A Consideration of the Korean War and How the Media Changed the outlook of the War

Kevin Koitz, Aaron Jones
War & Peace: Media and War


How an historical event is interpreted and how this rendering is portrayed to the public is often a more significant barometer of the incident than the truth itself.  I use the word "truth' for oft times, an event in history severely deviates from the path of truth due to the media's contortions.  Moreover, often times, the way in which the media paints the episode, changes the scope of the entire event for public opinion (directly or indirectly) helps pattern policy and hence the media's interpretation of an occurrence has the frightening capacity to essentially become the truth.  Clearly then, through a comprehensive consideration of the Korean War meshed with commentary on how the historical contours of the Korean war were shrouded due to the media, one can clearly deduce that the progression and the outcome of the Korean War was in many regards in the hands of the media,

The Korean War was a military undertaking waged on the Korean Peninsula from early June of 1950 to July of 1953.  The initial echelons of the war saw conflict between The Republic of Korea (South Korea) and The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), prompted by North Korea's invasion of the South.  Despite this initial limited involvement, the war quickly escalated into an international contest consisting of The United States and 19 other nations.

It is a commonly held notion that the Korean War was a manifestation of the prevailing Cold War hostilities between the communist and noncommunist governments and in the forefront of this struggle was the United States and the Soviet Union.  Clearly then, it is widely contested that the Korean War was simply a stage where the right for global and political supremacy could hold court.  This truth is well depicted through a consideration of North Korea's motives in Invading South Korea.  Contrary to the international political issues that loomed in the forefront as the war progressed, initially, "the motives behind North Korea's decision to attack South Korea had as much to do with Internal Korean politics north and south of the 38th parallel [the boundary between the two republics] as with the Cold War."' In fact, North Korea made the invasion without prompting from neither the Soviet Union nor China (the two most powerful communist nations of that period).  Although the Soviets anticipated military action in Korea, they were in the midst of boycotting the UN when the initial attack occurred while the Chinese government had their own endeavors in mind as they were devising an invasion of Taiwan.

The fire began to kindle in Korea as "considerable civil strife south of the 38th parallel and growing opposition to South Korea's president, Syngman Rhee, persuaded the north Korean leader, Kim sung", that "he would be welcomed by many South Koreans as a liberator intent on overthrowing the Rhee government and reuniting the two Koreas. , 2 In Kim's persuasion, we see his conniving and deceptive nature for this "champion of Korean Unification" would soon break his vows of unification and instead, turn to his hidden agenda of national domination.

The War officially commenced on June 25 as Kim Sung's agenda was displayed through North Korea's attack of South Korea, which was inscribed by North Korea's passage across the 38th parallel.  Immediately, Cold War tensions began to spark for the North Korean army was heavily armed with soviet weapons.  The United States saw this "soviet assisted" action as a threat to democracy and hence retaliated in imparting arms to South Korea.  Hence the war broadened from a national conflict to an international war as depicted on June 27 when the UN Security Council "with the Soviet Union voluntarily absent, passed a U.S.sponsored resolution calling for military sanctions against North Korea. , 4 Harry Truman's mandating American troops into Korean territories just three days after the UN's initial plea promptly followed this sanction.  The extent of this commitment proved even more severe with the United States' deployment of forces stationed in over twenty nations including: Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, Israel, The Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Denmark, Italy, Sweden, Greece, Colombia, Ecuador, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada and Holland.  All these contingents (including South Korean participants) were subsequently placed under the control of General Douglas MacArthur and grouped in the U.S. Eighth Army.  This operation was an unprecedented endeavor for "neither the UN nor its predecessor, the League of Nations, had ever used military measures to repel an aggressor."'

