INTRODUCTION
A human rights crisis in Algeria which has already claimed tens of thousands of lives has continued to worsen. In the past year thousands have been killed in what has been the most intense period of violence smce the beginning of the conflict. Men, women and children have been slaughtered, decapitated, mutilated and burned to death in massacres. The large-scale massacres of civilians of the past year have taken place against a background of increasingly widespread human rights abuses by security forces, state-armed militias and armed opposition groups. Arbitrary and secret detention, unfair trial, torture and ill-treatment, including rape, "disappearances", extrajudicial executions, deliberate and arbitrary killings of civilians, hostage-taking and death threats have become routine. As the toll of victirns continues to rise, the climate of fear has spread through all sectors of civilian society. In the absence of official statistics, and given the restrictions imposed by the authorities on obtaining such information, no accurate figures are available of the total number of victims since the beginning of the conflict. Up to 80,000, many of them civilians, are reported to have been killed since 1992. However, according to other sources, including Algerian political parties, health workers and journalists, the number of victims is considerably higher.
The Algerian authorities claim that "terrorist" groups are responsible for all the killings, abductions, and other human right abuses and acts of violence which have been committed since the beginning of the conflict. They also blame the massacres of the past year on these same groups. Yet, while most of the massacres have been in areas around the capital, in the most heavily mi~itanzed region of the country, and often in close proximity to army barracks and security forces outposts, on no occasion have the army or security forces intervened to stop or prevent the massacres or to arrest those responsible. At the very least, the Algerian authorities are responsible and should account for the consistent failure to provide protection for the civilian population. However, there is growing concern, from testimonies of survivors and eyewitnesses of the massacres, that death squads working in collusion with, and under the protection of, certain units or factions of the army, security forces, and state-armed militias, may have been responsible for some of the massacres. In spite of evidence of grave and widespread human rights violations such as extrajudicial executions, "disappearances", and torture by security forces, the Algerian authorities have systematically failed to carry out investigations and to bring those responsible to justice
The impunity afforded to those responsible for human rights violations has exacerbated a situation of increasing breakdown of law and order and has contributed to an increasing conftision and lack of protection for the civilian population. With killings and abductions carried out by members of the security forces who behave like armed opposition groups, and by armed opposition groups who wear uniforms and pose as security forces, the civilian population has found itself hostage in an atmosphere of fear, often unable to establish where the threat may come from and to whom to turn for protection.
Faced with an increasing level of targeted and indiscriminate violence from armed opposition groups, the authorities distributed weapons to the civilian population and encouraged the creation of militia groups, whose stated task is to protect their community from attacks by armed opposition groups. Given a free hand to carry out "anti-terrorist" operations, they have themselves committed extrajudicial executions and other abuses. If the existence of these militias has in some areas contributed to providing protection against attacks by armed groups, in other areas it has drawn the civilian population flirther into the conflict. By delegating law-enforcement tasks to paramilitary militias, who have not received the necessary training and who are allowed to operate outside the parameters of the law, the Algerian authorities have abdicated their responsibility to ensure the protection of the civilian population, and have allowed the rule of law to be flirther eroded.
Censorship and manipulation of information defined by the authorities as "security-related", denial of access to the country to foreign media and international human rights organizations, and strict surveillance and restrictions imposed on those journalists and human rights workers who have been allowed into the country, have played a major role in creating conflision about the complex reality of violence and counter-violence, and have contributed to building a wall of silence around the human rights crisis in Algeria. The heavy-handed management of "security-related" information by the Algerian authorities has kept the plight of a civilian population increasingly caught in a growing spiral of violence away from television screens and newspapers' front pages for more than five years. Thus, tens of thousands of people have been killed and the world has hardly noticed. It is only in recent months, as the largest massacres took place on the outskirts of the capital, that the silence has begun to be broken; in spite of the usual paucity of images and information the international media has begun to show some concern and raise questions about the human rights situation in Algeria.The international community has for too long remained indifferent to the tragedy of the civilian population in Algeria. Bodies such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), and their member states have from time to time expressed concern at, or condemned, the violence in Algeria - but have done nothing to stop it. Their lack of action in the face of a human rights crisis which has claimed tens of thousands of lives in the past few years makes such "expressions of concern" sound increasingly hollow.
Arnnesty International has repeatedly condemned the high level of abuses by armed opposition groups which call themselves "Islamic" groups who have been responsible for large scale killings, abductions and other atrocities against both civilians and security forces members, as well as the destruction of public property. The organization has continued to urge all armed opposition groups to put an end to the targeting of civilians, and all those who can have any influence on these groups to call on them to spare civilians' lives. The organization has also continued to call on the authorities to investigate human rights abuses and bring to justice those responsible - be they members of the security forces, of state-armed militias, or of armed opposition groups. Algeria is a state party to international human rights treaties which require that human rights abuses be promptly, impartially and independently investiga~ed. However, the authorities have consistently failed to carry out independent investigations into the massacres of civilians or into other killings and human rights abuses which have continued unabated since 1992, and have continued to impose increasing restrictions to prevent human rights organizations and media from investigating human rights abuses. In the absence of adequate investigations the reign of impunity has been flirther consolidated.
