation must be an error repair—a correction of a misquoted word. But consider these two quotations:

(68) a. Joe said 'how much' . you know 'guess what I paid for this?' [Svartvik & Quirk 1980]

b. but um . he said 'well you know I might get – um – terribly' .– you know 'I'm – I'm just hanging on now and . ((could take you on)) permanent((ly))' [Svartvik & Quirk 1980]

[18] Unpublished study by Elizabeth Wade and Herbert H. Clark.

In 68a the current speaker, say Irene, makes an appropriateness repair. After uttering *how much*, she doesn't use *I mean*, which would signal that the words being replaced were literally incorrect. She uses *you know*, which signals that she is looking for a more felicitous phrasing. (This *you know* is identifiable as hers and not Joe's by various means including intonation; compare the two *you know*'s in 68b.) But such a repair is impossible by the verbatim assumption. In a large sample of extemporaneous quotations we have examined, there were hundreds of such *you know*'s, and they occurred about eight times as often as *I mean*. Even though these narrators had trouble producing their quotations, surely they were competent in the use of *you know* and *I mean* for making their repairs.

The argument, then, is this. Speakers do run into problems formulating and uttering quotations. In dealing with the problems, they often make appropriateness repairs. But it is contradictory for speakers to be committed to verbatim reproduction and yet make appropriateness repairs. Hence speakers aren't generally committed to reproducing utterances verbatim.

**8.4.** LANGUAGE USED. All of the verbatim criteria mentioned, from 'the actual words spoken' to 'the surface structure of the quoted sentence', predict that translated quotations are impossible. The point is made explicit by Goodman 1978, who invented these three reports of Jean uttering a French sentence:

(69) a. Jean a dit 'Les triangles ont trois bords.'
b. John said 'Les triangles ont trois bords.'
c. John said 'Triangles have three sides.'

According to Goodman (following Church 1950), 69a is properly translated into English as 69b but not as 69c, 'which incorrectly reports Jean as having uttered a sentence of English' (53). This follows from Goodman's version of the verbatim assumption: 'The relation required in direct quotation between what is quoted and what is contained is syntactic identity ... or syntactic replication—sameness of spelling' (43).

Quotations like 69c, however, are common and entirely acceptable:

(70) a. 'Well met, captain,' he said, quietly, in German. 'Where are you bound to this time?' [Erskine Childers, *The Riddle of the Sands*]
b. 'Seignior,' said I, with as much Spanish as I could make up, 'we will talk afterwards; but we must fight now; if you have any strength left, take this pistol and sword, and lay about you.' [Daniel Defoe, *Robinson Crusoe*]

Although the quotations in 70 are explicitly marked as translations, many others aren't. And although these are marked, they aren't in any sense 'literal' translations[19] or 'the surface structure of the quoted sentence'. In 70a what German expression is 'well met' a translation of? And in 70b what pidgin Spanish did Crusoe make up? Narrators rarely intend us to be able to reconstruct

[19] According to the *American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, LITERAL means 'word for word; verbatim: *a literal translation*' and VERBATIM means 'using exactly the same words; word for word.'

the originals verbatim (see also ex. 42). No matter how we view translated quotations, it is sheer philosophical imperialism to rule them out as unacceptable or incorrect reports, as Goodman and Church do, or to consider them 'literal' or 'the actual words spoken', as others would have to do. It is hard to avoid the more obvious conclusion that the verbatim assumption is incorrect.

**8.5.** SELECTIVITY IN QUOTATIONS. In the demonstration theory, speakers depict only selective aspects of what they are demonstrating. Recall the mother in 7 who quotes her child as saying 'Oh but I DO believe in fairies.' She could have depicted any number of aspects—the utterance issued, sentence uttered, propositional content, slowed speed, increased volume, tremulousness, giggling, facial expressions, accompanying gestures, and other aspects—and in any combination. The verbatim assumption, in effect, grants a privileged status to the sentence uttered (or, perhaps, the utterance issued) and claims that it is what speakers are committed to providing. But as we have argued, speakers can be committed to depicting any combination of aspects. No one of them is privileged.

