Climbing to the top: The Slippery Slope of Instability and Autocracy in the Congo
Section 1: Anna Linderum, Section 2: Brian Sager, Section 3: Michael Wodnicki, Section 4: Andrea Tiffany Fernandez
INTRODUCTIONS
The Congo (ex-Zaire) has experienced a volatile and turbulent past. The country has endured the sharp vicissitudes of foreign conquest and colonial exploitation to finally gain a hastily engineered independence from the Belgians in 1960. The postcolonial period since then has reflected this legacy: violent upheaval and tenuous stability on the political front have been juxtaposed with brief periods of growth in the midst of decline, within the spheres of public health care and economics. Zaire's gradual descent down the slippery slope of autocracy and instability can be further reflected through the careful examination of the deleterious state of these two aspects of the nations welfare. This is a nation of ancient and modern controversies and systems; there still exist colonial economic and political structures, albeit they have been adapted to modern realities, as traditional customs and traditions continue. The future of this nation (potentially one of the richest in the world) and its ability to develop successfully, is very much linked to the events of its past.
I. THE LEOPOLDIAN LEGACY
"Opening up to civilization the only part of the globe into which it has not yet penetrated, piercing the shadowy darkness that shrouds entire populations: this I dare say, is a crusade worthy of this century of progress." These noble words of Leopold 11 of Belgium to the delegates at a geographical conference in the September of 1876 in Brussels, expressed merely a hypocritical pretext to justily the colonial enterprise.
In the name of these false principles, numerous expeditions (the most famous being that of the Englishman Stanley) were organized for the purpose of preparing the division of Africa. The Berlin Conference (15 November 1884 - 26 February 1885), consecrated this division. At the close of this conference, all the European powers recognized Leopold Ii's personal ownership of the Congo Free State. Officially, Leopold pledged to "open up this country to civilization and to religious faith." 2 But in the testament dated 2 August 1889 whereby he announced his decision to cede "his" State to Belgium, he flatly revealed the true incentives for the colonial enterprises, i.e. "to ensure for Belgium, if it so desires, outlets indispensable for its economy and industry, and to provide new channels for the activity of its subjects."3
In actual fact, the large companies swiftly "sentenced" the Congolese people to hard labor. By the thousands, men were snatched from their families and deported to worksites hundreds of miles from their homes. Everywhere, they were assigned to what amounted to slave labor, allotted meager rations and virtually no wages; they were whipped at the smallest sign of resistance, mutilated for an offense, and executed without trial in the event of rebellion or refusal to work. People died like flies. Between 1880 and 1910, a total of approximately ten million Congolese died at their posts, at all the worksites in the country.
It has been calculated that, for the construction of the Matadi-Kinshasa railroad, the death rate was one Negro for every cros~tie.
Wild Beasts - the leopards - killed some of us while we were working away in the forest and others got lost or died from exposure or starvation and we begged the white man to leave us alone, saying we could get no more rubber, but the white men and the soldiers said: Go. You are only beasts yourselves. You are only Nyama [meati]. 5
These atrocities soared to such proportions that they eventually triggered a tremendous wave of indignation in Europe. Under the pressure of international opinion, Leopold II had to appoint a fact-finding commission that set sail in September 1904 for the port of Matadi to discover the hidden truths of the colonial state. The public outcry forced the Belgian parliament to annex the Congo Free State in 1908, thereby creating a new royal autocracy in the colony. 6
It is clear then, that the catalyst for organizing the conquest of this huge African domain was that it was to become the personal fief of King Leopold II of the Belgians. His thinly veiled colonial ambitions paved the way for the Berlin West Africa Conference (188~85); thus armed with a mandate of international legitimacy, and under the cover of the African International Association, Leopold created one of the most coercive instruments of colonial hegemony. What became known as the Congo Free State (1885-1908) is most readily associated with the extraordinary hardships visited upon the Congolese masses in the name of the Leopoldian "civilizing mission." 7
"Without the railroad," said Leopold's agent, the British explorer and journalist Henry Morton Stanley, "the Congo is not worth a penny." 8 Without recourse to forced labor, however, the railroad could not be built, and the huge concessions made to private companies would not become profitable; nor could African resistance in the east be overcome without a massive recruitment of indigenous troops. The cruel logic of the revenue imperative left Leopold with no other option than to transform his nascent administrative system into an infernal machine designed to extract a maximum output of labor and natural resources from the land.
Not until 1908 did the Belgian Parliament vote in favor of annexation as the most sensible response to the flood of international criticism generated by the Leopoldian system. The impact of the 1~ee State on the African populations outlived its relatively brief life span, however. The widespread social disruption resulting from the application of physical violence did more than complicate the establishment of a viable system of administration; it also left a legacy of anti-Western sentiment on which subsequent generations of nationalists were able to capitalize.
MAJOR POLICIES OF THE IMPERIAL POWER
In terms of policy implementation, the Belgian government of the new Belgian Congo applied a paternalistic attitude to the Congolese (though the threat of coercion was never far from sight). The state shared responsibility for administration and development with the Roman Catholic Church and business interests involved in mining and plantations. State, church and business thus constituted what even Belgian officials called the "colonial trinity." 9 It was not simply a question of the state's taking care of administration, the church of evangelization, and the business community of economic development; rather, the tasks of the three overlapped and reinforced one another.
In describing their policies Belgians often drew analogies from the development of European civilization, in which they stressed the importance of a stable middle class as the major factor in the responsible exercise of political rights, of from child rearing, in which the Belgians emphasized the necessity of a gradual increase in responsibility. The attitude of benevolent paternalism was the most dominant dictator of policy implementation. One writer puts it succinctly:
The Belgian system was franHy paternalistic. Colonial officials prided themselves on their accomplishments in the fields of housing, health care, and primary education. They saw no need for experiments in self-government; they had no intention of granting independence in the foreseeable future. The Congolese, they explained, were "like children" and would need years and years of tutelage. 10
It is therefore not surprising that the Belgians gave no thought to an independent Congo until it was virtually thrust upon them. In the spirit of dominer pour server (ruling in order to serve) the Belgians felt that their "civilizing process was one that should be implemented from above. Economic, social, and moral development was the order of the day. Political advancement was to be postponed until it was determined that the Congolese had determined a certain level of "development" or "maturity."
The combined influence of the policies of preserving traditional rural institutions and inhibiting the social and economic development of the Congolese in urban environments slowed down the process of unification among the hundreds of ethnic groups constituting the population. French became the national language, but the diversity of indigenous languages remained; a diversity that corresponds to the cultural diversity among the people.
Clearly then, Belgian colonial rule bore traces of its Leopold ian pedigree: as the irreducible tendency to trcat Africans as childlike creatures and a firm commitment to political control and compulsion - on which Belgian paternalism was based - were both characteristic features of Leopoldian rule. The elimination of the more brutal aspects of the Congo Free State notwithstanding, Belgian rule remained conspicuously unreceptive to political reform. By placing the inculcation of Western moral principles above political education and welfare benefits above the apprenticeship of social responsibility, Belgian policies virtually ruled out all initiatives designed to foster political experience and responsibility.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM
As stated previously, Henry Morton Stanley of the Congo River spurred European penetration into central Africa late in the 19th century when King Leopold II of Belgium financed the exploration. The 1884-85 Berlin West Africa Conference recognized the Congo Free State with Leopold as its sovereign. The growing demand for rubber occurring at the turn of the 20th century helped finance the economic exploitation of the Congo, but abuses growing out of the extraction of rubber there outraged Western nations and forced Leopol(l to grant the Free State a colonial charter as the Belgian Congo in 1908. The consequences of the Belgian imperialist policy were manifold; some are traceable to the precolonial past, others to the legacy of colonial rule, others still to the political convulsions that followed in the wake of independence. All, in one way or another, have left their imprint on the development of Congolese society.
NATIONALIST AWAKENINGS
The profound social and economical changes that World War II brought about greatly influenced the collective consciousness of Congolese peoples. Furthermore, the heavy demands that the Belgians had placed upon the rural milieus by the war effort greatly accelerated the flow of migrants into towns; a new class of educated, French-speaking Congolese increasingly became more vocal in their demands for reforms. And though this Congolese nationalism grew slowly (it was not until 1957 that any inhabitants of the Congo, white or black, were given the vote in any elections); once nationalist sentiment had begun, it grew dramatically, and Belgium agreed to grant independence to the Congo on June 30, 1960.