This report focuses on the lack of protection for the civilian population in Algeria, highlighting the factors which have contributed to creating a wall of silence and indifference around this human rights crisis, and stressing the need for concrete action to be taken to stop and prevent the massive human rights abuses. The report also recalls other patterns of abuses which have been widespread since the beginning of the conflict.
BACKGROUND
For almost six years Algeria has been caught up in a growing spiral of violence. In January 1992, after the Front Islamique du salut (FIS), Islamic Salvation Front, had won a large majority of the seats decided in the first round of Algeria's first multi-party elections, the authorities canceled the second round of elections and imposed a state of emergency, which remains in place. Security forces resorted to excessive use of force and firearms to break up protest demonstrations and gatherings by FIS supporters. Thousands of known or suspected FIS supporters were arrested and more than 10,000 were placed in administrative detention without charge or trial in internment camps in the desert in the south of the country. Thousands of others were held in police stations and prisons, and torture, which had been virtually eradicated between 1989 and 1991, quickly became once again widespread.
The FIS was outlawed in March 1992 on the basis that it contravened the law on political parties, which stipulates that no party can be based on religion. However, two other Islamist political parties, HAMAS (Islamic Society Movement) and Islamic Nahda (Renaissance), which also contravened the same law, were not banned. The FIS president and vice-president (Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj), already detained since June 1991, were sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment in July 1992, and the interim FIS leader (Abdelkader Hachani) was arrested in February 1992. Other top and middle-ranking FIS leaders were also arrested, others fled the country, and the rest went underground. In the course of 1992, some members, including leading members, supporters and sympathizers of the FIS, began forming armed opposition groups. In the first year of the conflict armed opposition groups targeted mainly members of the security forces, but since then the
confrontation has continued to escalate, and since 1993 civilians have found themselves increasingly targeted by both security forces and armed opposition groups.
Since 1992, a plethora of armed opposition groups, break-away factions and splinter groups have emerged. These groups define themselves as "Islamic groups", but their leadership, composition and aims are in most cases unclear. There are frequent reports of the formation of new groups, usually described as breakaway factions of existing groups, which are often not heard of again. The main groups are the Armee islamique du salut (MS), Islamic Salvation Army - the armed wing of the FIS, which claims to attack only security forces and military targets, and the Groupe islamique arme' (GIA), Armed Islamic Group, an assembly of seemingly loosely-organized groups whose leadership and composition remain unclear, and which are reported to be responsible for many killings of civilians, massacres and other atrocities. The GIA has also issued death threats against FIS leaders and has reportedly killed FIS members and supporters. Other, reportedly small, armed groups which have also issued communique's and declarations include the Ligue islamique de Ia daawa et le djihad (LIDD), Islamic League for Preaching and Holy War, and the Front islamique pour le Djihad arme' (FIDA), Islamic Front for Armed Holy War.
The Algerian authorities have maintained a contradictory discourse on the nature of the conflict. They have argued that the conflict has no political dimension and no link with the 1992 cancellation of the elections and banning of the FIS. However, at the same time the authorities have maintained contacts with the FIS leaders, presenting these contacts as efforts to solve the pobtical crisis and stop the violence. Most recently, in the summer of 1997, negotiations between top generals in the Algerian army and leaders of the MS resulted in the announcement by the MS of a unilateral truce, which received wide coverage by Algerian state television, radio and newspapers.
MASSACRES OF CIVILIANS: NO ONE IS SAFE
Over the past year the civilian population has been targeted in an unprecedented manner, with the emergence of a pattern of massacres of large numbers of civilians, manym of them women and children, in rural areas. The pattern has become increasingly widespread - often a daily occurrence. villagers have been massacred in the most brutal ways; slaughtered, decapitated, and mutilated with knives, machetes and saws; some have been shot dead and others burned alive as their homes were set on fire.
The massacres have systematically been committed at night, by large groups of men who attacked the inhabitants, often in their sleep, killing entire families and villages and pursuing and killing whoever attempted to escape. No one is safe from the brutality. Men, women, children, small babies and elderly people have been hacked to death, decapitated, or mutilated and left to bleed to death. Pregnant women have been disemboweled. Survivors, relatives of the victims and medical personnel are traumatized by the horror they are forced to witness. Some survived only because their attackers left them lying injured, believing they were dead, while others managed to escape in spite of their wounds. Dozens of women are reported to have been abducted by the attackers, raped and then killed. As a result of these massacres thousands of people have fled their villages, some because their homes were destroyed or burned down, but most from fear of ~rther attacks. Their numbers add to the thousands of others who have been displaced by the conflict in the past few years.
