The once familiar caricature of two figures, one American, the other Soviet, pitted against each other, both surrounded by menacing, infinite stockpiles of nuclear arsenals is an image of the past.  The Cold Was has ended, communism in the once Soviet states is giving way to democracies, and both powers are committing themselves to drastically reducing the hoards of nuclear weapons they have amassed in the past half-century.  In all those years of extreme nuclear tension, however, none of those warheads was ever utilized in an attack against an opponent: the world managed to avert even the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, though to be certain disaster.  Nonetheless, policies to determine how to deal with the extant nuclear weapons, along with other weapons of mass destruction, have been the critical issues when discussing international security.  Numerous agreements aimed at minimizing their threat, such as the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, have been fervently pursued and are now being fervently upheld.  Debates over the question of abolition of nuclear warhead rage on, with analysts arguing about the viability and pragmatics of "virtual arsenal".  In view of the absence of any substantial attack by weapons of mass destruction, that such measures and such policies claim such attention and precedence over other issues may seem excessive and imprudent.  In fact, it could be said that scholars and governments spend too much time and resources worrying about the proliferation or weapons or mass destruction.  Such weapons may threaten global security theory; in reality, however, they have rarely been used.  The real threats to international security are those that kill real people and damage our economy and environment every day: internal wars and energy insecurity.  These two problems are the most pressing security threats today and for the foreseeable future.

At first glance, such a statement seems to ring true.  Weapons of mass destruction have been sparsely used, whereas civil wars are being waged continuously all the while accumulating a horrendous death toll, the specters of global warming and fuel crisis are approaching steadily.  However, while the observational claims the statement proposes are accurate, its implications made from these claims are not.  The mere fact that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have rarely been employed does not discount them as real and viable threats; historically, the world has enjoyed the absentation from WMD use partly because of luck and mostly because of specific international situations which lent themselves to policies of non-use, neither of which can be relied upon to function in the current era and in the future.  Thus, non-proliferation endeavors remain an essential tool for maintaining international security.  Furthermore, while internal wars and energy crises are substantial, actual dangers, which deserve immediate attention, they simply do not exceed the perils of WMD's and thus can not be accurately described as the most pressing security issues.

The improbability of an intentional nuclear strike on another nuclear nation has been greatly discussed amongst analyst and policy makers.  The theory of mutual deterrence, the idea that a nuclear attack would incite such drastic retribution as to outweigh any benefits that the initial action could possibly elicit, constituted the impelling force behind the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.  As Allan Krass stated, "The best one can say about nuclear weapons is that they can prevent war by making the risks too high for both sides ... it is their mere existence that imposes caution and prudence on national leaders in times of tension" (Krass, 90).  In his article, "The Long Peace," John Gaddis contributes to this same argument, claiming that fear of the mutual assured destruction a nuclear conflict would bring about instills an extremely pessimistic attitude towards war, which has the effect of thwarting lower scale crises from escalating into full blown wars (Gladdis, 123).  With this in mind, that nuclear weapons are self-canceling tools not of warfare but of stabilization and deterrence, that superfluousness and even counter activity of non-proliferation policies could be argued.  If nuclear weapons have stabilized relations between those powers currently possessing them, then proliferation would allow those other states which have not yet procured a nuclear armory to enjoy the same stability bestowed by mutual deterrence.  This scenario supports the original statement that WMD are scarcely put to use in actual situations-because mutual fear and deterrence bring about absentation and that proliferation worries are a waste of time and energy-because such proliferation that policies are trying to stave off and control would bring about a steady state of nuclear tension and non-use.

However, such a scenario of refraining from use out of fear of mutual assured destruction can encompass only the deterrence of some strikes at best.  While the systems controlling the ultimate launching of nuclear warhead are stringent and highly secure, they are not perfect; and the possibility of accidents or unintended attacks cannot be disregarded.  According to normal accident theory, those complex systems, which are tightly coupled will inevitably, suffer some sort of accident.  Like a nuclear reactor, the nuclear attack involves many interrelated factors, including information about the activity of the prospective enemy and orders from a higher command.  Precise and infallible communication between each individual factor is therefore essential; otherwise, confusion ensues, which likens the probability of an unintended and disastrous attack.  Various incidents in actual history have contributed to the validity of this accidents theory.  For example, during the Gulf War, Iraqi launchers were instructed to initiate biological weapons attack on opposing troops if certain messengers hadn't returned to their base.  However, American troops deployed there were under orders to eliminate those couriers.  During the Cuban Missile Crisis, a radar operator set the North American Defense Command into panic mode when he broadcast a tape simulating a possible attack from Cuba and other officers mistook it for an actual occurrence (Sagan, 96).  While such situations luckily were resolved without dire consequences, they illustrate the harrowing ease with which the command systems controlling WMD can fall prey to mortal misunderstandings and failures in communication.

