Pipelines and Party Switching:
Resource Control and Legislator Strategies in Brazil and Japan

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Abstract

What shapes politician strategies in political systems where pork, rather than programmatic platforms, wins elections? In this paper we explore the impact of decentralization on legislators' party affiliation strategies in pork-oriented systems, focusing on patterns of party-switching. Leveraging new data from almost fifty subnational legislatures, we find that in decentralized Brazil, both national and subnational politicians are oriented toward subnational political coalitions. In contrast, in centralized Japan, politicians at both national and subnational levels switched parties in response to national-level coalition politics. A key implication of our findings is that decentralized control has reinforced the fragmentation of the Brazilian party system, and centralized control in Japan has reinforced single-party dominance.
What shapes politician strategies in political systems where pork, rather than programmatic platforms, determines electoral outcomes? While most research focuses on spatial electoral competition, in many countries pork distribution is at least as important to candidate and party electoral success. The dominance of pork-barrel politics is a defining feature of a number of both established democracies and, more frequently, new democracies. Constitutional engineers spend considerable energy attempting to develop appropriate institutions in these new democracies. But if their efforts are based on purely spatial theories, they may lead to unanticipated — potentially unpleasant — outcomes.

By definition, in pork-oriented systems it is important for politicians to deliver private and local club goods to their constituents. As a result, those who control resources have substantial influence over numerous actors. In this way, the institutions that assign control over state resources are likely to shape power relations and the incentives that drive political behavior throughout the system, and different patterns of resource control ought to lead politicians to pursue different electoral strategies. In particular, politicians ought to make special effort to align themselves with those who provide access to state resources.

Focusing attention on pork-oriented systems and variation within them is an important step in the construction of general models of democratic politics. It is today common to apply U.S.-derived models and methods, founded on assumptions of spatial politics and programmatic voters, to other contexts. However, their blunt application, without any adaptation, to the diversity of democracies is unlikely to yield wholly useful insights. The challenge today is to leverage global diversity to turn assumptions about single cases into explanatory factors that vary across countries with the goal of constructing more general theories about democracy.

Our paper illustrates this approach. We compare legislative politics in Brazil and Japan. These cases share many similar features, including a strong pork barrel orientation, but differ in
patterns of resource control. In Brazil, pork allocation is significantly decentralized, while in Japan it is highly centralized. To study the influence of these institutions, we examine patterns of party affiliation and switching by both national and subnational legislators.

We find that in Brazil, party switchers in both the national and subnational legislatures align with the parties in their state that control public resources. In contrast in Japan, subnational and national legislators focus exclusively on national-level coalition politics when making party affiliation decisions. These findings show how the locus of resource control in pork-oriented systems shapes the larger party system. A key implication is that decentralized control has reinforced the fragmented nature of the Brazilian party system, and centralized control in Japan has reinforced single-party dominance.

**Decentralization and Centralization**

Mainstream political science work on party and candidate strategy tends to work from the Downsian spatial modeling tradition, considering the policy choices parties and candidates make relative to one another and how these choices affect the likelihood of victory (see, e.g., Adams, Merrill III, and Grofman (2005), Downs (1957)). Of course politicians and parties do not merely act within a vacuum, but, rather, institutions shape their strategies, with, for example, different electoral rules pushing them to take different positions within policy space (e.g., Cox (1987; 1990)). However, to our knowledge, there is no systematic comparative analysis that explicitly addresses the issue of politician strategy within heavily pork-oriented systems. Analyses tend to focus on explaining the strategy to pursue one politician-voter linkage strategy — programmatic or non-programmatic — rather than another (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007b), or are based on single country studies with comparative work based on secondary sources (e.g., Scheiner 2006).

The relative lack of systematic work on the topic is probably due in part to measurement
difficulties: Building hospitals and schools may be part of programmatic priorities, such as improving the health and education levels of citizens or they may be part of a pork-oriented targeted campaign to line the pockets of local construction companies that support particular politicians or parties. However, it is not clear how one might demonstrate this distinction quantitatively, with systematic cross-national applications. As a result, there is no metric to identify systematically different systems as more one form of politician-voter linkage than another (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007a).

Nevertheless, recent important work makes clear that studying politics systematically within non-programmatic systems is important and can be done without using quantitative measures of politician-voter linkage. To be sure, no system is entirely pork-oriented or programmatic; elements of each co-exist in most political systems. But various work, such as the contributions to the (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007b) and Piattoni (2001) volumes, is able to place different polities and parties into programmatic and non-programmatic conceptual boxes by means of qualitative analyses of their most pervasive practices. Following this convention, we conceptually distinguish between pork-oriented and programmatic politics and use evaluations drawn from in-depth qualitative analyses to justify our cases.

We classify political systems according to the political goods required to win election or career advancement. In pork-driven systems, elections are won or lost primarily on the ability of parties or candidates to deliver government resources in the form of private goods (such as jobs) that are targeted to specific individuals and local public goods or club goods (such as infrastructure projects) that are delivered to targeted groups and regions. In programmatic systems, elections are won or lost primarily on the policy positions that actors promise to defend while in office.

Where pork is an important part of electoral competition, legislators face substantial
pressure to deliver resources to core constituents. But state goods are not free. Legislators must trade something of value to obtain them. The most valuable tradeable good is their influence over the passage of bills, via the legislative process, including committee work, roll-call votes, and coalition membership. The idea that legislators would trade this influence for access to resources is hardly novel, but with whom do they bargain?

The answer depends on the rules that determine who has discretion over spending, and, we argue, the most important distinction in rules is between systems that centralize and decentralize control over governmental resources. Differences in the level of centralized control over resources ought to lead systematically to different strategies that legislators will pursue to gain access to these resources. In systems that centralize funding, legislators - whether at the national or local level - have strong incentives to bargain with actors that control resources at the national level. This is particularly the case in systems where national ruling parties withhold funds from individuals, organizations and regions that do not support them. Indeed, analyses of specific centralized systems – Chile (Valenzuela 1977), Italy (Hine 1993), Mexico (Diaz-Cayeros, Magalon, and Weingast 2000), and Japan (Curtis 1971, Scheiner 2005; 2006) – suggest that local candidates and/or voters in centralized systems often affiliate with a national government party to have a better chance of gaining central funding.