Despite the thousands of U.S. troops committed to Korea, the North continued to overwhelm the South as the Northern forces were only stymied after capturing Seoul and propelling the American forces "to a small perimeter around the city Pusan.  "6 Although the U.S. were able to hold at this juncture, an ambitious MacArther waged a counter attack on the North Koreans in Inch', a small coastal town on South Korea's west coast.  In this well executed offensive, the United States were able to push through the Pusan periphery and impel the North Korean forces back to the 38th parallel.  This epoch was a very optimistic period for the United States as it was their first period of success in this still blossoming war.  Because of this truth, Harry Truman may have made one of the greatest and most resonant errors in the Korean War in his ambitious attempt to perplex communist augmentation by means of pushing UN forces across the 38th parallel.  It seemed to be Harry Truman's contention that this emotional apex of the war would be the American's most opportune moment to try to grind North Korean forces and hence impede communist expansion.  Specifically, the United States were to move the North Koreans north of the Yalu River that separates North Korea from China.  The error in this motility lies in the truth that the Chinese had admonished that they would intervene in the conflict if the United States push the North Koreans up through the Yalu.  The U.N forces, along with the United States, proceeded however and fully transformed the War into a battle between democracy and communism.  On October 7, the UN forces made there way into North Korea and found considerable success in capturing the capital city P'y I ngyand.  After their voyage into the Capitol City, the UN forces progressed to the Yalu and soon found out that the Chinese conformed to their threat of interceding in the war for on October 25 , the UN forces unearthed what were called Chinese "volunteers' who had migrated into North Korea.  This new regiment proved meritorious foes as they forced MacArther's assemblage to withdraw (before the Chinese ultimately had to retire due to their dearth in numbers and supplies).  Although staggered, MacArther did not yield in his determination and proceeded North with his weary units.  This perseverance proved one of the most costly strategical errors in the war for the Chinese (shortly after their retreat), "struck again, this time in massive numbers" and "the UN troops, overextended, outnumbered and ill-equipped" to fight a totally regenerated army in the midst of a acrid Korean winter, were soon forced to fall back." Controlling factors did not improve for the U.N forces for on November 26 the Chinese obstructed the American escape route and hence forces were impelled to fight through simply to reach H Inam-ni n, the principle air evacuation site.  The communists forces amply exploited their military victory in reclaiming P'y I ngyand on December 5 and "sweeping into South Korea, triumphantly recovered Seoul on January 4, 1951.  "' Despite this immediate communist success however, Chinese forces were incapable of fully exploiting their victory (by means of progressing further south) for they had "overextended their weapon supply" and hence were forced to hold "along a front far south of Seoul.  "9 In the midst of the U.N failures and North Korean occupation farther south, Truman obstinately refused to declare "all out war with China' (with the fear that such a proclamation would invoke soviet interaction).  Instead, he altered his "military objective" from "the military reunification of Korea" to his original goal of "stopping communist aggression in Korea.”10

With this new proclamation and the UN's reconciliation of their losses, the Eighth Army combated the Chinese southern expansion and initiated their most ambitious and aggressive attack coined "Operation Killer" on February 21.  Unable to endure the tremendous U.N firepower, the Chinese retreated north once again and the U.N recaptured Seoul on March 14. By April 22, UN forces retained a position hovering a few miles north of the 38 parallel "along a line that, with very minimal changes, remained stationary for the rest of the war."" Even in this most auspicious era, internal political strife ran rampant in domestic front as General MacArther was discharged due to his public avocation of "a very aggressive military strategy that differed from the president Truman's policies."' In an exertion to restore internal order, the president reassigned Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgeway as MacArther's successor and, under his control, for the following two years of military action, UN forces committed to a military policy termed "active defense."13

Despite this new passive agenda, intense warfare continued on both the ground and in the air.  In fact, at its peak strength in July 1953, "the UN command stood at 932,539 ground forces' with the "Republic of Korea army and marine forces accounted for 590,911 of that force, and U.S. Army and marine forces for another 302,483,14 The communist extended their forces as well from approximately "500,000 to 865,000, and their armored strength grew from almost nothing to one North Korean and two Chinese armored divisions and one mechanized division, with an estimated 520 tanks.'15 Although the Chinese forces lacked the military potency to launch any offensive on their own, their "well entrenched”16 forces invoked havoc on the UN forces (even in a state of active defense) as depicted in some of the most desperate and severe battles including old Baldy, Capital, Pork Chop, T-Bone, and Heartbreak Ridge.

With heavy emphasis situated on ground warfare, it is also significant to consider that aircraft played a key role in the progression of the war.  In fact the Korean War was the arena in which first supersonic jets were employed in warfare.  Because of their stalwart ties with the Soviets, the Chinese quickly formed into a dominant air power for "half of their 1400 aircraft were soviet-built MIG-15s"" (the premium jet in the world at that time).  To combat such a looming threat, the United States scrambled to develop the "formidable" F-86, which had the capacity to challenge the MIG in battle.  These new air innovations manifested in increased involvement of these air forces in battle which ultimately resulted in "the loss of some 58 Sabres and 800 MIGS"' and innumerable casualties.

Just as UN air forces claimed their domain in the sky, so too, were these forces a crucial component in the "support of ground forces, in destroying Chinese supply lines, and in crippling North Korean airfields."9 Despite some communist intervention in the air, The US dominated the skies and, in doing so, began to derail the crucial North Korean industrial centers, railroads, supply bases, airbases, and hydroelectric plants.

Another major conflict that emerged from the Korean War was the issue of germ warfare.  Although the charges were never founded, the communists maintained that prisoner of war camp authorities had poisoned the captives with deadly pneumonic viruses so that when they were sent back to their respective countries, they would inflict many others with the virus.  This pressing issue consequently infused more tension in an already heated war and was even said to have perhaps prolonged warfare for a few months.

