My study is on “The Evolution of Political Alternatives in Mexico and
how they are affecting revolutions such as the one in Chiapas”
For the
greater part of the 20th Century, Mexico politics has been dominated
by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), a party started as a union of
local and state groups which quickly became a coalition of labor and “popular”
sectors, giving it the broad based support that it holds today throughout
Mexico. The party has had its difficult
times throughout its years of dominance but electoral fraud, ballot tampering,
violence, and bribery have been used to sustain its political dominance over
the two other major political parties in Mexico: the National Action Party
(PAN) and the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). Only until recently have the people of Mexico been able to put up
a respectable fight in a revolution for a true democracy in their country.
The PRI’s
actions and poor treatments of the people and their poor effort in providing
the basic freedoms of life have not gone unnoticed. On New Years day of 1994, the Zapatsita National Liberation Army,
formed mainly of Indian peasants, led a rebellion against the military in the
southern state of Chiapas. Living in
one the poorest regions in Mexico, the Zapatistas claimed that years of
government neglect left the Indians in poverty. The rebels demanded better social services, more jobs, and the
ultimate autonomy of Mexico’s native peoples.
The rebel’s leader, subcomandante Marcos has stated many times that all
the Zapatistas demand for all of Mexico is the right to live with justice,
democracy, liberty and dignity. Their
actions were brought in a manner of desperation.
“There are
two very different Mexico’s living side by side,” says an Economic and
political analyst. “In one is the top
15 percent who have the purchasing power, then there is a massive, very
low-income, poverty stricken population, mostly concentrated in the
south.” This statement sums up why the
indigenous people have revolted. There
is something wrong with the current political system under which they live and
they want it to change.
A partial
accord was signed in early 1996, giving the Indians greater rights but the
initiative was killed when President Zedillo failed to submit it to congress
because he said the accord overstepped the bounds of the constitution and
threatened to tear the country apart.
The conflict intensified in December 1997 when a group connected with
the PRI attacked a mountainside village in Chiapas and massacred 50 people. More than 150 people, including
Chiapas state officials, supporters of the ruling party and police officers
have either been charged or are under investigation in connection with the
killings.
Since
early 1996, almost no progress has been made.
Even in the last months of 1998, where the governments and the rebels
first meeting in two years took place, the great prospects of settling the
matters failed. Continual failed hopes
in these meetings are what have made the rest of Mexico’s population take
notice and in turn take action. The people recognize this as the government’s
problem and question why it hasn’t been resolved. Although there has been little accomplished by the rebels in
Chiapas, the people of Mexico have made substantial change in the voting
process during the last ten years. As result many doors have opened for
complete reform and assurance that the government will once again be totally
controlled by democracy and in the hands of the people rather than the powerful
few.
Beginning in 1988, many PRI members left
to the opposition parties. The
elections that year were a bit of a wake up call for the PRI. They lost 48% of their seats in the Lower
House of Congress. From 1988 to 1997, the ruling party had many problems to
deal with. There was the assassination
of a top presidential candidate, the Chiapas development, the continuation of
corrupt elections, and major economic problems that were not being addressed
until it was too late. In 1997 with
only 165 district victories, the PRI failed in retaining its absolute majority
in the house of deputies, which used to be the rubber stamp for the president
and his agenda. There was a huge amount
of seats won by the PDR.
Meanwhile,
the PRD also won an overwhelming victory in Mexico City. Cuauhtemoc
Cardenas, the party’s founder, won the powerful mayorship of Mexico
City. Also, the PRD took 38 of the local
assembly districts in Mexico’s capital city, PAN took 2, and most
significantly, PRI took none. Thus, the
PRD in a very real sense has total control of Mexico as a federal
district. Their success wasn’t just
felt in Mexico City. The PRD gained
nearly nine percentage points in all congressional seats throughout the
country. They made gains in every state
except Chiapas. PAN also made its
presence felt. They did well in the
states north and west of the capital, winning 6 governor chairs.
Studies
have shown that the number of votes received by the PRI have steadily declined
in recent years. The PRI machine still
seems to function, but the overall campaign in 1997 demonstrated that the PRI
continues to keep losing support and power.
So who are these two parties and what are they all about? Why are they getting votes and how can they
help the situations such as the one in Chiapas?
Former PRI
member Cuauhtemoc Cardenas founded the Democratic Revolutionary (PRD) in 1988.
