Jenny Chen
EDGE
Bruce Lusignan (Monday, 10AM Section)
Iraq Oil-for-Food Program
[i]
As the United States ramps up its efforts to maintain peace and safety in the world, biased views dominate the media. Saddam Hussien, presented as a tyrant and oppressor of his people, is the target of blame for Iraq’s economic collapse. How can Americans and Europeans be certain that this Iraqi leader is the one to blame? In the international realm, a balanced story is hard to find.
In the news, attention has been given to United Nations humanitarian programs for Iraq, especially the Oil-for-Food Program. By analyzing the history, three endogenous obstacles in the program, and the opposing attitudes toward United Nations sanctions, one can better analyze the Program breakdowns. New proposals for revising the sanctions in combination with the changing international dynamic allow us to suggest policy improvements instead of simply blaming the scapegoat. Through international cooperation, the U.N. and Iraq can agree on a solution that makes at least one party better off and no one worse off. The breakdowns are best understood after examining the nature of the program and sanctions.
Background and Oil-for-Food Program Structure
During the 1980s and 1990s, Iraq experienced two major wars including the Iran-Iraq and the Kuwait War. These in combination with a decade of economic sanctions left the resource rich country decimated and economically shattered. Iraq’s gross domestic product (GDP) has fallen significantly as compared to before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In August 1990, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 661, imposing comprehensive sanctions on Iraq following the country’s invasion of Kuwait.[1]
Resulting from the sanctions, the Secretary-General inter-agency mission assessed the humanitarian condition in Iraq noting, “Iraqi people may soon face a further imminent catastrophe, which could include epidemic and famine, if massive life-supporting needs are not rapidly met.”[2]
In 1991 to mitigate the post war damages, the United Nations proposed a program that allowed Iraq to sell limited quantities of oil to help meet its people’s needs. On April 14, 1995, under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council adopted resolution 986 which established this program, named the “Oil-for-Food” program. The resolution was detailed to be a “temporary” measure until Iraq fulfilled the relevant Security Council resolution. [3]
At the start of the program, Iraq was allowed to sell $2 billion worth of oil every six months, with two-thirds used to meet its humanitarian needs. In 1998, the Security Council raised oil exports to $5.26 billion every six months, and 1999 the ceiling was completely removed. Of the total oil revenues, 25% goes to the Compensation Fund for war reparation payments; 2.2% covers the United Nations administrative and operational costs for administering the program; and 0.8% is allocated to the weapons inspection program.
The program has expanded beyond its initial scope of food and medicine to infrastructure rebuilding. Through this approach the program allows for not only remedial solutions but also future growth. While Iraq has not used full capacity of the program, some $25 billion worth of humanitarian supplies and equipment have been delivered to the country, including $1.5 billion worth of oil industry spare parts and equipment. [4] The Oil-for-Food program now covers 24 sectors: food, food-handling, health, nutrition, electricity, agriculture and irrigation, education, transport and telecom-munications, water and sanitation, housing, settlement rehabilitation (internally displaced persons – IDPs), demining, special allocation for especially vulnerable groups, and oil industry spare parts and equipment. The Government of Iraq also introduced the following 10 new sectors in June 2002: construction, industry, labor and social affairs, Board of Youth and Sports, information, culture, religious affairs, justice, finance, and Central Bank of Iraq. [5]
United Nations Sanctions
The Oil-for-Food program was meant to serve as temporary relief for the Iraqi people, yet over ten years later the program is still in existence. The United Nations sanctions have crippled the economic well being of Iraq because until Iraq meets the outlined requirements of resolution 687, the sanctions will not be lifted. The international community increasingly views the sanctions as “illegitimate and punitive.”[6] Reports documenting humanitarian suffering and possible violations of international humanitarian laws cast doubt on the sanctions’ effectiveness and legitimacy. The sanctions were originally used as an unethical, nonviolent policy tool, but it has failed to achieve its ultimate policy goals. Although Iraq has disarmed its weapon’s supplies since the institution of the sanctions, the adverse effects continue to harm the Iraqi people who are rendered vulnerable and powerless.
