"On July 16, 1945, at Alamogordo, New Mexico, a Plutonium implosion bomb became the first nuclear device ever exploded" (Science, Technology, and the Nuclear Arms Race, pg. 33). This event marked the dawn of an era in human history where the destructive capabilities of our technologies reach far beyond any form of recoverable measure. Until that point technology had always made a profound influence on the character of war, but the innovation of nuclear weapons was the destructive pinnacle of a century defined by its technological advancements. The industrial revolution, culminating in the development of modern aircraft, tanks, artillery, and naval vessels increased the lethality of war many fold. However, the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945 represented a quantum leap in war's brutal nature that will forever be regretted. As it stands today, eight states possess nuclear weapons, with four states actively pursuing the technology. Along with the four proliferates, there are twenty five states whose desires for nuclear weapons remain latent, but have the potential to become active if presented with the necessity. Accompanying this scenario is a fierce debate regarding the future of nuclear proliferation, and which parties if any should be allowed participation. The debate harbors two distinct oppositions, those who support proliferation and those who abhor it. My support falls with the side in direct opposition. The notion of "More is better" (Kenneth Waltz), which sees the increased production of nuclear weapons as a deterrence mechanism completely abolishing the possibility of nuclear war, has insufficient certainty and accountability. The theory lacks the assurance that states will in fact be deterred by their enemy's possession of nuclear weapons, and fails to account for possible accidents or rogue organizations acting irrationally. Along with the inadequacies of deterrence theory, the proliferation of nuclear weapons enhances the possibility for nuclear war by placing the highest of all responsibilities in the hands of military organizations. Thus, the bold assumption that all states will act rationally and in the collective best interest of the world is naive and dangerously overconfident. Hence, nuclear proliferation should be completely stifled, and all other forms of preventive measures enacted.

The foundation for the argument supporting nuclear proliferation, lies in the theory of deterrence. Deterrence is a situation where one party is kept from carrying out their intended actions for fear of suffering overwhelming consequences or retaliation. Nuclear deterrence is an ideology based on dissuading a would-be attacker from mobilizing. As described by Kenneth Waltz deterrence is achieved in two ways:

This theory suggests that nuclear deterrence and nuclear defenses improve the prospects for peace. The ideal is supported by four prominent claims that attempt to establish beyond a shadow of a doubt, that nuclear weapons reduce the likelihood of war.

The first of these claims suggests that the nuclear deterrence theory, while unable to prevent the occurrence of conventional warfare will most certainly impede the outbreak of nuclear chaos. This ideal relies on the premise that a nation's nuclear forces will restrain an opposing state from engaging in a campaign of total destruction. Thus, while small scale conflicts may occur, the nuclear threat will keep them from escalating to mammoth proportions. "States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains. War between nuclear states remains possible, but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for. If states can score only small gains, because larger ones risk retaliation, they have little incentive to fight" (The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, pg. 5).

The second claim favoring deterrence submits that states act with less care if the stakes are low, and with more care if they are high. The Crimean War fought in March of 1854, perfectly exemplifies the reality of this theory (Crimean War: Military History, pg. 15). In this instance France and Britain assumed that victory over Russia would be easy. This mindf rame led to careless strategies and aggressive tactics that opted to challenge strength before offering diplomatic resolution (The Crimean War: Military History, pg. 45). The deterrence theory adheres to the notion that states, due to a nuclear presence, would never enter a conflict strictly because of a belief in an easy victory.

The next proposal in accordance with the deterrence theory establishes that nuclear weapons contribute to ensuring a country's security more than a conquest of territory. "A country with a deterrent strategy does not need the extent of territory required by a country relying on conventional defense. A deterrent strategy makes it unnecessary for a country to fight for the sake of increasing its security, and this removes a major cause of war" (The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, pg. 6).

The final argument made in favor of the deterrent strategy depends upon both nuclear capabilities and the will to use them. In this discussion its said that the will of the attacked, striving to defend its territory, is much stronger than the will of a state striving to annex someone else's land (Nuclear Warfare, Dean Wilkening pg. 215). This contention asserts that military leaders are fully aware that the will to use nuclear weapons would be greater in a nation under attack than in the attacking country. Knowing this, the would-be attacker is seriously inhibited from mobilizing their forces.