Moreover, keeping in step with what Walter Wriston terms the technological revolution commands systems of the present day have begun to rely heavily on computers and information networks.  While this bestows great strategically and tactical advantages, it also brings with it great vulnerability.  "The smallest nation, terrorist group, or drug cartel could hire a computer programmer to plant a Trojan horse virus in software, take down a vital network, or cause a missile to misfire" (Wriston, 18).  This merely adds one more locus of possible accident that could result in a devastating yet unintentional nuclear launch.

In addition to remaining vulnerable to the failures predicted by normal accidents theory, command systems may also suffer from those delineated by organization theory.  According to this outlook, any given organization is comprised of varying elements which may cooperate with each other under one higher command but ultimately have particular and self-interested objectives:

In military organizations, weapon system operators often have different interests than their commanders, units in the field have different interests than the command headquarters, and a particular service has different interests than the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Sagan, 73).

Correspondingly, civilian leaders' hesitance to attack nuclearly for fear of later retaliations might not be shared by military leaders who may desire to display their military prowess to potential enemies with inferior or developing nuclear capabilities.  Such willingness to employ nuclear weapons had been displayed by various U.S. military officers in the past despite dissension of other authorities on that matter and even to the point that it resulted in the loss on one officer's job (Sagan, 76).

The point can be contended that the dangers described by normal accidents and organization theories are just that: theories, which are mere extrapolations of fallible human minds and as they do not reflect the true state of things nor can they be used to predict the future.  However, whether or not accidents have occurred or military officers have been more aggressive in their attitudes towards war according to the reasons detailed by the respective theories, the fact remains that actual events correspond to those predicted by the theories, and often it is merely luck that resolves that situation.  In fact, General George Butler, ex-commander in chief of U. S, Strategic Command, claimed that the world emerged unscathed from the Cuban Missile Crisis thanks only to "the grace of God" (Butler, 132).

Furthermore, the portrait of stability to which Gaddis refers existed within the confines of a bipolar system, At the height of mutual deterrence during the Cold War, both the American and Soviet side maintained strong enough armories which could also ensure second strike capability.  It seems as though both powers were basically content with the status quo and understood the consequences of a modem war on their valued population.  Such circumstances proved favorable for the functioning of a stable nuclear standoff.  However, in today's framework, potential proliferators, such as Iraq, North Korea, and Pakistan, might not conform to such characteristics that allow deterrence to function.  First of all, these proliferators tend to not be satisfied with the status quo and feel that they are in desperate situations, thus rendering them risk accepting.  In this case, the threat of a retaliatory attack might not actively prevent them from initiating hostilities, possibly a nuclear attack on a neighbor or deployed foreign forces, in the first place.

Moreover, not all proliferants would have the economic or technological resources to construct weapons of superior grade, and instead might manufacture defective and thus unsafe arms, capable of detonating at the slightest unintentional provocation.

After the Gulf War, Iraq's nuclear bomb prototypes were discovered to be of such precarious nature: "The design calls for cramming so much weapon grade uranium into the core, they say, that the bomb would inevitably be on the verge of going off-even while sitting on the bench" (Sagan 98).  Finally, the mishaps outlined by normal accidents and organization theories are exacerbated in these smaller, regional neoproliferants.  For similar reasons that their bomb designs may tend to be accident prone, there is also high probability that safety measures and monitoring policies regarding the arsenal would be substandard in these states, increasing the likelihood of nuclear misfire, Additionally, some potentially proliferation states, such as Pakistan, have strong military contingencies with much sway in political authority, thus making them, according to organization theory, more liable to encourage warfare and overlook retaliatory threats.  Hence, the non-status quo states that are now the nuclear proliferators, render the practice of mutual deterrence ineffective, both by being immune to threats by virtue of risk accepting behavior and by suffering from an increased probability of unintentional and thus undeteffable mishaps, and effectively change the status of nuclear weapons from self-canceling stabilizers of the Cold War to active security threats in the present future.

An argument in contention with the danger of new regional proliferators could be made that because of their cumbersome nature of nuclear arms production, factories for such weapons would be easily detectable.  Then, any nuclear proliferation in states suspect of being unaffected by deterrence measures could be halted, thus eliminating that danger and returning the world to a state of non threatening nuclear tension.  However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the scattering of its nuclear arsenal to various newly independent states, regional powers have been offered the opportunity to acquire already manufactured weapons, as "the depressed economies of those nations created a potential buyers' market for weapons of mass destruction ... and unsettled political conditions ... made safeguarding the weapons and materials potentially more difficult: (Perry, 67).  Moreover, regional proliferators could endeavor to avoid such ease of detection by adopting more covert construction methods, which would entail less safety

procedures and increase the probability of defects, further contributing to the possibility of nuclear misfire.  Therefore, proliferation of WMD's still remains a crucial problem to be addressed.

