Korea, as
one of the remaining divided nations in the world produced by the Second World
War and the ensuing cold war politics 9 between the United States and the
Soviet Union, has continuously attracted the attention of governments around
the world. Recent concerns among
foreign policy makers of related nations regarding inter-Korean relations have
risen sharply, since conflict and competition between the two divided portions
of Korea have begun to have great impact on the power balance among East Asian
nations. It is undeniable that in one
way or another foreign policy among the United States, the Soviet Union, the
People's Republic of China, and Japan are directly linked to inter-Korean
relations. The division imposed by the
victors of the Second World War in 1945 produced two ideologically opposing
political entities on the Korean Peninsula, which have competed continuously
for political dominance. The North
Korean political system and style find their origin both in the indigenous
political culture and external influences.
The most important political force utilized by Kim 11-Sung to create a
communist state was the dictatorial imprint of the Soviet occupation after
World War 11. In that way, the
Communist revolution in North Korea was unique, because unlike other communist
countries, it was not initiated by native elements. The North Korean regime is in inevitable competition with the
South Korean government in every conceivable way. It is this competition that has threatened the stability of both
countries. Therefore, the political
climate in North Korea is very unstable, especially in light of the recent
events such as the nation-wide famine.
The
geographic position of North Korea has had a great influence upon its history
and present difficulties. Korea forms a
strategic center of East Asia with China on one side, Russia on another, and
Japan on a third. Because of this fact,
both the cross currents of East Asian civilization and the ambitions of Korea's
neighbors have flowed through Korea. The
policy of the United States after World War 11 was predicated upon its desire
to see the emergence of Korea as an independent and democratic nation,
according to the Western concept of liberal democracy. Russia's goal was primarily to create
conditions oriented to the Soviet Union, with its implicit desire to control
Korea to advance its national interest. (Park, Koh, & Kwak p.78) The impact
of these two outside powers taking a large role in politics in Korea had an
effect on the stability of the country as a whole.
By 1948,
the result of the great power rivalry had been to institutionalize a Korean
civil war between the North zone (socialist) and the South zone
(democratic). The timing and method of
the North Korean attack were dictated by the Japanese factor. By 1949, it was clear that the U.S. intended
to revive Japan as the key to the cold war system in Asia, a move that raised
the idea of the reintegration of the South into a Japanese sphere of influence,
backed by the U.S.. For Kim 11-Sung, the war was a pre-emptive move, designed
to snatch the South from a new threat and allow a united Korea greater freedom
of maneuver within the Socialist Bloc.
He thought that South Korea would quickly collapse before the United
States could intervene. He gambled with
the future of the country and it proved to be costly. Even though the North Koreans took over 90 percent of the South
in the summer of 1950, they were held at the Pusan perimeter and threatened
with utter defeat by General Mac Arthur's landing at Inchon. Kim 11-Sung and North Korea were only saved
by the contribution of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and the fighting ended
in a stalemate in July 1953. (Suh & Lee p.82) The Korean war was a disaster
for North Korea. It became the most
heavily bombed country in history. The
major cities were leveled to the ground and industry was shattered. Human losses were particularly
traumatic. A plausible estimate is that
at least 12 percent and possibly as high as 15 percent of the population were
killed during the war. (Smith, Rhodes, Pritchard, & Magill p.55) Kim
11-Sung was not held to account for the death and destruction visited on his
country. Instead, he became a symbol of
national resistance, using the bitter experience of war to consolidate his power. Because of this, North Koreans grew to hate
Americans and American foreign policy.
Kim 11-Sung died in 1994, and his son Kim Jong 11 took over for him and
follows in his father's path of leadership for North Korea.
A major
issue concerning Korean policy makers is the reunification of North and South
Korea. With the collapse of communist
powers in Eastern Europe, and the reunification of countries in a similar
situation, such as Germany, the idea of Korean reunification is a pressing
topic. The Korean peninsula supports a
population of well over 64 million people who constitute a single nation by
almost any reasonable criterion. (Eberstadt p.105) All Koreans speak the same
language, which is distinct from other East Asian languages. They share a common heritage of history
stretching over several thousand years and encompassing periods of both
political and cultural prominence.
Despite all of these common factors, the North and the South remain
ideologically opposed. The Korean War
and ensuing Cold war policies created two fundamentally antagonistic political
institutions, which remains an effective barrier to interaction between the
North and the South. Since their
inception in 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the North and
the Republic of Korea in the South have embraced very different, and extremely
competitive, strategies for modernization and development.
