North Korea: Past, Present, and Future of Foreign Relations

Brian Donoghue
War & Peace: Asia in the Global Community


Korea, as one of the remaining divided nations in the world produced by the Second World War and the ensuing cold war politics 9 between the United States and the Soviet Union, has continuously attracted the attention of governments around the world.  Recent concerns among foreign policy makers of related nations regarding inter-Korean relations have risen sharply, since conflict and competition between the two divided portions of Korea have begun to have great impact on the power balance among East Asian nations.  It is undeniable that in one way or another foreign policy among the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Japan are directly linked to inter-Korean relations.  The division imposed by the victors of the Second World War in 1945 produced two ideologically opposing political entities on the Korean Peninsula, which have competed continuously for political dominance.  The North Korean political system and style find their origin both in the indigenous political culture and external influences.  The most important political force utilized by Kim 11-Sung to create a communist state was the dictatorial imprint of the Soviet occupation after World War 11.  In that way, the Communist revolution in North Korea was unique, because unlike other communist countries, it was not initiated by native elements.  The North Korean regime is in inevitable competition with the South Korean government in every conceivable way.  It is this competition that has threatened the stability of both countries.  Therefore, the political climate in North Korea is very unstable, especially in light of the recent events such as the nation-wide famine.

The geographic position of North Korea has had a great influence upon its history and present difficulties.  Korea forms a strategic center of East Asia with China on one side, Russia on another, and Japan on a third.  Because of this fact, both the cross currents of East Asian civilization and the ambitions of Korea's neighbors have flowed through Korea.  The policy of the United States after World War 11 was predicated upon its desire to see the emergence of Korea as an independent and democratic nation, according to the Western concept of liberal democracy.  Russia's goal was primarily to create conditions oriented to the Soviet Union, with its implicit desire to control Korea to advance its national interest. (Park, Koh, & Kwak p.78) The impact of these two outside powers taking a large role in politics in Korea had an effect on the stability of the country as a whole.

By 1948, the result of the great power rivalry had been to institutionalize a Korean civil war between the North zone (socialist) and the South zone (democratic).  The timing and method of the North Korean attack were dictated by the Japanese factor.  By 1949, it was clear that the U.S. intended to revive Japan as the key to the cold war system in Asia, a move that raised the idea of the reintegration of the South into a Japanese sphere of influence, backed by the U.S.. For Kim 11-Sung, the war was a pre-emptive move, designed to snatch the South from a new threat and allow a united Korea greater freedom of maneuver within the Socialist Bloc.  He thought that South Korea would quickly collapse before the United States could intervene.  He gambled with the future of the country and it proved to be costly.  Even though the North Koreans took over 90 percent of the South in the summer of 1950, they were held at the Pusan perimeter and threatened with utter defeat by General Mac Arthur's landing at Inchon.  Kim 11-Sung and North Korea were only saved by the contribution of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and the fighting ended in a stalemate in July 1953. (Suh & Lee p.82) The Korean war was a disaster for North Korea.  It became the most heavily bombed country in history.  The major cities were leveled to the ground and industry was shattered.  Human losses were particularly traumatic.  A plausible estimate is that at least 12 percent and possibly as high as 15 percent of the population were killed during the war. (Smith, Rhodes, Pritchard, & Magill p.55) Kim 11-Sung was not held to account for the death and destruction visited on his country.  Instead, he became a symbol of national resistance, using the bitter experience of war to consolidate his power.  Because of this, North Koreans grew to hate Americans and American foreign policy.  Kim 11-Sung died in 1994, and his son Kim Jong 11 took over for him and follows in his father's path of leadership for North Korea.

A major issue concerning Korean policy makers is the reunification of North and South Korea.  With the collapse of communist powers in Eastern Europe, and the reunification of countries in a similar situation, such as Germany, the idea of Korean reunification is a pressing topic.  The Korean peninsula supports a population of well over 64 million people who constitute a single nation by almost any reasonable criterion. (Eberstadt p.105) All Koreans speak the same language, which is distinct from other East Asian languages.  They share a common heritage of history stretching over several thousand years and encompassing periods of both political and cultural prominence.  Despite all of these common factors, the North and the South remain ideologically opposed.  The Korean War and ensuing Cold war policies created two fundamentally antagonistic political institutions, which remains an effective barrier to interaction between the North and the South.  Since their inception in 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the North and the Republic of Korea in the South have embraced very different, and extremely competitive, strategies for modernization and development.

