

# **United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Improvements for Mission Success**

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## **I. Abstract**

The purpose of this paper is to investigate United Nations peacekeeping operations and comment on improvements that can be made to contribute to success in future missions. To this end, a background on United Nations peacekeeping, its beginnings and its evolution, will be provided. Two recent United Nations peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and East Timor will be discussed in detail. The successes and failures in these missions will be highlighted and this will provide the basis for a recommendation for future peacekeeping operations. Remarks on United States involvement in peacekeeping in Bosnia and East Timor, as well as current U.S. policy on peacekeeping will be presented. This investigation will arrive at a conclusion as to what steps should be taken by the United Nations to make for successful peacekeeping missions. It will also determine under what circumstances the United Nations can rely on the United States for assistance in peacekeeping operations.

## **II. United Nations Peacekeeping: Introduction and Background**

The peacekeeping principles of the United Nations are modeled after those on which the League of Nations operated. The League was created to facilitate the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes. Duties of the League included monitoring reporting or investigating; supervising the separation of opposing forces; establishing neutral zones between parties; confirming implementation of mandates formed by the League Council; or administering transfer of territory between parties (Daniel et al., 7). The League's final operation took place in 1934. The League disbanded after failing to prevent the

Second World War. On October 24, 1945, the United Nations was born when the five permanent members, United States, Britain, France, China, and Russia, ratified the charter. Membership originally included 51 nations. One of the main purposes of the United Nations, as set forth by the charter, is “to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security” (“Basic Facts about the UN”).

United Nations peacekeeping evolved since its beginnings in 1945. Initially, peacekeeping was limited to observer missions. The first four operations, occurring between 1947 and 1949, involved tasks similar to those undertaken by the League. In two of the missions, the UN Secretariat directly controlled employment of military personnel provided it by contributing nations. In the other two missions national authorities retained control of their personnel while operating under a UN mandate (Daniel et al., 7).

In 1956, Dag Hammarskjod created the first UN peacekeeping force in response to the Suez Crisis. The UN dispatched 6000 soldiers but the use of force was limited to self-defense. This type of involvement in a peacekeeping situation characterized the missions up through 1978 and is often referred to as “traditional peacekeeping”. These “traditional peacekeeping” missions had several distinguishing features (Thakur and Schnabel, 10):

- 1) Consent and cooperation of parties to the conflict;
- 2) International support, as well as support of the UN Security Council;
- 3) UN command and control;
- 4) Multinational composition of operations;
- 5) No use of force;

- 6) Neutrality of UN military between rival armies;
- 7) Political impartiality of the UN in relationships with rival states.

The failure of the United Nations during the Cold War caused states to move away from a system of collective security and toward a system of collective defense through alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw pact (Thakur and Schnabel, 10). For a period after the Cold War, peacekeeping missions were undertaken outside of the UN system. The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Group in Sinai and the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka are two examples of these types of missions. Some of these missions were successful, and others were not. Many of them had similar characteristics to traditional UN peacekeeping missions.

In the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War gave rise to unprecedented cooperation between the five permanent members of the UN. In 1988 when UN peacekeeping received the Nobel Peace Prize, there were just over 10,000 people involved in seven operations at an annual cost of US\$230 million. In mid-1994, at the peak of UN peacekeeping, there were 17 operations, involving more than 87,000 people, at an annual cost of US\$4 billion (Thakur and Schnabel, 13). The United Nations was faced with a new set of crises during this post-Cold War era. While in previous missions the UN was concerned with organized violence between states fighting over an international border, in this post-Cold War era the UN was faced with new types of emergencies, such as: “collapsed state structures; humanitarian tragedies caused by starvation, disease of genocide; large-scale fighting and slaughter between rival ethnic or bandit groups; [and] horrific human rights atrocities”(Thakur and Schnabel, 12). The following types of tasks

characterized peacekeeping operations in this post-Cold War era (Thakur and Schnabel, 12):

- 1) Military disengagement, demobilization, and cantonment;
- 2) Policing;
- 3) Human rights monitoring and enforcement;
- 4) Information dissemination;
- 5) Observation, organization, and conducting of elections;
- 6) Rehabilitation;
- 7) Repatriation;
- 8) Administration;
- 9) Working with or overseeing regional or non-UN peacekeeping operations

