Nigeria is the most populous nation on the continent of Africa with almost 100 million citizens. With a land size of slightly more than twice the size of California, Nigeria is key to the economic and political stability in West Africa and the continent as a whole. In May of 1999, Nigeria is scheduled to return to civilian rule after more than three decades of corrupt military regimes. The citizens of Nigerian are determined to proceed towards a civilian government and address the crisis facing the nation. However, it will not be an easy task and there are many obstacles in the way of a peaceful, successful democratization process that must include not only the revitalization of the political process, but also the nation's single commodity economy and interethnic relations. Furthermore, because of the significant role played by international governments and multinational corporations in both the economy and politics of Nigeria, it is important that both actively endorse the efforts of the Nigerian people, alter their policies concerning the continent of Africa and hold the Nigerian government accountable for corrupt practices and humanitarian crimes.

Before colonialism was introduced in the late 19 century by Britain, Nigeria did not exist. There was no nation-state and no encompassing sense of belonging to a single community just numerous ethnic groups speaking different languages, with different traditions of origin and competing states and empires (Funso, 46). What is now known as Nigeria came into existence in 1914 when the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria were amalgamated. Prom 1914 1946, the unification of the predominantly Moslem North and the predominantly African Traditional Worshipers (at the time) in the South only went so far as finances and budget preparation. Policies sought to preserve and if possible solidify ethno-regional distinctions in the country and the two regions continued to be ruled as two separate political entities, making integration difficult (Funso, 47; Osemwota, 10). In October of 1960, when Nigeria gained its independence from Britain, it was made up of three autonomous regions -the North, the East and the West. Each of these regions was powerful and independent of one another and made up of a conglomerate of different ethnicities (Osemwota, 15). Because of the inherent separation of the regions and Nigeria's distinct climatic zones, Britain was able to exploit several different crops on Nigerian soil. Groundnuts were grown in the noi~th, cocoa in the southwest and palm oil in the southeast (Wright, 2). The agricultural products were totally earmarked for Britain, beginning the nation's dependence on foreign, not domestic consumption for economic stability.

Aside from urbanization and industrialization, the main legacy of colonialism in Nigeria was the unraveling of the political structure (Wright, 25). At the beginning of colonial rule, Nigerians were more likely to identify themselves with their extended family, village or clan, but not by their ethnic group. However, as colonialism unfolded, such identification become more apparent and intrinsic in the society (Wright, 31). Interregional and interethnic tensions were encouraged during latter years of colonial rule as Britain failed to deal with the key issue of minorities' rights and tried to "protect" the north, whose inhabitants it deemed superior. These ethnic tensions continue to make it difficult to maintain a cohesive national government in Nigeria. Furthermore, the British had a misconception that their model of government could be easily transferred to Africa, although it was not aligned with traditional African norms and values (Wright, 25). The people of Nigeria, like those of many African nations, tend to try and copy the values and norms of the colonial powers rather than use their traditional strengths to solve conflicts and govern. These factors were partly to blame for the legacy of unstable government and lack of cohesiveness in present day Nigeria.

Nigeria has had difficulty inspiring national unity since its inception, as ethnic attachments are far older than loyalties to the state. Language, customs, geography and traditional~rule link ethnicity and colonial Nigeria did not disrupt these ties and actually made them stronger through divisive rule (Wright, 31). The Nigeria of today, like the Nigeria of colonial times, has remained a very diverse pop ulation. Its 100 million people belong to some 200-400 distinct ethnic groups practicing a variety of religions (47% Muslim, 34% Christian and 18% practicing indigenous religions) (Wright, 35) (See Table 1). However, the three major ethnic divisions - the Muslim Hausa and Fulani in the North, the mainly Christian Yoruba in south and west, and the mainly Christian Igbo in the east -make up 2/3 of the population (Funso 48, 54). While the ethic groups share some traits, there are major differences in language, traditional values, political attitude and perspectives on authority which make the groups predetermined to conflict and crisis (Funso, 54). In fact, no more than 1/3 of the people speaks any one indigenous language. Therefore, English, the colonial language, has become the official language to avoid increasing inter-ethic conflict (Funso, 48).

The political and social structure of the country also reflects the diversity of ethnic origins. Since colonialism, the political leadership has been drawn largely from the Northern region (Wright, 4). Northern Nigeria has supplied most of the Hausa-Fulani military rulers that have controlled the country for much of the past three decades. Sadly, that political power has not contributed to economic or educational power. Even during the colonial period, despite the favored role of the north in politics, the south enjoyed higher rates of literacy and a greater presence in higher education. The makeup of the universities was Yoruba 42%, Igbo 31%, and HausaFulani 0.8% and those numbers have not varied greatly over the years. Southern Nigerians continue to dominate the educational system and hence make up the bulk of the middle class (Wright, 52).

Two-thirds of Nigerians live in rural areas where communal loyalty at the level of the village or lineage communities is primary and paramount. The elite mass, made up of businessmen and military politicians (mainly from the North), live in urban areas. The modern elite claim to power is based on western education and employment in national and state positions of government authority and they have used their political power to amass wealth through corruption (Wright, 38; Funso, 52). The glaring inequalities between rich and poor have been made even more profound by the collapse of economy and middle class in 1980s and 1990s (Wright, 27).