The U.N. sanctions were first outlined in Resolution 661 in which the Security Council demanded that all U.N. states and non-U.N. states restrict imports of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait.[7] Additionally, states are not to make funds available for commercial, industrial, or public utility undertakings in Iraq or Kuwait with the exception of medicine or foodstuffs. In Resolution 687, sanctions were further outlined with specific requirements for the war-ravaged Iraq. The first provision requires Iraq to accept deployment of the United Nations observer to monitor demilitarized zones in both Kuwait and Iraq. Also, the resolution demands that under international supervision, Iraq unconditionally accept the destruction or removal of various items including ballistic missiles, chemical and biological weapons. Further, Iraq shall surrender the location of the weapons and items listed above. As a preventative measure, Iraq should unconditionally agree to nuclear missions inspections and prohibit obtaining nuclear weapons. Lastly, the Security Council requested that Iraq return Kuwait lands and abandon all terrorism support.[8]
While compliance with these sanctions would adequately restrain Iraq from engaging in nuclear warfare, policy makers overstep rational and feasible bounds. From an economic standpoint, rebuilding a devastated country without full trade capacity would be impossible. Since all states, both U.N. and non-U.N. partners, were requested to prohibit trade with Iraq, the only possible commerce would have to be generated from within. Having experienced two decades of warfare in addition to the totalitarian Saddam Hussein regime, Iraq has poor internal infrastructure and few resources to facilitate economic growth. The United Nations is asking Iraq to undertake its own rehabilitation without adequate support; even the United States could not stay afloat without international trade. Thus the sanctions press unreasonable and politically unjust stipulations.
The three main endogenous factors that contribute to the breakdown of the Oil-for-Food program include (1) the tedious application and monitoring process, (2) the misuse of the compensation fund, and (3) the poor oil industry infrastructure. We first cover the monitoring process and discuss the actual process, dual use items, and smuggling.
Monitoring Process
Under resolution 1409, the Security Council outlines the new procedures and provisions for monitoring the Oil-for-Food Program. The resolution introduced the Good Review List (GRL), under which only certain goods are permissible to import to Iraqi. Previously, the majority of contracts for humanitarian supplies were circulated to the Security Council's Sanctions Committee for approval, but under the new procedures only contracts that contain GRL items would be sent to the 661 Committee for consideration. The 18-step process begins when the supplier nation submits an application detailing complete technical specifications, outlining contracts, and indicating whether items are listed in the GRL as they relate to military products.[9]
Once submitted and reviewed by the Office of Iraq Program, the application undergoes comprehensive examination by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). During this time, additional information may be requested to fully determine if the requests are military related commodities, products covered under the GRL, or qualify as dual-use items. Should the supplier nation fail to submit additional data in 90 days, the application will be put on hold indefinitely as “supplier-inactive.” Should the board approve the application, additional steps must be taken to relay the decision to the Government of Iraq, the Nation supplier, and the escrow bank account. All these procedures could take over a year to complete and at least a few months.
As of September 30, 2002, the Office of Iraq Program had received over $45.6 billion worth of contracts, of which $37.4 billion had been approved and $3.2 billion put on hold by the 661 Sanctions Committee.[10] As a whole, over 94% of all requested Oil-for-Food goods have been approved with $8.9 billion worth of humanitarian items for the Iraqi people. No holds were placed on food and medicine.[11] The 6% of goods, which are on hold, include contracts for dual-use items that Iraq can use to rebuild its military capabilities. In other cases, holds are placed on contracts submitted by firms with a record of sanctions violations.
Despite favorable statistics for the Oil-for-Food program, several problems arise with the review process. Each billion worth of supplies that is put in hold significantly stunts the development and growth of the nation. The U.S. Department of the State claims that, “Iraq usually delays submission to the U.N. of the list of goods it wants to order during each six-month phase of the oil-for-food program until the last minute. In this way it tries to sneak in proscribed items by forcing the U.N. either to halt the flow of oil-for-food goods or to approve dubious contracts.” [12] While this tactic seems plausible, these are flimsy grounds for prolonging application approval. Although there is a need to be thorough, humanitarian goals must be weighed against goals of weapons control. In addition to the lengthy application process, the absence of cash constrains Iraq’s ability to control the flow of goods into the country. Without a quick, flexible means to pay for goods, supplier nations have another reason to not supply to Iraq. Lastly, the labeling of goods as permissible, military weapons, or dual use goods is often controversial.