In the demonstration theory, indeed, when speakers quote what someone said, they don't have to depict the sentence uttered at all and often don't. We have documented the point with a wide range of examples: (1) translated quotations, as in 15, and 38–43; (2) changed dialect, as in 16; (3) changed register, as in 17; (4) uses of *blah blah blah*, as in 22–24; (5) uses of such stand-ins as *so and so*, as in 25; (6) the demonstration of the rolled R in 26; (7) the rhetorical device called marking, as in 27; (8) sound quotations, as in 49–51; (9) quoted thoughts, as in 61; (10) impossible demonstrations, as in 62; and, in our analysis, (11) free indirect quotations, as in 46–48. The verbatim assumption seems impossible to retain in the face of these counterexamples.

**8.6.** NONLINGUISTIC QUOTATIONS. The verbatim assumption makes a category error altogether. As we have argued, quotations deal in depictions of things, not in linguistic expressions. The difference is crucial.

Nonlinguistic quotations pose one problem. For these what could it possibly mean to 'repeat the actual words spoken' or to produce 'the surface structure of the quoted sentence'? There are no words, no surface structures, for the car sound, rude gesture, wolf whistle, and belch in 28, for *ta-pocketa, ugf, ahfg*, and *brrrpppbrrrpppbrrrppp* in 44, and for the boy demonstrating how he hit his head on the lamppost in 31. There is a problem even for standard speech reports. The verbatim assumption would exclude Kate's gestures from 14, the mother's whispering, tremulousness, and giggle from 7, and such voice qualities as 'sobbing,' 'innocent voice,' and '"bored" voice' from the physician's story. Even if nonlinguistic sounds ARE accepted as verbatim reproductions, the assumption would still do violence to examples like this (from an eight-year-old boy):

(71) I want one of those tools that 'zzzz' [while demonstrating with his hands holding on to an imaginary jiggling jackhammer].

To separate off the boy's sound from the rest of his action and deem it alone to be the quotation would clearly distort what the boy was really doing.

**8.7.** CONVENTIONS FOR WRITTEN QUOTATIONS. The verbatim assumption, we suggest, comes from the 'written language bias' of linguistics and philosophy (Linnell 1982). In scholarly writing, as we have noted, the Western convention at least is to quote other written work verbatim. That is possible only because there are permanent artifacts writers can consult. The preoccupation with verbatim reproduction, hence with plagiarism, has only been around since the invention of printing and the availability of written documents (Eisenstein 1979:122). It was impossible to apply the same standard to written quotations of spoken language until the invention of the audio recorder. Even today the standard is hardly clear when newspapers expunge speech errors, clean up grammar, and standardize dialect.[20]

The primary site of language use, of course, is face-to-face conversation. That is where, in every culture, quotation evolved and it is still most commonly used. Now in the time pressure of conversation, speakers have to formulate quotations quickly and without checking memory closely, and the result is quotations replete with repetitions, incompletenesses, restarts, and other inaccuracies. Speakers realize their quotations are inaccurate, yet are perfectly happy to use them for all sorts of purposes. How could they if they were committing themselves each time to verbatim reproduction? That is simply not plausible. We know of no evidence that speakers in conversation are so committed, and the evidence just reviewed argues that they are not.

**9.** ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF QUOTATION. The demonstration theory of quotations has its forebears, and we are now in a position to evaluate them. It most closely resembles Davidson's demonstrative theory and Wierzbicka's dramaturgical theory of quotation, though it differs fundamentally from both. It contrasts most sharply with the traditional mention theories of quotation. Let us look briefly at these alternative theories.

**9.1.** MENTION THEORY. The classical account is that a quotation is the mention rather than the use of an expression (e.g. Church 1964, Quine 1951). Suppose Alice utters:

(72) On Tuesday George said 'I'm sad'. [I]

She isn't using the expression *I'm sad* to say that she is sad. She is merely mentioning it. And just as her statement is false if she names the wrong day George spoke on, it is also false if she mentions the wrong expression—if, for example, George had really uttered 'I'm unhappy.' In a common linguistic version of mention theory (e.g. Coulmas 1986), Alice is uttering another token of the same sentence that George had originally uttered a token of, namely *I'm sad*. Her assertion would be false if he had uttered a token of some other sentence.

[20] In written language, the use of quotation marks doesn't bear a one-to-one relation to quotations as we have characterized them. Nunberg 1990 argues that the category of thing within quotation marks 'indicates that its linguistic content is to be construed as produced in a different context from that of the production of the embedding text'. But not all quotations are enclosed in quotation marks.