In other words, when pork resources are strongly centralized, party hierarchies should thus be similarly “verticalized.” For example, writing about Japan, Scheiner (2005; 2006) highlights the prominence of patron-client relationships developed between local politicians and national ones who act as distributive “pipelines” from the center to the locality. There are clear advantages to this arrangement for both local and national legislators. For local legislators, vertical networks deliver pork from the central government. Meanwhile, for national legislators, vertical networks consolidate local political supporters who help mobilize votes at election time.
Such vertical networks have been critical to national level legislator and general party success in centralized pork-based countries such as Italy, Japan, and Mexico (Ames 1994, 95).

However, whereas the framework discussed in the previous paragraph might be termed a centralized pipeline, other heavily pork-oriented systems also maintain decentralized pipelines. At the extreme, all pork could theoretically be distributed by decentralized actors. Practically, however, no political systems have complete decentralization. Instead, national and subnational actors share pork discretion. In these systems, party hierarchies are complex. Legislators in such contexts potentially face multiple pipelines, where both national and subnational actors control career-advancing resources. To the extent possible, legislators’ focus should be on pleasing both constituencies, and maximizing access to pork. When impossible, legislators should respond to the actor with whom they have the most negotiating power and can extract the most pork (and who can most punish them for withholding their support).

Of course, not just any resource decentralization will restructure politics. The key variable is decentralized discretion. In many political systems, local governments receive major revenue transfers from the national government, but these transfers are often accompanied by tight spending constraints. In such cases, pork is not a political tool of influence. But where politicians maintain budgetary discretion, we expect spending to be politicized and affect both voter and politician decisions to affiliate with specific parties.

**Party Switching**

The importance of negotiating with those who control state resources should affect many aspects of political parties, including voter orientations, roll-call votes, and policy foci, but we focus on a dependent variable, party-switching, that offers a number of advantages over the others. Although less-studied and less-frequent than other elements of legislative behavior,
party-switching is in many ways the best measure for understanding the structure, organization, and roles that parties play in legislators’ careers.

In systems where there is no switching, scholars have no direct measures of legislator preferences, and have to rely on indirect measures that are more common in the literature, but are also potentially problematic. These indirect measures are less comparable across and within countries, and are noisy measures of subtle concepts. For example, legislative roll-call votes reflect the legislators’ ideology, constituency pressures, party pressures, and complex bargains between all these actors (Kingdon 1973). Agenda control can dramatically reduce the space of observed roll-call votes, and may bias measures of ideal points, party cohesion, and roll-rates (Hug 2006). Cross-legislature differences in legislative agendas make comparative roll call analysis problematic. Some systems have norms of roll-call votes on all bills, others only record votes on very controversial legislation, and others only vote on consensual bills. Such differences make cross-system comparisons of questionable utility (Desposato 2006b). Moreover, in parliamentary systems like Japan’s, it is rare that legislators cast anything but party-line votes. As a result, in general studying legislators’ votes in parliamentary systems teaches us little about the incentives affecting individual politicians. In contrast, party switching provides a window into legislators’ calculus and core priorities for career advancement, as well as helping us identify the roles parties play in such advancement.

The cases we use to test our hypotheses, Brazil and Japan, are among countries that have seen bouts of party-switching. Both fit the profile of political systems where the costs to switching are relatively low and the payoffs potentially high. Previous work has found that two variables are especially important in predicting switching rates across countries. The first is the transaction cost associated with a switch - the damage done to career prospects by switching party. Transaction costs are typically high, and switching very rare, where voter partisanship is
widespread, or where there are legal restrictions on switching. Second, switching is also less-frequent where parties control valuable electoral commodities such as high positions on closed-list proportional representation lists. Similarly, where legislative leadership positions, including committee assignments, are valuable and tightly controlled by the majority party, switchers will need to pre-negotiate their assignments or risk losing their seniority status. (See Desposato (2006a) for a more thorough discussion of these dynamics.)

Frequent party-switching is often erroneously seen as a sign that “parties don’t matter” and that parties are irrelevant to politicians, when in fact switching indicates the opposite. If parties had no relevance for political careers, politicians would not bother to switch. In personalistic systems, parties usually play smaller roles in campaigns and elections, but are still relevant in government. Party coalitions organize the legislative agenda and prevent cycling and instability brought on by individual agents. Even where party switching is common, parties add, at least in the short term, greater organizational stability and certainty to the policy-bargaining process. For example, Brazil may be called the “anti-party system,” but every president since democratization has sought to build a multi-party coalition instead of building coalitions of individuals. These coalitions provide a fairly reliable and disciplined legislative ally, and explain why President Cardoso was so successful in passing his legislative agenda (Figueiredo and Limongi 1999, Cox and Amorim Neto 2003). Switching can benefit parties and the president. For the president, a larger coalition makes it easier to get his proposals through Congress while avoiding bothersome legislative audits and inquiries. For parties, more members mean more legislative power (committee seats and other offices are distributed among all parties based on size) and more bargaining power with the president. Ultimately, even in personalistic systems, parties and party coalitions dramatically increase legislative efficiency and effectiveness, and politicians are not unaware of these benefits.
Comparing Brazil and Japan: Similarities, Differences, and Hypotheses

We test our argument by examining the dynamics of legislative party-switching in Brazil and Japan, two countries with similar political systems, but that differ on our principal explanatory variable: the locus of discretionary control over resources. Resource control in Brazil is decentralized, whereas it is highly centralized in Japan.

Both countries have highly personalistic electoral systems where pork has long played a well-documented and important role in political success. These are well-documented features of Brazilian politics (Leal 1977, Mainwaring 1999): Among Brazil’s strongest parties, only one — the more programmatic and leftist Worker’s Party — attracts a partisan base and only ten percent of voters express a preference for one the remaining parties (Samuels 2006). Further, many “partisans” are really personal partisans - their identity is linked to individual patrons, not to specific parties. Consequently, it is important for many legislators to take actions - such as delivering private and local club goods - that allow them to personally claim credit with voters; and the importance of government resource delivery for career advancement means that Brazilian legislators prioritize access to pork (Ames 2001, Mainwaring 1999). Typical local public goods for which deputies claim credit include soccer fields, health posts, schools, and road improvements. Legislators have also been known to deliver private goods, such as cash, hats, soccer balls, baskets of food, and even drivers’ licenses. Moreover, government jobs can be distributed to key constituents and supporters and construction contracts can generate kickbacks and campaign contributions. As Ames writes about Brazil, “pork buys deputies” (Ames 1995, 339).

