Political Scientist constantly grapple with the advantages and disadvantages of both multipolar and bipolar worlds. Our recent history has seen both a multipolar world prior to World War I and World War II, and more recently a bipolar world which led to the infamous Cold War. Prior to both world wars, power was dispersed through numerous countries, many of which had imperialist views. Each country had private interest, and due to the lack of ability to deter and contain countries with expansionist aspirations, they often acted freely. For example, Hitler's Germany trampled through a large part of Eastern Europe, and not until March of 1941, when Hitler's troops invaded Russia were they contained (http://sunsite.unc. edulexpolsoviet. exhibit/wartime. Html/). Shortly thereafter, the war ended, however, there was extreme tension due to the political and demographic uncertainty concerning post-war aims with anti-axis coalition.

In order to preserve peace after World War II, President Roosevelt came up with the Grand Design, in which he wanted to create a multipolar atmosphere through spheres of influence. To head the plan he picked a group called the four policemen, which consisted of the United States, Russia, Britain, and China (Larson, p.72). This policy was created as a substitute for the League of Nations because Roosevelt felt it had become nothing more than a "debating society" and the world direly needed political stability(Taylor, p.155). These four countries, Roosevelt felt, should lead this organization because of their individual, sovereign strength and respect amongst countries. Theoretically, all other nations would be forced to disarm, and if there was any hostility or potential warfare, the four policemen could quash aggressors through economic blockade and aerial bombardment. Furthermore, the four policemen could use collective decision making to reach a common solution to territorial, political issues and ultimately maintaining peace. In this way, Roosevelt was able to both sidestep the traditional American reluctance to send troops overseas and hopefully concentrate world power as to reduce the threat of another devastating war.

Eventually people began to demand the creation of a new, more effective League of Nations. Roosevelt felt that if the American people insisted on a new international organization as the vehicle for U.S. participation in world politics, then the Big Four should retain peace-making responsibilities. In February 1944 Roosevelt and Hull (a advisor of Roosevelt) had their proposal approved by the State Department (Dallek, p.508). Consequently, the Big Four and France became the foundation for the reformed League of Nations.

Despite the theoretical stability of the new League of Nations it had major problems with the dispersion of power. First, the bulk of control was within the United States and Russia due to the political and economic instability in China and Britain. Roosevelt knew China was not yet a great power because it was occupied with a civil war between the communist and the isolationist (Liska, p.145). He felt one day, nonetheless, due its population and size, it would be a great power. He vehemently believed that China would both support the U.S. in world politics and prevent Russia from spreading their political reginie in Asia. Britain, on the other hand, was included for sentimental reasons because they had historically been a great power.

Russia, in contrast, had the capability of great power and expansion, and was viewed as a direct rival for world domination. Despite Roosevelt's fear of Russian power, he was willing to overlook ideological differences and past grievances to preserve peace. A public opinion poll taken in 1944 shows that Roosevelt acted against the sentiments of the American people. Statistics stated that 44 percent of American people felt Russia could not be trusted and 35 percent thought they would cooperate (Larson, p.89).

Moreover, one of the U.S. greatest fears was that Russian ambitions had been ignited by the defeat of Hitler's armies, Roosevelt foresaw that Germany's unconditional surrender would leave a power vacuum in the heart of Europe and allow the Russian military to successively and generously expand. Neither the United States nor Britain could permanently occupy the vacuum between the Russian border and the English Channel (Liska, p.124). Traditionally, U.S. national interest lay in preventing a single power from exercising control over the manpower and resources of the European continent, but in this instance the alternatives to Soviet-American collaboration were either impossible or likely to have disastrous consequences (Davis, p.37)

FDR felt that Russia's distrust of others, especially the U.S., was a product of their experience, and could be overcome by maintaining a consistent "posture of patience, generosity, and friendliness toward them." (Larson, p.75) By refraining from public criticism of Soviet actions, providing them with aid, and siding with them on limited political issues, and avoiding retaliatory behavior to provocative actions by the soviets, Roosevelt hoped he could convince the Soviets that the U.S. could be trusted. If friendly relations were estabh.shed~ Roosevelt felt the Soviets could be convinced to cooperate with the U.S., and thus the U.S. could be overseers of all actions taken after the war. As a means of establishing this relationship, Harriman, met in Moscow with Russian officials, and discovered his hopes of collective decision making with Russia was unattainable.

They agreed to keep U.S. informed about their actions, but they planned to ensure friendliness and peace within the border states of the Soviet Union through unilateral action.

Still, the U.S. continued to act with respect and kinship towards Russia despite growing disillusionment among the American public. From the beginning the U.S . had doubted the truthtulness of Russia, but these feelings were passed over by the positive results seen in such meetings as those held in Tehran in 1943 (Larson, P.79). Many politicians considered the meeting a success because the fliture of Poland was addressed, and the two nations seemed to be productively interacting. However this belief was far from true, since the more contentious issues had not even been touched upon.