Much like its population, the geography and environment of Nigeria is also very diverse (Funso, 48; Osemwota, 29). The Northern region is principally Savannah grassland and Sahehia while the Southern is thickly forested. There are also differences in rainfall. In the extreme south there is rain every month while in the north, near the Sahara, five months can pass without rain. In the southern states timber, rubber and cocoa are the main products while in the west palm oil dominates. In the north groundnuts, tin, columbite, iron ore and coal are the principle products while in the east palm oil, iron ore and coal dominate. Petroleum is only a major resource in the Niger Delta of the South (Osemwota, 29). The distinct differences between the output of the various regions and the skewed economic dependence on petroleum for the nation's wealth cause further conflict among different groups.

At independence, Nigeria was made up of only three independent states. However, as ethnic groups have cried for more influence in their local government, that number has blossomed to 36 (See Tables 2 & 3). More states have provided greater possibilities for smaller ethnic groups to control their local affairs, but also lead to a multiplication of government, bureaucracy and overall cost at a time of budgetary shortfalls (Wright, 51). While state creation has strengthened local democracy it has weakened democracy on the state and national levels by creating nonviable states dependent for up to 80% of their revenues from federal government and by heightening ethnic sensitivities (Wright, 52). This dependence on the federal government has made the country especially susceptible to abuses and corruption by the national leadership.

The current role of the political and commercial elite in Nigeria has been conditioned by colonial rule. The traditional elements of consensus and shared decision making in local government were swept aside in the more competitive combative system of colonial rule. Perks by the bureaucratic and political elite has led to corruption and a general lack of accountability (Wright, 27). Indeed, Nigerian politics have become synonymous with rampant corruption and inefficiency and Nigeria has been rocked with rampant corruption an inefficiency and Nigeria has been rocked with political instability. Numerous political coups have taken place over the past 4 decades and since independence , Nigeria has been ruled by a succession of military regimes with the exception of nine years of democratic rule (See Table 4). The centralized military government has abused human rights and disregarded the needs of the majority of the population. The ruling coalitions have been dominated by northern Hausa speakers which has led to regional conflict between the North and the South, which feels as though it has been shut out of national governance (Nigeria: President from the South Possible).

While the military has gained power, the traditional leadership in Nigeria has gradually lost influence since independence. The impact of colonialism on traditional African society and leadership structures, combined with experiences of authoritarian colonial rule, has lead to difficulties in defining a future role of traditional leaders (Wright, 27). Traditional leaders are "consulted" on issues from time to time, but their status is more social than political as they have little or no decision making authority (Wright, 40). They have shown a remarkable adaptability and resilience throughout decades of military coups and corrupt civilian governments (Vaughan, 413). Traditional rulers, in spite of modernization, have continued to exercise residual influence in the society, especially on the local level, because of the prestige and importance attached to their position as enduring symbols of cultural and communal identities (Funso, 53). Their influence in terms of backing and organizing votes for political candidates and for that reason they are often known as kingmakers" (Funso, 53; Wright, 40). Because traditional leaders are critical to the process of regional elite f9rmation and consolidation, many have called for more involvement by traditional rulers in the democratization process since royal sanctions are often more respected by the people than government policies and laws (Vaughan, 413).

In May of 1999 Nigeria's military regime, led by General Abdulsalami Abubakar, has promised to return authority to a civilian government. Despite military governance for nearly _ of the post-independence period, there remains a widespread and strongly held belief among Nigerians that military rule is an aberration and that what ought to exist is a democratically elected government Even during the two periods of civilian rule (1960~1966 and 1979-1983), democracy was deeply flawed and marred by high levels of ethno-regional tension and corruption (Beckett) (See Table 5). The emergence and growth of Nigeria's pro-democracy and civil liberties movement after 29 years of repressive military rule is one of the most remarkable developments in recent African history (Nigeria's Moment).

An underhanded attempt at "democratization" was thwarted earlier in 1998 with the June death of past military leader General Sani Abacha, who was installed after General Babangida stepped down in 1993. Under Abacha's rule, daily life deteriorated disastrously as the economy and infrastructure crumbled. Unemployment and corruption inflamed ethnic animosity as billions of dollars were siphoned from the government by military bosses (White). Abacha planned to return Nigeria to a "civilian" government by October of 1998. However, all five political parties that he established nominated Abacha for the presidency - a deliberate attempt to maintain military control under the guise of a "civilian" government. There is a disturbing trend, particularly in West Africa, of military rulers resigning their commissions and competing in the "democratic" elections designed and supervised by their regimes (i.e. Ghana, Niger, Chad, and Gambia) (Dur6toye, 133). Military regimes justify political intervention by demonizing politics and politicians while characterizing military rule as a temporary corrective measure and no regime has ever presented military rule as a permanent fixture (Durotoye, 133; Beckett). So the people of Nigeria and around the world are understandably wary of this latest attempt at democracy.

General Abdulsalami Abubakar, who served as the intelligence chief under Babangida, has proven himself more in favor of handing over power to a civilian government than his predecessor and many see the death of Abacha as a chance to restore the country's legitimate government. Political parties established under his late predecessor have been discredited and abolished and Abubakar has set a timeline to return to civilian rule in May of 1999 (White). He has further facilitated the release of political prisoners who were imprisoned during the reign of Abacha as a symbol of good faith and to gain the favor of the international community. However, the July 7 death of jailed opposition leader, Chief Moshood Abiola, who won the annulled democratic election in 1993, not only sparked off widespread rioting, but many feared it may have sounded the death knell for a peaceful transition (Barling, 200). Interestingly, Abiola, who became the symbol of frustrated democracy, was thick as thieves with military strongmen throughout much of his career (White).