United Nations policy was tested shortly after this post-Cold War period. The UN was finding itself in situations in which some degree of force was necessary for the success of the mission, however the UN had generally been opposed to the notion of using force to keep peace. Once the United Nations determined that some force was necessary, they remained uncertain of how it should be supplied. This problem characterizes United Nations peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. In these missions the UN created its own “protection forces”. This attempt proved disastrous in that UN protection forces did not have the power to offer either protection or force. The following section on Bosnia will highlight the problem encountered in this era. A discussion of East Timor will follow the section on Bosnia, and will serve to detail the most recent era of United Nations peacekeeping.

### **III. Bosnia**

#### **Background**

Problems in Bosnia began when Yugoslavia entered the final stages of breakup in June 1991, beginning with Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence. At this time both Croatia and Serbia had interest in Bosnia and were making plans for its partition. Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic wanted to annex those territories in both Croatia and Bosnia that were inhabited by Serbs. The Bosnian Muslims, who accounted for 43 percent of Bosnia's population, were not satisfied with this two-way partition of Bosnia. On October 15, 1991 the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA) introduced a resolution of independence in the Bosnian parliament (Daniel et al., 42). The Bosnian Serbs did not want to break away from Yugoslavia, and so the Serbs left the Bosnian parliament to form their own parliament. The Bosnian Serb decision to split from the Bosnian parliament inspired the Bosnian Croats to also declare their autonomy.

As Bosnia began to disintegrate, Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic called for the deployment of UN peacekeepers in November of 1991 (Daniel et al., 42). This would require consent of Milosevic under existing UN policy, as Bosnia was still technically a part of Yugoslavia. Milosevic was unwilling to bring in peacekeepers because the unrest served his goal of annexing Bosnia. The UN already had a peacekeeping force present in Croatia, United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and decided that establishing UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo may calm the unrest in Bosnia.

Milosevic and Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, threatened war if Bosnia attempted to secede from Yugoslavia. By remaining part of a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, Izetbegovic would be putting Muslims in the minority, giving them little

power in government. It seemed impossible to divide Bosnia into smaller states in which Muslims could have their independence, as the Muslims were mostly city-dwellers and did not live in a contiguous region. Therefore, it was in the best interest of the Muslims for Bosnia to remain a unitary, sovereign state.

The war in Bosnia began after the European Community (EC) recognized Bosnia as a sovereign state on April 6, 1992 (Daniel et al., 45). In May 1992, UNPROFOR personnel had to pull out of Sarajevo because the situation became increasingly dangerous. During the summer of 1992 the eastern, northern and northwestern parts of Bosnia underwent a systematic ethnic cleansing. Serbs occupied 70 percent of Bosnia within a few months and produced 750,000 refugees by June 1992 (Daniel et al., 45).

### **United Nations Involvement**

The UN did little initially to help the situation in Bosnia. Once Bosnia was recognized as a sovereign state, the UN Security Council appealed to the Serbs, Bosnians and Croats to bring about a cease-fire and to negotiate a political solution, and demanded that any interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina cease immediately (“Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR”). The Security Council developed resolution 757 on May 30, 1992, which imposed sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro at that time) in hope of achieving a peaceful resolution to the conflict (“Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR”). In September 1992, the mandate of UNPROFOR was enlarged to assist the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in delivering humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular to provide protection when UNHCR considered it necessary. The humanitarian

airlift carried out by UNHCR under UNPROFOR protection brought in 2,476 aircraft carrying 27,460 tons of food, medicines and other relief goods between July 1992 and January 1993 (“Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR”). Although the UN humanitarian efforts were great, they did nothing to stop the war, and by mid-March of 1993, 30-40 people were dying daily due to military action, starvation, exposure to cold, or lack of medical treatment (“Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR”).

