Since the early stages of the industrial revolution, extenuating circumstances, including the increased use of technology and the size of the world population, have made choices concerning peoples' lifestyles much more complicated. Decisions concerning the production and use of energy should be based on and take into account the scientific facts and the social interactions and consequences which arise as the world's population progresses. With respect to the utilization of nuclear energy, citizens of the world must ask themselves questions concerning the safety of nuclear power and the foundation that supports it, the danger of existing plutonium stores, the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation, and the benefits industrial nations derive from nuclear technology. They should also carefully examine situations in which it becomes apparent that existing nuclear policy and relations between nations can be distorted, and in some cases, disregarded. The aforementioned questions will be expounded on and explained, and an examination will be undertaken with respect to the United States' relations with North Korea, including the results of a conflict of interest concerning nuclear policy between them.

As an example of how rapidly nuclear technology has progressed, one may observe the fact that in December 1951 at a government laboratory in Idaho, an experimental reactor generated enough electricity to light four 200-watt light bulbs. By December 1992, 424 commercial nuclear reactors with a capacity of 329.2 net gigawatts electricity (1 GWe equals 1 billion watts) were operating in 28 countries."1 Most of these are light water reactors, commonly known as LWRs. These reactors are capable of operating on reprocessed spent nuclear fuel, and therefore crucial in the recycling process of such material.

The development in nuclear power has seen a corresponding rise in waste nuclear fuel stores, the product of the reaction process. In addition, spent fuel from the LWRs contains enriched uranium and plutonium, a man-made radioactive element that is both a component in nuclear weapons production and a possible fuel for power generation.

In addition, "The Energy Information Administration (E IA) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) projects that total world [nuclear energy) output in 2010 will be in the range of 350.9 GWe to 426.8 GWe."2 EIA points out, however, that the rise from current levels will be almost entirely due to the nuclear power developments in Japan, France, South Korea, and China. In other nations, even those with substantial nuclear capacity, the future of nuclear power is unsure. For example, "Sweden, which generated 43 percent of its electricity from 12 power plants in 1992, decided by a 1980 referendum to phase out its nuclear capacity by 2010 while it sought a safe, economically viable alternative."3 The phasing out was to start in 1995, but the situation is being reevaluated because of energy efficiency concerns. National policy decisions have adjusted the course of nuclear expansion in various countries over the last few decades. The environment existing in the future of these countries will depend on judgments made in the coming years, which, today, are hard to predict. The outcome of these conflicts, however, will determine the future of the uranium market and thus the economics of plutonium recycling.

Early nuclear energy policies were based on two important assumptions, neither of which has proved wholly accurate in the long run. First of all, it was believed that nuclear energy would be very economical and almost "too cheap to meter."4 Given the substantial costs of research and development, construction, operation, decommissioning, safeguarding, and regulatory compliance, however, nuclear power has consequently been shown to be extremely expensive to develop and maintain, although in some countries it beats the alternative coal-fired facilities.

The second supposition made was that the world's uranium deposits were limited and, therefore, it was economically unsound to use the fuel only once, a practice which would utilize perhaps only three percent of its energy. It was assumed that plutonium recycling would eventually take place. Uranium deposits have been found to be extensive in Canada, where they are also very high quality, and in Australia. Consequently, over-investment in uranium mining and enrichment facilities, due to excessively optimistic projections of demand, has driven the price to historic lows, often below the production costs for many mines. In reaction to such prices, reprocessing used fuel to extract the plutonium appears to be an extensive process and is not currently economically feasible in some countries. Even taking this into consideration, however, decisions about keeping reprocessing as part of a national energy policy should not be based on short-term commercial considerations, but on long-term goals and perspectives.