Although mention theory has many virtues, it has serious deficiencies (see, e.g., Davidson 1984). For us the most obvious is that it makes the verbatim assumption, and so the evidence we have offered against the verbatim assumption is also evidence against mention theory. Still, mention theory assumes, as Quine 1969 says, that a quotation 'designates its object not by describing it in terms of other objects, but by picturing it'. 'When we quote a man's utterance directly,' Quine says, 'we report it almost as we might a bird call. However significant the utterance, direct quotation merely reports the physical incident' (219). But precisely what it pictures, and how it does so, are problematic or unspecified (Davidson 1984). In particular, it makes no provision for depicting only selected aspects of the 'physical incident', nor does it say what sort of thing the act of picturing is.

**9.2.** DEMONSTRATIVE THEORY. For Davidson, quotation is a species of demonstrative reference. Take these two sentences:

(73) a. Mary said, 'I like hot baths'. [I]
b. Mary said this: I like hot baths.

When Alice utters 73a, she is really saying something like 73b in which the word *this* is 'supplemented with fingers pointing to the token' of *I like hot baths*. For Davidson, the demonstrative reference in 73a is carried by the quotation marks. 'What appears in quotation marks is an INSCRIPTION', and it is what is pointed at. So in 73a the demonstrative reference (carried by the quotation marks) is part of the utterance, but what it points at (the inscription *I like hot baths*) is not. As Davidson says, 'if I say "I caught a fish this big" or "I caught this fish today", my hands, or the fish, do not become part of the language' (90).

Despite the similarity of names, Davidson's demonstrative theory is fundamentally different from ours. For him, 'quotation is a device for pointing to inscriptions (or utterances)' (91), so it is a type of indication. But we have argued that indicating is distinct from demonstrating: indicating locates things, whereas demonstrating depicts them. The crucial difference lies in the status of what appears in the quotation marks. For Davidson, it is an inscription. Now the inscription 'pictures' the expression being referred to,[21] but Davidson doesn't say how it does that. Inscriptions are static objects outside of language, like the fish he points at when he says *I caught this fish today*. In our theory, what appears in quotation marks is quite unlike a dead fish. It is a demonstration, a communicative act on a par with indicating and describing. And our theory tries to say what sort of communicative act it is and how it depicts.

**9.3.** DRAMATURGICAL THEORY. According to Wierzbicka 1974, quotations are imaginary speech performances. 'The person who reports another's words by quoting them temporarily assumes the role of that other person, "plays his part," that is to say, imagines himself as the other person and for a moment behaves in accordance with this counter-factual assumption' (272). In direct

[21] Davidson, however, makes the verbatim assumption—that what is pictured is an 'expression' and that the criterion for truth is that the expression be the correct one.

quotation, as Wierzbicka put it, the speaker 'does not say what the content of the quote is (i.e., what was said)—instead he does something that enables the hearer to SEE for himself what it is, that is to say, in a way, he *shows* this content.'[22]

The dramaturgical theory has much going for it. It treats quotations as nonserious actions and assumes they depict utterances as a way of enabling the hearer 'to SEE for himself' what the source speaker said. Still, it is committed to the verbatim assumption and therefore makes no provision for the selectivity of quotations, a central feature of all quotations.[23]

**10.** CONCLUSIONS. When people communicate, they have three fundamentally different devices at their disposal. They can describe. They can indicate, or point. And they can demonstrate. Language use is generally investigated as if it were entirely description. Although speakers often point when using a demonstrative reference like 'that man' or 'here', that is passed off as a mere accompaniment to description. As for demonstrating, it has no role at all. But if quotations are demonstrations, then demonstrating is an essential part of language use, and no account of language use can be complete without it.

Our proposal is that quotations are a type of demonstration. Demonstrations differ from descriptions and indications in two main ways. They are nonserious actions. And they depict their referents, though only selectively. It follows, then, that quotations too are nonserious actions and selective depictions. It also follows that speakers aren't necessarily committed to trying to reproduce a source utterance verbatim. The evidence provided bears out these claims.

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[22] For Wierzbicka, quotations are like but not identical to demonstrations, for she assumed that *say* takes linguistic quotations and *go* takes nonlinguistic gestures and noises. But as we have noted, the two distributions overlap, so the contrast is spurious.

[23] In particular, Wierzbicka's theory disallows free indirect quotation, since it always has the current speaker playing the source speaker's part.

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[Received 26 September 1989;
revision received 11 July 1990;
accepted 22 July 1990.]