Dual Use Items
Dual use items are defined as items that may have both a legitimate civilian use and a potential military use in a prohibited nuclear, chemical, biological, ballistic missile or conventional military program. A recent example of a dual-use application was a request for automatic injectors for atropine chemicals, which “have no possible civilian use and could only be used in a chemical warfare situation,” U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte said. “The injectors were not on the goods review list.” [13] Other items were militarily significant quantities of atropine, global positioning system jammers, and radio intercept and direction finding equipment. While many of these products may serve dubious purposes, several other cases argue the other side.
A number of contracts that include control instrumentation which are necessary for the “efficient and safe” operation of control rooms in pumping stations, degassing plants and crude oil treatment facilities are currently on hold "pending further technical evaluation.” These goods are crucial to ensuring that other major equipment is operated within the manufacturers’ recommendations to avoid damage[14]
While dual use items that are put on hold prevent shipment of the actual product, these products are also the building blocks of infrastructure projects. A recent review of circulated contracts in both Phases IV and V reveal a number of examples where some goods have been approved while other complementary goods necessary to complete projects are "on hold.” [15] One basic example is approved and delivered pipes that are waiting for fittings; another case is welding units and heavy equipment necessary for site preparation that are currently on hold. As a result of these “on hold” items, projects cannot be completed because of integral parts that are missing. Further, the contracts are often abandoned or cancelled by the purchaser.
A Middle East economic survey summarizes the obstacles that Iraq faces: “objectionable bureaucracy in the way that contracts are submitted, delays in preparing letters of credit, late arrival of goods, and an accumulation of money allocated for UNSCOM.”[16] Another issue that the UK and the U.S. take up with Iraq is the alleged illegal sale of oil by Iraq.
Fear of Smuggling
The U.N. often announces suspicion that Iraq is either diverting revenues from the program or smuggling oil for goods outside the program for use by the Government of Iraq. The UK government has claimed that the Government of Iraq diverts resources that it imports under the Oil-for-Food scheme thus exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. The smuggling scheme they hypothesize is used to supplement the wealth of a small elite or to sustain poverty for propagandistic reasons. [17] Although there is a lack of reliable data, it has been estimated that Iraq receives $1-2 billion a year for illegally sold oil. The Western powers claim that they have turned a blind eye on the unofficial trade between Iraq and bordering counties because they realize that many, primarily Turkey and Jordan, have suffered from the sanctions. To prevent massive opposition of the sanctions, they have tolerated underground smuggling. Though this approach, the UK and U.S. are not dealing with the true problem. Instead of allowing unofficial trade, perhaps a more efficient, transparent, and flexible way of trading goods should be adopted. Working with Iraq, Turkey, and Jordan to increase efficient trade would dissolve the problem and allow the UN to better monitor the trade of goods.
This solution would require the cooperation of states sharing a land border with Iraq. The solution should persuade these states by offering them Oil-for-Food revenues to assist them in improving border monitoring, and assuring them 150,000 barrels of imported petroleum and petroleum products per day.[18]
Compensation Fund
Another obstacle facing the Iraqi recovery through the Oil-for-Food Program is the Compensation Fund. While UN countries complain that Oil-for-Food revenues are being diverted to a small elite, Iraq can similarly complain that revenues for the Oil-for-Food Program are disproportionately allocated to the Compensation Fund. After the Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council held Iraq responsible for economic damages and loss resulting from the war. Consequently, the United Nations Compensation Committee (UNCC) was set up to oversee the compensation claims, and 30% of the of the Iraq Oil-for-Food program was paid to the Compensation Fund. Most recently, the procedures in which claims are processed and the amount paid to the Fund are being questioned.
According to a recent U.N. Secretary-General, at the end of 2000, $10.5 billion of Iraq’s revenues from the Oil-for-Food Program had been diverted to the UNCC. Of this amount, $175 million went to pay “operating expenses” of the UNCC such as lawyers’ fees. In contrast, the U.N. estimated the total value of humanitarian good to be $9.8 [19] billion. Some critics have renamed the program quite appropriately, “Oil for-Compensation.”