The Clinton administration put forth its policy concerning plutonium in September 1993: "The United States does not encourage the civil use of plutonium and accordingly, does not itself engage in plutonium reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear explosive purposes. The United States, however, will maintain its existing commitments regarding the use of plutonium in civil nuclear programs in Western Europe and Japan."5 This policy claim most likely takes into account the fact that the bulk of the world's plutonium is in the post-consumption fuel that resides in storage facilities at reactor sites around the world. One may observe that "...by the end of 1990, spent fuel accounted for an estimated 532 metric tons of plutonium. Separated civilian plutonium (inventory) was set at 72 MT, recycled civilian plutonium (already used in fast and thermal reactors) at 50 MT. Moreover, according to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, civilian plutonium is increasing at the rate of 70 short tons a year. Plutonium in spent fuel will reach about 2,100 short tons by 2010.~~6 To some extent, it seems that this accumulation was expected, even desired by industrial nations and their respective nuclear facilities. In the early days of nuclear development, it was commonly believed that LWRs would be a step in the direction of a 'breeder' economy, meaning that the depleted fuel from LWRs would provide the plutonium that would be the starting fuel for upcoming 'breeder' reactors, which in turn could operate using this reprocessed fuel. However, breeder' reactors that have progressed beyond experimental status are not commonly seen in operation, except the 'Superphenix' facility in France and the 'Monju' reactor in Japan.

Even those countries who are currently developing active 'breeder' programs are not forging ahead at full pace. Also notable, however, is the fact that the option of deep underground stowage of spent fuel, the one currently being chosen by the US government, is not being developed at optimal speed either. The storage option has been the practice undertaken by the US government ever since 1982. Yucca Mountain, Nevada, was selected as the only possible location considerable as a site, but even now conflict abounds between the state of Nevada and environmental groups around that choice. Other options also include interim storage at a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) facility, but a suitable location for this one has yet to be sited as well, and there is limited progress on the horizon.

While it is true that plutonium is being reprocessed as MOX (mixed oxide) fuel in some reactors outside the United States, MOX fabrication and use has some drawbacks of its own, and a policy restricting its practice is in place in the US. A principal argument used against civilian plutonium in the fuel cycle deals with proliferation and diversion risks, though not all sources of plutonium are equally useful for nuclear weapons. "A U.S. National Academy of Sciences report stated, although it did not do a qualitative analysis, that civil or reactor grade plutonium could be used for nuclear explosives, the report also recognized that such plutonium was not suitable for weapons use."7 It advocated as a nonproliferation practice that the United States modify the isotopic content of plutonium that is removed from nuclear warheads, so that the material is reduced to reactor-grade quality. The problem with this solution is that the only way to change weapon-grade plutonium to reactor-grade plutonium is to consume the weapon material as MOX fuel, which would be against U.S. nonproliferation policy. Moreover, nations with working reprocessing programs claim that belligerent nations or terrorist organizations that wish to acquire nuclear weapons could easily do so without access to reactor-grade plutonium, for there are, of course, quicker, cheaper, and easier routes. Much of these countries' reasoning stems from the fact that "reactor plutonium contains high concentrations of contaminating isotopes [such] as 240Pu and fission products that make handling hazardous, bomb design and manufacture difficult, and actual performance unpredictable."8 There has never been a diversion of civil plutonium for clandestine weapons purposes, proponents maintain, and none of the states that have proliferated weapons, or have attempted to do so, have considered using LWR plutonium for that specific purpose. Opponents also accept the fact, however, that this doesn't mean that such a diversion wouldn't occur, or even that the benefits of reprocessing and MOX use outweigh the risks.

From a proliferation perspective, the weapons grade material is of much more concern than plutonium extracted from spent commercial fuel. At the same time, however, in the United States, the Clinton administration has recognized growing concern over civil plutonium inventories in part by adopting the term "weapons-usable" to characterize all plutonium, whether derived from dismantled warheads or from spent fuel. By making this classification, it is ignoring the distinction made by the National Academy of Sciences between weapons and reactor grade material. Therefore, policy and decision making in the United States concerning what to do with excess weapons grade plutonium, on the one hand, and the large worldwide stores of civil plutonium, on the other, are linked under the current administration. Other nations commonly make a distinction between weapons and civil grade plutonium while constructing policy. Within the U.S. government, however, there is no consensus, and it has become evident that no prescriptive U.S. policy will systematically address the plutonium issues concerning both civil and weapons for every nation with which the United States has diplomatic and trade relations. The productivity of U.S. unilateral actions in the nuclear playing field is questionable. To many people in Europe and Japan, in fact, U.S. unilateral policies are viewed as reducing the effectiveness of multilateral regimes and have fueled much controversy and distrust between them.

