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# Greater China

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"IT'S OUR HOME":
A SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF THE FAILURE OF CHINESE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF RURAL WATER SUPPLY

Since the Cultural Revolution, China's government officials have encouraged industrial growth throughout urban and rural areas in the belief that rapid development would lead to maximal national progress. This persistent drive has had several environmental consequences, particularly in rural China, where citizens have become acutely distressed about the future of their country. Citizens have come to worry even over basic necessities such as air, and water, the quality of which has become a particular concern in village life. Many villagers living in rural areas have accordingly initiated protests against government inaction and brought China's current water pollution issue to the government's attention at both the national and local levels. Understanding the reluctance of local officials to institute environmental laws requires consideration of factors ranging across Chinese society, government, and economic life. Studies of urban and rural inequality, government systems, the influence of the Internet, differences between urban and rural protests, and Chinese beliefs such as Confucianism and guanxi, are of special relevance. Three factors have contributed crucially to failures in Chinese environmental policy: the hierarchical structure of authority in local government, the influence of industry as exerted through guanxi practices, and the singular concern of regional governments for promoting their own economic interests.

Since the time of the 1966 Cultural Revolution, China's main priority has been to encourage economic growth and rapid development in both urban and rural areas. As Mao Zedong once said, "I cannot sleep until we build the Panzhihua Iron and Steel Mill... If capital is lacking I will donate the royalties from my own writing." Even the reformist, Deng Xiaoping, continued this tradition in his advocacy of the phrase, "Development is the ultimate truth," thus reiterating industrialization as the sine qua non for national progress. In recent decades, continued emphasis on economic growth and a gradual increase in population have led to severe environmental consequences, leaving many Chinese citizens profoundly concerned about the future of their country. Citizens have expressed their worries by participating in protests, hoping that local government officials will institute policies of reform. Chinese officials, however, though aware of citizens' protests, are generally reluctant to create policies that will benefit the environment. The failure to establish environmental law results from the hierarchical system characteristic of rural governments, the corruption emanating from the Chinese practice of guanxi, and local government officials' on stimulating economic growth.

Current environmental issues of concern divide approximately between water pollution, air pollution, rising sea levels, and deforestation. Today, over 700 million people in China consume drinking water that is badly contaminated. Every year, factories in China discharge around 36 billion tons of untreated wastewater into rivers and lakes, adding to the severity of water pollution in the country. People who drink water with high levels of pollutants and bacteria are at risk of developing various diseases, among them Schistosomiasis, an illness often referred to as snail fever, which can lead to serious morbidity and even mortality; it is caused by waterborne flatworms that enter the body when individuals bathe in polluted water or use contaminated water for farming. In cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing, air pollution, another troubling consequence of extensive industrialization averages more than 10 times the standard proposed by

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2 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
the World Health Organization. In 1997, Zhao Weijun, deputy director of the air pollution department of the National Environmental Protection Agency, declared that “the residents of many of China’s largest cities are living under long-term harmful air quality conditions.” Weijun added that badly polluted air has largely been responsible for the recent percentage increase of respiratory disease among the people. Rising sea levels became an issue of environmental concern when China’s sea level hit a record high in 2012. The State Oceanic Administration report disclosed that the sea level rose 122 millimeters more in 2011 than the average sea level from 1975 to 1993. High seas, which can aggravate storm tides, erode shorelines, and inundate crops, can, therefore, be threatening to coastal residents. Deforestation is yet another unfortunate environmental problem that has had destructive consequences. As a result of deforestation, many forests have been destroyed due to regular soil erosion and blinding dust storms.

As many individuals and groups in China have attempted to shed light on grave environmental issues, the national government has become cognizant of some ecological challenges and occasionally, sought to address them. Implementation of environmental policy first began in the 1970s with the introduction of the 1979 Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China. The law required that factories comply with environmental standards; that environmental impact assessments be conducted for all new construction projects; and that environmental protection bureaus and offices, both local and national, be established. In the 1980s, environmental management efforts increased with the issuing of more national policies, many of which included industrial water pollution control laws such as the Provisional Measures for the Assessment of Pollutant Discharge Fees and the Regulations for the Prevention and Control of Industrial Pollution in Technological Renovation. Environmental policies introduced in the 1980s include the Three Synchronizations Policy of 1983, which aimed to reduce pollution in the course of renovating old factories and building new ones. Many of the environmental policies that were implemented during the 1970s and 1980s were enforced by state environmental organizations in China such as the Environmental Protection Leading Group of the State Council, established in 1974, and the Environmental Protection Administration, established in 1982. Although there were earlier efforts to create environmental laws, these laws were far from satisfactory. Chinese Vice-Minister of Environmental Protection, Li Ganjie, reported that the government intends to set higher anti-pollution standards and to promote clean energy policies, though the question of probability of enforcement remains.

China’s government is divided into two, levels of jurisdiction: the national government and the local government, both of which differ considerably from one another. The central government includes The National People’s Congress, which was formed in 1954; its delegates elect the president, vice president, chairman of the Central Military Commission, the chief justice, and the chief prosecutor. The other hand, the provincial government has its own structure and is divided between three levels of power: the county, the township, and the village. The county is responsible for overseeing, guiding, and promoting the direction of growth for villages and communities. The Party Secretary, who is a member of the county headquarters, sets policy direction, divides development strategy, and makes long-term plans. The county magistrate, also part of the county government, handles immediate concerns of development and problems relating to bureaucracy. The township’s main purpose is to oversee

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6 Murray and Cook, 6.
7 Ibid., 72.
8 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 103.
20 Ibid., 104.
21 Ibid., 103.
development specifically in villages, with township members focusing on implementing county targets and plans set for the township by the county. Leaders at the township level include cadres, the township party secretary, and the township head. The chairman of the village committee leads the village headquarters, at the bottom of the local corporate state.

The separation of the national government from the local government gives local government officials more freedom when implementing policy. Despite the influence that the central government has on local governments, a surprising degree of autonomy is reserved to the local government. Local government officials have ample choice in creating and implementing policy, often balancing their own perspectives with those of national government leaders.

Despite the national government’s conscious efforts to ameliorate environmental problems in China since the 1970s, many of the policies formulated have failed to improve current conditions and appease the public’s concerns. As a result, Chinese citizens living in both rural and urban areas have instigated protests and actively voiced their opinions about the country’s need for change. From dynastic ages to contemporary periods, citizens have found reason to express their disapproval of government policy. For instance, the government’s implementation of higher taxes during the Qing dynasty, during the late nineteenth century, resulted in an outburst of violent, anti-tax riots by citizens.

Other examples of aggressive demonstrations include the protests against low grain prices, land requisitions, social and cultural policies, and abusive officials. Such aggressive protests as the late nineteenth century’s tax protest, have continued into the present day.

In recent years, there has been a substantial rise in citizen protest. In rural areas, the emergence of a democratic culture is one possible explanation for the rise in the number of protests. A survey conducted in 1999 confirmed that villagers strongly support “democratic ideas.” Citizens living in rural areas have shown interest in participating in democratic elections and forming village councils. Peng Zhen, the chairman of the standing committee of the National People’s Congress, commented on the rights he believed villagers should have, stating, “Villagers should have the full right to decide what should be done and what should not; what should be done first and what should be done later.” Zhen’s comments show that even officials who had authority favored democratic systems of government in which local citizens could actively participate in elections. Statistics illustrate that the number of leaders rising to power in villages is increasing due to the villagers’ involvement in democratic activity. In the late 1990s, only 17 percent of village leaders came to office through direct election, but since then, percentages have increased to 42 percent in 2000 and 75 percent in 2004.

In urban areas, middle-class activists publicizing their research and communicating with others via the Internet have aided the promulgation of environmental concerns. In recent years, web-based voluntary groups in China have encouraged the public’s direct participation and community action by organizing environmental projects. Members of one of the most influential environmental nongovernmental organizations, Greener Beijing, which was founded in 1998, continues to promote green culture by reaching out to people through its website and taking part in environmental awareness raising exercises.

University and secondary-school students living in urban areas have played an important role in environmental protest. Patterns in student movements and protests show that students’ cries for change seem to influence the government in a way that differs in the level of attentive response from protests led by workers or peasants. Students, who often have a higher level of

21 Ibid., 107.
22 Ibid., 109.
23 Tak-Wing Ngo, Contemporary China Studies I: Politics (SAGE, 2011) 381.
education than peasants do, capture government officials' attention because officials believe they should be aware of how the educated class views their policies. Since the Cultural Revolution, Chinese students attending universities around the country have developed similar values, indicating their desire to enjoy independent expression. By displaying posters, publishing journals, and convening associations, students firmly believe that they can help make a difference in their society.

To shed light on the importance of ecological conservation, students have resorted to various means of protest. A recent environmental protest, which took place in Shifang, Sichuan in July of 2012, was sparked by a group of high school students who opposed the government’s proposal of a molybdenum copper plant. Researching about the copper plant, students began to understand the health risks that could affect the environment as well as the people living in surrounding area. Students’ concerns led them to begin posting their findings on some of China’s most popular social networking sites, including QQ, We-Chat, and Weibo, in order to inform others of the dangerous risks of the molybdenum copper plant. Clearly, sharing environmental concerns with others via use of the Internet benefited the effectiveness of the students’ protest since it allowed people of various environmental groups and organizations to come together and oppose the government collectively. In fact, more optimistic observers assert that the Internet has the ability to transform political life by creating networks of active citizens and by developing spaces where people can make decisions. Just as students used social networking sites to protest against the copper plant in Sichuan, various voluntary groups and environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) have used the Internet to diffuse information. Such ENGOs use their websites to publicize environmental information, debate environmental issues, organize activities, and mobilize volunteers through electronic newsletters. For example, the Greener Beijing organization’s online discussion forums have been catalysts for “offline” activism. In 1999, the organization’s online discussions concerning the recycling of batteries inspired students in Xiamen city to organize a successful community battery recycling program. Other successful organizations that use the Internet include Friends of Nature, which was established in 1994 by Liang Congjie, and Green Earth Volunteers, confounded in 1997 by Wang Yongchen. These organizations undoubtedly contributed to the spread of environmental awareness via use of the Internet.

On the other hand, protests held in rural areas differ considerably from protests in urban areas. Among an overall population of 1.2 billion people in China, 800 million are peasants in China’s lower class. Since rural areas in China are generally made up of economically underprivileged citizen populations, and since many poorer citizens tend to be less cognizant of environmental problems that exist, the Chinese government often takes advantage of rural land by building factories on property that should be protected from environmental degradation. Moreover, the government does not expect lower class citizens to protest or defy its actions because of lack of awareness.

Villagers’ limited knowledge stems largely from the poor education system and the lack of technology that exist in rural areas. In recent years, the Internet use in urban areas has been more prevalent than in rural areas. While citizens in urban areas often rely on mobile phones for Internet access, villagers in rural areas are often forced to share mobile phones; therefore, it is more difficult for rural citizens to gain access to the web. Furthermore, while official reports have shown that in half of Beijing, Shanghai, and other urban areas,
residents “frequently use the Internet,” only some rural households have obtained Internet connections, and a large majority of people still does not have regular access to the web. The low percentage of farmers in rural areas who are connected online leaves them at a disadvantage because information and news of important environmental issues and protests are spread via social media networks and the Internet. The education system in rural areas also contributes to villagers’ lack of awareness. Minorities, in particular, living in villages are highly disadvantaged in enrollment rates, with only 77% of rural minority girls enrolled and only about 48% of girls enrolled at a secondary age. Percentages of urban minority girls living in urban areas, on the other hand, are much higher. The investigation of education and literacy illustrates that poor education system in rural communities affects villagers’ willingness and ability to participate. Moreover, uneducated citizens with high illiteracy are “silent,” not likely to participate in protests, mainly because they are less cognizant of environmental problems and are less willing to confront authorities. In Wuli, Zhejiang province, villager Shao Guantong, was worried about the years of heavy pollution and wanted to voice his concerns. However, not having had a proper education, Shao could not read and did not have an “educated” way to resist. Clearly, villagers’ lack of education and lack of resources in rural areas contributes to the villagers’ reluctance to protest and voice their opinions about environmental issues to the government.

One of the worst environmental issues that exist in rural areas in China is water pollution. Severe water pollution has negatively affected communities around the country, with devastating effects on rivers and farmland, both of which villagers depend heavily on. According to a 1998 study, 436 out of 532 rivers in China tested positive for chemical toxins and harmful substances specifically because many locals rely on the rivers for drinking water, food preparation, and local agriculture. Polluted water not only affects the health of the villagers, but also contributes to the loss of farmland. In 1993, for example, about 8% of farmland received river water that was so polluted that it could not be used for irrigation; this predicament ultimately led to an estimated loss of one million tons of grain.

By the early twenty-first century, communities of villagers and farmers who were living in rural areas became especially aware of the dangers of water pollution. In one village, Dachuan, in Gansu province, villagers led a protest movement against a provincial government’s fertilizer factory, expressing their concerns about recent pollution in a village stream. The factory, which began operating in 1971, had been discharging its water through Dachuan’s stream for years. Although villagers were initially unaware of how deadly the contaminated water was, over the years, they began noticing patterns in villagers’ health and observing farmland that had contracted unusual diseases. As soon as villagers became aware of the water pollution issue, they sent cadres and leaders to factories in an attempt to confront factory workers and express their concerns. However, factory workers refused to compromise instead offering to hire locals and give villagers discounts to appease them in the hope of temporarily allaying their anger. Destruction hit Dachuan in 1996 when a flash flood ran down the stream, destroying a bridge that linked the village to a local township seat. Reacting with anger and force to the destruction of their bridge, the leader of the village led 200 locals to the fertilizer factory, where they blocked its entrance and demanded that the factory build or compensate them for a new bridge. Continued hostility eventually provoked a group of villagers to
load 10 tractors with contaminated stream water, which they used to fire at the walls of the factory. Only after continued forceful action did the villagers of Dachuan receive a response from the provincial government: the factory finally agreed to provide the village with 15,000 Yuan for the construction of a new bridge and the repair of a pump that would provide clean water for the villagers.

Villagers, who were advocating for the protection of their environment in Dachuan, struggled to let their voices be heard among local government officials. Why did it take the local government so long to respond to the villagers' protests? The local government officials' decisions to avoid the villagers' requests for environmental change show their reluctance to shut down factories that would ultimately hinder economic progress.

Another influential protest of this form that took place in rural China occurred in the 1990s. By this time, environmental awareness in China was growing rapidly. An increase in environmental knowledge among the people, together with the formation of various organizations such as Friends of Nature, Global Village of Beijing, and Green Earth Volunteers, led to the promotion of environmental education and the encouragement of nature conservation. With the help of environmental activists and environmental protection volunteers, these organizations were effectively able to communicate and offer education to the public about China's ecological condition. In addition, the organizations helped protest against government projects, such as the building of factories and businesses, if they were concerned that the construction of such industries would adversely affect the environment.

The government funded dam project along the Nu River ignited what would become one of the most controversial protests regarding environmental conservation. During the mid 1990s, the Yunnan Construction Bureau began preparing an application to request permission for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to create a world heritage site that would help preserve some of China's most diverse ecosystems. The site was home to 7,000 species of plants and 80 endangered species of animals. It spread across roughly 1.7 million hectares of land, including eight geographical clusters of protected area as well as the Nu, Lancang, and Jinsha Rivers. Not long after UNESCO approved the application, the Chinese government began planning to dam the Nu River in order to harness the river's hydroelectric power. The Chinese government evidently was more concerned with economic profit that with the conservation of precious ecosystems. By damming the Nu River and targeting the regional electricity market, the government made it clear that it was mainly interested in making profits and was willing to put Yunnan's wildlife at risk, putting animals' homes in particular danger.

As news of the government's plan reached Beijing, more organizations, among them Green Volunteers and Yunnan Green Watershed, began collaborating with local citizens to protest the dam project. In February of 2004, environmental activists, journalists, and conservation scholars, all outraged at the government's proposal, convened and embarked on a nine day investigative tour. They traveled along the Nu River, held meetings with local officials, and collected stories from village residents. During the investigative tour, both the media and the environmental organizations helped publicize and spread awareness about the issue. Although the future looked bleak for environmental activists, events took a surprising, unexpected turn when the premier, Wen Jiabao, ordered the suspension of the dam project later that year, claiming that the project had become too controversial. In this case, environmental groups and organizations, such as Yunnan Green Watershed, made protests more serious and involved more citizens voicing their concerns. The pressure of these serious protests is what ultimately caused the

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59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Perry and Goldman, 284.
66 Ibid.
68 Perry and Goldman, 287.
69 Mertha, 119-120.
70 Perry and Goldman, 290.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Perry and Goldman, 291.
government to take action and heed the advice of the public. The government’s actions show that officials are genuinely concerned to make changes that will benefit their communities. At the same time, though, Chinese citizens speculate as to whether the government was forced to respond to the people’s protest due to the large number of complaints from the public.74

In urban communities and villages throughout China, local governments are working in a limited way to improve and reform policies to contain local governments. However, in several instances, although villages have protested and directed their concerns about the environment to authorities, local government officials have not seemed to take action. The motivation of local officials in overlooking issues as important as environmental pollution, even when villagers protest, remains opaque. Perhaps the national government does strive to institute policies that will result in positive change, but local officials fail to carry out such policies due to private conviction or outright self-interest.

For the last 20 years or more, the rest of the world has watched while pollution despoils air, water and forests. Despite the severe damage done to the environment, the Chinese government seems to be more concerned about promoting continued economic and social development rather than about remedying the environmental problems facing the country. For some, it is impossible to understand why government officials are reluctant to take the initiative and begin implementing policies that will improve the country’s current environmental state. However, this reluctance is not only a result of China’s fear of losing economic power, but also of values and beliefs, such as Confucianism and guanxi, that have been instilled in Chinese culture for hundreds of years.

An incident in 1992 in Chongqing demonstrates how local leaders’ power in the hierarchy system allows them to make their own decisions when instituting policies. In Chongqing, the Environmental Protection Bureau was required to approve an environmental impact assessment (EIA) for a factory that the local government wanted to construct.75 However, Chongqing’s mayoral officials, eager to build the factory for economic reasons, demanded and received the Bureau’s approval to begin construction of the factory even though the EIA had not actually been conducted.76 In later years, the Environmental Protection Bureau attempted to inspect the manufacturing facility many more times, but on each occasion, factory managers became hostile and did not allow them to conduct the assessment.77 Furthermore, officials working in Chongqing’s mayoral office declared that the Bureau did not have the right to inspect the factory.78 As officials working in the mayoral office were steadfast and overpowering, the Environmental Protection Bureau had no choice but to abide by the officials’ commands.79

The hierarchal reality behind the Environmental Protection Bureau director’s inability to challenge mayoral officials reveals a great deal about policy enforcement in China. Local governments follow an organizational principle of democratic centralism, which requires that the minority obey the majority, that lower level organizations obey higher-level organizations, and that the whole party obey the central leadership.80 While the director of the Bureau could have challenged the mayor, since the Environmental Protection Bureau is below the mayor office in local political hierarchy, he would have been at risk of losing his career and would have had to face the consequences of violating the law.81 Although the director judgment in wanting to conduct an impact assessment, he might not have been able to because he was fearful of the repercussions that would result from his actions. The director’s judgment to conduct an assessment of the factory was correct; after all, the factory could have violated standards and posed a danger to the environment.

The incident that occurred between the members of the Environmental Protection Bureau and the mayoral officials, who prevented an impact assessment from being conducted, show that a flawed system of hierarchy exists within the Chinese government. Within the country’s administrative system, both local and national, there are ranks of many titles based on an individual’s wage and social stature.82 Hierarchical systems in government often affect governance because an individual with a lower status may be forced to

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74 Ibid.
75 Ma and Ortolano, 82.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Liu, 67.
81 Ma and Leonard Ortolano, 82.
82 Liu, 67.
consult someone of higher authority before making decisions. In addition, officials tend to report first to superiors who hold the powers of appointment and supervision. When Chongqing’s mayoral officials refused to allow the Environmental Protection Bureau director to conduct an impact assessment and ordered the director to follow his instructions, the mayoral officials were able to take advantage of the situation because of their high status. As seen in this case, hierarchal systems can often lead to corruption among officials. In fact, a large number of rural protests are sparked by local officials’ and law enforcement officers’ tendency towards favoritism, their corruption, and their propensity for exploiting the lack of information among citizens.

Cadre and local government official corruption came from the rural industries’ struggle to market their products. Rural industries were forced to sell products on their own because state-market organizations would not accept rural industry products. Rural industries, therefore, began to bribe their way into the public market by giving cadres a percentage of the sale of their products. Commissioned cadres were responsible for selling products to the state shops. The source of the party administration’s emphasis on hierarchy is surprisingly ancient. Much of Chinese culture and lifestyle revolves around Confucianism, a philosophical system developed from the teachings of the Chinese philosopher, Confucius during sixth-century B.C. Ideals of Confucianism stress that every individual has a specific role in a hierarchal social system and intends to create harmony between individuals. In Chinese daily life, Confucianism can be seen most clearly in the teacher-student relationship and the boss-worker relationship.

In the teacher-student relationship, the teacher holds a relatively high social status. The teacher is held in high regard not only by the educated class, but is also revered by the bottom social and economic classes in Chinese society. Following the Confucian belief in respect, students rarely address their teachers on a first-name basis and are sure to express honor, deference, and gratitude towards their teachers. Similarly, the boss-worker relationship enshrines the idea of a hierarchal system that exists between individuals of higher power and those of lower power. For example, China’s “floating population,” consists of about 120 million migrant workers, who are known to be the most underprivileged workers in the country. These migrants are subject to discrimination because of their low status, and as a result they are often deprived of equal access to health care, education, work, and residential context. Clearly, the Chinese hierarchal system, and the status of an individual in his or her society, is an integral part of Chinese culture and lifestyle.

An important Chinese concept that influences environmental policy decisions is called guanxi, a deeply rooted practice in the Chinese business world and in daily life. In English, guanxi is translated as “relationships” or “particularistic ties”; in general, the term refers to making connections with others through unofficial routes. For example, when individuals hope to form guanxi with others, they often give gifts, toasts, or serve food in banquets. Most gifts consist of clothing, food products, “congratulatory-gifts,” and “gift-money.” Guanxi practices can take place in a government setting. For example, entrepreneurs often attempt to establish guanxi with cadres in communities in order to have access to commodities and raw materials, land, financial capital, public customers, permits, and protection from bureaucratic harassment. Xiamen entrepreneurs, for example, who visit officials at work often attempt to develop such guanxi. As one
entrepreneur reported, "I often go and visit the bureau to talk with them ... Sometimes they will talk about their families or some problem that I can them with ... If you sit with somebody long enough you develop emotion." This entrepreneur's attitude shows that he deliberately attempted to cultivate *guanxi* for the purpose of becoming well associated with officials, hoping thereby to gain advantages in the work setting. In addition, Chinese villages and township factories often hold New Year's banquets for their employees to promote good relations with their workers. This New Year's banquet tradition shows the factory managers' pragmatic desire to treat their workers sympathetically in order to continue running their businesses smoothly. Clearly, the factory managers did not care to establish genuine relationships with their workers, but were only concerned with treating their workers nicely so that their businesses could benefit.

Another incident that represents the Chinese concept of *guanxi* occurred in Guangdong province. One business manager, who was running a factory that produced computer parts in one of Guangdong's cities, was approached many times because of the possible dangers his factory was posing to the surrounding environment. Despite the numerous complaints he received, however, the business manager believed he was entitled to special treatment because of the *guanxi* he had with the local government. His *guanxi* was nurtured by two factors: that he was born in a village nearby the factory, and that he paid a "monthly fee" to local officials. For these reasons, the government eventually allowed the business manager to continue running his factory. It is probable that the local government allowed the business manager to continue running his factory because he had already established connections with local officials and benefited the government by paying a fee. The relationship between the local government and the business manager, therefore, shows how the principle of *guanxi* can lead to corruption.

Local government officials in contemporary China act mainly to increase economic growth, which may offer an explanation as to why they often fail to institute environmental change. By encouraging economic development and industrial growth within villages and communities, officials promote both regional, and in some cases personal, enrichment. According to Jean Oi, it is obvious why township and village officials develop their own enterprises: "the reasons center on revenue." Clearly, officials are often more concerned with earning funds rather than instating policies that will benefit the environment.

One protest and the aftermath of the violent demonstrations that took place on August 14, 2011 demonstrates the local government's motivation in encouraging factories to continue production despite the effects of pollution. Turmoil broke out in Dalian, Liaoning province when thousands of demonstrators flocked to the streets in front of the municipal government office to demand environmental change. Demonstrators were protesting in the hope that the municipal government would relocate the Fujia Petrochemical Para xylene Plant. The plant, located approximately 50 yards behind a sea wall, arose as a source of public concern when a tropical storm pushed ocean waves against the wall, rupturing it. Soon after this incident, people who lived in the plant's surrounding area showed grave concern that the chemicals would leak from the area, and as a result, fled from their homes in panic. This particular factory in Dalian manufactures Para xylene (PX), which is used in the production of polyester. Paraxylene vapor can cause extreme eye and nose irritations, and in severe cases, can lead to death. One citizen in Dalian expressed his concern saying, "We know that they typhoon caused

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109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Wee, 2.
some leak of poisonous chemicals from the PX project and we are all working about it, because it is a threat to our life." Demonstrators expressed anger towards the government by marching and holding banners that declared: "I love Dalian and reject poison," "return me my home and garden," and "get out PX, protect Dalian." Xinhua, a News Agency in China, reported that some demonstrators even began throwing bottles of mineral water at police and officials who tried to calm the protest. After the public's violent protest and cries for change, government official, Mayor Li Wancai finally announced that the chemical factory would be relocated. Since so many local citizens were involved in protest, government officials seem to have had no choice but to comply and close the PX factory. However, if protesters had not demanded change, there is every indication that government officials would not have taken action to resolve this issue. Soon after the suspension of the PX factory, news reports had declared that the factory had secretly reopened.

Domestic critics and citizens were outraged, believing that the local government was reluctant to shut down the factory altogether since its closure would result in a significant loss of income and a large compensation payout for breach of a contract. It is evident that the local government officials were less motivated to support environmental protection and to mollify the angry citizens' protest. Instead, they were much more interested in keeping the factory open because they were aware that the closure of the factory would result in a loss of funds, thereby harming their economic state.

China's environmental battle is far from over. Continued protests and hostility between farmers and local government officials show that if villagers want change, firm action and persistence is required. Chinese government officials' reluctance to implement effective environmental regulation further emphasizes the frustration which villagers face. Villagers' continued protests and attempts to confront the government shed light on issues of democracy and public participation in China, both of which are important factors that will shape China's future.

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**WORK CITED**


Traditional scholarship on Mulian studies has extensively discussed the connection between Taoism and Buddhism, mainly through the study of Mulian-themed opera and ritual. However, the importance of the Blood Basin imagery for this religious connection to take place has often been overlooked. Though the Blood Basin imagery, this paper will examine its role in the Chen Jing’gu Cult of the Lu Shan Sect, and how this imagery is used in the adaptation of the Mulian theme into Taoist rituals. Paradoxically, while Taoists reject the use of the Buddhist Mulian theme, they also want to incorporate the rituals related to the Mulian theme into their own set of rituals. Using the City Whacking Ritual conducted in the Dongyue Temple of Tainan as a case study, this paper will argue that the Blood Basin imagery allows the establishment of the connection between the Mulian theme and the Chen Jing’gu Cult, while enabling individual religious sects to maintain their own identity at the same time.

INTRODUCTION

The Mulian theme, with an uniquely Indian Buddhist origin, refers to the general plot of Mulian (目連), one of Buddha’s ten disciples, rescuing his mother from hell and expurgating her sins. Novels, plays and religious scriptures on the Mulian theme would thus include this basic plot, and the Mulian theme, after being adapted into the Chinese culture, has since been closely related to the idea of filial piety. The history of the Mulian theme can be traced back to the Western Jin dynasty (A.D. 265-316)1, and has since influenced several aspects of the Chinese culture, especially that of the religious and literary culture. Hence, much of these influences can be observed in the connection between Chinese drama and popular religion, specifically through the case of adapting Mulian plays into religious rituals. While the Mulian theme was initially closely related to the Zhongyuan Festival (中元節) or Yulanpen Festival (盂蘭盆節), falling on the 15th day of the 7th lunar month, the Mulian theme has also been gradually adapted into everyday religious activities, such as funeral rites.2

Research based on the Mulian theme flourished after the mid-20th century, with a great influx of scholarly articles from the West, Japan and Southeast Asia in addition to those from China and Taiwan. A full review of the literature on current research based on the Mulian theme is beyond the scope of this paper, so attention would only be given to works that are related to ritual operas and the study of the Blood Basin imagery (血盆意象), which is the main topic of discussion for this paper. The “International Workshop on the Mulian Operas”3 held in Berkeley in 1987, came up with six published scholarly articles focusing on the Mulian skits and playlets presented during Chinese local funeral rites. The collection of essays features mainly the interpenetration of opera and ritual in traditional Chinese culture. From the various case studies presented, one observes that when fused into local religious settings, the adaptability of the Mulian theme is highly significant, resulting in several variations of the original Buddhist tradition. Also known as the Hell Whacking/Smashing Ritual (破 / 打地獄) or the City Whacking Ritual (打城法事), they can be seen as a hybrid of the Mulian theme and the Taoist rituals. These rituals

References:
1 Although the Buddhist character Mulian appeared in scriptures earlier than the Foshuo Yulanpen Jing (《佛說盂蘭盆經》), due to the significance of the Yulanpen Festival which was developed later, these scriptures did not result in as strong an impact and influence.

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are usually presented during funerals or on special occasions such as the one held in the Dongyue Temple (東嶽殿) of Tainan in Taiwan to rescue spirits from the City of the Wrongfully Dead (枉死城). However, judging from the name alone, these rituals do not indicate a direct relationship with the Mulian theme. Moreover, a deeper inspection of the City Whacking Ritual will reveal a close relationship with the Mulian theme, and provides a better understanding of the connection between Buddhism and Taoism in a modern-day context.

Although some scholars attempted to discuss the Blood Basin imagery, which is closely related to the study of the Mulian theme and appears frequently in texts related to the Mulian theme, the Blood Basin imagery was not the main focus of these studies. The Blood Basin is one of the more important ritual objects in the Mulian theme, and the image of the Blood Basin has also been adapted by other religious rituals, such as the City Whacking Ritual. In other words, the Blood Basin not only appears frequently in the Mulian theme, but also in the rituals conducted by other popular religious sects. In most previous studies, the Blood Basin imagery was mentioned mainly during the discussion of ritualistic operas, with an emphasis of the Blood Basin Ritual (血盆齋) or Blood Basin Scripture (血盆經) itself. The purpose of the Blood Basin imagery, its different interpretations by Taoists and Buddhists, and its influence on Chinese popular religion were not discussed in previous studies. This paper is aimed at filling in the above research gaps through the study of the significance of the Blood Basin imagery in the interaction between the Mulian theme and Chinese popular religion. Specifically, the Chen Jing’gu Cult (陳靖姑信仰), part of a more common and major Taoist sect, i.e. the Lv Shan Sect (臘山派), will be examined in this paper. Within the Lv Shan Sect, the cult of Chen Jing’gu plays an important role for several reasons. Firstly, not only is Chen a female deity who serves as the guardian for childhood, birth and pregnancy, Chen is also the main patronage deity of the Red-Head Priest (紅頭師) of the Lv Shan Sect. Moreover, the legends of Chen Jing’gu are closely related to the Blood Basin imagery.

Taking into consideration the role of the Mulian theme in the connection between Buddhist and Taoist culture, and that previous research on the Mulian theme have overlooked the importance of the Blood Basin imagery, this paper will use the City Whacking Ritual as a case study to examine how the Mulian theme was adapted into Taoist rituals by replacing the key characters in the original Mulian theme with a Taoist priest, a spirit medium and deities that belong to the Taoist pantheon. This adaptation is due to the competition between Buddhism and Taoism in Tainan region, where Taoism, specifically the Lv Shan Sect, dominates the local religious scene and constantly seeks to maintain their occupational niche in the region. Paradoxically, while Taoists reject the use of the Buddhist Mulian theme, they also want to incorporate the rituals related to the Mulian theme into their own set of rituals. By examining the City Whacking Ritual conducted in the Dongyue Temple of Tainan, this paper argues that the Blood Basin imagery allows the establishment of a connection between the Mulian theme and the Chen Jing’gu Cult, while at the same time enabling individual religious sects to maintain their own identity. The rise of the Blood Basin imagery and its various interpretations will be dealt with in the first section of this paper, followed by the interactions between the Chen Jing’gu Cult and the Blood Basin imagery in the second section. Finally, to better illustrate the above discussions, this paper cites the City Whacking Ritual conducted in Dongyue Temple (東嶽殿打城法事) of Tainan, as a case study to examine the adaptation of the Mulian theme.

RISE OF THE BLOOD BASIN IMAGERY AND ITS INTERPRETATIONS

The earliest literary form of the story of Mulian saving his mother can be traced back to the Tang dynasty, titled Biwen on the Great Maudgalyayana Rescues His Mother From Hell (《大目乾連冥間救母變文》), followed by Mulian Saving His Mother Zaju (《目連救母》雜劇) during the Song and Yuan dynasties. Due to a lack of original Zaju scripts, not much information can be extracted from the latter
It was not until the chapter of Seeking His Mother in the Third Palace of Hell (《三殿尋母》) in Script on Promoting Kindness based on Mulian Saving His Mother (《目連救母勸善戲文》) compiled by Zheng Zhizhen (鄭之珍, A.D. 1518-1595) during the Ming Dynasty that the Blood Basin imagery first appeared in Mulian stories and dramas. However it is important to note that the Blood Basin imagery adapted in Zheng’s version was under the influence of the Blood Basin Scripture, a forged Buddhist scripture (偽經) during the Southern Song dynasty that became widespread after the Ming era.2 Following the Buddhist Blood Basin Scripture, Taoists in the same era created their own versions, namely: Taiyi Jiuku Tianzun Shuo Badu Xuehu Baocan (《太乙救苦天尊說拔度血湖寶懺》) and Yuanshi Tianzun Jidu Xuehu Zhenjing (《元始天尊濟度血湖真經》). It is evident that the two scriptures are strongly influenced by the Blood Basin Scripture.3 Although the general motive of saving one’s mother out of the torturous Blood Basin/Lake in both Buddhist and Taoist versions is the same, attention needs to be paid on the reason why females end up in the Blood Basin/Lake in the first place. This scenario takes place in the scene after the death of females where they have to atone for their sins, and they have sinned because of the pollution caused by blood discharged from their body. This would then lead to the question of the purpose of creating this scripture.

Despite having the same Blood Basin imagery, Buddhist and Taoist versions of related scriptures have different interpretations of the nature of female pollution. According to the Blood Basin Scripture, blood produced during delivery will unintentionally stain fabric materials. Hence, the water used for consumption and praying will be polluted from the washing of these blood-stained fabrics. This then provokes the saints and deities, thus all women who have given birth would end up being punished for their sins during afterlife.4 However, in the Xuehu Zhenjing, in addition to pollution caused during delivery, miscarriage and abortion (which were usually caused by dystocia) were also considered sins, whereas in Xuehu Baocan, only miscarriage and abortion were considered. Leaving economic benefits gained by monks from conducting the ritual aside, the purpose of creating the Blood Basin scripture, absurd as it may seem, can be deemed as firstly providing justification for males to leave their homes to become monks, since pregnancy results in sinning. Secondly, it served to weaken the societal status of women. According to Gary Seaman, women are portrayed as possessing a polluting nature for they are the most dangerous threat to the solidarity of male-centered groups and are likely to cause the weakening of brotherhood bonds.5

As pregnancy, marriage and abortion are all directly related to child bearing and the continuation of the family line, these scriptures receive different responses from the Chinese society that is deeply influenced by Confucian values. Generally, Confucians think of filial piety entirely in terms of human relations on this earthly level—between parents and children. Buddhists, on the other hand, consider filial piety in terms of something spiritual that extends into the future.6 Hence, according to Confucian teachings, to have no children is considered the most unfilial act. Therefore, just as how Yulanpen Jing was created to minimize conflicts in the ideas of filial piety so that Buddhism can be accepted by a Confucianism-based Chinese society, the Blood Basin Scripture serves the same purpose on the surface, but was sculptured to appear in a more threatening manner.7 Due to its threatening and dramatic nature, the Blood Basin imagery can then be fused together with the Mulian theme to create dramas of a warning nature (警世) that serves as a constant reminder for

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6 Zhu Hengfu, Mulianxì Yanjìu, 19-31.
9 See Michel Soynine, “Xuehu Zhenjing” in Fajiao Hanxue, 87-93. Although Soynine did not elaborate on the reasons for the Taoists’ adaptations and re-creation, I speculate that it is primarily due to economic reasons, in terms of monetary and non-monetary benefits from performing this ritual, and also to maintain the Taoists’ occupational niche.
10 See Michel Soynine, “Xuehu Zhenjing” in Fajiao Hanxue, 87-93.
12 For more details on the purpose of the creation of the Yulanpen Jing, see: Sun Changwu, Zhongguo Fajiao Wenwu shaosheng de 華東佛教文化史 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju 中華書局, 2010), 568, 707.
people to perform good deeds (勤善). However, for the general audience of drama and the general readers of scriptures, if they were to look deeper into the plays and the scriptures, the fear of pregnancy and childbirth may be planted into their minds. Such a mindset may prevent them from having children and causes them to commit the most unfilial mistake. Perhaps after realizing the main flaw of the scripture, Zheng's version, in the chapter where the Blood Lake first appeared, included an important scene where Mulian's mother recited the Three Major Hardships (三大苦)14 endured during the ten months of pregnancy, while her children were growing up, and her constant worry for her children even after her death. Upon hearing the recitation, the hell guard of the Blood Lake was touched by Mulian's mother and allowed her to skip the punishment in the Blood Lake. Although the scripture was compiled by Zheng Zhizhen, this interpretation and modification of the scripture is undoubtedly done by some unknown literatus. This unknown literatus, whom once studied Confucianism and later turned to Buddhism, supposedly wrote this script to instill the idea of filial piety by highlighting that children should repay their parents for bringing them up.

Interestingly, the City Whacking Drama (打城戲), a genre of drama that evolved from the Mullan theme during the mid-Qing era, is more commonly deemed as a ritual to save the dead from suffering instead of a drama solely for entertainment purposes.15 On the other hand, the Quanzhou puppetry version of Mullan Saving His Mother16, which can be seen as a form of the City Whacking Drama, contains two unique chapters with strong ritualistic features, namely Whacking the Gate of the Blood Lake Hell (血湖門) and Whacking the Shenuo Palace (森羅殿) that are not found in most other versions of Mulian drama.17 While it is still uncertain which influenced which and the time period that this influence took place, it is however evident that the City Whacking Drama was eventually adapted and modified by the Taoists, such as those from the Lin Shan Sect, and by Buddhist monks who were involved in performing funeral rites. These modifications ultimately result in a complete City Whacking Ritual performed mainly during funerals.

Before looking at the case study of Dongyue Temple in Tainan, it is important to know that "some older Taoists in Tainan have long opposed the performance of Mu-lien (Mulian) operas during funeral ceremonies, claiming that they are Buddhist in origin. Consequently, they have removed the Mu-lien plays from the liturgies."18 Accordingly, it is understandable why Mulian operas are opposed in Tainan, as Taoism, specifically the Lin Shan Sect, is still the dominant religion in south Taiwan today. However, the case study suggests that although we can observe a parallel between the City Whacking Ritual in Dongyue Temple and the traditional City Whacking Ritual, the most significant difference between the two can be observed through the replacement of the role of "Mullan" by a Red-Head Priest. The Red-Head Priest is none other than the priest of the San-nai Sect (三奶派), a branch of the Lin Shan Sect usually known as the Lin Shan San-nai Sect (閩山三奶派), honoring Chen Jing'gu as their main deity or guardian deity. Hence to allow a clearer understanding of the case study, an elaboration on Chen Jing'gu, otherwise known as the Lady of Linshui (臨水夫人), and her relationship with the Blood Basin imagery is deemed necessary.

**LEGENDS OF CHEN JING'GU AND THE BLOOD BASIN IMAGERY**

As a legendary character, Chen Jing'gu is recognized as one of the more common Goddesses of Pregnancy, together with the Lady of Birth Register (註生娘娘) and the Holy Maiden B.xia (碧霞元君), along with the Thirty-six Nannies (三十六婆姐) as their assistants. However "San-nai" in the San-nai Sect, refers to the San-nai Furen (三奶夫人), who are Chen Jing'gu, Li San-niang (李三娘), and Lin Ji-ning (林九娘), Li and

17 Wang Kui, Guijie Chaoduo yu Quanshan Mulian, 461-462.
Lin are the sworn sisters of Chen Jing’gu, and all of them are disciples of Lord Xu Xun (許遜, A.D. 239-374), the Grand Master of the Lv Shan Sect. Legends of Chen Jing’gu can be mainly found at length in novels or records during the Ming-Qing era, such as Linshui Pingyao Zhan (林水平妖傳), Mindu Bieji (闵都別記) and Records of the Gutian County (古田縣誌). The most significant myth of Chen Jing’gu is that she had to tuotai (lit. liberation from the womb) in order to perform a ritual to pray for the rain, on a straw mat laid on the White Dragon River (白龍江). However she died of a hemorrhage after being plotted against by the White Snake (白蛇) who ate her embryo resulting in her collapse. After Chen collapsed, the Ravine Demon (長坑鬼) pulled the ritual mat into the water. The story continues with Lord Xu summoning three divine ducks to her rescue, and when her spirit returns to visit Lord Xu, she has mastered the skills to protect fetuses and to relieve women from dystocia, skills she refused to learn when she was under training from Lord Xu, and deeply regretted after this incident. Chen Jing’gu thence vowed that she would not become a deity if she ever failed to save the women and protect fetuses from dystocia.19

Although no mention of the Blood Basin/Lake was found in the legends of Chen Jing’gu, in his detailed study of the Lady of Linshui, Brigitte Baptandier parallels Chen Jing’gu falling into the White Dragon River after the ritual mat was dragged away, to her falling “into the Lake of Blood, the region of hell where women who die in childbirth go as punishment. Chen Jing’gu, whose responsibility as a divinity will be to protect women, herself suffers the bitterness of it in advance”.19 Hence from the Buddhist’s point of view, Chen Jing’gu’s death due to childbirth would definitely land her in the Blood Lake, while from the Taoist’s point of view, her death due to childbirth would be the main reason for which she is divinized and worshipped. In contrast to the Blood Basin Scripture which targets the Buddhists and in a way goes against Confucian ideology, the legend and the worship of Chen Jing’gu is not only targeted towards worshippers of the Taoist pantheon, but is in fact also accepted by a wider mass guided by Confucian ideas, who continue to pray for offspring in order to fulfill their duty of filial piety.