Nevertheless, even with the death of Abiola, the evolving process of democratization in Nigeria is going ahead full steam. Beginning in December of 1998, local elections will take place, culminating with the presidential election in February of 1999 (See Table 6). The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has given provisional approval to nine of the 29 associations that applied for registration as political parties and all are putting forth candidates (Agande). The election process has not been without its problems as people have accused the military regime of conspiring to retain control. In October, many could not register due to non-availability of voters' cards and accused INEC of having a hidden agenda (Uwugiaren). After a failed attempt at a democratic transition in 1993 when the elections were annulled by General Babangida, many in Nigeria and internationally are wary of the Nigerian military government and wonder if democratization will really take place this time.

General Abubakar has been giving the international community every indication that he will go through with his pledge to turn over the government to civilians in May of 1999. But, even if the elections are successful, Nigeria still has much work to do in order to ensure that the democracy will last. Thirty years of military dictatorships have produced a generation of civilian politicians m6re accustomed to doing business with tyrants than challenging them (White). Therefore, a peaceful democratization process must address not only the economic and ethnic ramifications, but also the role that the military will play in the new government.

One of the major obstacles to successful and long-lasting transfer of power from the military to a civilian government in Nigeria is the military itself. The long period of military rule set in motion the militarization of society and entrenchment of military oligarchy that is opposed to democratic rule. Under the Babangida and Abacha administrations, what used to be known as corruption has become the art of government itself in Nigeria. Conflict resolution mechanisms have broken down because the states do not view the military government as a neutral party (Joseph, 163). The general population has an increasing distaste for military regimes and is ready for a return to civilian government, but first the military must be genuinely willing to give up power.

Political activists want the military to decentralize its command structure before the local, gubernatorial, parliamentary and presidential elections take place, so that it cannot try to reshape the political landscape or cancel results with which it is unhappy as occurred in 1993. There~is a reaso~nable fear that military officers will resist giving up the privileges that they have established for themselves over decades (Nigerians Sign up for Polls). In addition to losing power and income, many military elite also fear prosecution if the civilian government probes into their financial affairs and human rights violations as is happening in South Africa (Wright, 41). Because of the local prestige associated with the positions, military and other political leaders are gathering chiefdom titles in an attempt to gain legitimacy (Abiola had more than 200). This is especially important as many military leaders attempt to strengthen ties for when the military leaves office (Wright, 40).

The role of the military in Nigeria must be totally recreated. The military needs to restructure in order to bring back trust and restore integrity (Fujah). It must support the democratization movement and play a passive role in the political landscape of the nation. The military cannot be allowed to usurp power from the civilian government and must cease to serve as a hired gun for multinational corporations against the people of Nigeria. In order for a successful transition, the military must allow politicians to make and correct their own mistakes. It is only this that will bring about political growth in the country (Jombo); However, even if the military successfully recreates its role in Nigeria, without economic invigoration, civil war will break out and bring the nation to its knees.

Nigeria's economy has been shackled since the days of colonial domination when countries were treated as businesses. Colonies were meant to profit the European governments and traders who controlled them and Nigerian leadership, like that of many African nations, have done little to distribute that wealth more broadly (Rupert). The macroeconomic instability has been accompanied by growing corruption, widening social inequality, institutional and infrastructure deterioration, volatile market instability, domestic lawlessness and international isolation (Lewis, 303).

At independence, agriculture accounted for more than half of all exports and 2/3 of gross domestic product in Nigeria (Wright, 3). Oil exploration began in 1938 and Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company was the only player until 1954 when American owned Mobil Exploration (Nig) Limited joined followed by several other multinational corporations. However, it was not until 1958 that the government took active interest in oil industry and in 1971, the Federal Government set up the Nigerian National Oil Company to work, produce, transport, store, and market petroleum (Abali, 5). By the mid 1970s, petroleum dominated the Nigerian economy. The oil boom had a crucial impact on the domestic politic and economy as revenues accrued to the federal government, increasing its influence over state governments within the country. And that wealth contributed to corruption (Wright, 3). Importantly, while petroleum became the mainstay of the economy in terms of both export revenues and attracting foreign investments, it has never been influential in terms of employment for Nigerian people (Wright, 103). Therefore the majority of the population cannot share in the wealth created by petroleum.

Ninety percent of Nigeria's foreign earnings come from crude oil sales, making Niger-Delta region stability crucial to the national economy (Oil Wars) (See Table 7). Oil reserves are concentrated in seven states of the federation: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers (Abali, 7). All the oil producing states are located in southern Nigeria with Delta state producing 38.6 percent of the nation's crude oil (Abali, 8). The natural resources have brought little profit to those who live beside them and have more often than not brought environmental devastation. Forty years of oil production directed by military governments has left the delta peoples poorer, sicker, less nourished, and less educated that the rest of the country. This neglect by the federal government is in part retaliation for a secession attempt by much of the delta in the Biafra War of the late 1960s. The northern generals who have ruled the country since independence have kept it starkly developed, without roads, bridges, electricity or running water. Oil spills have damaged fishing grounds and farmland, leading ethnic groups to campaign for a share of oil wealth and power, severely disrupting the output of the petroleum industry, relations with corporations, and the economic welfare of Nigeria (Rupert).