In a further attempt at achieving peace, the UN Security Council declared six safe areas in Bosnia: Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Zepa. These regions were to be “free from armed attacks and from any other hostile acts that would endanger the well-being and the safety of their inhabitants and where unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population would be ensured” (Daniel et al., 56). UNPROFOR was given the responsibility to enforce these safe areas through its presence alone. It was not authorized to defend territory or engage in offensive military operations. UNPROFOR could only use force in self-defense and was required to cease-fire as soon as the opponent did. UNPROFOR’s ability to carry out its mission was not only limited by the rules of engagement but also by limited resources. The UN member states authorized only 7,950 more troops of the 34,000 requested to carry out the mandate (Daniel et. al, 56). NATO air strikes were authorized to defend UNPROFOR troops and deter attacks on the safe areas.

Between April 13, 1993 and December 15, 1995, UN and NATO launched a series of air threats and strikes in response to Serb aggression on safe areas. In May 1995, several UN heavy-weapon collection points were overrun by Bosnian Serbs and NATO responded with air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets. Bosnian Serbs

immediately seized 350 UN peacekeepers, tied them to potential targets, and brought them before television cameras, forcing NATO to call off the air strikes (Daniel et al., 52). In July 1995, while UNPROFOR troops were being reconfigured, the Bosnian Serbs launched a full-scale assault on the safe area of Srebrenica, taking over the city and massacring thousands of Muslim men. NATO air strikes were not authorized until it was too late to stop the massacre. The United Nations made the decision to pull all UN peacekeeping personnel out of Bosnia and allowed NATO to take over. Following this attack, troop-contributing nations met in London and came to an agreement that any attack on Gorazde, the only remaining “safe-area”, would be met with “a substantial and decisive response” (Daniel et al., 69). It was decided that NATO no longer needed approval from the civilian UN representative to initiate air strikes. Between August 30 and September 14, 1995 NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force, a two-week series of air strikes on a number of Bosnian Serb military targets in response to a Serb mortar attack on Sarajevo occurring on August 28, 1995 (Daniel et al., 70).

### **United States and International Support**

One of the main reasons the UN was initially unable to make notable progress in Bosnia was the lack of international support early in the peace effort. U.S. presidential candidate Bill Clinton and former British foreign secretary David Owen called for a military action that would punish Serb aggression and put a stop to the war (Daniel et al., 46). However, the U.S. military strongly opposed the use of force in Bosnia. U.S. military doctrine developed after the Vietnam War called for the use of force only in

situations where victory could be assured rapidly, and where there were significant U.S. interests involved (Daniel et al., 46).

Early diplomatic efforts for peace were also unsuccessful. Both Serbs and Muslims opposed the Vance-Owen peace plan developed in January 1993. While Europe and Russia supported the plan, the U.S. was not as supportive, and the nations that were not directly involved in the conflict were unwilling to impose the peace plan on local parties.

After two million former Yugoslavs were homeless and 200,000 had been killed, the United States finally decided to take the lead in resolving the conflict. American negotiator, Richard Holbrook, along with help from France, Great Britain, Germany, NATO and Russia, obtained an agreement over the following principles (Rikhye, 43):

- 1) Bosnia and Herzegovina would remain a state within its previous borders, but would consist of two sub-states, the existing Bosnian-Croatian Federation and a new Republika Srpska;
- 2) Division of territory would be 51% to Bosnian-Croatian Federation, 49% Republika Srpska;
- 3) The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or another international organization would monitor elections;
- 4) A parliament or an assembly would be chosen on a two-thirds Muslim-Croat, one-third Bosnian Serb basis;
- 5) The presidency would be a tripartite elected on the same basis.

The Peace Agreement called for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces and the establishment of a multinational military implementation force (IFOR) composed of ground, air, and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO states to help ensure compliance with the Peace Agreement. UNPROFOR's mandate was terminated on December 20, 1995.

**Major Success of UNPROFOR in Bosnia (Rikhye, 45)**

- 1) Opening of the airport in Sarajevo prevented mass starvation in the city.
- 2) UN was able to provide medical aid and food relief by truck convoys and with help of US aircraft.

**Failures of UNPROFOR in Bosnia (Rikhye, 45)**

- 1) UN was initially indecisive as to whether or not to get involved in the conflict in Bosnia, which allowed for warring factions to break up Bosnia-Herzegovina into “ethnically cleansed” areas.
- 2) The peacekeeping mission had no real design and had a vague mandate that was stretched to cover changed circumstances in the region.
- 3) The rules of engagement given to the protection force were inadequate even for the delivery of humanitarian aid.
- 4) Poor naming of “protection force” and “safe-areas”. These terms were misleading as UN forces were unable to provide protection for civilians, and “safe-areas” did not provide safety.