The Chen Jing’gu Cult can also be observed in dramas, such as the Furen Drama (夫人戲) and Beidou Drama (北斗戲)21, and in rituals such as the Ritual of Cultivating Flowers (栽花科儀), and the Ritual of Crossing the Pass (過關科儀)22, which are usually performed and carried out within the premises of the temple worshipping Chen Jing’gu to pray for offspring and protection of the fetus. Due to word limitation, details of the dramas and rituals is not discussed here, but the general idea of the cult is to protect pregnant women and children, which is in direct contrast with the Mulian themed dramas and rituals to save the dead from sufferings and to send them for reincarnation. However from another point of view, the Chen Jing’gu Cult and the Mulian theme are in fact complements of each other in terms of their role in the cycle of life and death of human beings, and more importantly, their emphasis on filial piety. Similarly, although the technical aspects of the Blood Basin Scripture and the creation of the Blood Basin imagery is in conflict with the practice of Chen Jing’gu Cult, both of them share a common greater goal, which is to save most women, physically and spiritually, from undesirable sexual politics and their low social status in feudal China.23

Therefore, the Mulian theme and the Chen Jing’gu Cult were able to co-exist not only because they have different targeted audience and followers, but also because their ideas and beliefs were deemed appropriate to society and even complemented one another to a certain extent. Co-existence of both cultures can be seen vividly in the southern part of China, specifically in the Fujian region, and in Taiwan. Taiwan’s case is even unusual with the deviation of religious practice in north and south of Taiwan as observed by Chu’iu K’un-liang. Therefore the final section of the paper shall examine the adaptation of the Mulian theme using the

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19 For the Chinese edition of the legend, see Li Ren He Qiu 里人何求, Mindu Bieji 《閩都別記》(Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chubanshe福屬人民出版社, 1987), 418. For the English edition, see Brigitte Baptandier, translated by Kristin Ingrid Frykland, The Lady of Linshui: A Chinese Female Cult (California: Stanford University Press, 2008), 80-83.
20 Brigitte Baptandier, The Lady of Linshui, 82.
21 Details of the dramas can be found in Ye Mingsheng 葉明生, Minxi Shanghang Gaoqiang Kulie Yu Furen Xi 《閩西上杭高翔七科夫人戲》(Taipei: She He Zheng Jijian Hui台南儒會, 1995), Chapter 7; and Rong Shicheng 容世誠, The Anthropology of Chinese Drama: Ritual, Theater and Community (Taipei: Maitian Chubanshe麥田出版社, 1997), 59-131, respectively.
22 Details of the rituals in English can be found in Brigitte Baptandier, The Lady of Linshui, 222-241.

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City Whacking Ritual of Dongyue Temple in Tainan as a case study.

THE ADAPTATION OF THE MULIAN THEME

The City Whacking Ritual of Dongyue Temple serves mainly to rescue the souls trapped in the City of Wrongfully Dead and to end their sufferings by sending them for reincarnation. Research on this ritual still remains a minority today as it is uniquely and specifically confined to the premises of the Dongyue Temple of Tainan. According to the Taoist pantheon of deities, the God of Mount Tai, otherwise known as Dongyue Dadi (東嶽大帝), is in-charge of “hell” in traditional Chinese beliefs. Thus, his presence is deemed essential to releasing the souls, and this ritual is mainly conducted in the Dongyue Temple. In contrast to those funeral rites related to the Mulian theme, this ritual is not conducted during funerals, as its “target audience” are souls of family members who have already passed away for some time.

The most significant procedure of the ritual, which is the standard action of “whacking the city”, is an obvious adaptation from the Mulian drama and the “whacking” in the Mulian drama is in fact another direct adaptation from the Yujia Yankou Shishi (《喻迦焰口施食》) from the Song dynasty, which contains an incantation on Breaking the Hell (《破地獄真言》) to release the souls from the hell so that they can receive offerings from the priest. However, the most significant difference which distinguishes the City Whacking Ritual from the conventional Mulian theme, is where the Red-Head Priest replaced the role of Mulian. The Red-Head Priest, usually equipped with Ox-horn (騸角), Cleansing Whip (淨鞭), and Demon Slaying Sword (斬妖劍), is a direct representation of Chen Jing’gu, as according to Chen Jing’gu’s legend, these were the tools she used when praying for the rain and when slaying the demons. In addition to the priest, a medium (乩童) for the main god (應主) acts as a messenger between God of Mount Tai and the Hell Kings during the ritual. An Angyi ( Numero), someone for the spirit(s) of the family members that the devotee wants to rescue (or summon up from hell) to possess, will also be present. Through the various parallel roles in this ritual, whereby the priest, the medium and the Angyi represent Mulian, Lord Buddha and Mulian’s mother respectively, the adaptation of the Mulian theme into the City Whacking Ritual illustrates the common theme of expurgating one’s deceased family member of their sins and rescuing them from hell.

Scriptures used for this ritual are mainly extracted from the Descending to Hell Ritual (《落地府科儀》) of the Lv Shan Sect, with similar incantations in the introductory section to invite the gods and the Five Camp Generals (五營將軍) as performed in other rituals conducted by the sect. It is important to note that although it is named the City Whacking Ritual, this is just part of a few other rituals conducted together in order to form a complete whole. Two significant rituals related to the Mulian theme can be identified amongst this whole ritual package, namely “Whacking the Blood Basin” and “Consumption of Medicine”. It is important to note that both of the rituals are conducted after the City Whacking Ritual is completed and the souls have been “rescued” out of Hell. Although the purpose of Whacking of the Blood Basin Ritual is similar to that in the Mulian theme, this ritual is only conducted when the devotee wants to rescue a female spirit whose death was caused by childbirth and/or children who died during the process of childbirth. However, the Consumption of Medicine Ritual is exclusive, as it is believed that sickness the spirits used to possess when alive or developed after death, adds on to the sufferings in hell. Hence the God of Medicine (藥王) was invited to cure the sickness of the spirits to relieve them of the sufferings. This concept can

26 The main god who possessed the medium was also the one who notified the devotee before the ritual that a particular family member(s) is trapped in the City of Wrongfully Dead and needs to be rescued.


28 Original Chinese characters for this ritual is “打血（血藏）” which is a paper model representation of the Blood Lake/Basin in the Blood Basin Scriptures of both Buddhism and Taoism.
actually be seen as an adaptation or reinterpretation of the chapter on Inviting the Doctor to Cure His Mother (〈請醫救母〉) in Zheng’s version of Mulian Saving His Mother from Hell, where Mulian invited a doctor and even prayed to the Three Divine Officials (三官大帝) in hopes of curing his mother but to no avail.

Considering the deities worshipped along with the God of Mount Tai, Dongyue Temples serves many other functions besides dealing with the Netherworld. In Quanzhou, “people visit the Dongyue Temple to worship Tagawa Matsu (田川氏, A.D. 1601-1646), the mother of Zheng Chenggong (鄭成功, A.D. 1624-1662), to pray for the safety of the mother and baby during dystocia or to expiate one’s sins by rescuing her out of the Blood Basin.” Tagawa Matsu was conferred the title of Crazy Bloodied Furen (血瘋夫人) by the common folks for she committed suicide after being humiliated by the Qing soldiers. She is considered part of the Furen Cult (夫人媽信仰) in the Min-nan region of China, along with the San-nai Furen and several other female deities. Similarly, the Lady of Birth Register and the Tianyi Zhenren (天醫真人) are also worshipped in the Dongyue Temple in Tainan as they are closely related to certain parts of the City Whacking Ritual carried out in the temple.

It can therefore be observed that, although according to Ch’iu K’un-liang, the older Taoists in Tainan opposed the use of rituals related to the Mulian theme and even completely removed it from the funeral rites, the general structure and concept of the Mulian theme can still be observed in the Taoist’s City Whacking Ritual of Dongyue Temple. The Red-Head Priest is chosen to perform this ritual primarily due to their dominance in the southern parts of Taiwan and secondly because they are deemed to possess powers to descend to the hell with the aid of Chen Jing’gu and other deities worshipped by the Lü Shan Sect. In other words, in order to maintain their occupational niche in the region, the Red-Head Priest has to be able to take over the role of “Mulian” completely, that is to rescue the spirits from hell. Although co-existence of the Mulian theme and the Chen Jing’gu Cult can be observed in the City Whacking Ritual of Dongyue Temple in Tainan, we can no longer simply view this ritual as one that is directly related to the Mulian theme. Instead, we should approach it as an adaptation of the Mulian theme due to the interactions between the ritual, the Blood Basin Scripture, the Chen Jing’gu Cult and also the societal culture as a whole during its progression in history.

CONCLUSION

Mulian operas and rituals serve to rescue the spirits from their sufferings in hell, while at the same time promotes the idea of filial piety and the persuasion of doing good deeds. This paper examined the interaction between the Mulian theme and the Chen Jing’gu Cult though the connection established by the Blood Basin imagery. A case study showing the adaptation of the Mulian theme highlighted one of the results of the interaction. Regardless of the differences and even conflicts in terms of technical aspects between Taoism and Buddhism, the Blood Basin imagery nevertheless connects both religious groups, and yet, simultaneously enables each to maintain their own unique identity. Lastly, as the limitation of this paper lies in the fact that only one case study is presented, future research following this framework and focusing on the Blood Basin imagery could do a comparative study of related rituals and thus contribute to the overall study of the Blood Basin imagery.


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Wang Koon Lee Dean

Wang Koon Lee Dean is a first year master’s student in the Department of Chinese Studies at National University of Singapore.
IDENTIFYING PREDICTABLE PATTERNS IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

China’s foreign policy behavior is far more comprehensible and predictable than it is often presented in today’s public dialogue. A simple understanding of China’s core foreign policy objectives can allow even the casual observer of international affairs to assess China’s foreign policy behavior with informed conviction. By applying a straightforward framework that accounts for China’s pursuit of two main priorities, domestic development and security, any observer can gain a more sophisticated and nuanced command of China’s policy toward any international actor or issue. This framework lays out four considerations: geography and history, comparative advantages, security, and realpolitik calculations in evaluating Chinese behavior. It then applies these considerations to two example regions, Africa and Europe, and three ongoing foreign policy challenges (the North Korean nuclear threat, the ongoing East China Sea dispute with Japan, and cyber espionage with the United States) to illustrate how one can use this framework to explain and predict Chinese foreign policy behavior even without extensive expertise on Chinese politics.

INTRODUCTION

After almost four decades of the much-touted “rise of China,” China’s foreign policy has become a very influential force in global affairs. As its economic, political, and military clout grows, understanding China’s foreign policy behavior has become both crucial for the informed international observer, and increasingly challenging. Government transparency issues, differing political values between China and the West, and a proliferation of noise and punditry regarding China in the public dialogue complicate clear comprehension of the country’s behavior on the world stage. Uncertainty muddles the ability of public and private sector actors to make confident decisions when dealing with China, and can be a destabilizing influence in international affairs.

This paper sets out to illustrate that China’s foreign policy behavior has more regularity, and is thus more predictable, than the public dialogue suggests. There are patterns in Chinese foreign policy, and these patterns are characterized by the identifiable, foundational objectives of domestic development and security. We seek to show that outside observers can explain China’s policy posture toward any country, region, or international institution, based on that actor’s geographic distance from China, the comparative advantages of the actor in question vis-à-vis China, and how China pragmatically views the opportunities and threats of that relationship with respect to these two objectives.

Identifying the patterns in China’s behavior

This paper asserts two theses on the predictability of Chinese foreign policy behavior. The first is that China prioritizes the objectives of (1) domestic development and (2) security in every international relationship—with countries, regions and international institutions (like the United Nations or World Trade Organization). Domestic development, for the purposes of this paper, refers to economic growth and modernization, infrastructure development, and general efforts to lift the Chinese population out of poverty. Security refers both to national security, or protection from external threats, and to internal regime stability. To determine which factors control for China’s posture in any given relationship, the onlooker should consider the following four questions:

1 Geographical and Historical: Where is the international actor geographically with respect to China and what, if any, historical issues exist that factor into

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1 Professor Thomas Fingar, former Deputy Director of National Intelligence and head of the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence.
China's calculations?
- Comparative advantages: What technological, commercial, or natural resources does the actor have to offer? Likewise, what resources can China offer to that actor?
- Security: What security threats, if any, does the actor pose to China?
- Realpolitik calculations: How can China structure a relationship that maximizes the benefits to China's domestic development needs and minimizes the potential security threats?

The foundation of this first thesis is that China's international policies fundamentally serve domestic priorities. This internal focus makes sense from a historical perspective, as the People's Republic of China, since its founding in 1949, has faced the daunting task of catching up its woefully underdeveloped country to the industrialized powers of the postwar global order. Prioritizing stability as a foreign policy goal became a method of diverting resources away from hard security concerns toward much-needed domestic economic development. Particularly since Reform and Opening, the Party's legitimacy has rested on the ability of the leadership to, pragmatically, improve people's lives through economic growth and, ideologically, on popular nationalism. Today's 'Mandate of Heaven' is fueled and embodied by economic growth, and that growth is not something the Chinese leadership can afford to lose.

China's contradictory decline in freedom of action

The second thesis will not be the focus of this paper, but is worth noting upfront. While China's international influence has grown dramatically, its freedom of action, i.e., the ability of the government to act unilaterally as it pleases, has declined. China has been remarkably successful in its pursuit of the two core objectives of domestic development and security, but the means China chose to achieve these objectives was through engagement with the international community, a community for which membership is attached to rules of behavior.

To use a sports analogy, an isolationist China (such as China under Mao) is like an independent baseball team, unaffiliated with any league. This team can do whatever it wants to try winning games—encourage steroid use, have more than nine players on the field, bribe umpires, and so on. The consequence of this is that other teams might not want to play them. If, however, that team joins the Major Leagues, it must abide by certain rules to enjoy the benefits of league play. Drug tests, regulated bat sizes, salary caps, etc. are necessary sacrifices if a team wants to enjoy the increased revenue, access to talent, and access to paying fans by joining a reputable league. Once a part of the league and dependent on those benefits, the team can no longer afford to return to the freedoms enjoyed in isolation.

Similarly, China must obey the norms of the liberal order it has joined since Reform and Opening, so as to enjoy the access to trade, talent and technology the international economy offers. Indeed, the globalizing world creates webs of interdependence that constrain individual actors such as China and compel them to act in the interest of all members. Some rules are formalized through organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and World Trade Organization (WTO), and others are informal constraints embodied in the tradeoffs of diplomatic relationships in which unilateral action for short-term selfish gain jeopardizes long-term mutual benefits. For example, if China imposes self-serving tariffs on French products, the WTO imposes sanctions on China. If Beijing threatens war against Japan, fewer Japanese companies feel safe investing in China.

Thus, increasingly, China is playing by predetermined rules—rules we know. Greater international engagement limits China's ability to behave unpredictably and out of pure, short-term self-interest. Again, while this second thesis is not the focus of the paper, it is an important consideration that actively applies to each of the addressed case studies.

This paper's approach

In the following sections this paper expands on the framework summarized above as the first thesis, and tests it using various case studies. First, it will provide a concise overview of the historical context of Chinese foreign policy today, six decades into CCP rule. The paper will then take a brief, high-level look at China's approach to relations with Europe and Africa to better articulate the framework and how it is applied. Finally, it will use the framework to explain and predict China's behavior in three currently evolving foreign policy challenges, in which China's actions and policies may confound outside observers. These three issues are the North Korean nuclear threat, the Senkaku Island dispute with Japan, and cyber espionage in the U.S.-China relationship.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT: SIX DECADES OF CCP FOREIGN POLICY

Soviet tutelage, isolationism, and domestic failure

The installation of the CCP in 1949 ended what Chinese history books refer to as the “century of humiliation” from the Opium Wars of mid-19th century to the Japanese occupation from 1931-45. At this time, China was a highly impoverished, underdeveloped nation in desperate need of growth. Thus, two clear objectives for the new leadership in Beijing under Mao Zedong were (1) to build and feed the country, and (2) to secure the country against foreign invaders.

To rebuild China, Beijing needed access to capital, technology, and expertise in addition to security from foreign threats that would allow China to focus efforts on domestic development: instead of external warfare. At this time the bipolar Cold War landscape was forming around China leaving only two feasible options for China to look to for these needs: the United States or the Soviet Union. For a number of reasons, not least of which was the obvious historical and ideological affinity of communism, China looked to the Soviets. Thus for its first decade, China’s primary foreign policy focus became its relationship with Moscow.

Despite Beijing’s engagement in wars and skirmishes along its borders under Mao and its early relations with the Soviets, throughout the first three decades of CCP rule China was essentially an isolationist power. Even when Beijing’s relationship with Moscow became strained in the late 1950s and antagonistic in the 1960s, Beijing remained inwardly focused on mostly unsuccessful policies of domestic rebuilding, from the Great Leap Forward to the Cultural Revolution. Through a rocky alliance with the Soviets, de facto isolationism, and a list of failed domestic economic and social policies, by the time Mao passed away in 1976, China was still an impoverished, feeble nation.

Deng, Reform and Opening, and engagement with the U.S.

By the late 1960s, China was signaling to the United States that a warming of relations between the two countries was possible. With the Sino-Soviet relationship going cold, China needed a new source of the capital, technology, and know-how that it had previously sought from Moscow and failed to generate on its own. These early signals led to major steps in reestablishing Sino-US relations, with President Nixon’s famous visit to Beijing in 1972.

By the time Deng Xiaoping took the reins following the death of Mao and the end of the Cultural Revolution, the time was ripe for major shifts in China’s domestic and foreign policy realms. Reform and Opening policies began to slowly reshape China’s society and economy into one of more mobility and market orientation. Beijing’s foreign policy objectives could still be boiled down to the same twin pursuits as before: domestic development and security. However, the strategies and relationships through which China would pursue these objectives would shift dramatically under Deng.

The Soviet alliance had gone sour, and isolationism and resource-draining border wars had forestalled the pursuit of the capital, technology and know-how needed for development. Skirmishes and wars in neighboring countries had distracted China from the primary task of rebuilding the country. Outside China, countries that had aligned with the United States, both in Western Europe and in East Asia, were modernizing rapidly and building the first world international community. The so-called “Asian Tigers” of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan offered examples in China’s own backyard of the prosperity possible through participation in the U.S.-led international economy.

Thus, under Deng the fundamental shift in Chinese foreign policy was that the CCP—in behavior, if not always in rhetoric—would now seek to engage with the United States as well as the international economy and institutions under U.S. leadership. China’s engagement with the U.S. would not only provide great opportunities for access to capital, technology and expertise, but would also better ensure, for the time being, the peace and stability of its relationships with its East Asian neighbors, a crucial necessity if China was to shift its primary focus to domestic development.

ARTICULATING THE FRAMEWORK: IDENTIFYING THE PATTERNS IN CHINA’S BEHAVIOR

The following sections use Chinese foreign policy behavior toward two geographic areas to further
articulate the paper's proposed framework. The examples of Europe and Africa have been selected to illustrate that even toward two such dissimilar regions, Chinese policy behavior bears the marks of distinct and predictable patterns of behavior. It is worth noting that any region of Chinese foreign policy can be analyzed in this way, and this will be further demonstrated in the cases of Korea, Japan, and the United States in later case studies. With China's core goals of domestic development and security in mind, we evaluate each region by asking questions regarding its geography and history, the actor's comparative advantages vis-à-vis China, security considerations and China's subsequent realpolitik calculations.

**China and Europe**

**Geography and history.** Because Europe is very distant from China, any potential commercial opportunities or security threats will be a correspondingly smaller priority to China. Historical narrative does not play any significant role in China's current relationship with Europe. Though European nations such as Great Britain were among the foreign intruders of the 19th century, their lack of military involvement in the Pacific today neutralizes any present day tensions that could arise out of that history.

**Comparative advantages.** Despite the distance, Sino-European relationships have a large advantage for China in terms of securing resources for modernization. The European Union (EU), taken as a single economic entity, is the second largest export market for Chinese goods, behind only the U.S. Europe has a number of advanced economies with valuable technology to transfer to China through foreign direct investment (FDI) and direct trade.

**Security.** In China's pursuit of security through its foreign policy, Europe's distance poses an opportunity for China. The distance minimizes mutual security fears between the two, as well as direct threats of China's growth to Europe. While other developed nations such as Japan, South Korea, and the United States have security interests in China's backyard, European nations are more removed from such concerns because of their distance and lack of military involvement in East Asia. However, there is also no great cooperation in security, such as arms sales, because of Europe's close security relationship with the U.S. through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Additionally, Europe's sway in the international community makes them a potential counterweight to the United States on various international issues.

**Realpolitik considerations.** Taken together, the initial weighing of costs and benefits of relations with EU nations based on geographic proximity and resource opportunities suggest a strong commercial relationship with opportunities for security cooperation not available through the U.S. or other East Asian developed countries. This predicted posture tracks well with China's actual policy behavior toward Europe over the last few decades. Economically, the EU-China relationship is very strong, with the EU as a whole constituting China's largest market in the world for both exports and imports. As a market for Chinese goods, European nations, similar to Japan, have played a crucial role in providing the capital China needs to reinvest in modernizing. As an exporter of goods to China and a source of FDI to China, European nations have been invaluable to China in transferring the technology and know-how needed to modernize.

**China and Africa**

Applying the framework to Africa as a region—that is, sub-Saharan Africa, separate from North African nations from Morocco to Egypt—we see a very different picture of foreign policy behavior emerge. Nevertheless, the policies are still demonstrably driven by the same twin objectives of domestic development and security.

**Geography and history.** As with Europe, Africa is a long way away from China, with no significant historical issues between the two. This great distance decreases the threats and the opportunities China might face in the continent. There is little significant historical context for the relationship, allowing the relationships to be guided primarily by other factors.

**Comparative advantages.** As a developing continent with mostly underdeveloped nations, Africa possesses few technological or financial advantages to transfer to China. Given that many African nations have very low GDPs, they are also not particularly attractive markets for Chinese exports. However, Africa still has an important role in Chinese foreign policy thanks to natural resources and governments eager to strike contracts without the political, legal,
and ethical demands of Western nations. Especially as the Chinese economy began booming in the 1990s and early 2000s, Africa’s natural resources became a growing attraction for Beijing. China’s own natural resources could not keep pace with China’s economic growth, and Africa’s natural resources could be secured at cheaper costs than other regions because of Africa’s poverty and underdevelopment. As China’s hunger for natural resources has grown, so has the capacity for Chinese multinationals and Chinese capital to deploy to far flung regions like Africa to invest in much needed infrastructure projects.

Security. In contrast to European nations’ NATO alliance, African nations have no such complicating relationships, making some of them willing to engage in Chinese arms sales. Unlike North Korea’s fragility right on China’s doorstep, the weak and in some cases warring regimes of Africa pose no great security threats to China because of their geographic distance. These troubles may threaten Chinese interests in the future, however, if China’s economic footprint in Africa grows and requires protection that the local governments cannot provide.

Realpolitik considerations. Due to these economic interests, African nations and China have found increasingly significant economic gains, respectively, in their relationships. Moreover, the short-term economic gains for China have been so great that there has been little impetus to push for political reforms that other developed nations often insisted upon when dealing with corrupt and authoritarian governments in Africa. China has stable, commercial relationships with African nations, allowing China to secure much-needed natural resources that cannot be attained in closer locations.

The above section has sought to further illustrate the patterns of Chinese foreign policy behavior that stem from China’s identifiable, foundational objectives of domestic development and security. The following section applies the framework to ‘live’ foreign policy challenges China is currently confronting, in order to explain and predict China’s behavior in each situation.

7 Ibid.

APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK: PREDICTING OUTCOMES IN CURRENT CRISIS AND CHALLENGES

The previous section tested the framework at a macroscopic level to identify clear patterns and predictability in China’s foreign policy behavior toward various countries or regions in the world. The section below puts our theses to the test in unresolved foreign policy scenarios in which China’s behavior has seemed difficult to explain or predict.

Reigning in North Korea

In the past year, Northeast Asia has witnessed a new round of aggressive provocations from North Korea. In the first half of 2013 North Korea conducted its third nuclear test, stated that the U.S. was the target of its nuclear program, and declared that the North was officially withdrawing from its obligations under the 1953 armistice that effectively ended the Korean War. The U.S. has actively and aggressively pursued the denuclearization of North Korea, but has often felt thwarted by China’s continued support for the regime and reluctance to similarly pressure the hermit kingdom. In order to explain China’s posture toward North Korea, despite the clear and obvious threat the nuclear program poses to regional stability, we apply the paper’s framework to the China-North Korea relationship.

Geography and history. Northeast China, China’s industrial expanse formerly known as Manchuria, shares an 880-mile long border with North Korea. Thus, instability in North Korea is a discrete concern for China in a way that instability in El Salvador, for example, would not be. History also factors into the relationship. The Korean War of 1950-53 not only bound China to North Korea’s protection on the tensely divided Korean peninsula, but it also left a large U.S. military presence in South Korea. While China’s public rhetoric has long described its relationship with the North Korea as being as close as “lips and teeth,” the North Korean nuclear program suggests otherwise. Neither Japan nor South Korea have developed nuclear programs because of the extended deterrence provided by the so-called “nuclear umbrella” courtesy of their own nuclear arsenals.

alliances with the U.S.10 North Korea clearly feels no such security from its relationship with China—so much so that it has pursued, built, and tested nuclear arms11 and thus has worsened its already pariah status in the international community. North Korea has been adept at manipulating its bigger allies to its advantage, but with the fall of the Soviet Union, North Korea can now only effectively manipulate China because of the security concerns discussed below.12

Comparative advantages. In terms of comparative advantages that can be leveraged for the goal of domestic economic development, China has little to gain from North Korea. North Korea has no advanced technology to offer China, no financial capital, and virtually no market for Chinese exports given the lack of economic development and expendable income in North Korea. It does, however, have raw materials from mining and some cheap labor available, which could easily be integrated into China’s economy because of its proximity.13

Security concerns. China’s security interests compose the most important aspect of its relationship with North Korea. North Korea’s proximity to Northeast China, as well as to South Korea and Japan, means North Korea’s opportunistically erratic and unstable regime poses challenges to China’s domestic and international security interests.14 In terms of China’s domestic security interests, China fears the collapse of the regime in North Korea for a few reasons. First, there could be a flood of refugees across their shared land border into Northeast China, and these refugees would be expensive to house and feed. This burden could adversely affect the domestic stability of Northeast China.15 Hence, China has been building border fences and increasing the presence of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the region and its capacity to maintain order and to control the influx of refugees.16 Second, weapons-grade nuclear material in the country that could become lost or stolen creates a nuclear proliferation problem—one that would potentially invite physical intervention from the U.S., South Korea, Japan, or China.17

The collapse of North Korea would pose serious challenges to China’s domestic and regional security and is thus very unappealing to the Chinese leadership. In some ways, North Korea is holding a gun to its own head, and China will at least do the bare minimum to keep it from pulling the trigger. In the past this has included providing North Korea with food aid, heating oil, and other subsistence resources to replace the aid North Korea stopped receiving from international bodies following international sanctions.18

North Korea’s provocative behavior, such as that of 2013, also poses external security challenges for China. These kinds of regional frictions are particularly troubling to China because of the destabilizing influence it causes, not to mention the inevitable involvement of the U.S. in any such regional security issues because of its alliances with South Korea and Japan. Thus a North Korean misstep could potentially bring on armed confrontation with South Korea, Japan, or the U.S. Any war on China’s border would have immediate consequences on China’s economy and internal stability.19

Realpolitik considerations. With these competing needs to protect North Korea from collapse while simultaneously chastising its behavior, one can

understand why China’s policies toward North Korea seem so contradictory to outside observers. Outside observers have wondered why China shields North Korea from harm and from sanction when it has been so troublesome not only to the international community, but even to China. The answer is that, for all the trouble that North Korea causes China, the alternatives of collapse and conflict escalation are a much graver threat to China’s dual foreign policy objectives of domestic development and security. Despite the threat that North Korea’s nuclear program poses to China’s foreign policy objectives, pushing North Korea by supporting U.S. efforts at denuclearization could lead to more desperate behavior or even regime collapse, which is an even greater threat to China’s stability. China’s best option in this context is to seek the status quo, minimize as much as possible North Korea’s destabilizing behavior in the region, prop up its regime to prevent collapse, and press for economic reforms that would draw it more deeply into China’s own orbit and influence.20

How will China reign in North Korea?

Despite the recent uptick in aggression from North Korea, China’s goals remain the same: Going into the future, China’s policy toward North Korea will continue to change and evolve but only at the pace of the rest of its policies; China will “feel for the stones as it crosses the stream,” as goes a famous saying of Deng Xiaoping. This means that China will continue to press for changes in North Korea’s economy, closer integration with the Chinese economy, and less risk for Chinese investments. It will maintain troops and fences along the border to reduce permeability and as insurance against a sudden regime collapse. When North Korea’s behavior is most aggressive, China will use its limited leverage to return to a stable status quo. For example, as tensions currently escalate over North Korea’s recent, vociferous provocations, China’s core goal is still regional stability. Thus China supports resumption of the Six-Party Talks, but because it will not press for the preconditions that the U.S. and its allies will require, China’s support will have limited effect on the success of those Talks. Finally, although Kim Jong Un is quite young, the real political power in North Korea seems to rest in the hands of leaders in their seventies and eighties; so Chinese leaders will patiently wait for the old guard of North Korea to die off just like their forebears waited for Mao to pass on.21

The irony is that China has more influence on North Korea than any other country in the world, but it still is not enough to effectively institute change. Indeed, in accordance with this paper’s framework, it is China’s own, pragmatic goals of development and security that prevent it from pushing North Korea for stronger reforms—at least in the short-term. The Chinese approach to regime change in North Korea is in some ways a very long, partial siege, and the unstoppable march of time will do some of their work for them. In the short-term, however, no matter how extreme North Korea’s rhetoric or provocations become, China’s top priority will be the minimization of instability, a goal that will encourage the status quo.

Territorial Disputes in the East China Sea

The ongoing dispute over the uninhabited rocky islets in the East China Sea, known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan and the Diaoyu Islands in China, has raised major questions about China’s prudence in dealing with its neighbors and uncertainty about its potential for aggressive expansion in East Asia. To explain this behavior, we first look to the international relationship under which this conflict has arisen, as the islands dispute shows the difficulties that arise when China’s twin goals of economic growth and security clash.

Geography and history. Japan’s geographic proximity to China is one of the most crucial and complicating determinants of China’s policy toward Japan. This proximity means that if there are resources to be gained from Japan, then that opportunity is magnified, leading to the thriving and mutually beneficial economic partnership that exists today. However, this amplification also applies to threats. Geographic proximity has not only created the opportunity for a bitter history, but also enhances the significance of such historical factors between the two countries. These factors figure prominently in China’s calculations in the East China Sea.

Comparative advantages. China has pursued and

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achieved a very strong commercial relationship with Japan, because of the close geography and immense gain to be had in China’s pursuit of domestic modernization. Japan is one of the most advanced countries in the world technologically, and it is the third largest economy on the globe, behind only China and the U.S.\(^2\) Japan is a global leader in a range of electronics and computing and manufacturing technologies, and with the third highest GDP in the world, it has had the capital to invest in neighboring developing countries like China.\(^3\) Combine the third largest economy on earth with the 10th largest population, and it is clear how Japan has come to be the largest market for Chinese-produced goods among China’s neighbors.\(^4\) As of 2011, Japan was the top, single-country exporter of goods to China, and the second largest market in the world for Chinese exports (behind only the U.S.). Japan is also the top source of FDI in China, a process through which Japan has transferred much of the needed technology for modernization and development to China. Considering the centrality of economic development to China’s priorities, the maintenance of a stable relationship with Japan has therefore become paramount.

**Security.** The same proximity that has allowed the economic partnership to thrive also exacerbates security concerns. In addition to the threat posed by Japan’s own military capabilities and proximity to China, Japan also has an extremely close security relationship with the United States, with a large U.S. presence on Japanese soil. While the U.S. is not a direct military enemy of China, the U.S. is the dominant military force in East Asia and constrains China’s freedom of action in any disputes with its Pacific neighbors—most importantly with Taiwan. Despite the frustrating aspects of this U.S. presence, however, China also benefits from the U.S. military presence, which has protected shipping lanes for trade China relies on for growth, and has prevented Japan from needing to build up its regional military power in a way that would likely concern China.

**Realpolitik considerations.** Due to proximity and comparative advantages, the Sino-Japanese economic relationship is very important to both sides. However, geographical and historical factors play a significant role in the relationship. The immutable factor of the history of Japan’s invasion of China offers Beijing the opportunity to replace the failing beacon of communism with that of nationalism, and nationalism is often stoked by public anger against Japan. While this dance may appear to work against China’s interests by burning short-term bridges to a top trading partner like Japan, in the view of Beijing, only with strong CCP leadership and public support can the government achieve the twin objectives of domestic development and security. The centrality of this strategy to China’s internal stability can be gleaned by examining the East China Sea dispute in more detail.

**How to explain China’s erratic behavior in the East China Sea?**

A longstanding territorial issue exploded back onto the diplomatic radar in September 2012 following the Japanese government’s purchase of three of the five main islands in the disputed islands chain.\(^5\) Beijing responded with a series of apparently pre-planned maneuvers that have resulted in military units on both sides now operating in dangerously close proximity, and under excessively belligerent government rhetoric.\(^6\)

Though Japan is one of China’s most vital economic partners, the ongoing and dispute suggests that despite this economic interdependence between the two countries, the territorial issue in Beijing’s view constitutes a security threat great enough to risk instability in the relationship. The cause of this seemingly emotional, less-than-pragmatic behavior lies in the role China’s rhetorical policy toward Japan has in the maintenance of China’s internal stability.

Nationalism is an important factor in explaining China’s behavior in this dispute, stemming out of geographical and historical context. As discussed above, nationalism is a core pillar on which the CCP derives its license to rule, and China’s narrative Japan’s 20th century aggression toward China has often served as a log to throw on the nationalism fire when needed. The legacy of Japanese militarism and World War II has left an enduring mark in the imaginations of the Chinese people, in part because the Chinese government has actively encouraged this national narrative of victimization through education, political rhetoric and even omnipresent television dramas on

\(^2\) WTO Trade Profiles, China (April 2013).


\(^4\) WTO Trade Profiles, China (April 2013).

\(^5\) "Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks."

International Crisis Group, (April 8, 2013)

\(^6\) Ibid.
the subject. Moreover, territorial sovereignty has been elevated to such high status in the nationalistic public discourse, that leaders and media in China have almost no choice but to portray the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute as an existential threat to China. Therefore, the maintenance of territorial integrity is crucial to the regime’s perceived legitimacy, both externally and internally, as the Chinese public demands that their government defend China’s interests.

While the furor supports the CCP’s legitimacy, it also limits diplomatic maneuverability on these issues. As an external factor, this means China’s ability to maintain its claim over the course of the decades-long dispute has coincided with China’s postwar quest for international legitimacy—the very engagement and participation in the international community that has been integral to China’s growth and security since Reform and Opening.

Beijing’s handling of the situation, particularly in its most recent diplomatic maneuverings, suggests that the calculation favors the maintenance of a strong claim in the long run over short-term economic fallout with Japan. Considering Beijing’s goals, this approach has some rhyme and reason to it. The mutual economic gains between China and Japan suggest that the economic relationship will rebound once the dispute’s intensity subsides. China’s increased willingness to flex military muscles, not just rhetoric, not only reinforces the long-term interest in protecting China’s claim, but also signals that such disputes may be more costly in the future as China’s force projection capabilities grow.

As the North Korea analysis above also showed, China seeks to avoid major instability in the interests of its own long-term economic development. The combined signal to Japan that it wants to avoid such spats in the future and that China will always respond forcefully in such situations due to domestic political pressures should communicate that China does not want these issues to surface often. Some arrangement that would allow the issue to be shelved rather than solved is in China’s best interests for now, as it protects regional stability and the ability for China to continue enjoying the economic benefits of its relationship with Japan.

Cyber espionage in the context of U.S.-China relations

Public revelations of the extent of Chinese cyber economic espionage against the United States was one of the most significant developments in the U.S.-China relationship in 2013. A number of articles and privately produced reports detailed the methods of Chinese cyber thieves and the massive amounts of economic information pilfered from U.S. companies.

Even as early as summer 2012, the head of the U.S. Cyber Command and Director of the National Security Agency, General Keith Alexander, publicly described China’s cyber economic espionage successes vis-à-vis U.S. companies as the “greatest transfer of wealth in human history.” Assuming these reports are true about China’s extensive cyber economic espionage operations targeted at the U.S., one wonders how to interpret such brazen behavior. Onlookers struggle to understand how this risky, subtly belligerent undertaking against the U.S. fits with China’s desire for a strong relationship with the leader of the international community to which China is so irreversibly committed.

To explain and predict China’s cyber activities—and this paper will focus on economic espionage, not hacking of U.S. government targets—we must first understand China’s approach to U.S.-China relations. In order to grasp China’s posture toward the U.S., we apply this paper’s framework.

Geography. The United States is far from China, separated by the largest ocean on one side, and two continents plus an ocean on the other. Despite this distance, no country has been more crucial to China’s domestic and international successes since Reform and Opening than the U.S. Furthermore, no country has had a more complicated relationship with China in terms of security cooperation. As mentioned briefly in this paper’s introduction, a foundational aspect of China’s shift toward Reform and Opening was China’s decision to engage with the United States. China

28 Ibid.

37 Greater China
saw that its ticket to development and security was through the liberal economic order constructed and led by the U.S. The U.S. has been the key member and driving force behind international institutions and relationships that China needed to reap all the benefits of the international economy. Thus, the distance between the U.S. and China is less relevant than that between Europe or Africa, because of the U.S.'s virtual omnipresence across the globe. The U.S.'s primacy in the international community made it China's highest prioritized relationship after Reform and Opening.

**Comparative advantages.** In terms of comparative advantages, the U.S. has been a goldmine for China in its quest for development. The U.S. is the largest, most advanced economy in the world. By opening its borders to U.S. investment, China has found in the U.S. a top source of technology, foreign direct investment, and expertise to build China's economic infrastructure. Moreover, as China quickly took to an export-driven economic model to take advantage of its cheap, abundant labor, the U.S. soon became a top consumer of Chinese goods. Additionally, the U.S. is home to most of the top universities in the world. In order to develop its human capital and invigorate its own education system, China has encouraged its own citizens to study in the U.S. on educational exchanges, which good relations facilitate.

**Security concerns.** Security concerns pose both opportunities and challenges for China in its relationship with the U.S. On the one hand, the U.S. military presence in East Asia has been a fundamental factor in China's economic success over the past four decades. The U.S. has protected the peace between a host of belligerent neighbors such as North and South Korea, Taiwan and China, and Japan and China, all while facilitating economic development and trade in the region free of interruption by conflict. On the other hand, the United States military poses security challenges to China. The U.S. military is a steadfast ally to two regional neighbors, Japan and South Korea, who distrust and fear China's growth. More importantly, the U.S. supports and supplies arms sales to Taiwan, a very sensitive political issue for the Chinese government. The issue of Taiwan's de facto independence is a vital source of nationalism, which is similar to the territorial sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku Islands and the U.S. is viewed as an enabler to Taiwanese independence from China. Finally, China may one day aim to replace the U.S. as the security provider for the region, as that regional preeminence would theoretically give China more freedom of action. Thus, China could naturally view the U.S. as a long-term military rival in East Asia, even while China reaps huge benefits of U.S. military presence in the region today.

**Realpolitik considerations.** Somewhat similarly to China's approach to Japan, the policy rhetoric does not always match the actual policy behavior. While Chinese media may sometimes reflect a degree of public distrust toward the U.S. and its intentions against China, the U.S. remains the core actor in the international economic order that China continues to enmesh itself in and benefit from. Thus, in practice, China consistently prioritizes strong relations with the U.S. Taken together, China's engagement with the U.S. contributes more to its domestic development and security than any other international relationship. However, CCP legitimacy rests on a dose of public distrust of the U.S.—and in Beijing's view, serving CCP legitimacy also serves the two core goals of development and security for China.

**Explaining China's cyber espionage efforts**

Now we turn to the issue of China's cyber economic espionage activities to understand how they fit into the context of China's policy approach to the U.S. since Reform and Opening. The challenge is to evaluate how these operations compromise China's highly beneficial relationship with the U.S., and if those compromises outweigh benefits to China's core goals of domestic development and security. In doing so, we can attempt to explain this behavior and accordingly manage expectations with regard to these activities moving forward.

It is just such a realpolitik cost-benefit analysis that predicts China's continued cyber espionage activities against the U.S. The Chinese are not constrained by geography in cyber espionage, because the cyber realm transverses geographic obstacles of every kind. Thus, China can reach any of the most appealing targets, whether those targets are next door in Vietnam, or half a world away in the U.S.

Comparative advantages reinforce that China should focus on the U.S. for economic espionage and that cyber tactics should be the mode of choice. Cyber tactics offer China unparalleled opportunities given the technological and military asymmetry in other areas. While China's traditional military prowess comes
nowhere near that of the U.S., its cyber capabilities are more formidable—especially if directed at private companies who lack the sophisticated defenses of the U.S. government. The question of comparative advantages points to the U.S. as the primary target, because of the desirable intellectual property (IP) and technology in the U.S.

China’s security concerns are minimized by several factors. First, there is no protocol or expected international norm for nation-to-nation responses over cyber espionage—especially in the private sector. Thus, China has little reason to expect any drastic reaction from the U.S. Second, there are no international institutions or treaties explicitly governing cyber espionage. While China was forced to join a number of international agreements and institutions in order to gain access into and enjoy the benefits of the international community, there is no reason to partake in the creation of new agreements that would constrain its desired actions moving forward.

Thus, this paper’s framework for predicting Chinese foreign policy behavior suggests that China will likely continue to its cyber economic espionage efforts as long as it can do so with the benefits to domestic development and security outweighing the costs. The only way the U.S. can halt these activities is either (1) meeting them on the battlefield, so to speak, and crafting laws, technologies, and private sector response systems that thwart Chinese hackers, or (2) threaten benefits of the bilateral relationship that outweigh, in Beijing’s view, the benefits of continued economic espionage.

**CONCLUSION: THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF REDUCING UNCERTAINTY**

China’s foreign policy behavior and policies are not random, nor are they calculated within a metaphorical black box in Beijing. At a high-level, they are the result of realpolitik considerations based on geography, comparative advantages, and relevant security concerns, such that the behavior will serve China’s core interests of domestic economic growth and security.

Complicating factors

There are, of course, a number of complicating factors to the framework this paper introduces for interpreting Chinese foreign policy behavior. The first is bureaucratic and local political process within China. While China may have a clear policy pattern toward a country, region, institution or issue, clumsy handling of diplomatic events stemming from individual or bureaucratic incompetence can lead to short-term, or event-driven policy decisions or outcomes, that are inconsistent with the high-level policy goals our framework would suggest. The second complicating factor is, as addressed in the East China Sea section, CCP legitimacy. This one, however, can be accounted for by outside observers, as described in this paper, because Beijing ties success in achieving national goals of economic growth and security so closely to continued CCP one-party rule. Behavior that appears to be emotional overreaction may in fact be calculated to shore up domestic political support in the interests of China’s long-term goals.

In general, the exceptions will be just that—exceptions. The framework this paper presents is macroscopic, and to an extent simplified, but it is robust. Broadly speaking, there are identifiable patterns in how China approaches its international relationships, and those patterns inform how we should expect China to behave in the future.