The phenomenal growth of oil revenues in the 1970s and early 1980s contributed to "skewed" economic and industrial development in Nigeria (Wright, 107). Funds were plen~jiful, resulting massive increases in public spending and an ambitious industrialization program. However, many of the programs were import intensive and substantially increased Nigeria's dependence on foreign countries and lessened the domestic trade. At the same time money was showered on neighboring countries. The growth of oil revenues combined with and reinforced a trend towards the centralization of power by the military government (Wright, 108). This gave corrupt officials easy access to government funds and since the oil boom first began, millionaire generals have become common. There has been an estimated $176 billion unaccounted oil revenues during the 1980-1992 period (Wright, 109).

The dominance of a single export product has made Nigeria especially susceptible to the global market forces, which led to the collapse of the economy in the 1980s. During the 1970s and early 1980s, oil revenues and general economic strength and confidence provided for the development of a burgeoning middle class and rising salaries. However, millions of well-educated Nigerians who once formed an ambitious middle class have fled the country in frustration (White). The middle class has been devastated by inflation, unemployment and deteriorating public services. The rural areas have not been as seriously afflicted, but they have suffered through a decade of almost no growth (Lewis, 319). The contraction of agriculture and manufacturing has led to high unemployment and an increased sense of frustration (Ambitious Economic Programme).

Within the public sector, which dominates the economic and social life of the states, education and health care are in an advanced state for collapse. Public hospitals are losing expensively trained staff to other countries or the private sector and secondary school systems are also not doing well, but the neglect is most apparent in higher education. Nigeria once boasted one of the finest university systems in sub-Saharan Africa. By 1990, Nigeria had 31 universities, 30 polytechnics, 54 colleges of education, 45 federal government colleges, and 5000 secondary schools (Wright, 52). However, starting in the late 1980s, as government resources became limited and student numbers grew, facilities and equipment could not keep up and the overall quality of education has declined. This has lead to a lack of the fundamentals such as books, paper, and student housing and many staff members have left for better opportunities (Barling, 201). As the quality declined, campuses became increasingly hostile to the state and federal governments. In 1996 academics in many universities went on strike to protest government policies and low salaries. The military reacted by closing universities, ~ the problem. This has contributed to the presence of approximately 10,000 Nigerians in higher education in the U.S. alone, many of whom remain abroad after graduation because of the lack of opportunities in their homeland (Wright, 53). The collapse of the middle echelon showed the stark contrast between the living styles and c6nditions of the minority and of the majority (Wright, 44). The circle of military leaders and civilian allie~s h-a5- mad~e extravagant gains throughout the 1990s, however, most wage earners (public and private sectors) have experienced plummeting real incomes (Lewis, 319). The per capita income of Nigerians that was 33rd highest in the world two decades ago has plummeted to the l3~ lowest, below even Haiti's (White; Barling, 201).

In spite of a daily processing capacity of 445,000 barrels for crude oil, Nigeria has been in a fuel crisis for the past 2 years. The country imports petrol and other petroleum products due to the neglect of the four government owned refineries, none of which is currently functioning. Because fuel is being imported, the citizens are charged exorbitant amounts leading to the proliferation of black market trade (Barling, 201). In October of 1998, more than 700 people died after the explosion of a gas pipeline while hundreds of people were fetching petrol from a burst oil pipe. The disaster in Jesse has jolted the government to find quick solutions to fuel scarcity and in late October, the government accelerated massive importation of fuel (Adeyemi). However, the damage had already been done and the seeming lack of government compassion for victims of the explosion has led to more outrage against the petroleum industry and the military regime (Adeyemi).

This mismanagement of an abundant natural resource highlights the severe economic problems that Nigeria is facing. The failure to diversify from a single traded commodity has placed the country in aprecarious position as has its failure to develop substantial trade relations within the African continent (Wright, 3). Nigeria is roughly equal to all of the other 15 members of ECOWAS combined in terms of population size and economic output. However, Nigeria has been constrained in its regional economic output by the low levels of official trade between member-states. This low level of activity is due partly to the fact that Nigeria is surrounded by countries that were once colonies of France, contributing to a mix of problems due to culture, economy, language and security (Wright, 5). The economic woes of member states have not only affected their ability to develop their countries but also their willingness to contribute to the financial well being of ECOWAS. Many member states have failed to pay dues ($44 million) with only three of the sixteen members not owing (Nigeria, Benin, and Ivory Coast). This has affected the entire region's ability to perform roles in crisis management and conflict resolution ~igeria and Responsibility to ECOWAS). Nigeria has been a very active participant in West African peacekeeping roles. The country, under military leadership, helped to ensure free and fair elections held in Liberia in 1997 and help to restore government of President Kagbbah to power in Sierra Leone with Nigerian-led West African force (Uba). These actions have courted international opinion and allowed Nigeria's military regimes greater freedom to abuse their power.

The region is taking steps to try and bolster trade, such as the implementation of a regional travelers check that can be exchanged across different currencies. However, while regional and continental support for Nigeria has remained strong, the country is just beginning to regain international favor. Because of humanitarian crimes committed by the military regime in the past few decades and its participation as a major transit point for the illegal drug trade, international censure has been placed on Nigeria (Dellios). Mild sanctions by the Commonwealth, European Union and the United states, which deliberately excluded oil exports, have contributed to environment of ostracism that has weakened Nigeria's economic linkages and undermined its national pride and status (Wright, 3). With the movement to democracy, many western national are beginning to reestablish full trade relations with Nigeria and many hope this will help reinvigorate the economy. - -