These four principles are similar in theory, and equally ambiguous in practice. The source of this ambiguity stems from an inability to accurately predict the actions of any nation, or the actions of the military regimes that control them. The argument for deterrence relies on the rational, objective, and unprejudiced actions of all states. This optimism is fueled by a strong belief that the international system, and the potential costs of any nuclear war, will produce similar and essentially rational decisions in all states. As mentioned by Kenneth Waltz, "Whatever the identity of rulers, and whatever the characteristics of their states, the national behaviors they produce are strongly conditioned by the outside world" (The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, pg. 116). This vision is blurred by an optimism that could prove to be extremely lethal in the future. The assumption that all leaders will have the capacity to act rationally, regardless of the circumstance, is placing too much responsibility in the hands of human nature. All it would take is one rogue nation, or a violent terrorist organization to trigger a nuclear war that would bring mass destruction the likes of which we can hardly imagine. Throughout United States nuclear history, there have been many instances where unsafe warheads have caused serious problems. Situations have occurred where warheads have been dropped or damaged during their transportation. In one NSA inspection report, it was said that, "The country is extremely fortunate that it did not suffer its first nuclear disaster. If the device had exploded, it would have began a chain reaction the likes of which no one has ever seen." (Nuclear Weapons Safety, pg. 257) In Russia's case, there have been instances involving nuclear theft (Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Scott Sagan pg. 42). If these types of scenarios are unavoidable by the richest and most nuclear advanced nations, how can one promise the safe existence of nuclear weapons in many smaller and less resourceful states? A metaphor that can represent the possibility for unforeseen disaster can be seen in NASA's Challenger mission. NASA felt so confident about the safety and certainty of its launch processes, that it expanded its avenues to allow teachers and politicians to participate. Unfortunately, the Challenger resulted in one of NASA's greatest tragedies. Resulting from a small malfunction in one of the launch engines was the Challenger's fatal explosion and the death of all its astronauts. This type of accident cannot be tolerated when dealing with nuclear weapons.

Another important key to deterrence strategy is making one's threats credible. If the opponent does not believe the validity of the nuclear threat, then it has little deterrent value. The state appropriating deterrence tactics must adequately communicate a high resolve to utilize their nuclear weapons in no uncertain terms. However, since any use of nuclear weapons would most likely lead to nuclear war, the defendants ability to display his strength becomes minimal. Attacking countries realize that the opponent most likely does not want to use its nuclear weapons, thus it might see nuclear weapons as trophies with little use value.

Another argument reducing deterrence strategy, is that nuclear weapons have not succeeded in deterring the outbreak of wars. The United States and Russia have participated in wars such as Vietnam, Korea, and the Persian Gulf, where each nation had nuclear capability yet could not avoid the conflict. In the case of the Persian Gulf, president Bush said he was prepared to use any means necessary to prevent Sadam Hussein from achieving his goal (Nuclear Warfare, Dean Wilkening pg. 27). This was interpreted by most experts as a nuclear threat. This threat however, was unsuccessful in deterring Iraq and war became unavoidable. Other instances such as the Cuban missile crisis where it was described that The United States and Russia were "Within a breadth of nuclear war, all due to miscommunication and false assumptions" (Nuclear Warfare, pg. 212). The continuation of nuclear proliferation will increase the chances that other instances such as the Cuban missile crisis may occur, bringing deadly ramifications.

Deterrence strategy also fails to account for nuclear weapons in some of the rising nuclear powers who are highly vulnerable and extremely accident prone. As seen in the recent description of Iraq's nuclear weapons facilities, "The inspector's found out one other thing about the Iraqi bomb design, it is highly unstable. The design calls for cramming so much weapon grade uranium into the core, they say, that the bomb would inevitably be on the verge of going off, even while sitting on the workbench" (Nuclear Proliferation Problems, pg. 121). This statement serves as concrete evidence exposing a lack of adequate safety mechanisms throughout the infant nuclear proliferates. Another theory reinforcing the lack of safety within emerging nuclear states establishes that the highly covert nature of nuclear proliferation increases the likelihood of accidents. Due to international diplomatic pressure, new proliferates are forced to develop their weapons in a very secretive manner. "The secrecy and tight compartmentalization of such programs suggests that there will not be thorough monitoring of safety efforts" (Nuclear Proliferation Problems, pg. 140). This need for secrecy also inhibits a country's ability to provide full scale nuclear testing, thus hindering the development of effective safety devices.

I have established that the strategy of deterrence, which is the primary reason for nuclear proliferation, is greatly faulted and that the exposed failures have the potential for nuclear war. I will now establish a parallel argument that reiterates the dangers of nuclear proliferation. My argument consists of two central concerns. The first concern deals with the notion that professional military regimes, because of common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests display organizational behaviors that are likely to lead to a deterrence failure or accidental war. The second concern relays the fear that future nuclear states will lack the positive mechanisms of civilian control that can contain the enactment of military interests.

Organizational theory suggests that military organizations are dominated by common biases towards conflict, and are strictly binded by tight war plans and standard operating procedures. Many examples of organizational theory have arisen throughout history. World War I and II are examples where military organizations were unable to adapt to political flexibility, and war erupted vigorously. Scott Sagan states that,