Realizing the disproportionate amount of revenue going to compensation, the Security Council passed the 1330 resolution, which reduced the amount of compensation to 25%. The extra $.5 billion earned in phase IX was "to be used for strictly humanitarian projects to address the needs of the most vulnerable groups in Iraq.”[20]
The reallocation of money makes clear the direct tradeoff between war reparations and humanitarian efforts. The resolutions for the Compensation Fund seem unreasonable given the current state of Iraq. In 2000, the UNCC required Iraq to pay $15.9 billion in damages to the Kuwaiti Petroleum Corporation. The nature of the claims is dubious since they involve billions of dollars made to fairly large corporations; revenues used for food for Iraqi people are increasing shifted toward entrepreneurs and people with power. These exorbitant amounts of money have put Iraq in deep debt even though the country can hardly sustain its own people much less the people of Kuwait. If the U.N. prioritizes the growth of Iraq, perhaps only 10% of the Oil-for-Food Program revenues should be used for reparation purposes. The Compensation Fund hits Iraq at a time when it hurts the most; the country’s ability to pay is diminished due to two decades of war and the pressing need to aid its people. These considerations should be taken into consideration in light of the Oil-for-Food Program true goals.
Rebuilding Oil Production
Aside from administrative obstacles, Iraq faces a third roadblock in the Oil-for-Food Program, poor oil industry infrastructure. The inability of Iraq to fully utilize all the authorized oil production presents concrete evidence of the country’s weak infrastructure. After the U.N. raised the level ceiling of $2 billion in oil to $5.265 billion in 1998, oil industry experts reported on the "lamentable state" of the oil industry and noted the oil production level authorized by the Security Council was beyond Iraq’s capacity at current prices.[21] To remedy the situation, Resolution 1175 in June 1998 authorized the import of $300 million worth of oil spares and equipment for phase IV. From phase VI onwards this limit has been raised to $600 million per phase. [22] In 1999, The Security Council resolution 1284 completely lifted the ceiling on the amount of oil Iraq can export under the Oil-for-Food program. Despite aid to the oil industry and despite ceiling-less production, Iraq faces the challenge of rebuilding oil industry.
Iraq faces a daunting task of rebuilding its destroyed oil fields amidst local chaos.
According to analyst Raad Alkadiri, speaking at the Fortune Global Forum business conference in Washington, beliefs that Iraqi oil production capacity would recover after a US invasion were based more on fantasy than probability. [23] Alkadiri notes that predictions that Iraq would increase capacity by one million barrels per day in one year and six million barrels in five to ten years are too optimistic. Mid-1990 estimates for how much investment the oil industry would need to rebuild capacity now seem modest in light of the fully realized postwar damage. Analysts and international oil companies now expect approximately 40-50 billion dollars worth of investment. [24]
The secondary problem is the source of financing. “…it would be difficult to attract such money in times of trouble. Oil companies don’t tend to thrive when there’s chaos around them,” Alkadiri comments. Aside from economic and infrastructure obstacles, Iraq faces uncertainty in the political arena. The capability of the Iraq oil industry depends not on oil field potential but a number of international interactions. U.S. policy toward oil and arms may hinder progress with increased sanctions and arms disclosure. On the other hand, increased infrastructure aid packages would effectively help build industry. Cooperation with OPEC and other oil producing countries would help maintain much need revenues for infrastructure enhancement. [25] Since Iraq supply is volatile, having Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries make up for gaps in Iraq supply would keep the price stable so that reentrance would be profitable for all countries. Few doubt the oil capacity of Iraq, which has the second largest proven oil reserve after Saudi Arabia with about fifteen percent of the global resources.
The survival of the Iraq people depends on two factors: the rebuilding of the local oil industry and the political support of the Saddam Hussein regime. Lack of government support leads to several consequences: (1) oil revenues may not be generated, and (2) even if sufficient revenues are generated by oil, little of the revenues will filter to the poor Iraqi people.