It is of vital importance that international observers of all nationalities and professions have some capacity to ‘read the tea leaves,’ so to speak, and see method to the madness of Chinese foreign policy behavior. What China does in the world matters more than ever, and countries, companies, and communities must increasingly be able to react to Chinese policies with informed conviction. Thus, the more they can predict Chinese policy behavior, the less apprehension they will have about China’s rise. Reduced apprehension and uncertainty over China’s growing influence in turn lowers the possibility of miscommunication and conflict.

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Samuel Arnett, Sanaa Hafeez, and Thompson Paine are graduate students from Stanford University.
The Nine Songs is a chapter made up of eleven poems in the Songs of Chu that is one of the two most ancient anthologies of Chinese poetry (The other one is the Book of Songs). Considering the Nine Songs might be used in the rituals by shamans, this research examines the character ling, literally meaning the spirit, within the context of its appearance in order to assess the shamanistic theory in explaining the Nine Songs and to point out that the character ling, when used as an individual word, is actually a signal of the descending or the arrival of gods as well as an implication of the spirit possession within the Nine Song.

INTRODUCTION

Jiu ge 九歌, or the Nine Songs, which consists of eleven poems, is a section of the Chu ci 楚辞, or the Songs of Chu, and it is thought to be the oldest anthology of poems in the Songs of Chu tradition.1 Qu Yuan 屈原 (4th-3rd century BCE) is conventionally accepted to have either composed or edited the Nine Songs.2 The function of the Nine Songs has been debated among scholars for a long time. Some scholars like Wang Yi 王逸 (d. CE158) treat the Nine Songs as a historical reference of the autobiography of Qu Yuan. Some scholars including Zhu Xi朱熹 (1130-1200 A.D.) think it to be used during shamanistic rituals. Others like modern scholar Wen Yiduo闻一多 (1899-1946 A.D.) consider the poems in the Nines Songs as the acts of a drama played during rituals.3 Though the latter two seem to be very similar, it is spirit possession that differentiates shamanism from drama. According to Arthur Waley, ‘Possession’ is not mentioned or implied in any of the other songs, but from the second century A.D.

According to Galal Walker, “The first nine poems of the Jiu ge were the earliest poetry in the Chu ci tradition.” See Galal Walker, "Toward a Formal History of the Chu ci" (PhD diss, Cornell University, 1982), 432.

1 According to Galal Walker, “The first nine poems of the Jiu ge were the earliest poetry in the Chu ci tradition.” See Galal Walker, "Toward a Formal History of the Chu ci" (PhD diss, Cornell University, 1982), 432.

2 According to Wang Yi 王逸 (d. CE158)’s introduction to the Nine Songs in his Chu ci zhangu楚辭章句, or Commentary on the Chu ci, Qu Yuan is thought to be the author of the Nine Songs. Zhu Xi朱熹 (1130-1200 A.D.), a Song philosopher, thinks that the Nine Songs was edited by Qu Yuan. For Wang Yi’s commentary, see Hong Xingzhu洪興祖 (1090-1155 A.D.), Chu ci buzhu楚辭補注 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), 55. For Zhu Xi’s opinion, see Zhu Xi朱熹 (1130-1200 A.D.), Chu ci ji zhu楚辭集註 (Shanghai: Guji chubanshe, 2001), 31.


onwards (and perhaps earlier) it was regarded in China as the typical form of shamanism, and it also holds this position among the Turugu.4

Those who have already been familiar with shamanism may know that spirit possession is a process that shamans dance and sing to make spirits descend and then are possessed by the descending spirits. This shamanistic theory sheds light on understanding the Nine Songs from a new perspective. In this paper, I will explore the ling 禮 referring to both shamans and gods in the Nine Songs within the framework of shamanism. Each time a character ling appears in the Nine Songs, the context suggests that the worshipped god descends.5 My goal is to show that the ling in the Nine Songs is a signal of the descending of gods. Considering this character can refer to both shamans and gods, it further suggests that a process of spirit procession happens during rituals. To better understand the ling in the Nine Songs, it is necessary to hear the voices of the pre-modern scholars who lived in an era that is much closer to the composition time of the Nine Songs than us, and to read the surveys of modern scholars whose opinions contribute to some new values of the ling. Then, I will go through the sentences containing the ling in the Nine Songs and analyze how it implicates the descending of gods.

II. THE TRADITION OF THE COMMENTARIES ON THE LING IN THE NINE SONGS

In the oracle bones, the upper part of the character


5 The names of the first nine poems in the Nine Songs are thought to be the names of gods. See the comment given by the Five Officials in Hong, Chu ci buzhu, 57. Also see the introduction given by Dong Chuping董楚平 in his Chu ci yi zhu楚辭解註 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1998), 41-3.

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The Ling

ling, 雷 means thunder which is associated with rain, and the lower part 巳 can be either a verb meaning worshipping gods with sacrifices or a noun referring to shamans or gods. Thus the whole character ling means that shamans pray for rain by providing sacrifices to gods. In his famous dictionary, Shuowen jiezi 説文解字, Xu Shen 甄慎 (fl. 58-147 A.D.) explains the character ling from the perspective of pictography. He writes,

靈，或從巫。7

The ling, sometimes follows [the explanation of] wu, or shamans.6

Under the item “wu” in the Shuowen jiezi, Xu Shen explains,

巫，巫祝也，女人事無形以禱降神者也，象人兩靡形。9

The wu refers to shamans—women who can serve the invisible by dancing and making the gods descend. This character is like two people dancing with wide sleeves.

The character ling in the oracle bones and Shuowen jiezi shows that it may originally refers to the shamans who practiced sacrifices for gods. Wang Yi 王逸 (d. CE158), Xu Shen’s contemporary, is the author of the Chu ci buzhu Chu 芍芝, provides supplementary notes to Wang Yi’s comment of the ling.

Thus the whole character ling from the perspective of Qu Yuan’s autobiography has not been well accepted by other scholars.

In the Tang dynasty (618-907 A.D.), a certain Wu chen圅臣, or the Five Officials, commented on the Wen xuan 文選 in which the Nine Songs had been collected. The comment given by the Five Officials generally followed the tradition established by Wang Yi that the speaker in the Nine Songs was thought to be Qu Yuan and the content of the Nine Songs was related to Qu Yuan’s life experience.10 During the Song dynasty (960-1279 A.D.), commentary on the Songs of Chu began to flourish. Scholars avoided the allegory of Qu Yuan when commenting on the Nine Songs, and shamanistic theory was used to explain the Nine Songs. For example, Hong Xingzu 洪興祖 (1090-1155 A.D.), in his Chu ci buzhu 芍芝補註, provides supplementary notes to Wang Yi’s comment of the ling.

古者巫以降神。靈僞龜兮姣服，言神降而託於巫也。11

In ancient times, the shamans made the gods descend. That “The shamans dance in splendid clothes” is talking about the gods have descended and entered the body of the shamans.

By commenting on the ling in the first poem of the Nine Songs, Hong Xingzu points out that the ling, rather than only referring to gods or shamans, also means a process of spirit possession that contains two steps—gods descending and gods entering the bodies of shamans. Hong Xingzu’s opinion was developed by Zhu Xi, 朱熹 (1130-1200 A.D.), a famous Song philosopher. In his Chu ci ji zhu 芍芝集注, Zhu Xi writes,

古者巫以降神。神降而託於巫，則見其貌之美而服之好，盈身則巫而心則神也。12

In ancient times the shamans thereby [i.e., by dancing in beautiful clothes] made the spirits descend. And the spirit having descended finds haven in the shaman. It is then that one sees beauty in her face and finesse in her raiment, for though the body is the shaman’s, the heart is the spirit’s.13

In these words, Zhu Xi draws a very clear picture of spirit possession. Given that the first two sentences of Zhu Xi’s comments are almost the same as Hong Xingzu’s, Zhu Xi’s shamanistic explanation might be influenced by Hong Xingzu’s. In addition, as professor Gopal Sukhu points out in his book The Shaman and the Heresiarch: A New Interpretation of the Li sao, Zhu Xi’s own experience is another reason of his shamanistic theory. He once wrote a shamanistic lyric “The lyric for the music of welcoming and sending gods in the

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Temple of Yu” 廣帝廟迎送神樂歌詞 for the usage in the sacrifices. What differentiates Hong Xingzu and Zhu Xi from their former commentators including Wang Yi is that both of them introduced the concept of spirit possession when explaining the meaning of the ling and thus broke the commentary tradition of the Songs of Chu since Wang Yi in the Han dynasty (202 B.C.-220 A.D.).

The Qing dynasty (1644-1911 A.D.) is a productive era of scholarship on the Songs of Chu. Reading classics by words and making connections between texts and historical events became a commentary trend. Thus it is not surprising to see when Jiang Ji祥鴛 (fl. 1678-1745 A.D.), the author of the Shandaige zhu chu ci山海閣注楚辭, commented on the ling in the Nine Songs, he went back to the commentary tradition having been established by Wang Yi to attribute the speaker of the Nine Songs to Qu Yuan. However, his commentary also seems to have been influenced by Hong Xingzu’s and Zhu Xi’s. By coincidence or not, those stanzas in the Nine Songs containing the ling, when it means gods or shamans, are always followed by his comment that “This stanza is talking about the descending of gods.”

Modern scholars explain the ling in the Nine Songs from various perspectives. Jiang Liangfu 姜亮夫 (1902-1995 A.D.), an extraordinary scholar of the Songs of Chu, summarizes all the meanings of the ling in the Songs of Chu. Some of his conclusions contribute new ideas to the study of the ling in the Nine Songs. One example is the yang ling 揚靈 in the third poem, “Xiang jun” 楚君, or “The Goddess of the Xiang.” Jiang Liangfu thinks, unlike Wang Yi’s opinion that yang ling implies Qu Yuan’s absolute sincerity, yang ling must have relationship with the Yangtze River considering the context. Thus, Jiang Liangfu suggests that the ling in yang ling is actually a loaned character for another ling 靈 referring to the ship with windows. Another example is the ling bao 靈保 in the seventh poem of the Songs of Chu, “the Lord of the East.” Jiang Liangfu points out that the ling bao is a well organized group of shamans, and he disagrees with Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619-1692 A.D.)—a famous philosopher at the Ming-Qing transition—who suggests that ling bao refers to the major shaman who plays the role of the worshipped god.

Other modern scholars give their own opinions of the ling in the Nine Songs. Dong Chuping 杜鈺平 (1934 A.D.-), a contemporary scholar of the Songs of Chu, generally thinks that the ling only refers to gods in the Nine Songs. Jin Kaicheng 金開誠 (1932-2008 A.D.) et al. in Qu Yuan ji jiao zhu 戲原集校注 hold an opinion of shamanism:

The ling means shamans. In the Nine Songs, the ling and the lingbao refer to the major shaman who plays the role of god and accepts the ritual from other shamans. He or she, whose identity is a shaman, pretends to be possessed by a god or spirit, and thus has the identity of that god or spirit.

This comment arouses a question that may seem to be internalism. In the spirit possession, do shamans believe themselves to be possessed by gods, or do they just play the role of gods? The notes given by Jin Kaicheng et al. emphasize the nature of performance of shamanism when providing notes on the ling. However, it is hard to know whether Hong Xingzu and Zhu Xi also hold such an opinion or they believe there is a supernatural power in it.

III. THE LING IN THE NINE SONGS

Since the ling is closely related to the shamanistic nature of the Nine Songs, it is necessary to examine under what kind of situation the ling appears in the poems. I will go through the contexts of the ling whenever it appears in the poems of the Nine Songs.

“Donghuang taizi” 東皇太一, or “The Great Unity, August One of the East,” is the first poem in the Nine Songs. It is also the first time that the ling appears. The line with the ling is

Shamans dance in splendid clothes and, their fragrance fulfills the hall.

According to Wang Yi, this line describes the scene of the dances of shamans, with their splendid clothes

14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., vol.3: 32.
17 Dong, Chu ci yi zhu, 45.
18 Jin Kaicheng 金開誠 et al., Qu Yuan ji jiao zhu 戲原集校注 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996), 194. Ling bao 靈保 might refer to a certain shaman.
19 Dong, Chu ci yi zhu, 56.
20 Ibid.
and their fragrance filling the hall. If we follow Wang Yi’s opinion to take yan jian 儘箋 as a description of the shamankas dance, it suggests that the god descends on the body of the shaman, considering that spirit possession is always accompanied by shamankas dances. This line with the ling also functions as a transition from the description of shamans to that of the god. Those stanzas before this line describe the preparation of shamans for the sacrifices, such as jewels, jades, meats and wine. The stanza after this line, which is also the last part of this poem, shows that the god has already enjoyed the sacrifices with the music provided by shamans. Though shamans are always anxious that gods may refuse to descend, the line with the ling implies that shamans are being possessed by the god, because the contents before and after shows a transition from preparation of sacrifices by shamans to the god’s enjoyment of sacrifices. It may be safe to conclude that the line with the ling implies a process of spirit possession and marks the descending of the god.

In the second poem, “Yun zhong jun” 雲中君, or “The Lord in the Clouds,” it says,

靈僕箋兮既留，爛昭昭兮未央。
儼將懷兮壽宮，與日月兮齊光。
龍駕兮帝服，聊翱遊兮周章。
靈僕箋兮既降，焱遠舉兮雲中。

Shamans dance writhing and [the god] stays; his aura spreads and does not end.

He will be at ease in the Palace of Longevity, and his light is as bright as the sun and the moon.

He drives a dragon chariot and wears the High God’s clothes, wandering everywhere.

Splendidly, the god descends; suddenly he rushes away to rise into the clouds.

Similar to the meaning of yan jian 儫箋 in the former poem that shamans dance in order to welcome the gods, the word lian quan 銜蜷, according to Wang Yi, describes the scene that shamans welcome the gods. 22 What is different is that in “The Lord in the Clouds,” the god has already descended and stayed in the Palace of Longevity, which is mentioned in the beginning of the poem. Just as Zhu Xi comments, the god descends on the shaman and stays for a long time. After the god accepts sacrifices, he leaves suddenly. 23 In the first line quoted above, “Shamans dance writhing and [the god] stays,” the ling refers to shamans and it shows that the god is descending, while the ling in the last line quoted above, “Splendidly, the god descends,” refers to the god and this sentence demonstrates that the god rushes away. These two lines not only mark the staying and the leaving of the god but also suggest the beginning and the ending of a process of spirit possession.

In the third poem of the Nine Songs, “Xiang jun” 習君, or “The Goddess of the Xiang,” the lines with the ling are:

望雲陽兮極浦，橫大江兮揚箋。
揚箋兮未極，女紤箋兮為餘太息。 24
I gaze at Cenyang, the distant islet; I cross the broad Yangtze River to let my vigorous spirit fly.

Though I let my vigorous spirit fly, it does not reach the god; a woman sighs a sigh for me.

The ling in this poem does not refer to an image of either a shaman or a god. Instead, it refers to the vitality or energy of the shaman. Connecting the ling to the biography of Qu Yuan, Wang Yi thinks that here the ling means “absolute sincerity.” 25 Disagreeing with Wang Yi, Zhu Xi thinks that yang ling means to carry forward one’s brightness. 26 The fact that there is no character ling referring to shaman or god in this poem parallels the fact that the god does not descend at all. Near the end of this poem, the speaker worries that,

心不同兮媒勞，恩不甚兮輕絕。 27
If our hearts disaccord, the go-between works in vain; if our feelings are not deep enough, it is easy to break up.

And then he complains,
交不忠兮怨長，期不信兮告余以不問。 28
If the love is not loyal, the resentment will be aroused; we have an appointment but you do not come and just tell me that you do not have time.

These complaints reveal that the speaker is a shaman who waits for the god but fails in the end, implying the god does not descend. Without a character ling referring to the image of god or shaman, this poem shows us an image of shaman lingering on the shore, waiting for the descending of the god, and complaining about being stood up.

21 Ibid., 58.
22 Ibid.
23 Zhu, Chu ci ji zhu, 33.
“Xiang furen” 雲夫人, or “The Lady of the Xiang,” is the fourth poem in the Nine Songs. The line with the ling is:
九嶷嶽兮並運，靈之來兮如霧。29
The gods from the Mt. Nine Doubts welcome the Lady of the Xiang together with us; the coming of the gods is like a cloud.
Both Wang Yi and Zhu Xi think that Shun, the ancient virtuous king who was buried in the Mt. Nine Doubts, makes the gods of the Mt. Nine Doubts welcome the Goddess of the Xiang and the Lady of the Xiang.30 This suggests that the Lady of the Xiang has already descended. In the opening of this poem, it also implies the god has descended by saying that the child of the High God descends on the northern islet. This child of the High God plausibly refers to the Lady of the Xiang, according to Wang Yi.31 If the beginning tells us about the descending of the Lady of the Xiang which implies the beginning of spirit possession, the coming of the gods of the Mt. Nine Doubts may suggest the ending of the shaman’s imagination of being with the Lady of the Xiang. In another word, the ling shows an ending of spirit possession in this poem.
In the “Da siming” 大司命, or “The Greater Minister of Fate,” the fifth poem of the Nine Songs, the line with the ling is:
靈衣兮蔽軀，玉佩兮陸離。32
The robe of the god flutters; the jade ornaments are colorful and splendid.
Here, the robe of the ling may refer to both the god’s and the shaman’s. If this line does not clearly show whether the god descends or not, the stanzas in the latter part of this poem suggests that the Greater Minister of Fate does descend. A line in the latter part says:
乘龍兮載軒，高駕兮沖天。33
Rumbling, he drives his dragon chariot and rams into the sky.
According to Zhu Xi, this line means that the Great Minister of Fate leaves and does not stay any more.34 The ling in the line quoted above echoes the implication of this poem that the Greater Minister of Fate descends and leaves. Furthermore, given that the ling may refer to both the god and the shaman in the sentence about

the robe of the ling, it is plausible that this sentence implies spirit procession during which the god and the shaman become one entity.

In the sixth poem, “Shao siming”少司命, or “The Lesser Minister of Fate,” it seems that the god, the Lesser Minister of Fate, does not show up. As the following lines may be arguable about the descending of the god, I will discuss them here.

荷衣兮蕙帶，縈而來兮忽而逝。
夕宿兮帝郊，君誰與兮雲之趾?35
Dressing in lotus leaf robe and basil sash, the god suddenly comes and suddenly leaves.
At night, I sleep in the suburbs of the High God. For whom are you waiting on the border of the clouds?
Wang Yi thinks it describes the “clothes of the Lesser Minister are fragrant and clean, and his coming and going are sudden. Indeed he is seldom on duty 難當値也.”36 Following Wang Yi’s comment, the Five Officials writes that as the god’s coming and going are quick and sudden, one can never encounter the god.37 The Five Officials consider the sudden coming and going as the god’s usual behaviors. Furthermore, by asking for whom the god is waiting on the border of clouds, the shaman is anxious about why the god does not descend, which is another proof that the god does not descend. Throughout the poem, the Lesser Minister of Fate does not descend, overlapping the fact that the character ling does not appear.

“Dong jun” 東君, or “The Lord of the East,” is the seventh poem of the Nine Songs. It says:
嘯歎兮吹芋，思靈兮實南庭。
薅飛兮翥嘯，舉氛兮會舞。
應律兮合節，靈之來兮蔽日。38
Blowing the chi-flute and the yu-pipe; considering the Shaman’s virtue and beauty.
Whirling like the flying birds; dancing accompanied by displaying poems.
The tunes and beats accord; the coming of the gods blocks the sun.
The Lord of the East is thought by scholars to be the god of the sun. Based on Wang Yi’s comment, these lines imply that the god of the sun is delighted and then he descends. The attendants following him

29 Ibid., 68.
30 Hong, Chu ci buzhu, 38. Zhu, Chu ci ji zhu, 68.
31 Zhu, Chu ci ji zhu, 64.
32 Hong, Chu ci buzhu, 70.
33 Ibid.
34 Zhu, Chu ci ji zhu, 70.
35 Hong, Chu ci buzhu, 72.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 75.
block the light of the sun." The ling bao 玲保 in the line "considering the Shaman's virtue and beauty" may refer to a specific shaman based on Hong Xingzu's comment. Hong Xingzu writes,

曰：古人云：玲保，詔方相。說者曰：靈
保，神巫也。  

[It is] talking that ancient people said imperial edicts summon shamans and wizards. The speakers are saying that ling bao refers to shamans.

With Hong Xingzu's comment paralleling ling bao (shaman) with fang xiang (wizard), the scene described in this poem is still a shamanistic ritual. Wang FuZhi further explains ling bao as shi 屍, the person who plays the role of the god during rituals. 45 If we accept Wang FuZhi's opinion, ling bao is the major shaman who plays the role of the Lord of the East and is possessed by the Lord of the East in the music and dances played by other shamans. The ling in the line "the coming of the gods blocks the sun" is similar to that in the "Xiang furen," or "The Lady of the Xiang." Since the Lord of the East has descended, the coming of the attendants of the Lord of the East may mark the end of the spirit procession.

"He bo"河伯, or "The Earl of the Yellow River," is the eighth poem of the Nine Songs. The line in this poem that has the ling is

靈何為兮水中，乘白薦兮逐文魚。 42

Why does the god stay in the waters, riding the white tortoise and chasing the colorful fish?

The ling here refers to the Earl of the Yellow River. Considering the ling means god or shaman or both, the ling in the line "Why does the god stay in the waters" may refer to both the god of the Yellow River and the major shaman who is possessed by him. Compared with other poems in the Nine Songs, "The Earl of the Yellow River" is the only one that may involve human sacrifices during rituals. According to David Hawkes, sacrifices to the Earl of the Yellow River can be dated back to the Shang era (fl. 17th -11th century BCE), and in some places an annual "bride" would be given to the Earl of the Yellow River. 43 Even in the Han dynasty, it was still "necessary to throw in an occasional live horse along with the jade discs and other offerings." 44 If the sacrifices need to be thrown into the water, the ritual with the spirit possession may happen in the middle of the water, either on an islet or on a boat. The last sentence of this poem implies human sacrifices during rituals:

波滔滔兮來迎，魚鱉鱉兮媵予。 45

Waves after Waves, the billows come to welcome me; schools after schools, fish are my bridesmaids.

The word ying 胭, according to Dong Chuping, means the bridesmaids in ancient times. 46 If the fish are the speaker's bridesmaids, the speaker must be the "bride" who is sacrificed to the Earl of the Yellow River. In addition, the waves and fish suggest the ritual must have been practiced in the waters. In this poem, the Earl of the Yellow River not only descends but also gets a "bride."

The ninth poem is the "Shan gui"山鬼, or "The Mountain Spirit." It has the sentences containing the ling as the following:

杳冥冥兮羌晻晦，東風鬱兮神靈雨。

留靈修兮懸忘歸，歲晏兮孰華子。 47

The darkness is deep and the daylight is dim; a wind from the east blows and the god makes rains.

I lodge in the ling xiu, and you are at ease and forget to return; I have already become old, and who will make me flourish again.

As the original meaning of the character ling means that shamans practice rituals for rain, I understand the ling in "the god makes rains" as a verb referring to the shamans praying for rain. The ling xiu in the line "I lodge in the ling xiu" has been accepted as either the King of the Chu or the lover of the Mountain Spirit. 48 No matter whom the ling xiu refers to, this poem shows a shamanistic ritual that the shaman is possessed by the Mountain Spirit, representing her miss or love to either the King of the Chu or her lover.

The tenth and eleventh poems in the Nine Songs

44 Ibid., 114.
45 Hong, Chu ci buzhu, 78.
46 Dong, Chu ci yi zhu, 70.
47 Ibid., 80.
48 Wang Yi regards the ling xiu as an address to the King Huai of Chu. Jiang Liangfu follows Wang Yi's opinion. Dong Chuping and Jin Kaicheng et al. consider ling xiu to be the lover of the Mountain Spirit. See Hong, Chu ci buzhu, 80. Jiang Liangfu 莊亮夫 (1902-1995 A.D.), Chu ci tonggu 42 Poems by Qu Yuan and Other Poets, 113.

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are the “Guo shang” 國殤, or “Hymn to Those Who Died for the Kingdom,” and the “Li hun” 禮魂, or “The Spirit of the Rites.” In the “Guo shang” 國殤, or “Hymn to Those Who Died for the Kingdom,” the subject is holding ceremonies for the dead soldiers or generals in the national battles. The character ling appears in the following lines:

天時墜兮威靈怒，嚴殺盡兮棄原壇。 49

The heaven falls and the powerful spirits are angry. You do your best to kill enemies, but your corpses are abandoned in the wild plain.

And,

身既死兮神以靈，子魂魄兮為鬼雄。 50

Your bodies have died, but your spirits are still energetic. Your hun-soul and po-soul will be among the heroes of the dead.

The ling in both stanzas quoted above does not refer to gods or shamans. Instead, according to Wang Yi, they describe the energy of the spirit. 51 Supporting Wang Yi’s opinion, Dong Chuping comments on the second line quoted above “Your bodies have died, but your spirits are still energetic” that the ling describes the illustration of the spirits. 52 Paralleling to the fact that no character ling referring to god or shaman appears, this poem does not talk about either the descending of god or spirit possession. The eleventh poem—also the last poem of the Nine Songs—is the “Li hun” 禮魂, or “Honoring the Souls.” Given that this poem shows the scene of sending off the spirits, it accords with the fact that there is no character ling in this poem.

The subject and content of the last two poems are intruders in the Nine Songs. David Hawkes, when explaining why there are eleven poems in the Nine Songs, agrees with Japanese scholar Aoki Masaru that the “song cycle was designed for twice-yearly performance, once in spring and once in autumn...” They think “Guo shang” and “Li hun” are among those poems that are practiced twice a year. 53 By comparing the poems in the Nine Songs with other sections in the Songs of Chu, Galal Walker draws a conclusion that “Guo shang” and “Li hun” are different from the rest poems of the Nine Songs. He writes,

The Jiu ge shares 52 times with 9 other sections (16 pieces). Eliminating instances of repetition in the Jiu ge itself, this involves 27 Jiu ge sentences which occur outside the section nearly 50 times. Two of the eleven pieces of this set ion do not share any sentences. These are Guo shang (National Martyrs) and Li hun (Ritual Souls), both of which differ from the other nine pieces in subject and theme and are consequently separated from the section by many writers intent on reconciling the number of pieces to the “nine” in the title. 54 However, neither David Hawkes nor Galal Walker answers the question why they are included in the Nine Songs if their theme and subject are different from the rest. At least, it is safe to say that without a character ling referring to god or shaman, there is no god descending in the last two poems of the Nine Songs.

In conclusion, in the Nine Songs, if a god descends and possesses the shaman, the character ling referring to an image of shaman or god will appear in the poem. When the shaman is waiting for the god to descend or lingering on the shore after the leaving of the god, the character ling will not be used. Instead, other addresses, such as jun 君 or the lord, gongzi 公子 or the son of the lord, and jia ren 佳人 or the beautiful, are used by the speaker—the shaman—to refer to the god. For example, in the “Yun zhong jun” 云中君, or “The Lord in the Clouds,” after the Lord in the Clouds leaves, the shaman says,

思君兮大息，歎勞心兮忡忡。 55

I miss that lord and sigh a sigh; my heart worries to the limit.

It is the jun or the lord that is used here since the Lord of the Clouds does not descend at this moment. Thus, the ling in the Nine Songs marks the descending of gods and suggests a process of spirit possession.

IV. CONCLUSION

James J.Y. Liu once writes in his book, The Art of Chinese Poetry, “As in English, and to an even greater degree, a word in Chinese does not always have one clear-cut, fixed meaning, but often covers different meanings, some of which may be mutually exclusive.” 56 Then he goes on writing, “While this may be a serious

49 Hong, Chu ci buzhu, 83.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Dong, Chu ci yi zhu, 78.
53 Hawkes, The Songs of the South: An Anthology of Chinese Poems by Qu Yuan and Other Poets, 100.
drawback in expository prose, it can be an advantage in poetry, for it makes possible the expression of thought and emotion with the greatest economy of words.\textsuperscript{57} In the Nine Songs, though the character ling has various meanings, when it refers to an image of a shaman or a god or both, it becomes a signal to mark the descending of gods and spirit possession. My exploration of the ling in the Nine Songs draws a sketch of the shamanistic ceremonies that may help us understand how the ling reveals the communication between god and man.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.

Those gods worshipped in the Nine Songs are related to the power of “control,” such as the sun, the clouds, the Yellow River, and the fate of man. These powers were uncontrollable for man, especially for the man living in 4th-3rd century BCE. The shamans, who either seem to have the supernatural ability or are trained to make gods descend, are close to the gods and thus are close to the power of “control.” It is no wonder to see whether the gods descend or not became their major concern.

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Bixuan Liu is a second year master’s student in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at Columbia University.
MENTAL ILLNESS IN CHINA: STATE ATTITUDE AND POLICY 1949-2012

China has undergone massive political change in the latter half of the 20th century. This has affected all areas of life and policy including the study and advancement of psychiatry and mental health care. This paper will discuss the attitude and policy of the Chinese state towards mental illnesses from the founding of the People's Republic of China to the present day.

1949- EARLY STAGES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

It is widely known that when the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, social systems and structures in China were unchangeably altered. Naturally, psychiatry and its application were not exempt from these changes. As China began to reject any influence from non-communist countries, ideas from the West were shunned and viewed as bourgeois, whilst ideas from the Soviet Union became the main source of medical science.

The most significant Soviet influence was psychiatry related to crime investigation or forensic psychiatry. Whilst psychiatry in general received little attention from authorities, forensic psychiatry was given significant priority with assessment centres being formed in major cities including Beijing, Changsha, Chengdu, Nanjing and Shanghai. At the time, the Soviet Union wanted to suppress all those who opposed it and some of the methods used to do this involved attributing political and religious dissension to "dangerous" mental illnesses. China naturally had similar interest in quashing opposition and adopted similar techniques. The most common diagnosis, created to be applied to as many dissidents as possible, was known as "sluggish schizophrenia." Voren points out the symptoms of sluggish schizophrenia:

Their symptoms could resemble those of a neurosis or could take on a paranoid quality. The patient with paranoid symptoms retained some insight in his condition but overvalued his own importance and might exhibit grandiose ideas of reforming society. Thus, symptoms of sluggish schizophrenia could be "reform delusions," "struggle for the truth," and the delusion of "perseverance." This description largely seems to describe the opposite of an ideal citizen in the eyes of the Communist Party. They put themselves first and are committed to reforming society when the "right" party, the communist party, already has control. Another diagnosis used in the 1950's was "paranoid psychosis." Symptoms included:

- "Reformist delusions," "litigation mania," "overvalued (or excessive) religiosity," "serious illegal acts [such as] the writing of complaints," "slander and dissemination of false information," "persistent ideas of reform that tend to be convincing to others and tend to cause recurrent illegal actions" and even "an interest in poorly-understood and bizarre foreign fashions and trends in art, literature and philosophy, and discussion of such interests."

Again, these so-called symptoms clearly show hostility to anyone who wasn't committed to the communist cause and show how ruthless the Chinese Communist Party was in discrediting opposition. It appears that by adopting this technique, the Chinese authorities were able to diagnose as mentally ill, those who exhibited anything other than obedience and conformity to the communist regime.

Whilst psychiatry was being abused in favour of political power, there is little evidence of general psychiatry being developed for the benefit of the mentally ill at this time. The number of trained psychiatrists in the country was roughly 60, a very small number when compared to the size of the population, almost 500,000,000. In addition, the majority of these patients were diagnosed with schizophrenia.

2 Ibid., 52.
5 Osnos, Evan. "Letter from China, Meet Dr. Freud." The New Yorker, 10 (January 2011), 54.
psychiatrists had been trained in Western theories and techniques. Since China was aiming to push out Western ideas and bring in the Soviet way, this would have been a hindrance to those already in the profession, who presumably would have had to abandon what they had already learned to adopt the Soviet theories and techniques.

Evidence of the treatment of those who were actually mentally ill, rather than just political dissidents, is lacking. Pearson points one of the few psychiatric hospitals in China (the first psychiatric hospital in China founded by John Kerr in 1898) was being poorly run with patients often contracting illnesses due to malnutrition and inadequate food. Furthermore, patients were given no other treatment than being held in iron cages and ropes. This particular example shows that there was a lack of real medical care for those with mental illness. One reason for the negligence of this hospital could be that the Chinese didn’t want to make this Western founded institution a success, preferring to prove that the Chinese Communist developments were best.

Pearson goes on to describe the founding of another hospital:

“The authorities took over an old temple, 40 miles outside the city. There was no electricity, no running water and no transport access...none of the eight cadres were doctors..., nor had they worked with psychiatric patients before... most of the ‘care-takers’ were frightened and reluctant.”

This old temple may have been just an unused building, convenient for the use of the hospital. Another possibility could be that the Chinese authorities wanted to take advantage of covering up this religious building (because devotion to religion prevents full devotion to the communist state) and giving it another practical use. The use of which seems to be to hide the mentally ill in a remote and primitive place with inadequate carers.

1958 – THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD AND THE NANJING CONFERENCE

In 1958 two events happened in China concerning mental health care. The first was Mao’s second Five Year Plans (also referred to as the Great Leap Forward), which was initiated to boost industry to make China more powerful. The mental illness of the population was part of the plan, because it “brings not only pains and distress to the patient but also brings certain perils to industrial and agricultural production as well as social security.” While the communist party acknowledged the effects of mental illness on both individual sufferers and the state, it needed mentally healthy people to work for it without hindrance. Thus care for psychiatric patients not only enhanced personal wellbeing but also boosted workforce and production. Yet with Mao’s call for individuals to sacrifice themselves for the collective cause, it is hard to know to what extent the public health policy cared for the individual patient.

Serious mental health problems were acknowledged. It estimated that 200 per 100,000 of the population were mentally ill but that of these, few received proper treatment or were not well cared for at home. The plan provided a series of cheaper, more effective solutions, outpatient facilities, early preventative treatment, and increased care for the comfort of the patients. However, there is little evidence concerning the planning and implementation of these aims.

The second event was the First National Conference of Psychiatric Specialists in Nanjing, a part of the Five Year Plan to improve medical care (prompted by the Five Year Plan), was the First National Conference of Psychiatric Specialists in Nanjing. It advocated the development of Chinese theory and practice, expanding mental health care in rural areas (not just in urban areas), and eradicating the use of restraints and locking up of patients. At the conference, the discussion evolved around the difficulty of recruiting suitable staff for mental health care. Mental health care “was seen at a low status job that carried a high risk of being attacked or verbally abused by patients,” reflecting the population’s negative view of mentally illness. If the government was serious about improving mental health care, it must confront and engage these negative public attitudes. The government is a part of society and have grown up with similar views to those around them. If general public do not want to be trained in psychiatry and have negative attitudes towards the

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6 Ibid., 15.
7 Ibid., 16.
8 Ibid., 17.
9 Ibid., 18.
10 Ibid., 17.
mentally ill, working towards improving mental health care could be difficult for the country.

It is clear that great efforts were made to plan the improvement of mental health care in 1958 and although the importance of the state was expressed, this did not override the genuine attention that was being encouraged towards the individual experiences and views of the mentally ill. In fact, it seems that from the Five Year Plan and the Nanjing Conference, China was making efforts to expand, improve and develop national mental health care. This, in turn would improve the overall wellbeing of the population. However, it is unclear what aspects of these plans were actually implemented and successful. If results were the same as the other aims of the Five Year Plan, the situation regarding mental health would have been unfavourable to say the least. For example, an important aim of the Five Year Plan was the improvement of agriculture, yet according to what the country actually experienced, according to Dikötter, was mass famine. Furthermore, detaining some as mentally ill for their political crimes was still being practiced.\(^{12}\)

**1966–1976 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION**

The Cultural Revolution, which lasted roughly ten years until the death of Mao Zedong, caused turmoil throughout the country. Mao, having seen tensions developed in the Soviet Union, wanted to prevent similar events happening in China. Through attacking intellectuals, he wanted to destroy what he called bourgeois notions and ideas.\(^{13}\) Consequently, the distinction between political crimes and mental illness, although previously somewhat vague, vanished completely during the Cultural Revolution. Munro explains:

"...the political or religious dissenter was viewed as being possessed by a deeply wicked, or 'counterrevolutionary,' form of madness; [whilst] the genuinely mentally ill were all too often condemned and punished as dangerous political subversives."\(^{14}\)

As mentally ill were being treated in the same way as political criminals, they were not receiving any kind of appropriate medical care. Therapy that did exist consisted of group study sessions on the works of Mao. Furthermore, mental health care institutions were being dismantled throughout the country and psychiatric professionals labelled as "bourgeois academics."\(^{15}\) This led to a lack of progress in study of psychiatry and the implementation of mental health care.

Although it is known that psychiatry was being used for political favour, getting a accurate picture of how the Cultural Revolution affected psychiatry is difficult due to the destruction of thousands of records and documents (not just related to psychiatry) at the time and the closed off nature of the country. There are no statistics, policy statements or research about psychiatry and mental health care and a lot of the information is based on very few verbal reports given to visiting Westerners.\(^{16}\) A complete lack of documentation could show that progress in psychiatry was not a priority or the Chinese government didn't want how the mentally ill were being treated. It is already known that from the start of the communist revolution in 1949, China was hostile towards Westerners. Dikötter also describes how during the Great Leap Forward, Mao wanted to surpass the West in terms of science and industry but when it was not achieved, false figures were created in order to save face. Hence, it is likely that similar actions occurred during visits from foreigners to psychiatric institutions, leading to inaccurate reports.

Although there is a lack of sources from the time, it is clear that the proper care for the actual mentally ill patients during this time was not important to Mao. However, the use of a distorted psychiatry combined with a completely unrelated field, politics, was one aspect of the terror and control that Mao held over the Chinese population (another more widespread method of sending political dissidents to labour camps). This brand of psychiatry learned initially from the Soviet Union, was used early on in the communist revolution with increasing brutality over time. The general picture of mental health throughout Mao's time in power appears to be lacking in many areas. However, it seems that the main aim during this time for Chinese government was not to develop the scientific study

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\(^{13}\) "Cultural Revolution."


of psychosis. Instead, they focused on the so-called "development" of forensic psychiatry to the advantage of the Communist party maintaining power.

1976 – THE POST-MAO ERA

Towards the end of the Cultural Revolution and after the death of Mao in 1976, China began once again to change. As Deng Xiaoping took power, aims toward developing and opening the country towards foreigners were made. During the Cultural Revolution, whilst little scientific development was being made in the way of psychiatry in China, the rest of the world's understanding of psychiatric conditions was increasing. As academic study in all subjects resumed and learning from Western methods was no longer taboo, general psychiatry, rather than just political psychiatry recommenced. Foreigners visiting with the intention of learning about mental health care in China were able to be critical about their observations.17

Munro quotes that of psychiatric cases, 54% were of a political nature during the Cultural Revolution, whereas the figure in 1987 drops to 6.7%.18 This shows a massive improvement in the decrease of misuse of mental health care, but also shows that the misuse was still going on. Furthermore, Article 90 of the 1979 Criminal Law points out:

Under the dominant influence of pathological thinking and other symptoms of psychological disease, mentally ill people may engage in behaviour that sabotages the proletarian dictatorship and the socialist state.19

The law, as was the same during the Cultural Revolution makes no differentiation between the mentally ill and political dissidents. It should be noted that the little legislation that existed about the mentally ill here appears in criminal law. However, in 1983 there is evidence of change as a distinction was drawn between "genuine" political offenders and mentally disordered political offenders.20 Although both were still viewed as having committed a serious political crime, this shows improvement since the Cultural Revolution. The separation of the two, leads to the realisation that different methods are needed to deal with each group.

With increasing international relations during the 1980's came the need for China to meet international standards in many ways. When China joined the World Health Organisation, the government started to liaise with countries other than the Soviet Union about mental health care. Thornicroft, a British professor visiting psychiatric wards in urban China in 1986, reported that there was a discrepancy between Chinese and Western standards in hospitals. Furthermore, he suggests that Chinese psychiatry needed to be developed in two ways; a standardised system in line with international standards and the legitimising of their actions with neurobiochemical research.21 Although not bluntly expressed, it suggests that Chinese treatments or methods are sometimes scientifically unfounded. This perhaps alludes to the lack of scientific justification particularly when diagnosing mental illness, when the only symptom is opposition towards the government.

With increasing development in the country, came the need to improve medical health services on a national scale, including psychiatric care. In 1986, the ministry of health, civil affairs and public security held China's Second National Conference on Mental Hygiene services, the first of its kind in thirty years. The main problems addressed during the conference was the sharp rate of increase in mental illness in the Chinese population and the level of increasing violent crime, to which the lack of mental health facilities was viewed as the major cause. The solutions to these problems were to speed up the forming of a national mental health law, further developing forensic assessment work and to establishing a national police run network of centres for the custody and treatment of severely mentally ill offenders.22 Again, the focus of the government in terms of the mentally ill was criminal. Blaming the increasing rate of violent crime on the mentally ill also seems unjustified, as although mental illnesses can lead to unusual thinking and actions, the outcome is not always harmful or criminal.

After these plans were drawn up, the new forensic psychiatric institutions were given a name which translates as 'Peace and Health' (ankang安康). The people held in Ankang institutions constituted three

17 Ibid., 28.
19 Ibid., 90.
20 Ibid., 95.
categories:
The first are those commonly known as “romantic maniacs” [hua fengzi], who roam around the streets, grab food and drink from others, expose themselves naked, or look unkempt and disheveled, and so have an adverse effect on social decorum.

The second are those commonly known as “political maniacs” [zhengzhi fengzi], who shout reactionary slogans, write reactionary banners and reactionary letters, make anti-government speeches in public, and express opinions on important domestic and international affairs.

The third are those commonly known as “aggressive maniacs” [wu fengzi], who beat and curse people, pursue women, elderly people and children, smash up public property, commit murder or arson, or who otherwise endanger people’s lives and the safety of property.23

For anyone of these descriptions, admittance to an Ankang hospital was compulsory. The guide for the police running the Ankang hospitals also states:

The taking of mentally ill people into custody is especially important during major public festivals and when foreign guests arrive for visits, and it should be appropriately reinforced at such times.24

Although it may be true that mental illness can lead to nonconformist actions, it appears that the government legislation here targets any person who causes social unrest, with no mention of mentally ill who cause problems for themselves. In some ways, the plans to form police run centres can be seen as the same as was done during the Cultural Revolution, but in a less severe but more organised and legalised manner. It is clear that China was still treating some political dissidents or those who caused social turmoil as mentally ill, with not much mention or attention given to the genuinely mentally ill.

1990 - 2000

In 1990 a mental health care bill was formed under the supervision of members of the World Health Organisation.25 It outlines the general provisions, facilities, management, treatment, rights etc. and had to meet international standards. There is evidence of genuine concern and desire to care for the rights and
treatment of the mentally ill in the law, however, once again the implementation of these directives is unclear. On paper, this allowed China to claim it was on par with international law, however this may have not been true in reality.

Furthermore, Article 17 of the 1990 Mental Health Law (and later Article 18 of the 1997 Criminal Law) state that if necessary, if a mental patient causes harmful consequences at a time when he is unable to recognise or control his own behaviour, “the government may compel him to receive medical treatment.”26 It can be argued that this is just another way of enabling forced psychiatric hospitalisation on certain people the government want to get rid of, especially when the assessment process used as to whether a mental patient is able to recognise or control his own actions is vague.

