This past year the United States and Japan mutually agreed upon a new agreement dealing with their cooperation in the security of Japan and the region surrounding it.  The military relationship between the U.S. and Japan is a crucial international pact in sustaining a stable economy and political agendas.  Analyzing the history of this relationship is critical to understanding the importance of the latest alliance between the two nations.  While conflicting views do exist, evidence will lead most onlookers to agree with the strategies and goals put forth by the two governments in the latest treaty.

            The United States’ first treatise with the powerful Japanese occurred in January 1960 in the “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America” to replace the Security Treaty of 1951 that laid the terms for reparations of Japan after WWII (Treaty of Mutual...).  In November of 1978 the “Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation” set the ground-rules for cooperation in the area of defense.   In 1996, President Clinton and former Prime Minister Hashimoto issued the “U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security”  that confirmed that the U.S.-Japanese security relationship remained the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment in the Asia-Pacific region into the 21st century (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).  Finally, in 1997, the two nations formed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) that would formulate guidelines setting the premise for their cooperation in defense and security issues.

            Since World War II, an American military presence in Japan has set the stage for a relationship between the two nations.  After Japan’s occupation of Korea from 1910-45 and the invasion of China during WWII, Japan’s military was destroyed and American occupiers forced Japan to forever renounce war.  The United States kept a large military force in place to protect Japan.  In the half century since, as the likelihood of an invasion of Japan became remote, the emphasis of the U.S. troops in Japan has evolved more toward projecting American military power in Asia.    With new treaties expanding the power of Japanese forces in the area as well, military cooperation by the U.S. and Japan is becoming the  influential force in the region.  The role of the U.S. and Japanese alliance, along with growing United Nations concerns in the area, will determine stability and growth in the Far East (Watanuki).

            The major threat to U.S. and Japanese interests in the last thirty years was the Cold War empire of the Soviet Union.  With the Soviet Union gone, American and Japanese military planners have focused their planning on a potential military crisis on the Korean Peninsula (Luard).  Many strategists in both countries say a strong alliance is also prudent in the face of uncertainties posed by the rise of China.  The handover of Hong Kong in 1998, and the missile fired over the island of Taiwan has sparked the needed cooperation between American and Japanese forces.  However, the pact written between the U.S. and Japan, the most recent in 1997, was intentionally vague about the subject of the Taiwan Strait.  In spite of its vagueness in certain areas, the latest agreements between the U.S. and Japan expand specific elements of the Japanese military (Sullivan). 

            When studying the Japanese it is important to understand their position on certain ideas and the evolution of their unique culture.  Very early in their history, the Japanese evolved a distinctive culture and a way of life that bound people together in a very fundamental way (Ike).  The sense of allegiance to the nation remains strong today and is an overarching bond that transcends the ideological partisanship and bickering that often characterize contemporary partisan politics.  The “Establishment” of Japan rejects the idea of individualism, yet has a implicit goal of catching up with the West or surpassing the West industrially (Van Wolferen).  These cultural ideals reflect a modern society unwilling to seek imperialistic goals, as it did during WWII; and an economic superpower with the financial support to aide American and U.N. interests locally, and globally. 

            Mindful of Japanese nationalism and militarism, world leaders are intensely ambivalent as to whether Japan should enlarge its security role.  Soon after he left prime ministership in 1987, Nakasone Yasuhiro stated “Other countries especially those against whom we committed aggression and our neighboring countries whom we victimized, see little difference between Germany and Japan, between Hitler’s youth and Hirohito’s children.  I think a century must pass before the suspicion and distrust of our neighbors will dissipate” (Pyle, p. 6).   History shows Japanese aggression does not always end with their signature on a treaty.  In 1928, the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, better known as the Kellog-Briand Pact, “condemned recourse to war as a solution of international controversies” (Pyle, p. 6).  After breaking this pact in WWII, General Douglas MacArthur wanted to ensure that Japan would be militarily weakened forever.  He influenced the drafters of the Japanese Constitution of 1946-47 to insert Article 9, which is a clause renouncing war and armament.  MacArthur said “For centuries the Japanese people, unlike their neighbors in the Pacific Basin- the Chinese, the Malayans, the Indians, and the Whites- have been students and idolaters of the art of war and the warrior caste” (Pyle, p. 7).   These two world leaders knew militarism was historically ingrained in the Japanese experience. 

            One other cultural entity must be known before any conclusions or assumptions can be made in regards to the latest policy between Japan and the U.S.  The influence of industrial powers on Japanese public and foreign policy.  For instance, in 1960 there existed mass demonstrations and leftist opposition to the “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation.”  Public opinion was anti-military, yet Prime Minister Kishi signed the treaty.   Large corporations favored the treaty for it would lead to new markets in production of arms and military equipment.  By the mid-1960’s Japan possessed the largest military force in noncommunist Asia (Samuels, p. 161).  These influential firms, such as Mitsubishi or Toyota, gained profits from their production in army equipment and military funding of R & D in weapons and technology (Cowhey).

            The United States has over 47,000 troops stationed in Japan, including 28,000 in Okinawa, the largest single force out of about 100,000 American troops in Asia (NTT America P&W).  The Clinton Administration argues that this number of troops is necessary to protect U.S. interests in the region, while critics call this an unnecessary holdover from the Cold War (Dept. of State).  Despite changes in the post-Cold War strategic landscape, the U.S.-Japan alliance continues to be based on shared vital interests: stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the preservation and promotion of political and economic freedoms, support for human rights and democratic institutions, and the securing of prosperity for their two peoples and the other peoples of the region.  As Secretary of State Madeline Albright said, “It is an alliance that promotes the peace and security of all nations in the Pacific” (Sullivan). 