This independence however would not be the end of turmoil in the region, in fact it was the dawn of a new age of confusion and catastrophe that still continues today. King Baudoin's speech on the day of the ceremony clearly avoided divisive issues by presenting an artificial veneer of stability.
The independence of the Congo constitutes the crowning of the work conceived by the genius of King Leopold II, undertaken by him with tenacious courage and continued with perseverance by Belgium... the Congo has been endowed with railroads, highways, sea and air fleets which in putting your populations in touch with one another, have promoted their unity and opened the country to the world.
A medical service ... has been patiently organized and has delivered you from devastating diseases. Numerous and remarkably well equipped hospitals have been built. Agriculture has been improved and modernized. Cities have been built... industrial enterprises... schools... the emancipation of the individual which constitutes the true basis of all civilization.11
Little did anyone at that time know just how dire the situation truly was, though they would soon find out. The Congo, under the inexperienced leadership of Patrice Lumumba, was ill prepared for self-government. Within two weeks of independence, army and police officers mutinied and the Katanga (now Shaba) region seceded. The Congo called in Unit~4 Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces in an effort to avert civil war. The active involvement of the UN forces aroused some controversy, and a rival government faction particularly criticized them for not having prevented the murder of Lumumba in Katanga. The UN forces stayed until 1964, but their departure was followed by widespread rebellion.
This portion of the paper will first analyze the process of decolonization and the rising storms of controversy and conflict that began pervading the nation at this time in history. It will then secondly investigate how the growing nationalist powers drove the vehicle of anti~olonial rhetoric straight through the gates of Belgian paternalism and dragged the nation - and the world - into the Congo Crisis.
THE PROCESS OF DECOLONIZATION & THE RISING STORM
In the reconsideration of colonial policy that engaged all of the colonial powers after World War II, the Belgians very gradually; took the first steps to inaugurate a new stage in Congolese development. Opportunity for general secondary education was expanded and plans made for a university. Congolese in small numbers were invited to sit on a few advisory councils. Plans were discussed for allowing some measure of electoral choice in local governmental bodies. Legal bases for racial discrimination and segregation were gradually abolished. In the wake of World War II the colonial edifice had now more clearly than ever, begun to give way at the seams. Kimbanguism, a prophetic religious movement that rallied the people of the Belgian Congo against European culture and Christian missions, appeared in 1921. The oppressed peoples were gradually organizing themselves sufficiently so as to be able to demand their independence.
In the postcolonial era, finding a new equilibrium among the members of the "trinity" and sorting out the areas of responsibility of each posed, and still poses major problems, particularly with regard to education and the management of the economy. Indeed, the impact of European imperialism was so devastating, and its aftereffects so disruptive, because of the initial shock of European intrusion was followed almost immediately by a ruthless exploitation of human and natural resources. Latent hostility brooded deep within the sentiments of an entire nation - a hostility that subsequent generations of nationalists were able to capitalize upon, in the battle for democracy.
It was not until 1957, with the introduction of a major local government reform (the sccalled statut des villes), were Africans given their first taste of democracy. By then the impact of social change had become apparent in the rise of a class of Westernized Africans (evolue's) anxious to exercise their political rights beyond the urban arenas; the heavy demands made upon the rural masses during the years of the two world wars, coupled with the profound psychological impact of the postwar constitutional reforms introduced in neighboring French-speaking territories, created a climate of social unrest suited for the development of nationalist sentiment and activity. 12 The precipitating factor behind the political awakening of the Congolese masses was the publication in 1956 of a political manifesto calling for immediate independence. Penned by a group of Bakongo evolues affiliated to the Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO), an association based in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), the manifesto was the response of ABAKO to the ideas set forth by a young Belgian professor of colonial legislation, A.A.J. van Bilsen, in his Thirty-Year Plan for the Political Emancipation of Belgian Africa. 13 Far more impatient in tone, the ABAKO manifesto stated: "Rather than postponing emancipation for another thirty years, we should be granted self-government today."
Under the leadership of Joseph Kasavubu, ABAKO transformed itself into a major vehicle of anticolonial protest; the ferment of nationalist sentiment quickly spread through the lower Congo region, and, in time, the nationalist contagion reached the rest of the colony. Scores of self-styled nationalist movements mushroomed almost overnight in each province. In the welter of political parties brought into existence by the statut des villes, the Congolese National Movement (Mouvement National Congolais; MNC) stood out as the most powerful vector of territorial nationalism. Although the MNC never disavowed its commitment to national unity (unlike ABAKO, whose appeal was limited to Bakongo elements), not until the arrival of Patrice Lumumba in Leopoldville, in 1958, did the party enter its militant phase. 14 The turning point in the process of decolonization came on Jan. 4, 1959, when antiEuropean rioting erupted in Leopoldville, resulting in the death of scores of Africans at the hands of the security forces. On January 13, the Belgian government formally recognized independence as the ultimate goal of its policies--a goal to be reached "without fatal procrastination, yet without fatal haste." By then, however, nationalist agitation had reached a threshold of intensity that made it virtually impossible for the Belgian administration to effectively control the course of events. To this growing turbulence the Belgian government responded by convening a Round Table Conference in Brussels, in January 1960, involving the participation of a broad spectrum of nationalist organizations. The aim was to work out the conditions of a viable transfer of power; the result, however, was an experiment in instant decolonization. Six months later, on June 30, the Congo formally acceded to independence, hurtling toward a self-induced apocalypse: the Congo crisis was born.
THE CONGO CRISIS
The triggering element behind the "Congo crisis was the mutiny of the army (the so-called Force Publiquc) near Leopoldville on July 5, immediately followed by the intervention of Belgian paratroopers, ostensibly to protect the lives of Belgian citizens. Adding to the confusion cre~ted by the collapse of the Force Publique, the constitutional impasse arising from the opposition between the president and the Prime Minister brought the machinery of government to a halt. President Kasavubu revoked Prime Minister Lumumba from his functions; Lumumba responded by dismissing Kasavubu. Meanwhile, on July 11, the country's richest province, Katanga, declared itself independent under the leadership of Moise Tshombe. The support given by Belgium to the Katanga secession gave a measure of credibility to ~mumba's claims that Brussels was trying to reimpose its authority on its former colony, and on July 12 he and Kasavubu appealed to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold for UN security assistance. 15 While intended to pave the way for the restoration of peace and order, the arrival of the UN peacekeeping force added yet another source of tension between President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba. The latter's insistence that the United Nations should use force if necessary to bring Katanga back into the fold of the central government met with categorical opposition from Kasavubu. Lumumba then turned to the Soviet Union for logistic assistance to send troops to the Katanga, at which point the Congo crisis became inextricably bound up with East-West issues. 16
As the process of fragmentation set in motion by the Katanga secession reached its peak, resulting in the breakup of the country into four separate fragments (Katanga, Kasai, Orientale Province, and Leopoldville), Chief of Staff Joseph Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese Seko) announced on Sept.14, 1960, that the army would henceforth rule with the help of a caretaker government. 17 The threat posed to the new regime by the Lumumbist forces was substantially lessened by the capture of Lumumba in December 1960, after his dramatic escape from Leopoidville, and his subsequent execution at the hands of the Tshombe government. Although Kasavubu's surrender of Lumumba to the Katanga secession ists was intended to pave the way for a reintegration of the province into the fold of the central government, not until January 1963, and only afrer a violent showdown between the European-trained Katanga gendarmerie and the UN forces, was the secession decisively crushed. It would take another year for the last bastion of secessionism, the proLumumba Stanleyville government, to be brought to heel. Meanwhile, following the convening of parliament in Leopoldville, a new civilian government headed by Cyrille Adoula came to power on Aug. 2, 1961.18
Even more than his inability to deal effectively with the Katanga secession, Adoula's decision to dissolve parliament in September 1963 brought his popularity to its lowest ebb. His move contributed directly to the outbreak of rural insurgencies, which, from January to August 1964, engulfed 5 provinces out of 21 and suddenly raised the ominous prospect of a total collapse of the central government. Because of its poor leadership and fragmented bases of support, the rebellion failed to translate its early military successes into an effective power apparatlis; even more important in turning the tide against the insurgents was the decisive contribution made by European mercenaries in helping the central government regain control over rebel-held areas. For this, much of the credit goes to Moise Tshombe who, by July 10, had replaced Adoula as Prime Minister. 19 Ironically, a year and a half after his defeat at the hands of the UN forces, the most vocal advocate of secessionism had suddenly emerged as the providential leader of a besieged central government.