In spite of the conflicts and controversies that abound with US international relations concerning nuclear development, the American administration is adamant that "Article IV of the NPT, and indeed all past U.S. nonproliferation policy, is founded on the principle that signatories are entitled to develop any peaceful application of nuclear energy except explosives and to participate in international trade."9 In other words, the nuclear weapons possessing states must be active in peaceful nuclear spheres as reliable suppliers to other signatory nations. Such involvement has long been viewed as an effective means to prevent non-weapons states from seeking to acquire nuclear military capacity. In other words, the United States and the other weapons states must be engaged in peaceful nuclear trade and peaceful technology transfer if they are to maintain influence and credibility on an international level. Nonetheless, "the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) required the U.S. government to maintain consent rights over reprocessing of nuclear fuel exported from the United States and to execute cooperation agreements with individual nations."10 This has presented a problem, however, since "...the U.S.-Japan nuclear cooperation agreement of 1988 gave Japan 30 years of advance consent to reprocess U.S.-supplied fuel, including consent for Japan to send spent fuel to Europe for reprocessing. "ii U.S. consent rights have been a subject of controversy with Europeans nations since the NNPA was enacted. As the U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with Euratom (European nuclear community) comes closer to termination at the end

of 1995, the possibility exists that negotiation of a new arrangement could flounder over the U.S. consent rights issue. Hopefully, though, the US will come to terms, thereby convincing other nations to accept the fact that as nuclear disarmament continues, world stores of plutonium and highly enriched uranium will continue to rise, that the need for utilization of this store is possible, and indeed is getting increasingly probable, and should be taken seriously.

The following discussion will examine the economic, political, and technical implications of the United States' nonproliferation policy. It explores the 1993 North Korea nuclear crisis as a case study in the practical application of diplomacy in dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation and violations of existing nuclear treaty regulations.

Northeast Asia remains a region of vital importance to the United States, particularly in view of the growing prominence of the Pacific Rim nations as trading partners and as important players in the global economy. Security and stability in this region are essential if our economic relations are to continue to flourish.12

As noted above by an agent of the United States Department of Defense, as political and financial interests grow in the Far East, it is becoming increasingly important to maintain a peaceful climate, especially in problem areas such as the Korean peninsula. Concurrent with the growth of Western interests in Northeast Asia is the growth in demand for the means to increase productivity. Consequently, electricity, arguably the most convenient and versatile of commercial fuels, is foremost among the needs of these swiftly developing nations. The past two decades have seen a rapid increase in electric generation capacity that should continue or accelerate in the coming decades. As China continues on its current course of development, strains are placed on

the available stores of fossil fuels. In addition to the restriction of limited land area, the combination of an insufficient endowment of fossil fuels and the growing population has spurred several of the countries in Northeast Asia to explore new technologies and techniques for energy production, including nuclear power. Aside from the social, political and environmental considerations of such development, the use of nuclear reactors in energy production poses a specific threat to the goals of international agreements for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The problem that the United States and a host of other peaceful nations are facing is that there is a significant trade-off that accompanies their demands for nuclear non-proliferation. Specifically, these nations must accept that increasingly expensive concessions are the price they must pay in order to consummate ever more stringent restrictions on the spread of nuclear weapons.

