For the fifty or so years that the Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union was going on, both sides developed strategies to maintain national security and prevent a nuclear holocaust. The key strategies, especially for the United States, was deterrence and arms control. Though there were instances of extreme tension and close calls (Cuban Missile Crisis), the Cold War stayed as its name implies…Cold. Now as we move forward into the future, the Soviet Union is no more, and the Cold War is over. Questions remain, however, as to whether the strategies developed by the U.S. during this time will have an effect on the future enemies the U.S. is likely to face. The Soviet Union was rational, cautious, and in control of its military organizations. It can be argued that states and non states that don’t hold these characteristics, will not be effected by deterrence or arms control. This paper will show that proper use of both of these strategies will work in the future, and keep the world in relative peace. It will also show that while nuclear weapons maintain the strategies of deterrence and arms control, to allow them to proliferate throughout the world would be a tremendous mistake.
Deterrence will work in the future because of the world we live in. Nuclear weapons have completely changed the thought process of entering a war, and in most cases have leveled the playing field. "In a conventional world, one is uncertain about winning or losing. In a nuclear world, one is uncertain about surviving or being annihilated." (Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 6) If we lived in a conventional world, a world without nuclear weapons, one could easily argue that a change in rationality or caution could cause deterrence or arms control to fail. This, unfortunately, is not the world we live in. These weapons of mass destruction are so powerful and destructive, that a state would be foolish to risk being attacked by them. "Deterrence is achieved not through the ability to defend but through the ability to punish." (Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p.3) That is why deterrence has worked and will continue to work. Nuclear weapons punish and whether the credibility is all together there or not, even the slim chance that a state may use nuclear weapons completely changes the calculations and determinations of war.
Arms control will also work in the future because of nuclear weapons. "Nuclear weapons alter the dynamics of arms races." (Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 29) With conventional weapons, if one side has greater numbers than another state, it gives them an advantage. With nuclear weapons, sheer numbers aren’t nearly as important. If a country has enough nuclear weapons to survive an initial attack, and strike back, states will be deterred. Clearly deterrence and arms control go together. "With deterrent forces, arms races in their ultimate form - the fighting of offensive wars designed to increase national security - become pointless." (Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 33)
So now that we understand the basics of why deterrence and arms control have worked, let us manipulate the characteristics raised in this discussion, to see if they will continue to work. First let us consider both rationality and caution. It is true that many of the enemies the U.S. is likely to face (Iraq, Iran, North Korea, China) will not be as cautious or as rational as the Soviet Union was. But this does not mean that deterrence will fail. There is a difference between a leader being irrational, throwing caution to the wind, and starting a conventional war, and a leader being irrational, and risking their own annihilation in nuclear war. Many people saw Idi Amin and Muammar el-Qaddafi as being irrational and lacking caution. "…they were favorite examples of the kinds of rulers who supposedly could not be trusted…Despite wild rhetoric aimed at foreigners, however, both of these ‘irrational’ rulers became cautious and modest when punitive actions against them might have threatened their ability to rule." (Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 12) History has shown that deterrence works, even on "irrational" leaders. Another more recent example is seen when looking at Saddam Hussein. Hussein only invaded Kuwait after the U.S. had, "…given many indications that it would not oppose him or use military force to liberate a Kuwait conquered by Iraq." (Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 13) The missiles Hussein used against Israel, during Desert Storm, were feeble at best. It was clear that Iraq did not want to prompt attacks, "…more punishing than what they were already suffering. Deterrence worked for the United States and for Israel as it has for every other nuclear state." ." (Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 13) These example show, that even as the characteristics change, the power of deterrence that goes along with nuclear weapons does not.
When discussing rationality and caution, one also comes across the question of stability. As Waltz says, "Nuclear power and nuclear weapons programs require administrative and technical teams able to formulate and sustain programs of considerable cost that pay off only in the long run. The more unstable a government, the shorter becomes the attention span of its leaders." (Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 9) Most people fear that an irrational government will gain access to nuclear weapons and there will be no deterring them because of their irrational thinking. As this quote shows, these types of governments aren’t likely to put the forth the time or effort required to gain nuclear weapons.
The natural progression on this type of thinking is to ask what about the nuclear projects undergone by stable states that then became unstable? The answer is simple, nuclear weapons won’t solve anything for these states. A nuclear state may be unstable or become so, but why, in an internal struggle for power, would the contenders start using nuclear weapons? How would they use them as instruments for maintaining or gaining control? "One or another nuclear state will experience uncertainty of succession, fierce struggles for power, and instability of regime. Those who fear the worst have not shown how those events might lead to the use of nuclear weapons." (Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 10) Again it is shown that deterrence will continue to work, even as the characteristics of the state change.
What about the characteristic of military control? Waltz again attacks the thinking that this characteristic will be the down fall of deterrence or arms control.
In countries where political control is most difficult to maintain, government are least likely to initiate nuclear weapons programs. In such states, soldiers help to maintain leaders in power or try to overthrow them. For those purposes, nuclear weapons are not useful. Soldiers who have political clout, or want it, are not interested in nuclear weapons. They are not scientists or technicians. They like to command troops and squadrons. Their vested interests are in the military’s traditional trappings.
