Conflict and social unrest are not recent phenomenon in Mexican economic and political spheres. The January rebellion organized and headed by the Ejercito Zapatista Liberacion Nacional (EZLN) in the state of Chiapas highlighted the need for land and other resources that have been historically denied to the indigenous and rural populations throughout Mexico. I will, through the course of this paper, point to the neglect and exploitation specific to Chiapas. There is a point of agreement between all parties involved; it is inarguably that the Mexican state is facing an agricultural crisis. Surveying the historical progression of land reform provided a forum for policy analysis, which I will discuss more specifically, and an opportunity to identify common weaknesses in Mexican land reform policy. In identifying the problems found in this policy I will discuss possible alternatives in my recommendations.

Tracing the history of land reform throughout Mexico, more specifically its effects on Chiapas, certain policy trends are evident and certain cycles of government interest and disinterest in the issue are also manifest. The Mexican Revolution led to the establishment of a Constitution (1917) that included Article 27, an article providing for the redistribution of land and the creation of the ejido. This article would serve as the basis for agrarian reform of the following eighty years. It was not until Lazaro Cardenas’ presidency in 1930 that it was used and integrated in reform policy. Cardenas established a policy that expropriated of the largest estates turning them into ejidos or communal lands.

Cardenas’ move for agrarian land reform was historically significant. However, Cardenas' policy was slow in reaching the more remote areas, like Chiapas which did not feel the impact of the reforms until the late thirties and early forties. The forties brought more reform to Chiapas; improvements were scheduled and made to Chiapaneco infrastructure. These improvements made Chiapas more appealing to outside and foreign investors. The reform set by Cardenas in 1930 was active until 1965; a policy which over the course of thirty-five years made significant improvements and progress. Although the indigenous communities managed to gain control of over 1/2 of the land redistributed by 1950, the land was less fertile and more difficult to cultivate than the larger estates.

By 1969 exploration for oil began in the north eastern section of the state of Chiapas. The industrialization of the oil in Chiapas began in 1971 and caused a migration of peasants to this part of Chiapas in search of work in the oil industry. As a result of this new industry, a shift of the Chiapaneco agricultural labor force resulted and contributed significantly to Mexico’s inability to produce sufficient amounts of staple crops like maize. The development of the cattle industry also took shape during this period of time. The Mexican government, with the support of the World Bank, encouraged peasants to involve themselves in the industry. However, the government directed peasants to participate in the riskiest aspect of the cattle industry, the raising of calves.

The participation of these peasants in raising calves further devastated the agrarian economy. Because living conditions were so poor and the capital available for adequate resources needed to raise cattle was not as readily accessible to the peasant population many cattle suffered and were lost to malnutrition and disease. Consequently, peasants were forced to sell them at prices set by the buyer. Peasants turned to illegally renting their lands to larger cattle ranchers. This was so common that, "by 1983 30% of cattle ranches were in the hands of latifundistas while 100,000 peasants were landless."

The emergence of Echeverria as president in 1970 prompted the redirection of agrarian policy. Echeverria embraced reform that, "opened uncolonized land to peasants." Echeverria’s efforts to expand the previous limits of agrarian reform included incorporating peasants into the reform bureaucracy. Although Echeverria directed efforts at agrarian reform and land redistribution, he also shifted the concentration of production from staple foods to foods like vegetables and meat, food for consumption by the middle class. In effect, these reforms contributed to the inability of Mexico to produce the staple foods necessary to feed its own people.

The 1980’s was riddled with economic instability as the debt crisis took firm hold of the nation. The collapse of oil prices in 1982, Mexico's inability to pay off its national debt, and pressure from the international economic community caused Mexico to make cuts. Mexico made cuts in federal expenditures, thus devaluing the peso, slashing wages, and removing subsidies for urban and rural poor. These cuts significantly devastated the agrarian sector of the economy. The implications of these cuts included a lack of funds for independent organizations, which translated into an absence of government land grants.

Under president Miguel De La Madrid in 1983, Chiapaneco Governor Castellano Dominguez launched land reform programs that redistributed large blocks of land. In light of these reforms the Chiapaneco peasants did not make significant gains; of the 493 large plots distributed only 27 were given to peasants. Trends like this continued to plague the region throughout the eighties.

By 1988 the effects of the failed reforms and the debt crisis led to decreases in agricultural production. From 1982- 1987 production of staple foods like maize fell 20% and Mexico was importing $4 billion per annum in corn alone. 1989 brought the emergence of Salinas de Gortari and neo-liberal policies. By 1992 Salinas de Gortari resolved the issue of land reform in his terms; he nulled and basically dismantled article 27, destroying the premise for land distribution. The decision to change article 27 was part of Salinas’ efforts to, as Collier says, "further liberalize agrarian production." Also part of Salinas de Gortari’s plans was to legalize sharecropping and rental of ejidal lands. These policies reflected Salinas’ general plans, to attract and incorporate foreign investment and the modernization of the state.

Reform efforts failed for several reasons and among them are three, which I will discuss further. The three reasons are: the inconsistency of government implementation of policy and the establishment of policy specific goals, government corruption, and the top-down hierarchy of power. I will use the historical information previously mentioned to point to specific events, periods, and policies which illustrate these reasons.

The inconsistency of the Mexican government’s support and enforcement of land reform policies has led to an ineffective set of results. Throughout all phases of land reform the government officials attempted, and often succeeded, in circumventing the true purpose of land reform and managed to build the concentrated base of economic power made up of wealthy land owners. George Collier makes reference to the undermining of these peasants and the passive treatment of their urgent need for land.