A principal precipitation of these concerns presented itself in the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993 when North Korea refused to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities, generating global apprehension regarding the intent of North Korea's nuclear program. The crisis was later resolved in 1994 with the Agreed Framework, an agreement between the U.S. and North Korea to control its nuclear development. The past two decades saw vigorous programs to build nuclear power facilities as a means of supplying electricity in North Korea. The United States and other conglomerates, however, expressed adamant concerns that the by-products of North Korea's nuclear reactors might be used for nuclear weapons development, directly violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) that North Korea itself agreed to sign. Stemming from the antagonism between democratic and communist forces during the Cold War, relations between the United States and North Korea have long been tenuous, and in recent years, the degree of North Korea's cooperation with the NPT often seemed quite suspect.

In the 1960s, under an agreement to assist North Korea in its fundamental understanding of nuclear physics, the Soviet Union provided a small nuclear

research reactor and related training. This assistance provided North Korea with both the means and practical experience in nuclear physics and reactor operations to begin its own nuclear research and development. Through the 1980s and early 1990s, North Korea worked to develop a full nuclear fuel cycle, complete with facilities capable of fabricating nuclear fuel, an electric reactor to produce plutonium, and a reprocessing facility capable of extracting weapons-grade plutonium, the key ingredient needed to produce nuclear weapons.13 Aside from simply having the capabilities, U.S. intelligence sources speculate that North Korea had in fact pursued an active nuclear weapons program, despite its membership to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty since 1985.

As previously mentioned, the NPT identifies that signatory nations may be free to develop peaceful applications of nuclear energy, but the intent of the NPT was to deliberately prohibit or constrict the possibility of using nuclear energy for nuclear weapons production. For example, one of the NPT mandates stipulated that participating nations would report their nuclear materials for monitoring purposes. In addition, all signatory nations would allow for inspections of their nuclear facilities, providing a transparent view of their own intentions and striving toward a comprehensive awareness of the course of nuclear proliferation around the world. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the watch-dog organization responsible for the monitoring of nuclear developments in signatory nations.

Unfortunately, despite signing the NPT, North Korea is believed to have been engaging in an aggressive program to develop such prohibited arms as are specifically outlawed by the agreement. In April 1994, the communist dictator of

North Korea, Kim IL Sung, told American journalists, "We will never have nuclear

weapons, I promise you. This statement was probably untrue as he said it. As Secretary of Defense William Perry observed just two days later, "Within the

next few weeks, North Korea will have to remove plutonium from its 25 megawatt

reactor -- enough for four or five nuclear weapons."15 It is largely due to the unpredictability of the communist regime that the United States has grown so apprehensive in its foreign policy involving North Korea.

Generally speaking, experts agree that the main problem potential nuclear weapons builders face is getting hold of enough weapons grade material- either plutonium or heavily enriched uranium. Once that material is acquired, processing it and developing a fully fledged nuclear bomb is easier. North Korea's suspected violation of the treaty was centered around a number of facilities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, North Korea's principal nuclear development. The key facilities at Yongbyon include an operational 5 MW experimental nuclear power reactor, a partially completed large-scale reprocessing plant for plutonium extraction, a high-explosive testing facility, a nuclear fuel fabrication plant, and a partially completed 50-MW power reactor. North Korea was also in the midst of building a 200-MW reactor at another site.16 North Korea clearly had access to the ingredients for the production of nuclear weapons

Although North Korea signed the NPT in 1985, it did not permit the IAEA to conduct inspections as required by the Treaty, until May 1992. When North Korea finally completed its safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1992, the IAEA took actions to see that North Korea declared all of its nuclear materials and facilities as required by the NPT. In mid-I 992, the IAEA began inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities in order to assess the initial inventory, but found discrepancies in North Korea's declaration of past plutonium production. In the early 1990s, US intelligence agencies estimated that North Korea had extracted plutonium at the Yongbyon reprocessing plant, using spent fuel from the 5 MW reactor which is thought to have been partially refueled in 1989. Despite North Korea's claims that the fuel core of the reactor had not been changed since it began operating in 1986, the IAEA found that there most likely