Several thousands are reported to have been killed in these massacres, but there are no accurate figures. In the majority of cases the government does not comment and issues no information about killings and when it does, the figures are considerably lower than those figures given by other sources. In the wake of the massacres the sites are often sealed off; preventing access to journalists and others. Survivors, relatives of victims, medical personnel, ambulance drivers and cemetery workers who give figures and other details to journalists usually do so on conditions of anonymity to avoid problems with the authorities. Because of these restrictions, the exact figures and details of the massacres are in most cases impossible to verify, and the information published by the heavily censored Algerian press often varies from one newspaper to another, while many killings go completely unreported in the press.
Most of the massacres have taken place around the capital in the Algiers, Blida and Medea regions - in the most heavily militarized part of the country. In many cases, massacres, often lasting several hours, took place only a very short distance, a few kilometers or even a few hundred meters' away from army and security forces barracks and outposts. However, in spite of the screams and cries for help of the victims, the sound of gunshots, and the flames and smoke of the burning houses, the security forces have not intervened - neither to come to the rescue of those who were being massacred, nor to arrest those responsible for the massacres, who got away on each occasion. Survivors and neighbors have told of telephoning or running to nearby security posts seeking help, with the security forces there retusing to intervene, claiming that they were not mandated to do so. In at least two cases, several survivors described how people who had tried to escape from villages where a massacre was taking place had actually been turned back by a cordon of members of the security forces who stood by while the villagers were being slaughtered and did not come into the village until after the attackers had left. That army barracks and security forces outposts are located next to the sites of several massacres is an indisputable fact. That the security forces have not intervened during the massacres is also a fact, which is not disputed by the Algerian authorities. The question which remains unanswered is why was there no intervention? The Algerian authorities have not commented officially on any specific incidents, but newspapers close to the authorities have often reported that the security forces could not intervene because the terrain around the villages where the massacres were committed had been mined by those who committed the massacres to prevent the security forces' intervention. However, this seems to be unlikely given that during the massacres villagers managed to flee from the villages and after the massacres survivors, ambulances, helpers, and security services have gone in and out of the villages without stepping on any mines. If such movements have been possible both during and after the massacres, it should also have been possible for security forces to go into the villages to stop the massacres.
The largest massacre of civilians reported to date was committed during the night of 28 August 1997 in Sidi Rais, south of Algiers. According to a wide range of sources, including medical personnel, up to 300 people, many of them women and children, and even small babies, were killed and more than 100 injured. The authorities did not issue any information on the massacre until late that afternoon, when they announced that 98 people had been killed and 120 injured. Sidi Rais is located in close proximity to the army barracks of Sidi Moussa, about three kilometers away, the army barracks of Baraki, about six to seven kilometers away, the security forces outpost of Gaid Kacem, about four kilometers away, and other security forces posts a few hundreds meters away. The security forces never intervened, either to stop the massacre, or to prevent the attackers from getting away.
Testimonies of survivors gathered by Algerian journalists, some of which were cited in Algerian newspapers, have emphasized how massacres have occurred close to army barracks..... People banged on my door screaming. Frightened neighbors wanted to pass through my house to run to the army barrack, which is not far to alert the army and seek their protection. Many neighbors were thus able to get away and be safe. Just as I was letting through an elderly woman a terrorist shot me and wounded me in the shoulder but I managed to run to the army barracks..."
In the evening of 5 September 1997, more than 60 men, women and children were massacred in Sidi Youssef (Beni Messous), on the western outskirts of Algiers. Many of the victims lived in makeshift homes built next to the residential district of Beni Messous. According to testimonies received, people from a nearby neighborhood, who were alerted by the screams and banging of pots and pans (a means of attracting attention for those in danger), telephoned the security forces to alert them but were told that they could not intervene as the matter was under the mandate of the gendarmerie. They called the gendarmerie but received no reply. Beni Messous hosts the largest army barracks and military security center of the capital, as well as three other gendarmerie and security forces centers from which the site of the massacre is clearly visible. The army barracks of Cheraga is also only a few kilometers away. However, as with all the other massacres, there was no intervention by the security forces to stop the massacre and the attackers left undisturbed. The authorities did not issue any details about the massacre nor did they provide information on the number of fatalities. In the night of September 23 1997, more than 200 men, women and children were massacred in Bentalha (Baraki), south of Algiers. Bentalha is near five different army and security forces outposts, including the army barracks of Baraki, about three kilometers away, the army barracks of Sidi Moussa, about five kilometers away, the Gaid Kacem security forces post, less than one kilometer away, the corninunal guard barracks about one kilometer away, and the security forces posts at the entrance of Bentalha. Survivors have told Arnnesty International that at the time of the massacres armed forces units with armored vehicles were stationed outside the village and stopped some of those trying to flee from getting out of the village. Similar reports have been received from journalists who have interviewed survivors.