## **Lessons from Bosnia**

After the massacre in Srebrenica, the international community was left with two options. They could withdraw all UN troops or they could impose peace. At this time, the United States finally committed itself to ending the war in Bosnia. As soon as a clear purpose developed, the peace process began. It seems that the major failure of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Bosnia was that it never had a clear purpose. Initially, the UN was hesitant to get involved in Bosnia as it began as an intra-state conflict and the United Nations was unsure of its role in these situations. This hesitance led to tremendous human rights violations and the displacement of 750,000. Once the UN got involved they were indecisive as to the use of force to carry out UNPROFOR's mandate. It was not until NATO took over military operations and the United States and other nations got involved in negotiations that there was any progress towards peace. The experience in Bosnia makes it clear that the UN needs to make decisions as to what course of action it will follow very early in the conflict. Also, the protection forces must be given the rules of engagement and resources necessary for the mission to be successful.

## **Bosnia Today**

The current situation in Bosnia and throughout the Balkan states is not yet stable. Regional peacekeeping has taken over from the United Nations in order to develop the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina to help it become a modern European nation and eventually join the European community. On January 15, 2003 the European Union Peace Mission (EUPM) was inaugurated ("EU Launches Police Mission"). The goal of

the EUPM is to build a strong police service in Bosnia and Herzegovina, create a more effective judiciary and assist in the fight against organized crime. The EUPM feels that these are priorities if Bosnia is to look forward to a stable future and closer relationship with the European Union. Rebuilding an uncorrupt state will help Bosnia to attract foreign investment and strengthen the economy (“EU Launches Police Mission”). The EUPM effort will help to maintain the peace achieved in this region.



Fig. (1): A Map of Bosnia

## **IV. East Timor**

### **Background**

Prior to 1974, East Timor was administered by Portugal. At that time, Portugal wished to develop a provisional government and popular assembly to determine the status of East Timor. This resulted in the outbreak of civil war between those that were in favor of independence and others that wanted the integration of East Timor with Indonesia. Portugal withdrew from East Timor as they were unable to control the conflict and Indonesia intervened militarily and integrated East Timor as its 27<sup>th</sup> province in 1976 (“East Timor – UNTAET Background”).

The United Nations did not recognize this integration and called for the withdrawal of Indonesia. Several talks between Indonesia and Portugal were held beginning in 1982 in an attempt to resolve the status of East Timor. In a set of agreements between Indonesia and Portugal signed on May 5, 1999, the UN was entrusted with the job of organizing and conducting a “popular consultation” in order to determine if the East Timorese people would accept the proposal of a special autonomy for East Timor within the Republic of Indonesia (“East Timor – UNTAET Background”).

### **United Nations Involvement**

Resolution 1246 by the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). UNAMET was created to carry out a vote and oversee the transition period pending implementation of the outcome (“East Timor – UNTAET Background”). UNAMET registered 451,792 potential voters among the population of just over 800,000 in East Timor and abroad. On voting day, 98 percent

of registered voters went to the polls and 78.5 percent voted to reject the proposed autonomy and begin a process of transition towards independence (“East Timor – UNTAET Background”). Following this vote for independence many pro-integration militias began a campaign of violence in East Timor, displacing 500,000 people from their homes. In a three-week campaign, Operation Clean Sweep, Indonesian armed forces and locally organized militia executed some 3,000-4,000 (McFarlane and Maley, 2003) East Timorese. Indonesia failed to respond effectively to the violence even though they made commitments to do so under the agreement signed in May. UNAMET undertook a partial evacuation of both its international and local staff. In September 1999, the Security Council authorized the multinational force, International Force East Timor (INTERFET), to restore peace and security to East Timor and to protect and support UNAMET to carry out tasks and aid in humanitarian assistance operations (“East Timor – UNTAET Background”).

On October 25, 1999 the UN Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) by resolution 1272. The mandate for this mission gave UNTAET the following responsibilities (“East Timor – UNTAET Mandate”):

- 1) To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor;
- 2) To establish an effective administration;
- 3) To assist in the development of civil and social services;
- 4) To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitations and development assistance;

- 5) To support capacity-building for self-government;
- 6) To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.