An interesting development in the Korean situation is that the populations under the authority of the two Korean governments have been kept in almost complete isolation from one another.  There has been virtually no contact and communication between private citizens in North and South Korea since the stalemate in the Korean over fifty years ago.  Many important facets of modernization in divided Korea appear to surprisingly comparable.  Both countries have progressed from large families to small ones.  Both have achieved a rapid transition out of agriculture, and out of the countryside into urban centers.  Also, both have achieved near universal enrollment within their grade school and secondary school systems, and have surprisingly high proportions of graduates or attendees of higher educational establishments among their adult populations. (Eberstadt p.116) isee Table 11 Progress with unification will be measured by two criteria: assimilation and development.  The imperative of assimilation is the largest hurdle in reunification.  North and South Korea have been separated societies steeped in mutually hostile political cultures.  Reunification without assimilation would not be worth anything.  Sustaining Korea's development would be desirable if only to promote assimilation.  But continued development is vital to reunification for other reasons as well.  South Korea's economic performance over the past generation has been exceptional.  Between the early 1960s and the late 1980s, its per capita output is estimated to have multiplied by a factor of six in real terms. (Haas p.63) South Korea is by no means as affluent as other industrialized democracies, and reunification might slow down or stall continued progress.  The unification of the economies could prove to be a burden on the South.  North Korea is suffering through difficult economic times, and is feeling the effects of a famine in recent years.  The situation for reunification in Korea is different than in Germany, because the levels of economic development of the two Koreas are more divergent than was the case with the two Germanys.  Unification may well be a much more problematic proposition in Korea than it was in Germany.  South Koreans could be pushed toward an unwelcome choice: unity or affluence.

In recent times, North Korea has been a interesting topic considering Nuclear weapons.  In 1994, North Korea became international headline news because of clashes with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  North Korea's possible nuclear capabilities threatened the stability in East Asia.  The incomprehension and mistrust between North Korea and the West even produced talk of a war in 1994.  In October 1994, the United States and North Korea signed an agreement designed to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons.  The Agreed Framework was the first constrictive measure that the United States and North Korea had taken to ease tensions on the Korean peninsula.  The United States negotiated to persuade North Korea to remain a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to dissuade it from further developing nuclear capabilities by providing alternative energy sources. (Suh & Lee p.76) Since then, the situation has died down, mostly because of the hard financial times that have stricken the country.  But still, the stability of North Korea, and its role in the talks with the IAEA are of great concern to most major countries.

 

North Korea has continued to develop their weapons program.  On August 31, 1998 North Korea conducted a test of their medium range Taepo Dong I missile.  The missile was fired over Japan, and the test concerned many Japanese officials.  The launch proved that North Korea could build a multistage missile, even though the one that was fired encountered some problems in flight.  The missile's three stages did not separate properly, and it was unable to launch a satellite into orbit.  The missile has a range of 1250 miles, which concerns some East Asian countries because that means it could reach Japan and parts of China.  The test missile fell into the ocean, but the possibility of a North Korean missile program startled many East Asian countries.  North Koreans are expected to conduct another test of the Taepo Dong 1 missile sometime later this year.  North Korea's development of a missile program is not in violation of the settlement reached in 1994, but South Korean President Kim Dae Jung said that it is "cause for deep concern." (S.J. Mercury News 11/21/98) The conclusion that North Korea is developing a weapons program is one of a few signs of increased hostility from the country.

In the last week of November 1998, the relationship between the United States and North Korean government was once again major news.  During a recent trip by President Bill Clinton to Asia, he was confronted with the problem of a North Korean arms drive.  Clinton already had to address this problem in 1994.  After the settlement in 1994, North Korea promised to not develop nuclear weapons or the ingredients for them.  In exchange, Japan and South Korea agreed to help build the kind of nuclear power plants for North Korea that could not be used to produce weapons grade plutonium.  The United States agreed to supply fuel oil to North Korea.  Now, U.S. analysts believe that an underground site is being developed near the North Korean capital of Pyongyang.  It is believed, but not confirmed, to house a weapons producing nuclear reactor. (S.J. Mercury News 11/21/98) If this is the case, it would be in direct violation of the accordance reached in 1994.  Clinton said North Korea should abide to its agreements on nuclear non-proliferation, and warned that, "further provocations will threaten the progress we have made." (S.J. Mercury News 11/21/98) This presents a new problem for Clinton and the U.S. government.