The massacres fall within a pattern whereby large groups of men have been able to come from their supposed hiding places in the mountains and forests into the villages, which often entails crossing main roads, carry out killings lasting several hours, and leave to return - undisturbed - to their hiding places. The sound of gunfire and bomb explosions, the screams of the victims, and the flames and smoke of the houses on fire are audible and visible from a distance. Whether or not certain units of the army and security forces have been actively involved in the massacres must be investigated. In the meantime it is clear that there has been a conscious abdication by the Algerian authorities of its responsibility to protect the civilian population in areas whose position and security and communications network should make such protection possible.
According to the authorities and security services all the massacres have been committed by the GIA and other such groups with the aim of terrorizing and punishing the population hostile to them, or who formerly supported them but who had recently withdrawn their support, or relatives and current supporters of rival armed groups. Many massacres have taken place in areas where a large percentage of the population had voted for the FIS in the 1990 municipal elections and in the 1991 legislative elections. Members of the security forces and militias are reported to have said to local irihabitants and journalists that the victims of some of the massacres had met the fate they deserved because they had supported the "terrorists", and thus deserved no protection. Many massacres are believed to have been carried out by armed groups with the aim of eliminating supporters of rival groups, or supporters of the FIS, which has increasingly often condemned killings of civilians and other abuses by these groups. However, there have been allegations that some of the massacres have been cornmitted by groups acting on instructions, or with the consent, of certain army and security forces units and paramilitary groups, with the aim of eradicating the grassroots base of armed opposition groups, which continue to maintain a presence in these areas in spite of repeated armed action against them by the army and security forces over the years.
The victims of the massacres seem to have been mostly ordinary people, often poor and living in makeshift homes, including people who had settled in the area in recent years after having fled their homes elsewhere because of the conflict. The FIS' armed wing, the MS, does not appear to have been present in any significant way in the region (the MS is reportedly present mainly in the east and west of the country, but not in the center), whereas GIA groups have reportedly been based in the area. However, it is not known to what extent the local population really supported such groups, and if so to what extent it did so willingly or out of fear. The pattern of large-scale massacres has developed against a background of years of escalating violence. Security forces killed members of armed groups, their relatives and people known or suspected of supporting such groups; while armed opposition groups targeted relatives of security forces' and militias' members, as well as families and supporters of rival armed groups. In this context, some believe that certain massacres have been committed as a vendetta, in retaliation for previous massacres and killings of relatives or communities by rival forces. In addition, there are allegations that part of the violence is the result of rival government factions' interests and power struggles linked to economic issues, including the forthcoming privatization of agricultural land and state-owned enterprises, exploitation of oil resources and corruption.
The presidential elections of November 1995 and the legislative elections of June 1997 - in spite of increased threats issued by armed opposition groups against civilians who participated in the election processes - indicates that the Algerian authorities have the means to ensure a higher level of protection for the civilian population throughout the country when it is necessary for them to do so. Whoever the perpetrators of these massacres may be, and whatever logic they may use to justif~ such atrocities, urgent and concrete measures must be taken to stop the unprecedented level of violence and brutality, and to protect the civilian population, especially those who are most vulnerable to such attacks such as women, children, the elderly and the poor. As a first step, a full and independent investigation must be carried out to establish who is responsible for these killings and other crimes which continue to be a daily occurrence, and to ensure that those responsible be brought to justice.
THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF THE MILITIAS
For the past three years the Algerian Government has continued to repeat that there are only "a handfiil of terrorists left", that the security situation is "under control" and that "terrorism is residual". Yet at the same time the authorities have been distributing arms to the civilian population and have encouraged the formation of militia groups so as to protect their communities from attacks by armed opposition groups. These militia groups, operating outside the parameters of the law and mostly not subjected to any supervision have been allowed to carry out law-enforcement tasks and "anti-terrorist" offensive operations. The existence of militias armed by the state and defined as "groups of legitimate defense", "self-defense groups", or "patriots", goes back to 1994. Initially the authorities tended to deny the existence of militias or to play down their role, but from the end of 1995 they openly encouraged the civilian population to take up arms and organize themselves in militia groups. State television gave coverage to the activities of militias, praising their role in "combating and eradicating terrorism", and even ran "advertising" spots encouraging men to form militias; the motto was rijal khuliqu li-l-watan (men born for their motherland). Newspapers also gave increased coverage to the activities of the militias. As the number of militias grew and more information became available about their activities, evidence emerged that in addition to guarding their villages and communities to defend them from attacks, they were increasingly involved in tully-fledged military operations in their region and elsewhere. In some areas they virtually replaced the security forces who according to the local population had been absent and had failed to protect them from attacks by armed opposition groups setting up roadblocks and checkpoints, and organizing ambushes and "anti-terrorist" operations. They also participated increasingly in such operations alongside the army and security forces.