The literature characterizes Japan in similar terms. In a recent wide-ranging analysis of voting behavior around the world, Japan ranked fourth lowest among advanced industrial established democracies (and in the bottom third overall) in terms of the proportion of voters who list themselves as partisans (Norris 2004). Politics in Japan are typically highly personalized,
in large part because of the electoral systems utilized. Pork plays a major part in Japan, where gaining access to government funds is critical to politician success (Scheiner 2006). Public works spending — a central feature of Japanese pork — is roughly three to four times the percentage of GDP seen in other advanced industrial economies (Ogawa 2004; Seaman 2003). And, ultimately, as Fukui and Fukai (1996) write, “Japanese voters are mobilized at election time mainly by the lure of pork barrel, only marginally by policy issues, and even less by ideals and visions” (268-9).

In both cases, part of the explanation for low partisanship is the highly personalistic electoral rules. Both countries use legislative electoral systems that encourage candidates to cultivate a personal vote and that may promote substantial intra-party competition. Brazil uses an open-list proportional (OLPR) representation system, with high district magnitude, for every legislative election from city council to national Chamber (the Senate is the only exception using a combination of SMD and MMD). During the period studied, Japan’s House of Representatives (HR) used a similarly personalistic system: the single nontransferable vote in multi-member district system (SNTV/MMD). Both systems have been identified as promoting personal, not partisan, politics (Carey and Shugart 1995).

Like all countries, Brazil and Japan are not completely devoid of programmatic politics. In Brazil, some parties run on issues (such as the death penalty or security), but these parties tend to be very small and unsuccessful. There is also variance in the appeal of pork across regions, with pork strongest in the poorest areas. But most actors prefer pork distribution when they can get it. For example, the Worker’s Party ran on ideological platforms while in the opposition, but once in power, with access to resources, it has adopted distributive support-building strategies as well. In Japan, many voters, parties, and candidates care much less about pork. Pork is less of a concern in more urban areas and even some members of the longtime ruling party care particularly strongly about programmatic issues. Most notably, the opposition, especially the
Socialist and Communist parties have placed great emphasis on protecting Japan’s constitutional ban on the military and pushed ideas such as the dictatorship of the proletariat. All that said, even the Socialists have long been supportive of clientelistic spending if it could benefit them and their constituents (Otake 2000) and, once in national government briefly in the mid-1990s, they were expected by local constituents to help act as a distributive pork pipeline.

Both countries have governmental jurisdiction divided between national and subnational elected authorities, creating a natural comparison between national and subnational politics. Brazil is divided into 26 states and a federal district, each with an elected governor and elected unicameral legislature. Japan is divided into 47 prefectures, also with separately elected governors and legislatures.

A fundamental difference between the two countries is the extent of resource decentralization. In Japan, resource distribution decisions are highly centralized, with the greater part of control in the hands of the national government. In Brazil, both national and subnational governments have substantial resource discretion. The net result is that ambitious legislators in Japan - at all levels - must look to national sources of distributable goods, while Brazilian legislators may bargain with national or local budgetary powers. This institutional variance creates very different behavioral incentives.

Brazil

In Brazil, budgetary discretion is concentrated in the hands of the executive at each level of government (Schneider 2001). Consequently, legislators who wish to deliver jobs, development projects, and lucrative government contracts to waiting constituents must negotiate with the executive branch. Most commonly, the legislator’s side of the bargain involves trading legislative support for the executive’s agenda. In this way, executives construct legislative majority
coalitions, sometimes on an individual vote-by-vote basis, but more frequently by building party
coalitions. Support implies roll-call votes supporting the executive’s programs and often switching
into the executive’s party or another party in the governing coalition. Opposition party legislators
can expect difficulty obtaining public works projects, do not receive political appointments, and
may not even be able to schedule a meeting with public works officials. Legislators report that,
“in the opposition, you can’t get anything done” (Desposato 2001). These dynamics are well
documented in legislative-executive relations at both the state and national levels (see, e.g.,

The practice of these bargains, however, is different for Brazilian national and subnational
legislators. For subnational legislators, the subnational executive branch — often a mayor, but,
more powerfully, the governor — is the only reliable source of pork. Subnational legislators have
little or nothing to trade with presidents. Consequently, for subnational legislators, the state
governor is the dominant player. Ambitious state legislators should therefore focus exclusively on
bargaining with the governor, ignoring national-level politics.

For national legislators, the game is more complex. The president is a major source of
distributable goods, but governors control access to state ministerial jobs and resources that
national legislators covet. National legislators therefore also negotiate with state level executives.
These incentives are reflected in, and exacerbated by, patterns of progressive ambition, most
notably the non-linear career paths of many Brazilian politicians: National politicians frequently
leave national legislative offices to pursue opportunities for subnational level office (Samuels 2003).
These positions enhance their visibility and give them access to part of the state’s machine.
De facto discretion over Japanese governmental finances has long been centralized. Although funds are spent locally in Japan, control and discretion are highly centralized, and Japanese local governments’ ability to raise their own revenue has traditionally been limited. The central government regulates local taxes very strictly, even compared to other unitary systems (Reed 1986, 27-9). To be sure, prefectural governors have some discretion over pork and spending, but most political resources come from the center. Central government subsidies are typically granted at the central government’s discretion to cover projects beyond “need-based” ones (Ishihara 1986; Yonehara 1986), so the central government can push its own priorities at the local level.

Practically, this means that access to resources requires being part of the national ruling party (or coalition), which for most of the postwar period has been the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The LDP does not always use its budget control politically, but many localities and politicians have good reason to believe that the party might punish them by withholding funds if they do not behave as the LDP central government wishes. In elections, the LDP is often quick to note that electoral support for other parties will lead to a cut in subsidies (see, e.g., Scheiner 2003; Asahi Shinbun March 6, 2002) and it is widely believed that the LDP is more likely to reward financially regions that support it with votes (see, e.g., Fukui and Fukai 1996; Igarashi and Ogawa 1997). One of the biggest reasons for this belief is the consensus view that to get subsidies, “local governments have to lobby either directly or through politicians (usually… [LDP] Diet members from the local district)” (Akizuki 1955, 354).