Finding ways of bolstering the economy is essential for the smooth transfer of power. Without additional funding the newly elected civilian administration would have no funds to implement its programs. It is also hard to conceive how order and peace can be restored if the living conditions of Nigerians drops lower than what it is at the moment. Tragically, Nigeria is within the top six amongst the world's oil producers yet Nigerians are among the poorest human beings on earth (Economic Summit's Gloomy Prediction). Abubakar's regime is working to stabilize the Nigerian economy - including scrapping monopolies, introducing privatization, and repealing legislation that inhibited competition. Although Nigeria's overall economic status has improved in recent years, as stated by military leader Abubakar, "We recognize that the macroeconomic stability recorded has not translated into higher standard of living for a majority of the population" (Ambitious Economic Programme). During the Nigerian banking boom in the late 1980s and early 1990s the government liberalized the licensing of banks. However, many of these banks were defaulting, creating a dangerous economic climate (Olori, "Twenty"). Early in 1998,36 Nigerian Banks were told to close in an effort to reinforce confidence in the nation's banking system (Olori, "Twenty"). Further steps are also being taken to reduce the budget on projects that are perceived by the public as phantoms for massive fund leakage. Many believe that charity must begin at home and that foreign aid to neighbors should also be drastically reduced until the economic crisis ends.

One source of governmental income will be the recovery of money looted from treasury by Abacha's corrupt military regime (Economic Summit's Gloomy Prediction). In November of 1998, members of late dictator's family handed over more than 625 million dollars and more than 75 million pounds sterling in hard currency, with billions more unaccounted for (Nigerian Government Recovers Looted Millions from Abacha's Family). If the government is successful in locating corrupt government officials and businessmen and recovering the money, that will go a long way in stabilizing the economy until further changes can be made to the infrastructure.

Nigeria's position in the international economy has deteriorated since the 1980s and by 1992 although there were significant inflows of direct foreign investment, there was virtually no engagement outside the petroleum sector (Lewis, 319). Nigeria received 32 per cent of all foreign direct investment in African in 1996, however it was all in the oil and gas sectors. It is extremely important that Nigeria diversifies its economy and engages states outside the Niger Delta in the national economy. Nigeria must build strong state economies that can be insulated from the vagaries of the Nigerian national economy and reduce their dependence on the federal government. To be successful, the Government must articulate sound development policies. For example, it can't call for additional private investment in states' economy when government is crippling private investors by refusing to pay the huge debts it afready owes (Badmus, 102).

Privatization is another an important key for re-energizing of the Nigerian economy and making public utilities efficient, but it must be approached carefully. People always seem to forget that if private hands acquire a public monopoly, because of the nature of a monopoly, that efficiency will not just come automatically because it is now in private hands. For that reason, many suggest that the government continue to operate utilities, but open the door to private ownership as well so that the power of the monopoly is broken. One will either die a natural death or both will improve and this type of arrangement has been successful with Nigeria Airways (Ogbu). However there is other concern that interference from the government will prevent private ownership from becoming effective so both the private industry and the government must work together (Privatization: Groups Say Now is the Time to Begin).

The move to privatization must take place quickly. Nigeria is feeling international pressure to privatize from both the World Bank and the IMF and moving quickly will increase the likelihood of further investment. Furthermore, the process of privatization and commercialization has been discussed for almost a decade under the regimes of Babangida and Abacha, however nothing much has happened with regard to the program prior to the death of Abacha on June 8, 1998. Unless Akubakar's regime is able to achieve an irreversible momentum in the privatization program, there is no guarantee that the incoming civilian administration would have the will to do it. It would be another way of reducing areas of patronage to party faithful (Privatization: Groups Say Now is the Time to Begin).

Private investment and the active engagement in international trade will be major factors affecting the ability of the Nigerian economy to rebound. Major international investors have started responding favorably to the positive socio-economic and political policies initiated by the new regime of General Abubakar. A group of international investors, led by a Saudi Prince have brought 30.7% of the United Bank for Africa (Nwachukwu). Hopefully, this will be a continuing trend and Nigeria tries to pump money into its economy. Since much of the nation's private investments comes from outside of Nigeria, multinational oil corporations control much of the petroleum industry, and international policies have a profound effect on the Nigerian economy, it is eminently important that the role of the international community be included in discussions on Nigeria's future.

Multinational corporations have contributed to the instability in the Nigerian government and the increasing frustration of the people. Corporations have benefited from go yemment liberalization policies in Nigeria, which favor the federal government and companies, to the detriment of the communities and the people since the colonial era. Multinational oil companies have caused environmental degradation and done little to improve quality of life for those closest to oil operations (Wright, 109). For instance, in the village of Atiwor, gasoline taints the river and the village has no water to drink (Rupert). In many villages the soil has been ruined, preventing the people from even planting crops to feed themselves. The deep poverty of the delta - alongside the luxurious homes and lives of the military rulers, political allies and the US and European oil firms who are their partners - has left people desperate, frustration, and bitter. Disillusioned youth have formed militias, stolen guns, seized oil facilities, and made war on ethnic rivals. Ogonis, Nembe, Ijawas and other ethnic groups have escalated protest to violence, often seizing oil facilities and oil company workers (Rupert). Nigeria has lost an estimated N8.3 billion in oil sales owing to the raging war between youths in the oil-producing states of Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, and Akwa Ibom and multinational oil companies operating in Niger Delta (Oil Wars).