In November 1965 a military coup took place in which General Mobutu Sese Seko overthrew President Joseph Kasavubu. Mobutu was able to restore political stability to the Congo, and 1967 had also quelled the Katanga rebellion. Under Mobutu, the name of the country was changed to Zaire in 1971. In 1977 and 1978 Katangese rebels operating from Angola invaded the Shaba region but were repelled. 20 By the late 20th century, the economic mismanagement and political corruption of Mobutu's regime had devastated the Congolese infrastructure and economy to the point that the country had one of the lowest standards of living in the world. Mobutu was forced to create a transition government in 1990, promising a new constitution and multiparty elections for the following year. Conflicts among the opposition parties, however, combined with Mobutu's unwillingness to cede power to form an impasse. An impasse that to this very day is no closer in being negotiated than it ever was.
CONCLUSION
What began as a king's private domain (the Congo Free State), evolved into a colony (the Belgian Congo), and came to be known at the time of independence in 1960 as the Republic of the Congo (later the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and in 1971 as Zaire, is the product of a complex concatenation of historical forces. Some are traceable to the precolonial past, others to the legacy of colonial rule, others still to the political convulsions that followed in the wake of independence. All, in one way or another, have left their imprint on Congolese societies.
The long period of Belgian rule established internal and external boundaries, which did not, in general, correspond to existing cultural and ethnic boundaries. 21 But new institutions and values introduced with a deliberate attempt at consistency through the highly centralized colonial administration gave the Congolese a common experience upon which a future nationalism could be based. The nation of Zaire clearly reflects both continuity and change.
Zaire's ability to achieve long4erm political and economic development and growth depends in a large measure on the willingness of the government to resolve decisively the conflict between authoritarian patrimonialism and democracy. Patrimonialism has led inexorably to widespread corruption, economic mismanagement and miscalculation, and chronic borrowing. Resolution of this conflict is vital to removing Zaire's primary economic constraints: a heavy external debt burden, which has grown as a result of repeated rescheduling at market interest rates; dependence on primary commodity exports -copper, coffee, cobalt, and diamonds 4hat have poor market price prospects and are in any case subject to severe price fluctuations; an outdated and deteriorating transportation and communication infrastructure; and a badly neglected rural sector. In order to resolve its chronic economic problems and move towards sustained growth, Zaire would need to generate confidence in its institutions and to mobilize and invest substantial additional resources, both domestic and foreign. Observers increasingly believe that such changes will not be possible so long as the Mobutu regime remains in power. Thus, political change is the key to economic development. Until that change finally comes about: plus c,a change, plus ca reste Ia me me will tragically remain as the paradigm of Congolese development.
II. THE SECOND REPUBLIC 196~1990
In 1965, a man known as Mobutu Sese Seko seized power of the government in Zaire and effectively ended the reign of the First Republic, which lasted from 1960 to 1965. This rule, which has come to be known as the Second Republic lasted from 1965 until 1990, when the formal registration of other political parties was officially allowed. Mobutti's reign encompassed many changes in life in Zaire in all aspects of life including social, political, as well as economic.
During this period of time, Mobutu held a virtual stranglehold on the government of Zaire, earning the self appointed title "Father of the Nation". Mobutti's government consisted of a sole political party, known as the Popular Revolutionary Movement or MPR. Corruption and nepotism marked his rule. Mobutu felt that he was bringing order to a disorganized society as he stated that the First Republic consisted of "chaos, disorder, and incompetence."
The first two years of the existence of the First Republic were devoted solely to the reconstruction and consolidation of politics. Mobutu used whatever means necessary to maintain his absolute authority over virtually all levels and branches of the government. He relied solely on the loyalty and brotherhood of his entourage to maintain this authority over the course of his presidency. This came to be known as the "presidential brotherhood", which constituted the inner circle of Mobutu's clients, consisting of anywhere from as many as fifreen to twenty people. Included in the group were members of the MPR as well as key figures of the security forces. Other members constituted the lower rungs of society, but the common thread that kept all loyal to Mobutti was his constant habit to rearrange the government structure and the anticipation of rewards and benefits from Mobutu for services rendered. Penalties to the disloyal proved to be just as useful as rewatds to the faithful. Mobutu's real power lies in a wide array of paramilitary and intelligence gathering agencies such as the Special Presidential Division (DSP), an elite force in charge of ensuring Mobutu's personal security, the Military Action and Intelligence Service (SARM) in charge of military intelligence and its civilian counterpart the National Documentation Agency (AND). Bribery and extortion were very common due to the low pay they received. Mobutu regularly diverted government funds to a presidential slush fund to pay for rewards for loyalty.
Also from 1965 to 1967, the Mobutu set out to establish his authority by destroying the programs, which evolved from the First Republic and centralize the power of the office of Presidency. Parliament still met from time to time; however, its power was significantly reduced. Any kind of important decisions involving the state were now made through executive decrees known as ordonnance4ois. This began a snowball effect, as Mobutu now reorganized the entire system of government in the state to suit his needs. He abolished all other political party activity for five years, and in 1966, he eliminated the office of Prime Minister, making him the sole executive authority figure of the state. By 1966, Mobutu had also reorganized the existing 21 provinces into 12 and later 8 provinces plus the capita~. Furthermore, they were turned into purely administrative bodies, with assemblies that were merely consultative rather than administrative. Also, by January, 1966, another step toward political consolidation had taken place with the creation of the Corps of Volunteers of the Republic or CVR, a loosely knit organization whose membership was mainly recruited from the students associated with the General Union of Congolese Students of UGEC. Many of the ideas set forth by the CVR displayed reflected a brand of student radicalism in which the themes of nationalism, economic independence, and socialization were demonstrated. This was basically a vanguard unit used to mobilize popular energies behind Mobutu.
By 1967, Mobutu had unified his rule and went on to propose a new constitution and a single party. The new constitution was submitted for vote in June of 1967 and received approval from 98 percent of those voting. The new constitution called for executive powcrs to be centralized under the office of the president, who was to be the head of the state, head of the government, commander in chief of the armed forces and the police, and in charge of foreign policy. It also gave the president the right to appoint as well as dismiss cabinet members and determine the extent of their legislative powers and rights. The ministers, who were heads of their respective departments, were to act in accordance to the wishes and decisions of the president. The president also had the power to appoint and dismiss judges of the Supreme Court of Justice as well as governors of the provinces. A unicameral legislative body called the National Assembly replaced the bicameral parliament. The central government or more directly, the president would appoint the governors instead of them being elected by provincial assemblies. Under certain circumstances, the president had the authority to govern by executive order, which carried the force of law. Probably the most prominent change of this time came on April 17, 1967 with the creation of the Popular Revolutionary Movement marking the emergence of the national politically organized. More importantly, the MPR had become the sole legitimate body for participating in the political life of the country. As one official put it, "the MPR must be considered as a Church and its Founder as the Messiah." The doctrinal foundation of this party was later released in May of 1967 to the public, which was known as the Manifesto of N'Sele. Mobutti's policies of nationalism, revolution, and authenticity were identified as the major themes that consisted of what came to be known as Mobutuism. Mobutu followed by changing the name of the country in 1971 to the Republic of Zaire, and the armed forces were now known as the Zairian Armed Forces, or FAZ.