had been a refueling of the core during a three month shutdown in 1989, where much more than "a few defective fuel rods" were replaced. It is estimated that the shut down provided North Korea with a significant stockpile of plutonium-bearing spent fuel, and that they had subsequently extracted plutonium in multiple campaigns at the Yongbyon reprocessing plant. At least enough weapons-grade plutonium was extracted to create one or two nuclear weapons. The fact that there existed a plutonium reprocessing center at Yongbyon at all was circumstantial evidence in and of itself; it is logical to speculate that North Korea would not have fabricated a reprocessing plant capable of refining the spent fuel to weapons-grade plutonium without the intent to use it.

The crisis in 1993 began when the IAEA initiated a series of inspections and tests to examine the wastes of plutonium extraction supposedly remaining at an undeclared complex near the reprocessing plant. Such action was taken in order to investigate the discrepancies between North Korea's reports and the IAEA's findings, as well as to determine the extent to which North Korea may have violated the NPT. North Korea simply refused to allow the special inspections, however, escalating suspicions that it had been involved in an active nuclear weapons campaign that was clearly a contradiction of its feigned support of the NPT. Refusing the inspections allowed North Korea to effectively restrict the IAEA from providing any safeguards to insure that no nuclear capabilities were being diverted to weapons development. In practical terms, the situation in North Korea was making it evident that this watchdog agency had been constructed with such little authority that North Korea's insubordination was enough to essentially nullify the utility of the IAEA altogether. In the West, the inspection controversy highlighted convictions that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is of critical importance to Americans. Similarly, this threat also presented difficult questions as to the methods to safely deal with the possibility of nuclear capabilities falling into the hands of untrustworthy and dangerous actors.

The 1993 crisis reached a new level of urgency when North Korea claimed that it would interpret any punitive actions by the NPT signatories as an act of war. The United States was faced with an opponent practicing a form of brinkmanship that was terrifyingly similar to Cuba during the Missile Crisis. In response, the United States proposed to enforce economic sanctions on North Korea, recommending a worldwide ban on financial dealings with North Korea. It even considered, but later dismissed, notions of a preemptive air strike on North Korea. Fortunately, the crisis was resolved somewhat painlessly in a series of emergency discussions between former President Jimmy Carter and the North Korean President Kim IL Sung in June of 1994. These discussions culminated in an accordance, the "Agreed Framework," under which North Korea would freeze its nuclear facilities, cease construction of new nuclear facilities, and endeavor to improve relations between North Korea and the United States.~7

It was agreed that the North Korean graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities would be immediately frozen and eventually dismantled, removing from North Korea the future capability to produce dozens of nuclear weapons per year from the spent fuel removed from that type of reactor. Of course, this resolution did not come without concessions by the United States. In exchange for the cooperation of the North Koreans in dismantling the graphite-moderated reactors, the United States agreed to substitute two new light-water reactors (LWRs) in addition to a number of other energy-related inducements and security assurances. The new reactors would be funded and supervised by an international consortium, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and would not be capable of military uses. The new, less proliferation-prone LWRs will create a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW by a target date of 2003.

The US would be the principal representative among the international consortium, serving as the primary point of contact with North Korea for the LWR project. Under the Agreed Framework, the United States also agreed to provide sufficient fossil fuel to offset the energy forgone due to the freeze of the graphite-moderated reactors. Heavy oil for heating and electricity production would be supplied to North Korea at a rate totaling 500,000 tons annually. Japan, South Korea, and more recently the European Union have agreed to share the bill for the new LWR projects, South Korea footing most of the 4.5 billion dollar estimated cost of the project.