Multinational oil companies and the government equally are responsible for much of the environmental and economic anguish in the Nigerian delta. It is a sad fact of life that the Nigerian military serves as a hired gun for transnational oil coml)anies although most companies officially deny this fact until they are exposed. Shell claims that it is a "law-abiding company". However, after years of denial, this year Shell finally accepted responsibility and admitted that it funded the 1993 military attacks that unleashed reign of terror on the Ogoni settlement of Korokoro (Oil Wars) American oil companies are no less responsible for the plight of the Niger Delta. United States oil giant Chevron played a major role in the killing of two delta activists earlier in 1998. Chevron called on the feared Nigerian Navy and Mobile Police to attack a group of unarmed people from a delta village called Ilajeland who had occupied one of Chevron's offshore drilling facilities demanding clean drinking water, electricity, environmental reparations, employment and scholarships for young people. Chevron consistently claimed its only action against the occupation was to call the federal authorities and inform them that armed people had taken over the station. However, in October 1998, a Chevron spokesperson conceded that the company had in fact transported the Nigerian soldiers to the facility and that the villagers were unarmed (Goodman).

Foreign oil firms, which have long avoided questions of development, have in recent years made efforts to improve life in the oil belt's villages, but it is too little, too late (Rupert). Shell, like many multinational oil companies operating in Nigeria, has a documented history of pollution of the waters and soil of the Niger-Delta. On its part, Shell blames the Nigerian government for the condition of the communities surrounding the corporations (Oil Wars). However, the admission of responsibility in past attacks leaves little doubt that multinational corporations have supported other forms of devastation. They should be held accountable for abusing the freedom that the government has provided them. "It is true that we would have never dreamed of behaving in Scotland the way we behaved in Nigeria," a retired delta oil manager admits. Oil pipes that should have been buried were not, he says, and gas was flared continuously (Santoro). The people of the delta want to end to the pollution caused by the oil companies and gain compensation for their oil-rich land. Half of oil production has been shut down by unprecedented acts of resistance, infuriating transnational oil-corporations and their Nigerian military business partners (Goodman). As the situation has worsened, many western nations whose citizens have business interests in Nigeria have become more interested in Nigeria achieving democracy and economic stability.

Western democratic powers have also contributed current situation in Nigeria because of a lack of cohesive policies towards Africa since colonization ended. For decades following independence, western countries have continued to treat African nations as places to exploit power, but not as viable political or trade partners. Atrocities that have been allowed to occur under the corrupt military leadership of Abacha and Babangida would never have been allowed to persist in a western country. Indeed, many in Nigeria feel betrayed that the American leadership has not increased political and financial assistance to the democratic movement in Nigeria, just as it did in Eastern Europe last decade. However, the stakes are different. The United States sees Europe as a viable trade partner and African as a viable source for resources, hence the differentiation in policy (Afro-Americans Slam Clinton's Nigeria Policy). The policies of the West towards Africa is hinged on th~ir economic interests and not on democratic value and practice as many are deluded to think (Ewulu).

Most western countries are in a position to take effective action and force change in Nigeria. However, they don't want their companies to stop doing business in Nigeria, which has prevented the emergence of a coherent Western policy towards the crisis. Indeed, trade with Britain, France, US, Japan, and Germany have all seen significant growth since 1996 under the tyranny of Abacha (Barling). The United States policy is "to support American companies and their operation abroad" (Goodman), but should that include supporting violations of human rights? Sales to the United States accounts for nearly _ of the annual oil revenue of Nigeria, leaving dictatorships extremely vulnerable to American sanctions. However, like most western nations, the United States has engaged in an "accommodation with the dictatorship that is a betrayal of the Nigerian people and an abandonment of principle in U.S. policy towards Africa". For the most part, administrations have refused to use their considerable economic influence for human rights and democracy (Afro-Americans Slam Clinton's Nigeria Policy). The United States and European Union have maintained some sanctions against the administration, but stopped short of oil sanctions. However, with 90% of Nigeria's export revenues coming from the petroleum industry, oil sanction are the only sanctions able to pressure a military that steals millions from the government coffers. All other sanctions are simply to give the impression of censure without affecting real economic pressure. Therefore, during his reign, Abacha rightly concluded that he could sit out Western pressures against his regime and continue to rape the country of its resources and people of their dignity (Wright, 103). He continued to do so until his death and probably would have prolonged these actions with his corrupt attempt at re-establishing a "democracy" under his leadership with the full "support" of the Western powers.

Because of this ambivalent behavior by many western nations, many fear that if elections are once again annulled by the military regime, the people of Nigeria would lack the full support of the democratic nations of the Americas and Europe, Nigeria's major trade partners. Canada has announced that it would offer financial and technical assistance for Nigeria's political transition program, but it is the only western country to offer full assistance thus far. While the US and Britain have praised the new regime in Nigeria for its reconciliation efforts and swift moves to bring about political reform in West African nation, they have done little to aid in the spread of democracy (Olori, "Nigeria"). It is definitely the will of the people of Nigeria to become a democracy, after all, they expressed their opinion clearly in 1993. But the international community has allowed the military regime to ignore the will of the people and given the people of Nigeria reason to believe that the democratic powers of the world do not believe that democracy is of the utmost importance, just capitalism. Since international interests are still making money with Nigeria in its current state, they are willing to let the people continue to suffer. Only recently, since the people of Nigeria have begun to take actions into their own hands and led attacks on the ability of the corporations to make money has the world taken notice. But this is unacceptable if the democratically elected government in Nigeria is to be successful and pull Nigeria out of its current economic and social crisis.

Nigeria is imminently important to the continent of Africa. With the largest demographic on the continent, if Africa is to become a viable part of the global economy, Nigeria must become politically and economically stable. The citizens of Nigeria are doing their part by pushing for democratic elections which will take place in the coming months. However, the military, government, corporate interests, and the international community must also do their parts.

