Security: Network Attacks

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Network Attacks

- "man in the middle" threat model
- Attacker has access to network communication between browser and server

- Passive attacks:
  - Eavesdrop on network traffic

- Active attacks:
  - Inject network packets
  - Modify packets
  - Reorder, replay packets
  - Block packets
Cryptography to the rescue

- **Solution**: use encryption to prevent eavesdropping and detect active attacks.
  - Old idea: Scramble the information before transmitting it, unscramble when received

- **Traditional encryption**: keys guide scramble/unscramble
  - Symmetric keys (same key on both ends)
  - Key distribution problem: how can we exchange keys without meeting in person?

- **Public-key encryption helps with the key distribution problem**
  - Each principal (user, program, etc.) has two encryption keys, one public, one secret
  - Information encrypted with one can only be decrypted with the other.
    - Encrypt with public key: Only principle can access
    - Encrypt with secret key: Know that it comes from principle

- **Public-key encryption is slower than symmetric encryption**
  - Use public-key to exchange symmetric key
How to find the public key for a particular server?

Can't just ask it for its public key?

Don't know if the entity we're asking is really the server we want!

**Certificate authority**: well-known, trusted server that certifies public keys.

**Certificate**: a document encrypted with the secret key of a certificate authority

- Identifies a particular service along with its public key
Certificate authorities

- Certificate authorities establish selves as well known services on Internet
  - Browsers hard-wired to accept certificates from dozens of authorities
- Internet services compute keys, gives the public key to a certificate authority along with proof of identity
- Certificate authority returns a certificate for that service
- Service can pass along this certificate to browsers
  - Browser can validate the certificate came from the certification authority and see who the certification authority thinks the browser is talking to.
- Trust: Browser trusts to certification authority
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) & Transport Layer Security (TLS) - HTTPS

- Protocol used for secure communication between browsers and servers
- Browser uses certificate to verify server's identity
- Only one way: SSL/TLS does not allow the server to verify browser identity
- Uses certificates and public-key encryption to pass a secret session-specific key from browser to server
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) & Transport Layer Security (TLS) Overview

Browser

Random key $K$

Server

client-hello

server-hello + $\{\text{server-cert}\}SK_{CA}$

Key Exchange (Several options)

client-key-exchange: $\{K\}PK_{Server}$

$\{\text{HTTP data}\}K$
Excuses for not using HTTPS for all Web traffic?

- Expensive: slows down web servers - more cycles per connection
  - Can now offload to networking hardware

- Breaks in-the-middle web page caching

- Today over 90% of HTTP traffic uses HTTPS
  - Industry moving to "HTTPS Everywhere"
Problem: SSL stripping

- Common use pattern: user browses site with HTTP, upgrades to HTTPS for checkout.
- Active network attacker interposes on communication
- When server returns pages with HTTPS links, attacker changes them to HTTP.
- When browser follows those links, attacker intercepts requests, creates its own HTTPS connection to server, and forwards requests via that.
- As a result, the attacker sees all client packets (e.g., passwords).
- Browser provides feedback to user about whether HTTPS is in use, but most users won't notice the difference.
Problem: Mixed content

- Main page loaded with HTTPS, but some internal content loaded via HTTP (e.g. `<script src="http://.../script.js">`).
  - Network attacker can modify content to attack page.

- Some browsers help to notify users:
  - IE7: displays dialog for user, doesn't show SSL lock.
  - Firefox: displays lock icon with "!"
  - Chrome: did show warning, now just shows same as HTTP

- Common developer error: over-specified URLs:
  - `<script src="http://www.site.com/library.js">`
  - Instead, don't specify explicit protocols (or even site):
    - `<script src="/library.js">`
Problem: "Just in time" HTTPS

- Login page displayed with HTTP
  - Form posted with HTTPS
  - Appears secure but it isn't:
    - Active attack corrupts login page (send password someplace else during form post)
    - SSL stripping during form post: nothing indicates that the actual connection didn't use SSL

- Solution: before server returns HTML for login page, check for HTTPS; if page fetched via HTTP, redirect to the HTTPS version
Problem: Bad certificate

- If a certificate is bad/unknown, browser issues warning dialog:
  - Most users can't understand, so they just click OK.
  - Some browsers warn repeatedly, but users will still just click through.
  - This enables various network attacks.
Chrome (after Bad Certificate Warning)
Bad Certificate Warning - Safari

This Connection Is Not Private

This website may be impersonating “192.168.0.1” to steal your personal or financial information. You should go back to the previous page.

Safari warns you when a website has a certificate that is not valid. This may happen if the website is misconfigured or an attacker has compromised your connection.

To learn more, you can view the certificate. If you understand the risks involved, you can visit this website.
Bad Certificate Warning Details - Safari

Certificate
Root certificate authority
Expired: Friday, November 15, 2019 at 8:48:38 AM Pacific
Standard Time
This root certificate is not trusted

Details

Subject Name: iVolve
Country or Region: US
State/Province: TX
Locality: Dallas
Organization: iPhotonix
Common Name: iVolve
Email Address: support@iphotonix.com

Issuer Name
Country or Region: US
State/Province: TX
Locality: Dallas
Organization: iPhotonix
Common Name: iVolve
Email Address: support@iphotonix.com