The main consequence, in practice, of this organizational theory is the enactment of preventive war. Preventive war is a situation where one state attacks another at a time where they hold a distinct advantage. The attack occurs in order to avoid being attacked in the future. In the nuclear age, preventive war becomes a serious issue. If one state acquires nuclear technology, they must not act impulsively and attack their neighboring adversary who has yet to develop nuclear weapons. The organizational perspective shows a distinct tendency for preventive war to occur as the result of military biases that encourage such attacks. There are four strong reasons to expect that military officers are predisposed to view preventive war in a much more favorable light than civilian leaders. The first of these reasons is that the nature of their profession, and self selection into that position gives the officer a higher inclination towards using armed means to resolve conflicts (The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Scott Sagan) The second stems from the intense military training that the officer has received. They are taught to follow a strict code of military logic, and are given precise operational goals that must be met (The Strategy of Conflict, Thomas Schelling). This type of trained inflexibility could lead to involvement in a preventive war situation. Third, military officers display strong biases in favor of offensive doctrines and decisive operations (The Strategy of Conflict, Thomas Schelling). This inclination could promote the leader to use nuclear weapons as a complete form of reducing the opposition’s means of retaliation. This type of mentality is exactly what experts feel will lead to an eventual nuclear war. Finally, military organizations concern themselves with planning for the immediate task at hand (Strategy in the Missile Age, Bernard Brodie). This creates a situation where a state is fully prepared to engage in the war, but never fully considers the ramifications of their actions in the post war world. The combination of these four inherent traits of military organizations, point to a likely occurrence of preventive warfare, a situation that could lead to a nuclear war.

Tangible evidence of implicated organizational theory was seen many times during the Cold War. A convincing example of this occurred during the Korean conflict during the 1950's. During Eisenhower's administration, senior military officers highly in favor of preventive war stated their readiness and determination to take decisive action abroad. It was only after eloquent proposals by civilian dignitaries such as philosopher Bertrand Russell, that Eisenhower decided not to engage in preventive war (The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, pg. 58). The more recent nuclear powers have already displayed a desire for preventive war. The events that transpired earlier this year regarding India and Pakistan greatly emphasize the dangers of nuclear spread. Pakistan responded to Indian nuclear tests by engaging some of their own nuclear weapons, beginning a process that is cohesive to the preventive war theory. In response to a possible Indian threat, Pakistan decided their best form of protection would be to begin mobilizing their nuclear weapons. In the case of nuclear weapons, the simple mobilization of one country against another can be interpreted as a very serious offensive strategy. This interpretation could suddenly lead to nuclear war, and total destruction.

Fortunately, efforts aimed at pursuing the global proliferation of nuclear weapons have begun to diminish. The events that transpired in South Asia this past year have helped illustrate the gravity of a nuclear standoff. While non-proliferation seems the obvious course of action, it to is hampered by certain fundamental problems. These problems arise due to the fact that the very concept of non-proliferation is predicated on the assumption that every state seeking nuclear weapons must produce the necessary material itself. This objective has usually taken a wealthy state at least ten years to achieve involving the construction of numerous, highly complex, and hard to disguise installations. The emergence of a black market, enabling countries to sidestep the usual barriers by purchasing the necessary materials and technology, would drastically alter this equation. "A black market in nuclear weapons material could undermine the global non-proliferation verification system of the IAEA. Indeed, it could destroy confidence in the historical understanding of nuclear proliferation as a slow, potentially controllable process." (Non-Proliferation, pg. 33) While the general consensus might be towards non-proliferation, there are circumstances that make it nearly impossible to ensure. The most dangerous and vulnerable region from which nuclear materials may be leaked, is Russia and the surrounding states that were once a part of the Soviet Union. A number of confirmed episodes have already taken place in which very small quantities of weapons usable nuclear material were stolen from Russian facilities and in some cases smuggled out of the country. None of the known episodes, however, has involved the quantity of material necessary to manufacture a nuclear explosive; but, It must be recognized that other episodes may have taken place that have not come to the attention of law enforcement or intelligence officials. Weaknesses in the non-proliferation regime are also accountable for the inability to positively eliminate the spread of nuclear weapons. Developments in Iraq have highlighted the limits of the IAEA system. Despite the IAEA’s extraordinary investigatory powers in Iraq, the country continually concealed the full extent of its nuclear program and continues to pursue work on nuclear weapons designs. If non-proliferation is to be successful, a system must be devised that eliminates both the loop holes and inefficiencies of the current procedure.

Nuclear weapons pose a very serious threat to international safety that can be ignored no longer. As I have displayed, the deterrence theory, which guards the existence of nuclear weapons, is flawed in many ways and lacks the high level of certainty required for insuring international safety. Accompanying the flawed deterrence theory is the concrete organizational evidence that points to instability and vulnerable weapons operations, both of which could easily induce war. The proliferation of nuclear weapons should be completely abandoned, and all nations possessing nuclear capabilities should deactivate and place them in highly secured and extremely safe environments. Unfortunately, nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented, thus the technology can never completely disappear. Despite this drawback, all efforts must be made to insure that nuclear weapons never again become a realized form of contemporary warfare. States must concentrate their energies on establishing strong domestic defense systems, and maintain a highly conservative military outlook. Countries must also exhaust all forms of diplomatic resolution before involving themselves in any form of armed conflict. The safety and future of the world, depends upon the total dismantling of global nuclear forces and the whole hearted commitment to a peaceful coexistence. Everyone must adhere not only to an anti-nuclear strategy, but an anti-war strategy as well.

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