Most of the land that Lazaro Cardenas’s representatives turned over to peasant communities in Chiapas was marginal land that highland ranchers had appropriated from Indian communities in the nineteenth century. ......1950’s their(peasant) needs could still be met by granting them small parcels of less valuable lands on the outskirts of plantations.

Collier’s reference to the way in which policy was implemented during the time points to the government’s undermining of indigenous communities. The government appeared to be working for the good of peasant communities, and appeared to be making legislative progress, when in reality, peasants were only being patronized through minimum concessions. This example reflects the government's incomplete commitment to true land reform.

Furthermore, these type of policy implementations were ineffective because of the absence of policy specific goals. Improvements made in terms of land reform policy were generally not set in quantitative terms, as exemplified in the first thirty years of the reform. Under De La Madrid, Governor Castellano Dominguez, distributed more land in the six year period of his office than the amount previously distributed in the first thirty years of land reform. Again this points to the lack of goal directed policy; had the first wave of reforms been accompanied by more specific goals progress may not have been as slow.

Government corruption is an enormously significant factor when examining land reform and Mexican policy in general. The government’s consistent commitment to constituents vitally important to the livelihood of their political position led to the growing disparity between rich and poor, the continued need for resources such as capital, medical services, roads, and schools and the decline of the agricultural sector of the economy. Alignment of the PRI with foreign investors, businessmen, companies, large estate owners, and (often coerced or manipulated) indigenous supporters led to inequalities and a disparity between the amount of services given to the less fortunate and the already fortunate. Even the most recent presidency has demonstrated obvious loyalty to outside sources as reflected in policy. Salinas De Gortari’s commitment to the NAFTA organization and the ‘modernization’ of Mexico are clear indications of his commitment to investment. Furthermore, his repeal of article 27 reflects his move away from agrarian issues and the need for modernization.

The interventionist and top-down hierarchical power structures created and implemented in the agrarian sectors of Chiapas have proven to fail. As cited by Rossett and Burbach ,"it (policy of intervention) has not failed because of any inherent ‘backwardness’ of the ejido or because of a lack of initiative on the part of the Mexican peasantry." Collier gives a proposal, that will be discussed later, that provides an example of a possible power structure that would benefit and in effect work better within the indigenous communities.

The agricultural economy of Mexico, as existing in Chiapas, would benefit from restructuring and redirecting policy. The following are recommendations I feel would expedite and ameliorate the agricultural crisis in Chiapas. Although these recommendations are not complete enough to solely base an policy on they do serve, in my view, as important points of departure for the development of an effective policy.

First and foremost in importance is that the Mexican government recognize the desperate need that the people of Chiapas are in and that the appeal by the Zapatistas for land should be taken seriously. The government should reassess the repeal of article 27 and adjust it accordingly to return the article to its original purpose. Doing these two things would open the door to negotiation and compromise in terms of designing policy that addresses the needs of both the government and the indigenous populations; failing to do so could only lead to more miserable conditions and further contribute to social unrest. It is in the best interest of the Mexican government to heed the demands of the Zapatistas.

The government should recognize the potential peasant populations have for producing crops for agribusiness. However, what the government should realize, the peasant population has already recognized this, that in order to successfully produce crops more than land is needed. The government should look to ways of empowering the peasant populations; providing these populations with support services and market access should be primary objectives. In order to be adequately prepared to produce crops on larger scales (small scales as well) the Mexican government must go beyond building roads and dams, although these are vastly important, they must extend the breadth of services available to these communities. Salinas De Gortari’s repeal of services like credit, technical assistance, marketing and agricultural advising are precisely what should have remained; these services are exactly what peasants need to diversify and upscale their production operations.

In terms of market access, the government should look to making subsidies and tariffs beneficial for peasant industries. Providing these subsidies and tariffs would help insure fair prices. If peasants are kept out of the market because of low prices they cannot compete and therefore resort to more desperate measures of acquiring income, measures that only cause them to sink further into the extremities of poverty.

Peasants must also be incorporated into policy making. In doing so, effectively, peasants would be part of the process of planning rather than having the process be about them. The peasant sector of the economy has survived to this point in light of countless obstacles. They have been able to do so through their own innovations and plans and they very possibly could offer effective plans that had otherwise been overlooked by the government. This would grant the peasant the power of decision and choice, two vitally important powers that could lead to a more stable society.

Peasant communities should be granted certain degrees of autonomy; the top-down interventionist methods enforced by the government have proven to fail. The power structure or structure of accountability of the EZLN is a possible model to be looked at. Communities granted larger, more fertile lands to use as a collective could effectively use this model. The model, as Collier refers to in his book, would consist of a general assembly at the top, with a set of delegates and officers on the tier below, with a committee of directors below that tier, and an advisor, director and administrator at the bottom. This structure could very possibly work effectively for the peasant communities, considering their cultural and geographical circumstances.

The government must also recognize that these peasants are capable enough of forming their own ties to large distributors that respectfully collaborate with the indigenous producers. Collier discusses this saying, "Economists and planners need to recognize...how diverse and flexible peasants’ enterprises can be. Those who plan agrarian development need to recognize the potential of such peasant enterprise." The Zapatistas, among other community organizations, have made demands that have also been accompanied by plans and suggestions for solutions. These groups are willing to help find solutions and they are equally able to develop such plans effectively; the Mexican government should take note of this vitally important source of knowledge and innovation when considering reform.