Finally, in mid June of 1951, as positional warfare became the staple of the war and no ground was gained nor lost on either front, Soviet officials associated to the UN recommended to Korean officials that it was time for a cease-fire.  On July 10, 1951, following initial talks, officials from both the UN and communist began to draw upon a peace agreement at Kaes I ng in North Korea which continued for two years.  Although conducted in a shroud of "mutual suspicion, 20 all the pending issues were resolved with the exception of the communists refusal to adhere to the UN's policy  that prisoners of wars cannot he forced to return to their country against their volition.  This discrepancy was soon resolved in late spring of 1953 when both sides agreed that a prisoner who was unwilling to return to his own country (for fear of spreading virus, disease, etc.) would be placed in a 90 day neutral quarantined territory to assure that the prisoner was without major illness.  After this disagreement was settled, the truce pact was officially signed at P'anmunj m in July of 1953 and the war was officially terminated.  The casualties on each side of the front were devastating as depicted in the United States' loss of 33,629 men while the communist forces suffered a loss of 415,004.

Through this consideration of this documented (and veritable) account of the Korean War and the peripheral factors that helped maintain the natural progression of the war, we have established the "truth" as we all know it.  Yet at a more profound level, we will soon discover that the media has molded this truth for it had a tremendous effect on the consequences and the dimensions of the war.  Clearly then, the reality above would not be our universal truth without the media's manipulation.

The Korean War Part II: The Role of the

United Nations and the True meaning of the War

In the UN Resolution of June 27,1950, it states:

"The Security Council,

"HAVING DETERMINED that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

"HAVING CALLED FOR an immediate cessation of hostilities, and "HAVING CALLED UPON the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and "HAVING NOTED from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, and

"HAVING NOTED the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security,

"RECOMMENDS that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

With this simple UN resolution, President Truman was compelled to initiate UN's participation in the Korean War.  As previously stated by my colleague, the United States was named executive agent for the conduct of the war, and on

July 10th, 1950, Truman appointed General of the Army Douglas Mac Arthur as Commander in Chief of the UN command.  However before one can understand the consequences of the UN resolution and the resulting Korean War, one must consider the five years following the conclusion of World War II which set the stage for this unprecedented decision by the UN committee.  More specifically, I am referring to the relationship between the Soviet-led North Korea and the US-led South Korea, the ensuing liberation of Korea, the inability of North Korea and South Korea to become unified, and ultimately, the unprovoked attack on South Korea by North Korea.

Upon Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945, Soviet military forces swept through Manchuria and North Korea taking over Japanese control over these provinces.  The United States reacted in alarm when she realized the potential danger of having the strategic Korean peninsula controlled by communist forces.  President Truman proposed a joint occupation of Korea by the two powers where the Soviets would occupied the territory north of the 38 parallel, while the U.S. would control the area south of the line.

Initially, it was the intention of both sides to establish a stable and unified Korea in order to withdraw their military forces from the area.  However, neither the Soviet Union nor the U.S. wanted the peninsula to fall into the other's hand.  In short, the Soviets and the U.S. desired to withdraw their military and resources out of Korea, but they also wanted to leave behind a nation that was favorable to each's ideology; the Soviets desired a Communist Korea whereas the U.S. wanted a democratic nation to be established.  Reluctantly, both sides initiated the liberation of Korea and withdrew most of their forces from Korean soil.

And so the roots of division were laid from the very onset of Korea's liberation.  Although two different political governments had emerged in Korea by 1947, the fact that they were still only provisional governments gave the Korean people hope for a possible unification.  Up until this time, nationalists from both the North and South continued their efforts to negotiate a unification treaty, however, unreconcilable differences between the U.S. and the Soviet Union prevented any such goal.  Eventually, the U.S. concluded that the chasm that existed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in establishing a unified Korea was insurmountable and so they pressured the United Nations to allow for a general election in Korea.  Suspicious of foul play by the U.S., the Soviets refused to allow the election to be held in North Korea.

            While a Soviet-backed Kim II Sung headed the Communist leadership in North Korea, a U.S.-backed Syngman Rhee was elected President of South Korea.  This election was heavily influenced by the U.S. military control in South Korea.  In fact, ever since the U.S. took over temporary control of South Korea in 1945, U.S. General Hodge had been using Rhee as a political puppet to rid South Korea of pro-Japanese communists as well as to promote American interests in South Korea . 1 Back on Oct. 12, 1945, MacArthur ordered Col.  Preston Goodfellow, former Deputy Director of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), to fetch Syngman Rhee from America.  Rhee owed this fortune to the American President who was looking for a Korean leader that he could count on.  He asked an informant named Chiang to come up with a few names of Korean leaders with ties to America.  Chiang came out with two names: Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee.  By electing Rhee as the president of the newly liberated country, the U.S., concerned about Soviet intervention in North Korea, used their own style of imperialism in South Korea with hopes to rid a unified Korea of communism.