An
interesting development in the Korean situation is that the populations under
the authority of the two Korean governments have been kept in almost complete
isolation from one another. There has
been virtually no contact and communication between private citizens in North
and South Korea since the stalemate in the Korean over fifty years ago. Many important facets of modernization in
divided Korea appear to surprisingly comparable. Both countries have progressed from large families to small
ones. Both have achieved a rapid
transition out of agriculture, and out of the countryside into urban
centers. Also, both have achieved near
universal enrollment within their grade school and secondary school systems,
and have surprisingly high proportions of graduates or attendees of higher
educational establishments among their adult populations. (Eberstadt p.116)
isee Table 11 Progress with unification will be measured by two criteria:
assimilation and development. The
imperative of assimilation is the largest hurdle in reunification. North and South Korea have been separated
societies steeped in mutually hostile political cultures. Reunification without assimilation would not
be worth anything. Sustaining Korea's
development would be desirable if only to promote assimilation. But continued development is vital to
reunification for other reasons as well.
South Korea's economic performance over the past generation has been
exceptional. Between the early 1960s
and the late 1980s, its per capita output is estimated to have multiplied by a
factor of six in real terms. (Haas p.63) South Korea is by no means as affluent
as other industrialized democracies, and reunification might slow down or stall
continued progress. The unification of
the economies could prove to be a burden on the South. North Korea is suffering through difficult
economic times, and is feeling the effects of a famine in recent years. The situation for reunification in Korea is
different than in Germany, because the levels of economic development of the
two Koreas are more divergent than was the case with the two Germanys. Unification may well be a much more problematic
proposition in Korea than it was in Germany.
South Koreans could be pushed toward an unwelcome choice: unity or
affluence.
In recent
times, North Korea has been a interesting topic considering Nuclear
weapons. In 1994, North Korea became
international headline news because of clashes with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). North Korea's
possible nuclear capabilities threatened the stability in East Asia. The incomprehension and mistrust between
North Korea and the West even produced talk of a war in 1994. In October 1994, the United States and North
Korea signed an agreement designed to prevent North Korea from developing
nuclear weapons. The Agreed Framework
was the first constrictive measure that the United States and North Korea had
taken to ease tensions on the Korean peninsula. The United States negotiated to persuade North Korea to remain a
member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to
dissuade it from further developing nuclear capabilities by providing
alternative energy sources. (Suh & Lee p.76) Since then, the situation has
died down, mostly because of the hard financial times that have stricken the
country. But still, the stability of
North Korea, and its role in the talks with the IAEA are of great concern to
most major countries.
North Korea has continued to develop their weapons
program. On August 31, 1998 North Korea
conducted a test of their medium range Taepo Dong I missile. The missile was fired over Japan, and the
test concerned many Japanese officials.
The launch proved that North Korea could build a multistage missile,
even though the one that was fired encountered some problems in flight. The missile's three stages did not separate
properly, and it was unable to launch a satellite into orbit. The missile has a range of 1250 miles, which
concerns some East Asian countries because that means it could reach Japan and
parts of China. The test missile fell
into the ocean, but the possibility of a North Korean missile program startled
many East Asian countries. North
Koreans are expected to conduct another test of the Taepo Dong 1 missile
sometime later this year. North Korea's
development of a missile program is not in violation of the settlement reached
in 1994, but South Korean President Kim Dae Jung said that it is "cause
for deep concern." (S.J. Mercury News 11/21/98) The conclusion
that North Korea is developing a weapons program is one of a few signs of
increased hostility from the country.
In the
last week of November 1998, the relationship between the United States and
North Korean government was once again major news. During a recent trip by President Bill Clinton to Asia, he was
confronted with the problem of a North Korean arms drive. Clinton already had to address this problem
in 1994. After the settlement in 1994,
North Korea promised to not develop nuclear weapons or the ingredients for
them. In exchange, Japan and South
Korea agreed to help build the kind of nuclear power plants for North Korea
that could not be used to produce weapons grade plutonium. The United States agreed to supply fuel oil
to North Korea. Now, U.S. analysts
believe that an underground site is being developed near the North Korean
capital of Pyongyang. It is believed,
but not confirmed, to house a weapons producing nuclear reactor. (S.J. Mercury News 11/21/98) If this
is the case, it would be in direct violation of the accordance reached in
1994. Clinton said North Korea should
abide to its agreements on nuclear non-proliferation, and warned that, "further
provocations will threaten the progress we have made." (S.J. Mercury News 11/21/98) This presents a
new problem for Clinton and the U.S. government.