The military government must first show it is genuine in its attempt to restore power to a civilian government and follow through with the pledge for military withdrawal in May of 1999. The role of the military must be redefined and become a service to the people of Nigeria rather than an oppressor. The government must pursue economic policies to reinvigorate the national economy and decrease dependence on a single commodity since the oil reserves are expected to last only until 2020. If a replacement in the national economy is not found before that time, the country will collapse (Wright, 109). The government must also defuse ethnic animosity, provide government funds to improve the infrastructure, and restore trust in the federal government. Rampant corruption must become a thing of Nigeria's past and the country must work to lure back educated Nigerians from around the world to rebuild its national economy. Nigeria must prove that it is earnest in its attempts to remove the stigmas attached to its involvement in the drug trade and humanitarian crimes against its own people so that sanctions will be removed and Nigeria will be able to rejoin the global economy.

The western powers, especially the United States, also play a critical role in the success of the "makeover" of Nigeria. The military regimes have been aware that the civil society is too weak and apathetic to resist and that the Western society too protective of its own interests to intervene (Wright, 96), leading to a dangerous balance as we await the transfer of power to a civilian government. The international democratic community must actively support Nigeria's democratization movement because the people have made their choice of government heard. The United States government has offered verbal support for pledges made by Nigeria's new head of state, but diplomatic and economic sanctions - however weak - imposed against military regime of Abacha remain. The European Union decided to lift all non-military sanctions against Nigeria in late October. However, Nigerians want the West to be very cautious about offering the regime any rhetorical or other support that it could interpret as western complacency because that might lead to a repeat of the situation in 1993 when the elections were annulled by the military regime (Lobe). If General Abubakar does not keep his pledge the U.S. and the European Union should take immediate actions to enforce an oil embargo. The military has been willing and able to remain in power for so long because of the abundant availability of wealth, supplied directly by international governments. The United States alone accounts for 1/2 of the export of petroleum and if the source of that wealth is shut off, the military will be forced to comply.

Western powers like the United States must not only hold responsible the government of Nigeria, but also the multinational corporations. They must not continue to give tactic approval for oil companies to operate in the same manner in which they have for the past 6 decades. The petroleum industry controls more than 90% of Nigeria's revenue and is a key component to the economic future of Nigeria. The degradation to the land, the people and the economy must stop and corporations must be forced to act as citizens of the earth. It must become in the interest of the oil companies to support the changes that are occurring in Nigeria. Sadly, since most corporations operating in Africa have shown time and time again that only the only profits count, actions must be taken to financially convince multinational corporations that they want to change. Nations should consider, not only sanctions against the government of Nigeria, but also against the multinational corporations that are responsible for the environmental degradation and support policies destructive to human rights. Corporations must not be able to continue to use the Nigerian military to pursue personal policies and the people of Nigeria should be prepared to request international peacekeeping forces to prevent such a catastrophe from continuing once the democratic government takes place. Corporations must do their part by pursuing vigorous plans to reverse the environmental degradation caused by years of neglect and changing their operating policies in Africa to be more in line with those in Europe. They must further make the communities feel involved in the petroleum industry through employment and engage in dialogue with the citizens and the government. If oil corporations do not successfully engage the communities and help end ethnic conflicts, the oil wars will continue causing corporations to lose millions of dollars and Nigeria's oil output to keep dwindling, putting the country in an even more precarious economic position.

Nigeria is at the threshold of a new beginning. Democratization and a renewed economy will put Nigeria in the position to help lead the continent of Africa in the next century. Although these changes will not happen overnight and many setbacks may take place along the way, Nigeria has the golden opportunity to rejoin the global economy and make its citizens feel like a nation. Nigeria is on the brink of democracy and it must succeed.

Table 1: Populations of Regions by Consensus (in thousands) (Wright, 46)

* Abuja became the capital in 1991. Data unavailable before 1991.

Table 2: State Populations According to the 1991 Census (Wright, 49)

Table 3: State Creation (Wright 51~~ Suberu, 354)

NM - Northern Minority, SM - Southern Minority

Table 4: Governments in Nigeria: 1960-1998 (Wright 68)

Table 5: Nigeria's Army Takeovers

Table 6: Democratization Movement Timeline (Olori, "Nigeria")

Table 7: Crude Oil Production in 1992 (Abali, 7)

Abali, Deson. "Impact of oil on Nigeria's Foreign Policy." Essavs on Ni~erian Politics and Government: Forei2n Policy Series January 1996: Vol.1 No.1.

Adeyemi, Segun. "Nigeria to Import More Fuel." Panafrican News Agency October 29, 1998:

http://www.africanews.or~PANAinews/1998 1 O29Ifeat4.html

"Afro-Americans slam Clinton's Nigeria Policy." Electronic Mail & Guardian. Johannesburg. South Africa May 20, 1998: http:I/www.mg.co.za/mglnews/98may2I2Omay-nigeria.html.

Agande, Ben and Jacob Edi, (Abuj a). "The Next republic will Collapse If." Post Exoress (La~os. Nigeria), November 3, 1998: http://www.postexpresswired.coml.

"Ambitious Economic Programme." African Research Bulletin: Economic Financial and Technical Series July 16-August15, 1998: 13540-13541.

Badmus, Aliu A. "The Challenges of Economic Development Amidst Declining Opportunities." Ni~erian Educational Digest: Journal of Kwara State ColIe2e of Education. ILORIN December 1997: Volume 3, #1, 95 - 104.