So it can be seen that the characteristics of the Soviet Union do not need to be present in future enemies of the United States in order for deterrence and arms control to continue to work.
Though I have stated throughout this paper that deterrence and arms control will continue to work in the future, I do believe that there can be extreme circumstances where they fail. This can be seen when examining religious fundamentalist groups, and terrorists. In both instances, deterrence will fail, because there is no deterring those who don’t care about the consequences of their actions.
To deter, "literally means to stop people from doing something by frightening them." (Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 3) With terrorists, they are safe from this fright for a couple reasons. First and foremost, the exist on the premise that they will use fright to get attention or have their demands met. They will do whatever it takes to achieve their goals. The biggest difference between terrorists and states is that terrorists really have no address. States will not even use nuclear weapons anonymously because of the chance that it could be traced back to them. It is nearly impossible to trace a terrorist group, and so no there is no fear of retaliation. How can deterrence work without this fear factor? You can’t hit what you can’t see. Terrorists know this, and because of this, they are not afraid, and thus deterrence fails.
Deterrence will also fail in cases of religious fundamentalist and other radical groups, especially when considering holy wars. In a holy war, it is believed that dying for the cause will send one to a place better than heaven. To die for your country is an honor. How can deterrence be expected to work, when death is almost a salvation? Again, because the fear is eliminated, deterrence will not work. However, it is only with these extreme groups, that deterrence is likely to fail.
Though I have described the world in the future as having deterrence and arms control, I do not think it will necessarily be safe. I disagree that deterrence and arms control will fail because future enemies of the United States won’t have the characteristics of the Cold War Soviet Union. But if I had to say which world I thought would be safer, I would to say the Cold War period. Just because nuclear weapon work so well on preventing wars, doesn’t mean the world will stay peaceful and safe. This is because with everything, you take the good with the bad. Nuclear weapons level the playing field and work great in deterrence, but there is a negative. This is seen with Scott Sagan’s "More is Worse" theory. Sagan believes that the spread of nuclear weapons heightens the likelihood of accidents occurring, and "…organizational behaviors that are likely to lead to deterrence failures…or accidental war." (Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 48) I believe this view to be a little too pessimistic, but one that definitely needs to be considered.
Nuclear weapons serve well for deterrence, as Waltz has said. The problem is that more and more countries are going to want nuclear weapons to strengthen their national security. Accident theory basically states, the more states that have nuclear weapons, the more likely an accident will occur. Realistically, states are going to do whatever it takes to maintain their security, but if this means the further spread of nuclear weapons, then this could cause major catastrophes in the future.
Another problem with the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the manner at which nuclear capabilities are arrived at. States test secretly and try to hide their nuclear arsenal from other states. It also may be more important to a state to develop the arsenal, and not worry so much about the safety issues. Namely, it is more important to have the biggest toy and less important on how safe you were in getting it. This adds to the accident theory. Though the positive of deterrence is nice, the negative of a nuclear accident is not.
Organization theory is another problem with nuclear weapons raised by Sagan. Countries have to worry that if there is a nuclear attack, they will maintain the capabilities of second strike. To do this states will not always maintain the checks and balances that Sagan believes are essential to maintaining deterrence. "This organizational critique argues that military organizations, unless professionally managed through a checks - and - balances system are unlikely to fulfill the operational requirements for stable nuclear deterrence." (Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 49) I agree that a system of checks and balances is needed, but I don’t think it needs to be "professionally managed"
Sagan formulates perfectly the requirements needed for a rational deterrence framework,
1) there must not be a preventive war during the transition period when one state has nuclear weapons and the other state is building, but has not yet achieved, a nuclear capability; 2) both states must develop, not just the ability to inflict some level of unacceptable damage to the other side, but also a sufficient degree of ‘second strike’ survivability so that its forces could retaliate if attacked first; and 3) the nuclear arsenals must not be prone to accidental or unauthorized use.
Sagan states that, to believe, "…new nuclear powers will meet these requirements [is] a very problematic belief." (Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 53) I agree that if these requirements are not met, deterrence will fail, but I am also much more hopeful than Sagan, that they will indeed be met.
It may seem as if I am contradicting myself in this paper by first saying deterrence will work, and then saying it won’t. It may also seem contradicting to first write on how well nuclear weapons maintain deterrence, and then write on all the negative possibilities. My problem is one that many people looking at this topic face. I am smack in the middle of the two views; "More is Better" (Waltz) and "More is Worse" (Sagan) I agree with Waltz in the strength that nuclear weapons have in deterrence, but I definitely don’t think nuclear weapons should be allowed to proliferate. The question asked in this paper is whether countries having different characteristics than the Cold War Soviet Union can/will still be deterred. I have shown the answer to this question, except in extreme cases, is yes. be no. I also hope, however, that if the question was asked as to whether the future will be safer than the Cold War period, I have shown the answer to be no.
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