 

In the past six months, North Korea has presented a threatening position.  The launching of a newly developed missile across Japanese airspace and the underground construction project might be the evidence of a new nuclear weapons installation.  This leads to a lot of suspicion surrounding the North Korean weapons program.  The United States wants to inspect the site, but the 1994 deal provides no provisions for inspection of the site.  The North Koreans have denied that the complex is intended to help build nuclear weapons.  But they have demanded that the United States pay $300 million dollars to inspect the site. (Fresno Bee 11/22/98) The U.S. delegation to Pyongyang quickly rejected that offer.  The Clinton administration fears that the construction site may be evidence that North Korea has abandoned their 1994 pledge.  All of these new problems have prompted critics in Washington to question the administration's wisdom in relying so heavily on the 1994 deal.  Arnold Kanter, former U.S. Undersecretary of State, says, "If, despite the 1994 deal, North Korea poses a continuing threat to U.S. interests, then the 'agreed framework' either is inadequate or has failed." (S.J. Mercury News 11/22/98) There is strong sentiment in Washington for the 1994 deal to be reworked or revised in order to deal with current problems.  People in Washington want to prevent the region from becoming a major crisis.  Clinton claims that the 1994 deal has already worked because without it, "North Korea would already have produced a sizable amount of weapons grade plutonium." (Fresno Bee 11/22/98) Clinton has said that he does not want to change his policy towards North Korea, but he hopes that the North Koreans do not do anything that would force him to change policy.  He has sought to preserve his four year old policy of engagement with Pyongyang and is reluctant to come up with a newer and tougher approach.

Clinton also has raised the possibility that the North Koreans might be using the threat of weapons production as leverage to get more help for the nation's failing economy.  The fact that the North Koreans said that the United States would have to pay $300 million dollars in order to inspect the site, which the U.S. has refused to pay, lends some credibility to this idea.  Clinton said, " No one can be absolutely sure if the North Korean position is simply a product of economic difficulties so they're attempting to get more money out of various countries for what they ought to be doing anyway." (S.J. Mercury News 11/21/98) The threat of nuclear weapons production always has to be taken seriously.  Therefore, this could be an elaborate plan of the North Korean government to prey on the fears of the United States and East Asian countries.  Clinton warned though that unless North Korea allows an inspection and proves it is biding by its side of the 1994 deal, there will be a great reluctance on the part of the U.S. to pay for the fuel that impoverished North Korea desperately needs. (S.F. Examiner 11/22/98) Many aspects of the North Korean situation are still speculation, but Clinton has attempted to arrange a talk between U.S. and North Korean governments later in December of this year, and he has even gone as far as appointing William Perry, his former defense secretary, to review his policy on North Korea.

Despite the negativity of recent events concerning North Korea, there have been some positive events as well.  Clinton even commented on the positive developments.  Clinton talked about news footage that showed the first voyage of a cruise ship full of South Korean tourists to the North since the peninsula was divided five decades ago.  Clinton expressed his enthusiasm for South Korean leader Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy" of engaging North Korea through the tourism industry. (S.F. Examiner 11/22/98) Kim is committed to increasing connections between the long estranged neighbors on the peninsula.  Contacts between private citizens, which were long forbidden, are encouraged.  There are even efforts by South Korean companies to do business in the North.  It was with the blessing of Kim's policy that Chung Ju Yang, founder of Hyundai Group Automobile Company, held consultations with Kim Jong 11 to launch the tourist cruises.  Even though Kim Dae Jong wants to promote ties with the North, his comment concerning the possible North Korean nuclear weapons plant was that, "We will not tolerate any possible attempt of North Korea to proliferate nuclear weapons, missiles and other weapons of mass destruction." (Fresno Bee 11/22/98) The recent threat of North Korea has made the positive developments between the countries seem less significant.

The recent developments between the United States and North Korea have provided some tense negotiations between the two countries.  Relations between the U.S. and North Korea since the Korean war have improved, but in the last few years the possibility of North Korean nuclear weapons production has forced the U.S. to take an authoritative approach toward negotiations.  The events of the last few weeks might just be based on speculation and suspicion, but due to the severity of nuclear war they can't be taken lightly.  East Asian leaders like Kim Jae Dung would like to incorporate North Korea into the global community, but are still a little hesitant because of recent events.  Even the threat of nuclear capabilities is enough to upset the power balance in East Asia.  Clinton's administration is handling the situation well because they are not treating the situation lightly and are considering this a real threat.  They do not want this to turn into the next global crisis.  The possibility of Korean reunification is growing increasingly distant, but Kim's recent "sunshine policy" has shown that the relations between the North and the South are improving.  It is difficult to speculate what the foreign relations of North Korea will be like in the future, but it will be interesting to see what will happen in the next few months because it is a situation that needs to be dealt with and it will have an impact on the entire global community.  Korea into the global community, but are still a little hesitant because of recent events.  Even the threat of nuclear capabilities is enough to upset the power balance in East Asia.  Clinton's administration is handling the situation well because they are not treating the situation lightly and are considering this a real threat.  They do not want this to turn into the next global crisis.  The possibility of Korean reunification is growing increasingly distant, but Kim's recent "sunshine policy" has shown that the relations between the North and the South are improving.  It is difficult to speculate what the foreign relations of North Korea will be like in the future, but it will be interesting to see what will happen in the next few months because it is a situation that needs to be dealt with and it will have an impact on the entire global community.