One thing that is clear about mental health care during the 1990’s is the continued development of the Ankang. Since then, there have been many dissidents who have spoken about their involuntary admittance to Ankang hospitals after having been released. Wang Wuxing claims he was admitted in 1992 for 13 years purely because he unfurled a banner on the anniversary of the 1989 student protests in Tiananmen Square.27 The protests in 1989 led to the killing of many protestors by the government and remain a sensitive topic, so Wang clearly touched a nerve with higher authorities. After he was locked up, he says that the majority of the inmates in the hospital were actually mentally ill, but there were also others like him who had angered the government. This shows that the mentally ill and some political dissidents were still being treated in the same way. Furthermore, Wang describes the prison management as archaic, with nurses using out-dated methods, showing that little care was taken to improve the lives of the mentally ill.

Further evidence of government use of Ankang institutions for holding certain dissidents rather than the mentally ill is shown in the case of the Falun Gong. As this religion became larger and more popular, the Chinese government started to view practitioners of Falun Gong as a threat. Subsequently, the religion was banned in 1999 and several practitioners were put into

23 Ibid., 121.
24 Ibid., 122.
25 Ibid., 298.
26 Ibid., 97.
Ankang prisons. This further reinforces the point that the government was more concerned about holding absolute power and influence over the population rather than developing suitable institutions devoted to the proper care of the mentally ill. It also shows that groups of people who were seen as troublesome - this includes criminals, dissidents and the mentally ill, were sometimes grouped together and put in the same institutions to be hidden from society.

2000- PRESENT

As China's international relations have continued to increase, so does the scrutiny from other countries. Human rights groups in particular have been vocal in the protesting for an end to the locking up of political and religious dissidents, such as members of Falun Gong. In 2002 Robin Munro, a London based psychiatry expert, published a document on the Human Rights Watch website detailing China's misuse of psychiatry through history. Events like this have pressured the government in recent years, especially when supported by important international organisations such as the UN, to improve legislation and care for the mentally ill. Consequently, a new mental health law was formed in October 2012. Many feel it is ground breaking for China because it abolishes most forms involuntary hospitalisation. Only when a patient exhibits actions that are a danger to society and have no guardian or relatives can the government force hospitalisation. As the law has only just begun to be implemented (from May 2013), the results of this specific piece of legislation have yet to be seen. However, this seems to be a huge step for China in terms of mental health care as only those who are criminally or dangerously insane can be forced into psychiatric care.

Nonetheless, according to Human Rights groups a loophole still exists for the Chinese government to continue to abuse psychiatry to quash certain dissidents. The reasoning being the process involved for judicial administrative departments to become social guardians of mentally ill patients is by no means official or recorded, which gives the government free reign to hospitalise whom they please. Furthermore, the law states that it will protect the rights of the mentally ill, but still allows relatives of sufferers to commit them involuntarily. In the worst case scenario this could result in a family's abuse of the law, in order to rid themselves of having to look after someone who is mentally ill, without taking into account the rights of the mentally ill family member.

It has also been noted that although the law expresses the need to increase the amount of mental health professionals in China, the government has yet to announce what funding and incentives it will provide to achieve this goal. In an interview about psychiatry in China with a psychology graduate (questions and answers are attached in appendix 1), the interviewee stated that Chinese society has a lot of prejudices towards those with mental illness and most likely will try and avoid them. This shows that the government needs to provide strong incentives for people to choose careers in mental health care. Originally, I wanted to interview a Chinese psychiatrist. However, I was told numerous times by students and teachers related to the field of psychiatry that it was very unlikely I would succeed and after several attempts, I gave up. This shows sensitive and sometimes taboo nature of this topic in China which also acts as resistance to the development and research of mental health care.

Along with the new Mental Health Law, the point that those with mental illness enjoy the same rights as normal citizens of the People's Republic was enforced in the People's Daily. However, in the interview I conducted with a psychology graduate, I found she had conflicting views. When asked what difficulties those with mental illnesses have to face, she replied one aspect is work. This is because many companies will not accept those with mental illnesses. Avoiding employing those with mental illness purely on this basis clearly shows they do not always have equal rights.

According to a recent article published in the People's Daily:

At present, 30% of those with serious illnesses in China can be effectively cured. However, roughly 70% don't have access to effective treatment. Some are not

29 "Groundbreaking Mental Health Law to Take Effect in China."
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ding and Wang. "Jucheng, woguo ge lei jingshen jibing huanzhe renshu zai yi ren yishang."
aware they have an illness or don’t know how to get treatment, whilst some simply do not have the money to be cured.34

The article also says that the amount of people who suffer from a mental illness in China has been reported as over one hundred million. This clearly shows that there is a lack of adequate mental health care when the need is great. The government have expressed desires to increase the number of Ankang hospitals, however this desire was the result of a rising number of violent attacks by people suffering from mental disorders.35 Again, this expresses concern prompted by criminal activity of some rather than concern for those with more minor repercussions from their mental illnesses. Furthermore, as pointed out earlier, the treatment given to patients in Ankang isn’t necessarily helpful. The government’s preoccupation with mental illness resulting in criminal activity is further apparent by looking at the three government branches that manage the running of mental hospitals: the health department, the police department and the civil affairs department.36 This shows that despite the many changes in China, it is still true that “mental health is not seen as a medical issue, as it should be, but as a matter of social stability and a concern of law enforcement.”37

BON TV in a feature about Chinese Mental Institutions showed an example of a psychiatric hospital in Beijing that is trying to implement proper therapy and activities for its patients. The government provided some of the funding for the hospital, although not all. The activities such as baking to make more money for the hospital were put in place to try and give more meaning to patients’ lives and hence provide some kind of therapy. Individuals implemented these activities with no input from the government. The only treatment the hospital gave patients was in the form of pills, but at the time of filming they were trying to raise enough money to provide patients with group therapy. Although this particular hospital appeared to be doing everything in their capacity for the well being of the patients, this seems mainly down to the enthusiasm of individuals rather than input and encouragement from the authorities.

On the feature about a Beijing Mental Institutions on BON TV the point was made that the Chinese media often portray the mentally ill as dangerous murderers or attackers when the majority of people with mental problems are more a danger to themselves than society. It is well known that the media is heavily controlled by the government in China.38 This obviously sends the message out to the general public that the mentally ill are extremely dangerous and should be taken away from normal society. If this is the picture that the government is painting of sufferers through the media, then they are indirectly creating prejudices towards the mentally ill, which is by no means helpful towards their wellbeing or encouraging people to take up a career in psychiatry.

The government attitude toward the mentally ill is further shown in the visa application for foreigners. Currently, one of the stipulations for obtaining a work or study visa in China for foreigners requires the completion of a medical examination. Included in the Foreigner Physical Examination Form (Waigouren tijian biao 外国人体检表), are questions about conditions that the form states are endangering the public order and security, under which psychosis is included along with leprosy and AIDS. If the Chinese government believes that foreigners with psychotic problems are a danger to society and don’t permit them entry to the country, it is likely they do not have a more improved attitude to nationals with the same conditions.

CONCLUSION

When the People’s Republic was founded in 1949 the study of psychiatry faced difficulties due to the fact that most professionals in the field had been trained in Western methods, which they then had to abandon. Soviet methods took over which meant an increase on forensic psychiatry. Following on, as China began to get on its feet as an independent communist state, attempts to develop law and policy for the mentally ill were made. However, as the case seems to be for much of the latter part of the 20th century, when China claimed it was going to improve mental health care and policy, the so-called criminally insane took priority.

During the Cultural Revolution, along with most art and academia, psychiatry suffered on a massive scale. Proper scientific study was halted and forensic

34 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
psychiatry took over as the government’s main concern. Mao’s reign of terror was the guiding force in these times and some who disagreed were declared mentally insane. Although this tactic was used with greater force during the Cultural Revolution, it seems that it is still being used in China. When the government decide that an individual or group has become too controversial or threatening, one method used to silence them is by admitting them to psychiatric institutions. In modern times, this process takes place in a more underhand way than previously practiced and more efforts are made for these to seem like legitimate actions, as in the use of Ankang hospitals for example.

Although this is still going on, it is getting increasingly difficult for the government to justify their actions, especially due to the advancement of international psychiatry and pressure from human rights groups. The international collective knowledge of mental health conditions can by no means be described as exhaustive. However, it is clear that the government can no longer bracket political rebellion with mental illness.

China is now under more international scrutiny and attention. Not only that, Chinese people are also increasing communication with each other about these kinds of issues using Weibo and other internet sources. Many dissidents use the internet as a tool to get their message across and although the government does control the websites accessible from mainland China, it is becoming increasingly easy to bypass monitoring measures. Furthermore, releasing prisoners such as Wang Wanxing has shown others what the situation in Ankang hospitals is actually like, putting more pressure on the government.

There is no doubt that the criminal insanity exists and if a someone who is mentally ill commits a crime it may be seen as more dangerous, as they may have less control over their actions. However, to say treatment for these conditions is needed on a large scale is unwarranted. Mental illness does not always end in criminal activity. However, in early modern history in China there seems to be an attitude that all mental illness will lead to criminal activity or dangerous behaviour.

Gradually, there does seem to be improvements in China for the care of its mentally ill citizens. This does not seem to be improvement enforced by the government itself but forced due to the changing times. And the question remains as to whether the government will altogether stop the use of mental institutions as prisons for dissidents.

WORK CITED


Ding Ting丁汀, and Wang Junping王君平. “Jucheng, woguo ge lei jingshen jibing huanzhe renshu zai 1 yi ren yishang. Zhe sihu yu
MENTAL ILLNESS IN CHINA

richang jingyän you jull—jingshen bingen you zhe me duo ma?" 据称，我国各类精神疾病患者人数在1亿人以上。这似乎与日常经有距离——精神病人有这多吗? ( Allegedly, the number of patients with various types of mental illnesses in China amounts to 1 billion or more. This doesn’t seem to match daily life -- can the number of mentally ill be this many?). Renmin Ribao人民日报 (People’s Daily), 11 July 2011. Accessed 18 October 2012. http://rmrb.greenapple.com.cn/proxy.soas.ac.uk/detail?record=6&ChannelID=16380 &randno=7518&kresultid=148&presearchwords=%e636b%e8765%e3d00%e2800%ube7c%e5e79%ube75%uc575%u2900&presortfield=d=%e5200%e4500%e4c00%e5600%e4100%e4e00%e4500


Filmography


WINTER 2014
TINA LALLY

Tina Lally is a third year undergraduate student in the Department of China and Inner Asia at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET

THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON CHINESE NATIONALISM

The Emergence of Contentious Spaces Online

This paper seeks to answer the question of why anti-Japanese nationalism related to historical memory of World War II has grown at such a rapid pace among Chinese internet-users despite several elements commonly understood to decrease the likelihood of such vitriolic nationalism. Using a comparative historical analysis of events in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, I argue that state-led movements such as the Patriotic Education Campaign (PEC) alone cannot account for the rapid rise in nationalism since the late 1990s. Rather, with the arrival of the Internet in 1994 and its maturation around 2000, new spaces for contentious politics have opened online. These spaces have allowed nationalists in China to contend with the state over the "correct" historical narrative, sometimes constraining the center's ability to formulate and implement foreign policies, especially in the case of Japan, while at other times further legitimating CCP rule.

INTRODUCTION

This paper seeks to answer the question of why anti-Japanese nationalism related to historical memory of World War II has grown at such a rapid pace among Chinese internet-users despite several elements commonly understood to decrease the likelihood of such vitriolic nationalism. For example, China and Japan have rapidly increased their economic interdependence, political and non-political communications, and people-to-people interactions. In spite of these mitigating factors, however, it is increasingly apparent that anti-Japanese nationalism related to historical memory has expanded, not contracted, in the reform era.

While some scholars suggest that nationalism has grown rapidly due to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) utilizing it as a new legitimating ideology to replace Marxism-Leninism, I argue that viewing nationalism through the lens of instrumentalism risks missing the impact of the Internet on grassroots mobilization of nationalist sentiment. In other words, state-led movements such as the Patriotic Education Campaign (PEC) alone cannot account for the rapid rise in nationalism since the late 1990s. Rather, with the arrival of the Internet in 1994 and its maturation around 2000, new spaces for contentious politics have opened online. These spaces have allowed nationalists in China to contend with the state over the "correct" historical narrative, sometimes constraining the center's ability to formulate and implement foreign policies, especially in the case of Japan, while at other times further legitimating CCP rule.

In this paper, I will demonstrate that the growth of nationalism among Chinese citizens rapidly accelerated once the Internet arrived and matured in China by using a comparative historical analysis of events in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. I argue that the Internet serves as an intervening variable in the causal chain between state-led historical revision of public memory and the manifestations of online nationalist activism since the late 1990s. The Internet accelerates the growth of nationalism by creating a space for contentious politics online in which to struggle for one's preferred narrative of public memory. This argument contradicts the conventional wisdom which posits that the Internet serves as a static space for the manifestation of Chinese nationalism, rather than a dynamic space contributing to its rapid rise.

The outline of the paper is as follows. First, I summarize the framework I use to disaggregate public memory into four fluid "terrains" which shift through a temporal and political mechanism known as the "chronopolitics of memory." I follow this summary

1 See for example Arthur N. Waldron, "China's New Remembering of World War II: the Case of Zhang Zizhong," Modern Asian Studies, 30 (1996): 945-78. Two nationalism scholars who have more recently examined the nature of nationalist legitimation of the CCP include Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); and Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese

2 Ibid.
with a short discussion of Chinese nationalism. Next, I survey the transformations of historical memory of World War II in China since 1949 with laying special emphasis on the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s in order to demonstrate the important role of the Internet in accelerating the growth of anti-Japanese nationalism. I then address alternative explanations, and finally conclude with a short summary of my argument and possible avenues for further research.

OPERATIONS OF PUBLIC MEMORY

Carol Gluck, in proposing a framework through which to understand the operations of public memory, describes four interrelated and fluid “terrains of memory.” The first terrain is official memory, which denotes the type of memory most commonly associated with public memory, that is, state-constructed or state-guided memories. Some examples of memory work in the terrain of official memory include public monuments and national textbooks. The second terrain is vernacular memory, or civil society-shaped memory. The work of “memory activists”—those seeking recognition, compensation, and commemoration, including veterans’ associations, history textbook reform groups, etc.—resides in the terrain of vernacular memory. Other popular media such as books and movies, and even public opinion polls all help to define the contours of vernacular memory. Personal memory—the memory of individuals—is the third terrain. The fourth and final terrain is meta-memory, or the discourse concerning memory itself. For example, Chinese and Japanese debates over the number of civilians killed in the Nanjing Massacre constitute the discourse of meta-memory: even if one were uninterested in the massacre, media coverage made it difficult for citizens of both countries to avoid learning about the event behind the controversy. Meta-memory debates prior to the 1980s were largely confined to marginalized pockets of society.

Gluck defines the mechanism for memory change as the “chronopolitics” of memory, that is, the shift over time of a country’s political context. These shifts create conditions whereby changes in public memory can occur. Changes arise in two ways: outside pressures and bottom-up forces. The former include international political disputes, publication of controversial books, or even foreign class action lawsuits. Memory activists represent the main bottom-up forces; they are occasionally aided by politicians or celebrities. These forces intersect and interact: outside pressures may create momentum enabling memory activists to suddenly generate significant changes in public memory.

Gluck’s terrains of memory allow us to deconstruct and better understand the operations of public memory, especially in a democracy such as Japan. However, these terrains operate differently in authoritarian China. In the Maoist era, official memory presumably exerted far more influence on public memory due to the absence of a non-state-directed vernacular memory. Only in the reform era did memory production in the terrain of vernacular memory begin without (or with more limited) state interference. I argue that starting in the late 1990s, activity in this terrain of memory accelerated thanks to the advent of the Internet in China in 1994.

CHINESE NATIONALISM

Scholars of reform era Chinese nationalism have debated whether it represents a top-down or bottom-up phenomenon. Suisheng Zhao argues that the Communist Party has pursued an instrumental, or state-led, “pragmatic nationalism.” Emerging from a long, complex history of competing ideologies, pragmatic nationalism now serves as the basis for the legitimacy of the reform-era Communist Party. Peter Hays Gries suggests that viewing Chinese nationalism as a top-down phenomenon may cause us to miss the spontaneous, grassroots nature of many recent nationalist protests. Analyzing various forms of media including literature, film, television, and more, Gries concludes that “[I]n China today, popular networks are challenging the state’s hegemony over nationalism, threatening to rupture the Chinese nation-state.” This “new” Chinese nationalism suggests a more bottom-

2 Ibid., 57.
3 Ibid., 58.
4 Ibid., 58.
5 Ibid., 61.
6 Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction, 4-5.
7 Ibid., 209.
8 Ibid., 134.
9 Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).
up approach. Zheng Wang, like Zhao, sees the state as playing a significant role in the construction of national identity. He contends that historical memory and national identity are closely related, pointing to Anthony Smith's influential work on ethnic nationalism as evidence.11 He further claims that in the case of China, the “Chinese Communist Party has used history education as an instrument” for party legitimacy since 1989.12

My understanding of nationalism is influenced by all three scholars' work. Zhao and Wang see nationalism as a tool used by the CCP to build legitimacy and thereby sustain Communist rule, while Gries sees the potential of the new grassroots nationalism to upset the very rule it is meant to support. I agree with Wang’s assertion that there exists a critical link between historical memory and nationalism. I adopt Zhao’s view that Chinese anti-Japanese nationalism linked to historical memory has been constructed by the state in the terrain of official memory. But I also incorporate Gries’ assertion that Chinese society has engaged in memory work in the vernacular terrain, outside of Party control. I thus view Chinese Nationalism as both a grassroots and elite-led phenomenon grounded in a national identity derived largely from historical memory. In this definition, historical narratives serve as the locus for nationalist contestation between citizens (i.e. internet-users) and government elites.

Quantitatively measuring levels of nationalism and aggregate national identity on a large scale is notoriously difficult. The case of Chinese nationalism compounds this problem due to the lack of historical benchmarks in the nationalism literature, itself evidence of the difficulty in acquiring reliable data, whether in the present or stretching back into the Maoist era and beyond.13 However, most scholars agree that nationalism appears to be rising in China, and they point to correlating anecdotal and quantitative data. For example, the scale, intensity, and frequency of nationalist protests appear to be increasing. Following ten years of trouble-free relations after normalization in 1972, widespread anti-Japanese protests have broken out in China in 1985, 1996, 2005, 2010, and 2012. Despite the small sample size, the protests clearly appear to be accelerating in frequency. The scale has also expanded from a few hundred (at most one thousand) in 1985 to tens of thousands nationwide in 2012, while the intensity has also risen from sporadic protests spread out over the course of a month in 1985 to mass mobilization over the course of just a few days in 2012.14 Anti-U.S. protests have occurred with less frequency, but they have been vigorous, especially following the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in 1999; anti-French protests have followed a similar trajectory of “rare but vigorous.”15 These demonstrations of nationalist emotion are reflected in public opinion data, as well: Chinese public opinion toward Japan has plummeted over the course of the last decade, while it has fluctuated with regard to the United States.16

### CHANGING HISTORICAL NARRATIVES: PUBLIC MEMORY OF WORLD WAR II IN CHINA

In this section I conduct a historical analysis of anti-Japanese war narratives and memory activism by state and non-state actors on the various terrains of memory in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. During the Maoist era, the heroic war narrative dominated party propaganda and the CCP held a monopoly over memory discourse

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11 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, 7.
12 Ibid., 9.
in all terrains except for personal memory. During the reform era, however, the Communist Party began emphasizing nationalism as a means of legitimating one-party authoritarian rule by revising historical narratives of World War II in the terrain of official memory and guiding discourse in the terrain of vernacular memory. The Party altered the narrative using a variety of methods, including building new museums, allowing and encouraging new works and genres of film, TV, literature, and other media, and establishing a new history curriculum in classrooms nationwide through the Patriotic Education Campaign. These initiatives portrayed the Japanese and Guomindang (GMD) in a revised light. In the case of the Japanese, previously hidden atrocities were allowed to surface and enter public discussion. The GMD contributions to the war effort, previously downplayed, were now highlighted.

But it was the arrival of the Internet in China in 1994 and the rapid expansion of users from the late nineties onward that accelerated the re-shaping of national identity and the growth of nationalism. The Internet allowed increased and faster access to historically sensitive news, such as the visit of a Japanese politician to the Yasukuni Shrine. This access sped up the chronopolitics of memory by increasing the chance that outside pressures would create opportunities for memory activists to exploit. The Internet has created an easily accessible and difficult to censor space for memory activists to work in, resulting in an explosion of activity in the vernacular and meta-memory terrains.

Maoist Era (1949-1978)

The CCP adopted a policy of "benevolent amnesia" following their victorious conclusion of the Chinese Civil War. Taking a lenient approach to Japanese prisoners of war, the Party repatriated all personnel by 1964, including those indicted for war crimes in the 1956 Shenyang and Taiyuan tribunals. Decrying the greatest Cold War threat to be the United States and the Nationalists in Taiwan, the CCP minimized U.S. and Guomindang (GMD) contributions to the war effort, without playing up Japanese atrocities.17

At the same time, the victimization narrative was relegated to a lesser role in constructing Chinese postwar identity. The CCP recast the century of national humiliation as an aspect of global class struggle.18 Japanese atrocities were largely ignored in favor of building up Communist heroic actions. For example, "filmmakers were urged to avoid depiction of Chinese wartime suffering that would 'dilute our hatred of imperialism' and 'lower our morale.' Scholars who tried to investigate the Nanjing Massacre were criticized for 'stirring up national hatred and revenge.'"19

1980s

The Chinese heroic narrative began to change from the mid-1980s onward. Rana Mitter points out four interrelated chronopolitical factors that contributed to a dramatic shift in the boundaries of official discourse of the war. First, Beijing hoped to attract Taipei into reunification. The CCP began stressing Nationalist contributions to the war and unity with the Communists in official historical narratives. Second, the Cold War motivation to emphasize Nationalist atrocities instead of Japanese ones gradually disappeared. Therefore, the CCP began emphasizing Japanese atrocities in official historical narratives, especially the Nanjing Massacre, both due to the enormity of the tragedy, but also as a reaction to right wing forces in Japan seeking to minimize mention of the event in national textbooks. Third, Marxism faced a crisis of delegitimation in post-1978 China and the post-1989 world outside China. CCP efforts to change the official historical narrative accelerated following the Tiananmen Square Protests and fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, two events that highlighted the delegitimation of Marxism in China, as well as the need to successfully replace it with a legitimating ideology: nationalism. Fourth, the CCP wanted to reduce U.S. and Japanese power in East Asia.20

Mitter's reasons for the historical revision of wartime narratives that occurred in the mid-1980s make

19 Reilly, "Remember History, Not Hatred." 469.
remarkably evident the geopolitical factors behind Beijing's decision-making. Reunification with Taiwan, rising Japanese power in East Asia, and the continued threat of the U.S.-Japan Alliance (despite the tensions between the United States and Japan during the decade): the foreign policy calculus behind these decisions cannot be linked to nationalism alone. Not until after the June 4th protests in 1989 did the CCP begin implementing widespread educational indoctrination concerning the century of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers.

The most visible work of memory alteration during the 1980s occurred in the terrain of official memory, but work in the terrain of vernacular memory gradually began to sprout. Examples of memory work within the contours of official memory include the opening of several museums, including the Memorial Hall for the Victims of the Nanjing Massacre in 1984, a major exhibition on GMD General Zhang Zizhong in the Hall of the Anti-Japanese War at the Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution in 1985, and the Memorial Hall of the People's War of Resistance Against Japan in 1987. The History Working Group of the Communist Party of Henan province published a collection of wartime reporting in 1988, with articles stressing a narrative of victimization at the hands of Japanese troops. Vernacular memory work began in the 1980s as well. The internationally acclaimed film Red Sorghum was released in 1987. Nanjing Massacre-related films were released in 1982 and 1987. A collection of short war stories by intellectuals and reporters was published in 1989.

1990s

The trend of memory work in all terrains accelerated in the 1990s with the shifting chronopolitics of memory following the international isolation and legitimacy crisis facing the CCP after 1989. In the terrain of official memory, several examples are particularly indicative of the shifting memoryscape. The most important academic journal devoted to research of the

Sino-Japanese War, Research on the War of Resistance to Japan, only began publication in 1991, touching on topics such as the Nanjing Massacre and GMD and U.S. contributions to the war. Rana Mitter points out that "Academic history is generally the first area in China to show the signs of historiographical change, when prestigious research institutes are authorized to open up new channels of interpretation." Lin Zhibo, a researcher at the Academy of Military Sciences, continued the rehabilitation of GMD General Zhang with the publication of a biography in 1993. New museums opened and new patriotic exhibitions were added to existing museums.

But the most important state-led effort at official memory alteration in the 1990s occurred with the announcement of the Patriotic Education Campaign in 1994, which took for inspiration a 1991 letter written by Jiang Zemin. The historical narrative in Jiang's letter emphasized four points. First, Chinese people were bullied and humiliated by foreign powers for more than 100 years. Second, Chinese people were resolved to defend the nation by laying down their lives. Third, the CCP led the multi-ethnic Chinese people on the journey to liberation and continued fighting wars of anti-aggression to counter attempted bullying by foreign powers after liberation. Fourth, the Chinese people have never feared external forces and have always opposed foreign invasions. This narrative, though not specifically anti-Japanese, clearly hews to the recently reformulated victimization narrative. The CCP remains the hero as always, saving the nation by winning multiple anti-foreign wars.

The new narrative was reflected in a wide variety of ways. New curricula were designed and new textbooks written. In 1995, 100 national-level sites were selected as demonstration bases for patriotic education (forty of which focus on external conflicts), part of an effort that eventually included the construction and remodeling of over 10,000 memory sites nationwide. Local governments built their own demonstration bases at


Waldron, "China's New Remembering," 975-76.


Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, 98.

Ibid., 100-105, 6.
the provincial and county level. The CCP also asked local governments to use holidays and special dates to support patriotic education: in 1995 alone, there were more than ten thousand events commemorating victory on the 50th anniversary of the end of the war. The return of Hong Kong and Macao prompted more than six months of patriotic celebration over the “wiping away of humiliation.” The PEC is ongoing and continues to evolve and expand according to the changing socio-political context.

Works contesting Japanese atrocities in the terrain of vernacular memory flourished, feeding a public appetite for war stories long suppressed and suddenly internationalized by sensational media coverage. Many more memoirs were published, such as The Devil Soldiers I Knew by Jun Fang in 1997, as well as several multi-volume collections of wartime reporting. War-related films and TV shows proliferated in abundance, many of them showing Japanese atrocities previously outside the boundaries of acceptable discourse on the war.

2000s

Memory work in the official terrain continued in the 2000s, but it was the arrival of the Internet in 1994 and its maturation by the early 2000s that played a pivotal role in the memory activism of the decade. In the terrain of official memory, Beijing continued tweaking the PEC. For example, all patriotic education bases became free-of-charge to group visits by elementary and middle school students. In 2007, an education reform initiative required that the college-level required core course on Marxism-Leninism and Maoism be replaced by a history course on Chinese post-1840 history, an unambiguous sign that historical memory-based nationalism had replaced delegitimated Communist ideologies of the past. The campaign also expanded to include forms of entertainment: in 2004, seven PRC ministries and CCP departments created a list of 100 patriotic films, songs, and books to recommend to society, an effort by the center to reclaim lost ground in the terrain of vernacular memory. In

2005, the National Bureau of Tourism published a list of 100 former revolutionary bases and landmarks to be designated as sites of “Red Tourism.” With the move into new mediums of entertainment and tourism for society at large, the CCP signaled the expansion of the PEC beyond the classrooms of children to the everyday lives of adults.

In the terrain of vernacular and meta-memory, meanwhile, the public continued to devour new works on wartime events. Several Western works were translated into Chinese, such as the diary of John Rabe, “the good Nazi” who saved Chinese lives during the Nanjing Massacre. These works continued to reflect the “newly remembered” victimization historical narrative. Several additional films on the Nanjing Massacre were produced in the 2000s. In 2004, Hong Kong lobbyists pushed for national commemoration of September 18—the day of the Manchurian Incident in 1931—as a day of mourning. Although the petition failed, they organized widespread protest events instead. Finally, anti-Japanese shows represented 70 of the 200 primetime dramas that aired in 2012 alone; reports suggest these dramas nearly always pass through the state censorship authorities.

The arrival in 1994 and maturation by the early 2000s of the Internet in China marked a change in the way Chinese citizens engaged with historical

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Notes

27 Ibid., 109.
28 I would suggest that by the early 2000s, the terrain of meta-memory had begun overlapping significantly and consistently with that of vernacular memory (not to mention, to a lesser degree, official and personal memory). This is due to the fact that the 1980s and 1990s saw the extreme politicization of debates over historical memory in the international sphere between China/South Korea and Japan. Gluck, “Operations of Memory,” 47-77.
30 Examples include The Children of Huang Shi, City of Life and Death, Nanking, John Rabe, and The Flowers of War. It should be noted that Western filmmakers produced several of these films and the level of victimization and anti-Japanese feeling varies among them.
The inherent ease of access of the Internet meant that the chronopolitics of memory “sped up” due to increased media coverage and the rapid spread of information online through forums and other websites. One of the first examples of this phenomenon was the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999. News quickly traveled via cyberspace to China; Chinese hackers soon defaced U.S. government websites, heightening tensions in an already complex international crisis. Some in China viewed the bombing as a continuation of past victimization at the hands of foreigners. Through access to news and discussion based websites, the Internet opened up a space for online memory activists to work in that was more difficult (but by no means impossible) to censor and control. In other words, by the late 1990s, the Internet already acted as a mechanism that accelerated the rise of nationalism.

In the early 2000s, despite the Chinese government’s desire to implement a moderate Japan policy, grassroots anti-Japanese nationalism rapidly increased online. The website “China 9-18” was established in 2000 and called for an online “war of resistance” against Japan in 2002. The website has since expanded to include an anti-Japan-focused news site. Feng Jinhua, famous in China for spraying “go to hell” (gaisi) on a stone sculpture in the Yasukuni Shrine, co-founded the popular “Alliance of Patriots” website in 2003. According to James Reilly, China hosted some 1,000 anti-Japan websites by 2004. Ma Licheng’s 2003 article “New Thinking on Relations with Japan,” which advocated a moderate approach toward Japan in line with elite policymakers’ desires, was lambasted online. There are many other examples of anti-Japanese web activism during this period: in 2003, an online petition demanded compensation for injuries caused by abandoned Japanese chemical weapons; online boycotts of Japanese goods spread; online reports uncovered a Japanese sex scandal.

I now examine two cases in detail to demonstrate the effect of the Internet on policy outcomes. Specifically, I show how nationalist movements originating on the Internet constrain CCP decision-making in a complex, continuous process of contestation involving the potential for protests as well as the possibility of reinforcing regime legitimacy. Because the Internet provides a crucial space for contention, both disruptive and legitimating opinions may coexist and compete. Depending on the context, these narratives can constrain the range of options open to party leaders in making foreign policy decisions. These constraints may be desirable or undesirable for policymakers.

The first case illustrates the impact of internet-users on the building of high-speed railways in China. Shortly after announcing their plan to issue contracts to foreign firms for the new railway in 2002, Chinese officials met with their Japanese counterparts to discuss a potential deal. By the end of May 2003, Chinese and Japanese press reported that the probability of the contracts going to a Japanese firm, as opposed German or French consortiums, was over ninety percent. Officials on both sides signaled their clear approval of the award decision.

Beginning in late 2002, Chinese internet-users began voicing their opposition to a Japanese-built railway line, with online opinion growing louder and more united into the summer of 2003. The Alliance of Patriots website created an online petition in July 2003 warning against the construction of a railway line connecting Beijing and Shanghai by a Japanese firm. It collected 82,752 signatures before submission to the Ministry of Railroads. News articles expressing similar apprehensions followed in subsequent months. Citing public opinion, Chinese government officials began publicly distancing themselves from the Japanese technology, and newspapers suggested that internet activists had driven the outcome.

In the summer of 2004, Chinese officials announced...
the awarding of train-building contracts split among Japanese, French, and Canadian firms and consortiums; half of the trains would be supplied by Japanese companies. A new Alliance of Patriots online petition collected nearly 70,000 signatures, this time pushing officials for more transparency in the process of awarding contracts, reversal of the decision, and calling for China to build its own trains. At this point, censors blocked the website and petition. However, Japanese companies received no future contracts (while non-Japanese companies did), and party officials continued to cite anti-Japan public attitudes as a reason for their avoidance of Japanese bullet train technology. Furthermore, they stressed the involvement of Chinese companies in future construction and moved to debunk any rumors of additional Japanese involvement in railway projects.53

This case demonstrates the critical role of Chinese online activists in shaping the contours of debate regarding an issue of nationalist importance. Newspapers only began editorializing in opposition to the Japanese government and railway companies after online debate, which had been growing for months, culminated in a widely disseminated petition. These newspapers themselves acknowledged the influence of online activists. In addition, the railways case vividly illustrates the continually negotiated nature of online contention: even after influencing the policy outcome by limiting the number of trains provided by Japanese firms, activists again agitated with additional demands. At this point, the CCP ended debate by shutting down the website and employing censors to limit discussion of the petition. Yet party leaders also tacitly capitulated to the demands of the campaigners by sharply curtailing the involvement of Japanese companies in the future development of Chinese railways, thereby signaling their intention to listen to the voices of online nationalists. In this way, contention between internet-users and government officials concluded with the renewed legitimacy of the CCP, which appeared to be a party in tune with the demands of the people. As we have seen, however, Chinese leaders originally preferred Japanese firms. They adjusted their policy preferences only after nationalists reshaped the debate to reflect the anti-Japan historical memory landscape of the early 2000s.

The second case demonstrates the how contentious spaces on the Internet triggered a cascade of nationalist sentiment online and offline in 2004 and 2005 in response to the Japanese bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).54 Tokyo began promoting a bid in September 2004. Beijing’s benign official response is encapsulated in the Foreign Ministry spokesman’s statement that “we understand Japan’s aspiration to play a greater role in international affairs.”55 This initial reaction triggered anti-Japan nationalist discourse among internet-users, foreshadowing significant contention in the coming months. But for the time being, Tokyo’s bid gained additional support around the world. By mid-March 2005, the United States and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had both endorsed Japan’s bid; it had also received broad support in the UN General Assembly.56

Overseas Chinese associations began mobilizing users to sign online petitions opposing Japan’s entry into the UNSC in February 2005. These petitions garnered significantly more signatures and attention after the People’s Daily reported on them in late March, expanding to commercial portals Sina and Sohu soon thereafter. As nationalist fervor took hold online, official websites including Xinhua followed with their own petitions.57 The State Council General Office estimates that over 28 million users ultimately signed petitions.58 Soon, organizers led petition signature drives in the street, with some turning violent. Censors scrubbed the Internet in China of any reference to protests that damaged Japanese stores.59

Corresponding with increasing demonstrations against the Japanese bid, nationalist internet-users (including members of the Alliance of Patriots) continued to berate the government for not taking a firm stance against Japan. Unlike South Korea, China had not announced a clear policy of opposition to the Japanese bid.60 On the weekend of April 9, protests broke out across China and were tolerated by the CCP. The next weekend saw continued protests allowed and even supported by the government. By mid-April it became clear that the Japanese bid, which had lost U.S.

53 Ibid., 56-7.
54 This case is adapted from a fuller account in Weiss, “Powerful Patriots,” 90-116.
55 Ibid., 94.
56 Ibid., 93-7.
57 Ibid., 97-8.
58 Ibid., 90.
60 Reilly, Strong Society, 153.
support, was unlikely to succeed. At this point, the party began cracking down on the protests, but despite their successes in Beijing and Shanghai, demonstrations continued in many cities around the country.\textsuperscript{61} Finally, in late April, the Chinese government succeeded in tamping down on the protests. Newspapers changed their fiery rhetoric over Japanese historical abuses, instead appealing for "friendly coexistence and win-win cooperation;" the security apparatus blocked text messages including the word "Japan" or "protest;" security forces detained suspected nationalist activists.\textsuperscript{62} On May 1, confident that the proposal had lost support among major power brokers and much of the General Assembly, China announced that it would veto Japan's UNSC bid.\textsuperscript{63}

Like the railways case, the anti-Japanese UNSC bid case demonstrates the Internet's power to mobilize public opinion in resistance to Chinese government policy. Unlike the railways case, however, in this case the CCP preferred the nationalist outcome and sought a pretext with which to overcome world opinion that appeared to be in favor of the Japanese bid. This example, then, reveals the ability of the CCP to utilize nationalist discourse to its advantage within the confines of a narrowed debate. Although opposition formed initially on the Internet and expanded through the efforts of overseas Chinese, the People's Daily article signaled party approval of grassroots resistance efforts. The very unusual step of allowing widespread protests further illustrates the Chinese government's preferred policy outcome. Yet the UNSC case also shows the potential destabilizing effects of allowing contentious spaces to exist on the Internet. The CCP was largely successful in its efforts to control the protests that erupted across the country. Nonetheless, street petitions and protests turned violent in several instances, and some protests outside Beijing and Shanghai went unreported by the Chinese media. The UNSC case therefore highlights the risks to the regime in allowing emotion-laden discourse to translate into collective action.

\section*{Alternative Explanations}

What else could explain the dramatic rise in historical-memory-related nationalism online since the late 1990s? Three alternative explanations are addressed here. First, perhaps the rise in nationalism results from the Internet's compartmentalization of information into discrete spheres of ideological discourse, rather than the increased accessibility of information and the creation of new societal spaces for memory activism in the terrain of vernacular and meta-memory. This argument fails due the fact that balkanized spheres of discourse on the Internet are easier to censor, and the Chinese government's Internet regulation regime is far too comprehensive and powerful for such spheres to influence national discourse.\textsuperscript{64}

Second, perhaps older Chinese citizens, less removed from the experiences of war than their younger counterparts, are flooding online in large numbers and driving online memory activism. This explanation fails due to the fact that the average age of internet-users in China today is under thirty.\textsuperscript{65} Furthermore, technical barriers to entry probably prevent older internet-users from making as full use of the technology as younger users.

Third, it could be argued that the Japanese have become more nationalistic, thereby driving the rise in Chinese nationalism. This argument implies that the medium does not matter—communications technologies from an earlier era would have had the same effect. Yet the Japanese have always had more societal openings in which to conduct memory activism from both sides of the ideological spectrum.\textsuperscript{66} Additionally, the number of official government Japanese acts considered "inflammatory" (such as visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by politicians in an official capacity) has decreased since start of the reform era, while inflammatory statements by right-wing ideologues in Japan are now easily transmitted to the Chinese public.

\section*{Conclusion}

In summary, I have argued that the rapid rise of anti-Japanese nationalism related to historical memory of World War II stems from the arrival and maturation of the Internet in China. The Internet, contrary to conventional wisdom, does not serve simply as a platform for the expression of state-led pragmatic nationalism. Rather, due to its nature as a participatory medium that accelerates the spread of information, the

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Year} & \textbf{Number of internet-users} \\
\hline
1990 & 5 million \\
1995 & 20 million \\
2000 & 200 million \\
2010 & 1 billion \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Internet Users in China}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{61} Yang, The Power of the Internet, 46-53.


Internet creates space for contentious politics. In the case of historical memory related to World War II, the expressions of nationalist politics online have been far more grassroots in nature than those of previous decades. They have begun to contend with the state over the "correct" interpretation of historical memory in the long neglected vernacular terrain.

However, I have not argued for technological determinism. The contentious politics of nationalism on the Internet in China will not necessarily lead to democracy. Nor will they necessarily strengthen the rule of the Communist Party. In my framework, the Internet provides a space for contentious politics—both destabilizing and supportive—to occur in an authoritarian regime that would otherwise exert far more control over the terrains of public memory.

This paper raises additional questions as to how the Communist Party negotiates and shapes the contours of the space provided for contention online. In what contexts and through which mechanisms do online nationalist discourses support or undermine the regime? Jonathan Hassid and James Reilly have suggested that the degree of information control exercised by the state greatly influences the political effect of online and offline contention. Likewise, Gary King, et al. suggest that the center's sophisticated censorship apparatus allows social media posts critical of the CCP, but censors posts which could potentially lead to collective action. Does information control of online nationalist contention operate in the same manner as information control of other forms of online contention? Daniela Stockmann has argued that media commercialization in China leads to increased regime stability; indeed, the average reader may perceive commercialized newspapers to be more credible relative to their state-run counterparts. Does online nationalism appear more credible vis-à-vis the Patriotic Education Campaign to the average Chinese internet-user? Following these avenues for further research will help us gain an even better understanding of the Internet's effects on politics in China and elsewhere.

66 Hassid argues that blogs help stabilize the regime when state-guided media set the contours of discussion by acting as a "safety valve" on public discontent. When bloggers get ahead of the media, however, blogs act as a "pressure cooker" that undermines the regime. Jonathan Hassid, "Safety Valve or Pressure Cooker? Blogs in Chinese Political Life" Journal of Communication 62 (2012): 212-230, Reilly argues that when the state loses control over the flow of information regarding issues of high emotional impact, the mobilization levels and public pressure for state action is greatest. Reilly, Strong Society, 129-155.

67 Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts, "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, August 30-September 2, 2012).

**THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET**

**WORK CITED**


OLIVIER GARAUD

Olivier Garaud is a first year graduate student at Department of Asian Studies at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.
The emergence of National South-west Associated University (hereafter abbreviated as NSAU) coincided roughly with the war of the Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression. The university, known as an exemplar of wartime education in modern China history, was also an important arena of the Chinese Communist Party's (hereafter abbreviated as CCP) United Front activities during the war. Little research has been done in the area of the Chinese Communist underground party in NSAU. Because of the secretive nature of the subject, written materials are rare. As a result, oral histories have become significant first-hand sources. This paper explores the Chinese Communist Party's underground organization in NSAU between 1938 and 1946 based on interviews of members of the party and its external organizations, their internal publications, as well as memoirs and other kinds of open publications. In reviewing the core and front of the NSAU's underground party, examining the organization's guidelines and operations, and probing the complex struggle on campus between the Guomindang's Three Principles Youth Corps and the CCP's Group Society, and between the Nationalists and Communists, I try to discuss the NSAU's underground party's organization and its functions in the CCP's United Front strategies and activities. Based on the open and "internal" original sources, I have found that the core and front of the CCP's underground party formed an organism that could deploy its members efficiently and sustain its development. It is hoped that this study builds the groundwork on which we can analyze in-depth the effects of the CCP's other United Front activities.

The Chinese Communist Party's (hereafter abbreviated as CCP) organization consisted of the core and front. While the core refers to the underground organizations of the CCP such as the National South-west Associated University's (hereafter abbreviated as NSAU) General Party Branch and its party groups that were formed by the underground party members of the CCP, the front refers to the groups led by the underground party members of the CCP. Most members of the front groups that were open in NSAU were the common students. The underground party members could hide their identity, make friends, and find and foster the talents who believed in communism through the front groups. In a word, the core and its front groups were very important to the underground organization of the CCP.