It emphasizes social welfare and greater state control of the economy, and it
opposes initiatives increasing trade and foreign investment. The PRD was built
on a grass roots organization in what had been an overwhelming priista
state. In the late 1980’s, neighborhood
teams of PRD volunteers went door to door, countering the PRI’s efforts with a
message that rooting out the corruption is better long term than getting a few
handouts before every election. This
strategy boosted the PRD’s number of votes and set them up for a victorious
election in 1997. The PDR draws its
support mostly from poorer rural residents in central and Southern Mexico. PAN draws its support from the industrial
north and other urban areas. It is viewed as pro-Catholic and pro-business. The
PAN's conquest of city halls has been impressive. The PAN likes to point out that it governs or will govern 15 of
the 20 largest cities in the country, including all of the larger regional
cities except Acapulco and Chihuahua. All together, PAN will now govern 308 and
the PRD 251 of Mexico's 2,395 municipalities, and those figures correspond to
35 percent and 19 percent of the population.
Although
the new pragmatism and success of the two opposition parties is good news,
there does come a danger. As the PRI disintegrates, more and more of its state
and local leaders are switching party allegiances. Many are doing so more out
of opportunism than principle. In so
doing, they bring along many of the old vices: graft, patronage, nepotism,
padded expense accounts. But the plain
and simple truth is that the people want change and suffering through a few
setbacks to get that a minimal concern on their minds during this revolutionary
period in Mexico’s history.
The regime
issues that dominated 1997 election will continue to shape political
developments in the coming two years for Mexico. Since Mexico voted to deny
President Zedillo his PRI majority he will now have to govern by negotiating
with the opposition, and perhaps with his own party too. It’s ironic now that during the Salinas
administration of 1988-94, the PAN was accused of working too closely with the
PRI in its policy decisions. Now the
role is reversed for the PRI and their leader.
President Zedillo is now going through a role reversal in order to save
his party from complete defeat in the 2000 elections. He has made a valid effort trying to be more of a “peoples”
president by working harder for the rights of the poor and working harder for
the life and liberty of all Mexican citizens.
Now that
the PAN and the PRD have a greater role in their government, the two will
probably put forward bills to further decentralize authority and public
spending which would make it possible for local governments to be more
responsive to the local electorates.
They will put bills up that will benefit the people, but will most
likely fail because they do not have the power to make such change yet. The only power they have now is the ability
to stop PRI legislation from making the speedy deliverance to the president’s
office for signing.
Being able
to stop legislation and have presence felt in the capital is a big feat for an
opposition party to the PRI, but in order to get what’s better for the people,
it’s evident that the PRI needs to get driven out of power completely. In early 1996, Mexican Congress called a
special session to discuss a major overhaul of the political system and debate
political reform but later backed down.
The PRI have talked plenty of times dealing with the reform of Mexico
politics and government, but have repeatedly failed to produce. This is very similar to situation in the state
of Chiapas.
The
government has said for almost five years now that they wanted to resolve the
situation with the Zapatistas, but have failed to do so. In the end, the PRI is the one who has
failed in this stalemate between the indigenous Indians and the government. The
people have concluded that if the government powered by the ways of the PRI
can’t handle a situation of that magnitude, how are they going to handle the
social injustices suffered by other millions throughout Mexico. The people most likely will continue to vote
in PRD and PAN members into political positions because they feel that where
there hope lies.
Many
people feel that Mexico is too corrupt and too deep in their own problems to
ever bring about change. But, it is
apparent that revolutionary reform is well underway and that significant
changes in high political seats will continue on the tread of winding up in
non-PRI member hands. The Mexican
people have a firm belief that change will happen soon and sooner than
later. Personally I think a non- PRI
candidate will win the presidency very soon.
Maybe in the year 2000, maybe 2006.
The key to these elections is that now more then ever, the votes are in
the hands of the people, and not the powerful few. Less fraud in a sense means more non-PRI members in control.
The voting
citizens in Mexico have taught the rebels in Chiapas a lesson. They have learned that change doesn’t have
to happen by violence, it has to happen by patience and the ability to take
action by voting. Why did opposition
parties make gains in every state except in Chiapas? It was because they had thought that Mexico’s democratic system
had failed. Now they have seen that it
hasn’t. Nothing is being resolved in
the talks that they’re having with the government now. Only until the Mexican government is taken
over by the PRD or PAN, will the Zapatistas get what they want. Only then will the Mexican people receive
justice, democracy, liberty, and dignity.
Only then will there be peace in Mexico.
Bibliography
Yoo, Aileen S. “The Rise and Fall of Mexican Politics” Washington Post 1997
Rosset, Peter and Cunningham,
Shea “Understanding Chiapas” WWW Food First Action Alert.
1996
CNN
website. “Chiapas Rebel Leader Willing to Restart Peace Talks” (AP)
October 19,1998
Institutu Federal Electoral(IFE);
Press Reports. 1997
Moore, Molly. “Mayor Elect Keeps Eyes on Presidency” (AP) WWW.
1997
Klesner, Joseph. “Democratic Transition: The 1997 Mexican Elections” WWW.
Reding, Joseph. “What’s behind the PRD’s success?” Los Angeles Times October 12, 1997