Militia groups have been affiliated or closely linked to certain political parties, to different military and security forces and to local officials The quality of their equipment
and weapons varies, and some militia groups have complained that they were more poorly equipped than other groups linked to more powertul people who had sophisticated weapons and equipment. Algerian television showed militia groups wearing official military and security forces uniforms and using official military and security forces vehicles and roadblock signs. Some people have welcomed the creation of militias as the sole means of protection in the face of the inability or unwillingness of the security forces to protect the civilian population. However, others have opposed it because they believe that the presence of militias makes the civilian population a target of armed opposition groups, who take revenge against the militias by targeting the local inhabitants. There are widespread reports that militias commit abuses to impose their control over the local population. For example, at the end of 1995, relatives of Aritar Zouabri, leader of the GIA, were killed by members of a militia group in Hauch-el-Gros (Boufarik) in revenge for the GIA having killed relatives of a leader of the local militia group. Reports of such incidents are widespread and members of militias have often justified and advocated such crimes. In 1996 members of militia groups told Arnnesty International delegates. They can kill me, but if they kill one of my relatives I will kill their entire families; this is the only language that terrorists understand...":
In March 1996, after widespread allegations that militia members had killed civilians and committed abuses with impunity, the Algerian authorities announced that scores of militia groups' members had been arrested and would be brought to trial for human rights abuses, including murder. However, to date no investigation is known to have been carijed out and the authorities have not responded to requests for details of these trials.
In January 1997 the Algerian Prime Minister signed an executive decree which made the existence of the militias official and set out a framework for their activities Thus, groups of individuals who are recruited arbitrarily, and acting outside the framework of law-enforcement legislation and without the necessary training and supervision, have been entrusted to carry outlaw-enforcement tasks which should be the sole responsibility of the state. The decree, which was passed more than two years after militias came into existence, makes no mention of accountability for thousands of existing militia groups and contains no provision for disbanding existing militias or ensuring compliance with flindamental human rights standards. It contains none of the essential provisions contained in human rights standards such as the ICCPR, the Convention against Torture, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the UN Body of Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (Force and Firearms Principles), and the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (Code of Conduct). For example, it lacks provisions setting out recruitment and training requirements for members of the "groups of legitimate defense", required under Article 5 of the Convention Against Torture and under Principles 18 to 21 of the Force and Firearms Principles; it contains no provisions to ensure that members of these groups respect and protect human rights, as required by Article 2 of the Code of Conduct, nor does it contain any provision for complaints of human rights abuses by members of these groups to be investigated and for those responsible for the violations to be brought to justice, as required under Article 2 of the ICCPR, Articles 12 and 13 of the Convention against Torture, and Article 7(1)(e) of the African Charter. It contains no provisions for the right to disobey orders to use force and firearms, required under Principle 25 of the Force and Firearms Principles. This decree states that members of the "groups of legitimate defense" can use force and firearms "in case of aggression, of attempted aggression, or in case of duty to assist persons in danger". However, militias carry out and actively participate in counter-insurgency military operations, either on their own or in conjunction with the military and security forces. They thus routinely violate the terms of this decree with the knowledge and consent of the authorities who have passed this decree and are responsible for its application.
BUILDING A WALL OF SILENCE: INCREASING OBSTACLES TO INDEPENDENT RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATIONS
Various factors have contributed to the building of the wall of silence and indifference which surrounds the human rights crisis in Algeria. Restrictions imposed by the authorities on gathering and ~ommunicating information have made it increasingly difficult to research and investigate the violations and abuses which are committed every day. Killings and death threats by armed opposition groups against journalists have created a climate of fear among Algerian journalists. Meanwhile firther restrictions have been imposed on foreign journalists, many of whom have experienced increasing problems in gaining access to the country. In the prevailing climate of lawlessness people have been more and more reluctant to give information and testify to the media. in the absence of accurate and verified information, rumors and speculation have thrived adding to the contusion and insecurity.