THE CORE BEFORE 1941

The development of the organization of the CCP's underground party in NSAU can be divided into two periods by the Wannan Incident of January 1941. The first was the period of its germination and development in NSAU. Since one of the characteristics of the underground party was its secrecy, some members of the CCP's underground party who came from Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and other cities had failed to make connection with the CCP's organization until the autumn of 1938. By the end of 1938, there were two groups of the CCP's underground party in NSAU, but they were initially unaware of each other's existence.

In March 1939, according to the Southern Bureau's instructions the members of NSAU's underground party, such as Yuan and Xing, formally created the NSAU's branch of the CCP's underground party that was under the Yunnan Work Committee's command. The Southern Bureau appointed Yuan as the Secretary of the branch. Simultaneously, a student of the National Changsha Temporary University (hereafter abbreviated as NCTU), Wang, who took orders from Ye Jianying and Huang Wenjie of the Changjiang Bureau and prepared to establish a branch of the NSAU's underground party

1 Because of the Marco Polo Bridge (Lugou Qiao) incident on 7 July 1937 and the subsequent Japanese invasion of China, three renowned universities of north China, Peking University, Tsinghua University and Nankai University were consolidated into one temporary university by the Ministry of Education and relocated to Changsha in 1937. At the end of 1937, Nanjing fell, and Wuhan was in emergency, NCTU was forced to move again to Yunnan province in 1938 and changed its name to NSAU.
during the NCTU’s period, moved to Yunnan and created the branch on campus in November 1938. In January 1939, the CCP founded the Southern Bureau that was in charge of the underground party branches in Chiang Kai-shek’s districts. Wang connected four party members’ relations to the CCP’s organization and admitted three schoolmates into the CCP, including Zhang. Wang kept in touch with the Southern Bureau.

As Zhang, who was the member of the NSAU’s underground party branch, described in an interview to me in 2009, “One morning, Wang asked me whether I wished to join the CCP in private. I was so happy to hear that I had finally found the organization and remembered that in the afternoon another person also had asked me whether I wished to join the CCP. I was confused and then replied that the party had already asked me. He was shocked and then left quickly. I later reported this to Wang. The two branches of the NSAU’s underground party did not know of each other’s existence until this moment!”

After Wang’s graduation in July 1939, the two branches were combined and Yuan became the leader of the NSAU’s underground party branch led by the Yunnan Work Committee. The Southern Bureau was in charge of the Yunnan Work Committee. With the growing number of party members through the transfer of the party members from other universities to NSAU and the development of new party members, according to the Yunnan Work Committee’s directives, the NSAU’s party branch expanded into the NSAU’s General Party Branch that was in charge of three party branches and four party groups in March 1940. The Institute of the CCP’s History of the Yunnan Provincial Committee indicated that there were 247 party members in Yunnan by 1940, and the editorial board of the NSAU’s underground party history mentioned that there were 83 party members in NSAU. The secretary of the NSAU’s General Party Branch was Yuan during the period from March to September in 1940, and Chen succeeded Yuan as the secretary from September 1940 to January 1941. However, in a piece of original material, the party member Rong, who was the member of the organization department of the Southern Bureau, pointed out, “following the Southern Bureau’s instructions, the organizations of the CCP’s underground party stopped recruiting party members, and entered into the period of consolidation”.

Why did the NSAU’s underground party’s branch still recruit new party members when the Southern Bureau had decided to stop developing its organizations? To Zhi, who was the NSAU’s underground party member, the distance was far between Chongqing and Kunming and communications between the Southern Bureau and the Yunnan Work Committee were not easy in wartime. In addition, the Yunnan Work Committee and the NSAU’s branch of the underground party did not understand the Southern Bureau’s intention at the outset.

At the end of 1940, in order to maintain the sustainable development of the NSAU’s underground party, the Youth Committee of the Yunnan Work Committee created the No.2 General Party Branch of NSAU whose other appellation was “Secret General Branch” because of its highly secret characteristic. The No.2 General Party Branch was in absolute secrecy.


3 According to an original material that is undisclosed (Zhang is a pseudonym); The editorial board of the NSAU’s underground party history, History of the Underground Organization of the Chinese Communist Party in National South-west Associated University and Revolutionary Activities of the Masses (Kunming: Yunnan People Press, 1994), 13.

4 According to the oral history of Zhang (a pseudonym), interview by me in 2009.

2 The editorial board of the NSAU’s underground party history, History of the Undergroung Organization of the Chinese Communist Party in National South-west Associated University and Revolutionary Activities of the Masses (Kunming: Yunnan People Press, 1994), 14.


8 According to an original material that is undisclosed.

9 According to the oral history of Zhi (a pseudonym), Interview by me in 2010.
and even the No.1 General Party Branch of NSAU did not know of its existence. If the No.1 General Party Branch was damaged or was forced to transfer, the No.2 General Party Branch could continue working at NSAU. Both of the two General Party Branches were led by Yang who was the Youth Committee’s member of the Yunnan Work Committee till March 1941. The secretary of the NSAU’s No.2 General Party Branch was Zhi during the period from October to December in 1940, and Zou succeeded Zhi as Secretary from December 1940 to March 1941.

However, the information of the editorial board of the NSAU’s underground party history did not mention why the No.2 General Party Branch worked longer than the No.1 General Party Branch. According to Zhi, the reason was that the No.2 General Party Branch was more secret than the No.1 General Party Branch, and thus the No.2 General Party Branch protected the transfer of the members of the No.1 General Party Branch and front groups secretly, and later the No.2 General Party Branch also transferred from Kunming to the countryside of Yunnan and other cities such as Shanghai and Hong Kong after the Wannan Incident on January 6, 1941.

THE CORE AFTER 1941

Under the influence of the Wannan Incident and the Second anti-Communist onslaught, the CCP’s underground party in NSAU was at its lowest ebb. For example, all the branches were dissolved, and one-way contact among members was unavailable. In 1941, the Southern Bureau sent Zheng to Kunming as the secretary of the Yunnan Work Committee. In my opinion, the Southern Bureau chose Zheng to be the leader of the Yunnan’s underground party because he was a new face to the Guomindang’s organizations in Kunming and an experienced leader of the CCP’s underground party, and his belief in communism was firm.

The appearance of critical new evidence, the published memoirs of Zheng and Ma, the two key leaders of the Yunnan and NSAU’s underground party during the period from 1941 to 1946, and articles of the party members of the re-founding of the Yunnan and NSAU’s underground party after the Wannan Incident, makes it possible for me to review the core of the NSAU’s underground party after 1941.

According to selections from the notebooks of Bo’s talks on the NSAU’s underground party and Li Ling’s recollection, under the Yunnan Work Committee that had three members sent by the Southern Bureau after the Wannan Incident, there were two party branches of NSAU re-founded in 1943. The secretary of the No.1 party branch was Yuan who came back to NSAU and the No.2 party branch’s secretary was Ma.

Zheng notes that the Southern Bureau did not give him concrete instructions to develop the United Front work until 1943. During the period from 1941 to 1943, he followed the guideline of the Southern Bureau’s Sixteen-Character (Shiliuzi Fangzhen) and implemented the policy of the Three Dilligences (Sanqin Zhengce). “During the period, I did not contact the Southern Bureau directly. The only way of learning the information and directives of the Southern Bureau was to buy and read the ‘Xinhua Daily’ in Kunming.”

According to selections from the notebooks of Bo’s talks on the NSAU’s underground party, “there were two ways to contact the Southern Bureau: one was via the transceiver of Long Yun’s communication group; the other was through the party member who was responsible for communications between Chongqing and Kunming from 1943 to 1946.”

In September 1944, Zheng went to Chongqing and reported on the work of the Yunnan Work Committee and NSAU’s underground party to the Southern Bureau.

According to the selections from the notebooks of Bo’s talks on the NSAU’s underground party that is undisclosed (Bo is a pseudonym); Li Ling, “Zheng Boke and Hua Gang in Kunming”, Baimianchao, vol.9 (2004), 43-44.

According to the selections from the notebooks of Bo’s talks on the NSAU’s underground party that is undisclosed (Bo is a pseudonym).
The directive of the Southern Bureau for Zheng was that he could not contact Hua who was sent by the Southern Bureau to complete the United Front work of Long Yun unless Hua needed his help, and he could not ask for any information on Hua’s work. Li Ling found out that “Hua came to Kunming in 1943, and the party member Sun had told Zheng about Hua’s United Front work, but Zheng did not connect with Hua because he did not receive the directive of the Southern Bureau on Hua’s work. According to the rules of the organization, Zheng could not directly contact Hua, but he could protect and help Hua secretly. In fact, Zheng had asked Sun to help Hua move to a safe place.”

Under the Three Diligences policy of the Southern Bureau, the party members made friends extensively and tried to establish a broad popular base. The Three Diligences were the detailed forms of the United Front. According to the selections from the notebooks of Bo’s talks on the NSAU’s underground party, “the party members began to make friends from their dormitories. If one party member might make three friends, the three students might make nine friends, and then the nine students might make twenty-seven friends. This could be called the Pyramid form of making friends. This way had been used by the NSAU’s party members such as Ma, He and Xu.” The memoirs of Ma published in 2005 confirmed the evidence. According to an original material, Yunnan had 268 party members, of whom 165 were intellectuals such as students and teachers, and 115 of them were in Kunming before the “12.1 movement” in 1945.

THE FRONT OF THE ORGANIZATION

The NSAU’s underground party front can be divided not only into two periods: the front before 1941 and the front after 1941, but also into two kinds of groups: one was open and the other was secret.

On interviewing Zhi in 2010, he said, “most of our front groups were ‘grey’, and ‘grey’ meant no political background. We could hide the identity of the party members and make friends through these groups, such as the group of fellowmen (Tongxianghui), the meal group (Fantuan), the grade group (Jihui), the department group (Xihui) and the poetry group (Shiche).” The front groups presented plays such as “Motherland” and “the Story of A.Q.” in order to disseminate resistance to Japanese aggression and establish a broad popular base in NSAU and Kunming.

The NSAU’s underground party member Xing Fangqun notes that the front “the Group Society” (Qunshe), founded by him in 1939, was the largest student group in NSAU before the Wannan Incident of 1941. Although most of the Group Society’s members were leftist and neutral schoolmates, a few students who were members of the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps were also recruited into the front group. There was a discussion about the front group’s name among the Group Society’s members. The adopted son of Lin Seng proposed that the group should be called “Lixingshe”, and some people suggested that it should be called “the Masses Society”. The names were not appropriate for the group, because “Lixingshe” would be connected with the “Lixing Philosophy” of Chiang Kai-shek, and “the Masses Society” would be associated with “the Masses Periodical” of the CCP published in Chongqing. The biggest student group of NSAU was finally named “the Group Society” proposed by Dong, one of NSAU’s underground party members. The Group Society founded by the party members launched into activities for the immediate interests of students, and on students’ behalf, and solved students’ practical difficulties.

These front groups could contact a wide range of students, understand their thoughts, and inform them of the CCP’s positions and the voices from Yenan. In contrast, some members of the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps behaved like the superiors of students, and tended to monitor suspicious students. During the period of NSAU, the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps had alienated the rest of the students, which was also the manifestation of the Guomindang losing the people’s heart. However, because of the occurrence of the Wannan Incident, the party members and leftists of

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17 According to the selections from the notebooks of Bo’s talks on the NSAU’s underground party that is undisclosed (Bo is a pseudonym).
19 According to the selections from the notebooks of Bo’s talks on the NSAU’s underground party that is undisclosed (Bo is a pseudonym).
21 According to an original material that is undisclosed.
22 According to the oral history of Zhi (a pseudonym), interview by me in 2010.
the Group Society had to transfer and their activities stopped at NSAU.

With the change of the political situation, under the party branches of NSAU, three branches of the Democracy Youth Alliance were created in 1945 that were similar to the Vanguard Team of Chinese Nation Liberation (Minxian). The Democracy Youth Alliance, the front led by the NSAU’s underground party was secret. Meanwhile, the party members and leftists competed for the leadership of the Grade Group, the Department Group and the Student Autonomous Association. Qi Liang, the party member and Ma’s good friend, became the leader of the Student Autonomous Association of NSAU and the Student Union of Kunming’s universities and middle schools. The Yunnan Work Committee and NSAU’s party branches could organize the student movements through the Student Autonomous Association of NSAU and the Student Union of Kunming’s universities and middle schools such as “12.1 movement” in Kunming.

GUIDELINES AND OPERATIONS OF THE ORGANIZATION

The second battle line was highly significant for the Southern Bureau. The directives of the Southern Bureau of May 4, 1939 and January 1942 were that one branch consisted of three to five party members, and the members’ number of a branch could not have more than five people. For example, with the increase in members, the NSAU’s party branch was developed into the NSAU’s General Party Branch and oversaw three party branches. The directives of May 4, 1939 and June 29, 1939 noted that the party member who held an important post did not organize into the secret branch and only connected with the leader of the provincial party committee. In Yunnan, the relationship, between Huo who held an important post as the representative of the CCP to Long Yun’s district and Zheng the leader of the Yunnan Work Committee, was an example of the directives’ practice.

In order to secure the safety of the CCP’s underground party members and the sustainable development of the CCP, the instructions on June 20, 1939 stressed that the exposed party members had to transfer immediately from their work’s places, even though the work suffered damage temporarily. For example, Ma was transferred from Sichuan to Yunnan in 1941. Yuan and Zhi were transferred from NSAU to the countryside of Yunnan and Zhang was transferred from NSAU to Hong Kong in 1941. The instructions on April 1, 1940 also stressed the importance of sustainable development. Secret documents, such as the lists of the party members, and the materials of the United Front should be burned. It was most important to protect the party members. Moreover, the instructions noted that it was the party members’ duty to transfer or hide for saving force of the party, and that evacuation was not a retreat from fighting.

On May 4, 1940, Mao Zedong formulated the guidelines of the CCP’s underground party work in the White District: Hiding Elite’s (Yinbi Jinggan), Long-term Ambushes (Changqi Maifu), Saving Force (Jixu Liliang) and Pending the Time (Yidai Shiji), and opposed impatience and revelation. Mao Zedong stressed the work of the United Front was to make friends. According to the draft of Zhou Enlai’s talk on September 27, 1947, the policy of the Three Diligences was concrete to the Sixteen-Character Guideline. The Three Diligences referred to Working with Diligence, Studying with Diligence, Making friends with Diligence. For instance, Qi Liang won the students’ respect, became the leader of the Student Autonomous Association of NSAU and the Student Union of Kunming’s universities and middle schools, and established the masses basis under the policy of the Three Diligences.

The Southern Bureau held a conference in Chongqing during the period from December 1941 to January 1942, and Zhou Enlai as the secretary of the Southern Bureau made a speech at the conference.

24 Ma, Shitu, The Collected Works of Ma Shitu no.9 (Chengdu: Sichuan Wenyi Press, 2005), 416-420; According to the selections from the notebooks of Bo’s talks on the NSAU’s underground party that is undisclosed (Bo is a pseudonym).
25 Ibid., 404-405.
He said that the Southern Bureau should observe the political tendencies, social relationships, work abilities and backgrounds of every cadre, find talented people and foster their abilities further. Moreover, the party members could join the Guomindang or the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps in order to contact the masses and hide themselves, if necessary.32

THE FUNCTION OF THE ORGANIZATION

The fact that the members of the core and front of the CCP’s underground organization took the leadership of the Grade and Department Groups and the Student Autonomous Association by election among the students of NSAU has proved the United Front work’s result of the underground organization of the CCP.

The organization of the CCP’s underground party had long-term guidelines that were connected with the struggle practice of its party members. For example, the Three Diligences’ policy was proposed in 1941 after the Wannan Incident.33 However, the founder of the Group Society, the NSAU’s underground party member Xing Fanqun had won the support of the schoolmates of NSAU by working with diligence, studying with diligence and making friends with diligence in 1939. Facing Chiang Kai-shek’s onsluaths on the CCP and the setbacks of the CCP’s underground party in Sichuan, Guangdong and Hunan at the beginning of 1940, the Sixteen-Character Guideline was rapidly formulated by Mao Zedong in May 1940, which protected the organizations of the party in White Districts.

The organization attached significance to the schools’ and professors’ understanding and support. For instance, during the “12.1 Movement” period, the Kunming’s students’ strikes were contradictory to the School’s requirements of the resumption of classes. When the schools insisted, the Yunnan Work Committee required its party members to persuade students to return to classrooms, although a few students refused.34

The detailed rules of the principles of secrecy secured the organization’s sustainable development. For instance, the members of one party branch could not ask for the other party branch or party member’s information without the directive of the Southern Bureau. Lateral connections were not permitted between the party branches. The No.2 party branch should keep its secret from the No.1 party branch. If

the party member’s identity was once revealed, the member had to be transferred to other places at once, break contact with his or her society relationship and change his or her name and profession that appeared to the public.35

Although the organization did not permit lateral relations among the branches, it encouraged its party members to make friends outside the party. Under the directives of the Southern Bureau, the organization gave its branches and members the decision-making power to launch the work of United Front. For instance, the Southern Bureau sent Zheng to Kunming as the secretary of the Yunnan Work Committee in 1941, but the Southern Bureau did not contact him till September 1944. He led the United Front work of the Yunnan Work Committee and learned the directives of the organization by “Xinhua Daily” during the period from 1941 to 1944.

Moreover, in order to hide its party members’ identities and assist them to contact the masses, the organization could compromise its principles by permitting its members to join the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps or the Guomindang, if necessary.

In sum, the organization of the CCP’s underground party by the core and front formed an organism that could expand its cadre troops by recruiting and fostering the elites among the youth and intellectuals, deploy and hide its members efficiently, lay stress on its sustainable development and attach importance to the battle line of culture. It is hoped that this study on the underground organization of the CCP in NSAU is a base that helps us to understand the CCP’s success afterward on the United Front and battle line of culture.

32 Ibid., 38-42.
33 Ibid., 58.
34 According to an original material that is undisclosed.
LIU YU

Liu Yu is a third year doctoral student in the Department of History at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
LAND RIGHTS IN CHINA: ALLOCATION, EFFICIENCY
AND THE RURAL-URBAN INCOME GAP.

Insecurity of rural land rights in China has a profound effect on China’s society. It is responsible for slower agricultural growth, unsustainable farming practices and a large and widening rural-urban income gap. Not only does the lack of legislation protecting farmers’ land rights expose them to the risk of government land taking but it also makes them less able to invest in their future and put their land to its best use. A severe shortage of farm land when compared to China’s huge population makes food security a pressing issue. This paper looks at the achievements of Chinese land reform over the last 30 years and discusses the problems that still remain. Alternative property rights systems are discussed in a theoretical context and with reference to some that are practiced in other countries. Reform is required to give farmers greater autonomy of land use and ownership in order to increase land productivity and rural income whilst protecting natural resources and best providing food for China’s 1.35 billion people.

Economists have repeatedly proven the relationship between the security of property rights and efficient, autonomous development. Although China’s urban economy has developed rapidly towards greater privatisation, rural areas still persist in systems of state ownership and household usage rights, with government land acquisitions threatening the security of farmers. The direct effects include inadequate compensation for third-party land acquisitions and loss of income where there is no alternative employment available. This is part of the reason why China has seen such massive migration away from impoverished rural areas towards its major cities as rapid urbanisation and environmental issues are reducing the total amount of land available for farmers to farm. The unpredictable nature and relatively short term of usage rights also has an effect on the Chinese economy in terms of sustainability, efficiency, rural income and investment.

Any discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of a country’s property rights system must surely start with a discussion of the theories supporting that system and the alternatives available. Differing theories on the ownership of private property are the foundation stones of specific economic models. Private property is defined as the ownership of property by non-governmental legal entities. A Private Good that may be owned by individuals must be excludable, relatively scarce and must be rivalrous. These properties allow the good to be perceived as having value that individuals feel the need to lay claim to. In the absence of scarcity, property rights are unnecessary while a lack of excludability makes rights impossible to enforce. A rivalrous good is one where consumption by any individual limits the amount that can be consumed by others. Private property is the cornerstone of market economies such as the USA.

Rights to distinguish the ownership of property are necessary to avoid a situation known as ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’. First put forward by mathematician William Forster Lloyd in 1833, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ was developed by Garret Hardin in 1968. The article uses herdsmen grazing their cattle on common land as a frame of reference. The marginal utility to the herdsman of adding one more animal to his herd is given as 1 and the usage of the common by the extra animal as minus 1. Farmers on common land have ownership of their livestock but only have a right to the usage of the land, rather than the right to ownership of that land. As a result, the herdsman keeps 100% of the marginal benefit of an extra cow but the marginal cost is divided among all of the other commoners. The rational herdsman will therefore continue to increase the size of his herd as much as he is able since he only bears a fraction of the cost of his actions. Well-defined rights that divide ownership of the common to smaller groups or divides sections of the common among individuals.
effectively internalise this cost by forcing the owner to take responsibility for the detrimental effect of his animals and decrease the size of his herd.5

According to Adam Smith, who’s book The Wealth of Nations is often seen as the start of the classical school of economics, individual ownership of private property rights are necessary to encourage owners to develop their property and generate wealth. Smith uses the analogy of privately owning a canal lock to illustrate this.

“In several different parts of Europe, the toll or lock-duty upon a canal is the property of private persons, whose private interest obliges them to keep up the canal. If it is not kept in tolerable order, the navigation necessarily ceases altogether, and, along with it, the whole profit which they can make by the tolls.”6

Since the profit gained from canal tolls is regarded as the sole incentive for maintaining the canal, the right of the individual to exclude others from the benefits of owning the canal directly influences the upkeep of the canal itself. Without the vested interest of the owner, the benefits to society of access to a well-maintained canal would be lost. Thus, the right of the owner to be the sole receiver of profit from the canal also benefits society as a whole.

Another important feature of private property rights is that they are tradable. Since private goods are scarce, they have intrinsic value that can be bought and sold. Control of this value is important to economic development in Western economies since it gives individuals greater confidence. Moreover, private property is less likely to be lost to others in this system, reducing uncertainty with regards to future value and promotes investment.7 Investment has a direct relationship to aggregate demand and economic growth.

A system of private property rights however is not the only system that carries theoretical benefits for society. Common ownership is the system by which a good is owned by a group of people. Commonly owned goods can be public goods such as public parks, which are considered non-excludable, but also often refer to the ownership of the means of production. Common ownership usually refers to the ownership of something by society as a whole while ownership by a smaller group of people is known as a cooperative.8 Cooperatives may consist of customers, workers or a large group of investors that may comprise either or both of the former. This organisation has several advantages to members of the cooperative. For example, the means of production and resources available to each member can be made available to the group at much reduced cost. This allows economies of scale9 to be enjoyed by all members that would be impossible if they were to act as individuals. Because of these benefits Cooperative businesses exist in many countries, particularly in agriculture and the processing of agricultural products.

Cooperatives also give workers and customers greater power through economic democracy. This means that all members of the cooperative carry out decisions made by firms, including decisions regarding pricing, allocation of resources and reinvestment of profits. Research has shown that cooperative bodies are more likely to make decisions that ensure stability and sustainability of the company whereas senior managers in privately-owned companies are more likely to seek large short-term profits and other status benefits. Cooperative businesses are more likely to reinvest a larger percentage of their profits.10

These principles applied to agriculture in Communist countries led to the collectivisation of farming. The aim of collectivisation was to produce large, mechanised farms by combining the land and resources of many smaller holdings, thus allowing countries like the USSR and China to raise their levels of agricultural production to match that of developed countries quickly. In Soviet Russia under Stalin, collectivisation was intended to provide enough food both to support rapid growth in domestic industry and to increase Russia’s net exports of food.11

This system was later introduced to Chinese agriculture as part of the Great Leap Forward. The formation of People’s Communes was intended to increase agricultural production and the output of the steel industry to surpass that of the United States and the United Kingdom. However, because

5 Hardin, “Tragedy of the Commons”.
7 Allsopp, Understanding Economics, 72.
8 Sullivan, “Collective Rights”.
9 Reductions in long run average cost made possible by production on a larger scale.
10 Bajo and Roelants, Capital and the Debt trap, 79-100.
11 Overy, Russia’s War.
Collectivisation was compulsory under both the Russian and Chinese systems and thus could not be classified as the formation of genuine communes but rather a sort of production cooperative. While collectives should theoretically have experienced huge benefits from the pooling of their resources through the above mentioned economies of scale, over-ambitious policies aiming to increase production too quickly meant that these were outweighed. Furthermore, collective farms cannot be said to constitute an economic democracy since production decisions were made on a national scale by the central government, resulting, especially in the case of China, to very large falls in output and eventually disastrous famine.12

Currently, Chinese rural property rights are composed of a strange combination of all of the above systems. Following a secret agreement in Xiaogang village in Anhui province in 1978, 18 farmers decided to illegally divide collective land amongst their households. They gave the government the required quota of grain but kept the surplus for themselves. According to the village records the grain harvest in 1979 was six times higher than the previous year following this change. Prior to this change the farmers were starving, all that was required was a change of the ownership of their produce to prevent famine. 13 Since the vastly improved harvest made continued secrecy impossible, the scheme was found out and the government under Deng Xiaoping, seeking a source of economic growth, decided to apply the idea to farms across China. Deng’s decision led to the implementation of the Household Responsibility System which means that rural households are allocated a plot of land by the local collective along with a certain quota of grain they must produce, the rest of the grain is then the households own to sell at market prices. New legislation in 1993 made these usage rights renewable and guaranteed them for a period of thirty years. In 2008, rights were made transferable between some rural entities, which has set up a limited rural land market. The 2008 legislation created a growth in land rental between farmers, which bought increases in farm output in some areas.14 The land itself remains collectively owned.

Agricultural performance in China following these reforms appears very positive; China now has almost 100% grain security and an agricultural GDP growth rate of 4 percent. Poverty rates in China have also fallen from 63.7% to 9.9% between 1981 and 2004 with a large contribution stemming from these land reforms.15

Unfortunately, problems clearly remain for China’s farmers. China’s rural urban income gap remains high and this problem appears to be continually worsening. In 2005, China saw an overall increase of almost ten percent to its GDP, however, agriculture only showed a 5.2% growth. Growth in manufacturing and service sectors, both almost solely urban activities, drove the majority of aggregate growth in China, giving rise to further income disparity between urban and rural regions. Despite growth in the agriculture sector following the land reforms already seen in China, the ratio of urban to rural income has risen from 2.2:1 in the early 1990’s to 3.21:1 in 2005.16 For comparison, most developing countries have an urban-rural income gap of around 2:1 whilst in 2011, the ratio had reached 3.41:1 in China.17 There are also significant disparities on key social factors such as education and healthcare access between city and countryside, with rural children 5 times less likely to attend university than their urban counterparts.18 This phenomenon also represents problems in that rural households experience difficulties in significantly increasing their human capital, a serious issue for the future of rural households considering that the Chinese economy is rapidly moving away from the primary sector.19

Apart from low incomes, Farmers in China are at significant risk of losing their source of income altogether. Landesa, formerly the Rural Development Institute, works with policy makers in China and regularly carries out surveys designed to reflect the levels of farmers’ land tenure security across China. In 2011, this survey looked at 1,791 farmers in 17 Chinese provinces,20 making this survey large enough in terms of geographical area to represent farmers across diverse rural regions. Of the villages surveyed, 43% had experienced compulsory state land acquisitions. Although state land acquisitions are legal in China, 17.4% of the survey respondents reported that they had experienced their land tenure being transferred unilaterally.21

Li et al., China and Africa, 20-30.
Gao Yu, “Land and the Law in Rural China”.
Ibid.
Landesa, “Insecure land rights”.

Footnotes:
12 MacFarquhar and Fairbank, History of China, 475-540.
13 Forney, “It Takes a Village”.
14 Zhuo, Huffman and Rozelle, “Farm size and productivity”, 21.
15 Li et al., China and Africa, 20-30.
17 Gao Yu, “Land and the Law in Rural China”.
18 Ibid.
20 Landesa, “Insecure land rights”.

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The authorities are obliged to pay farmers compensation for the loss of access to their land. Unfortunately, according to this survey, only 77.5% of farmers actually received compensation and those who were satisfied with their compensation amount were outnumbered by those who were not satisfied by two to one. Even more shockingly, the mean compensation paid per acre was $17,800, while the mean price subsequently received by local authorities when selling the land to industrial and property developers was $740,000 per acre. This means that, on average, farmers were paid less than 3% of the market value of their land in compensation.

The practice of "eminent domain" exists in almost all countries. "Eminent domain" means that governments can seize private land in order to benefit all citizens, as long as a suitable level of compensation is paid to the previous owner of that land.21 The main reason for the vast disparity between the land's value and the compensation amounts paid in China is that compensation paid to farmers is only intended to offset the loss of the farmers' land use rights since the land itself is still owned by collectives. Clearly, a farmer's loss of land use has the same effect as a sudden loss of ownership since both actions remove access to what is most likely the farmer's main source of income. However, secure land rights make this kind of land seizure much more difficult as the full market value of the land must be paid to the owner if a transfer of property rights is to occur. Owing to the lack of secure property rights in China, seizure of land is much cheaper for local authorities than it would be in other countries. Many farmers find this situation very hard to accept and 17.8% of evictions found in Landesa's survey were described as "forceful".

One of the main reasons for land takings that are under-compensated for, or that farmers feel are unlawful, is a lack of documentation of farmers’ rights to the land. For Chinese farmers to prove the legitimacy of their land use rights, they require both a certificate and a contract. The survey showed a serious lack in the issuing of these documents; more than a fifth of farmers were issued neither document and only 36.7% were found to possess both documents required by law. The quality of documentation was also poor, with only around 20% of issued certificates and 40% of contracts containing all of the required information to comply with legal standards. Furthermore, only 17% of existing land contracts contained the names of women in the household. At a time when many men are moving to the city as migrant workers seeking to take advantage of higher wages in urban areas, many women are taking an increasingly active role in farming the land. It is important that their names feature on both of these documents. As a result, many farmers are finding their property extremely difficult to defend against government acquisition due to a lack of evidence.

Aside from complete government land takings, whereby the right to the land is removed from individual farmers, regulatory land takings are causing large problems for certain sectors of rural Chinese society. Regulatory takings occur when the rights to the land remain titled to individuals but new regulations with regard to its use prevent the land from being used profitably. Regulatory takings are usually defined as having a large, if not absolute, effect on the value of land. An example of such takings in China is the Natural Forest Protection Program, designed to protect China's land from the detrimental effects of deforestation. As much as 30% of China's farmland is subject to soil erosion while 40% is considered at risk of desertification.22 To prevent permanent desertification, a complete logging ban has been imposed on 61 million hectares of forest lands, regardless of whether it is naturally occurring forest land or consists of trees planted by farmers for the timber trade. While the pragmatism behind protecting China from soil erosions and other problems is justified, this legislation has had severe negative impacts on the livelihoods of farmers who rely on forestry as their main source of income. In these cases, the regulatory taking of land has an effect very similar to the complete expropriation of land from farmers.23

Two countries that most vigorously defend private individuals' rights during regulatory takings are Poland and the United States. Under USA law, compensation for regulatory takings of land is regarded as being the same as the market value of that property. In a similar way, in Poland, even partial government regulatory takings of private land requires that the compensation be paid for the damage to the lands profitability or that the loss in value actually be purchased by the authorities.

The rationale behind these policies known as "just

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21 Li, "Regulatory takings", 5.
22 Ding, "Farmland Preservation in China", 11.
23 Li, "Regulatory Takings", 4.
compensation” meaning the amount of compensation paid following a regulatory taking is equal to the decrease in market value of the part of the property affected. Loss of use rights and land expropriation in China are, in theory, protected with compensation legislation, however, with regards to regulatory takings, no legislation on the subject currently exists. Since individual farmers in China do not normally own their land, compensation for the loss of the market value of their property is impossible. On the other hand, the loss of income for forest dwelling farmers following a ban in logging, while their use rights still stand, is an issue that affects farmers’ current positions and so should surely be compensated. A move towards more definite, long term land rights would make protecting farmers from unfair land takings far more practical.

Although the Chinese state press generally plays down protests, farmers’ objections to land takings have definitely been heard. Complaints about land use accounted for 73% of petitions filed to Beijing by rural residents in 2003, and 67% of the 130 mass confrontations between peasants and police in 2004 were sparked by land use disputes. This number remains high in 2010 with 65% of rural mass incidents arising from land disputes. In more than half of cases, protesters chose to blockade government buildings, deny access to the land in question or destroy construction equipment.

Concern is also fuelled in the government by the scarcity of agriculturally productive land, and the threat that this has on China’s future food security. The threat of bringing grain security to 20% of the world’s population is exceedingly impressive since China only has 7% of the world’s farmland. These figures mean that China has the lowest acreage of farmland per capita of any country in the world, roughly 0.28 acres per person. The eastern region of China, comprising around 46% of China’s geographical area, contains 86% of China’s farmland alongside 94% of the country’s population. This close geographical relationship between China and its farmland is the source of the problem of farmland being converted to other uses. Expanding urban residential land into agricultural or converting rural agricultural land for non-agricultural uses is often much more profitable in the short term than continuing to farm, particularly in areas where farmland has yet to be developed to its full productivity. The Farmland Protection Regulation introduced in 1994 and the New Land Administration Law introduced in 1999 attempted to reduce the scale of this problem by requiring that changes of land use be approved by authorities over certain acreage and that the overall area of “basic farmland” is not reduced by the change, i.e., existing farm land lost to non-agricultural uses must be replaced by developing an equal area of new farmland.

Although these regulations would seem to be a move in the right direction for preventing the source of farmers’ land-loss problems, they have been less effective in practice. In the period 2001 to 2002, 3 years after the New Land Administration Law was introduced, the overall level of farmland was reduced by at least 1%. In a country where the food security of a huge population depends on such a small amount of agricultural land, a continuation of this trend would be completely unsustainable. Also, since the definition of what constitutes basic farmland lies in soil productivity and not the location of the land, the efficiency with which land is allocated to different uses can be adversely affected. The increase in cost and time that comes from longer distances, both for farm workers and workers at new industrial developments, may well outweigh the benefit of preserving farmland based solely on the soil productivity criterion. Decentralization of these kinds of decisions can lead to much more productive use of land resources as local individuals are able to judge the suitability of plots based on many more factors than could be easily written into national legislation.

These laws defending land also create unnatural imbalances in the existing land market. Since developers must either seek land that is not protected or pay to create new farmland to replace that which has been developed, the price of land available for legal development is greatly increased. This price increase creates uneven development not only in terms of the locations selected for development but also in terms of the greater incentives it gives to farmers and officials to relinquish unprotected land to developers in view of the higher possible prices. Under high and increasing demand pressure for land conversion to urban uses in

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26 Gaoyu, “Land and the Law in Rural China”.

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certain areas, some protected farmland may even be leased to developers illegally by officials at very high prices relative to the amount of compensation received by farmers. These officials are usually tempted by the high levels of local economic growth that can be achieved in the short run by industrializing land rather than persisting with slower agricultural development.30 Another problem is brought about by land use given to farmers on the condition of meeting a quota of a certain crop. The quota of grain required by collectives is one of the main reasons that grain security has been achieved in China, along with very large state subsidies on fertiliser.31 Conversely to what state policy would suggest, the goal of grain security looks to be becoming increasingly impossible and unnecessary. The huge inputs of state money into agriculture by the Chinese government, consisting of chemicals, increased plastics use and the use of new seed types, cannot make up for China’s increasing lack of two of agriculture’s main basic inputs; land and water. Loss of land to soil erosion, desertification and urbanization, as discussed above, has led to increasingly intensive use of China’s farmland to reach grain targets. Coinciding with its increasing population, China’s intensive agriculture has led to an unsustainable approach to water resources. According to China’s Ministry of Water Resources, 62% of China’s water is used for agricultural purposes, with as much as 90% of the water in the Huai River and as much as 60% in the Liao and Yellow Rivers already in use. In the north of China, where large amounts of available space present a great opportunity for agricultural development, the World Bank estimates that aquifers will be exhausted within 30 years. Despite these facts, the 12th Five-year Plan announced in 2011 calls for a 50 million ton increase in grain output by 2015.32 Giving farmers greater control of how they use resources and what they grow can help make farming more sustainable. Increasing scarcity of water will make intensive irrigation of wheat crops more expensive and encourage farmers to look to alternative crops that can be farmed more sustainably.

In view of these stark issues, China must seek a method to maximise its grain output while using available

inputs as efficiently as possible. Under the existing system, China’s land is exceedingly fragmented with the average plot size in 2010 coming to just 0.6 hectares.33 Fragmentation of land has a very large effect on land productivity since it limits the ease of mechanisation and greatly increases the amount of labour required to till the land. More labour intensive methods of planting lead to a situation where different plots are planted at different times and so harvesting times also need to be differentiated accordingly. In China’s most dense grain producing area, located between Beijing and Shanghai and easily observed from the two cities’ high-speed train link, there exists an obvious problem. Although many individual plots are not separated by fencing, the wheat plants growing in adjacent plots are often at different stages of the growing cycle. For this reason, due to the lack of mechanisation of planting, the highly efficient mechanisation of harvesting is made impossible.

Small plot sizes in China means that farmers do not enjoy economies of scale from centralised land ownership. The most obvious reason for a reluctance to consolidate and mechanize land on a large scale is that China has a massive rural labour force, making labour intensive wheat production wholly possible. Moreover, the allocation of land equally to households in rural China, which results in such small plot sizes, is seen as a form of social security as small-scale farmers are guaranteed a source of income.34 Some studies have found that farm size is inversely related to productivity in China35 and this is currently true because of the increased costs to large farms of hiring labour and ensuring that hired labour is used productively. Labourers that are hired from outside the household are likely to have less motivation to increase their productivity than family labourers on smaller scale farms owing to the way in which they are paid. Workers who are paid by the hour have an incentive to work slowly while those who are paid per unit of land have incentives to work quickly with little attention to detail. Family workers on small-scale farms benefit directly from increasing their productivity.36

However, these calculations are made under the

30 Ding, “Farmland Preservation in China”, 11.
35 Benjamin and Brandt, “The Case of Rural China”.
36 Zhuo, Huffman and Rozelle, “Farm size and productivity” 3.
assumption of continuation of China's limited 30-year land use rights. It is obvious that large farms will not function efficiently if they are tilled using the same techniques used in the tiny plots of China today. Under these conditions more land simply means employing more labour to carry out the same functions on a larger scale. An expansion of farm size and an increase in the longevity of farmer’s rights can motivate autonomous investment in greater mechanization of agriculture. This would require the reform of the Household Responsibility System and the marketization of land as private property. Privatization will allow those farmers who are able to farm efficiently and who have the financial ability to invest in their land to consolidate local plots into larger farms. According to Zhuo, Huffman and Rozelle, greater mechanisation will allow larger farms to gain a comparative advantage over smaller farms. They state that:

“The returns to adoption [of new technology] are positively related to size of the farming activity and the length of the farmer’s planning horizon.”

Thus, if Chinese farms are to mechanize grain production efficiently, farmers need to be given the power to expand their plot sizes to accept machines and gain longer-term rights to their land to guarantee that the expenditure is justified by many years of use.

On top of this, a step away from determined grain security will be required. Importing grain to satisfy demand would be a viable option considering China's large trade surplus. It is not unusual for countries to import a large amount of grain, indeed, according to the United States Department of Agriculture, The US imported 3,538 kilotons of wheat in 2012. While the idea of creating larger, mechanized farms suits grain production in areas of highly productive, well-irrigated land, it may not suit different regions and cropping structures. In areas with poorer soil, it is much more likely that there will be an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity. Increases in mechanisation and farm size also run the risk of producing a large surplus of rural labour. This writer would propose that an increase in the cultivation of labour intensive cash crops in arealess suited to grain production would help to absorb the surplus whilst also increasing the amount of exportable agricultural goods to partially offset an increase in grain imports. The nature of China’s agricultural land does not give the country a comparative advantage in wheat production. A move towards producing grain more efficiently and re-allocating space that is poorly suited to grain production to the production of high value cash crops has the potential to have a large effect on the rural-urban income gap. Putting planting decisions in the hands of farmers is the best way to make sure that land is allocated most efficiently on a micro scale and the security of land rights will have a large bearing on the rationality of these producer decisions.

Incremental increases in land rights security in China have already given farmers greater confidence to invest. According to Landesa's research, farmers' ability to invest is highly correlated to the security of their land rights. While a lack of legal documentation of usage rights makes farmers feel insecure about future prospects in the face of land takings they are unlikely to invest. This is because they cannot guarantee that they will have access to their land long enough to fully reap the benefits of their investment. Private investment appears to be becoming more commonplace with a third of households involved in Landesa’s survey reporting that they had made mid to long-term investments in diversification projects. What is essential to note is that 81% of these investments were made in the year following the issue of both the land certificate and contract that is required by law to prove a household’s rights to their land. Greater issuance of land rights documentation clearly represents a step in the right direction to encourage farmers to invest in their land.

Farmers are unfortunately still missing one key element needed to make autonomous investment commonplace: bank credit. Of the investment projects mentioned above, Landesa found that in 93% of cases

42 Diversion of labour away from wheat production not only assumes that surplus labour will be diverted elsewhere in the agricultural sector but also that the secondary and tertiary sectors of China’s economy will continue to grow, prolonging the trend of migration from rural to urban areas and absorbing rural unemployment. The possible inflationary effect of Chinese grain demand on the global grain market is outside the scope of this essay.
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farmers had used their own family savings to make these investments and that only 15% had access to bank credit. The reason is that farmers cannot mortgage land, as it remains owned by the collective. A look at The Agricultural Bank of China's website reveals that proof of land ownership is required as a guarantee when in the application for "personal business loan for farmers". Clearly this is impossible for Chinese farmers. The amount of fixed capital has been proven to have a positive impact on agricultural GDP by the World Bank. In 2010, the average amount of fixed capital per farm in China totalled 8332 yuan, very low by global standards. A lack of fixed capital undoubtedly restricts production both at the household level and in terms of China's agricultural GDP as a whole.

The above listed problems all have the potential to be alleviated to some degree by a reform of the Household Responsibility System. In the short term, the current system needs to be better enforced. Farmers need access to both the required land certificate and contract in order to defend their rights. Better education on these rights is also required to increase farmers' assertiveness when resisting coercive land takings. In the medium term, land allocation and protection laws are creating non-optimal allocation of land in the Chinese countryside and require reform. Determined ideological grain security despite the lack of a comparative advantage in wheat production means that too much land is devoted to the production of grain. Production is limited by the small plot size of most farms and the huge rural labour force is better allocated to producing more labour intensive crops; this is where China has the greatest resources. From a global perspective, non-mechanized, labour intensive wheat production is not efficient. The consequences of this government-mandated monoculture for the environment is also important to note, as soil erosion and quickly diminishing water resources are problems that will not only affect China's rural poor.