            Financially the Japanese seem to be the pocketbook for much of America’s operations and even those of NATO.  During the Gulf War, Japan paid millions in order to compensate for their lack of military combat which is restricted under the “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security,” signed in 1960 (Sullivan).  Much of the equipment used during the Gulf War was purchased by the Japanese for NATO. To maintain the development and production of defense equipment and armaments, Japan’s “Host Nation Support” helps defray the costs of maintaining U.S. forces in Japan.  Also, Japan funds many of the U.N.’s costly peacekeeping operations worldwide (NTT America P&W).

            Japan has already participated in U.N peace-keeping operations.  It has sent its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) personnel to the Golan Heights in effort to maintain peace in the Middle East in 1996 (Higgins).  Japan also has chaired the Environmental Working Group of the Multitrack of the Middle East Peace Process since may of 1992.  Together with the U.S. and South Korea, Japan plays a significant role in the Korean Peninsula energy Development Organization (KEDO), established in 1995, to deal with the issue of North Korea’s nuclear development.  Also, Japan played a leading role in the international efforts for reconstruction and democratization of Cambodia.  More than 700 Self-Defense Forces personnel were engaged in this international effort from 1992 to 1993 (NTT America P&W).

             Some Japanese media has described the latest U.S.-Japanese agreement as “drastic.”  They see the pact as an attempt to send Japanese troops abroad, and even as unarmed soldiers on U.N. peacekeeping missions (Sullivan).  Also, leaders of China, Indonesia, and other Southeast Asian countries have expressed concern about the new pact where fear of renewed Japanese military is still visceral 50 years after WWII.    However, officials in South Korea, potentially one of the main beneficiaries of the deal, support the agreement, even though Korea suffered greatly during Japan’s occupation (Sullivan).  Keeping this in mind, Japan wants to play a more equal leadership role with the United States in policing Asia, but it does not want to arouse fears in China and other Asian capitals.  The U.S. and Japan have repeatedly assured China that their expanded military alliance is not a threat.  President Clinton even visited China this year to assure the Chinese as an ally and not an enemy.  Nevertheless, Beijing officials have frequently been bitter in their opposition to the pact (Sullivan).  The pact forbids Japan from sending troops into combat, but only specifically in a case of a war on the Korean Peninsula, so the debate still lingers.

            Another problem the agreement brings forward is that Japanese land is being used for American military purposes.  Many Japanese do not appreciate the difficulties caused by having a military base next door.  In order to minimize the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on Okinawa, Japan and the U.S. are working through the Special Action Committee on Okinawa to return land, adjust training and operational procedures, and implement noise reduction initiatives (Dept. of State).  However, many Japanese view the military bases as a convenient addition to their economic community and enjoy the income brought in by the troops.

            Under the terms of the expanded pact on security, Japan would, for the first time since the war, engage in military activities outside its borders in conflicts involving the United States.  Specifically, Japan would provide mine sweepers and conduct search and rescue missions in international waters, use its military ships to conduct inspections of ships at sea to enforce U.N.-sanctioned embargoes, and assist with communications and surveillance in international waters and airspace.  It also would allow its civilian airports, ports, and hospitals to be used by U.S. troops, and it would accept refugees from war zones and receive noncombatants evacuated from areas of conflict.  However, in keeping with Japan’s “no-war” constitution, which governments have interpreted as banning all but defensive operations, no Japanese forces would be required to fight or even enter combat areas, and Japan’s logistical support for U.S. troops under the agreement specifically excludes providing weapons or ammunition (Ministry of Foreign affairs Interim Report).

            The newest agreement takes into consideration all possible situations that may occur.  There are three major areas: cooperation under normal circumstances, actions in response to an armed attack against Japan, and cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.  These are the guidelines that direct the SDC based agreement that the U.S. and Japan have agreed upon.   Cooperation under normal circumstances deals with basic defense postures along with information sharing and policy consultations.  Also, security cooperation and the use of bilateral programs falls under normal circumstances in the agreement.  The agreement also spells out what the Japanese and U.S. response would be to an armed attack.  In case of an attack, the U.S. will provide appropriate military support and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces will take primary responsibility for the immediate actions necessary to repel aggression as soon as possible.  In regards to situations in the surrounding areas, the agreement lays out the plans for  preventing negligence of “hot spots” around the region.  Also, the agreement concerns the cooperation between the nations for humanitarian activities, search and rescue operations, and noncombatant evacuation operations.  The final part of the agreement ensures Japanese support for U.S. forces’ activities from use of facilities to providing airspace intelligence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Joint Statement).

            The safety and stability of the Far East is essential for the Japanese to continue growth economically and politically, therefore, it is in their best interest to continue their acceptance of U.S. troops in their territory.  Piecing together the information now known, it is clear that an American presence in the Far East, particularly Japan, benefits long term goals of peace and stability.  However, one must remain wary of Japanese intent to accumulate their military forces, especially knowing their history of warfare and aggression.   Future problems with Far Eastern nations such as China and Korea, may be unavoidable, yet the alliance between the U.S. and Japan builds a stronger “watchful eye” on these nations.   The ultimate goal for the United States would most likely be a treaty that would incorporate the Chinese and the Japanese into one Far Eastern ally and trading bloc.  The U.S. realizes the enormous potential wealth of China and the strength of the Chinese military, as well as, the financial importance and strategic location of their Japanese ally.  Therefore, foreign policy towards these two nations, but Japan most recently, must reflect the American goals of achieving political stability, new economic markets, and promoting democratic and human rights.  President Clinton summed up the importance of this issue when he remarked, “The security alliance between our two nations is the cornerstone of stability throughout Asia.  The truth is, our security alliance benefits both our countries, the entire region, and the world.  So, to the young people I say, this alliance is our commitment to your freedom and to your future.”

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