In the
past six months, North Korea has presented a threatening position. The launching of a newly developed missile
across Japanese airspace and the underground construction project might be the
evidence of a new nuclear weapons installation. This leads to a lot of suspicion surrounding the North Korean
weapons program. The United States
wants to inspect the site, but the 1994 deal provides no provisions for
inspection of the site. The North
Koreans have denied that the complex is intended to help build nuclear
weapons. But they have demanded that
the United States pay $300 million dollars to inspect the site. (Fresno Bee
11/22/98) The U.S. delegation to Pyongyang quickly rejected that offer. The Clinton administration fears that the
construction site may be evidence that North Korea has abandoned their 1994
pledge. All of these new problems have
prompted critics in Washington to question the administration's wisdom in
relying so heavily on the 1994 deal.
Arnold Kanter, former U.S. Undersecretary of State, says, "If,
despite the 1994 deal, North Korea poses a continuing threat to U.S. interests,
then the 'agreed framework' either is inadequate or has failed." (S.J. Mercury News 11/22/98) There is
strong sentiment in Washington for the 1994 deal to be reworked or revised in
order to deal with current problems.
People in Washington want to prevent the region from becoming a major
crisis. Clinton claims that the 1994
deal has already worked because without it, "North Korea would already
have produced a sizable amount of weapons grade plutonium." (Fresno Bee
11/22/98) Clinton has said that he does not want to change his policy towards
North Korea, but he hopes that the North Koreans do not do anything that would
force him to change policy. He has
sought to preserve his four year old policy of engagement with Pyongyang and is
reluctant to come up with a newer and tougher approach.
Clinton
also has raised the possibility that the North Koreans might be using the
threat of weapons production as leverage to get more help for the nation's
failing economy. The fact that the
North Koreans said that the United States would have to pay $300 million
dollars in order to inspect the site, which the U.S. has refused to pay, lends
some credibility to this idea. Clinton
said, " No one can be absolutely sure if the North Korean position is
simply a product of economic difficulties so they're attempting to get more
money out of various countries for what they ought to be doing anyway." (S.J. Mercury News 11/21/98) The
threat of nuclear weapons production always has to be taken seriously. Therefore, this could be an elaborate plan
of the North Korean government to prey on the fears of the United States and
East Asian countries. Clinton warned
though that unless North Korea allows an inspection and proves it is biding by
its side of the 1994 deal, there will be a great reluctance on the part of the
U.S. to pay for the fuel that impoverished North Korea desperately needs. (S.F.
Examiner 11/22/98) Many aspects of the North Korean situation are still
speculation, but Clinton has attempted to arrange a talk between U.S. and North
Korean governments later in December of this year, and he has even gone as far
as appointing William Perry, his former defense secretary, to review his policy
on North Korea.
Despite
the negativity of recent events concerning North Korea, there have been some
positive events as well. Clinton even
commented on the positive developments.
Clinton talked about news footage that showed the first voyage of a
cruise ship full of South Korean tourists to the North since the peninsula was
divided five decades ago. Clinton
expressed his enthusiasm for South Korean leader Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine
policy" of engaging North Korea through the tourism industry. (S.F.
Examiner 11/22/98) Kim is committed to increasing connections between the long
estranged neighbors on the peninsula.
Contacts between private citizens, which were long forbidden, are
encouraged. There are even efforts by
South Korean companies to do business in the North. It was with the blessing of Kim's policy that Chung Ju Yang,
founder of Hyundai Group Automobile Company, held consultations with Kim Jong
11 to launch the tourist cruises. Even
though Kim Dae Jong wants to promote ties with the North, his comment
concerning the possible North Korean nuclear weapons plant was that, "We
will not tolerate any possible attempt of North Korea to proliferate nuclear
weapons, missiles and other weapons of mass destruction." (Fresno Bee
11/22/98) The recent threat of North Korea has made the positive developments
between the countries seem less significant.
The recent
developments between the United States and North Korea have provided some tense
negotiations between the two countries.