UNTAET, along with East Timorese political leadership, established the National Consultative Council (NCC), a political body composed of 11 East Timorese and four UNTAET members to oversee the decision making process in the transitional period. The NCC worked to set up a legal system, re-establish judiciaries, set up an official currency, create border controls, develop a system of taxation, and create the first budget for East Timor (“East Timor – UNTAET Background”). In February 2000, when UNTAET had been completely deployed, command of military operations was transferred from INTERFET to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force within UNTAET (“East Timor – UNTAET Background”). In October 2000, a National Council (NC) was established to replace and expand on the former NCC as the seed for a future assembly. It comprised 36 members from East Timorese civil society - businesses, political parties, NGOs, and the territory's 13 districts (“East Timor – UNTAET Background”).

UNTAET made efforts to create a means of sustainable development and ensure economic growth in East Timor. In an agreement reached on July 3, 2001, representatives of the Transitional Administration and of Australia created the Timor Sea Arrangement, a document detailing how petroleum operation in the Timor Sea would be undertaken. The East Timor’s first constitution was signed on March 22, 2002, Xanana Gusamo was appointed president-elect of East Timor on April 14, 2002, and on May 20, 2002 the Constituent Assembly transformed into the country’s parliament and changed the nation’s name to Timor-Leste (“East Timor – UNTAET Background”). United Nations is continuing its presence in Timor-Leste in this post-independence period

through a successor mission, United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET). This mission will withdraw over a two-year period from Timor-Leste, with the purpose of supporting the East Timorese in the areas of stability, democracy and justice, internal security and law enforcement and external security and border control (“East Timor – UNTAET Background”). On September 27, 2002, Timor-Leste became the 191<sup>st</sup> member state of the United Nations.

### **United States and International Support**

The Australian prime minister and the Indonesian president met in Bali on April 27, 1999, when the Australian prime minister committed the Australian Federal Police to serve as an interim civilian police force in East Timor (McFarlane and Maley, 190). INTERFET was primarily an Australian force, with Australian control, but it also comprised personnel from several Asian nations including Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and South Korea (“Asian Contributions to ET”).

The United States has taken an approach that is fairly different to that of the UN in its policy regarding East Timor. President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger were visiting Indonesian President Suharto two days prior to the 1975 Indonesian invasion of East Timor. It is fairly clear that the U.S. gave president Suharto approval for the invasion of the newly independent East Timor. The day before the invasion, U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger told reporters that “the United States understands Indonesia’s position on the question” of East Timor (Jardine). According to the State Department, U.S. companies supplied some 90 percent of the weapons used by the Indonesian Armed

Forces (ABRI) during the invasion (Jardine). U.S. arms sales to Indonesia peaked during the presidency of Ronald Reagan, exceeding U.S.\$1 billion from 1982-84.

At the March 1993 meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission, the U.S. delegation reversed its historical intransigence and co-sponsored a resolution condemning Indonesian human rights violations in East Timor. But Indonesia's continuing economic and strategic importance exposed the limits of the Clinton administration's concern for human rights and international law. Evidence of this is exhibited by the Clinton administration providing US\$180 million in economic assistance to Indonesia's rulers over a two-year period through the World Bank-chaired Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), a consortium of donor countries and organizations (Jardine). If the United States had stopped funding and training the Indonesian military, the East Timorese people would probably have gained their independence without the tremendous loss of life and in a much shorter time period.

The United States did supply UNTAET with 80 civilian police ("U.S. Involvement in CIVPOL Missions") although they did not send in peacekeeping forces. This is consistent with U.S. military policy as they had no interest in the independence of the East Timorese, and did have economic and political interest in retaining a good relationship with Indonesia. In a meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and the leaders of East Timor's independence movement, Xanana Gusamo and Jose Ramos Horta, on May 16, 2001, the United States promised to assist East Timor in every way possible once the territory achieved statehood ("United States Promises East Timor Support"). At the opening of the U.S. embassy in East Timor on May 22, 2002, former president Clinton spoke on behalf of the U.S. government saying that the United States

seeks to build "a strong relationship between the United States and East Timor" ("Peace, Democracy in East Timor"). However the U.S. is currently rebuilding ties with the Indonesian military. The Senate voted 61-36 on January 23, 2003 to allow funding for enrolling Indonesians in Washington's International Military Education and Training (IMET) program in hopes of gaining the aid of the Indonesian government in the U.S. led war on terrorism ("U.S. Paves the Way").

