Questions on the first three Meditations (all references to Anscombe 
& Geach).  Be prepared to discuss them in sections this coming week 
(Nov. 24)-or else write short answers to them.

1.  What is the difference between the skeptical argument based on 
the possibility of dreaming (pp. 62-3) and that based on the 
possibility of a deceptive god or "evil spirit" (pp. 63-4)?  Which 
putative truths are cast into doubt, respectively, by the two 
different arguments?

2.  Explain the unique place of the cogito-the "I think" and "I 
exist"-as an Archimedean point supposedly invulnerable to all 
possible skeptical doubts (pp. 66-7).

3.  How does it follow from the cogito (question 2) that my essence 
or nature is to be a thinking or conscious being (res cogitans) (pp. 
67-71)?

4.  Explain the argument concluding that "even bodies are not really 
perceived by the senses . . . , but by the intellect" (p. 75) on pp. 
71-5.  What is the connection of this argument with Descartes's view 
that the essence of matter is extension (pp. 199-221 of the 
Principles)?

5.  What does Descartes mean by "clear and distinct perception" and 
by the principle that "whatever I perceive very clearly and 
distinctly is true" (p. 76)?  How does the possibility of a deceptive 
god (question 1) affect this principle (pp. 77-8)?

6.  Explain the distinction between "inherent reality" and 
"representative reality" on pp. 80-2.  What does Descartes mean by 
the principle that "the specific representative reality comprised in 
my idea must be got from a cause possessing at least the same degree 
of inherent reality as the idea has of representative reality" (p. 
82)?

7.  How does Descartes deploy the distinction and the principle of 
question 6 in his argument for the existence of God on pp. 82-91?

8.  Is there a fatal circularity in this argument for the existence 
of God (question 7)?-namely, Descartes seems to require that God 
exists and is no deceiver to conclude that "whatever I perceive very 
clearly and distinctly is true" (question 5), but the argument for 
the existence of God itself seems to assume that some "clear and 
distinct perceptions" are already true-e.g., the principle mentioned 
in question 6.