Relations between the U.S. and North Korea since the Korean war have
improved, but in the last few years the possibility of North Korean nuclear
weapons production has forced the U.S. to take an authoritative approach toward
negotiations. The events of the last
few weeks might just be based on speculation and suspicion, but due to the
severity of nuclear war they can't be taken lightly. East Asian leaders like Kim Jae Dung would like to incorporate
North Korea into the global community, but are still a little hesitant because
of recent events. Even the threat of
nuclear capabilities is enough to upset the power balance in East Asia. Clinton's administration is handling the
situation well because they are not treating the situation lightly and are
considering this a real threat. They do
not want this to turn into the next global crisis. The possibility of Korean reunification is growing increasingly
distant, but Kim's recent "sunshine policy" has shown that the
relations between the North and the South are improving. It is difficult to speculate what the
foreign relations of North Korea will be like in the future, but it will be
interesting to see what will happen in the next few months because it is a
situation that needs to be dealt with and it will have an impact on the entire
global community. Korea into the global
community, but are still a little hesitant because of recent events. Even the threat of nuclear capabilities is
enough to upset the power balance in East Asia. Clinton's administration is handling the situation well because
they are not treating the situation lightly and are considering this a real
threat. They do not want this to turn
into the next global crisis. The
possibility of Korean reunification is growing increasingly distant, but Kim's
recent "sunshine policy" has shown that the relations between the
North and the South are improving. It
is difficult to speculate what the foreign relations of North Korea will be
like in the future, but it will be interesting to see what will happen in the
next few months because it is a situation that needs to be dealt with and it
will have an impact on the entire global community.
POLICY ISSUES IN A PEACEFUL REUNIFICATIO
Table 1
Reported Educational Attainment for North and South Korea and for Selected Other Countries, Recent Years
|
Graduates and attendees of post- secondary schools (Percent of adult population) |
Sex ratio |
North Korea 198-88 (16 and above) |
13.7 |
184 |
South Korea 1980 (15 and above) |
9.2 |
283 |
Japan 1980 (15 and above) |
18.5 |
161 |
China (PRC) 1982 (15 and above) |
0.9 |
297 |
Hong Kong 1981 (15 and above) |
6.6 |
175 |
United States 1987 (16 and above) |
36.0 |
105 |
East Germany 1981 (15 and above) |
14.9 |
107 |
Soviet Union 1979 (16 and above) |
9.4 |
101 |
Source.- Eberstadt and Banister, The Population of north Korea, p. 77.
Notes.-
The percentage figures in column 2 are not directly
comparable; length and quality of post-secondary education" training
varies by country, and within country over time. For North Korea, those enrolled in specialized colleges,
colleges, and universities in 1987 were added to the 1988 total of graduates of
colleges and universities, and the total number of graduates and attendees was
divided by the estimated total North Korean population at ages 16 and above,
including the military, at year-end 1987.
For North Korea and Japan, the sex ratio is for graduates only. For Japan it is assumed that two-fifths of
enrolled students at ages 15 to 19 are enrolled in post-secondary
education. Data for the United States
include all persons at ages 25 and above who have completed one or more years
of college, plus all those persons of any age who are currently enrolled in a
college or university. This may mean
there is some double-counting of persons who are age 25 or older and who are
still enrolled in higher education.
POLICY
ISSUES IN A PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION 105
Comparative
Demographic Indicators: Estimates for North and South
Korea, 1990
|
North Korea |
South Korea |
Population (millions) |
21.4 |
43.4 |
Area (1,000 sq. km.) |
122.8 |
99.3 |
Population Density (persons/sq. km.) |
174.0 |
437.0 |
Sex Ratio (males/1 00 females) |
97.5 |
100.8 |
Median Age of Population (years) |
23.4 |
27.4 |
Population Aged 0-1 4
(percent) |
29.4 |
25.4 |
Population Aged 15-64
(percent) |
66.9 |
69.5 |
Population Aged 65 and
Older (percent) |
3.7 |
5.1 |
Crude Birth Rate
(births/1,000 population) |
24.1 |
16.0 |
Crude Death Rate
(deaths/1,000 population) |
5.6 |
6.1 |
Rate of Natural Increase
(per 1,000 population) |
18.5 |
9.9 |
Infant Mortality Rate (per
1,000 births) |
31.0 |
23.0 |
Sources.- For North Korea: Eberstadt and Banister, The Population of North Korea, pp.
II 7-118. For South Korea: 1990 Advance Report of 1990 Population and
Housing Census (Republic of
Korea: National Statistical Office, 1991), pp. 42-43; vital rate estimates
derived from United Nations, World
Population Prospects 1990 (New York: UN Department of International
Economic and Social Affairs, 1991), pp. 456-457; 9 4 medium variant"
projections were used.
Note:
1990 estimates for North
Korea depend in part upon projections from earlier base-year data.
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