In the long-term, the period of time for which farmers are guaranteed access to their land needs to be extended in order to increase their business confidence. Firstly, this means defending farmers from unfair land acquisitions and providing much higher standards of compensation that take into account the farm's amount of fixed capital. Not only would this reduce future uncertainty for farms that are threatened by land loss but it would also ensure that, in the event of necessary land taking, their investments would also be compensated for. If land acquisition is seen as being for the good of society as a whole, it is unfair that individual farmers should have to bear a large portion of the cost. While the lease time on farmland stands at 30 years before renewal is required, for forest land this period is longer at 70 years. Extension of the arable land leases by 40 years to match those of forestland has the potential to have a great effect on rural investment by increasing confidence. Finally, farmers need to be given greater access to bank credit. The Chinese government obviously does not wish to relinquish the state ownership of farmland as it represents one of the last remnants of Communist ideas in the Communist party. In view of this, following an extension of farmer's lease rights, these rights should be fully transferable and a system should be created to make them mortgage-able. It is common for agricultural land in the UK to be purchased on a long-term agricultural lease. The intention of such leases is to ensure that agricultural land is not developed for other uses; however, during the lease period the farmland itself is owned by the individual and can be used as collateral when obtaining bank credit. The purpose of the reform suggested herein is to alleviate the issue of China's rural-urban income gap by putting more assets in the hands of farmers for longer and encouraging more efficient, autonomous rural growth. Adam Smith wrote in The Wealth of Nations:

"Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is, in reality, instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all."

In China the very opposite is the case, the institution of more secure long term land rights is necessary to defend the country's poorest against the encroachment of wealthy developers and from widening disparity, in terms of quality of life, with the development of the urban middle class.

43 Gao Yu, "Land and the Law in Rural China".
45 The World Bank, "Fixed Capital in Agriculture".
46 Gao Yu, "Land and the Law in Rural China".

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youtube.com/watch?v=UaEr-MA_Lnw.


GIDEON OLNLEY

Gideon Olney is a third year undergraduate student in the Faculty of Languages and Cultures at the School of Oriental and African Studies.

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The aging population in Japan has led to what can be called a silver democracy. Elderly people play an important role in elections, which causes disparity in the value of votes. As a result, conservative parties have greater opportunities to be elected. In order to stay in power, these elderly politicians have made several elderly-friendly policies. However, these policies bring about inequality and non-transparency, which are detrimental to democracy. Therefore, the government needs to find solutions to deal with the democratic stagnation.

INTRODUCTION

Although Japan has transformed into a democratic country, it still has yet to advance to the status of a mature and functioning democracy and is trapped in a state of democratic standstill. What are the main problems latent in Japanese democracy?

This paper argues that Japan's stagnant democracy is attributable to its aging population. Between 1985 and today, elderly people over 65 years old in Japan have risen from a tenth to nearly a quarter of the population. It is estimated that by 2060, that figure will skyrocket to almost 40 percent. The aging trend has long been considered to be a burden to Japan's social structure, workforce, and economic growth. In this paper, urgent problems, current situations, and foreseeable solutions are discussed, all of which are related to Japan's silver democracy. In addition, the paper will focus on how detrimental Japan's silver democracy is and how bad effects can be resolved and bleak circumstances can be improved. This paper relies on information collection, data interpretation, and text analysis to arrive at its conclusions. The paper also suggests a few avenues for Japan to reform. These include: including younger generations in the political process, revising the pension system, and changing public attitudes towards politics.

In the political science field, democratic development is closely tied to economic growth. Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to the influence of the aging population on Japan's democracy, which can be called Japan's silver democracy and this is an important but neglected study.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Democracy in Japan is often different compared to that in countries in the world. Japan's initial exposure to democracy was during the Taisho Period (1912-1926), which promoted the liberty and popular rights movements called for new rights and freedoms. However, it was generally regarded as a superficial temporary phenomenon by many Japanese historians, and therefore easily replaced by expansionist militarism. As a result of the post-WWII American occupation (1945-1952), Japan embarked on a new democratic chapter. The constitution was drafted with the help of General Douglas MacArthur, the leading Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was established in 1955, and women's suffrage was approved in 1947.

There are several studies addressing democracy in Japan. For example, Takeshi Ishida and Ellis S. Krauss (Democracy in Japan, 1989) introduce general ideas about political democracy, social democracy and economic democracy. They refer to the inequality problems of distribution patterns in a few chapters. In addition, According to Peter J. Herzog (Japanese Pseudo-Democracy, 1993), Japan isn't as highly a developed democratic country as western people think. One chapter about Japan's electoral system demonstrates that elderly people have a negative impact on its democracy.

PROBLEMS

Electoral System

In the 1940s, the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter outlined that democracy was defined as having “free and fair” elections. Therefore, whether a country is democratic or not relies greatly on its electoral system, which connects the public and the rulers. In the legislative electoral system, there are three broad categories, proportional representation (PR),

1 Alexandra Harney, “Japan’s Silver Democracy: The Costs of Letting the Elderly Rule Politics”, Foreign Affairs, July 18, 2013

2 Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy (Henry Holt and Company, LLC. Publisher), 2008
majoritarian systems and intermediate systems, among which it is proposed that PR is the most optimal way of ensuring a good election.

Since Japan adopted the PR system that allocates "in proportion to the population" (Art.15, par.7), Japan has regular, multiparty elections, formal institutions like a national Diet, a court system, and a constitution. It is specified that no constituency should be larger than twice the size of any other constituency. Thus, some larger cities and wards are divided into an appropriate number of single seat constituencies while other cities, wards, towns and villages are not split. In addition, no further constituencies can be created, further diluting the population.

However, there is disparity in the value of votes. Comparisons between different prefectures show their distinctions. From a survey conducted by the Ministry of International Affairs and Communication in September 2013, the number of voters entitled to elect one representative in the most under-represented and the most over-represented constituencies is as follows (Table 1). In the Chiba4 constituency, 497,350 voters were entitled to one representative in the Lower House, while the number of voters per seat was 205,461 in Kochi3 constituency, a ratio of 2.42:1. This reflects that the value of votes per person in Kochi3 is nearly 2.5 times than that in Chiba4. Because the national average was 347,686 voters for one representative, the ratio of the former (Chiba4) to the national average was 1.43:1, while that of the later (Kochi3) was 0.59:1. This means that Chiba4 has 1.43 times the number of voters per representative than the national average, while Kochi3 has only over half of that.

Therefore, we can conclude that the larger number of voters in a constituency, the less value each individual vote has. The inverse is true in smaller constituencies.

Because most young people are moving to big cities to seek jobs, the demographic change has led to some prefectures losing significant proportions of their populations. Only elderly people are left in less developed regions. As a result, the population structure of constituencies with large number of voters mainly includes younger and middle-aged generations, while that with small number of voters consists quite a lot elderly people. In conclusion, elderly people represent smaller number of voters in less developed regions and their value of votes becomes higher, while younger and middle-aged generations represent larger number of voters in highly developed areas and their value of votes is lower. This phenomenon is detrimental to the "free and fair" election and bad for democracy. Undoubtedly, controversies concerning the inequality in the distribution of Diet seats have been raised many times in the postwar era.

**Elderly voters**

Due to the conglomeration of metropolitan cities and the depopulation of rural districts, Japan's electoral system contributes to the overrepresentation of rural areas and the outsized influence of elderly voters. One of the factors facilitating the ascendancy of conservative parties like the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is the electoral system, which favors farm voters at the expense of the urban population. The aversion to redistribution of seats is strongest in the LDP because in most cases, an adjustment could reduce the number of representatives from rural districts and increase those from the large cities. The usual way in which politicians build up their reputation and acquire a following is by organizing a supporters' group (called

### Table 1

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<td>212,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo3</td>
<td>482,494</td>
<td>Kochi2</td>
<td>213,606</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Ministry of International Affairs and Communication, Japan, September 2013*
Koenkai, which is usually dominated by the elderly. According to Japanese government surveys, most participants in Koenkai are in their fifties, sixties and seventies. From this, we can see that elderly people play a pivotal role in deciding general elections to the House of Representatives (as explained in Table 1), the House of Councilors (as showed in Table 2) and local elections, the three main types of elections in Japan.

As presented in Table 2, there is a clear rural bias in the Japanese Upper House. Through comparing Tokyo, Osaka, Chiba, Hiroshima and Iwate, as well as the average population size, population density, share of agricultural households, agricultural population share, GDP share of primary sector and weight of one vote, we can draw the conclusion that the value of votes in Iwate and Hiroshima, two agriculture-oriented prefectures, weigh more than that of big cities such as Tokyo and Osaka and the developed district, Chiba. So rural bias in Japan is a serious issue, which cannot easily be disregarded.

Perceptions of whether the government can be held accountable for its actions. Table 3 shows evaluation of citizens' oversight of the government between elections. 62.5% agree that “between elections, the people have no way of holding the government responsible for its actions”. This pessimistic sentiment is related to the LDP's rural bias.

Political competition is essential to liberal democracy (Dahl, 1971). From the 1990s onward, Japanese politics experienced a power shift and party system change from the predominant system to coalition government. However, despite Japan’s consolidated
democracy, it has very low political competition. Although the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) offered itself as a credible challenge to the LDP, the dominance of LDP is long buttressed by the existence of a strong political support base in the rural areas. In this light, we can argue that even within a consolidated democracy like Japan, the fundamental norms of competition that form the key pillars of a highly developed democracy remain missing.

Old Politicians

Old politicians in Japan have advantages to win elections for two reasons. First, thanks to the majority of elderly people in rural areas, chances are that old politicians from small towns and villages will be elected thanks to the long-standing relations established by koenkai networks. Second, the scheme of the Japanese pension system for Diet members encourages politicians to serve as long as possible. The longer the politician serves the party, the more yearly pension the politician obtains. Even when the payment is insufficient to fund the pension payments, the deficiency is made up by the government, such as from taxes. Therefore, there is the possibility that not only do old politicians get elected easier than younger generations, but also once they become Diet members, they prefer to stay longer because of the benefits they are receiving from the pension system.

In 2005 and 2009, the average age of Diet members in Japan was 52.3 and 52 years old, respectively. As Table 4 below shows, politicians over 50 years old were 60.6 percent of the Diet in 2005 and 57.5 percent in 2009. Another example in 2013 shows the average age of the elected politicians in the Tokyo local election stood out at 53 years old, higher than that of Diet members which was 51.9 years old, despite the large population of younger people in the capital. Since the average age of citizens in Tokyo was 43.8 years old, which was lower than that of the national average of 44.9 years old, it could be interpreted that there were not as many young voters participating in the Tokyo local election, so this situation led to the victory of elderly politicians.

In contrast, Sweden, a leading democratic country in the world and also has a large aging population, has much younger politicians. In the 2010 general election, the average age of parliament members was 47 years old, over half of whom were less than 50 years old, while politicians over 50 years old accounted for 46 percent. What is more, the youngest parliament member elected was only 18 years old.

To sum up, one of the reasons why Japan is trapped in its current stage of democracy is related to its conservative, stubborn and inflexible elderly politicians, who are disproportionately implicated in corruption scandals, and illegal money practices and donations, which will be discussed in the following section.

SITUATIONS

Elderly-friendly Policies

From what has been mentioned above, we know that elderly Japanese people have a strong impact on

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Members of The House of Representatives</th>
<th>Proportion of the Number of the Diet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over 70 Years Old</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 60s</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 50s</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 40s</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 30s</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 20s</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of International Affairs and Communication, Japan, March 2011
elections. Consequently, in order to attract elderly voters and thus be elected by the public, the LDP continuously enacts elderly-friendly policies and laws that help them stay in power. On one hand, it wins favor from elderly people, especially those in rural areas. But on the other hand, this results in inequality and non-transparency when it comes to the rule of law. Democracy is a system of rule by laws, not individuals. In a democracy, the rule of law protects the rights of citizens, maintains order, and limits the power of government. All citizens are equal under the law. Therefore, the degree to which a government fulfills this criterion is the degree to which it can be considered democratic. However, in Japan, those elderly-friendly policies show a preference over elderly people, and as a result, it harms Japan’s democracy.

The most serious problem is in agricultural policies in Japan. An illustration of this was Japan’s refusal to liberalize the import of rice, which was prompted by the politicians’ fear that such an action would cost them the large farm vote. Also, because of the high age levels within the Diet, the old age of the leadership groups has strengthened the tendency to maintain the status quo. Agricultural protectionism in Japan has been notorious for its incredibly high agricultural tariffs. For example, tariffs on rice, diary products, and sugar are over 200 percent. Hence, whether Japan should participate in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was heatedly discussed by Japanese politicians since some TPP members asked Japan to open its farm sectors by killing all tariffs on agricultural goods, which conflicted with traditional Japanese elderly-friendly policies.

Conventional wisdom has held that economic development, wherever it occurs, will lead inevitably to democracy. There are several elements with regards to development. The most significant element is per capita income, which can be used to measure economic growth that in Modernization Theory (Max Weber), the principal cause of democratic development. Additionally, increases in per capita income lead to increases in popular demand for political power. Therefore, economic growth also tends to increase citizens’ satisfaction with their government. Among already established democracies, a high per capita income contributes to stability. Seymour Martin Lipset, the eminent sociologist and political scientist who popularized the notion that economic growth fosters democratization by increasing the size of the educated middle class. Furthermore, many Western policymakers and development experts have assumed that political liberalization basically tracks the rate of economic growth.

These ideas can also be applied to the Japanese case. Over the last two decades, Japan has been trapped in a state of economic stagnation due to its rather low development rate. The sluggishness of Japanese economic performance is bad for its democratic process. At the current stage, Japan’s healthcare and public pension systems have become thorny problems that Japan’s leaders are loath to tackle.

On the healthcare side, Japan has one of the most generous health-care systems in the world. It is reported that Japanese seniors visit a doctor between two and four times as often as the elderly in the United States, Germany and Sweden. As a result, nearly half
(48 percent) of Japan’s health-care spending goes to people over 65 years old. On the public pension side, benefits begin at 65 years old, and given Japan’s long life expectancy (79 years for men, 86 years for women), the Japanese pension system pays out longer than other western countries. Currently, the portion of the paying group is falling because of Japan’s low birthrate and small work force, while the population of people over 65 years old is growing. Also, since the Japanese government spends excessive money on public transportation and infrastructure in rural areas, all of these factors add a burden to an already substantial debt crisis.

If the ruling party keeps avoiding taking these rigorous situations into account, and letting them become worse, government pension funds may run out in the near future.

**Political Money Corruption**

Abraham Lincoln’s famous dictum “government of the people, by the people” has been widely acknowledged. In a democratic country, government should emphasize the common good rather than vested interests. However, in Japan, elected leaders who accept illegal donations from business interests seek favorable legislation or government contracts. Corruption in Japan is pervasive, recurring and harmful to democracy. So many Japanese leaders have engaged in corrupt practices that many politicians are not representatives of the people but agents or advocates of special interests or pressure groups. Therefore, Diet members, supposed to put the common good in first place, have been unable to free themselves from their ties to special interests.

Tanaka Kakuei, a former Japanese Prime Minister, was decried as “that paragon of post-war corruption”. His involvement in the 1976 Lockheed Martin Scandal was just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Tanaka’s dubious financial dealings. As the owner and inherit of a large construction company, Tanaka had always mixed business and politics.

It is not surprising that money politics corrupts the political process as well as undermines democracy. If Diet members approach everything from the point view of their vested interests, they will attach greater importance to cultivating their own benefits instead of promoting the common good.

**SOLUTIONS**

*Include the Younger Generation*

Young generations who bear the future and carry the hope are a potential power for every nation. If young people in Japan lose interest and confidence in their politics, it could be dangerous because democracy would never move forward or even worse, it may lag behind. Given the current situation of rural bias and elderly voters and old politicians dominating the Japanese political world, it is necessary for younger generations to participate in elections, compete in campaigns, and act as new politicians. As such, I suggest three practical ways to include more young people in politics.

To begin with, the law in Japan is that only after a citizen turns 20 years old can he or she vote. This is because in Japan, the age for a person to be considered an adult is 20, which is called “the coming of age”. However, compared to some other countries in the East Asian region, such as China where the age of adulthood is 18 and Korea where it is 19, the coming of age in Japan is a little bit late. Also, considering its austere low birthrate problem, changing the threshold of the coming of age (for example, to 18 years old), will be good for the composition of the electorate. If someone is permitted the right to vote, it may stimulate his transition from childhood to adulthood and facilitate maturity.

Next, the appearance of second-generation politicians in Japan has been a controversial topic since WWII. Second-generation politicians enjoy a considerable superiority because they inherit a well-known name, loyal supporters and a stable source of money.

As depicted in Table 4, from 1989 to 2010, in total 13 prime ministers, there are 9 second or third-generation prime ministers, which occupies nearly 70 percent of the sum. Add to that, according to some statistics, in 2010 second-generation politicians in the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors were about 180 members, over 40 percent of the total. Therefore, it can be concluded that Japanese people have a preference towards these second-generation politicians because of Koenkai and nepotism. On one hand, they can bring innovative ideas and creative strategies. While on the other hand, they are susceptible to standing still and a lack of perseverance caused by the hereditary ideology. Determining how to make best use of the advantages and bypass the disadvantages of these talented second-generation politicians is a key issue.
Third, paying more attention to young politicians may make the public familiar with them and promote political reforms, thus advancing the democratic transformation. Mass communication can be used as bridge-building, a way for who are curious about young politicians’ roles and responsibilities to know more about them. Most citizens have no chance to see the workings of government first hand. They form their opinions based on what they see and how they interpret the news. Therefore, the mass media plays an important role in politics. It is contributed to the political values of openness and democratic accountability. First, the mass media promotes the informational transparency: knowledge about government actors and decisions and access to government information. Second, it facilitates the participatory transparency: the ability to participate in political decisions either through fair representation or direct participation. Third, it encourages the accountability transparency: the ability to hold government officials accountable either to the legal system or to public opinion – when they violate the law or when they act in ways that adversely affect people’s interests.

*Revise the Pension System*

Japan’s average life expectancy is now the longest in the world. There is currently a higher proportion of elderly people, while the number of newborn babies is decreasing, and that declining birthrate is continuing.

Hence, the pension system in Japan has become one of the most important welfare systems pandering to elderly people. The basic concept of public pensions is called the mechanism of inter-generation support, where pension benefits for present-day seniors are covered by premiums paid by present working generations. Although the government is currently able to cover the deficiency in the pension fund by using taxation, the need for pension review should be taken into account.

One way that may drive Japan out of two decades of deflation and sluggish growth would be lifting the threshold of the retirement age. Changing Japan’s retirement age will help shake off the burden on young workers added by the pension system. Moreover, because Japan’s average long life expectancy, it will make the pension system more effective and efficient.

*Change Attitudes Towards Politics*

Japanese democracy has the persistent problem of an elected leadership that often behaves undemocratically and citizens that abide such behavior passively. There is a great possibility that the reason old Japanese politicians are continuously being elected in spite of their corrupt practices is due to the Japanese being too tolerant of their politicians’ misdeeds and rural-elderly malapportionment, which at the very least weakens democracy and at most makes its future problematic.

In truth, Japanese voters will keep on electing political leaders tainted by corruption or accused, even convicted, of wrongdoing. Their tolerance threshold for undemocratic actions is quite high. This is manifested in the paradox of Japanese citizens protesting against some government policies, while at the same time, reelecting the perpetrators of these policies. For example, people can protest Ishihara’s nationalism but still elect him because he makes good mayoral policy.

The consensus-based election form of leadership in Japan emphasizes intense solidarity and organizational traits, which manifests invested benefits, closed-door...
behaviors and little paradigm changes. Therefore, changing citizens’ attitudes towards Japanese politics is a feasible way to solve corruption problems. First, the Japanese people should understand their personal rights and know that they have the power to elect a representative who is really responsible for the people’s common good, not someone who is only good at preaching empty words. Second, the Japanese people should take advantage of mass media to supervise politicians’ personal income and political behavior. Once the atmosphere becomes transparent, it will be difficult for those who are accustomed to engaging in corruption. Third, if a politician has some misdeeds, he should not be allowed to be a member of the party or participate in campaigns. A single slip can cause a lasting sorrow, so only if the penalty is severe can politicians behave strictly and impartially.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Japan is still on its way to a state of highly developed democracy. Japan’s silver democracy has led to three main problems: the disparity in its electoral system, the bias toward its elderly voters, and the stubbornness of its old politicians. All of these formulate a vicious circle. Due to different values of votes depending on Japan’s individual constituency, rural areas where elderly voters are a large proportion of the population enjoy the advantage of getting privileges over metropolitan cities. Moreover, because people over middle age have a tendency to select representatives as old as they are, it turns out that the average age of Japanese politicians is higher compared to that in other western democratic countries. In addition, if old politicians stay longer and become stronger, they are probably inclined to put emphasis on elderly people who are in favor of them. Therefore, members of the leading LDP are reluctant to make changes in terms of the Japanese electoral system, which has been a controversial issue since the last century.

The aforementioned problems have caused some negative circumstances such that elderly-friendly policies bring about inequality considering the younger generations in Japan, public works spending adds burdens to the already stagnant economic situation, and in addition, political money corrupts the Japanese political system. All of these actions are detrimental to its democratization because fiscal problems and corrupt practices undermine democracy, and even worse, they possibly will make the country lag behind.

In order to solve the problems discussed in this paper, three strategies were proposed. First, including more younger generations would not only widen the voter base, but also strengthen political involvement. Second, revising the pension system could tackle the serious elderly-preferred situation. Third, changing attitudes toward politics may help Japanese society get rid of its corrupt practices and money scandals.

In conclusion, democracy is about the end of political, social and economic influence and the assertion of independence by the self-determination and self-government of the people, free from manipulation by special interests and outside influences. Only if a free and fair electoral system which detaches itself from the current in-equal participation and non-transparent procedure, is implemented and conducted, can Japan welcome a true democracy. If Japanese politicians attach great importance to the common good rather than personal interests, corruption and bribery would be cut down, so that a moral and public-spirited government can take charge of the happiness of all the Japanese citizens.

Although there are thistles and thorns on Japan’s road to a complete democratic regime, it cannot be denied that Japan has the ability to overcome its difficulties, as long as the three main problems discussed can be resolved and useful plans are carried out.
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Jingwen Xing

Jingwen Xing is a first year graduate student at Stanford’s Center for East Asian Studies.
KAMI AND IDENTITY: YANAGITA’S LEGENDS OF TÔNO AND MIYAZAKI’S SPIRITED AWAY

This paper undertakes a comparative study of Yanagita’s Legends of Tôno and Miyazaki’s Spirited Away in light of their attempts to retain and recover what is regarded as a vanishing Japanese national identity. Through their respective works they have defined the Japanese national identity as they perceived it. Despite their different approaches to identity they both turned to the kami, the Japanese indigenous spirits or gods, in their attempts to define this identity. Yanagita and Miyazaki also come together regarding the basic values they see the Japanese identity as containing. This paper explores how they have used the kami in their respective identity projects and how their different treatment of the kami can be said to mirror the differences in their take on the Japanese national identity.

INTRODUCTION

Ever since the establishment of the Japanese national polity, the Japanese people have been engaged in a continuous effort to establish a coherent national identity. This article undertakes a comparative study of two works that figure into this ongoing project; Yanagita Kunio’s literary/academic compilation of folktales, The Legends of Tôno (Tôno Monogatari) from 1910, and Miyazaki Hayao’s hugely popular animation movie, Spirited Away (Sen to Chihiro no Kamikakushi) from 2001. These works endeavor to recover and retain what both Yanagita and Miyazaki regarded as a vanishing Japanese identity. In The Legends of Tôno, Yanagita explores what he later defined as “the essence of the Japanese national personality”.1 Likewise, Miyazaki’s Spirited Away can be read as an attempt at reclaiming a Japanese identity. In their search for the Japanese national identity, both Yanagita and Miyazaki turn to the rural, and also to the fantastic and fushigi (mysterious), and attempt to reestablish this identity in a contemporary kami landscape. The kami landscape is the main stage of both works, consisting of the concealed world of the kami (Japanese spirits or gods), made visible and situated in real geography.

Both The Legends of Tôno and Spirited Away gained immense popularity with the general Japanese populace. Although much of this popularity stems from the entertainment value of the works, one might also surmise that the ‘national personality’ they each unearthed over ninety years apart rang true with their contemporary audiences. By comparing these two works the continuities and breaks in the Japanese’ conception of their national identity can be highlighted.

This article shows how the approach to Japan’s national identity has changed quite drastically, from Yanagita’s portrayal of the identity as static and unique, barely living on in Japan’s disappearing indigenous traditions, to Miyazaki’s portrayal of an evolving and adapting identity rooted in Japan’s shared past. However, they both grounded Japan’s national identity in the kami and the kami landscape and also came together when it came to the underlying values they saw this identity as containing, especially the primacy of the value of community. The way they portray the kami and the kami landscape differs, however, in ways that mirror their different approaches to identity.

YANAGITA’S BACKGROUND AND INTENTIONS WITH THE LEGENDS OF TÔNO

Yanagita Kunio was the sixth son of a Shinto priest and grew up in the Japanese countryside towards the end of the 19th century. He was later adopted into the influential Yanagita family, thanks to whom he was able to get a law degree at the prestigious Tokyo Imperial
KAMI AND IDENTITY

University. After graduating, he secured a position as a bureaucrat at the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. Despite spending the greater part of his life as an urban intellectual, his childhood memories would come to shape his work later in life. These included fond memories of village communal life and the central position of the village shrine, as well as memories of its hardships, which included suffering through famines. Perhaps it was this experience that allowed him to see rural life in a more positive light than was common amongst the urban elite. Indeed, according to Takayanagi Shunichirō, professor emeritus at Sophia University, Yanagita regarded rural life as anything but miserable. Despite acknowledging the hardships he saw it as holding a vitality, wisdom and character that the urban parts of Japan were losing. This becomes clear when we look at Yanagita’s view of Shinto, where he placed the household kami and village kami above the national kami in an inversion of the prevailing official view. Yanagita took this position despite being a part of the shin-kokugaku movement — a movement for the revival of the Edo-period school of nationalistic thought, which among other things espoused the return of sovereignty to the emperor.

The Legends of Tōno is a compilation of local legends and stories that tell of strange sightings and happenings in Tōno, a small village in a secluded valley in Iwate prefecture. According to Yanagita’s preface, at the time of writing, these tales were still a living reality for the people of Tōno. To various degrees they believed in, feared, and found hope in their common oral history; their world of shared fantasy. Yet even then these ‘live’ traditions were on the brink of extinction; the very same train that brought Yanagita to Tōno was also bringing industrialization. Tōno’s woodlands — which in the tales had held so much mystery and danger — were being chopped down for timber. Furthermore, the countryside, Tōno included, was already then facing problems of population decline.

It was this sense of urgency, and the fear of the past

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being lost right before their eyes, that led Yanagita from bureaucracy to folklore. Yanagita had a strong regard for the Japanese nation and saw the decline of the old traditions and the introduction of Western and mainland ideas in their place as a national identity crisis. The ‘true Japan’ was for Yanagita something unchanging and unique, which in 1910 endured only barely in rural legends. Bureaucracy wouldn’t solve the problem; in Yanagita’s eyes he needed to take direct action in order to preserve rural culture, community and tradition. Yet, it was not a desire to preserve the past for its own sake that drove Yanagita. Rather, his concern was the influence of the past on the present. With The Legends of Tōno he started a lifetime project of establishing a ‘uniquely Japanese identity’, grounded in rural community and in Shinto. For Yanagita, Shinto, as it existed in the form of rural ‘pre-Buddhist’ mountain- and ancestor worship, was an example of a true and universal ancient religious faith, which had been suppressed by Christianity in the West.

YANAGITA’S IDENTITY PROJECT

Modernization in Tōno is barely visible in Yanagita’s narrative — there is only a brief mention (in legend 75) of a matchstick factory and a hut for cutting wood for railroad ties, both plagued by yōkai (spirits of a more consistently malicious nature than kami). There is also an apparent disregard for Buddhism in The Legends of Tōno. Although there are a few brief mentions of Buddhist temples and priests in the legends, Buddhist traditions are not detailed in the legends at all. This contrasts with the abounding description of Shinto practices and deities. Michael Dylan Foster, associate professor of folklore at Indiana University, notes that the village of Tōno is presented as a non-modern otherworld in The Legends of Tōno. He sees this as part of a nostalgic project to rediscover an “authentic Japan.” The lack of treatment of Buddhism in The Legends of Tōno makes sense in this context. The Kokugaku movement

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8 Takayanagi, S. “In Search of Yanagita Kunio,” 167
10 Yanagita, K. The Legends of Tōno: 52-53

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regarded Buddhism as a Chinese import and thus did not consider it authentically Japanese (Yanagita, as was mentioned above, was a proponent of Shin-Kokugaku). Foster further reads Yanagita’s project as an attempt to reassert the ‘otherness’ of Tōno’s kami and yōkai in order to define a modern Japanese ‘self’ against it.12 However, he also notes how Yanagita, while portraying Tōno’s fantastic legends uncritically as historical fact, put the final nail in the coffin of the very ‘otherness’ he wished to preserve. By putting the unseen world of the kami and yōkai on display he robbed them of their power and sense of fushigi (mystery) and so also of their vitality, rendering them into musealized objects.13

Takayuki Tatsumi, professor of English at Keio University, takes a different approach. He reads The Legends of Tōno as an attempt at redefining Western modernization as ‘the other’ through highlighting the traditionally rooted Japanese ‘us’ that emerges from the work. As a part of this argument he points out how legend 84 and 8514, under the common title ‘Foreigners’, portray Christian Westerners as a radically different ‘other’.15 When it comes to the kami, he picked up Yanagita’s early theory and main academic focus until the mid-1920s, on how the liminal creatures – creatures straddling the boundary of this world and the unseen world of the kami – were in fact referring to “descendants of a real, separate aboriginal race of people who were long ago forced into the mountains by the Japanese who then populated the plains.”16 Yanagita himself raised the tengu (long nosed, mountain dwelling goblins) and yamabito (literally mountain people), both of which appear in the Legends of Tōno, as examples of such liminal creatures. Takayuki reads the yamabito as referring to the Ainu, Japan’s indigenous.17

Takayanagi brings up Yanagita’s critique of Western ideas applied to Japan, but emphasizes that Yanagita was not against modernization itself. Instead, Yanagita was, according to Takayanagi “the first scholar who used this native tradition in his efforts to cope with the aftermath of Japan’s modernization on the Western

pattern.”18 As such, Takayanagi reads the Legends of Tōno as an attempt to find the unique Japanese essence which further modernization needed to be grounded in if the Japanese wish to avoid losing their ‘unique Japanese-ness’.19

One of Yanagita’s followers, Yamaguchi Masao, boiled down Yanagita’s project further to the question “who are the Japanese?”20 Takayanagi sees Yanagita’s answer as being tied to two main concepts: the Japanese family centered tradition, and jōmin, the general (unchanging) populace. According to Yanagita, the jōmin share a common pattern of consciousness and behavior tied to the idea of ie, which in Takayanagi’s words is “the household, ancestor veneration, and the desire to be regarded as kami by descendants”.21 Ortabasi Melek, associate professor in the world literature program at the Simon Fraser University, notes how Yanagita had little regard for the literary style common amongst his literary friends in Tokyo, who (according to him) betrayed an unhealthy obsession with the self when they simply “wrote down what [they] had just experienced.”22 The Legends of Tōno was, in contrast, a project exploring identity tied to community rather than the individual.

**KAMI IN THE LEGENDS OF TŌNO**

The Legends of Tōno takes place on the borders between the kami landscape and the human world. While the core of the kami landscape appears to be firmly placed in the mountains and woodlands, the borders are mutable: they extend to where the kami are, and the kami go where they please. The narrative is limited to the human view and as such we see the kami as the villagers do, meaning our perspective of the kami is fragmented and there is little to no explanation given for the actions of the kami. Instead, the legends convey the boundaries of the kami landscape, and of what befall those who strayed across these boundaries. As such, the legends could be seen to define the villagers of Tōno through defining the boundaries of the kami landscape.

The kami, yōkai and various spirits as they appear in The Legends of Tōno are both benign and cruel; however, even when benign, they were to be treated

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12 Foster, M. D. Pandemonium and Parade : 139
13 Ibid., 141-142
14 Yanagita, K. The Legends of Tōno: 58-59
17 Takayuki, T. Full Metal Apache: 75-84
18 Yanagita, S. “Yanagita Kunio,” 330
19 Ibid., 167-171
20 Yanagita, S. “Yanagita Kunio,” 330
21 Ibid., 334
with fear as they could easily turn cruel at the smallest provocation. A kami that usually brings good fortune to the house, Zashikiwarashi, is told to have left a household to ruin—ending in the death of all the members of the household, save the youngest daughter—after the household servants killed a large number of snakes for the fun of it. Lesser spirits and harmful yōkai were treated less reverently and several legends tell of both successful and failed attempts at killing these. The fear the villagers held for the liminal denizens is clear and quite a few of the legends end with the villager running away in fright. The yōkai and kami rather resemble the uncontrollable and incomprehensible forces of nature, helpful at one turn, deadly the next. They are neither good nor evil; they are simply responding to the situation and the world around them. The spirits and kami constitute the defining ‘others’ for the villagers ‘us’, and the liminal kami landscape was exactly that, a world that existed on the boundaries of the village which denoted the safe human sphere. The liminal denizens defined the human world; the place humans could be was where the kami and spirits were not. Consequently villagers who had crossed over into the kami landscape were treated as a part of ‘the others’. Legend 31 tells of villagers, often girls, being spirited away by some spirit or kami (kamikakushi). These were given up once it became clear that they had crossed over into the liminal world. In those cases where they returned for a brief visit to the village (as a girl did in legend 8) or were spotted in the mountains (legend 6 and 7) they might have shown an attachment to the villagers, yet they did not express any wish to return.

IDENTITY AND KAMI IN THE LEGENDS OF TÔNO

To sum up, Yanagita’s view of the Japanese national identity was that it was static and unique. It was a value he regarded as already lost in urban areas due to Western influence, yet which as of 1910 was still alive in some rural areas. This unique, unchanging Japanese essence was, in Yanagita’s eyes, to be found in the non-rational and in the traditional; in what he regarded as the true, ancient religious faith still present in Japan in the form of ‘pre-Buddhist’ Shintoistic nature and ancestor worship. Further modernization, in the eyes of Yanagita, had to be based on this unique Japanese essence in order to retain a Japanese identity. Following this view, the kami landscape, as the holder of this unique essence, has to be retained as it is, the stories about it preserved and remembered, otherwise the unique qualities it holds, the Japanese identity, could be lost. However, as shown above, the kami landscape was endangered already in 1910, and had been lost in many areas, particularly urban ones.

Yanagita’s intention with The Legends of Tôno was not just to unearth Tôno’s local identity, but to explore a national Japanese identity. As long as a kami landscape was preserved, that kami landscape, regardless of where in Japan it was located, could be utilized to define a national identity. As long as the kami landscape was preserved, the kami would be preserved, and so remain as essential ‘others’ that define the national ‘self’.

MIYAZAKI’S BACKGROUND AND INTENTIONS WITH SPIRITED AWAY

Miyazaki Hayao was born in 1941. His father held an executive position in Miyazaki Aircrafts, which allowed him to profit from the Japanese war effort during the Second World War. This gave the family a high standard of living even in the midst of a war that left the nation and most of the population destitute. Despite being conscripted, Miyazaki’s father was able to avoid being sent to the front line, claiming that he could not go because he had a wife and a child; an excuse that certainly would not have worked for the average soldier. The young Miyazaki appears to have felt ashamed both of the hypocrisy that his father had displayed during the war, as well as of Japanese wartime aggression. As such he had little confidence in his own country. As he grew older, however, he started viewing Japan, both historically and culturally, as a part of the greater Asian continent which resulted in a more positive view of his own country. This view led him to approach Japanese identity, not as something based on unique Japanese traditions, but as inherently diverse and as grounded in a shared sense of past. Despite his guilt over Japanese war-history, Miyazaki retains nostalgia for the Japanese past, especially the Taishô and early Shôwa periods. The buildings in Spirited Away are also modeled on

22 Yanagita, K. The Legends of Tôno: 24
23 Ibid., 31
24 Ibid., 15-17

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buildings from these periods.

*Spirited Away*’s protagonist is the ten year old Chihiro, who reluctantly follows her parents as they unwittingly trespass into the kami landscape. Her parents brazenly partake of the food of the kami and are turned into pigs as punishment. Chihiro, who had refused to eat, manages to escape her parents’ fate with the help of some kami by getting a job at the kami bath-house. The film follows her struggle to reclaim her parents and return home. *Spirited Away* premiered in 2001, 10 years after the Japanese asset price bubble burst, at the end of what has come to be referred to as the Lost Decade. This can also be read out of the movie, as well as a critique of the spending culture that caused the bubble and still managed to survive it. An example of this is the careless greed of Chihiro’s parents upon entering the kami landscape, which is punished severely by their transformation into pigs. Against this background of a nation recovering from a crisis, *Spirited Away* was Miyazaki’s warning of a second looming crisis. Japan was, to him, not just facing economic problems, but environmental problems as well and perhaps even worse, existential problems where they are in danger of forgetting their past.

In contemporary society where borders are disappearing rapidly, those who have no place to return to are the most insignificant sort of people. A place is past and history. Those who have no history, people who have forgotten their history, I reckon, cannot but simply vanish like ephemeral mayflies, or be turned into chickens and keep laying eggs, until they are finally processed for food.

Like Yanagita, the past is first and foremost important to Miyazaki because of its significance for the present and for how it shapes us. As such he shows less interest in pre-Taishō history as it would be too distant to have shaped him and his audience personally. Still, it might be worth noting that the workers in the bathhouse in *Spirited Away* wear clothes reminiscent of Heian period costumes. This is most likely related to

the formal Shinto costumes deriving from this period. Despite the secularization that follows in the wake of capitalism, it is to this setting, imbued with references to Shinto, that Miyazaki brings us in his quest for the Japanese identity. As with Yanagita, we notice that it is folk-Shinto that Miyazaki turns to rather than national Shinto. Miyazaki cites “very warm appreciation for the various, very humble rural Shinto rituals that continue to this day throughout rural Japan”.

WESTERNIZATION IN SPIRITED AWAY

Yubaba, the owner of the kami bath-house in *Spirited Away* (who takes Chihiro’s name from her in exchange for a job) was, according to Miyazaki, designed as a pseudo-Western character. She is reminiscent of a Western witch with her grandmotherly visage, long nose and wart. Her Western connection is also made clear through her Western-style rooms on the very top floor of the otherwise traditionally Japanese building. Yubaba’s placement at the very top of the tall bath-house, her wealth of knowledge, as well as her visage with her extremely long nose could otherwise remind one of a tengu—a yokai that usually lives on top of mountains, have long noses and are often featured in tales as being sought out by warriors who wish to learn martial arts or some other skill. Yet Chihiro receives help during her quest to regain her past (in the form of her parents who were turned into pigs) from Yubaba’s identical twin-sister Zenba—a similar tengu-like character, and a virtuous foil to Yubaba. Yubaba is not an evil character, however; she is depicted as caring greatly for her son, Bo, and deals fairly with the bath-house workers. She is merely self-absorbed and obsessed with profits and regulations. This leads her to be too absorbed in earning to notice when her son, Bo, is replaced by her familiar spirits, transformed into his likeness by Zenba. By Zenba’s own admission she and Yubaba are two sides of the same coin. Like Yubaba, her environs are a mix of Western and traditional Japanese; her cottage reminiscent of an English countryside house, but surrounded by archetypical Japanese rice paddies. Zenba and Yubaba are as such not disruptive foreign elements, but fully integrated ones. Miyazaki, in contrast to Yanagita, does not seem to regard the

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28 Yoshiooka, S. “History and Nostalgia in Hayao Miyazaki’s *Spirited Away,*” 261
29 Miyazaki, H. *Spirited Away.* (Studio Ghibli, Tokyo 2001) DVD
30 Miyazaki, H. “Chihiro in a Strange World: The Aim of This Film” in The Art of Spirited Away, (Studio Ghibli, Tokyo 2001): 19
31 Yoshiooka, S. “History and Nostalgia in Hayao Miyazaki’s *Spirited Away,*” 263-264
West as the antithesis of Japanese identity, but rather sees Western things as having become integrated into Japanese culture.24 Westerners, as mentioned above, also make an appearance in The Legends of Tōno, but rather than being integrated into the kami landscape they are placed outside it, mentioned only as having been sighted near the coast. While the ‘strangeness’ of the Westerners in The Legends of Tōno is emphasized, their ‘strangeness’ is one of exotic rarity, rather than the transformative and frightening power of the kami. The spreading of Western traditions, in the form of Christianity (practiced secretly as discovery would lead to crucifixion) or ‘children of mixed parenthood’, is mentioned as something noteworthy in the same way the sighting of a kami is noteworthy; as something curious and disconcerting. However the relevant legends lack the element of fear or awe so often present in the legends describing the kami. Whereas the villagers of Tōno can live side by side with the kami, the foreigners and those ‘tainted’ by them (Christians and children of mixed background) cannot be integrated.

**MIYAZAKI’S IDENTITY PROJECT**

There seems in Spirited Away to be an aspect of having to reconcile with one’s past (as Miyazaki did when he reconciled himself with his shame over Japan’s wartime past and guilt towards the victims of Japanese wartime aggression with a new understanding of Japanese identity as a part of Asia25). Should the viewer fail to do this, they could end up denying their own existence, like Chihiro is in danger of doing in the beginning of the movie upon realizing that her parents are gone and she herself stuck in the mysterious and initially frightening bath-house town. Distraught, Chihiro initially tries to deny the reality of what had transpired. However, she finds that it is herself, and not the world around her, that has started to fade away. Only by accepting one’s past can one find one’s identity. Having lost touch with the past when her parents were turned into pigs, Chihiro easily hands her name, and with it her identity, over to Yubaba.

Susan Napier, professor of Japanese studies at Tufts University, notes how Miyazaki’s narratives tend to begin with the dissolution of a world, and goes on to show how this is especially true in Spirited Away.

Chihiro’s parents’ greed and irresponsibility plunges Chihiro into a situation where she loses not only her past in the form of her parents, but also her name. According to Napier, this is not just the dissolution of Chihiro’s personal circumstances, but also the dissolution of Japanese society.26 She sees Spirited Away as a reaction to collateral nomocide (the destruction of a culture or way of life as a side-effect of modernization) against Japanese culture and identity by modernity and Western influence. She reads Miyazaki’s project as an attempt at reasserting the uniquely Japanese nomos through stressing local cultural elements, amongst these the cleansing aspects of Shinto (cleansing oneself and ones surroundings of accumulated kegare: sins and pollution) inherent to the bath-house setting. However she argues that this project is undermined by the ingrained pollution and abundant transgressive forces. A polluted river kami bursts into the bath house at one point and is cleansed, but Chihiro herself is also a transgressing and even a polluting force. The bath house workers frequently complain about her ‘stink’. Chihiro also inadvertently brings No-face with her, who after rampantly consuming all the food the bath house has to offer, as well as three bath house workers, throws it all up again, polluting the bath house.37

Knowing Miyazaki’s personal history one might question Napier’s conclusion on Miyazaki’s attitude towards Japanese-ness and external influence. Indeed Yoshioka Shiro, lecturer in Japanese studies at Newcastle University, comes to a quite different conclusion and argues for Miyazaki’s view on Japanese-ness being “dynamically protean” and not uniquely distinguished from Western culture.38 He likens Spirited Away to a folk-tale for the 21st century: one which puts contemporary Japan into a broader historical context, tying the modern Japan to the traditional with focus on the continuity, rather than the break (as Yanagita would perceive) with the past.39 In Yoshioka’s eyes Spirited

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34 Yoshioka, S. ”History and Nostalgia in Hayao Miyazaki’s Spirited Away,” 257
35 Ibid., 257

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26 Yoshioka, S. ”History and Nostalgia in Hayao Miyazaki’s Spirited Away,” 272
27 Yoshioka, S. "History and Nostalgia in Hayao Miyazaki’s Spirited Away," 258
Away is a journey into the Japanese’ collective memory of their past, which Miyazaki believes all Japanese retain in their unconsciousness, in order to reclaim identity.\(^4\)

According to Yoshioka’s view, Miyazaki does not appear to regard Japanese identity as something that relies on constant upkeep and protection from external forces as one might see Yanagita as doing. Rather, it emerges that Miyazaki sees national identity as something that already exists within the individual, and which merely has to be discovered and accepted. Yamanaka Hiroshi, professor of religious studies at Tsukuba University, can be seen as supporting this view. He sees the movie as conveying Miyazaki’s hope for the Japanese peoples’ ability to recover a national identity even in the aftermath of the economically and spiritually devastating bursting of the bubble economy. He further speculates that the film may be “an attempt to convey a modern ‘secular religious’ myth that provides psychological healing to those Japanese people suffering from an ongoing identity crisis”\(^5\).

