The United States has been concerned about the number of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union for some time. The last decade of the 20th century is characterized by changes in world politics brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the relations that were formed among countries after World War II. The tension between United States and the USSR ultimately resulted in a large arms race and the accumulation of enormous nuclear arsenals. With two major nuclear superpowers, the most important element of international security became nuclear prevention.
The Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) was signed in 1987 and for the first time this treaty included provisions for the exchange of data for nuclear weapons and verification of their destruction. This Treaty was significant because it led the way for more weapons reduction agreements. Agreements such as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty were signed and this eventually led to the START Treaties and a major breakthrough in arms control.
After the end of the cold war, Russia and the United States made some progress in reducing their nuclear arsenals. The Strategic Arms Reductions Treaties (START) were implemented to help the two nuclear super powers reach their goals. The START I Treaty was signed in 1991 between the U.S. and Russia. The START II was signed by the US in 1993 and ratified by the senate in 1996, and awaits ratification by the Russian Duma1. More than four years have passed since the START II Treaty was signed. Problems that arose in the course of preparation for the ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian Federal Assembly created serious obstacles for further nuclear weapons reduction.
Russia's current political and economic situation should also be taken into account when analyzing Russia's attitudes toward the START Treaties. Today conventional forces are in somewhat of a crisis and therefore Russia's strategic nuclear forces are being regarded as the principal guarantor of its security. Nuclear weapons' mission is to guarantee sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as prevent external aggression2. Some experts also point out that maintaining the leading nuclear power status is not only for guaranteeing Russia's security, but from the perspective of keeping Russia's place in the international hierarchy. Russia has suffered through some serious economic hardships. Russia's economic capacity is considerably lower than the USSR's. The Russian Federation inherited slightly over a half of the Soviet population, less than 30% of industrial potential and 20% of the GDP.3 The lack of economic resources does not allow Russia to maintain the huge nuclear potential
Russia inherited from the Soviet Union. Given its Treaty obligations, it appears that the long term development of Russia's nuclear policy is on a course for gradual decline of the role and size of nuclear weapons. Many experts feel that the dynamics of nuclear disarmament should correspond to the rate of building an effective global security system and increase confidence and trust among states.
In the near future, given the present international situation, most experts seem to agree that it should be rational for Russia to have nuclear forces which would be capable to carry out a non-confrontational deterrence strategy. Such a strategy would contain the basic features of credibility and no provoking or aggressive factors.
Russian politicians and experts understand that in order to guarantee stability and security for both sides an agreement on new reductions should meet at least two conditions: the exclusion of unilateral advantages and strict compliance to mutual agreements.4 This makes sense and would be extremely important because any weaknesses in a Treaty may lead to significant advantages of one of the parties. Developing mutually acceptable agreements is difficult because it requires the two parties to make concessions and compromises. Russian experts heavily criticize the START Treaties. They feel that it not only gives the United States an advantage in carrying out nuclear weapons reduction, but also leads to a violation of equitable security.
Numerous publications discuss the Russian view about START I and II's shortcomings. The START I short comings are
1) Counting rules for nuclear weapons on heavy bombers do not count the actual number of weapons.
Apparently counting rules were accepted because the U.S. was insistent about the issue. One weapon on a heavy bomber cannot be compared with one warhead on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) . The U.S. would not be so insistent about the counting rules if the did not have an obvious advantage.
2) Moderate limitations and control measures are placed on sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLCBMs), in which the U.S. has an advantage, in comparison to Russia's mobile ICBMs, which the U.S. does not have.
The U.S. stated that the sea-launched ballistic missile with its high survivability is intended only for retaliatory strike and, thus, enhances strategic stability. The U.S. also argues that intercontinental ballistic missiles equipped with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVed ICBMs) are a destabilizing component because they can be used in the first strike.5
Russian experts feel this argument is one sided because it does not distinguish between Russian mobile and silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. Russian mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles were built as a supplement to silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles for the purpose of increasing strategic forces' survivability. On the other hand the U.S.'s arguments in defense of its naval component ignore the fact that sealaunched ballistic missiles are capable of reaching specific targets, like silo based missiles. Therefore the missiles are in fact destabilizing.
3) The U.S. insisted that START I does not include any reduction of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)
In the case of the U.S. we are talking about Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles. There were many modifications of this type of missile and thousands of them were produced. Four modifications of nuclear and conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles were designed within a single program and by 1997 over 4000 of them had been produced.6 Tomahawk missiles continue to be produced today. The modifications are also indistinguishable and easily convertible, which potentially could cause a break in the balance of weapons.
4) Implementation of the Treaty requires Russia to commit unjustifiably large physical and financial resources because Russia faces a much greater elimination burden than the United States.
Given the current economic situation in Russia, it would be very difficult for Russia to carry out its obligations of the Treaty. The value of the Ruble has fallen dramatically over the years and it is very costly to disarm a nuclear warhead. During the negotiations over START II the Russian side took efforts to correct these drawbacks and some agreements were reached.
The United States accepted a Russian proposal on warhead counting in agreeing with the actual number of weapons deployed on a heavy bomber. The US consent to the Russian proposal on the actual warheads counting for bombers was countered by a proposal that each side could convert a certain number bombers for conventional missions. Apparently the U.S. was only referring to its own bombs and it is unlikely that Russia will take advantage of such a provision.
The U.S. also accepted a Russian proposal that in addition to multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles with intercontinental ballistic missiles (of interest to the U.S.), warhead reductions should also include multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles with sea-launched ballistic missiles (of interest to Russia).7
The United States submitted a proposal to the Russian Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs to allow the downloading if intercontinental ballistic missiles and sea-launched ballistic missiles without the replacement of re-entry vehicle platforms.8 This became a serious obstacle for the ratification of the START II Treaty because it allows for the platforms to remain in place and thus the missiles can easily be replaced if necessary.
Russia and the U.S. also acknowledge the fact that the implementation of START I required a lot of expenditures and that the new Treaty should be less costly to both parties
Despite the post-Cold-War improvements in the international climate, nuclear weapons remain an important element of foreign policy. It appears that they cannot be eliminated by a declaration and they will probably be around for some time. Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals are still excessive even though there have been some reductions in their respective arsenals. Reducing nuclear arsenals would definitely increase the confidence between the leading nuclear powers and show the world their desire for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons should only be regarded as extreme means of a nation's protection against the threat of utter destruction. The ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian Duma is currently the main obstacle in the way of further disarmament. The economic situation in Russia is a major factor and there are some shortcoming's in the Treaty, however, its ratification and implementation are in Russia' s best interests.
1"Background Information on the START II Treaty", supplied by the White House Office of the Press Secretary.
2Sergey Kortunov, "National Philosophy of Disarmament," No.5, 1996.
3 Sergey Rogov, "Military Reform Under Conditions of Economic Crisis in Russia," No.5, p.12, 1997.
4 Valery Poliakov, "Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces: The Present and the Future," No.1, 1996.
5 "Reducing Nuclear Arms" Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies. Vol.1, P.4.1997
6 "Reducing Nuclear Arms", Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies. Vol.1, p.10
1997.
7"Reducing Nuclear Arms", Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies. Vol.1 P.20. ~ 997.
8"Background Information on the START II Treaty", supplied by the White House Office of the Press Secretary