Saddam Hussein Approach
The Saddam Hussein authoritarian regime sees the United Nations and especially the U.S. as “foreign oppressors.” Hussein’s decision to stop all exports sheds light on motives for non-cooperation with the U.N. In a speech to his people, he announces,
“The Revolution Command Council, the Iraqi leadership of the Ba’th
Arab Socialist Party, and the Cabinet in their meeting on 8 April 2002
declare, in the name of the faithful, honest, mujahid, noble, Iraqi people: completely stopping oil exporting starting from this afternoon April 8,
through the pipelines going to the Turkish port on the Mediterranean,
and our ports in Bassra for a period of the thirty days after which we
will further decide, or until the Zionist entity’s armed forces have
unconditionally withdrawn from the Palestinian territories they have
occupied and have shown respect for the will of the Palestinian people
and the Arab nation to sovereignty, security, dignity and life..” [26]
Saddam’s speech appeals to the sensitivity of the Iraq people with words such as “faithful,” “honest,” and “noble.” He desires to bring “sovereignty, security, dignity and life” to a region that many people view as oppressed by the western world. Although the underlying action of stopping oil exports will devastate the country, many Iraq nationalists would argue that Saddam asserts the power of the country by regulating the trade of oil, Iraq’s most valuable resource. As a western news source put the two-sided story, “On the streets of Arab cities he is admired as a leader who has dared to defy and challenge Israel and the West, a symbol of Arab steadfastness in the face of Western aggression.” [27]
U.S. Stance
The stance of the United States continues to be somewhat adversary. Based on reports from the Department of State, the U.S. believes that under Saddam, Iraq continues to repress its people, threaten the region, and obstruct international efforts to provide humanitarian relief.[28]
In one of his speeches, Saddam Hussein claims, “They are even using part of them against the best of the Arab nation, after having tamed those whom they have made accept the weakness and humility of themselves.”[29] Many U.N. supporters comment that with such a perspective on western aid, the regime is certain to refuse help and in fact use assistance to exacerbate the situation of the Iraqi people. Hussein’s decision to stop all exports magnifies his disdain toward U.N. help. Without oil revenues, the Hussein government will have no resources to feed its people, build its government, and even sustain itself. Many view Saddam as the root of Iraq poverty. A former Iraqi diplomat living in exile summed up Saddam's rule, "Saddam is a dictator who is ready to sacrifice his country, just so long as he can remain on his throne in Baghdad. Few Iraqis would disagree with this. Although none living in Iraq would dare to say so publicly.” [30] Critics describe Saddam as feared, vicious dictator who threatens the security of the Gulf region as a whole.
The U.S., a proponent of global intervention, seeks to establish Iraq as a prosperous member of the international community. The U.S. along with other U.N. countries resolves that as long as Saddam is in power, the Western powers will contain the Iraqi regime and prevent it from threatening the region or its own people. They will also continue to provide assistance through foreign aid, including the Oil-for-Food program.
Effectiveness in Humanitarian Efforts
Considering several statistics and surveys, the true effectiveness of the Oil-for-Food program should be examined. In the September 2000 report, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) described Iraq’s food rationing system as “effective.”[31] The FAO indicates that source of the problem arises not from distribution networks but from the unsustainable structure of the economy and resources. It affirms that the availability of "cereal imports since 1997/98 under the oil-for-food deal has led to significant improvements in the food supply situation.”[32] Nonetheless, a major problem is that "food rations do not provide a nutritionally adequate and varied diet." An adequate solution to this problem would be complementing the ration with locally produced goods. However, with two consecutive years of severe drought and inadequate supply of essential agricultural equipment and inputs, including spare parts, fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides, the Iraqi agriculture sector has diminished.[33] Further, with the decline in household income, many Iraqis are unable to obtain sufficient complements to their diet.
The issues brought before the Security Council present complex dilemmas. While sanctions were put in place to curb the untrustworthiness of Saddam Hussein for behaviors often viewed as rash, the results have spread to innocent Iraqi people. The international community cannot condemn Saddam Hussein for oppression of his people and expect sanctions to instantly correct his action. If his actions to begin with were inhumane, his subsequent action are bound to be equally if not more cruel. As the International Development Select Committee of the UK House of Commons concluded, “A sanctions regime which relies on the good faith of Saddam Hussein is fundamentally flawed.”[34]
Saddam Hussein’s affect on the effectiveness of the sanctions can be clearly demonstrated by the disparities in progress between North Iraq, whose humanitarian efforts are administered by the U.N., and southern and central Iraq, whose humanitarian efforts are administered by the Government of Iraq. The U.S. and UK governments argue that this is evidence that the Iraqi regime is intentionally keeping mortality rates high outside of Northern Iraqi Kurdistan to win sympathy.[35] The influence of Saddam Hussein on the Oil-for-Food program cannot be disentangled from the well being of the Iraqi people. Efficiency, timing, and distribution of food and goods are largely if not completely controlled by the Saddam Hussein regime. Small whims can easily change the social and economic situation of the fragile nation.