The importance of ties to the central government’s purse strings is even greater for local politicians than national politicians. Subnational politicians’ principal function is to provide goods to the district. Because prefectures and governors have traditionally had much less power than the central government, subnational level legislators need to look more to national
politicians in order to get funds allocated and thereby earn reelection. Subnational Japanese politicians therefore align with national politicians from their district who can connect them with the government and key bureaucratic ministries (Park 1998, 209).

More specifically, many subnational politicians — especially at the prefectural assembly level — become part of a national member’s electoral keiretsu (Fukui and Fukai 1996), or, as we refer to it here, a centralized pipeline. Within these patron-client relationships, subnational politicians act as vote mobilization machines, getting their constituents to vote for their national patron. In exchange, the national politician bestows upon his clients pork, a reputation for having clout at the national level, and, therefore, a greater chance of reelection (Fukui and Fukai 1996, 280-1; Kataoka, 1997, 208). Implicating the centralized pork distribution system in shaping these national politician-local politician pipelines is the fact that members of traditional opposition parties in Japan do not typically have such tight relationships. These pipelines tend to be tied to the pork center of Japan, the LDP-controlled central government.

Hypotheses

The logic of our discussion implies four empirical patterns for party defections that vary according to the level of government — whether national or subnational — and the level of centralization of discretionary spending power.

In Brazil, pork operates through multiple pipelines. For national politicians, it works through both centralized and decentralized pipelines. And for subnational politicians, it operates through decentralized pipelines. Therefore, Brazilian national politicians ought to orient their party affiliation patterns around both central and local governmental alliances and resource control. In switching parties, they are likely to consider the parties of the coalition tied to the nation’s president and their state’s governor, positions that most fully control the resources they
seek to obtain. On the other hand, subnational legislators effectively have no resources that they can use to negotiate with the president. Consequently, Brazilian subnational politicians should be oriented toward local political alliances and switch parties to affiliate with the party (or parties) controlling state level resources. Their primary political currencies - roll-call votes and party coalitions in the state legislature - are only valuable in state politics.

In contrast, in Japan pork operates through a *centralized pipeline*, and, therefore, if our argument is correct, both national and subnational politicians in Japan should orient their party affiliation patterns around national alliances and resource control. All else equal, they will only switch parties when it enhances (or does not harm) their capacity to gain central resources. When they switch parties, they ought to switch to those that control these central resources. More concretely, in Japan national politicians who prioritize pork should switch parties only if it does not cost them their place in the government with access to national state resources. Subnational politicians should only switch parties if their national patron – their point of access to national state resources – does so.

**Evidence**

We test our hypotheses using new data on party affiliations in Brazil and Japan. We treat party membership as a strategic career decision - parties being used as vehicles to facilitate political careers (Aldrich 1995). Legislator $i$ chooses to affiliate with party $j$ if that party maximizes her utility:

$$ U_j = \text{Max}(U_1, \ldots, U_n) $$

If $j$ is her current party, she stays put. If $j$ is a different party, she switches. The utility that a party $j$ offers to a legislator $i$ is a function of the resources a party can offer a legislator, which vary with political context, a legislator’s own characteristics, and less a transaction cost if she
switches party:

\[ U_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times \text{National Pork} + \beta_2 \times \text{Subnational Pork} + \beta_3 \times \text{Controls} + \beta_4 \times I_{\text{Switch}} + \epsilon_{ij} \]

The variables measure characteristics of the parties and individual legislators, and the parameters determine how these characteristics make parties more or less attractive. If we assume \( \epsilon_{ij} \) are independent and identically distributed extreme value, this leads directly to the conditional or mixed logit model, where agents choose between multiple options as a function of choice attributes and their own characteristics (McFadden 1973, Long 1997). Previous work on party-switching has used this method to study switching in Brazil and the European Parliament (Desposato 2006a, McElroy 2003).

Our theory predicts for Japan national pork access will affect party affiliation decisions for both subnational and national actors \( (\beta_1 > 0) \) and subnational pork access will not affect any legislators \( (\beta_2 = 0) \). For Brazil, we expect both national and subnational coalition politics to affect national legislators \( (\beta_1 > 0, \beta_2 > 0) \), and only subnational party arrangements to influence local legislators \( (\beta_1 = 0, \beta_2 > 0) \).

We construct models and datasets that are as similar as possible, but there are some differences that reflect the specific context of each case, as well as data availability. For example, presidentialism in Brazil allows us to include an indicator for presidential coalition in our analysis of party switching in that country, whereas we can not do so in the parliamentary Japanese case. In addition, in Brazil, legislators left and joined almost every one of over twenty parties, creating substantial variance in the choice set. In the period studied in Japan (1993-1994), all defectors came from the LDP and joined one of two new parties or became independents (the new parties and new independents joined the new national government); all non-LDP legislators stayed put. For this reason, our data sets at both the national and subnational level for Japan are made up only of all LDP legislators. We do not include the traditional opposition parties, as the model fits
them perfectly. After the realignment, the traditional opposition parties (except for the Communist Party) formed a new government coalition, and all (former) opposition legislators remained in their parties and gained greater access to pork. If anything excluding them provides a harder test for our model, and including them would only increase the significance of our results.

The datasets differ slightly in operationalization. In Brazil, presidential coalitions changed more than ten times during the period studied (1991-1998), so we analyze each cabinet period separately. In Japan, there was only one realignment, so the data are analyzed as a single period. In addition, the variables naturally differ in response to different contexts - different electoral rules, for example, lead to different measures of electoral strength. Consequently, we discuss operationalization and results separately for each country.