Barling, Kurt & Sola Akinrinade. "The Edge of the Abyss." The World Todav AugustlSeptember 1998: 200-202.

Beckett, Paul. "Review of Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria." American Political Science Review: Volume 92, Number 3.

Dellios, Hugh. "Once just a supplier, Nigeria develops heroin woes." Chicago Tribune, July 29, 1998.

Durotoye, Yomi and Robert J. Griffiths. "Civiliani zing Military Rule: Conditions and Processes for Political Transmutation in Ghana and Nigeria." African Studies Review December 1997: Volume 40, Number 3, 133-160.

"Economic Summit's Gloomy Prediction" Post Express (Lagos, Ni2eria) October 28, 1998:

http://www.postexpresswired.com/.

Ewulu, Bright. "Nzirimo Blames Developmental Failure on Faulty Foundation." Post Exoress (Lagos. Nigeria) November 8, 1998: http:I/www.postexpresswired.coml.

Fujah, Hakeem. "Dimensions of National restructuring." Post Express (Lagos. Nigeria) November 2, 1998: http :llwww.postexpresswired.com/.

Funso, Afolayan "Nigeria: A political Entity and A Society." Dilemmas of Democracy in Ni~eria Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1997.

Goodman, Amy and Jeremy Scahill. "Drilling and Killing." The Nation November 16, 1998:

http:IIwww.TheNation.com/981 116/11 16G00D.HTM

Jombo, Okechukwu (Abuja). "Why we Oppose Zoning, Power Shift." Post Express (Lagos. Nigeria), November 3, 1998: http:/Iwww.postexpresswired.com/.

Joseph, Richard. "Democratization Under Military Rule and Repression in Nigeria." Dilemmas of Democracv in Ni~eria Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1997.

Lewis, Peter. "Politics and the Economy: A downward Spiral." Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1997.

Lobe, Jim. "US welcomes Nigeria moves - but sanctions remain." Electronic Mail & Guardian. Johannesbur2. South Africa July 22, 1998: http://www.mg.co.za/mg/newsI98jly2I22july-nigeria.html.

"Nigeria's Moment." The Nation July 27 - August 3,1998: Volume 267 Number 4, 3-4

"Nigeria: President from the South Possible." African Research Bulletin: Political Social and Cultural Series: 13212-13213.

"Nigeria and Responsibility to ECOWAS." Post Exoress (Lagos. Nigeria) October 27, 1998:

http://www.postexpresswired.com/.

"Nigerian government recovers looted millions from Abacha's family" Yahoo! In Asia News November 1, 1998: http:/Iwww.yahoo.com.sg/headlines4 01198/world.

"Nigerians sign up for polls." Electronic Mail & Guardian. Johannesbur~. South Africa October 6, 1998: http://www.nig.co.za/mg/news/98octl/6oc-nigeria.html

Nwachuku, Clara. "Saudi Prince, Other Foreigners Invest N2.Sb in UBA." Post Exoress (Lagos. Nigeria) November 13, 1998: http://www.postexpresswired.com/.

Ogbu, Chijama. "My Fears about Privatization, by Akwaeze." Post Express (Lagos. Nigeria), November 2, 1998: http:I/www.postexpresswired.com/.

"Oil Wars" AfricaNews Online October 14, 1998:

http://www.africanews.org/west/nigeria/stories/1 9981014_feat2.htmi.

Olori, Toye. "Twenty six African banks told to close." Electronic Mail & Guardian. Johannesburg. South Africa January 20, 1998: http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/98jan2/2Ojanuary-nigerianbanks.html.

Olori, Toye. "Nigeria releases election timetable." Electronic Mail & Guardian. Johannesburg. South 27, 1998: http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/98aug2/27aug-nigeria.html.

Osemwota, Osa. Regional Economic disnarity and Conflict in Nigeria 1960 -67. Ugbowo Benin City: Omega Publishers Limited, 1994.

Oyo, Remi. "Nigerian clashes worry investors." Electronic Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg. South Africa October 29,1998: http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/98octl/29oc-nigeria.html.

"Privatization: Groups Say Time to Begin is Now." Post Express (Lagos. Nigeria), October 30 1998: http://www.postexpresswired.com/

Rupert, James. "Deni(~'d Wealth, Nigeria's Poor Take Dire Steps." The Washington Post November 8, 1998: A18.

Santoro, Lara. "David and Goliath in Africa." Christian Science Monitor. November 18, 1998:

http://www.c smonitor.com/durable/1 998/11/1 8/fpss 1 -csm.shtml.

Soggot, Mungo. "US policy, four years after Nigeria's "coup"." Electronic Mail & Guardian. Johannesburg. South Africa June 16,1997: http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/97june 1/1 6june-nigeria.html.

Suberu, Rotimi "Federalism, Ethnicity and Regionalism in Nigeria." Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1997.

Uba, Jude. "Africa's "Finest Hour" Approaches." Daily Nation, April 6,1998.

Uwugiaren, lyobosa. "Outrage as Voters Can't Register." AfricaNews Online October 19,1998:

http://www.africanews.org/west/nigeria/stories/1 9981019_featl .html.

Vaughan, Olufemi "Traditional Rulers and the dilemma of democratic transitions in Nigeria." Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1997.

White, Jack. "Desperate for Democracy." Time July 20, 1998: Volume 152, No 3.

Wright, Stephen. Nigeria: Struggle for Stability and Status. Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1998.