"The thief who at night hides along the walls on his way home, it's him. The father who recommends to his children not to tell anyone the nasty job he does, it's him. The bad citizen who hangs around the courtroom, waiting to be interrogated by the judge, it's him. The individual caught in a police raid, hit with a gun-butt and propelled (thrown) to the back of a lorry, it's him. It's him who leaves his house in the morning without knowing if he'll get to his work, and who leaves his work in the evening without knowing if he'll get home. The tramp who doesn't know anymore where to spend the night, it's him. It's him who is threatened in secret in the office of an official - a witness who must keep inside what he knows, a citizen naked and helpless The man who vows not to die slaughtered (with his throat cut), it's him. It's him who can do nothing with his hands, nothing else other than his little writings. Him who hopes in spite of everything because, after all, roses can grow on a pile of manure. Him who is all this, and only ajournalist."
This article was written by Said Mekbel, journalist and director of the French-language daily Le Matin. It was published on the day of his assassination on 3 December I 994. Since 1993 more than 60 journalists and media workers have been killed in Algeria, more than in any other country. Communique's signed by armed groups defining themselves as "Islamic" groups, such as the GIA, have threatened to kill all journalists and have claimed responsibility for the assassination of many of them. Spokesmen for the FIS, and its armed wing, the MS, have increasingly distanced themselves from, and condemned, the GI A's murders and death threats against journalists. However, in the past they not only failed to condemn such threats and killings ofjournalists, but even justified
such crimes arguing that journalists who did not report abuses by security forces and who had called for, or supported, the intervention of the army to cancel the 1991 elections were coilaborators of the regime and contributed to the repression. Assassinations of their colleagues and deaths threats forced journalists underground, away from their homes and families, and to use pseudonyms and change their routines. Few were given protected accommodation, usually only those well connected to official circles, and many left the country.
As time went on, and more and more journalists were killed, allegations began to emerge that certain factions within the military and security forces had been behind the killings of some journalists because they had been investigating sensitive issues, notably state corruption. To date not a single individual has been prosecuted and found responsible for the killing of any of the 60 or so dead journalists. On many occasions the security forces announced that they had killed the killers of this or that journalist, without however producing the evidence which had led them to draw the conclusion that those whom they had indeed killed had been those responsible for the crimes attributed to them. In the absence of any concrete action by the authorities to bring to justice those responsible for the killing ofjournalists, doubts remain, and journalists continue to live in fear and have learned not to raise certain issues.
If much of the lack of reporting on the violations committed by government forces has been due to censorship and fear, some of it results from political bias. Most newspapers have not reported on such issues, and some have routinely attacked those who, in Algeria or outside, have exposed and raised concerns about human rights violations committed by government forces against known or suspected Islamist activists. For example, the cases of Islamist journalists who have been victims of abuses at the hands of government forces have received little or no coverage in most Algerian media. Djamaleddine Fahassi, a journalist working with Algerian radio, was abducted by security forces near his home in May 1995 and "disappeared". The Algerian media, which gives extensive coverage to cases ofjournalists victims of attacks known or believed to have been carried out by armed opposition groups, was totally silent on his abduction and "disappearance~'. While the arrest of a journalist immediately makes the headlines in most newspapers, the arrest and secret detention for more than a week of Khaled Gherdjouma, a journalist with the Arabic~language daily El Alam el~siyassi (Political world), in October 1995, was met with silence by most of the press. More recently, in February 1997, Aziz Bouabdallah, also a journalist with El Alam el~siyassi, was abducted from his home by security forces and "disappeared". His abduction received little coverage at the time, and has not been mentioned since, even though he remains "disappeared". Several Algerian journalists have stated, off the record, that they know that he was taken by the security forces and that this is the reason why the case is not being talked about in the media. When raising the issue with Algerian journalists, few dispute the facts of these cases; but they say that it is not possible to raise the cases because they are "sensitive". Some said that they had tried to write about their colleague without indicating who had been responsible for the "disappearance", so that if the authorities raised questions they could have protected themselves by arguing that they had written about the case believing that their colleague had been abducted by an armed group, but that their editors had not allowed their articles to be published because they too knew the security forces were responsible for the abduction and were not prepared to take the risk. A journalist who wanted to write about the "disappearance" of Djamaleddine Fahassi reported being told by a member of the editorial board of the newspaper, "Do you want the paper to be closed down for good?"
Other methods of curtailing press freedom have been through financial pressures. Newspapers who stepped out of line on political and security issues have been closed down because of their debts with the state-owned printing press, while other more "compliant" newspapers who also have arrears have been allowed to continue their activities. The authorities have stifled any initiatives to set up an independent printing press. In 1996, the government rejected an initiative by the Federation internationale des journalistes (,FIJ), International Federation of Journalists, who had offered to donate a printing press to private newspapers in Algeria. In 1997, a private printing press (SodiPress), co-set up as a limited company by the editor of a previously banned newspaper, was seized immediately on the grounds that the co-owner had outstanding debts. The seizure violated Algerian law, which stipulates that a limited company and its assets cannot be seized on the basis of the previous debts of one of its owners. The action was seen as yet another effort by the authorities to thwart any initiative to create a private printing press, which could not be controlled in the same way as a state-owned one.