The models include two kinds of explanatory variables. Some are characteristics of parties - variables that determine whether a particular party is an attractive target for a switcher. Other variables help determine a baseline propensity to switch at all. For all analyses, we include a variable that we call Switch, a dummy variable coded 0 for a legislator’s current party, and 1 for all other parties. Effectively, this is an intercept-like term that measures a baseline propensity to switch party. Most of our variables measure characteristics of parties - what they offer members. But we also include some individual characteristics of legislators that the literature suggests affect a baseline propensity to switch. We interact these variables with Switch, and denote each of these variables by placing an asterisk (*) at the end of its name. Each of these interaction terms indicates the impact of the variable on the legislator’s likelihood of switching parties. This approach is a typical use of conditional logit, discussed in Long (1997)

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National and Subnational Level Party Switching in Brazil

For Brazil, we collected data on party switching by all legislators from the national Chamber of Deputies and from the State Assemblies of Bahia and São Paulo, from 1991 to 1998. Unfortunately, switching data from state assemblies is extremely difficult to obtain, and often poorly documented, restricting our sample to these two subnational legislatures. However, these cases are two of Brazil’s largest and most important states: Each is geographically larger than most countries, and their combined population is over fifty million. Further, the two states capture much of Brazil’s economic, cultural, and political diversity, with all major social sectors present and active in politics.

For both the national and subnational legislators, we examine two core variables: First, we create President’s Coalition, a dummy variable coded 1 for parties forming part of a president’s coalition, and 0 otherwise. Only national legislators should prioritize national coalition politics, so this variable should have a positive coefficient only for the national Chamber of Deputies. Second, we include Governor’s Coalition, a dummy variable coded 1 for parties forming part of a governor’s electoral coalition, and 0 for other parties. Both national and state legislators should prefer switching into the state ruling coalition, giving this variable a positive coefficient.

Drawing on previous work on switching in Brazil, we also include a number of control variables: First, we compute Electoral Strength, an indicator variable coded 1 if the legislator would have been elected in party $j$, and 0 otherwise (see Desposato (2006a)). This variable assesses a legislator’s chances for electoral success in a new party, given the strength of the party list and its candidates. Open-list proportional representation results in different electoral thresholds for each party. For example, thresholds may be lowered by celebrity candidates that draw surplus votes. Legislators should avoid difficult-to-win parties, and should switch to parties where election is easier, giving this variable a negative coefficient. Second, we include Ideological
Distance, a simple categorical variable measuring the absolute distance between a legislator’s current party and possible destination party, where parties are coded 0 for left, 1 for center, and 2 for right. (For more on the use of this variable in the study of Brazilian politics, see Brown, Brown, and Desposato (2002).) If legislators use parties for any ideological purposes, switching should be constrained to “close” parties, giving this variable a negative coefficient. Third, we include PRN, a dummy variable coded 1 for the National Renewal Party (PRN) and 0 otherwise. President Collor, who founded the PRN, was forced to resign amid corruption allegations in 1992. The stigma of that event made the PRN a party to avoid. This variable should have a negative coefficient.⁴

We interact two measures with Switch to see how they affect legislators likelihood of leaving their party. Terms* captures the impact of experience on switching. We predict that more senior legislators — those that have served more terms in office — will be more likely to stay put than political novices, implying a negative coefficient. Rural* measures how rural a legislator’s constituency is. We predict that more rural legislators are more likely to switch, as pork is more important in less-developed areas (see Desposato (2001)).

Table 1 shows results from estimating our models of party membership for national and subnational legislators. Both sets of results confirm our hypotheses. For state legislators, state coalitions figure prominently in party affiliation decisions - the coefficient is consistently positive and significant. Also as expected, national pork coalitions have no impact on state party affiliation decisions. In Model 1, the coefficient actually has a negative and significant sign - suggesting that state legislators avoid national pork coalitions. However, this result is driven by a disagreement within the Liberal Front Party of Sao Paulo, which happened to be part of the governing coalition. Dropping this one party from the choice set in Sao Paulo eliminates the
negative coefficient (Model 2). Also as expected, for national legislators, both gubernatorial and national coalitions are important. Brazilian national legislators pay attention to both national and subnational coalition politics when choosing between parties (Model 3).

Our main variables are also substantively significant. For example, a member of a state assembly, choosing between parties that are identical except that one is in the state’s governing coalition and one is not, is more than twice as likely to switch to the party in the ruling coalition than in the opposition \( p_{Gov.} = .68 \) versus \( p_{Opp.} = .32 \). The make up of governors’ governing coalitions also appears to affect national legislators’ party switching decisions: A national legislator choosing between two otherwise identical parties picks a party in the governor’s coalition almost three-fifths of the time \( p = .58 \) and an opposition party two-fifths of the time \( p = .42 \). National level politics have no impact on state legislators’ behavior, but do shape the strategies of federal deputies. When choosing between two identical parties that differ only in that one is in the president’s coalition and the other is not, national legislators are two and a half times more likely to choose the ruling party than the opposition party \( p = .71 \) versus \( p = .29 \).\(^5\)

The strong impact of national (president’s) coalitions deserves additional comment. Although Brazil is heavily decentralized, national politics and coalitions still matter. Indeed, for national legislators, presidential coalitions are more powerful predictors of behavior than are gubernatorial coalitions. We would have expected only gubernatorial politics to shape behavior only if presidents were essentially powerless and politics were completely decentralized.

The control variables in Brazil are almost all significant with expected signs. Switchers avoid ideologically distant parties (negative coefficient for Ideological Distance), and all else equal, prefer to stay in their current party (negative coefficient for Switch). Deputies from more rural areas are more likely to switch party, and after the scandals associated with the PRN, deputies avoid that party. Several results were unexpected. The estimated coefficient for Terms* was
negative, as predicted: more senior legislators are less likely to switch party. This result was only significant, however, for the national Chamber of Deputies. Nonsignificance at the local level might reflect the smaller sample size, or the state legislature may be less professionalized with many members aspiring to higher posts.

Together, these results confirm our hypotheses: Gubernatorial coalition politics have an impact on party affiliation strategies at both the state and national level, as expected given Brazil’s decentralization of resources. National coalition politics have a significant impact on national legislators’ behavior, but not on subnational politics. Moreover, to further test the robustness of our findings for Brazil, we ran our models on the choice of party that switchers moved to in a larger number of states, and the results demonstrated the same patterns.

**Party Switching in Japan**

Party switching ought to be rarer in Japan, where one party held a lock on access to pork for decades. However, in 1993, angry over the LDP government’s inability to enact electoral reform, nearly four dozen members of the ruling party helped pass a no-confidence motion against the government. The defectors, along with other reformers, then formed new parties (with a small group also becoming independents) and joined the opposition in a coalition government that excluded the LDP. At the same time, local politicians also switched parties, mirroring the patterns at the national level.