Once he had established a prominent grip on political dominance in the state, Mobutu had the motive of economic independence high on his agenda for change of the state. Government attempts to establish greater control over foreign enterprises operating in the country brought about a confrontation with the Belgian~wned Upper Katanga Mining Union, which was nationalized in January 1967. In November 1973, Mobutu began his plan of Zairianization, through which "farms, ranches, plantations, concessions, commerce, and real estate agencies will be turned over to sons of the country" in order to prevent frirther exploitation of the Zairian economy. The so-called "sons of the country consisted of high-ranking party members and government officials, totaling approximately 300 people. Major plantations and ranches and large commercial enterprises were given to the top politicil elite. Smaller enterprises were given to local officials. Army officers, judges, members of the regional administration, and ambassadors failed to qualify as recipients. Citizens would now have to purchase land from the state. Confusion resulted due to the criteria used to assess individual qualifications, such as party militancy, integrity, solvency, and commercial experience. These could all be interpreted in a number of different ways. Bribes were a way of avoiding the process. In the words of Thomas Turner and Crawford Young, "What transpired was a tumultuous, disorderly and profoundly demeaning scramble for the loot...." This had a horrible effect, sending the economy into a downward spiral. This forced Mobutu to enact a policy of radicalization, calling for all state officials to turn their property over to the state and devote themselves to agricultural needs. This did not help much, as the economic disaster continued, so in November of 1975, Mobutu was forced to enact a formula of retrocession to redistribute 40 percent equity in both Zairianized and radicalized businesses. This was inefficient as the economic problems worsened.
Further aggravating the economic setback of Zairianataion were the military defeats suffered by tht Zairian army in the course of its intervention in the Angolan Civil War. In late 1974, in order to counteract the growing influence of the neo-Marxist Popular Movement For the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), Mobutti chose to back Holden Roberto's pro-westemNational front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). In July 1975, the Zairian army suffered a devastating defeat at the hands of the Cuban soldiers supporting the MPLA while attempting to take the capitol. Furthermore, they suffered similar disastrous defeats during the 1977 and 1978 Shaba invasions, which were spearheaded by the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), the only credible Zairian unit of opposition of that time. The 1978 invasion in Shaba from Zambia also was led by this group and once again the FAZ showed its ineffectiveness and corruption, failing to stop the attack at all. This rose serious questions about the effectiveness of the army. However unsuccessful militarily, Mobutu used allegations of joint Cuban-Soviet collaboration in the Shaba invasions to drum up support from his friends (Belgium, France, and the United States) in the form of military support. Furthermore, his endorsement of U.S. security objectives in Southern Africa made it possible for his regime to benefit financially from foreign aid while resisting domestic pressures for economic, social, and political reforms.
Once he had a secure stronghold on his dominance of the nation, Mobutti looked to increase the expansion of state authority. This began with a major expansion of state control of civil society. This meant incorporating youth groups and worker organizations into the scheme of the MPR. In July 1967, the Political Bureau announced the creation of the Youth of the Popular Revolutionary Movement or the JMPR, following the creation of the National Union of Zairian Workers or UNTZA, which brought together three previously separate trade unions. This merger was in fact enacted to reduce worker opposition to the government. By organizing the JMPR, Mobutu attempted to bring control of the student population under the state. Mobutti continued by bringing women's groups and the press under the influence of the state. In December 1971, Mobutu allowed the state to recognize only three churches: the Church of Christ in Zaire, the Kimbaquest Church, and the Roman Catholic Church. Furthermore, Mobutu insisted on the ban of ill Christian names. Mobutu was also careful to suppress all institutions that could mol)ilize ethnic loyalties. Also, important administrative reforms were introduced in both 1967 and 1973. The central objective of the 1967 reform was to abolish provincial governments and replace them with officials appointed by Kinshasa. The principle of centralization was further extended to districts and territories each headed by administrators appointed by the national government. With the January 1973 reform, the aim was to operate a complete fusion of political and administrative hierarchies by making the head of each administrative unit the president of the local party committee. This reform severely curtailed the power of the traditional authorities at the local level. Hereditary claims to authority were no longer recognized. Also, in 1973, Mobutu introduced obligatory civic work, which came to be known as Salongo. This consisted of one afternoon a week spent on agricultural and developmental projects. This met with public disapproval and contributed greatly to the erosion of legitimacy in the Mubutuian state.
The price paid for living in such a system are quite evident in such deficiencies as the populace's low standard of living, the utter neglect of the rural sectors, the absence of an investment budget for the development and maintenance of infrastructure, and the very modest amounts spent on education and health services. Although Mubutu's personal style bears much of the blame for this dismal state of affairs, part of the explanation must also be found in the emergence in Zaire of a polity that combined some of the worst features of the absolutist, bula matari state with the inefficiency and corruption of a patrimonial regime.
On April 24, 1990, President Mobutu Sese Seko ushered in a new era in the political development of the Congo. He announced to the people that the existing one party government would be replaced by a multi-party system. This major change led into the beginning of the Third Republic. This was against the wishes of the people, however, as Mobutu took a public poll and the overwhelming majority favored the status quo as opposed to a multi-party system, including the MPR. Mobutu claimed he wanted the people to determine the destiny of the country, however, he made himself above the government, acting as the chief of state. He would have the final say in all matters pertaining to the government. Mobutu thus resigned as head of the MPR, and lefr them to appoint a new leader in 1990. However, Mobutu eventually resumed control of the party once again on April 21, 1991.
According to Mobutu, these changes would require a transitional period of twelve months. The deliberative bodies from the national legislature to the collectivity councils would remain untouched until the next elections, but the cabinet or National Executive Council was considered to have resigned. A prime minister would later be named who would put together a team of individuals to oversee the transition. Mobutu also maintained the abocost as the national dress of his personal choice, but allowed Zairians to wear a suit and tie if they so wished. However the desire for status quo was demonstrated as the members of the new transitional government showed up for the first meeting dressed in the abocost. By introducing such a three party government, Mobutu in fact served his own interests by overcoming the opposition of such groups as the UDPS at home and other groups in exile whose demands were centered around political reform. This was not a long lasting change, as Mobutu was already having second thoughts ten days later, as he was already shifting back towards the ways of the Second Republic.
III. ZMRE'S ECONOMY
Zaire's economy illustrates a continuous downward slope of disintegration. While meaningful economic figures are difficult to come by, Zaire's hyperinflation, chronic large government deficits, and plunging mineral production have made the country one of the world's poorest. Most formal transactions are conducted in hard currency because the indigenous bank notes have lost almost all value and a barter economy now flourishes in all but the largest cities. Most individuals and families just about hang on through subsistence farming and petty trade. The government has not been able to meet its financial obligations to the International Monetary Fund or put in place the financial measures established by IMF (Gregory 47). Although short-term prospects for improvement 'ire dim, improved political stability would boost Zaire's long-term potential to effectively exploit its vast wealth of mineral and agricultural resources.
The economy's downhill run goes back to 1973 when President Mobutti ordered Zaireans to ta~c over international business interests. The result was a disaster, and Mobutti ultimately reversed the order three years later (The Internationalist). Still, the economy hasn't recovered a setback that is all the more painful given the countries massive human and natural resources. Zaire is blessed with strong agricultural, gold, diamonds and a work force that given the chance could fuel a healthy economy. With much fighting and the rebel advance there is a huge distraction to commerce and yet another hindrance to productivity. Underlying the struggle while the formal economy is in a tailspin, the informal part is flourishing (Time). Banks do routine exchange on the streets in which are strewn with side walk entrepreneurs. It will take much incentive to motivate the work force and a powerful dose of honesty to clean up the corruption that has been done. Only radical change will prevent Zaire from having a total economic breakdown, and these changes need to originate from a powerful source that is both honest and determined.
Major changes have taken place in the structure of government expenditure since 1984. Although total expenditure increased by about 29 percent between 1984 and 1985, their share of GDP fell from 59 to 37 percent. Faced with a shrinking resource base, the government reduced its role in the economy as a whole. Significantly, this was brought about by a very sharp contraction in the government's capital expenditures in both absolute and relative terms; by 1987, they amounted to only 9 percent of GDP, less that in the early 1980's and about one4hird of the share in 1984 (Szper 6). As a result of these changes current expenditure made up close to 80 percent of total expenditures in 1987, up two-thirds in 1984. The increase in budgetary expenditure appears more dramatic. The major source of this continuous increase has been the wage and salary bill. These bills absorbed 72 percent of total budgetary revenue and thus became a prime cause of the Government's current account deficit. In contrast, other operating expenditure of the Central Government lagged considerably and by 1988 amounted to only 6.9 percent of GDP, about half of the 1980 level. The most important change in the composition of the government's current budgetary expenditure has been the increasing importance of departmental spending (10).