While the influence of Saddam Hussein is the primary reason for this shortfall in mortality between regions, other factors may also come into play. We must examine the disparities that underline the possible breakdowns of the Oil-for-Food program. Anupama Singh, Unicef representative in Baghdad, highlights that the heavy presence of humanitarian agencies and the extra cash component in the Northern region help the Kurdish population. [36] With the availability of cash, the U.N. can train local authorities and more effectively implement programs. On the other hand, in the Center and South Iraqi region, no cash funds are available because of mistrust; therefore, installation of equipment and delivery is less feasible. Many attest that the embargo in the North is not the same embargo. The North has “porous” borders with Turkey, Syria, and Iran, and thus is less restrained by the embargo than the rest of the country.[37] The region benefits from the aid of 34 Non-Government Organizations, while in the rest of the country there are only 11. Northern Iraq receives 22% more per capita from the Oil-for-Food program, and gets about 10% of all U.N.-controlled assistance in currency. The rest of the country, however, receives only commodities.[38]
While numerous factors have attempted to explain the breakdown of the Iraqi aid program, the relative inequalities between regions of the country and the characterization of Saddam Hussein as a tyrant are counterproductive to the ultimate humanitarian goal. As Professor Richard Garfield asserts,
“A good faith effort to meet basic needs in Iraq would create a
better basis to negotiate an end to the Iraq conflict. Instead, every
problem is blamed on Saddam. This politicization of the Oil for
Food program only delays and weakens our ability to address the
urgent humanitarian needs created by this most comprehensive
embargo of the 20th century." [39]
Instead of pointing the finger at Saddam Hussein, the U.N. and Arab countries alike must work together to propose feasible alternatives and policy improvements.
Policy Discussion
As a result of attacks on the U.N. sanctions imposed on Iraq, the UK and U.S. have created a package of proposals for revising the current sanctions, titled “Smart Sanctions.” The sanctions refer to targeted instead of comprehensive sanctions, which would put pressure on those who are thought to pose a threat to international peace or human rights. The resolution proposes changes to two areas: changing the procedures by which Iraq could import commodities, and creating additional measures to prevent the Iraq Government from having access to funds.[40] While the resolution addressed making the review process more streamline with no “on hold” provision, automatic disapproval of arms and munitions, additional items on the Goods Review List, and automatic approval of goods not listed above, it does not address the cash flow issue. Further, the resolution fails to appropriately address dual use items. The U.N. might better explore the necessities of Iraq, instead of narrowly focusing on the potential harm of dual-use items. As a peacekeeping body promoting economic growth, the U.N. needs to weigh the tradeoff of humanitarian aid with weapons control. While weapons control has only the potential to harm others, lack of humanitarian aid will certainly sacrifice lives.
In addition to revising the sanctions, perhaps the UK and U.S. could put together a more comprehensive aid package, involving bordering countries such as Turkey and Jordan. While many members of the Arab League are dissatisfied with the isolationist attitude of Iraq, many are coming around to support their neighboring country.[41] Further, their attitude toward the Security Council seems to be one of respect – the League invests confidence in the U.N. Sanctions. Therefore, a practical solution might be for the U.N. to further revise sanctions and add a comprehensive aid package with the support of the Arab League.
Despite economic and social downturns, Iraq has continued to garner support from the international front. The Baghdad Trade Fair, beginning on November 1, 2002, demonstrates this backing. “We have signed more than 20 contracts with [firms in] Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, France, Iran and Germany totaling more than 500 million dollars,” Trade Minister Mohammed Mehdi Saleh told reporters at the end of the 10-day fair.[42] The contracts were mainly in the food, construction and automotive sectors. In an address to officials and diplomats attending the closing ceremony, Saleh thanked the countries and firms which “came to our country in these circumstances, despite the US Administration’s impudent threats” against Iraq.[43]
The Fair marked a step toward furthering economic growth and improving international relations. In addition to this formal presentation of international trade and economic robustness, the fair also announced the reopening of the Arar border crossing between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, which had been closed since the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis. These climatic developments indicate “the will of the international community to support Iraq against US threats” [44] and give hope that the country will rid itself of U.N. sanctions by next year’s Fair.