**National Party Switching**

We cannot tell the story as systematically for Japanese national politicians as we do for all of our other cases, but it seems clear that the ability to maintain access to national governmental resources played a central part in Japanese national politicians’ decisions to switch parties.
Except for one minor exception (six switchers in 1976), there were no cases of defection from the LDP until 1993 – national legislators avoided switching when leaving the LDP threatened their access to pork. Popular anger with the LDP grew in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but even then party switching only occurred when there was a group of defectors sufficiently large — 20 percent of the party’s members — that it could determine who would make up the next government and, in either case therefore, maintain access to national governmental pork.\textsuperscript{6}

We can find no evidence that a desire to align with subnational level resource brokers played a role in national legislators’ decision to switch parties: We examine national level party switching using the same data as Reed and Scheiner (2003), who previously analyzed the LDP split.\textsuperscript{7} Unlike previous analyses, we model legislators’ choice of party, not just the binary decision to switch or not. In addition, we include indicators of local ruling coalitions to demonstrate how, unlike in Brazil, subnational politics have no impact on national parties. To measure potential subnational influences on national party affiliation, we include two core variables: \textit{Governor’s Coalition} identifies the party of the prefectural governor for each legislator. \textit{LDP Share of Subnational Legislature*} measures LDP dominance of the prefectural assembly. Our theory predicts that the coefficients on these variables should be zero. The results of the model are consistent with our prediction - neither \textit{Governor’s Coalition} nor \textit{LDP Share of Subnational Legislature*} has a statistically significant effect (see the second column of Table 2).

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In short, national data from Japan are consistent with our hypotheses. There is no evidence that subnational politics shaped party switching by national legislators. However, continued pork access at the national level appears to have been a prerequisite to migration away from the LDP, and later helped drive moves back to the longtime ruling party.
Subnational Party Switching

Our theory predicts that subnational switching should follow national level patterns, without regard for local politics. One implication is that during the long period of LDP dominance, there should have been little or no party-switching, regardless of changes in the party of the subnational governor, or the local legislative majority. Indeed, looking at a data set of all prefectural assembly legislators in Japan between 1987 and 1992, we find no cases of LDP members leaving the LDP to join another party (although some became LDP-affiliated independents). Leaving the LDP would cut off their primary pipeline to the center.

In the 1990s, however, the defection of many members from the LDP at the national Diet level left subnational politicians with a difficult choice to make. The LDP has typically dominated subnational politics — controlling or acting in a coalition in most governorships and holding majorities in most prefectural assemblies. At the same time, the national pipeline source for many subnational LDP members switched away from the LDP to a new party that under the new national coalition government maintained control over national pork. We have argued that for local politicians, it was in their interest to consider shifting with their national level patron because he provided their main tie to the central government.

National party switching was followed by subnational switching that followed the same trends. When the LDP split in 1993-94, HR members left the party to join two small parties, Shinsei and Sakigake, and a small number simply became independents. After the summer 1993 elections, these defectors joined with the former opposition to create an anti-LDP coalition government. These defections were mirrored at the subnational level, though with less overall switching. Whereas more than 15 percent of LDP Diet members joined Shinsei and nearly 4 percent joined Sakigake, only 5 and .5 percent, respectively, of roughly 1,600 LDP prefectural assembly members did.
It is impossible to determine precisely each patron-client relationship, but we can safely assume that most are founded first and foremost on shared geography: That is, local politician clients will tend to represent electoral districts that overlap at least somewhat with the electoral districts of their national level patron. We use this intuition to code our principal independent variable, *Pipeline Switch*. This is an indicator variable coded 1 if a national legislator from the same district as the subnational legislator switched to party $j$. If the national legislator, the national pipeline source for pork, switches to a different party, the prefectural assembly client should switch to the same party. In other words, if our hypothesis about the importance of access to central pork is correct, this variable should have a positive coefficient.

Many of the variables from the national-level model were not available for the subnational assemblies. We were, however, able to obtain both measures of local political coalitions (Governor’s Coalition and LDP Share of Subnational Legislature*, discussed above), enabling us to test directly central versus subnational political factors in Japan. We also include *Electoral Strength*, equal to $V_i - D_q$, where $V_i$ is the prefectural assembly member’s vote share in the previous election and $D_q$ is the droop quota. We hypothesize that legislators who are electorally “at-risk” are mostly likely to switch. Their re-election is not assured, so they should be more willing to risk party switching to enhance their electoral position. More accomplished vote-getters will not be as threatened by the shifting alliances - they have comfortable vote margins to fall back on - so they will wait for the system to stabilize (Aldrich and Bianco 1992). Therefore, *Electoral Strength* should have a negative coefficient.

The analysis of subnational switching fully supports our hypotheses (Table 2, column 1). The coefficient on Pipeline Switch is positive and statistically significant. Subnational legislators follow the lead of their national pipeline sources - staying put or switching as the case may be. Practically, the results mean that an LDP subnational legislator whose pipeline did not switch...
will choose to stay in the LDP with probability .93. In contrast, when a national legislator switches out of the LDP, the probability that a local politician will follow him out of the LDP increases to .26. This result offers strong evidence for the power of these patron-client ties and centralized pipelines in pushing prefectural assembly party switching.

There is no evidence that subnational political alignments influenced subnational party switching. Neither the governor’s party, nor the size of the LDP’s subnational coalition has a significant effect on party affiliation decisions. Local politicians in Japan remained focused on their national pipelines and effectively ignored regional coalitional politics.

In addition, our control variable, Electoral Strength*, was statistically significant and negative. Prefectural assembly members who had nearly lost their previous election were more likely to switch parties than those who had won by a substantial margin and were, hence, fairly secure.