As the budget has become the cornerstone of any effort to stabilize the economy, it is important to assess what has been the experience in this area during the crisis. Before the crisis actual receipts were higher than forecasts, particularly in years of high copper prices such as 1980, 1983 and 1984. In 1885 the whole budgeting exercise collapsed in the .>( wake of falling copper prices, and since then actual receipts have been significantly lower than expected. Underlying this shift has been the consistent and significant underestimation of taxes on international trade (exports in particular) before 1984 and their overestimation thereafter. During 1985-86, cumulative revenues from international trade taxes were short of forecasts. In contrast, forecasts of domestic taxation have been except for 1985, constantly lower than actual receipts. This experience displays the enormous difficulty of forecasting revenues in a complex situation involving declining economic activity, high inflation, falling import levels, fluctuating copper prices and uncertain success in improving tax collection (Varon 5).
MINING
Mining has been the cornerstone of Zaire's wealth since colonial times. In the late 1980's, Zaire was the world's largest producer of cobalt, second or third largest producer of industrial diamonds, and fifth largest producer of copper. Mining, mineral processing, and petroleum extraction accounted for 17 percent of the GDP in 1990 (down from 24 percent in 1987) and mineral exports, principally copper, cobalt, diamonds, and gold, provided nearly 75 percent of all export earnings (Time). The mining industry, primarily a large company called Ge camines, also provided a significant percentage of ordinary government revenues, although the company failed to reinvest profits, resulting in worn-out machines and equipment. Throughout the early 1990's, the deterioration of Ge camines was both a symbol and a result of the country's economic chaos. Most skilled expatriates working for the company fled following the military looting in 1991 and further unrest in 1992. Since then Gecamenes's facilities have systematically broken down, and the company is now bankrupt. Mining is centered in the southeastern and eastern parts of the country with the exception of petroleum, which is found in the Far West in Ba~Zaire Region, and diamonds, mined in Kasai-Oriental and Kasai-Occidental regions. Shaba Region has the greatest concentration of minerals, with copper, cobalt, and zinc mined in a narrow crescent known as the copper-cobalt zone, stretching roughly from Kolwezi to Lubumbashi. Shaba Region also contains most of Zaire's known deposits of coal and manganese. A broad belt in eastern Zaire from northern Shaba to eastern HautZaire Region contains deposits of tin and gold with lesser amounts of tungsten-bearing wolframite, niobium, and tantalum (Varon iii).
In 1992 Zaire was the world's third largest producer of industrial diamonds after Australia, and Botswana, which surpassed Zaire in 1992 because of Zaire's reduced production. In 1984 and 1995, Zaire accounted for nearly 30 percent of world production, dropping to about 26 percent in 1986 as new Australian mine production came on stream. Although Zaire mines both gem quality and industrial diamonds, 90 percent of production is of industrial quality. This means that almost all of the diamond mining is used in industry. Bakwanga Mining Company, the state-owned mining concession in Kasa i-Oriental Regional produces much of the country's total export in diamonds. Because of their value on the international market, diamonds have long been smuggled extensively in Zaire. The smuggling creates a loss of funds because the wrong people are getting this money from these expensive gems. However, the smuggling has decrease recently due to the legalization of diamond mining and the establishment of official licensing (Time).
AGRICULTh RE
Zaire's agricultural systems employ 65 percent of the work force and accounts for approximately 32 percent of GDP throughout the 1980's. The country has a rich potential in becoming a net exporter of agricultural produce, but the land is greatly underutilized with as little as 1 percent of land under cultivation. Zaire has not been self-sufficient in food production throughout the 1990's. The area has suffered from nationalization in the 1970's, lack of investment funds, and inadequate infrastructure for transport of produce. Major food crops include: cassava, corn, rice, and plantains, followed by bananas, beans, peanuts, millet, sorghum, yams, potatoes, and fruits. The principal cash crops are coffee, palm oil and kernel oil, sugar, cocoa, rubber, and tea (Szper 14). Coffee being the most important cash crop. It has been estimated that 30 to 60 percent of the coffee crop is smuggled out of the country each year, once again taking away from the country's income.
FORESTRY
Forestry and the timber industry appeared very promising to future income. It is surprising that the potential of timber in Zaire has only recently been grasped in a country with an innovative and resourceful business community. An immense rain forest, one of the last still to be comprehensively exploited in the world, cuts right 'across the center of the country and covers tip to 50 percent of the surface area. The first enterprise to take the undoubted commercial opportunities was Siforzal, a company founded in 1973 and owned by the private West German Danzer group and the government (Szper 20). The section has since attracted the attention of other foreign interests, which have been, drawn by the potential for foreign currency earnings, and the absence of export quotas and effective government supervision of the industry. A second important company in forestry is Forescom, state owned but managed by Canadian interests (Kronsten 40). Forescom was managed for five years under a Canadian aid program. It has now been reorganized with an emphasis on private management and capital. Even though there is so much forest not much can be done because it is such a natural resource of the country that should not be disturbed.
TOURISM
Tourisrn in Zaire is still in its infancy. A county as rich as Zaire can easily be a hot vacation spot for people who want to see beautiful land. The country is not on any of the circuits favored by international operators. Major efforts to create the necessary infrastructure are being made, in particular international class hotels. There are at present only ten five star and four star hotels in Zaire, five of them in Kinshasa and N'Sele, one in Gbado-Lite, two in Goma and two in Lubumbashi (Szper 19). A Hilton hotel is proposed for Kinshasa, which is a great expansion. Generally speaking, hotels in Zaire are both luxurious and costly or in very poor condition and cheap. There is definitely room for well-managed rnoderately priced hotels with between fifty and one hundred rooms. The country's tourism potential is enormous with magnificent scenery, nature reserves, and possible safaris. However, there has been no organized way proposed for setting up such tourist attractions (20). The only thing that has been done is called the Tourism Promotion Fund, creating a way to obtain money to start certain programs.
TRADE
Zaire's role in the trade market has also been declining since the 1990's. Trade in Zaire is free. Pricing, however, is expected to comply with general regulations on authorized profit margins. The Department of Economic Affairs and the regional governors exercise price control on an afrer-th~fact basis. Copper, cobalt, crude petroleum, diamonds, coffee, and gold are Zaire's most significant exports. The country primarily imports machinery and other capital goods for mining industry as well as fuels, consumer goods, and produce (Szper 27). The main trade partners include Belgium, The United States, and other West European countries. Their trade balance had been positive in the 1980's but drcpped into the 1990's because of decrease in world commodity prices, drops in production1 and rises in import prices. The current account balance is consistently negative because of massive increase in external debt. Also, there are four different currencies used in Zaire, all of which play havoc with exchange rates and complicates what could be simple business deals (ABC book of Zaire). Finally there is widespread smuggling taking place across the border every day which certainly doesn't help the countries poor economic state.
INFLATION
Although there are a number of problems associated with inflation indicators in Zaire the general trends are not in doubt because there are several sources of information on prices, which permit cross checking. The rate of inflation in Zaire began to increase significantly in 1972, when consumer prices increased by about fifteen percent, compared to about five percent the year before. The rate remained unchanged in 1980 but jumped to about thirty percent in 1981 (Kronsten 40). The inflation rate slowed down to sixty percent in 1983 and returned to eighty percent in 1984. These figures, however, are based on averages for the last quarter of each year and understate the most recent trend. The devaluation of the zaire by fifty in four stages between November 1984 and January 1885 was accompanied by and increase in consumer prices of about forty percent over these three months. As a consequence, the price increase during the whole of 1984 (from December 1984 to December 1985) was ninety4ive percent. This rate of inflation is continuing today where 7, 024 new zaires equal one U.S. dollar (Varon ii). At this rate of hyperinflation it makes it nearly impossible to start any kind of economic progress. In one specific example, an executive who works for Beltexco, which makes bicycles, among other things has to check every morning to see if his businesses around the country have survived the night (CNN World News).
How can a country so rich and full of natural resources be so economically poor? Zaire has all the necessities for become a great and fruitful country. The struggle starts from all the political unrest that goes on within the country everyday. Leaders that are so corrupt and selfish as Mobutu take away any prosperity that the country may obtain. There is not very much to be said about rule such as this, and how can this situation be reversed. It looks as though a massive revolt can change things. The people of Zaire have to take the situation in their own hands. They need to be willing to work and make use of all the materials the country itself contains. It is impossible to say how long it would take before Zaire was once again back on its feet, but it can be done.