Conclusions
These policy improvements and international relation developments reveal that instead of casting blame on any one party, countries must work together to achieve a common goal. In the situation of Iraqi poverty, the United Nations should set aside weapons control to address the more serious problem of rampant death and substandard living in a nation rich with resources.
The Oil-for-Food Program was only meant to be a temporary measure to help Iraq get back on its feet and to ensure that the country would not threaten peace in the Arab world. However, if the United Nations restricts Iraq to the extent that it cannot help itself, then the aiding body is in effect crippling the nation. Only with international cooperation, understanding, and action will changes come about. Progress has already been made as evidenced by the Baghdad Trade Fair, but further progress must ensue.
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[1] “Background Information” November 2002. Office of the Iraq Programme – Oil-for-Food. http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/fact-sheet.html
[2] Security General, United Nations Security Council Report. March 20, 1991.
[3] See note 1
[4] “Background Information” November 2002. Office of the Iraq Programme – Oil-for-Food. http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/fact-sheet.html
[5] See note 4
[6] “Iraq Sanctions: Humanitarian Implications and Options for the Future” August 6, 2002. UN Security Council, Global Policy Forum.
[7] Resolution 661, Security Council Resolutions
[8] Resolution 687, Security Council Resolutions
[9] Resolution 1409, Security Council Resolutions
[10] “Oil-for-Food Program: In Brief.” September 2002. Office of the Iraq Programme – Oil-for-Food. http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/inbrief.html
[11] “Holds on Oil-for-Food Contracts” September 13, 1999. U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs.
[12] See note 11
[13] “U.S. Wants Iraq Import List Expanded” November 26, 1999. U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs.
[14] Briefing by Benon Sevan, Executive Director of the Iraq Programme, before the Security Council.
July 22, 1999.
[15] See note 14
[16] “Article: Oil-for-Food Program.” VOL. XLIV No. 28, July 9, 2001. Middle East Economic Survey.
[17] See note 16
[18] “Guide to Sanctions: Smuggling in the Oil –for-Food Program” Campaign Against Sanction on Iraq website. http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/index.html
[19] See note 18
[20] Security Council, Resolution 1330
[21] “Guide to Sanctions: Smuggling in the Oil –for-Food Program” Campaign Against Sanction on Iraq website. http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/index.html
[22] Security Council, Resolution 1175
[23] “Iraq: the Long task of Rebuilding Oil Production” November 18, 2002. Monday Morning. Issue No.1560
[24] See note 23
[25] “Iraq: the Long task of Rebuilding Oil Production” November 18, 2002. Monday Morning. Issue No.1560.
[26] “Iraq: the Long task of Rebuilding Oil Production” November 18, 2002. Monday Morning. Issue No.1560.
[27] See note 26
[28] “Saddam Hussein’s Iraq” September 13, 1999. U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs.
[29] “President Saddam Hussein: Iraq decide completely stopping oil exporting.” August 4, 2002. The Iraqi Presidency Website. http://www.uruklink.net/iraq/espeech.htm
[30] “Saddam Hussein profile” January 4, 2001. BBC World News.
[31] Technical Report prepared for the Government of Iraq by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Rome 2000
[32] See note 31
[33] Technical Report prepared for the Government of Iraq by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Rome 2000.
[34] See note 33
[35] “Guide to Sanctions: Why is Northern Iraq in a better shape than the areas under the control of the Iraqi Government?” Campaign Against Sanction on Iraq website. http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/index.html
[36] See note 35
[37] Columbia University, Professor Richard Garfield, New York Times. September 13, 1999.
[38] See note 37
[39] See note 37
[40] UK Draft Resolution. May 22, 2001
[41] “Arab government refuse to help Iraq rehabilitate itself.” Muslim Media. http://www.muslimedia.com/archives/oaw99/arab-irq.htm
[42] “Saudis confirm Baghdad trade fair.” September 10, 2002. BBC news.
[43] “Contracts Worth $500M. Signed at Baghdad Fair.” November 18, 2002. Monday Morning. Issue 1560.
[44] See note 43