It might be argued that the results of the statistical analysis suggest the impact of personal ties and loyalty between subnational and national politicians rather than a desire to maintain access to central governmental resources. Personal ties undoubtedly played some part in the patterns we see, but we have good reason to believe that state resources were also very important. To begin with, based on interviews with Japanese national level party switchers and local level newspaper political reporters conducted during 1999, we find that: (1) Most local politicians defected only when their national level patron did, but (2) some prefectural assembly politicians did not defect, even when their patron did because they lacked confidence in the ability of the non-LDP parties to remain in power and feared falling out of favor with an LDP that could return to power and take away their funding. This suggests a strong link between local- and national-level politicians, founded to a large degree on the ability of national-level politicians to act as a pipeline for the local-level politicians’ distributive needs.
Perhaps most compelling on this point: During the 1993-94 period, the LDP-spin-off parties (which entered the national government in 1993) had gradually established more of a presence in a number of prefectural assemblies by drawing additional LDP defectors. However, once the LDP returned to power at the national level in 1994, even though politicians were still willing to switch from the party at the national level, subnational LDP members were reluctant to switch to the new parties (Kataoka 1997, 210).\(^9\)

Together, the results confirm our hypotheses: National legislators typically switched parties only when they could retain access to central governmental pork. Subnational legislators typically only switched parties in order to maintain ties to their patron at the national level who provided their central pipeline. And, exactly the opposite of Brazil, subnational political party arrangements appeared to play no part in the decision by legislators at either level of government.

**Conclusion**

Political scientists and would-be reformers commonly argue that having the “right” institutions is essential to the success, stability, and strength of democracies. However, arguments of this kind are founded on institutional theories that are only as accurate as their assumptions allow them to be. Most of the formal literature is built around wealthy and fairly issue-driven democracies. But most democracies are poorer, with less experience with democratic institutions, and, in many, pork is a natural substitute for policy proposals. Moreover, even in wealthy countries like the U.S. that contain substantial “programmatic” components, pork is still an important part of politics (see, e.g., Kim (2007)).

The results of our research suggest a powerful interaction between institutions and the type of politician-voter linkage (programmatic or pork). We focus on one important institution: decentralization. Looking at heavily centralized Japan, we find the existence of centralized
pipelines, which lead both national and subnational politicians to organize around national coalition politics. In contrast, faced with decentralized pipelines in Brazil, both local and national legislators organize around subnational politics, with only national politicians also showing concern for national coalitions.

Ignoring the distinction between more programmatic and pork-oriented systems leaves analysts with at best an incomplete picture of the impact of the level of resource (de)centralization. We are certainly not the first to point out the impact of centralization on party politics. For example, Chhibber and Kollman (1998; 2004) link the relative authority of national and subnational governments to the formation of national party systems. They argue that in systems where resources are centralized, “voters develop national policy preferences, and candidates associate themselves with certain national policy positions. As a result, local party systems and national party systems begin to resemble each other” (1998, 335). To be sure, our findings also highlight how centralized systems orient candidates and voters to politics at the national level. However, by highlighting the distinction between programmatic and pork-oriented politics, our analysis shows the extreme result that obtains when combining centralization and an emphasis on pork. Rather than simply leading to close ties between national and subnational party systems, the combination leads to a greater bias favoring the national ruling party. All else equal in such systems, voters and politicians will be more likely to affiliate with those that control the national budget and therefore can provide them with pork. The implication is that the combination of centralization and pork-politics reinforces the power principally of those already controlling the national budget.

Our results are based on data from just two countries, although they include two national and forty-nine subnational legislatures. Our findings should extend easily to other systems with two similar features: a strong pork orientation and personalistic electoral rules. Likely candidates
for study include countries like Italy (under its now-defunct PR system that included preference voting), Russia, and Ecuador.

Our cases leverage extreme values of our explanatory variables and consequently maximize measurable impact in several ways. Japan and Brazil are at the extremes of resource centralization and decentralization. They are both very personalistic. And pork plays an important role in legislative politics in both cases, both directly and indirectly. Many countries have similar, though less exaggerated tendencies, or different contexts altogether.

Our framework extends to such cases as well, but with some qualifications. We expect the observed effects to be attenuated in systems with strong partisanship or party-centric electoral systems, where party leaders already have strong control over political careers independent of pork distribution. In such systems, legislator behavior will be shaped to a large degree by the extent to which power over state resources and party nominations for office are at the same level as one another. That is, decentralized resources combined with decentralized ballot control should lead to powerful and cohesive subnational factions within parties; centralized resources combined with centralized ballot control should lead to powerful national parties. Where resource and ballot control are not congruent, which level dominates will depend more broadly on career paths. Where legislators aspire to personalistic career outlets, including popularly-elected mayoral and other executive offices, pork should trump party. Where parties act as gate-keepers for all political offices, partisanship should trump individual pork opportunities.

In these more partisan political systems, party-switching is quite rare, but the core organizational incentives that we have explored herein should still be present. Though constrained within parties, politicians will still orient and organize factions pointed at the primary resource holders. Such foci may be reflected, albeit imperfectly, in the usual measures of legislative behavior: roll-call votes, bill co-sponsorship, and even strategic abstentions.
Testable implications are especially relevant in cases where decentralization has recently increased or decreased. Mexico offers one example. Formally, Mexican politics are fairly decentralized, with elected state governors and state legislatures. Practically, the ruling PRI lorded over authoritarian Mexico with an iron fist from the presidency, vigorously centralizing politics. Under the PRI, the national executive dominated resource distribution and could effectively fire governors at will. The result was very similar to Japan: National coalition politics shaped numerous subnational political alignments. Over the last ten years, however, Mexican politics have become much more decentralized. Subsequently, governors have enjoyed increased autonomy and increasing influence over both state and national legislators.

In addition, our analysis might be profitably applied to cases that tend to the programmatic side, but contain subnational regions of pork-oriented politics. That is, even in more balanced and programmatic countries, there are substantial pockets of localized, pork-oriented party machines. Further attention to the interaction between pork-oriented politics and the locus of resource control would further our understanding of the party alignments and machines that develop in such contexts.

Finally, our results also offer a warning about the excesses of centralization - and decentralization. On one hand, economists often predict that decentralization improves efficiency (see, e.g., Musgrave 1959) and political analysis often suggests that decentralization aids democratic values, consolidation and practice (Dahl 1971; Diamond 1999; Diamond and Tsalik 1999, 121; O’Neill 2002), and encourages policy experimentation (Tocqueville [1835] 2000). Many argue that it increases accountability and responsiveness to local concerns, improves the representativeness of democracy by offering additional channels of political access for marginalized (often ethnic) groups, provides additional checks and balances on central governmental power, and creates greater opportunities for opposition entry into the political
arena (Dahl 1971; Diamond 1999; Diamond and Tsalik 1999). On the other hand, Alesina et al. (1999) argue that it hinders fiscal restraint. Others argue that it can increase corruption (Treisman 1999) and may give legitimacy to subnational authoritarian bosses (Cornelius 1999).