### **Major Successes of UN Peacekeeping in East Timor**

- 1) Registered 451,792 voters of a population of 800,000 in East Timor and carried out a successful vote in which 98 percent of registered voters went to the polls and 78.5 percent voted for independence ("East Timor – UNTAET Background").
- 2) After violence broke out in response to the result of the vote, the UN Security Council authorized the multinational force INTERFET to restore peace and security to East Timor.
- 3) The UN Security Council established a thorough mandate for UNTAET where duties began with the maintenance of peace and ended with the establishment of a government and creation of conditions for sustainable development in East Timor.
- 4) From the beginning, the UN brought the East Timorese people into the effort to rebuild the state to ensure that they felt it was their government, and not one that was forced on them by the West.

### **Failures of UN Peacekeeping In East Timor**

- 1) The Security Council failed to anticipate the consequences of a rejection of autonomy by the East Timorese, which led to a humanitarian catastrophe (Chawla).
- 2) The agreement of May 5, 1999 made no provision for a military component of UNAMET, which left the Timorese people hostage to whoever exercised power in East Timor.

### **Lessons from East Timor**

The actions undertaken by the United Nations in East Timor represent the most recent generation of peacekeeping. With a new concept of the role of UN peacekeeping, an UN-authorized multinational force is prepared for combat action if necessary, and is given the mandate, troops, equipment, and robust rules of engagement that are required for such a mission (Thakur and Schnabel, 13). But with this new notion of peacekeeping, military operations are just a prelude to state creation by the United Nations. The UN has realized that peace restoration is not possible without the creation of law and order.

### **East Timor Today**

East Timor is still in the process of building a stable society. The United Nations began UNMISSET, a successor mission to UNTAET, on May 20, 2002 for an initial period of 12 months, to help to create political stability, to provide interim law enforcement, and to build the East Timor Police Force (“East Timor – UNMISSET – Mandate”). On February 2, 2003, a plane that was carrying 50 tons of electronics needed



## **V. Conclusions**

In comparing missions in Bosnia and East Timor, it is clear that the United Nations has made improvements in its peacekeeping operations. Failures of the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, including indecisiveness as to whether or not to get involved, an unclear mandate, and hesitance to use force through a multinational operation, became successes of the mission in East Timor. The Brahimi Report, issued in August 2000, gives several recommendations to the United Nations for improvements of peacekeeping operations. First, it asks that the UN become serious about conflict prevention by addressing the causes of conflict and attempting to fix these problems before they result in further escalation of conflict. The Brahimi Report also emphasizes the need for clear mandates and goals, and the military and financial resources to match. The general recommendation of the report is that the United Nations should “define the peacekeeping mission, bring the force needed for the purpose, and do what is required to get the job done” (Thakur and Schnabel, 19). The UN seemed to follow these recommendations in the mission in East Timor, which resulted in a successful operation.

In future peacekeeping missions, the UN should use a similar mandate to that given to UNTAET in its mission in East Timor. This mandate is general enough to apply to any peacekeeping mission that requires rebuilding of the state, and it is thorough enough to make for a successful operation. The United Nations should also use multinational regional peacekeeping forces in its operations. In doing this, those groups that UN peacekeeping is aiding will not feel that a foreign force is imposing its power and changing the customs in that region. A regional peacekeeping force will better

understand the needs of the people and will be better able to help in the rebuilding stages, as they are the nations that will deal more closely with the new state.

Finally, from United States involvement in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and East Timor, it is apparent that the UN can only rely on the support of the U.S. when the U.S. has some direct interest in the mission. In 2003, the Bush Administration reduced funding for existing United Nations peacekeeping missions and failed to provide any additional funding that may be necessary for reforms or new peacekeeping operations (“U.S. Funding for Peace Operations”). With the reduction in United States support under the current administration, the United Nations should look for support from other nations, especially those with some interest in the success of a mission.

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