IV. HEAUDI AND MEDICINE IN ZAiRE
In the past decade, the Democratic Republic of Congo has become a political and economic battlefield. its people, land and way of life have been torn apart and plagued by brutal genocide, perpetual civil and political unrest and a dysfunctional government. In the midst of this tragic situation, the status of health care and the health of the nation has deteriorated and fallen into the great abyss of collapsing and ineffective governmental services. Native Congolese have been forced to seek a better quality of health care in other facets of the private sector of the economy. The Democratic Republic of Congo has been termed an underdeveloped country or a third world country, which turns attention to the glaring differences between the rich and the poor nations of the world. It was also soon recognized that in many cases this title was a misnomer, for close examination of Congo's economic and political characteristics revealed that it is not developing at all, but in fact, growing poorer. One should not underestimate the drastic and detrimental effects of these chaotic political plights on traditional medicine, the present health care status and international health aid from non-governmental organizations. The dynamics of medical pluralism are evident in the evolution of traditional medicine and the present health care status. Medical pluralism is the existence in a single society of differently designed and conceived medical systems. Because medical systems are social and cultural, their boundaries are those of political organization and cultural exchange. They utilize categories of thought and sentiment common to many to many occasions and interests, which is to say that they are part of the general culture in a society (1anzen 5).
TRADITIONAL MEDICINE
Traditional medical systems in Zaire consist of the healers and their clientele. Healers were defined as people who consolidate the populanon's knowledge about health and take responsibility for most medical care. By focusing on the type of treatment administered, healers may be divided into four categories: pure herbalists, herbalistritualists, ritualist-herbalists and spiritualists. The second and third categories comprise healers who use plants and rituals either simultaneously or alternately; the distinction is that the healers in the third category build the therapy around the ritual, whereas those in the second category treat the ritual as peripheral to the therapy. They can be generally divided into the herbal healers, who comprise pure herbalists and herbalist-ritualists, and ritualists, who include the ritualist-herbalists and spiritualists (See Appendices for Classifying Healers). The therapeutic activity of these healers forms part of the direct evolution of African medical traditions. The healer tended to show no signs of any specialization in their practice, partly to respond to the greatest number of demands and partly to promote the image of a polyvalent healer, owing perhaps to the influence of dispensaries and hospitals. Healers possess certain rites, which allow them to treat almost any ailment from illnesses caused by spirits to infantile asthma and hemorrhoids (26).
Chentele
The sociocultural characteristics of the healers' clientele directly lead to the determination of the current position of traditional medicine in the delivery of health care in Zaire. The clientele of the healers are generally women between the ages of 21 and 30. As there are other options offered to the population for the treatment of illnesses, it is important to understand the circumstances that would lead patients to seek traditional medicine over modern medical or "Western" medical services. Studies show that the majority of people seek treatment first from modern medicine, although the proportion is lower in the rural areas, where there is less accessibility to modern medicine and greater familiarity with traditional medicine and its practitioners. The shortages of modern drugs and equipment, the impersonal care provided, the doctor or nurse's reliance strictly on somatic aspects, the patient's expectations for instant cure, and the inability of modern medicine to treat certain illnesses all contribute to the abandonment of modern medical treatment (Bibeau 10). Patients' motives for consulting traditional medicine were related not only to their perception of their ailment, but also correlated to their ethnicity and where they lived.
TraditionaL Medicine as a MedicaL System
As a medical system, traditional medicine in Zaire is practiced in a holistic sense. A healer functions variously as a botanist, pharmacist, doctor, psychologist, and sociologist in treating different illnesses. In comparison with modern medicine and its standards, traditional medicine can only be judged negatively because the entire arsenal of experimental techniques that have enabled modern practitioners to refine their medical knowledge. In diagnosing and treating illness, healers often look closely at two basic signs: body temperature and the "quantity" of blood. Some people believe that the healer's therapeutic practice is the result of careful observation of the body and its functioning and represents the healer's basic knowledge. All treatments are either natural or ritual, while most combine both. Numerous signs have led many to believe that the system is undergoing periodic restructuring (30). Changing circumstances and the creative impulse of great healers were two forces that operated in the evolution and succession of the healing arts. It is irrefutable that not only the medical system itself has undergone changes, but the population and the healers. The desires of the population have evolved toward more services and more modern conditions. This may be considered either a progression or regression towards a holistically better system of health care. Although hygiene, order, and cleanliness have always been part of traditional medicine, the standards were not as high as those in modern medicine. Some people believe new tensions between the healer and patient, which could endanger the warm and personal relationship integral to therapy, are offset by any improvements in hygiene.
The Economics of TraditionaL HeaLth Care Traditional healers' fees are determined as follows:
Consultations involving love or business success, which are peripheral to traditional
medicine, are very costly;
…
Consultations for illness are treated by herbalists very similarly to those in modern medicine, with the patient paying for a registration card, a consultation, and the medicine received; and…
Some examinations are done at a fixed rate, but the price of divination fluctuates considerably (and is at present increasing);…
The price of ritual treatments is very difficult to evaluate. The payment does not all go to the healer; everyone in the rites---such as assistants and drummers-receives a substantial share. The money taken in during the dances or at the festivals celebrating the end of the treatments is redistributed among the members of the group attending;…
Hospitalization fees are usually calculated separately either on a daily basis or on a lump sum basis; and…
Initiation treatments, which relate to an apprenticeship or the acquisition of power, are sometimes quite high, constituting a sort of investment from which the patient hopes to profit (27).Traditional medicine truly reflects medical pluralism through its dynamic of evolving in every aspect to cope with today's society. This dynamism and pluralism can be utilized effectively as a basis for developing a new integrated system of health care in Zaire. By taking into account not only the nature and function of traditional medical methodology but also the specialties and styles of its practitioners as keys to modalities of cooperation, it is possible to set up more concrete programs of cooperation with traditional medicine. This may also help its society to avoid the dangers of the present evolution, which might threaten the very existence of medicine itself.
HEALTH CARE STATUS
Incidences of Infectious Diseases
After the turbulent years of early colonialism a new equilibrium was established between the conditions of life in the Lower Zaire, the tropical diseases of central Africa, and available medical care. The endemic killers such as sleeping sickness, malaria, intestinal parasites, tuberculosis and bilharzia were brought under greater control although none have been entirely eliminated. Numerous endemic diseases take the lives of hundreds of children each year. Man of these diseases can be directly related to inadequate knowledge and insufficient supply of proper food (1anzen 25). The health of the population of Zaire is a cause for serious concern around the globe. The abnormally high fatality rate reflects the low level of health care in the country presently, that has led to malnutrition, cholera and meningitis that has killed hundreds of people in refugee camps and in numerous communities. The World Health Organization (WHO) has gathered data through epidemiological centers in Zaire, both in zones controlled by the Alliance of Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL) and in those controlled by the Zairian government, that indicate that the health situation is pre-occupying for both the population in general and for refugees fleeing the combat.
Infectious and parasitic diseases can account for at least fifty percent of all deaths in Zaire. By comparison, the United States rate is 1.5 percent. These endemic diseases include malaria, trypanosomiasis, onchocerciasis and schistosomiasis. Malaria's increasing resistance to antimalarial drugs is alarming and a significant cause of illness and death. At least thirty new infectious diseases have appeared, during the past two decades alone. Ebola haemorrhagic fever and Bovine spongiform encephalopathy are prominent examples of newcomers. At the same time, older diseases like diphtheria, cholera and tuberculosis are returning vigorously. The region around Kisangani is also experiencing a re~mergence of other endemic diseases such as bloody diarrhea, meningitis, malaria and measles. These diseases are also gripping this region in an endemic manner, where sporadic cases of meningitis have also been notified. An epidemic of meningitis has been signaled in the Health Zones of Rutshuru and Rwanguba between mid-February and late March of 1997. Of three hundred thousand people exposed to the disease, there were fifty-seven cases recorded, with ten deaths among the inhabitants. However, the situation is now under control.