Even if nuclear weapons still served the purpose with which they have been attributed during the cold war and created a worldwide fear that established tension but prevented actual use, proliferation of WMD's would be still be a danger, as that term encompasses also biological and chemical weapons, This class of  WMD 's has the special characteristic of the capacity for covert, untraditional delivery, thus allowing for a surprise attack.  As the praxis of deterrence requires previous knowledge of the possible initial strike, such a surprise maneuver would undermine the functioning of deterrence.  Thus, the absentation from employment of biological and chemical weapons cannot be ensured by deterrence.  While such weapons existed during the Cold War, their proliferation became an even greater threat with the arrival of the technical revolution.  With the age of computers and electronic highway, information spanning all spectra, including directions on how to build biological and chemical weapons, became accessible to anyone with a network connection.  Because of such availability of this type of information, the demographics of the new proliferators in this era expanded to include not only unstable regional powers but also terrorists and extremist groups.  This latter group could be even more indifferent to deterrence than regional aggressors as they would have no outstanding international reputation to uphold nor any concern with economic or political sanctions.  Furthermore, there remains the question against whom retaliation should be targeted; terrorists rarely have return addresses and punishment is impossible when one can not locate the criminal to be punished.  Lastly, terrorists do not acquire WMD to procure deterring power in the case that a nation threatens an initial strike against them; rather, they desire the weapons as bargaining power and seek to achieve their objectives by causing devastating and intolerable casualties.

Historically, terrorists have not actually employed biological chemical weapons to their full extent, keeping their victims to smaller numbers (Stern, 405).  In light of this, one could argue that such limited target decreases the threat of the WNM, equalizing its effects to a normal conventional bomb, which is dangerous, but by no means a priority in international security.  However, human control over the effects of biological or chemical weapons ends with dispersal.  As many are airborne agents, the area affected depends greatly on weather conditions, such as wind velocity and direction which are unreliable, uncontrollable factors.  Thus, a terrorist could disperse several spores of anthrax, with the intention to kill a limited number of people, but the bacteria might be spread by the wind to contaminate a much larger area, greatly exceeding the effects of the traditional bomb.  This illustrates the general problem with WMD 's: that in the current world order, they possess an element of uncontrollability, either by virtue of being prone to accidents or resistance to deterrence, thus making their detonation very possible and a huge threat.

Internal wars and energy dilemmas to indeed pose potent threats to international security.  While the definition itself of an internal war indicates that the conflict arises in and the bulk of the fighting takes place within the boundaries of a given state, it does not preclude international significance.  A foreign country may have vested interests, possibly ideological or economic, in the state in question and as a result of such a relation, may find a number of its own nationals residing in that state.  Both cases would engender the former country's concern about inner turmoil in the latter.  Such was the case with the recent hostage crisis in Peru during which Tupac Amaru rebels infiltrated the house of the Japanese ambassador, held in captivity many high profile guests, along with a number of Japanese nationals, and demanded, among other changes, a discontinuance of Japan's involvement in the Peruvian economy.  Obviously, this problem was not contained within Peru's borders, but roped in the Japanese government also, Additionally, when a state fraught with internal tumult provides the rest of the world with important resources, oil being the most salient one, foreign countries will naturally have a stake in maintaining or regaining stability in that area to ensure the continued provision of that essential resource.  It is for the precise reason that activity in the Middle East remains such a priority in international concern.  Finally, as described by Michael Brown, internal conflict remains an interest to the international arena as it can undermine laws and principles that the international community has erected to serve as standards of behavior:

For example, the international community has tried to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants in formulating rules and laws about the conduct of war.  It will find its distinctions and norms hard to sustain in the long run if it allows them to be trampled in ethnic conflicts in which civilians are attacked deliberately and systematically (Brown, 9).

International security faces the additional threat of a perceived energy crisis.  Although total oil supplies are far from danger, the time during which the world can continue to enjoy this fuel at its relatively low current price is dwindling and analysts predict an oil price strike in the near future.  Such an energy crisis would create stiff competition in fuel acquisition which could very well escalate to international hostilities: contrasted to the oil crisis of the 1970's in which the U.S. had been in competition with its NATO allies, rapidly developing Asian nations would be joining the contention for fuel (Romm, 60) and such a shift in opponent relations reduces apparent incentives to compete peacefully and diplomatically.  Furthermore, the fact that the inexpensive oil supply is localized to the unstable regions of the Middle East elevates insecurities concerning this fossil fuel.  Because of the necessity of oil not only in common day civilian life but also in the military arena to fuel planes, tanks, ships, essential for combat, regional aggressors like Iraq can exploit their control over fuel supply and exert leverage over those countries in need.  While this is a fairly unlikely scenario, world interests in the area due to fuel supplies are strong enough to impel involvement in and cause vulnerability to wars and turmoil in that region.  On another note, problems with global warming, supposedly caused by the exorbitant emissions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere by heavily industrialized nations falls under the canopy of energy insecurity, The changes projected by scientists would be so drastic relative to the very gradual increase the world has been experiencing that they would "dramatically alter accustomed climatic patterns, affecting agriculture, water supplies, disease patters, ecosystems..." (Schneider 173).  Such extreme fluctuations would have tremendous impacts of the security of every country in the world, by affecting its economy, its health, and its natural resources.