As demonstrated by the standoff in 1993, nuclear proliferation is a delicate game on both sides. Critics of the Agreed Framework argue that North Korea played its hand beautifully, risking a dangerous and tenuous game of brinkmanship only to be "rewarded" in the end for its defiance with the gift of a free nuclear structure far more powerful than its previous energy-producing capabilities. It is also possible, of course, that North Korea simply tried to persuade the West that it did have nuclear weapons even when it didn't, just to increase its bargaining position. Their tint of irrationality was enough to make the US commit to an agreement that it would not have had to consider if North Korea had abided by the NPT which they signed in 1985. Even after the apparent resolution of the conflict, the NPT, in fact, will still not be able to determine whether North Korea already has a pre-existing stockpile of plutonium, or possibly even one or two nuclear weapons. This is due to the fact that inspections have been postponed as a compromise included in the Agreed Framework.

Nevertheless, the United States, long regarded as an aggressor by North Korea, was able to maintain its regulatory influence in Northeast Asia and preserve stability there. The tangible rewards of the Agreed Framework include increased security on the Korean Peninsula and the surrounding region, a reduction of future nuclear proliferation, a halting of an arms race in the region, a step towards normalized diplomatic relations between the US and North Korea, and consequently a pacifying influence in the Pacific Rim. Should North Korea continue to cooperate in making its nuclear intentions transparent to the United States and the NPT, significant progress will be made in creating a more stable political and financial environment in the Far East. In one sense, the KEDO consortium and the new LWR plants are a triumph of constructive negotiation, for the United States managed to turn an international crisis (caused by the North's refusal to submit to international inspection of its nuclear facilities) into an opportunity, by in effect taking over North Korea's nuclear program. With respects to nuclear weapons regulation and monitoring, the future international policy of the United States will likely imitate practices similar to those that resolved the North Korea crisis. The peaceful resolution in North Korea was proof that a balance of nuclear interests, however uncertain it may seem, can be accomplished through policy, without resorting to military action. The financial burdens that peaceful nations must bear for this peace of mind, however, is significant. The fact remains, the United States narrowly but brilliantly avoided a calamitous confrontation, and in so doing was able to establish a quite favorable administrative position in North Korea's nuclear program.

During the Cold War and in subsequent years, the United States led the world in a race to develop nuclear programs. Years of research and development in the field of nuclear physics led to the spread of knowledge across national boarders, and today the use of nuclear power is no longer restricted to world superpowers. The resulting state of affairs is one in which there exists an excess of weapons and civilian grade plutonium. If the US wants to regulate the global flow of nuclear material, it will have to pay a substantial opportunity cost. This was evidenced by the aforementioned outcome of the North Korea crisis. Hence, the U.S.'s option of taking over the nuclear programs of foreign nations is one solution to regulating this flow. This is an extremely expensive resolution, however, and could be avoided by the U.S. taking a different stance on research and development of civilian grade plutonium recycling, and the isotopic reduction of weapons grade plutonium into such material.

1"The Nuclear Fuel Cycle," http://www,uilondon.org/, Online, Internet, 3 Nov.1998.

2 Ian Hore-Lacy, Nuclear Electricity~ Fourth Edition, Uranium Information Center, Ltd. 1997. At 1.1

3 "Nuclear Energy Institute, USA, http://www.nei.orgl, Online, Internet, 3 Nov.1998

4 Ibid.

5 Nuclear Electricity at 4.2

6 The Nuclear Fuel Cycle

7 Ibid.

8 Nuclear Energy Inst., USA

9 Ibid.

10 Nuclear Electricity at 5.4

11 Ibid., at 6.2

12 "Northeast Asia," DefenseLlNK, www.defenselink.rnil, Online, Internet, 3 Nov.1998.

13Defenselink.

14 "Proliferation Watch," Empower America Apr.1994. www.emtower.or~, Online, Internet, 3 Nov. 1998.

15 Empower America.

16 Empower America.

17 "Agreed Framework Between The Democratic People's Republic Of Korea And The United States Of America," Historic A~eements 21 Oct.1994. hll1)://www.korea-np.co.ipI~k/DPRK%2OLeadership~cate~orv3 1 .htm, Online, Internet, 7 Nov. 1998.