As a result, the U.S. slowly moved towards a policy of Quid Pro Quo because Harriman, a skeptic in the Whitehouse of Russia's intentions, felt that the Soviets respected firmness. Since they were candidly obvious with there disapprovals, he thought the Soviets regarded forbearance as a sign of weakness. This approach seemed to come with no success since the Soviets did not prefer one way of action over another (Harriman & Abel, p.206). Instead, they did not cooperate because they were extremely cautious of hostile capitalist powers and they were afraid to have their people exposed to the higher living standards of the West.

Finally, matters began to publicly intensi~ on March 2, 1946, when Soviets reflised to withdraw their troops from Iran in an attempt to set up a puppet government (Larson, p.221). There were two primary motives behind the Soviet's attempt to set up a puppet state. First, they were worried about U.S. involvement in Baka, Iran, which was located on the soviet border. Second, in order to counteract U.S. demand for an oil concession, they also wanted an oil concession (Larson, p.222). Because Russia and the U.S. were not able to solve the issue privately, the UN intervened and denied the Soviet's attempt to set up a puppet state. This meeting marked the first use of the UN in international affairs, as well as a early glimpse at the battle over world power between the US and Russia.

Again, in August of 1946 the Soviets tried to expand their influence in Eastern Europe when they sent two demands to Turkey: a new Regime with control by USSR and Turkey, and a Soviet Base in Turkey. Suprisingly the U.S. agreed USSR should have more influence in the Turkish Straits to create stability in Eastern Europe, but they objected to a Soviet ~ase in Europe. The U.S. believed a base would give Russia an immense advantage in Eastern Europe. Sure enough, the Soviets backed down and took back their prior demands.

Tensions between the two powers continued to grow and culminated over the issue of the Greek Civil War between Authoritarian Government and the Communist led guerrillas. During the time of the Civil War both countries were under British spheres of influence. However, on February 21, 1947 Britain sent formal notes asking U.S. to take over their obligations in Greece and Turkey. Completely awestruck by these demands, the U.S. was left with an extremely volatile and important decision to make. Any sort of action by the U.S. would cause a complete upheaval between the balance of powers, that had existed successfiilly between Russia and the U.S. after the war. On the contrary, if the U.S. did not take action and fill the power vacuum left by Britain, then the Soviet Union had the potential to aid the communist and take over.

Many important politicians came together to voice their opinions about the situation in Greece, which led to the policy of containment. George Marshall, the new Secretary of State, felt that if Greece fell to communism, it would lead to the collapse of democracy in Turkey, Austria, Italy and France (http://ctbw.com/king.html). Dean Acherson, Undersecretary of State claimed that the world was polarized between U.S. and USSR with his comparison to the historical Athens and Sparta. The USSR, he claimed, was aggressive and expanding, while the U.S., in contrast, was protective and cautious trying to maintain their status. Senator Arthur Vandenburg believed one had to scare "hell" out of American Public to get appropriations from Congress. Truman took Vandenburg's beliefs to heart and in March of 1947, gave his inspirational speech about preserving democracy and our freedom. He claimed the Greek Civil War was part of a struggle between Totalitarianism and freedom (George, p.125). Soon after his speech, the Red Scare circulated through the American public and led to the U.S. policy for Containment.

The containment Policy centered on preventive measures to stop the spread of communism, and more substantially restrict Russia's control. In order to inhibit communist growth the U.S. planned to economically aid countries that had been destroyed by WWII (formally known as the Marshall Plan). Two of their primary reasons for economic assistance was, the U.S. felt poverty and hunger were fertile grounds for communism and assistance would promote political stability. Moreover, the U.S. believed they would have to keep a solid military strength to prohibit Soviet aggression, as well as help countries with arms and assistance. Ironically, the U.S. did not want to provide other countries with U.S. troops, because they felt the threat from the Soviets was political, not military.

Several incidents took place throughout the cold war that seemingly shifted the balance of power, but nothing developed from these situations. Each country was so fearftil of the others potential power, that they deterred each other from a greater, more harmfiil war. For example, in September of 1949, when the Soviets became nuclear capable with the A-bomb and in October of 1949 China fell to communism, the U.S. became extremely fea~l of Soviet territorial and technological expansion (http:Ilctbw. corniking.html). This resulted, first, with the Press Club Speech in January of 1950 by Acheson that said U.S. would defend Japan, Phillipines, Okinawa and; second, with the creation of the Hydrogen Bomb.