**KAMI IN SPIRITED AWAY**

Spirited Away begins with Chihiro and her parents moving from some unnamed urban area to the more rural Tochinoki in Gifu prefecture in the very outskirts of the expanding suburbs north of Nagoya. Yet the main setting of Spirited Away lies within the kami landscape, in the bath-house Aburaya and the mysterious town around it. Aburaya is a traditional style bath-house, but has elevators and fans and electricity, giving the impression that the kami have moved with the times. The countless eyes and signs for eyes in the kami landscape might also be interpreted as an allegory for the surveillance that abounds in the modern human world. The boundaries of this kami landscape are rigid. Yet, despite the boundaries’ rigidity they are open in the sense that Chihiro and her parents are able to cross over into the kami landscape as well as to go out again. This contrasts with the villagers in Tôno, where despite the boundaries’ mutability, there was no return for humans who crossed into the heart of the kami landscape. It is no longer the kami who dictate the boundaries, but the humans – as can be seen by the discarded stone hokora

\(^4\) Ibid., 272


(small shrines) by the forest edge in the beginning of the movie. The same forest edge coincides with the border between the human realm and the kami landscape. The narrative here follows Chihiro into the kami landscape and shows us the kami perspective in addition to the human one. We are introduced to the interactions between kami and their reactions to and adaptations to human progress.

Chihiro’s parents are unfamiliar with the rules that govern the kami landscape and which were so natural and accepted in Tôno; they uncaringly enter the sacred place and as a result are bound to be cursed even before they partake of the food of the kami. They are still trying to play by the rules of the human world – expecting credit-cards to absolve them from the debt they incur by eating someone else’s food. It is only Chihiro who seems to sense something of the old taboo. Yet she, too, overstay their welcome straying into the time of the kami. Once darkness falls, she is cursed never to leave, and - unless she proves herself useful - to meet the same fate as her parents.

Miyazaki describes a world where humans have forgotten the kami, and the kami have been pushed to the borders of society. Yet despite being dumped and forgotten at the borders of society the kami have not forgotten humans. Haku (a river kami that helps Chihiro find her way in the kami landscape) recognizes Chihiro from when he saved her from drowning in his river. Whereas Chihiro has no initial recollection of near-drowning or of being saved other than what her mother had told her. Another possibility is that the kami cannot forget humans. Haku has had his river, the Kohaku River, drained and built over by humans. Another river kami in the movie has been so polluted that he is mistaken for a stink-kami to the initial disgust of the bath-house workers.

As in Tôno, we still see the same spirit or kami helping and destroying in turn. The bath-house workers talk of eating Chihiro and even Haku tells them that they may do as they please with her if she doesn’t prove herself useful. Furthermore Chihiro is plagued throughout the movie with the fear that her parents will be eaten by the same bath-house kami and spirits that help her. Perhaps what we see here is an example of the same dichotomy where children in Tôno could play safely with the image of a kami, while adults would have been
Indeed once her industry and perseverance gains her the acceptance of the kami, Chihiro is fully integrated into the kami landscape. Yet despite having become part of the kami landscape, Chihiro has gained, through connecting with her past and establishing a sense of self rooted in community, remains. The charm she still wears in her hair which she received from Zeniba, the bath-house owner Yubaba’s sister, can be seen to represent this. The charm could be taken to show how the memories have not been lost, but have entered the subconscious - as evidenced by Zeniba’s utterance that meetings, even if the memories evade you, are never truly forgotten.

**KAMI AS MIRRORS FOR IDENTITY**

A warning of the danger of forgetting our past presents itself in the form of No-face, a miserable entity in the film who has lost his identity and past. Chihiro is called by Yubaba to take responsibility for him after he has grown huge and demanding through the greed of the bath-house workers. When she enquires about his place of origin, his home, and his parents, No-face sinks into himself moaning “lonely, lonely”. According to Satoshi Ando, associate professor of English at Aichi University, “[past and place are two most important bases of identity, for past experience and its memory forms one’s identity, and one needs a place where one can be ‘at home’ to maintain it.” This is what No-face has lost, and what Chihiro is struggling to regain. No-face can be seen as an embodiment of Japan during the bubble period; glutonously over-consuming, throwing gold around him, and cheered along by the greedy bath-house staff until he bursts, losing everything he has consumed. His preoccupation with Chihiro can perhaps be seen as the identity-less ‘bubble-Japan’ thirsting for and futilely trying to buy back its genuine identity, which is embodied by Chihiro. No-face gets no reaction from Chihiro when he offers her the delicious bath-house food (eerily reminiscent of how Chihiro’s mother in the beginning of the film tries to entice Chihiro into joining them in the meal that eventually gets them turned into pigs) and gold. When he then asks her to tell him what she wishes for, Chihiro replies that her wish isn’t something No-face is capable of granting. The film’s message can be read as how the truly valuable things in life cannot be obtained through gold or credit-cards, like Chihiro’s dad and No-face at first seem to assume. Rather, one has to work for them as Chihiro does, and as No-face also comes to do towards the end of the movie. The virtue of moderation is also extolled symbolically when Chihiro, No-face and Bo, on their way to see Zeniba towards the end of the film, ride a train marked childish, the middle way or moderation. In many ways, No-face mirrors Chihiro’s progress through the film, entering the bath-house as she does and leaving it with her. He also mirrors her spiritual growth; developing from spoiled, demanding and insecure (constantly calling for and reaching out to Chihiro like she did to her parents upon crossing into the kami landscape) to contentedly working for his keep at Zeniba’s. He appears like the shadow of Chihiro, brought to monstrous life as she crosses the bridge into the bath-house, transgressing into the inner sanctum of the kami landscape. He thus becomes Chihiro’s mirror, embodying her struggle to gain a sense of identity and finally finding his place in the kami landscape as Chihiro confidently returns to the human world.

No-face is not the only kami that mirrors Chihiro’s spiritual growth, however. Yubaba’s son Bo, initially a spoiled, self-centered crybaby that threatens to break Chihiro’s arm if she does not play with him, also follows Chihiro on her trip to see Zeniba. Like No-face and Chihiro he achieves spiritual growth and learns independence and the value of cooperation as well as the satisfaction of working for something himself. The kami landscape as a whole could indeed appear to take on the role of a mirror for the Japanese nation. It reflects contemporary Japan’s technological and environmental state, and shows the Western influence in Yubaba and Zeniba. It also displays the continuing gender divide in higher positions, what with all the bath-house guests being male kami in contrast to the bath-house workers where both sexes are equally present. The bath-house workers, along with Yubaba, also reflect the euphoric
gred of the bubble, as well as the skepticism to foreigners (in this case Chihiro) still apparent from time to time in Japan. Yet despite the cold welcome the bathhouse workers gave Chihiro when she first arrived at the bath-house, they all cheer her on when she returns from Zeniba and is faced with a final test by Yubaba. Chihiro returns changed from the kami landscape, and that change is in turn reflected by the kami.

IDENTITY AND KAMI IN SPIRITED AWAY

Miyazaki sees Japan as a nation deeply affected by its role in the Second World War, and does not see the Japanese national identity as unique or static. While he might agree with Yanagita on the importance of the past, he appears to see national identity as an evolving and adapting value that integrates foreign elements rather than becoming corrupted by them. Miyazaki does not seem to regard the Japanese identity as something the Japanese can lose as it is rooted in their shared past. As long as they retain the past they will have the means to reconstruct their identity. However if the Japanese forget their past, they are in danger of not recognizing, or perhaps even rejecting, their own identity (as Chihiro who upon having forgotten her real name, only realized she had forgotten it when Haku returned her farewell-card from her old school, a relic of the past, where her real name was written). Miyazaki himself maintains that “...it’s not a story in which the characters grow up, but a story in which they draw on something already inside them, brought out by the particular circumstances...”

The Japanese identity is not something he is trying to create, but something he wants his (Japanese) viewers to find in themselves through reconnecting with the past and traditions that shaped them, which can be found embodied in Miyazaki’s portrayal of the kami landscape in the film.

CONCLUSION

The works of Yanagita and Miyazaki come together regarding the basic values that the Japanese national identity contains; the value of tradition and community, of collective effort and helpfulness over selfishness, of hard work and perseverance over opting for the easy way out. They also come together regarding the importance of the past in maintaining this identity. Furthermore, both Yanagita and Miyazaki ground the Japanese national identity squarely in the contemporary, rural, kami landscape. Yet where Miyazaki lets us return to the human world, Yanagita seems to offer us no escape from the kami landscape. This can be seen in connection to their views of identity. Where Miyazaki considers identity to naturally adapt and evolve, Yanagita regards it as a static value.

The mutable boarders of Yanagita’s kami landscape rings true with his view of the Japanese national identity as something that could be lost; the onslaught of modernity would infringe on the kami landscape pushing its borders back and cause it to dwindle away. In Spirited Away, however, the boarders of the kami landscape are rigidly defined, and so it cannot be diminished or lost. Rather the kami have gone with the tide of modernization and Westernization. Where the Tono kami merely haunt the railway’s timber-men for daring to enter the mountains and woods, the kami in Spirited Away have adopted the railway itself along with the other conveniences of modern life. Miyazaki’s rigid kami landscape can be, and is, forgotten by humans, but is not lost simply because it is forgotten.

The kami as such could appear to be utilized by both Yanagita and Miyazaki as necessary defining values of the Japanese national identity. Yanagita raises them up as defining ‘others’. Miyazaki, meanwhile, presents them as mirrors of the Japanese national ‘self’, symbolic of the need for self-reflection in order to reconcile oneself with one’s past and thus regain identity. As such both Yanagita and Miyazaki can propagate their definition of the Japanese national identity through folk-tales telling of the relations between humans and kami, and of the kami landscape.

The shift from the identity propagated by Yanagita through The Tales of Tono to Miyazaki’s take on the Japanese national identity as it emerges in Spirited Away would seem to be a positive one. It shows a shift towards a more inclusive and adaptable identity, and so perhaps an identity more suited towards today’s rapidly globalizing society.

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KAJA SINEAD SELVIK

Kaja Sinead Selvik is a first year graduate student at The School of Oriental and African Studies at University of London.

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Why Do Japanese Prime Ministers Visit Yasukuni Jinja Despite Adverse International Repercussions?

Yasukuni Jinja is a shrine in downtown Tokyo whose purpose is to house all of the souls of the Japanese who have died in war on behalf of Japan. However, what sets Yasukuni apart from other Japanese shrines, or even the American Arlington Cemetery, are the fourteen WWII convicted Class A war criminals also enshrined there. Several prime ministers have made their visits to Yasukuni, and several have additionally chosen to visit Yasukuni on August 15, the anniversary of Japan's WWII surrender. This action has historically raised numerous red flags and favor in the international community in what many perceive to be symbolic support of Japan's WWII efforts and the ideologies of many right-wing Japanese groups. Whenever a Japanese official, specifically a prime minister, visits Yasukuni Shrine, Japanese diplomacy pays a price through the anger of surrounding Asian nations such as China and South Korea. This reductio portion of my honor’s thesis, Why do Japanese Prime Ministers Visit Yasukuni Despite Adverse International Repercussions, a Stanford International Relations Departmental Award for Outstanding Thesis recipient, aims to explore several qualitative hypotheses as to why Japan’s leaders continue to visit the shrine. Following an explanation of the historical and international significance of the specific case that is Yasukuni, five arguments are proposed as to why prime ministers choose to visit: 1) to protect, as they see it, Japan's honor and history, 2) to remove or regain a semblance of pre-Occupation governmental policies, 3) out of respect for the war dead, 4) out of subscription to the belief that visiting will protect against vervous spirits, and 5) to reinforce a culture of appreciation for troops and ensure this appreciation is in place for future generations. Current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit in December 2013 — the first visit by a prime minister while in office in over seven years — readers the explanation of these hypotheses all the more relevant.

"To visit or not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine: that is the question that every Japanese prime minister is expected to answer at the outset of his administration." — Akihiko Tanaka

INTRODUCTION

When Prime Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi visited Yasukuni Jinja, a Shinto shrine in Tokyo, in October of 2005 (his fifth visit of six total visits), China responded one day later by cancelling a visit with Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura, stating that: “Given the present situation, the visit is not timely.” According to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan, China was “not in a position to receive this visit.” Following another visit by Koizumi to Yasukuni nearly one year later on August 15, 2006, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun refused to meet with Koizumi in protest and the South Korean government pledged to refrain from holding a summit with Japan while its leaders continued to visit the shrine.3

Had Koizumi stayed in office for another year, based on his term’s track record of visiting each year in office, it is highly likely that he would have paid his respects at Yasukuni again, possibly extending strained relations with Chinese and South Korean leaders. Koizumi is certainly not the first prime minister to visit Yasukuni and, as demonstrated in December 2013, by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, he is definitely not the last. The immediate question emerges: why do prime ministers visit Yasukuni Jinja despite the adverse international repercussions? What makes Yasukuni Shrine such a sore point in East Asian international relations?

Yasukuni Jinja is a shrine whose purpose is to house all of the souls of the Japanese who have died in war during World War II. For instance, when former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Yasukuni Jinja in 2005, South Korea’s President Roh Moo-hyun refused to meet with Koizumi in protest and the South Korean government pledged to refrain from holding a summit with Japan while its leaders continued to visit the shrine.3

2 “China cancels meeting with Machimura,” The Japan Times, October 19, 2005.
on behalf of Japan. However, what sets Yasukuni apart from other Japanese shrines, or even the American Arlington Cemetery, are the fourteen WWII convicted Class A war criminals also enshrined there. This group of criminals were considered to be the perpetrators of the worst war crimes committed from Japan during WWII — among their likes is Hideki Tōjō, Prime Minister of Japan during WWII who was later hanged by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East for his war crimes.

Several prime ministers have made their visits officially state-sponsored rather than private, and several have additionally chosen to visit Yasukuni on August 15, the anniversary of Japan’s surrender to WWII, setting off more red flags and fervor in the international community. Whenever a Japanese official, specifically a prime minister, visits Yasukuni Shrine, Japanese diplomacy pays a price through the anger of surrounding Asian nations such as China and South Korea. Both nations were extremely adversely affected and victimized by Japan during WWII, and both react to Yasukuni visits in various forms not limited to cancelled diplomatic or presidential meetings. For example, on August 14, 1985, the day before Prime Minister Nakasone's scheduled visit to Yasukuni, 1,000 students from Beida and Qinghua universities in Beijing gathered for anti-Japanese demonstrations at Tiananmen Square. Conversely, protest sometimes erupts domestically within Japan when a prime minister doesn't go to Yasukuni. One Japanese activist cut off his little finger in protest and sent it to the Liberal Democratic Party headquarters after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe refused to visit. However, when visits to Yasukuni are avoided, international relations have been observed to improve, such as when Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda refused to visit.\(^4\) Such a seemingly micro action has resulted in damaging, macro repercussions — based on the repercussions, it is posited that the motivations behind Japanese officials going to the shrine are as significant and noteworthy as the backlash they receive. Furthermore, among Japan’s political officials, prime ministers are certainly not alone in electing to visit. In a contagion-like effect, Diet members will sometimes visit with or after a prime minister has made the first move. After Koizumi visited in 2005 during Japan's Fall Festival, nearly 200 Diet members followed the next day.\(^5\) The enigma is why, in spite of the resulting international anger, Japanese officials continue to go pay their respects at Yasukuni Jinja.

**INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE**

China, South Korea, and Japan are all major powers in one of the world’s fastest growing regions. In August 2010, China's Gross Domestic Product surpassed Japan’s, and is arguably on track to eventually surpass the United States. While Yasukuni may seem like one small shrine among many and the act of prime ministers visiting simply one more insensitive action Japan has committed with regard to WWII memory, this shrine remains a major point of unease between Japan and its neighbors. This unease is exacerbated each time a prime minister elects to visit Yasukuni, additionally signifying that it is a recurring problem with no obvious signs of ceasing. Relations between China and Japan, specifically post-WWII, have been littered with conflicts over post-war disagreements regarding war memory. One of the largest controversies stems from the dispute over Japanese officials visiting Yasukuni Shrine, which has previously stopped diplomatic relations between the two nations cold.

Although the war has been finished for nearly seven decades, tension between China and Japan is still rekindled by actions surrounding the treatment of the Japanese dead, causing conflict surrounding WWII to still be very much alive. Both East Asian nations have a significant position in current world affairs and will most likely maintain this in the foreseeable future. Dialogue between the two nations is key, and their cooperation — or lack thereof — on international issues has the potential to create significant rifts and cause reverberations for the rest of the international community. The study of Sino-Japanese relations, specifically what events could bolster or hinder progress, is therefore extremely relevant. Cooperation between the two Asian power players is absolutely imperative on a number of issues, from the North Korean nuclear progression, to the debate over the Šenkaku Islands, to prime ministers’ decisions to visit Yasukuni Jinja.

**HISTORY OF YASUKUNI**

Ironically, Yasukuni Jinja — the shrine infamous for

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housing the spirits of Class-A war criminals tried for "crimes against the peace," — translates into "Shrine for Establishing Peace in the Empire." After the Boshin War of 1867 between the forces of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the anti-Shogunate forces in Japan, the new Meiji Emperor wanted a place to pay tribute to the spirits who died on behalf of Japan during warfare. As stated by Hasegawa, "Yasukuni, in contrast, was a shrine for ordinary people." In some ways, Yasukuni helped to unify the nation under the Meiji Restoration by making the option of enshrinement there open to everybody. Shrines gained popularity during the Meiji Restoration, which additionally boasted 16 other separate shrines for spirits of the war dead, or "Shikonsha". Located in each new prefecture, a Shikonsha was established "for the veneration of the war dead from its province." By the end of WW2 in 1945, over 2,400,000 souls of the war dead had been enshrined. As of October 17, 2001, the breakdown of souls at Yasukuni from different Japanese conflicts was as follows:

Souls enshrined at Yasukuni as of October 17, 2001:

Meiji Restoration (7,751)
Sino-Japanese War (13,619)
Boxer Uprising (1,256)
WWI (4,850)
Manchurian Incident (17,175)
WWII (2,133,778)
Satsuma Rebellion (6,971)
Formosan Expedition (1,130)
Russo-Japanese War (88,429)
Sainan Incident (185)

The latter are the type enshrined at Yasukuni. The most vengeful of spirits are those who have died a "sudden, violent and often miserable death," which wholly describes the deaths of countless Japanese soldiers on the battlefield. According to state ideology, these spirits that have died on behalf of Japan during warfare are "instantly turned into gods." These "heroic spirits," or eirei, enshrined at Yasukuni are "regarded as living gods," with state ideology formally stating that the sacrifice of the soldier's spirit is "instantly turned into a heroic spirit and a god (kami) by the act of dying for the country." What therefore makes Yasukuni a unique shrine is that it is not necessitated that one has to be from a rich or famous family; all that is required is that one dies on behalf of Japan during warfare. As phrased by Hasegawa, "Yasukuni, in contrast, was a shrine for ordinary people." In some ways, Yasukuni helped to unify the nation under the Meiji Restoration by making the option of enshrinement there open to everybody. Shrines gained popularity during the Meiji Restoration, which additionally boasted 16 other separate shrines for spirits of the war dead, or "Shikonsha". Located in each new prefecture, a Shikonsha was established "for the veneration of the war dead from its province." By the end of WW2 in 1945, over 2,400,000 souls of the war dead had been enshrined. As of October 17, 2001, the breakdown of souls at Yasukuni from different Japanese conflicts was as follows:

Souls enshrined at Yasukuni as of October 17, 2001:

Meiji Restoration (7,751)
Sino-Japanese War (13,619)
Boxer Uprising (1,256)
WWI (4,850)
Manchurian Incident (17,175)
WWII (2,133,778)
Satsuma Rebellion (6,971)
Formosan Expedition (1,130)
Russo-Japanese War (88,429)
Sainan Incident (185)

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9 Ibid.
10 Hasegawa and Togo, East Asia's haunted present, 120.
11 Yun Hui Timothy Tsu, Jan van Bremen, and Eyal Ben-Ari, Perspectives on social memory in Japan. (Folkestone, Kent, UK: Global Oriental, 2005), 26.
12 Tsu, Bremen, and Ben-Ari, Perspectives on social memory in Japan, 26-27.
13 Ibid., 27.
14 Ibid., 28.
15 Hasegawa and Togo, East Asia's haunted present, 120.
16 Tsu, Bremen, and Ben-Ari, Perspectives on social memory in Japan, 30.
Despite the high number of enshrined spirits, Yasukuni does not include everyone who died on Japan’s behalf during WWII. The shrine does not include the enshrinement of “gunpu,” or military porters, service laborers, and camp followers. Furthermore, unknown soldiers and non-Japanese victims are not enshrined; a separate shrine about a ten-minute walk away from Yasukuni called Chidorigafuchi National Memorial Garden is meant for unknown soldiers. Established in 1956, Chidorigafuchi was built with a view of Yasukuni Shrine, but one-fifth of its size. Yasukuni spirits are those “whose remains, usually partial, could be returned to their relatives or relations.” In addition to human spirits, Yasukuni additionally has monuments inside the inner shrine for the spirits of military horses (erected in 1958), dogs (1992), and pigeons (moved to Yasukuni in 1956).

**SEPARATION OF SHINTO AND STATE**

Although established by the Emperor as a “Special Class State Shrine,” the end of WWII brought with it submission to the United States government and a reevaluation of the relationship between religion and the nation. Previously, the emperor was the ultimate head of both religious leadership and political leadership, with National Shintoism representing the religion of loyalty to the emperor. Under a new Constitution drafted by the United States, Japan’s right to maintain standing armed forces or engage in conflict was scrapped. Additionally, any ties between Shintoism and the Japanese national government — previously combined under the power of the emperor — were deemed unconstitutional under the General Headquarters of the Occupation forces, specifically with Article 20 of the new Constitution dismantling the system of National Shintoism.

Dividing these two historically married sects, with the emperor formerly at the forefront of both, was monumental; Yasukuni Shrine, previously under the jurisdiction of the Japanese government, was rendered a completely separate entity. State-sponsored visits were no longer constitutional, despite several attempted state visits such as Prime Minister Yushiro Nakasone’s “semi-official” visit in 1985 for the 40th anniversary of the end of WWII. When Koizumi visited Yasukuni, court cases emerged across Japan with over 900 plaintiffs claiming that he violated the separation of state/religion (similar to the United States) in the Japanese Constitution, causing them “mental anguish.” The plaintiffs demanded compensation — although they ultimately did not receive any, Osaka High Court judges ruled in 2005 that Koizumi did, in fact, violate the state/religion clause.

Backtracking, in 1956, the Liberal Democratic Party made its first call among many for the re-nationalization of Yasukuni. Prime ministers, in order to surpass the Constitutional ban on their visits, began claiming that trips to Yasukuni were instead for personal or private reasons. To add to the controversy of prime ministers visiting Yasukuni Shrine, the membership of spirits enshrined in Yasukuni notoriously expanded in 1978.

**CONTROVERSIAL ENSHRINEMENT OF CLASS-A WAR CRIMINALS**

It was not until well after the American Occupation ended in 1952 that Japan’s WWII dead were enshrined in Yasukuni. In 1978, the decision was made to expand membership to Class A WWII war criminals. Following the surrender of Japan on August 15, 1945, Japan’s most responsible members of the government and military — including Prime Minister and Imperial Japanese Army General Hideki Tōjō — were tried by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, otherwise known as the Tokyo Military Tribunal. Brought to trial for “crimes against the peace,” 28 military, intellectual, and political leaders were tried at the same time as the Nuremberg Trials in Germany. Of the 28 on trial, seven were sentenced to death, 16 were imprisoned for life, one imprisoned for 20 years, and one for seven years. Two alleged war criminals died during the trials, and one was discharged for “mental derangement.”

In 1969, the Council of Worshipers’ Representatives, “Church and State in Japan,” ReligionDispatches, n.d.

Hasegawa and Togo, East Asia’s haunted present, 124.

Hasegawa and Togo, East Asia’s haunted present, 123.
the decision-making body of Yasukuni Shrine, made the decision that the dead Class A war criminals were qualified to be enshrined. At first, Yaskuni’s Chief Priest Tsukuba refused to enshrine them. It was not until after his death in 1978 that former Self-Defense Force official Nagayoshi Matudaira was appointed Chief Priest and chose, under pressure from former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Kazuto Ishida, to enshrine the fourteen Class A war criminals. The enshrinement was kept a secret until media reported it in April 1979. In addition to the fourteen Class A war criminals, “some 1,000 Class-B and C war criminals” were enshrined quietly along with the other war dead” in 1959.27 Charged with conventional war crimes, there were originally 5,644 Japanese Class B and Class C war criminals, of which 934 were sentenced to death. The Showa Emperor, once having learned that the fourteen Class A war criminals had been permitted to be enshrined at Yasukuni, was “deeply disturbed,” electing to forego any future visits to the shrine.28 What was once largely a domestic issue of contention between violating the Constitution for state-sponsored visits to Yasukuni quickly turned into an international issue as other East Asian leaders strongly protested state-sponsored visits to the spirits of war criminals that had greatly damaged their nations during WWII.

THE DECISIONS OF PRIME MINISTERS

When prime ministers or other government officials elect to visit Yasukuni Shrine, underlying tensions and sensitivities from the messy histories of China and South Korea often erupt, resulting in adverse international repercussions. Despite these historical clashes, Japan faces the choice of whether or not to dig up past problems with China and Korea every time a new prime minister is selected. As captured in “The Yasukuni Issue and Japan’s International Relations,” chapter from Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo’s East Asia’s Haunted Present, Professor Akihiko Tanaka writes:

To visit or not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine: that is the question that every Japanese prime minister is expected to answer at the outset of his administration. Whether to pay tribute to two million soldiers and a limited number of political leaders enshrined in this Shrine is one of the most controversial symbolic acts of prime ministers in Japan. If the answer is affirmative, the prime minister should expect substantial international criticism, especially from China and Korea.29

The resulting reactions are often catastrophic to diplomatic relations and seriously hinder any progress between these nations. Even small agreements are made more difficult with the knowledge that Japan continues, in the eyes of surrounding nations, to put their war criminals on a pedestal. As a result, “…issues that otherwise should be manageable — such as the Takeshima/Dokdo or Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands — can turn into crises, potentially militarized ones.”30

China and South Korea have reacted accordingly. Every time Prime Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi, who held office from 2001-2006, visited Yasukuni, “Beijing and Seoul raised strong voices of criticism.” After a visit in October of 2005, both nations refused bilateral summit meetings with Koizumi and Japan-China relations “reached the most abnormal stage since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1972.”31 Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’s visit in 1985 caused students of Peking University to begin protests on Tiananmen Square, waving signs that read: “Down with Nakasone! Oppose the visit to Yasukuni Shrine.” One poster read: “the new devils are enshrining the tombs of the old ogres. Yasuhiro pays tributes to the spirit of Hideki Tōjō...Raise 100 million and destroy Ogres.”32 Protests reportedly spread to eight major cities in China. Nakasone ended up cancelling his following October visit stating: “China’s reaction to the enshrinement of Class A war criminals was strong.”33 Nakasone never made another visit, and was joined by his successor, Shinzo Abe, who chose at the beginning of his first term not to visit Yasukuni. Abe, who had observed Nakasone, realized the diplomatic turmoil caused and adopted an “ambiguous strategy” of not saying whether or not he would visit. China and South Korea accepted this and welcomed Abe when he visited after first becoming Prime Minister in September.

28 Hasegawa and Togo, East Asia’s haunted present, 35.
29 Ibid., 119-120.
30 Ibid., 126.
31 Akihiko, “The Yasukuni Issue and Japan’s International Relations,” 128.
2006.34

Adding another layer to the initial decision of prime ministers and Diet members to pay their respects at or to refrain from visiting Yasukuni, government officials must additionally choose on which day to visit — an action often holding the potential to incite as much controversy as the initial action itself. Prime ministers have had a tendency to overlap their visits on particular days or clusters of days. In the years since the Class A war criminals were enshrined, Yasukuni has seen a total of 22 visits between the dates of April 21-24 and a similar cluster of 15 visits between October 17 – 19. These particular dates are no coincidence: April 21-23 marks Japan’s Annual Spring Festival, or Shunki Reitaisai, paralleled by the Annual Autumn Festival from October 17-20, or Shuki Reitaisai. The Spring Festival is marked by a procession at Nikko Toshogu Shrine in Tochigi Prefecture honoring previous Shoguns, with a similar procession in October (the main Shogun honored is Japan’s first Shogun, Tokugawa Ieyasu, who ruled and died centuries before WWII).35 The main summer festival at Yasukuni, Mitama Matsuri, is from July 13-16, and boasts over 30,000 lanterns and various performances to honor the enshrined souls.36 Ironically, not one prime minister who has visited Japan during the summer months has elected to go during Mitama Matsuri. Instead, the summer date on which the highest number of prime ministers have visited (seven total) is August 15, the anniversary of Japan’s WWII surrender.

THE ANNIVERSARY OF AUGUST 15, 1945

The surrender of Japan on August 15, 1945, is both a memorable day in history and continues to be an active day in the present. Every August 15, Yasukuni is visited by thousands of Japanese as well as domestic and international press as hordes of conservative interest groups flock to the shrine. Despite the increased police surveillance within Yasukuni, a blind eye tends to be turned toward the behavior of the conservatives. Within the main gate but before the actual shrine, a large tent is set up with organizations that have erected booths to register visitors, give out tea, sell souvenirs, and spread propaganda. For example, one booth run

by the “Nippon-Kaigi” promotes the protection of the history, culture, and tradition of Japan. They distribute videos of the movie “Pride” (featuring Hideki Tōjō) and descriptions of the Tokyo War Trials. On the streets surrounding the shrine, large black vans belonging to the right-wing extremist group Uyoku Dantai blast the anthem of Japan and circle the streets leading up to the front gate-structure, or Torii. Broadly speaking, the main goals of this particular conservative group include excluding foreigners and expanding Japan’s military. A Uyoku group member shot the mayor of Nagasaki in 1990 after he “publicly suggested that Japan take responsibility for WWII.”37 The Uyoku Dantai are not allowed to park their trucks or vans inside the shrine, and when entering the shrine on foot, groups cannot proceed in throngs of more than approximately 20 people.

Meanwhile, groups of bereaved families — families that have deceased members enshrined in Yasukuni — come in large tour buses organized by prefectural associations. Within the shrine itself, “coteries of old-soldiers donning new tailored uniforms of the Imperial Army and Navy,” practice in-step marching complete with bayonets, drawing crowds and press.38

Throughout the day, “Interspersed within these flows [of people] are a number of limousines that approach the side entrance to disgorge politicians visiting the shrine...The atmosphere here is a bit like a smooth running train station with shrine officials timing the arrival and conveyance of various groups and personages.”39 Once politicians are inside the shrine, photographers flock around them and their families. Nearby, the Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery for unknown soldiers holds a ceremony, and the famous Nippon Budōkan arena hosts the Prime Minister, the Emperor, and the Empress, who all give speeches to honor the military and civilian dead to a limited audience.

Materials with information about Japan’s Yasukuni Shrine are equitable to puzzle pieces, each holding a different theory and presenting unique evidence as to why prime ministers and other high-end officials make visits. Ideally, these pieces would fit together to create

36 “Mitama Matsuri,” CNNGo.com, n.d.
38 Tsur, Bremen, and Ben-Ari, Perspectives on social memory in Japan, 78.
39 Ibid., 81.
a comprehensive, complete explanation of the various motivations officials have. However, these puzzle pieces often do not fit together, presenting conflicting theories that often overlap each other while attempting to shed light on the same phenomena. The remaining sections analyze several qualitative hypotheses surrounding why prime ministers might have been and continue to be motivated to visit Yasukuni, and in some cases document the explicit reasons for previous visits. It is important to note that, while many of the texts offer both overlapping and conflicting hypotheses, it is, of course, possible for multiple motivations to exist together. These motivators are not mutually exclusive, and it is possible for a prime minister to have more than one reason for visiting Yasukuni.

**PROTECTING JAPAN’S HONOR & HISTORY**

Daiki Shibuchi in *The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan: Why All the Fuss?* states how important it is for Japan’s history to remain respectable. He notes, “Rightists also fear that an admission of guilt for past transgressions would turn their erstwhile fathers and brothers into war criminals.”

Masaru Tamamoto, in *A Land Without Patriots, The Yasukuni Controversy and Japanese Nationalism*, agrees that the Japanese people are afraid to apologize because it will render their war dead and war criminals in the wrong. Several other texts: Tsyosumi Hasegawa and Kazuhiro Togo’s *East Asia’s Haunted Present and Hyun Dae-song’s The Historical Perceptions of Korea and Japan* emphasize the importance of Japan remaining skeptical of the Tokyo War Tribunals. To accept the validity of the trials would be to accept their rulings and acknowledge that former prime ministers were in fact criminals of war, which is extremely difficult for many Japanese to accept, even today. Tamamoto also highlights the sustained doubt toward the correctness of the war tribunal: “Another issue laid bare by the Yasukuni controversy is that there is still no Japanese consensus on whether those condemned by the Americans as war criminals were indeed criminals — or was it victor’s justice?”

Although the act of prime ministers visiting the shrine that houses the spirits of said condemned war criminals on the symbolic August 15 is not necessarily a direct protest of the aforementioned condemnation, the act is definitely nowhere near the realm of an apology or any, even slight, admission of guilt. Although it becomes slightly muddier, it could additionally be posited that the act of not visiting translates to some, especially right-wing groups, as an acceptance of guilt.

**RESTORING PRE-OCCUPATION POLICIES AND PRACTICES**

Post-WWII, Japan was at the mercy of the United States and forced to adopt a new Constitution that emphasized peace (most notably in Article 9, which makes Japan promise to never again engage in acts of warfare). To date, not a word of the Constitution has been amended since its radical redrafting. Additionally included in the Constitution are Article 20 and Article 89, which mandate the separation of religion and state. This rendered Yasukuni as a private shrine separate from the government and technically making government-sponsored visits unconstitutional. In the case of the separation of Shinto and the state, Tamamoto makes an interesting point regarding visits to Yasukuni resembling an urge to return to the old ways before the Constitution was amended. Returning to a Japan and a Japanese government not yet reorganized and restricted by the post-war Constitution could represent a desire for the current government to return to the ways of the pre-Occupation government. He states: “Koizumi’s original choice to visit Yasukuni on August 15 was meant as a way to reconnect the prewar and postwar worlds. Connecting the two worlds may be the only way to finally clarify the issue of Japan’s responsibility.”

However, what is meant by “responsibility” is unclear — Koizumi, constantly shrouded in mystery, could be attempting to clarify that Japan’s war criminals were not responsible for their convictions, or he could conversely be silently acknowledging their responsibility. The absence of a direct interview with explicit answers from Koizumi remains problematic.

Cyril Powels in *Yasukuni Jinja Hoan: Religion and Politics in Contemporary Japan* additionally supports the view of visits to Yasukuni attempting to reestablish the union of religion and politics pre-1945. Her analysis is history-heavy, looking at the historical importance of the Emperor and the Imperial Family. With the implied return to the union of religion and politics would come more authority to the Imperial Family. The Imperial

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Family’s divinity was called into question after the surrender of WWII, and their influence has significantly decreased. Powels states: “The attempts to reestablish it [Yasukuni Shrine] go hand in hand with plans for increased rearmament and a return to an authoritarian society.”  

**RESPECT FOR WAR DEAD**

Although the most literal reason for visiting Yasukuni — to pay respects to the souls of the dead — it is this explanation that receives the most flak. Shibuichi examines Koizumi’s multiple visits in detail and notes that Koizumi has consistently maintained the same explanation: “I wish to express gratitude and respect to the war dead. The peace and prosperity of postwar Japan is based on their self-sacrifice.” Shibuichi’s article concludes with the examination of several potential alternatives to Yasukuni that have been discussed, such as a separate facility without the Class A war criminals or the possibility of “de-shrining” the criminals entirely. However, “Koizumi has announced that he would continue his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine even if the government built an alternative facility.”

This statement could either significantly reinforce Koizumi’s desire to pay his respects to the spirits of the dead as one whole spirit, or highlight that he is paying special attention to the war criminals. A consistent problem that all aforementioned books and articles share is that Koizumi has yet to explicitly provide a clear explanation as to his motivations, causing the factors motivating one of the most infamous series of visits by a prime minister to simply be speculated.

As a side note, Takahashi Tetsuya in his chapter “Yasukuni Shrine: A Controversial Historical Issue Involving Japan and Korea” appearing in The Historical Perceptions of Korea and Japan by Hyun Dae-song states that it is not possible to separate any souls individually from the 2.46 million that are “enshrined as one.” Furthermore, he points out that the “doctrine of Shintoism requires that a spirit once enshrined be enshrined forever.” Thus, even if the government wanted to propose a separate facility, it is likely that more controversy would erupt concerning the aforementioned problems with siphoning off the select spirits of the 14 Class A war criminals or even trying to remove them from the shrine completely.

Tamamotowrites that “There is no reason to doubt his [Koizumi’s] sincerity…” although he then delves into explaining why Koizumi preaches appreciation for peace while visiting war museums (Koizumi frequented a museum for kamikaze pilots prior to becoming Prime Minister). He maintains, however, that “Koizumi is a sentimental who is touched by the pain of his people.” Tamamoto, although a Japanese author, has written several pieces highly critical of Japan, such as his article “Will Japan Ever Grow Up?” which appeared in the July/August 2009 Far Eastern Economic Review. He adds, “Unfortunately, he [Koizumi] has yet to adequately experience the pain of other Asians.”

**WARDING OFF VENGEFUL SPIRITS**

As the article’s name might hint, Klaus Antoni discusses the motivation of prime ministers to visit the shrine through the lens of quelling the angry sentiments of the deceased in “Yasukuni-Jinja and Folk Religion: The Problem of Vengeful Spirits.” Many shrines in Japan are built with the sole purpose of consoling the spirit of the potentially vengeful dead. The Kitano Tenmangu Shrine in Kyoto was built after it was thought that Michizane, a scholar who was exiled to the southern islands of Kyushu, was believed to be wreaking havoc from beyond the grave. Antoni’s article discusses in detail the Japanese belief that spirits that die with a grudge become vengeful. In Asia, two kinds of spirits are feared the most: mothers who die during childbirth and fallen warriors. Antoni goes on to explain the importance of enshrining those who have become “wandering spirit[s]” by dying young or unmarried, which is often the case with Japanese soldiers. It is feared in Japan that these souls have suffered a “bad” death. He discusses the family perception of spirits and the fear of having individual spirits returning to their households. With the “family spirit of the nation as described by Antoni as existing.

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46 Ibid., 34-35.
47 Ibid., 35.
in Japan, the potential return of vengeful spirits thus becomes a national issue: "In this view the country is protected from instead of being protected by the spirits of the fallen warriors." This view is an added layer of motivation to Koizumi, for example, who has stated that he is there to respect the war dead. As outlined by Angtoni, perhaps prime ministers are additionally taking precautionary measures in the supernatural sense when visiting Yasukuni.

The film "Spirits of the State: Japan’s Yasukuni Shrine" by the Japan Foundation, Northeast Asia Council, additionally focuses on the deterrence of vengeful spirits as a motivation for visiting Yasukuni. The film states that the dead are "believed capable of intervening in the world of the living," and that "Military dead, those vibrant young men and women cut down in the prime, are highly volatile and unstable entities...Many believe these spirits, which are confused, lost, or neglected on some distant battlefield, might seek retribution from the nation..." It is important to note that it is believed spirits would seek domestic retribution rather than revenge from those that killed them, focusing the responsibility of quelling their spirits solely to Yasukuni. The film then states that Yasukuni pacifies these spirits, "and thus keeps the nation secure," interpreting prime ministers paying their respects as a sort of national security against an intangible potential enemy.

RECRUITING TROOPS/MINDSET FOR THE FUTURE

Tetsuya Takahashi in his chapter "The national politics of the Yasukuni Shrine" in Naoko Shimazu’s book Nationalisms in Japan makes the focal point of his chapter a new motivation entirely for prime ministers to visit Yasukuni:

This is clearly a political act at the level of national politics with a view to making Japan once again a 'state capable of prosecuting wars.' It is to show the people that when new war deaths among the SDF (or a reconstituted Japanese army) occur, these deaths will be praised as 'precious sacrifice for the nation' and the country's top political leaders will express their 'gratitude and respect.'

Takahashi has been the motivation of Koizumi visiting the shrine as a sort of future insurance policy, guaranteeing that if people continue to fight and die for Japan, government officials will continue to appreciate their duties and potential ultimate sacrifices. Although Article 9 prevents Japan from even having an established military, some Self Defense Force troops have been deployed to Iraq (the first deployment of troops since WWII) and there is increasing talk of constitutional revision. By continuing to visit Yasukuni, Takahashi indicates that the militaristic spirit of Japan is kept alive and that people, if summoned in the future, will not hesitate to fight on behalf of their country knowing that they are appreciated and will additionally be appreciated in death. He states: "While accepting the inevitability of death in war, if political leaders do not acknowledge death as 'precious' or express 'thanks and respect' in public, the state will ultimately be unable to mobilize the people for war." It is important to maintain gratitude in order to keep the mentality of the glorification of death afloat. Takahashi additionally quotes Prime Minister Nakasone in 2003: "...if we do not extend our gratitude to the fallen, who is going to give their life for the nation?"