Diseases such as measles, diarrheal diseases, tetanus, diphtheria, pertussis, poliomyelitis, tuberculosis and leprosy are preventable or curable given available technology and services, yet it has been estimated that the immunization rate in the early 1990s to be only 38 percent for measles and 35 percent for diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus. Due to the lack of adequate sanitation and poor knowledge of proper hygiene, a majority of the population is infected with intestinal worms-the effect of these parasites is to further weaken a population already suffering from widespread malnutrition. Additionally, acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) is regarded as a potentially even greater public health hazard in the face of virtual collapse of the state-run health care system. By most accounts, in 1993 the majority of blood banks had been closed, and blood screenings were rare (Creative Primary Health Care).
Cases of cholera have been signaled without interruption since the beginning of the year in Kin shasa, Kasese, Mbandaka and other regions of western Zaire. There has been a significant increase in the case4atality rate to approximately ten- percent. This has become an extreme concern, as Kinshasa and Mbandaka are linked by the Zaire River, and the disease is partly spread by refugees arriving from locations where armed conflict is taking place. The treatment for this type of cholera is rehydration and only in cases of severe dehydration are antibiotics neede4 (CNN World News).
Nutrition
Sadly, an astonishing 25 percent of the country's children, reflected by the measures of children's standard weight-for-age, are undernourished. Malnutrition has joined the ranks of becoming one of the many widespread epidemics to ravage Zaire. Protein-calorie malnutrition and anemia are common among the population, as well as iodine-deficiency disorders resulting in the growth of goiters and in cretinism. The key constituent to malnutrition is poverty. Poverty has played a pivotal role in supplying the local markets with abundant supplies of food that most of the population cannot afford to purchase. Deficiencies in food production and diet have led to the importation of food from foreign nations to aid in balancing the population's diet (1anzen 192).
Water Sanitation
Yet, another factor affecting health care in Zaire is the increasing concern amongst scientists and physicians that, tinder the twin impact of industrialization and inadequate state protection, the rivers of Africa are rapidly becoming among the most polluted in the world (Koch 30). Because of the ineffectual regulations, and the contempt with which major mines and factories treat them, pollution is having a dramatic impact on the quality of drinking water in many towns and cities. This problem is then exacerbated by inadequate water purification systems, which rely heavily on chlorine to remove the bacteria and are not yet capable of removing the organic pollutants pumped into surface water by industry. Water sanitation poses yet another potential threat to public health in Zaire, as chlorine reacts with the pollutants to create chloroform, a potent carcinogen, and other highly toxic compounds known as chlorobenzines (35). Water supply has been a serious constraint on public health, as the sanitation is a serious health hazard when services break down and sewage runs untreated through streets and streams become polluted by fecal matter. Outbreaks of cholera or typhoid are likely to follow. According to United Nations estimates, only 14 percent of the population in Zaire have access to safe water. A staggering 50 percent get their water from wells and surface water of varying quality. Approximately 30 percent of the urban population have access to a sewage system, 10 percent use septic tanks and 60 percent use latrines. Adding to this potentially catastrophic equation, there is no garbage collection system, and only about 20 percent of the population uses pit latrines (40).
HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT IN ZAIRE
The instability and conflict prevalent within President Kabila's government do not aid in alleviating the current status of health care. For the civilian population, this means a situation of generalized crime and violence and little if no improvements for health. Zaire's system of social welfare included the guarantee of insurance coverage for sickness, pensions and family allowances under an obligatory scheme of National Insurance by the Institut National de la Securite Sociale. In 1995, of total expenditure by the central government, 25,OOOm. new zaires (less than 1%) were allocated to public health. In 1979 Zaire had 942 hospitals, with a total of 79,244 ~eds, and there were 1,900 physicians working in the country. In 1988-91, it was estimated, there were, on average, 14,286 inhabitants for every doctor and 1,351 inhabitants for every nurse in the country (For current statistics involving public health see appendices).
The United Nations estimates that recently only 500/o of the population had access to health care in the early 1990s; the ratio of physicians to population was claimed to be approximately one per 14,000; the ratio of nurses to population was approximately one to 1,900; and the average population per hospital bed was estimated to be about 700.
The concept of primary health care in Zaire predated the 1978 Alma-Ata conference. In 1975 a national seminar organized by the churches, and with full MOH participation, adopted the principles of integrated medicine and proposed the establishment of geographically defined health zones. Based on those principles, a few pilot health zones developed between 1975-1980 as models for the management of decentralized zones. in theory, the nation is divided into health zones, which are organizational units for primary health care in Zaire. Each health zone covers a population of 100,000 inhabitants containing, on average, one referral hospital, between one and three reference health centers, and fifteen to twenty-five standard health centers. Each standard health center is staffed with at least one certified nurse and provides basic preventative and simple curative services to the five to ten villages in its area. However, serious medical cases are referred upward to the health zone's reference health centers and referral hospital (World Health Organization-public health, Zaire).
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH AID
Although the development of these health zones may appear to be a solution to the deteriorating health care in Zaire, it is considerably less impressive in practice. The relatively high ratios mask the fact that the quality of medical education has seriously disintegrated and salaries of medical personnel are too low to permit staff the luxury of full-time attention to their professional obligations (Namuddu 16). Astonishingly, a majority of the physicians and health care personnel employed in the public sector must seek outside income in order to survive. Often, medical personnel require payment of a personal fee before they will care for a patient. In considering this suggested improvement in health care, one must take into account the fact that statistics are all too often misleading. An investigation by a national health agency revealed that the government's health services have almost entirely collapsed and the elite continue to seek quality health care abroad. Many governmental health centers lack the medications or equipment and personnel to cope with the day to day situations that arise in medical facilities. Zaire's dependence on international relief organizations and religious organizations, such as the Catholic medical service network which takes primary responsibility for ninety health zones, becomes extremely significant as they provide the bulk of Zaire's health care (25).
The World Health Organization (WHO) is working closely with its partners in UNICEF and Medecins Sans Prontieres (MSF) to deal with the disease. The mission statement of MSF is that it is,
.An international humanitarian aid organization that provides emergency medical assistance to populations in danger in more than 80 countries. In carrying out humanitarian assistance, MSF seeks also to raise awareness of crisis situations; MSF acts as a witness and will speak out, either in private or in public about the plight of populations in danger for whom MSF works. In doing so, MSF sets out to alleviate human suffering, to protect life and health and to restore and ensure respect for the human beings and their fundamental human rights.
The WHO was involved in serving the people through its office there, along with MSF Belgium, which is providing logistical support. They have also provided cholera treatment kits, undertaken preventative measures and assisted local health authorities in isolating cases at hospitals. Local health committees have additionally been strengthened and a cholera task force has been created and includes the AFDL Regional Health Officer in Kisangani, epidemiologists from WHO and the Centers for Disease Control, Atlanta, USA, and a medical coordinator from UNHCR. Considering the enormous lack of organized health systems in Zaire, the WHO has reinforced its epidemiological surveillance in targeted cities, such as Mbandaka and Lubumbashi, to combat the risk of epidemics. Epidemiologists and international cholera experts are being deployed in the region, and special emphasis has been put on tracking diseases with epidemic potential. WHO has also established a new program to combat the growing threat of infectious diseases to international public health in 1995. The program's mission is "to strengthen national and international capacity in the surveillance and control of infectious diseases that represent new, emerging, and re-emerging public health problems, including the growing phenomenon of antibiotic resistance." One of the program's top priorities is to have a team of experts at the location of an outbreak anywhere in the world within 24 hours of being officially notified of it. WHO activities are managed in close collaboration with local health authorities and several United Nations organizations (UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP), as well as with non-governmental organizations such as Medecins sans Frontieres and the epidemiological group Epicenter (World Health Organization).
UNICEF provided local health authorities with 270,000 doses of vaccines, as part of a vaccination project in North Kivu. The vaccines against measles, polio, diphtheria, whooping cough, tuberculosis and tetanus have been transported to various health zones in the Province. UNICEF has additionally signed an agreement with a local NGO, ADIF (Action pour le Development Integre de Ia Femme) for the construction and maintenance of water sources in the Bukavu area. Under this two-month project, ADI F, in collaboration with the local population, will construct or rehabilitate nine water sources in the three urban zones of Bukavu. They have established and trained committee~made up of five women and one man- which will be responsible for managing water use and maintenance, as well as constructing separate facilities at each source for the washing of dishes and clothes, to avoid dirtying the drinking water supplies. The project's objectives are to ensure access to potable water for about 30,000 people, prevent the spread of water-borne diseases, alleviate the burden on women and children for the collection of water, and improve hygiene conditions around the water sources (One World Online).