Another example is the Cuban Missile Crisis. Many scholars regard this crisis as the closest we came to war with the Russia. Beginning late in 1960 and extending through 1961, NSA intercepted messages concerning Soviet ships headed for Havana. The cargo manifests were suspiciously blank, indicating that what they carried was more than just palm oil or farm equipment. Thus it came as no surprise when, in mid-1961, CIA sources got wind of the imminent arrival of Soviet combat and transport aircraft, including the light bomber IL-28 and the state of the art MIG-iSs, 17s and 19s. It was clear by then that a major upgrade of the Cuban air forces was in progress. One problem shared by intelligence analysts and administration policy makers alike was the nature of the military deliveries. Most of the military equipment could be described accurately as defensive, but much of it could also be used in taking the offense. The primary question for Americans was. would the Soviets introduce offensive missiles into Cuban territory? Military deliveries increased in 1962, and along with them, Soviet attempts to conceal them. An NSA report in July indicated that Soviet vessels calling on Cuban ports were making false port declarations and declaring less than the known cargo carrying capacity. By late August NSA noted that there had already been fifty-seven voyages in a little over a month, and some ships were on their second voyage in that period of time. In August and September 1962, Soviet deliveries surged to the highest levels ever seen. American apprehension reached an all time high when the CIA discovered the construction of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles. These represented a new turn in the arming of Cuba -- such weapons could shoot American military aircraft out of the skies, including CIA's U-2 photographic reconnaissance planes. At this point, on October 15 analysis of photographs taken on the U-2 flights revealed to the U.S. senior leadership that the Soviet Union was preparing sites to install SS-4s, medium-range ballistic missiles. DCI McCone, alone among the government's senior leaders, had been correct about Soviet intentions. President John F. Kennedy secretly convened a series of emergency meetings of his senior military, diplomatic, and political advisors, a grouping that became known as the Executive Committee, or ExCom, to seek ways of coping with this ominous development. As the crisis progressed, and the ExCom considered a wide variety of diplomatic and military options, the need for information on Cuba and the Soviet Union increased. On October 22, President Kennedy appeared on television and announced the U-2 findings to an anxious public. Despite assurances from the Soviet government that the buildup was defensive in nature, he said, medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles had been introduced into Cuba. He called for their withdrawal or elimination. As one measure to solve the crisis, he proclaimed a naval "quarantine" of Cuban ports to prevent the introduction of additional Soviet armaments. Kennedy also warned that further actions might be needed if the buildup of offensive weapons continued. After intercepting messages between the Soviet Union and Cuba, a cordon of U.S. Navy vessels awaited the Soviet cargo vessels in the Atlantic. Would they turn around, or would they challenge the U.S. Navy "quarantine" that the president had imposed on Cuba? Conflict between them, if it happened, carried with it the possibility of escalation into a wider war between the two superpowers. The answer came the next day, from signals intelligence. A Navy SIGINT direction finding net in the Atlantic located the Soviet ships by intercepting and triangulating messages that they were sending back to the Soviet Union (http:Ilharvard.edulcubancrisis/). The ships were stopped dead in the water, outside the ring of American naval vessels waiting for them. At this point they reached a treaty and the threat of war was temporally lifted.

Much of the Cold War, in effect, was one country trying to maintain a balance of power. Both Russia and U.S. felt that if either country was to obtain territory or military advantages, the result would be instability and potentially war. The threat of war was extremely fright~l, and the ramifications would have been severe for the entire world. Often, especially in the U.S., people felt that the conflict between the two powers would escalate, but this fear had been played up by the media through the "Red Scare" and other similar propaganda(http://ctbw/king. htmll).

For instance, atomic weapon expansion was more an act to promote the appearance of power then actual combat. It is true that these weapons had the ability to destroy, but the excess number of nuclear bombs that were created during the Cold War, made the idea of warfare impractical and borderline absurd. A few of these bombs could have wiped Out either of these countries, and at the peak of the nuclear hiatus, each country had in excess of 60 nuclear warheads (sunsite.unc.edu/soviet.exllibit/). Evidence shows that the nuclear arms race was much less harrnfiil than many people tend to believe since neither country wanted t& start a huge, irteversible c6nflict. It became a seesaw battle in which both countries closely monitored each other. Neither country had the freedom to secretly invade a country or increase military power. All actions taken by either side could be difflised by quick and spontaneous counteractions.

The struggle for world power after WWII. ledto volatile relations between the US and Russia, and ultimately resulted in the Cold War. Muci? of this war is characterized with numerous "what if?" and "almost" events. In reality, however, neither country wanted a war but each country reflised to back down and allow the other country to expand since they were searching to assert their own individual power and influence. Luckily, after many frightening interactions between the countries they have declared peace, and have since agreed to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and improve political relations. Recently, Russia has been devastated by financial and economic turmoil leaving it far inferior to the current status of the United States. Now, that we don't have the same stability of a bipolar world that we had during the Cold war, what is the filture of our nation? China, temporarily, looked to be ascending towards a rival to the United States (as Roosevelt predicted) with its rapid economic growth but they have been harshly set back with domestic instability as well. Where does that leave us; is our nation headed by one great power The United States of America? Is there any country that can check the power of the United States, or will they be free to act as they please in the future?