Similar to an insurance policy, Takahashi notes that visits to Yasukuni can be further interpreted as a method of increasing national security. The ease of mobilizing troops in the future if need be is increased if the glorification of death is kept alive: "The cultivation of this spirit became vital for the defense of the country, and as a result, the highest honour needed to be given to the war dead so that 'people would never fail to feel a sense of happiness about falling on the battlefield.' In other words, it was necessary to make people feel happy to die in battle." Not only are the visits to motivate the spirits of the soldiers themselves, but for the families as well. Takahashi makes note of the very people for whom many of the protest groups (for and against Yasukuni) are named: the bereaved families. In what Takahashi calls "akin to an alchemist's trick,"

[54] Ibid., 170.
[55] Ibid., 171.
leaders attempt to appease as much to the remaining relatives of the deceased soldiers as the deceased ones themselves: “If his Imperial Majesty himself leads a special ceremony, the dead will appreciate the grace of heaven from their graves, and the bereaved relatives will cry in honour, find joy in the deaths of their fathers and brothers, and the people will be willing to die for their nation when demanded.” Takahashi concentrates largely on interviews with mothers of deceased sons expressing their extreme gratitude for Yasukuni and how the Emperor inspired them to continue to make future sacrifices for Japan. Takahashi additionally introduces the “Yasukuni Doctrine”, which is the creation of a “national spirit” that supports war and replaces the feeling of loss with happiness in dying for one’s country. An added motivation for prime ministers or members of the Imperial Family to visit Yasukuni is thus to enforce the Yasukuni Doctrine. Tetsuya additionally emphasizes the importance of ceremony at Yasukuni in “Yasukuni Shrine: A Controversial Historical Issue Involving Japan and Korea” when he states: “Looking on at such a solemn ceremony for fallen heroes, other Japanese also renewed their resolve to sacrifice themselves for the Emperor and the motherland as loyal subjects of the Emperor.”

FITTING THE PIECES TOGETHER

Despite the high number of potential motivators behind visiting Yasukuni Jinja, the overlapping of some combination of literature on nearly all of the points made is evidence toward portions of them potentially being correct or at least worth pursuing in further research. For example, Tamamot, Takahashi, and the film on Yasukuni all mention the equivalence of Yasukuni to Arlington National Cemetery (with Tamamot comparing how Japanese prime ministers can visit Arlington but no American president would visit Yasukuni, and Takahashi quoting Nakasone in saying that Japanese should be able to visit Yasukuni similar to how Americans visit Arlington), evidencing that this is a widely believed comparison that could warrant future analysis.

As with all groupings, there are always factoids or miscellaneous bits of data supporting reasoning for a visit that simply do not fit into any one hypothesis. Akihiko Tanaka’s chapter “The Yasukuni Issue and Japan’s International Relations” in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiro Togo’s book East Asia’s Haunted Present, Historic Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism mentions how Koizumi rounded off his term with a visit to Yasukuni on August 15, 2006. Five years after the date he had previously scheduled and subsequently rescheduled to August 13 (following international and domestic pressure), “...Koizumi said that he decided to visit the shrine on this day because no matter how he changed the dates or styles of visit, he was criticized in any case.”

When analyzing the motivations for prime ministers to visit a shrine whose translation means “Peaceful Country” or “Shrine of the Peaceful Land,” despite the Class A war criminals charged with “crimes against the peace” that were enshrined there, the relevance of the visits (aside from the pure irony) repeatedly resurfaces. In all of these articles, more details about the international aftermath and reaction — especially that of East Asian countries — of these visits reaffirms the relevance of this dilemma and of this thesis. Powls additionally notes that the importance of Yasukuni has only increased as the years have gone by and as more and more war dead have been enshrined over the years (with the largest number coming from WWII).

In its full form, this thesis contained three additional quantitative analysis sections testing theories surrounding whether or not historical visits (there have been 67 to date) were tied to: 1) personal and/or family member association to the war, 2) political party percentages in Japan’s Diet at the time of each respective visit, and 3) the state of international relations with the United States, Japan, and the Koreas at the time of visit measured by data drawn from the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB). The results of the quantitative analysis revealed that prime ministers with certain personal and/or family association(s) to the war were more likely to visit than those who did not possess those associations, a weak relationship between political

56 Ibid., 171.
57 Ibid., 175.

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party percentages in the Diet, and evidence against the significance of the status of foreign relations in the aforementioned countries as having a relationship to the prime ministers’ motivations to visit the shrine.

It is important to note that, so far, not one text examined could be cited under every hypothesis subheading; a statement that holds true for both the qualitative and quantitative portions of this thesis in full. Authors argue a wide array of potential motivators that sometimes overlap, but in many cases do not. There appears to be no clear-cut, one-size-fits-all answer as to why prime ministers on the whole visit Yasukuni derived from these hypotheses. However, with every new prime minister that takes office (which, in Japan’s recent case, is a frequent occurrence), the available data increases — in time, it may become clearer if a certain aforementioned hypothesis provides explanations for more prime ministers going to Yasukuni than others.

CONCLUSION
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certainly, this is an important area that has not received overwhelming study and definitely has room for more. What additionally makes this question unique is its refusal to go away or to be fully answered — with each new prime minister, Japan, China, South Korea, and the United States will continue to question whether or not he or she will choose to go to Yasukuni shrine, and, if so, when. Even if a solid, testable motivation is found for past prime ministers visiting Yasukuni, there is no way of telling if subsequent prime ministers or government officials will share that same motivation in the future.

Prime ministers visiting Yasukuni remains an active issue, and between the actual visits made on sensitive days such as August 15 are years and terms where prime ministers have not had opportunities to visit on that date, resulting in an interesting subset of prime ministers who might have visited Yasukuni given the opportunity or the overlap. Prime Ministers Uno Sōsuke, Hata Tsutomu, and Hatoyama Yukio did not have terms that overlapped August 15. They may have had the motivation to visit Yasukuni on that date, but never received the chance to do so in an official capacity, leaving untested, unobservable motivations that are impossible to measure. It is unclear how many prime ministers have had the motivation to visit in the past but have not done so, and conversely who will possess the motivation in the future and ultimately elect to do so. Nevertheless, as made clear by Prime Minister Abe’s December 2013 visit — the first by a prime minister in office in over seven years — it is apparent that this domestic and international issue is not going away anytime soon.
SJEAA
KOREA
INTRODUCTION

Nationalism is central to understanding the modern nation-state. Broadly speaking, it describes two distinct phenomena: "the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity, and the actions that the members of a national take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) self-determination." In this paper we describe both phenomena in South Korea over the last four years. Using literature on South Korean nationalism, the latest public opinion data, and conservative and progressive discourses, we locate and sketch a primer to a new nationalism taking shape in the Republic of Korea. Overall, we find that the new nationalism in South Korea is a natural outgrowth of the country's material development and newfound confidence. In times past, national identity and political attitudes suggested a divide between the South Korea state and the South Korean nation—a divide reinforced by pan-Korean ethnonationalism—recent data suggests variation in both measures reflective of a new nationalism that mends the nation-state divide.

A NEW NATIONALISM ON THE HORIZON

Many South Koreans are now coming to terms with the fact that they are both citizens of a "strong and prosperous country." It is a slogan more commonly depicted in bold type on North Korean propaganda banners or proclaimed in speeches by Kim Jong-il as kangseong taeguk ("strong and prosperous great power;" 강성태극) yet South Korea is also fond of a development slogan with a nationalistic hue: buguk gangbyeong ("rich country, powerful army;" 부국강병)

reads the South Korean variant. The translation may be different, but the point is the same: building a militarily strong and economically prosperous country for the purpose of protecting national sovereignty. A modernized military, with a strong backbone in the US security guarantee, protects South Korea from conventional military threats and macroeconomic indicators (GDP, trade volume, etc.) show that South Korea has achieved economic preeminence through its Export Oriented-Industrialization strategy. Though revealing of Korea’s material strength, these indicators speak of no more than macro-level developments. The opinions of conservative elites, the progressive press, and the "gusts of popular feeling" indicate something more: a nascent but burgeoning new nationalism. Koreans have begun to view themselves and their country in a way that reflects political, social, and economic realities. These realities are based on the country’s modern accomplishments and a formidable development experience that has fostered a newfound level of confidence. Those expressing a new nationalism in South Korea are both ordinary people and the elites and, with the exception of nuclear weapons, show signs of crossing South Korea’s rigid political divide. Korea’s new nationalism views the state of South Korea with an increasing level of confidence, sees North Korea as

2 A crude measurement of its economic success is shown by South Korea’s GDP per capita, which was recorded at $22,590 in 2012. See the World Bank data for GDP per capita (current US$) reported at Google’s Public Data: https://www.google.com/publicdata/directory. For a concise historical overview of South Korea’s economic success story, see: Marcus Noland, “The Backwater That Boomed,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2014).


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solution to concerns related to the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella and the existential threat posed by North Korea. Most importantly, in an era of strength and prosperity, what better way to help solve the century-old issue of sovereignty than to acquire the world’s most powerful deterrent? Indeed, following the most recent North Korean nuclear test, a hard-right conservative pundit and former editor of Chosun Monthly, Cho Gab-je, published an article entitled “Why the Nuclear Arming of South Korea is Possible.”

In the article, he provided 10 reasons why South Korea can and should go nuclear, including some to explain why the US either cannot or will not stop it from doing so. Cho’s perspective is still an outlier, but the general population, including young South Koreans, supports a shift towards more assertive, traditionally conservative policies. According to an Asan Institute of Policy Studies report on public opinion immediately following the 3rd North Korean nuclear test on February 12, 2013, “66% of the South Korea public supported a domestic nuclear weapons program,” which was a “10pp increase from 2010.” Most notably, nearly 50 percent of the 20s cohort supported the same move. The trend amongst young South Koreans, especially regarding issues of national security (ergo national prestige), shows that “the young think like the old.” The report states:

One of the most consistent findings of Asan surveys is that Koreans in their 20s identify themselves as “national security conservatives,” and often correlate very closely with those in their 60s and older on issues related to North Korea. The same seems to have applied in this case, as 72% of those 60 or older reported feeling threatened by the most recent test (the highest), while 64% of those in their 20s reported the same (second highest).

The authors have been following this shift in opinion amongst young Koreans for some time. In a 2012 discussion between the authors, Karl Friedhoff had the following to say about the way younger South Koreans feel about modern Korea:

“A strong Korea” means an “independent Korea”... This is especially true for people in their 20s. For this age group, they know no other strong regional power in the way their parents and grandparents did, other than Korea itself. Growing up in the age of Japan’s lost decade, the concept of a strong Japan is lost on them, and China, though certainly an economic power, is not perceived to be as industrially and technologically advanced as Korea. Their perception of what Korea is and represents is much different from that of previous generations. Events like the 2002 World Cup, wherein the Koreans had a strong showing, are some of the earliest memories for younger Koreans. They have this new perception, which is reshaping the way Koreans view themselves and, as such, is redefining Korean identity.... For the youngest generation in Korea, it is taken for granted that Korea is a strong and prosperous nation.

In other words, the strong and prosperous South Korea is starting to think of itself as such.

THE PROGRESSIVE POSITION IN AN ERA OF STRENGTH AND PROSPERITY

Thus far, outside of the general population only the conservative view has been analyzed. In a country as polarized as South Korea, it may seem counterintuitive at first but progressives find a lot of common ground with conservatives. Both sides of the political aisle support a militarily strong and economically prosperous South Korea. There are, however, some significant differences. Using the “nuclear issue” (but not related to North Korea) as a wedge issue again, the progressive position can be summarized as follows: continue developing nuclear energy, but hold off on the nukes. In other words, and following the theme of a “new nationalism” in South Korea founded upon a “strong and prosperous country,” progressives want a nuclear-powered, but nuclear weapons-free Korea. This position is confirmed by one of the left’s political mediums: the...
Hankyoreh.\textsuperscript{20} The title to an April 3 English-language op-ed reads: “South Korea should reduce, not expand, reliance on nuclear power.”\textsuperscript{21}

The article starts off by lamenting the fact that if the Agreement for Cooperation Concerning the Civil Use of Atomic Energy—the 123 Agreement—with the US expires without being amended (to allow Korea to reprocess spent fuel), then “South Korea will have trouble securing a stable supply of nuclear fuel and its nuclear power exports could be damaged,” a situation the Hankyoreh, ergo progressives, certainly wants the Korean government to avoid. It then goes on to list the accomplishments of Korea’s indigenous nuclear energy program, saying:

...the current agreement has failed to reflect the changing times and developing technologies. Back when it was originally signed in 1974, South Korea was building its very first commercial reactor at Kori. Now, we rank fifth in the world for nuclear power, with 23 reactors up and running. We are also trying hard to export our reactor models to countries around the world, following a landmark deal with the United Arab Emirates. The government plans to bring the number of reactors up to 34 by 2024.

Only in the second to last line of the last paragraph is it mentioned, in a rather perfunctory way, that “Obviously, the best course of action is to abandon nuclear power as an energy source.” Though it does warn against an overflow of spent fuel and the distraction that nuclear weapons-supporting conservatives are to

\textsuperscript{22} This position can be easily ascertained through a guided reading of print (and digital) media. Media to Korea what political parties are to America. To get a sense of what the Korean right thinks on an issue, it is best to read the Dong-a Ilbo, the Joongang Ilbo, and Chosun Ilbo (and follow Chosun media more generally); the Hankyoreh and the Kyunghyang Shinmun are good sources to get a sense of the progressive/liberal position on any given issue.

\textsuperscript{23} This title, however, is somewhat misleading (though not entirely inaccurate). The title to the Korean version (published on April 2), reads: “The Korean-US Atomic Energy Agreement and the debate to arm Korea with nuclear weapons” does more harm than good.” See: 한·미 원자력협정, ‘핵무장론’은 펌페무 인이다.” 한국일보, April 3, 2013, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/580888.html.

The actual content (identical in both versions) is more in-line with the title of the Korean version. See the English version at: http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/581072.html.

finding a solution, the Hankyoreh does not—nor is it likely to in the future—oppose Korea’s continued use (and development) of nuclear energy as a source of power.

In fact, according to a forthcoming book on nuclear power in Korea, progressives strongly support the use of nuclear energy. Dr. Kim Jiyoon, reporting on attitudes towards nuclear power by ideological position and party affiliation, finds the assumption that conservatives are more supportive than progressives technically true, but “largely insignificant.”

It is generally reported that it is progressives who are opposed to nuclear energy. Indeed, that tendency is detected in the Korean case as well—conservatives (80.0%) are more likely than liberals [progressives] (70.9%) to support nuclear energy. However, 70.9% is still a clear-cut majority making the difference between conservatives and liberals largely insignificant. Partisan affiliation was also not much of a divider. While 84.5% of supporters of the conservative Saenuri Party approved of nuclear energy, 73.8% of supporters of the Democratic United Party (DUP)—the major opposition liberal party of Korea—agreed.\textsuperscript{22}

Although the use of and support for nuclear energy is not a sufficient condition for being considered a prosperous country, it is certainly a necessary condition. Poor and underdeveloped countries lack the necessary capital and infrastructure. Of course, populations in highly advanced countries may actually oppose the use of nuclear energy, South Korea, as member of a still new member to the league of advanced countries, seem to be highly impressed by this feat and, consequentially, support the use of nuclear power. As such, it can be said that this broad support is an analogous measure of a new nationalism.

Thus, the difference between progressives and conservatives on the issue of nuclear power is not whether to use it—but whether to make bombs with it. Though progressives (and many conservatives for that matter) may oppose the development of nuclear weapons, they do not oppose a nuclear powered strong and prosperous Korea. As the Hankyoreh argues, it is a matter of (nuclear) waste and “toilet upgrading.”

The biggest issue South Korea faces when it comes

\textsuperscript{22} Kim Jiyoon, “Public Opinions on Nuclear Power in Korea,” in Korea’s Nuclear Future (Seoul: Asan Institute). (forthcoming) Quoted with permission.
to nuclear power: how to upgrade from a conventional house without indoor plumbing to one with a modern plumbing system that can get rid of stored up waste. 

CONCLUSION

The political, social, and economic changes are now beginning to bring about a new mode of thinking in South Korea. Though it does not receive as much attention as other characteristics, there is a new nationalism in contemporary South Korea. Its emergence has been precipitated by Korea’s remarkable—and remarkably fast—development. North Korea may portend to be a “strong and prosperous” country, but it is South Korea who has attained this status. Korea’s development has also precipitated a change in attitudes amongst ordinary people and elites. Whereas the Republic of Korea has suffered legitimacy issues, due mainly from a being a divided nation, a general shift appears to be in motion. It is hard to go so far as to say that Korea is the “trusted state,” but it is clear that so far as North-South relations are concerned, it is the government in Seoul who rightfully carries the mantle of legitimate government. As data suggests, even those in their 20s, usually the most distrustful of the South Korean state, historically speaking, now see North Korea more as a threat than as a legitimacy-bearing entity. What is more, ethno-nationalism in South Korea, a phenomenon that has kept up the illusion of North and South Korea as one nation, is facing in the post-development era. In response to the threat posed by North Korea, a cohort of stalwart conservatives have gone public with their call for South Korean to re-arm itself with nuclear weapons. Some conservatives and many more progressives may disagree, but an overwhelming majority of the progressive camp still supports a strong and prosperous South Korea powered by nuclear energy. Welcome to the new South Korea.

APPENDIX

Survey Methodology

Annual Survey 2010: The Asan Annual Survey 2010 was conducted from August 16 to September 17, 2010 by Media Research. The sample size was 2,000 and it was a Mixed-Mode survey employing RDD for mobile phones and an online survey. The margin of error is ±2.2% at the 95% confidence level.

Annual Survey 2011: The Asan Annual Survey 2011 was conducted from August 26 to October 4, 2011 by EmBrain. The sample size was 2,000 and it was a Mixed-Mode survey employing RDD for mobile and landline telephones. The margin of error is ±2.2% at the 95% confidence level.

Annual Survey 2012: The Asan Annual Survey 2012 was conducted in two parts. The sample was recruited from September 5-14, 2012 via RDD for mobile and landline telephones. The data was gathered from September 25 – November 1, 2012 via an online survey. The sample size was 1,500 and the margin of error is ±2.5% at the 95% confidence level. The survey was conducted by Media Research.

Annual Survey 2013: The Asan Annual Survey 2013 was conducted in two parts. The sample was recruited from September 4-13, 2014 via RDD for mobile and landline telephones. The data was gathered from September 5-27, 2014 via an online survey. The sample size was 1,500 and the margin of error is ±2.5% at the 95% confidence level. The survey was conducted by Media Research.
WORK CITED


Public Opinions on Nuclear Power in Korea.” in Korea’s Nuclear Future (Seoul: Asan Institute). (forthcoming)


“South Korea: The Unloved Republic,” speech at the Asia Society: Korea, September 14, 2010.


STEVEN DENNEY AND KARL FRIEDHOFF

Steven Denney is currently a first year doctoral student at University of Toronto. Karl Friedhoff holds a BA in Political Science at Wittenberg University and a MA in International Commerce at Seoul National University.
This paper explores the conflict between Presbyterian missionaries in Korea and the Japanese colonial state regarding Shinto shrine worship. Using missionary writings from the early years of the conflict (1935-1936), I examine the extent to which compromise with the government was possible, missionaries' anxieties during the conflict, as well as the stakes underlying debates on the nature of State Shinto. Presbyterian missionaries’ opposition to shrine worship transcended a simple struggle for religious liberty. They challenged the state’s exclusive claim to determine what constituted the religious and the secular, asserting their own voice and right to participate in delineating the bounds separating the two spheres.

INTRODUCTION

During the 1930s, state shrines formed a central part of Japan’s efforts to inculcate patriotism and loyalty among its colonial subjects. According to official dictate, State Shinto was purely secular, not religious, and shrine rituals demonstrated respect for the emperor, the imperial ancestors, and the nation’s fallen soldiers. Some Christians in Korea, however, perceived traces of religion in shrine ceremonies and made conscientious objections. This disagreement flared into a heated conflict in 1935, when American Presbyterian missionaries George McCune, the president of Union Christian College, and Velma L. Snook, the principal of Sungsil Girl’s High School, refused to attend the Heijō shrine in Pyōngyang. McCune’s continued non-compliance prompted closure of many mission schools and the widespread arrest of like-minded Korean Christians. Scholars have offered various interpretations of the meaning of the controversy. While English-language analyses are limited, they have shed light on the experiences of Korean Christians, differing denominational stances, or the naiveté of the Presbyterian missionaries’ stubborn resistance. This paper specifically examines the Presbyterian missionaries’ early writings on the conflict (1935-1936). This brief period saw the liveliest debate among missionaries themselves, as well as the boldest contestation with the colonial state. Presbyterian missionaries’ writings reveal that their opposition to shrine worship transcended a simple struggle for religious liberty. They also challenged the state’s exclusive claim to determine what constituted the religious and the secular, asserting their own voice and right to participate in delineating the bounds separating the two spheres.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

Many scholars situate the conflict over the Heijō shrine in the context of the colonial state’s wartime mobilization policies (1937-1945). Historian Wan-yao Chou, for instance, views the controversy as part and parcel of the state’s imperialization movement (kōminka). The demands of war called for an intensification of earlier assimilation policies and the spiritual transformation of colonial subjects into Japanese. This vision translated into various projects: promoting the Japanese language, compelling Koreans to adopt Japanese names, military recruitment, and of greatest interest to this discussion, religious reform. The state targeted Christianity because it represented “Korea’s most active and influential religion.” In other words, Christianity was a stubbornly unassimilated entity that posed an obstacle to kōminka aims. The state quashed resistance to its policies, arresting over two hundred Christians, more than fifty of whom died in jail. For Chou, the shrine controversy serves to highlight the increasingly repressive policies the colonial government pursued during the wartime mobilization period.


3 Ibid., 46.

4 Ibid., 47.
Some scholars, however, contextualize the shrine controversy within a much longer trajectory of church-state relations in the colonial period. Both church historian Jai-Keun Choi and anthropologist James Grayson view the story of the Korean Church as one of “[t]ragedy, suffering, and crisis.” Unlike Chou, Choi and Grayson see the beginning of church-state conflict in 1910, the annexation of Korea. The Church was not simply unassimilated, it was “enthusiastically nationalistic” from the start, “perhaps more so than in any other country.” The colonial authorities in turn viewed it “as the one organized body which might oppose their rule.” According to Choi and Grayson, the targeted arrest and torture of Korean Christians in the 1911 Conspiracy Case, wholesale slaughter of Christians during the 1919 March First Movement, and the forcible shrine worship together construct a narrative of systematic persecution. The shrine question in particular became the “climax” of the struggles, as it “was an offense both nationally and theologically” in the eyes of Korean Christians. In Choi and Grayson’s analyses, national and religious struggle were often inextricably bound together.

While these accounts provide useful historical contextualization of the shrine controversy, they also have limitations. In particular, the three authors draw too heavily from a nationalist paradigm. According to sociologist Gi-Wook Shin and historian Michael Robinson, nationalist histories present a “simplistic Korea-Japan binary” that “obscure a rich and pluralistic discourse on representation of the political community during the colonial period.” Indeed, the three authors suggest that genuine Korean Christians resided, and those who did acquiesce to government dictate, did so only under duress, merely paying “lip services” to the emperor. While it is true many Korean Christians opposed participation at state shrines out of contentious reservations, these portrayals also silence the diversity of voices within the Christian community.

They overlook those who found ways to negotiate compromises without abandoning their religious convictions and silences the stories of foreign missionaries, another Christian group who had an important stake in the controversy.

Sociologist Sung-Gun Kim moves beyond the framework of nationalism and colonial repression to examine instead the diversity of perspectives within the Christian community in Korea. His central concern lies in the factors that produced differing responses to Shinto shrines along denominational lines, leading Catholics and Methodists to acquiesce and Presbyterians to steadfastly resist. Kim argues that this disparity arises from three factors: theological orientation, mission policy, and church structure. Because Methodists had a comparatively liberal theology and a hierarchical organization, missionaries were able to accept the state’s claims regarding State Shinto’s secular nature and enforce participation at shrines. And while Roman Catholic theology was not necessarily liberal, Catholic missionaries avoided conflicts with the colonial state, recalling the harsh repression of Korean Catholics during the late Chosón period. They acted upon “the defensiveness and the reflexes of a persecuted minority” and followed the 1936 papal permission to participate.

Kim writes that Presbyterians, on the other hand, were very theologically conservative and refused any compromise on moral grounds. Moreover, even when colonial authorities ultimately coerced the Presbyterian General Assembly to approve of shrine participation, the denomination’s democratic governance structure hindered enforcement of the policy at lower levels.

Historian Donald Clark presents a brief but nuanced discussion of missionary views of the shrine controversy. Clark begins his analysis by first recognizing the importance of the Korean Christians’ experiences. He acknowledges that the conflict “was not about missionaries,” considering the government dictate did not apply to all missionaries, but only those who acted as educators and school officials. Nonetheless, he focuses his attention on American missionaries, shedding light

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6 Ibid.
8 Choi, 97.
9 Grayson.
11 Chou, 48.
13 Ibid., 511.
14 Ibid., 518.
15 Donald N. Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience 1900-1950 (Norwalk: Eastbridge, 2003), 210-211.
not only on the multiplicity of denominational responses, but also on dissenting views among Presbyterians themselves. For instance, Horace H. Underwood, the son of pioneering Presbyterian missionaries Horace G. Underwood and Lillias Underwood, lobbied hard to convince other Presbyterian missionaries to strike a compromise with colonial authorities. Clark writes that Underwood “was willing to 'render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.'”16 There was a degree of fluidity in interpreting religious meaning and biblical dictate even among the comparatively conservative Presbyterians.

A. Hamish Ion, a prolific historian of Western missionaries in Japan, provides perhaps the most in-depth treatment of the missionaries’ experiences of the conflict. Ion places the shrine controversy within the context of the historical tensions between the Japanese state, which had an interest in religious control, and those who demanded greater religious liberty. He thus gives a broad overview of the creation of the Meiji Constitution, the response of Japanese Christians to State Shinto, as well as a comparative analysis of the enforcement of shrine participation in Taiwan and Korea. And through his main focus on Canadian missionaries, he also sheds light on the ways in which responses to Shinto shrines varied by nationality. With regard to missionaries in Korea, Ion’s conclusions share some similarities with that of Clark. He suggests that American Presbyterian missionaries should have taken a more conciliatory approach to secure a better outcome for the Christian community in Korea. In his view, McCune fundamentally misjudged the political climate taking an oppositional stance, failing to realize that he fought a losing battle. The government was not willing to compromise, and Korean Christians would ultimately pay the human cost for his miscalculation.17 In fact, Ion’s account is even more critical of the Presbyterian missionaries than that of Clark, questioning the ethical implications of McCune’s non-compliance.

Kim, Clark, and Ion offer useful interventions to the dominant paradigm of nationalism, but their analyses also raise questions. Kim is right to be sensitive to differences among denominations, but the categories he employs are essentializing. Not only does he assume that beliefs are uniform and static within denominations, but his analysis of denominational polity structure presents a rather monolithic portrayal of missionary organizations. He does not account for the ways in which missionaries on the ground often disagreed with missionary boards in America and pursued their own interests. Clark’s examination of Horace H. Underwood’s dissenting views offers a corrective to Kim’s approach, but he could have pushed his analysis further. Clark and Ion both argue that other Presbyterian missionaries took unnecessarily hardline positions vis-à-vis colonial authorities. But to what extent was compromise even possible? Does the probability for success determine the legitimacy of resistance or protest? What kind of anxieties plagued missionaries during the controversy, and what were the stakes underlying the debates? To address these questions, we must turn to the missionaries’ own writings of the conflict.

**MISSIONARY VOICES**

Presbyterian missionaries wrote prolifically on the topic of Shinto shrines. Archived in the Presbyterian Historical Society are excerpts of scholarly writings, official briefings, minutes of missionaries’ meetings, personal letters, copies of government statements, as well as correspondences with colonial officials that missionaries relayed to the Board of Foreign Missions.18 On the most basic level, the writings served a bureaucratic function of keeping denomination leaders informed of affairs on the mission field. Missionaries gave regular updates on changes and occasionally sought advice on how to proceed. Missionaries’ documentation, however, played another role as well. The varied writings created a communicative space in which missionaries could make sense of their experiences, formulate their views, and express their anxieties.

One of the central concerns of missionary writings was to determine the nature of Shinto shrine ceremonies. Missionaries were particularly troubled by the inconsistencies they saw in the avowedly secular practices. George McCune critiqued that far from simple commemoration of fallen soldiers, “the ceremonies of preparing food, calling back the spirits, bowing before them, sending them back after a short sojourn

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16 Ibid., 216.
18 The Presbyterian Historical Society, located in Philadelphia, is the national archives for the Presbyterian Church, preserving denominational records, records of clergy, as well as documents related to its overseas missionary work.
in the temple-like tablet prepared for them, the prayers that are said...are religious.” J.G. Holdecroft made especial note of the character of specific Shinto prayers when commenting on the official annual schedule of the Chōn'ju State Shrine ceremonies. There were prayers for good harvest, the “safety of the country,” the “longevity of the Emperor,” and most alarming to Holdecroft, the “purification for sins committed unwittingly by all under heaven.” In the missionaries’ perspective, these discrepancies could not be attributed to an incomplete understanding of Shintoism. They quoted existing scholarly works confirming their views, excerpting D.C. Holtom’s The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto: A Study of the State Religion and Katō Genchi’s A Study of the History of Religious Development in Shinto. Considering Katō’s renown as one of the leading Japanese scholars of religion at the time, his conclusion that “institutional Shinto, in whatever form, is genuine religion” held great weight for missionaries already inclined to see religious elements in shrine worship.

Colonial officials’ own mixed messages compounded these discrepancies. Unlike government schools, Christian schools for the most part had not been required to participate at shrines until 1935. In fact, one missionary characterizes previous government policy as “very considerate and lenient.” When Christian students did attend shrine rituals, accommodations were often made so that they did not have to bow at shrines or participate “until the spirits had been dismissed and the ceremony over when as they left the grounds they were asked to bow to the presiding official and to the families of the bereaved soldiers.” Moreover, local colonial functionaries themselves were

loath to discuss the shrines’ metaphysical qualities. Some Japanese reluctantly acknowledged the presence of spirits, another “private[ly]... recognized the fact that there were religious elements present,” and one Korean secretary apparently claimed that participants at shrine ceremonies did “[e]xactly what...Christians do” at Sunday service, “sing[ing] a hymn, offer[ing] a prayer and makin[g] a statement to God.” These anecdotal accounts reveal that for missionaries, the government’s sudden policy change served more to signal the growing militarism of the state than demonstrate a genuine belief in the secular nature of state shrines.

The perceived religious elements offended missionaries who considered them idolatrous and antithetical to Christian beliefs. The most central tenet of Abrahamic faiths ismonotheism. George McCune explains in his petition to the Government-General, “Christians worship one God only, and are forbidden to worship other gods.” He quotes scripture that states, “’Thou shalt have no other gods before me,’” “’Thou shalt fear Jehovah thy God; and Him shalt thou serve,’” and “’Ye shall not fear other gods, no bow yourselves to them, nor serve them, nor sacrifice to them.’” Idolatry was a “clear-cut issue.” As another missionary declared, “no Christian” can “worship... other gods” without “being a traitor to our Lord and Savior.”

Maintaining an unadulterated devotion to God was constitutive of missionaries’ very identity and concerned the “eternal destinies of many.”

To underscore their religious reservations to State Shinto, missionaries disavowed any political motivations for their stance. In correspondences with colonial officials, missionaries gave frequent assurances of their whole-hearted support for the state’s campaign to inculcate patriotism among Koreans for the Japanese empire. Writing to the governor of the South Heian (P’yongan) Province, McCune expressed...
his “profound respect and deep loyalty towards His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor, the Imperial Household and towards those Great Personages whose memory the state so rightly cherishes.” What is more, he promised to “lead the students under [his] care to appreciate and adopt” the “virtues of patriotism, loyalty, discipline and unity so impressively symbolized in the State Jinja.”

Considering these kinds of effusive statements appear only in writings addressed to government officials, they were not devoid of strategic calculations. But questions of sincerity aside, these statements do reveal missionaries’ pressing sense of anxiety. Japanese Christians, as well as the Catholic, Methodist, and Seventh-Day Adventist communities in Korea raised no religious opposition to shrine worship, prompting Presbyterian missionaries to fear that officials may misinterpret their conscientious objections as political. In private letters, missionaries voiced concern that the government would accuse them of fanning “anti-Japanese feelings” or “attempting to meddle with political questions in which [they were] not definitely concerned.”

There were high stakes involved in successfully navigating this volatile situation. By the time the shrine controversy broke out, Protestant missionaries had firmly embedded themselves in the country’s educational landscape. James Fischer, a professor at Chosen Christian College (present day Yonsei University), provides the following description of the state of missionary institutions in 1926:

These schools represent an investment in land, buildings, and equipment of about $10,000,000; they employ the time of between two and three hundred missionary educational workers, and about 2,500 Korean and Japanese teachers, and have annual budgets totaling half a million dollars...the schools of this system...directly and indirectly, influence the lives of about eighteen millions of people.

Fischer intended for these numbers to awe the reader and instill a sense of the “importance of this enterprise.” While his assertion that missionary schools affected an astounding “eighteen million” people may be exaggerated, it sheds light on missionaries’ perceptions of the wide-reaching scope of their work. Perhaps more significantly, it gives us an idea of how much the missionaries stood to lose in the shrine controversy. An official statement addressed to McCune warned that authorities would respond to continued non-compliance with “necessary measures.” Not only would McCune lose his position, but the government intimated that it would revoke permits from other offending schools or even close missionary schools altogether.

The elimination of Christian schools posed irreparable damage to missionaries’ ultimate project of proselytization. Missionaries were not solely interested in education for its own sake. As historian Hyaeewol Choi writes, missionaries espoused a notion of “Christian modernity” that was distinct from Western or Japanese modernity, believing that true progress stemmed from the inculcation of “spiritual values.” Samuel A. Moffett expounded on this idea: “Reformation is not redemption. Salvation from sin, not mere moral reformation, is the essence of the Gospel message. Civilization is not Christianity... Education is not regeneration.” Missionaries engaged in educational work for the winning of souls. According to one missionary, the goals of Christian education were threefold: “to train native helpers,” “to bring the non-Christian youth of the community under systematic religious influences,” and “to assist in the development of self-supporting and self-propagating churches.” Just as education formed the crux of the colonial agenda, it held an almost existential importance for the missionary enterprise. In Horace H. Underwood’s words, the “very life of the future church” hung in the balance.

36 “A Warning to Dr. G.S. McCune, Principal of the Suitsa School,” December 31, 1935, in Sinsa Ch’ambae Munje Yongmun Charyojip Vol.2, 73.
Confronted with the possibility of these staggering losses, even Presbyterian missionaries sought compromise in the early years of the controversy. The kinds of concessions they were willing to make, however, ranged widely. McCune, for instance, steadfastly refused to go to the state shrine, but vaguely expressed hopes for “some way” to be found that would allow Christians “to cooperate with the Government... without violation of conscience.” J.G. Holdecroft, the president of the Executive Committee of the Chosen Mission, sought more concrete measures to bring together patriotism and Christian values. In a meeting with the head of the government-general educational department, he requested not only for Christians to be given a separate hour to express their patriotism, but to be allowed “to hold Christian service or at least offer a Christian prayer for the Emperor and for the State.”

Still others drew boundaries delineating the kinds of shrine participation they felt comfortable joining. Some were “willing to go to the shrine, but not during a ceremony,” or were “willing to go to the shrine during the ceremony, but now bow.” H.H. Underwood, the president of Chosen Christian College, encouraged fellow missionaries to follow the dictates of their own consciences. But unlike McCune, he urged his colleagues to remember their “responsibility both to the church at home and the church [in Korea].” He himself was “unwilling to take the responsibility of closing the doors of [Chosen Christian College],” and stressed that “for anyone who can conscientiously do so,” “attendance” at shrines represented “a real though difficult duty.”

PROTEST AND CONTESTATION

In the missionaries’ eyes, the state took an unreasonably hardline stance. Local colonial functionaries, like the Korean secretary drawing parallels between Christian and Shinto practices, may have presented ambiguous and confusing portrayals of state shrines, but official responses to missionary queries were unequivocal. More strikingly, they were also repetitive and largely unresponsive to missionaries’ specific points of conscientious objection. As one letter to McCune emphatically states, “Jinja and religion are distinctly separated by our national law.”

Furthermore, “[t]he worship of Imperial Ancestors is the basis of moral virtue of the Japanese Empire and must... be considered as part of the required curriculum and under no conditions can be omitted.” In making these statements, the colonial government did not provide clarification regarding what constituted religion, and why jinja fell outside its bounds. State shrines were not religious simply because the government designated it as such. As early as 1936, the government-general refused to recognize diplomas from schools that did not participate in Shinto ceremonies and began replacing missionary school principals with Koreans.

The colonial state justified its actions by appropriating the discourse of Western secularism. Official pronouncements depicted the government as the champion of religious liberty, “ever ready to protect...the freedom of belief assured by [the] constitution.” The state by no means harbored “the slightest intention of attempting to interfere with the propagation of Christianity or with the religious faith of the Christian adherents.”

The source of the shrine controversy, officials insisted, rested with the missionaries’ “confusion of education and religion.” When the government-general had promulgated the 1915 Regulations for Private Schools, which banned all religious instruction in schools, it claimed that the “complete separation of education and religion” was necessary to guarantee the freedoms of each student in a multi-confessional society. In the case of Shinto shrines, the state demanded a clear distinction between education and religion so that all could benefit from

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48 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 213.
50 Ibid.
51 During the period of “cultural rule,” missionaries were able to resume religious instruction in Christian schools.
"national education. As historian Helen Hardacre notes, the Meiji constitution’s protection of religious freedom purported to safeguard “subjects’ right to private exercise of their faith” but also gave the state wide latitude “to limit that right by appeal to civic duty and law.” The government thus styled itself an impartial arbiter that secured social order and national prerogatives against the particularistic interests of religious groups.

Missionaries similarly made loud appeals to the Meiji constitution, but they advanced a very different perspective of the liberties it guaranteed. To a large extent, the American Bill of Rights mediated missionaries’ understanding of religious freedom. The constitutional guarantee should not only forbid the imposition of a state religion, but it should also protect the free exercise of individual beliefs. The state could not justifiably mandate subjects “to do anything which would offend their consciences.” For government officials to enforce participation at Shinto shrines, it must first “convince[e]” Christians that doing so would not offend their “sincere religious convictions.” McCune in part justified his abstention from shrine ceremonies on the grounds that “Government statements have failed to meet and remove [his] conscientious objections.”

Unlike the government’s understanding of religious freedom, missionaries underscored the paramount importance of individual religious beliefs.

The missionaries’ protestations, however, cannot be reduced to simple cultural misunderstanding. Missionaries expressed deep misgivings about the implications of the government’s portrayal of religious freedom. The latter was not merely different from its American counterpart; it made enormous claims over the religious sphere. Missionaries perceptively noted that the government’s promises of liberty in reality “circumscribe[d] the rights heretofore allowed to religion.” As one missionary describes:

The very terms of the phrase ‘religious liberty’ are no longer fixed. What is the ‘religion’ which is to be allowed freedom? Is it to be merely the speculation of men about another life or about the origin and end of the universe or of the individual soul? Or is it to be the body of moral ideals and sanctions which are to govern the present relations of men and nations? ‘Religion can be free’, some say, ‘as long as it does not concern itself with the affairs of the state...So religion is no longer free save as the state may define...’

The author of this passage recognizes the inherent ambiguity of the terms, “religion” and “religious liberty,” as well as their vulnerability to manipulation. If perceived as the basis of ethical principles, religion had a legitimate place in the public sphere. On the other hand, if seen as “mer[e]” speculation about metaphysics, it could be easily banished to the confines of private belief. Missionaries were alarmed not just by the government-general’s use of brute force to enforce participation at state shrines, but also by its exercise of this less visible yet insidious power over religion.

Contemporary theories of secularism may help illuminate the conflict between the missionaries and the colonial government. According to anthropologist Talal Asad, viewing “uncontrolled religion” as threatening or subversive became part of the modern nation-state’s performance of sovereignty. There was a politics to the demarcation of the religious and the secular. As the state assumed authority to draw the line between the two, it “meant that ‘religion’ could be excluded from its domain or absorbed by it.”

Sociologist José Casanova adds, however, that religious actors often did not passively accept their marginalization from the public sphere. He writes that the modern age has seen the “deprivatization” of religion, whereby different religions across the world rejected the “privatized role” consigned to them by theories of modernity and secularization.

Casanova maintains that this resistance and contestation have always accompanied the process of secularization. Religions “ente[r] the public sphere... not only to defend their traditional turf...but also to participate in the very struggles to define and set the
modern boundaries between the private and public spheres.651

Through this lens, missionaries’ refusal to pay obeisance at shrines could be seen as an effort to renegotiate the bounds of the religious and secular. One missionary, for instance, pointedly questioned the government’s “power or authority to remove a religious element from a ceremony merely by an official fiat,” thereby “tell[ing] an individual that something is not religious which profoundly impresses and convinces his conscience as being definitely religious.”662 Presenting itemized lists enumerating the religious aspects of shrine rituals enabled missionaries to voice a dissenting view of what constituted religious or patriotic behavior. For many Presbyterian missionaries shrine worship, the religious included all that dealt with spirits and gods, as well as practices resembling Christian worship. Conversely, “purely patriotic act[s]” necessarily excluded any hints of the religious. Missionaries also strategically wielded biblical injunctions to stage “solemn[n] protest.”663 Writings addressed to government officials often quoted verbatim multiple Bible passages to underscore the absolute quality of biblical command. Not only did McCune write that “the Word of God” compelled him to abstain from state shrines,664 but some missionaries appealed to the Bible to justify their efforts to “do all in [their] power and authority to restrain Mission schools from taking part in something [they were] sure [was] fundamentally wrong.”665 Even Presbyterian missionaries who called for compromise maintained the importance of maintaining individual conscience and the ability to act accordingly. They were willing to negotiate but only within the purview of moral choices that they, not the state, configured. Missionaries thus fought to recover a role in distinguishing between the realms of religion and politics.

CONCLUSION

In 1936, George McCune was pressured to resign from his post at Union Christian College and eventually left the country where he had lived and worked for over thirty years. During the annual General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of Korea two years later, many Korean church leaders, under pressure from the colonial police, voted to support participation at Shinto shrines. Presbyterian missionaries, in turn, collectively resigned from the Korean church.666 The debates over state shrines among continued unabated among foreign missionaries, Korean Christians, and the colonial state until 1940, when three quarters of Protestant missionaries evacuated Korea under pressure from the American Consulate.667 By the start of the Pacific War in 1941, nearly all foreign missionaries had left their home countries, and only a small fraction of them would have the opportunity to resume their work in a liberated Korea.

In many ways, it is difficult to offer an assessment of the Shinto shrine controversy. If one looks strictly at the outcome of the controversy, missionary efforts to challenge colonial authorities failed. What is more, as Ion notes, it may have been unjustifiably reckless with regard to the consequences for Korean Christians. And perhaps the echoes of the missionaries’ hardline stances can be heard in the fierce debates and finger-pointing among Korean Christians about who had acquiesced to shrine worship and who had nobly resisted to the end. These insights, however, may only be clear to us in retrospect. The Presbyterian missionaries’ richly textured writings shed light on the complexity of the situation they confronted. With their life’s work on the line, missionaries not only acted upon their moral convictions, but they also asserted their right as religious leaders to voice their own understandings of what constituted the religious sphere. Moreover, the Presbyterian missionaries’ experiences in the shrine controversy highlight the importance of non-national resistance to colonial authority. The missionaries may not have suffered the kind of bodily harm that Korean Christians did for their acts of dissent, but their stories also warrant careful examination.

61 Ibid., 6.
66 Clark, 218.
67 Ibid., 258.
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HAJIN JUN

Hajin Jun is currently a second year PhD student at Stanford University.
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