Our analysis suggests that the impact of decentralization will depend a great deal on the extent to which programmatic or pork politics drive political competition. For our cases, which represent the extremes of centralization and decentralization, our results clarify some of the mechanisms that weaken democracy. Excessive centralization can promote one-party dominance, and excessive decentralization encourages party fragmentation. In centralized cases like Japan, political actors have effectively just one source for distributable goods, reinforcing the stability of single party majority rule. Similar patterns existed until recently in countries like Italy and Mexico. This centralization also explains the lack of switching in Japan. National coalition membership is usually quite stable and predictable, so politicians’ initial choice of party is usually sufficient for the duration of their career. In contrast, decentralization in Brazil reinforces high party fragmentation.

We conclude by suggesting caution to those active in the study and practical development of new democracies. It is common for politicians in new democracies to emphasize pork rather than programs, thereby producing a simpler means to produce measurable performance and build personal loyalty among voters. It is not uncommon to criticize pork-dominated politics because of their wasteful economic effects, but the analysis here also suggests that an emphasis on pork can raise problems for the functioning of democracy: When combined with extreme levels of centralization or decentralization, pork-centered politics may easily run to single-party dominance or reinforce high levels of party fragmentation.
Notes

1Further, there is frequently within-country variance in the degree to which one or the other matters. Such variance may be across region, sometimes with the same party delivering pork in one region and policy in another. For example, Desposato (2001) shows how parties in the poorest parts of Brazil have the strongest pork orientation. Shefter (1994) notes how the American Democratic Party has been more patronage-oriented in its Chicago machine, but more programmatic in the state of Wisconsin. Similarly, Levitsky (2007) shows how in Argentina, the Justicialista Party was able to use pork in poorer communities and programmatic appeals with the urban middle-class.

2Indeed, in our cases, there is little switching into or out of parties with ideological mass constituencies, like the Brazilian Worker’s Party or the Japanese Communist Party.

3We use the term “pipeline” slightly differently than is commonly used in Japanese, which places greater emphasis on a national politician who can act as an effective pipeline between the locality and the central government.

4We do not include the PRN for subnational models. The party was formed at the last minute for President Collor’s presidential campaign, and attracted some party-switchers at the national level. But it elected no governors, and was much smaller at the state-level, consistent with our hypotheses. Every state-level member of the PRN in our dataset abandoned the party after the corruption scandal, except for one deputy from the state of Bahia. Because it almost perfectly predicts failure, the estimates for that variable are unstable (negative and very large), so we dropped it.

5In both Brazil and Japan, a minority of the legislature remained in parties without access to pork so one might wonder, why don’t all legislators join the pork-rich parties? There are several reasons. First, governments face budget constraints, so every additional member of a government
party slightly reduces all other legislators’ access to pork. At some point, a party may refuse new
members, when the marginal gain from a larger coalition is less than the cost of sharing more
pork. Similarly, potential switchers at some point might not consider the transaction cost of
switching worth the small amount of pork available in a large, hungry coalition. Second, many
legislators have other reasons to not switch parties. Legislators might be planning a run for a
different office, and see nomination and victory as more likely in their current opposition party
than a government party with pork access. Some legislators may have stronger ideological or
partisanship ties that make switching unlikely. Even the most pork-oriented systems usually have
some ideological component as well.

The events that followed the LDP’s 1993 fall further demonstrate the importance of access to
national level resources to party switching. After the original defection from the LDP in 1993,
party switching away from the longtime ruling party and toward the new (now-government)
parties continued. It was widely expected that a mass exodus from the LDP to the new parties in
the coalition government was highly likely (Curtis 1999), as LDP members recognized that they
would need to leave their once-dominant party in order to maintain power and access to
resources. Indeed, many believed that the draw of central governmental resources would lead to a
new one-party monopoly on power (Jameson 1999). The LDP was therefore desperate to return
to the government. In 1994, tactical errors led to the downfall of the anti-LDP coalition and, in
order to return to power and regain control over state resources, the LDP went so far as link up
with its longtime enemy, the Socialist Party, and in the bargain even gave the longtime opposition
party the prime ministership in an LDP-Socialist Party government. Further highlighting the
importance of access to state control: Even despite the odd LDP-Socialist Party government,
many of the LDP defectors returned to the party in droves after the following election when it
became clear that the LDP’s grip on the government had returned.
7For the sake of comparability across cases, we transform two variables used by Reed and Scheiner: We code Rural* as 0 for urban districts and 1 for rural ones. And we divide the Reed and Scheiner’s Electoral Strength* variable by 100,000. Naturally, none of these transformations affects the substance of the results.

8A number of prefectural assembly members run unopposed in their districts. For these politicians, we gave an Electoral Strength* score equal to that of the candidate with the highest Electoral Strength* score in the prefecture.

9If the new parties were in the national government in 1993-94, why would prefectural assembly members be wary of defecting to them? The main reason has to do with some politicians’ sense of stability at the time regarding the staying power of the non-LDP government. While defection at the national level did indeed put Shinsei in the anti-LDP government, the government’s tenure was quite short. From the time that the anti-LDP government was formed to the time that it lost its Diet majority, only nine months elapsed. Given the brevity of Shinsei’s time in government, insecurity about the stability of the new party system, and local skepticism about the new party’s staying power in government, it is reasonable to think that many local politicians did not see Shinsei as a reliable long-term pipeline to central governmental resources. (Interviews conducted by one of the authors with Diet members from three different parties, with opposition prefectural party organizations, and correspondence with prefectural newspapers’ reporters in selected prefectures over May-August 1999 confirmed the uneasiness held by a number of subnational politicians with regard to the stability of the party system and the anti-LDP government.)
References


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Yomiuri Shinbun. Various. *Bunyabetsu Jinmeiroku (Key names in various fields).*


Table 1: Conditional Logit Models of Party Choice in Brazil

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Table 2: Conditional Logit Models of Party Choice in Japan

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