The death threats by armed groups and the assassinations of journalists and foreigners created a certain level of concern amongst foreign journalists. Some were no longer prepared to go to Algeria, others continued to go, and many more wanted to go but were unable to obtain visas, especially since 1994. At the same time the Algerian authorities began to impose "protection" measures on foreign journalists visiting the country, such as requiring them to be accompanied by security forces at all times, and this has increasingly become a condition for obtaining visas. With such arrangements many foreign journalists were only able to gather information on killings and abuses committed by armed opposition groups, but found it very difficult to do the same on killings and abuses committed by government forces, as such victims and their families are afraid of exposing themselves to turther violations.
Gradually foreign journalists began to feel that the security "protection" was a deliberate policy to prevent them from carrying out their professional duties. Scores of newsprint, television and radio journalists from different countries who have visited Algeria stated that they were unable to work, move around and meet people freely. The security forces' members in charge of their protection often insist on attending their meetings, even inside their hotels, and check the identity of the people they are interviewing, thus increasing the reluctance of people to meet and speak with them. The protection teams have often reflised to accompany journalists to places they wish to visit but reflise to let them go on their own. Officials from the Algerian Foreign Affairs Ministry and from Algerian embassies in different countries have summoned journalists to complain to them about meeting certain people, and even about the content of telephone conversations they had from their hotel rooms. Some have been told, implicitly or explicitly, that access to the country depends on the nature of their coverage, especially concerning political and security issues, and many have been reftised visas on the same grounds.
Very few foreign media correspondents were able to remain in Algeria after 1993-94. Some were expelled, others could not obtain accreditation and others left saying that the restrictions had become too stringent for them to carry out their work.
Thus the human rights crisis in Algeria has been surrounded by a wall of silence; a tragedy with no images and one of the most under-reported conflicts. Whilst journalists have been able to monitor, report and investigate massacres and other abuses during war and internal conflict in isolated locations in other countries, it has so far proved impossible for journalists to do so in Algeria, where massacres and other atrocities are committed daily, in a region which is at a short distance from a capital which is no more than two hours' flight from the main European capitals.
For some years the Algerian human rights organizations have been unable to adequately research, investigate and document the human rights situation. The assassination of You sef Fathallah, President of the Ligue algerienne des droits de l'homme (LADH), Algerian Human Rights League, death threats, imprisonment and harassment of human rights lawyers and activists, banning of meetings and other activities, political divisions and lack of flinds, have been among the factors contributing to the paralysis of the human rights organizations in Algeria. However, there remain committed human rights defenders who, despite the difficult and dangerous situation, continue to defend human rights with great courage.
The Algerian authorities have routinely accused anyone criticizing their human rights record of deliberately lying, interference in Algeria's internal affairs, and political bias. As a stale party to international human rights treaties, Algeria has accepted that its human rights record be subject to international scrutiny. The government has welcomed the "condemnation of terrorism" in Algeria by other governments, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, but questions about the human rights situation in the country and about the state's responsibility to respect and protect human rights have been rejected and condemned as interfering with "national sovereignty".
In a media interview in August 1997, in the wake of the massacre of hundreds of people, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, expressed concern at the human rights situation in Algeria, stating that in a situation which has for a long time been considered as
an internal problem, it is no longer enough to condemn the violence whilst leaving the Algerian people to their fate, and that an urgent solution must be found. The Algerian Government reacted by saying that these declarations were "unacceptable" and constituted an "interference" in Algeria's internal affairs.
THE INDIFFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMNIUNITY
The international community has for years shunned its responsibilities in the face of a tragedy which takes place in camera. This indifference and absence of efforts to stop and prevent the massacres and other atrocities and grave abuses should not continue. For years the cries for help of victims in Algeria and the efforts of human rights organizations to draw attention to the human rights situation in Algeria have received little or no response.
The UN Human Rights Commission has, year after year, caretully avoided addressing the issue of the human rights situation in Algeria. The UN Special Reporter on Extrajudicial and Summary Execution has to date not been able to visit Algeria. He was officially invited to visit the country in 1993, and since 1996 he has sought to make arrangements with the Algerian government in order to visit the country at a mutually convenient time.