Therefore, energy and internal crises do serve as actual major perils, which jeopardize international security; however, they ultimately remain secondary to the danger of WMD 's. First of all, the fact that the gravity of either problem is increased exponentially if they involve WNM'S.  An internal crisis involving a state which has some WNM capability immediately becomes an international affair even if otherwise there would be no vested interest in the matter by other nations.  Nuclear fuel could be a potential alternative to oil, but the perils of the manufacture of weapons from the waste renders it an even more dangerous resource than the original one it was meant to replace.

Secondly, the degree that civil wars and energy securities pose threats is attenuated by the fact that they can be somewhat resolved.  If a foreign nation's interests are at risk because of internal turmoil in another, then intervention is possible to stave off, minimize, or even eliminate the conflict.  That U.N. endeavors to intervene in such problems have been minimally successful at best should serve more as a reflection of U.N.'s failure to adopt the necessary undertakings than as a sign of the general hopelessness concerning the viability of intervention.  During the Rwandan crises, General Romeo Dallaire of the Reconnaissance Mission to asses the situation claims that he needed a force of 4500 men to contain the conflict and enforce the cease-fire.  He was presented with about 2500, a force that was unable to prevent massive genocide and even attacks on the U.N. troops themselves (Early Warning 36).  Has the U.N. accurately fulfilled his request, the intervention attempt may have been successful, Regarding energy security, an oil crisis or Iraq's exploitation of an in-demand fuel seem frightening scenarios, but they are not unavoidable ones.  An increased gas tax, although unpopular, would bestow a country with the financial resources to turn to more expensive oil sources, thus avoiding possibly hostile competition and Middle East control.

Furthermore, through research and technological advances, alternate energy sources can be harnessed so that countries will not be completely dependent on oil as fuel.  By implementing strong programs to drastically reduce gas emissions, by monitoring closely and encouraging environment-friendly progress of developing industrial areas, and by investing in research to minimize the effects air pollution, countries of the world can address the problem of global warming and atmospheric pollution.

Despite the fact such solutions are rather tenuous they are a great improvement over the helplessness of a country to protect itself from a nuclear attack once it is initiated.  Since "the lack of defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles makes an attack virtually unstoppable" (Fetter, 13), once deterrence fails its job, the targeted country destined to suffer the effects of a WMD detonation.  And these weapons produce enormous effects.  Given the destructive power of these weapons along with the inability to impede them once they have been launched, increasing importance should be placed on preventing their launch in the first place.  Since the current world order of regional aggressors and terrorists, who resist retaliatory threats and make more likely the occurrence of accidents and unintentional weapon firings, the cold war's method of staving off nuclear disaster by deterrence can no longer be relied upon, the threat of such an attack is a very ominous, very possible one.  Therefore, while internal wars and energy crisis remain high priorities for policy makers-, the threat of WMD detonation remains a higher one, for which new methods and policies of prevention must be developed.

Works Cited

Butler, George.  "The General's Bombshell." The Washington Quarterly.  Vol 20.  No, 3 Summer 1997.

"Early Warning and Conflict Management." Study 2 of The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience.

Fetter, Steve.  "Ballistic Missles and Weapons of Mass Destruction." International Security.  Summer 1991.

Gaddis, John.  "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," International Security, Spring 1986.  Vol. 10 No. 4.

Krass, Allan.  "The Second Nuclear Era: Nuclear Weapons in a Transformed World." World Security: Challenges for a New Century. (NY: St. Martin's Press 1994) 85-105

Perry, William.  "Defense in an Age of Hope." Foreign Affairs.  Nov/Dec 1996.

Romm, Joseph J. and Charles B. Curtis, "Mideast Oil Forever?" The Atlantic Monthly (April 1996) 57-74.

Sagan, Scott.  "The Perils of Proliferation: Organizational Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons." International Security.  Spring 1994, Vol. 18, No.4.

Schneider, Stephen, "Degrees of Uncertainty." National Geographic Research and Exploration, 9(2): 173-190; 1993.

Stern, Jessica.  "Will Terrorists Turn to Poison?" ORBIS.  Summer 1993.

Wriston, Walter, "Bits, Bytes, and Diplomacy." Foreign Affairs (Sept/Oct 1997) 172182.