So even though the Korean War started as a civil war with North Korea invading South Korea, the U.S. anticipated this, used this as a chance to intervene, and, for once and for all, rid Korea of communism.  The media, however did not present this motive as the reasoning for America going into a war in which they should not have been involved.  Instead, the media presented a communist nation (N.  Korea) invading a poor, helpless democratic nation (S.  Korea).  In order to protect this helpless country, the media shows a swift and just decision by the newly formed UN committee to intervene with a "UN police-keeping force" and return North Koreans back above the 38th parallel.

The UN Security Council that met to decide the UN resolution was entirely influenced by the U.S. interest in ending communism.  The President of the U.S. used the Security Council as a way to achieve military action without making it seem like the U.S. was entirely behind the operation.  In fact, one day before the signing of the resolution, President Truman met with the NSC and ordered the U.S. Navy and Air Force into South Korea to stop the invasion, but not Army ground troops.  Then on Monday, June 26,1950, Truman asked and received support from the UN.  While the UN facade was a harmless delusion, Truman's decision not to seek a declaration of war set a dangerous precedent that was soon to be followed in the next war in Vietnam.  Claiming their war-making authority rested in their power as commanders in chief, both Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon refused to ask Congress for approval to wage war in Vietnam, a major factor in undermining support for that conflict.  It was not until the Gulf War in 1991 that then President Bush rejected suggestions that he follow the Korean precedent and instead, as the Constitution provides, asked Congress for permission to wage war."

Using the UN Security Council resolution as his authority, President Truman said the conflict in Korea was not a war, but a "police action." As a result of this premature decision to wage war in Korea, the US and the rest of the UN effort paid the price the lack of America's preparedness.  Many of the Infantry Division's heavy tank battalions were not activated, and more importantly, the battalions that were activated were equipped not with heavy tanks but with M-24 Chaffee light reconnaissance tanks armed with low velocity 75 = guns, that proved to be no match for the North Koreans' Soviet supplied T-34 85 mm-gun 2 Also inadequate were the infantry's 2.36 medium tanks inch anti-tank rocket launchers, radios that did not work properly, and many of the guns that were supplied to the rifle battalions.  These inadequacies proved fatal for the UN's first attempt at taking back South Korea, the entry of the 24th Division as the first ground combat unit committed to the war.  Going into action with some 16,000 UN soldiers, the 24th Division had only 8,660 men left by the time it was relieved by the 1st Calvary Division on July 22.

Thus, the effects of using the United Nations as the authorizer of the Korean War were quickly felt.  The UN itself was a newly developed organization made up after World War II in order to, among other reasons, prevent another World War from occurring.  The name "United Nations" was devised by United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt and was first used in the "Declaration by United Nations" on January 1st 1942, during the Second World War, when representatives of 26 nations pledged their Governments to continue fighting together against the Axis Powers.  The United Nations Charter was drawn up by the representatives of 50 countries at the United Nations Conference on International organization, which met at San

· Francisco from April 25th to June 26th, 1945.  Those delegates deliberated on the basis of proposals worked out by the representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States at Dumbarton Oaks in October 1944.  The Charter was signed on June 26th, 1945 by the representatives of the 50 countries.  Poland, which was not represented at the Conference, signed it later and became one of the 51 Member States.  The United Nations officially came into existence on October 24th, 1945, when the Charter had been ratified by China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and by a majority of other signatories.  Although the Soviet Union was present for the ratification of the UN charter, it was purposely absent for the signing of the UN resolution to intervene in Korea.  The Russians sided with the North Koreans in their attempt to take control of South Korea.  North Korea's Kim II Sung convinced Josef Stalin, the Soviet Premier at the time, that the invasion of South Korea was a low-risk operation that could be successfully concluded before the United States could intervene.  Stalin supplied the North Koreans with the military weaponry to complete the invasion.

Unexpectedly for Stalin and the North Koreans, when President Truman forced the signing of the UN resolution in Korea, and then proceeded to send military intervention to reclaim the invaded parts of South Korea, a larger war had started.  The United Nations proved to be a real force in the process of waging war, in this case making it easier for the United States to wage war with any country without the consent of Congress.  This had disastrous effects on the way wars were waged from Korea on into the present.  The lack of preparedness on the part of the US and the other UN countries that quickly intervened was quite apparent.  The early defeats to the US and the UN force suggest that a more time-invested approach to the Korean situation may have reduced the countless lives lost in Korea and in other countries, for example, Vietnam.  Congress would not have backed President Truman in waging war in Korea if had asked Congress to declare war on North Korea.  This is simply because not enough American public support would have wanted a declaration of all-out war.  Therefore, it is interesting to speculate on what would have happened if the UN was not created, and this invasion by North Korea was seen just as another incident to be dealt with by countries involved, not by some overlying peace keeping mission from the US and UN.





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