 


POLICY ISSUES IN A PEACEFUL REUNIFICATIO

 

 

Table 1

 

Reported Educational Attainment for North and South Korea and for Selected Other Countries, Recent Years

 

 

Graduates and attendees of post-

secondary schools (Percent of adult population)

 

Sex ratio

North Korea 198-88 (16 and above)

13.7

184

South Korea 1980 (15 and above)

9.2

283

Japan 1980 (15 and above)

18.5

161

China (PRC) 1982 (15 and above)

0.9

297

Hong Kong 1981 (15 and above)

6.6

175

United States 1987 (16 and above)

36.0

105

East Germany 1981 (15 and above)

14.9

107

Soviet Union 1979 (16 and above)

9.4

101

                                                    

Source.- Eberstadt and Banister, The Population of north Korea, p. 77.

Notes.-

 

The percentage figures in column 2 are not directly comparable; length and quality of post-secondary education" training varies by country, and within country over time.  For North Korea, those enrolled in specialized colleges, colleges, and universities in 1987 were added to the 1988 total of graduates of colleges and universities, and the total number of graduates and attendees was divided by the estimated total North Korean population at ages 16 and above, including the military, at year-end 1987.  For North Korea and Japan, the sex ratio is for graduates only.  For Japan it is assumed that two-fifths of enrolled students at ages 15 to 19 are enrolled in post-secondary education.  Data for the United States include all persons at ages 25 and above who have completed one or more years of college, plus all those persons of any age who are currently enrolled in a college or university.  This may mean there is some double-counting of persons who are age 25 or older and who are still enrolled in higher education.

 

 

 


POLICY ISSUES IN A PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION 105

 

 

 

Comparative Demographic Indicators: Estimates for North and South

Korea, 1990

 

 

North Korea

South Korea

 

Population (millions)

21.4

43.4

Area (1,000 sq. km.)

122.8

99.3

Population Density (persons/sq. km.)

174.0

437.0

Sex Ratio (males/1 00 females)

97.5

100.8

Median Age of Population (years)

23.4

27.4

Population Aged 0-1 4 (percent)

29.4

25.4

Population Aged 15-64 (percent)

66.9

69.5

Population Aged 65 and Older (percent)

3.7

5.1

Crude Birth Rate (births/1,000 population)

24.1

16.0

Crude Death Rate (deaths/1,000 population)

5.6

6.1

Rate of Natural Increase (per 1,000 population)

18.5

9.9

Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 births)

31.0

23.0

                                      

Sources.- For North Korea: Eberstadt and Banister, The Population of North Korea, pp.  II 7-118.  For South Korea: 1990 Advance Report of 1990 Population and Housing Census (Republic of Korea: National Statistical Office, 1991), pp. 42-43; vital rate estimates derived from United Nations, World Population Prospects 1990 (New York: UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 1991), pp. 456-457; 9 4 medium variant" projections were used.

 

Note:

1990 estimates for North Korea depend in part upon projections from earlier base-year data.

 

 


Bibliography

 

Bennet, James.  "Clinton Warns North Korea." Fresno Bee. 22 Nov. 1998, final ed.: Al, A16.

 

Eberstadt, Nicholas.  Korea Approaches Reunification.  Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1995.

 

Haas,      Michael.  Korean Unification- Alternative Pathways.  New York, New York: Praeger Publishers. 1989.

 

Mann,     Jim.  "At Crossroads in North Korea." San Jose Mercury News. 22 Nov. 1998, peninsula ed.: A4.

 

Park,      Jae Kyu, Byung Chul Koh, and Tae-Hwan Kwak.  The Foreign Relations of North Korea: New Perspectives.  Seoul, Korea: The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University Press. 1987.

 

Shogren, Elizabeth.  "North Korea Told: End Arms Drive." San Francisco

Examiner. 22 Nov. 1998, final ed.: A19, A21.

 

Smith, Hazel, Chris Rhodes, Diana Pritchard, and Kevin Magill.  North Korea in the New World Order.  New York, New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc. 1996.

 

Suh,     Dae-Sook and Chae-Jin Lee.  North Korea After Kim 11 Sung.  London, England: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1998.

 

Thomma, Steven.  "North Korean Arms Fears Dominate Japan Talks."

San Jose Mercury News. 21 Nov. 1998, peninsula ed.: Al, A22.

 





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