The European Union and Parliament have, over the past few years, also tended to avoid dealing with the situation in Algeria in any concrete terms. The European Union's statements to the UN Human Rights Commission in 1996 and 1997 were worded in very general terms, broadly condemning violence and encouraging the government to follow through with the democratic and election process, but failing to recogmze any state responsibility concerning the human rights violations or to recommend any concrete action to stop and prevent the violations.(19)
The European Parliament has issued several resolutions on the human rights situation in Algeria, in April 1995, December 1996, and September 1997,(20) all of them including "calls for political dialogue and condemnation of terrorism". Whereas the 1995 resolution contains a reference to state responsibility in human rights violations, any such reference was dropped in the 1996 and 1997 resolutions - even though the European Parliament was aware that no investigations had been carried out into the human rights violations by government forces mentioned in the previous resolution. Whilst condemning killings and other acts of violence against the civilian population, the European Parliament does not condemn the failure of the state to protect the civilian population, nor does it issue any recommendation for action to be taken to ensure such protection.
The EU is currently discussing a partnership agreement with Algeria, in the context of the Euro~Mediterranean Partnership Agreement, which contains provisions for the respect of human rights. (21) If these provisions are to have a concrete meaning the EU should make efforts to shed light on the human rights situation in Algeria, so as to be able to formulate constructive policies and recommendations.
In November 1994, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission) adopted a resolution on Algeria which included its concern about extrajudicial executions, torture and arbitrary detention. The resolution also called on "the international community to mobilize and support democratic forces in Algeria and abroad in their efforts to restore peace, the rule of law, and respect for human rights in Algeria". The resolution was recorded in the final communique' of the 16th ordinary session of the African Commission.(22) At its 17th ordinary session, held in March 1995, the African Commission decided to discuss again the resolutions adopted at the previous session and proceeded to adopt again all the resolutions of the previous session except the one on Algeria. (23)
The double-standard approach of the international community to the human rights crisis in Algeria is blatantly obvious when noting the position they have taken on Algerian asylum-seekers: After the killing of some 100 foreigners in Algeria and the death threats issued by the GIA against foreigners, most western governments took far-reaching protection measures for their embassies in Algeria and advised their citizens not to travel to Algeria. They took such measures because they considered that the risks were serious and that the Algerian authorities could not provide adequate protection for their nationals.
On the other hand, Algerians who had hoped to escape death by seeking reflige in western countries have had their asylum claim rejected on the basis that "it could not be proved that they would be in danger in their country", or that "it could not be proved that
they could not obtain protection from the authorities of their country". This is in spite of the fact that tens of thousands of Algerians have been killed and that killings, massacres, "disappearances" and other grave abuses are a daily occurrence.
If a handfiil of foreigners, who in most cases live in much safer conditions than Algerians, cannot be adequately protected, how can it be argued that Algerians - who are the overwhelming majority of the victims of the violence - are not at risk? By adopting such a position, western governments have shown that they do not attach the same value to the life of Algerians as they do to the lives of their own nationals.
Moreover, not only have western governments failed to grant protection to Algerian asylum-seekers, but they have made it virtually impossible for Algerians to obtain visas to their countries - thus denying them the possibility of escaping death. The men, women and children who have died in the recent massacres did not fall within the very select category of people who are able to obtain visas to western countries under the current visa policies. Even if they had been able to get to western countries by other means and claimed asylum, their claims would have most likely been turned down, on the argument that there was no evidence that they were facing any particular risk at home. And yet they were murdered, and more people continue to be killed every day. If western governments had adopted a more humane position on this issue, lives could have been saved.
Finally, in September 1997 the UN High Commissioner for Reftigees (UNHCR) and the European Parliament recommended that Algerian asylum-seekers who would be at risk if they were forced to return to their country should benefit from international protection. Amnesty International welcomes this recommendation, and considers that it should be a first step in breaking the wall of indifference of the international community to the plight of the victims of human rights abuses in Algeria. Concrete action needs to be taken by the international community to show solidarity with victims of human rights abuses in Algeria and to ensure that the issue of the human rights situation in Algeria -which is the reason why Algerian asylum-seekers have been forced to flee their country -is addressed without flirther delay.
Recommendations to all armed opposition groups in Algeria:
To have all armed groups in Algeria to stop targeting civilians and to respect the most flindamental of human rights: the right to life.
Recommendations to the United Nations:
To have the UN Commission on Human Rights to convene a Special Session to establish an international investigation into the recent massacres and other human rights abuses to:
-establish facts
-examine allegations of responsibility
-make recommendations.
Such an investigation could lay the foundations for flirther concerted action by the international community. It would be the start of a process which should include the design of a long term human rights plan for Algeria, to which relevant bodies and agencies of the UN could contribute their expertise.
The international investigation should also make recommendations on steps to bring perpetrators of human rights abuses to justice.
Recommendations to other intergovernmental organizations:
European Parliament and the European Commission to support an international investigation and to ensure that it becomes a reality.
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