The World ORT Union has also stepped in to lend Zaire a helping hand through their Mother and Child Care project, which reached over 2,000 children and thousands of parents in Lubumbashi in 1984, who received health and nutrition education. Many adults were also trained as child minders and health workers. ORT is currently developing a network to reach the large population in the area surrounding Kinshasa. World ORT Union prepar(~s parents to enter the workforce and brings education and health care to some of the poorest communities in the world (Amnesty International).
MSF sends support to health centers including supplies of essential drugs, medical and logistical material, staff training and assistance with preventative activities such as vaccinations, prenatal care and condom distributions. MSF runs comprehensive STD/AIDS programs, where the focus is on safe blood transfusions. An AIDS leaflet directed at teenagers is produced and distributed throughout schools. They are additionally helping to set up a nationwide epidemiological surveillance system and a water-borne diseases prevention program. MSF focuses chiefly on education and public health awareness as a means of prevention and treatment (Med icins Sans Frontieres).
CONCLUSION
In a nation characterized by corruption, excessive poverty, and chaos, the need for change is both entirely obvious and desperately needed. The Democratic Republic of Congo is ironically far from democratic; it is in fact a dictatorship granting few rights to the citizens and inhabitants of the nation. The wealth of the nation, potentially one the richest in the world, has been squandered by the corrupt leaders of the nation. The country has endured the exploitation of each and every one of the dictatorial powers in the Congo. Dating back to its foreign conquest in the late 1800's up until present day, the Congo has withstood exploitation, corruption, violent upheavals, and abhorrent living conditions. Africa was seen as a vast hunting ground on which swaggering empire builders blithely battled over the spoils of conquest. The colonists' efforts to pacify the natives were merely a part of the game.
The spoils of the nation have been deeply integrated into all aspects of life in the Congo, especially the politics, economy, and healthcare. The process of ameliorating the current situation will prove to be a long and arduous task, but will be possible given time. The Congo's ability to achieve long-term political and economic growth and development lies directly upon the willingness of the government to abandon its authoritarian style regime and to move towards a more democratic government. It is vital for the nation to resolve its problems with economic mismanagement, widespread corruption, and inveterate borrowing.
In order to halt the current descent down the slippery slope of autocracy, development must begin with the majority of the nation-the poor, underrepresented citizens. This "grassroots development" requires the people to learn how to work together to achieve a common goal, democracy and peace. As they attempt to accomplish this goal with renewed vigor and determination they will acquire a valuable degree of human dignity by doing something to help themselves, instead of continuing to accept the status quo.
To reduce poverty and improve the way of life for the Congolese, the status of women must be altered at the grassroots level. Women's contributions to the economy must be recognized, especially since they control the markets where all the food and necessities for everyday living are sold. Women are also the heads of one third of all family households in underdeveloped nations around the world. The power of women exists, but is not enough; they must be educated to help them use their power. In 1993 the "mammas", the women selling or bartering in the market, refused to accept the 5 million Zaire bill. The result of their refusal was the "Second Pillage", a period of violent rioting and pillaging. This mass rioting was due to the fact that the military was paid only with 5 million Zaire bills and therefore were unable to purchase food or anything for that matter.
In order to improve the economy, major adjustments must be made on the political front. The country would also have to follow a "balanced growth" theory. According to the theory,
Growth must take place simultaneously in different sectors of the economy - such as industry and agriculture - as well as in different regions of the country. The idea behind this was that in order to create sufficient aggregate demand to support any one sector, other sectors must grow as well in order to provide the necessary employment and income. But for any poor country to carry out such a program requires enormous amounts of capital, sums far beyond the means of the country itself. (Torres 15)
The money needed to invest in the Congo would have to be provided by a foreign nation. However, it would be rather difficult to convince another nation to invest in the Congo, as there is very little security for their investment. The Congo would have to guarantee that the money would be invested in the development of the nation.
The key to development in the Congo lies in the restructuring of the government. Studies have suown that the greater the concentration of political power, or the less representative the government is, the lower the level of economic development is likely to be. Power must be delegated to the legislation, and the power of the president must be restricted. Nor only must the government be restructured, but the people must also grow accustomed to a new way of life. Education must be emphasized, as it is needed to help prepare people for devolution of legislative authority and democratic rule. The press can also be used as an educational medium. Ideally, an "educational revolution" would be needed, as this would increase productivity. A better-educated society would be more sufficiently pn~ared to be more productive economically, than a poorly educated and largely illiterate society. Education would lead to greater political access for greater numbers of people.
In addition to educating the people, one would need to put an end to corruption, which is so inherent in everyday life in the Congo. Corruption exists not only at all levels of the government, but at all levels of society. Bribery, embezzlement and theft, all much too common and too easily accepted in the Congo, must be terminated if there is ever to be stability within the nation.
Corruption has become a fact of life and an important feature of the political landscape of many African countries. The bribe, known in West Africa as "dash" or "speed", is in some nations a necessary part of every official transaction, from obtaining a driver's license or a passport to enrolling a child in school. (ibid. p.45)
The above quote summarizes perfectly the view of bribes in the Congo. They are not regarded as immoral or harmful, but are merely the oil that gets the wheel turning.
The steps toward a more democratic and peaceful Congo are steep and numerous. In order to reach their goal, reforms must be made from the bottom up; unions, cooperatives and associations should be developed. The country should utilize and maximize the tactors of production, which are most abundant, such as land, labor, and natural resources for example. Appropriate and affordable technologies should be used to aid in the development of the nation. The Congo would also have to look to the foreign nations for assistance. In order for foreign aid programs to succeed, they necessitate complete restructuring. The current aid programs are not directed to the people who are in true need of it. The misdirection of the programs has led to the money being funneled into the pockets of officials as opposed to the starving, sick civilians.
The conflict between authoritarian patrimonialism and democracy must be resolved if there is ever to be withstanding political and economic developments in the Congo. Political stability is indispensable for development to occur. Corruption must be ended and the workers must be motivated to work without "matabish" (payment given to get something done - a bribe). To stop the declining economy, the smuggling of the Congo's most valuable natural resource, diamonds, must be stopped. The potential for wealth and success in the Congo is great, but lies within the nation's ability to resist and oppose their rapid descent down the slippery slope. The Congolese must gradually ascend the ladder towards development by starting at the very bottom and preparing themselves for their ultimate goal - democracy, peace and economic growth. This goal is dependent on the government, as political change is the key to economic development.
END NOTES
B Area Handbook for the Republic of Congo (Leopoldville) Foreign Areas Studies
Division, Special Operations Research Office. (The American University, Washington
16, D.C. June 1962). p6.
B Anstey, Roger. King Leopold's Legacy. (London, University Press, 1966), p60.
B ibid, p68
[1 ibid, p78.
B Testimony of Congo villagers interviewed by Consul Casement, 1893.
B Cornevin, Robert. Histoire du Congo: Des Origines PrehistoriquesA La Republique
Democratique du Congo. (Paris, Editions Berger-Levrault, 1970), P132.
B Anstey. King Leopold's Legacy. p78.
B ibid, p43
B Smith & Merrill & Med itz, Zaire. A Country Study, pl 12.
B Kaib, Madeleine. The Congo Cables, Macmillan Press, New York, 1982. p. xxi.
B King Baudoum's independence day speech.
B Young, Crawford. Politics In The Congo: Decolonization And Independence
(Princeton: Princeton University Press)
B Leslie, Zaire, p18.
B Ibid, p20.
Blbid,p22.
B Ibid, p23.
B Smith & Merrill & Meditz, Zaire. A Country Study, p32.
Blbid,p38.
B Ibid, p288.
B Ibid, p32.
B Area Handbook for the Republic of Congo (Leopoldville), Foreign Areas Studies
Division, Special Operations Research Office. (The American University, Washington 16, D.C. June 1962). p 13.
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