NIETZSCHE AND THE BODY OF KNOWLEDGE

by

Oguz Erdur

Ph.D. Candidate,
Columbia University,
Department of Anthropology
Schermerhorn Ext. Room 452
1200 Amsterdam Avenue,
New York, NY 10027

oe7@columbia.edu
erdur@arkeoloji.org
Abstract

This paper makes a single point and asks a single question—both based on the suspicion that Friedrich Nietzsche verbalizes: That philosophy has been "merely an interpretation of the body and a misunderstanding of the body" (1974:35, original emphasis).

The point: One says "I," whereas it is the body that does the "I" that speaks (Nietzsche 1954:146). The same holds for those other bodies of knowledge called the “disciplines.” In either case, the voice that speaks on behalf of the body is always-already ontologically justified by the body itself. This self-referential semiotic matrix, even when it produces self-doubt or a self-critique, is a performance of the body, through which the conflicting energies of that very body are ritualistically reaffirmed and reunited. Reflexivity thus is more about functionality and instrumentality than about truthfulness.

The question: The tautology of the self-referential self-legitimization of knowledge, just as the concomitant creation of the disciplinary bodies of knowledge, is an invention of the modern era when, for the first time in history, “knowledge wants to be more than a mere means” (Nietzsche 1974:180). This observation is the source not only of Nietzsche’s disdain for the "mindless historicism" of the nineteenth century, but also of my derivative question here: After more than a century since Nietzsche scolded scholars as the “spoiled idlers in the garden of knowledge” (Nietzsche 1980:7), to what extent is the enterprise of archaeological knowledge production capable of reversing the direction of purposiveness that the modern body-knowledge relationship perverted? (Life is not for knowledge; knowledge is for life!) Can Archaeology participate in the grand experiment that Nietzsche calls for?—an experiment, the modus operandi of which shall be to “cleanse the body,” the ultimate goal of which is to “give the earth a meaning, a human meaning” (Nietzsche 1954:188).

1.

I will start from what I try to do in my so-called “work,” so that the urge behind the one point I wish to make and the one question I would like to raise might perhaps become rather more intelligible.

I am not an archaeologist myself but am doing something that I call “an ethnography of archaeological knowledge production” in Turkey.

The idea with which I started out my quest was to ethnographically ground a philosophical question that takes its cue from Nietzsche: What happens when will to knowledge faces something essentially unknowable—i.e. the past which, regardless of the many theoretical and textual myths with which scholarship surrounds itself, is “untextable” (Denning 1991)?

What kind of forces of creation and destruction are involved in this confrontation with the “untextable,” I set out to inquire. And how does this will to knowledge, this will out of nowhere, justify itself? How does it speak, among other things, about itself—about this very urge to know and about this very urge to speak?

What I do, in “methodological” terms, is quite simply to hang out with archaeologists at and around a number of excavations in Central Anatolia, including Çatalhöyük.

I approach archaeology in the manner of “the stranger” that Georg Simmel talks about. The stranger, according to Simmel, is someone who comes today, but who, unlike the wanderer,
does not leave tomorrow. The stranger stays but sustains his relationship as a stranger. This,
Simmel argues, is a particular form of positive interaction caused by the “unity of nearness and remoteness” (Simmel, 1950:402).

In my relationship with archaeology, I appeal to the specific license to ignorance that “the stranger” allows me. A major part of what I try to understand on the basis of this ignorance is: Just how is it that archaeologists find meaning in the practice of “finding meaning in the past” (Cf. Hodder et al. 1995)? How do archaeologists, or the practices of archaeology as a discipline, justify the efforts and the outcomes of the disciplinary practice? How do archaeologists speak about their work? How do they explain how they have gotten seduced, convinced, and recruited into doing what they do?

The source of the energies that go into my matrix of questions is perhaps rather apparent. It has everything to do with what Nietzsche diagnosed as the “sickness” of the 19th century western Bourgeois society, namely “nihilism.”

What “nihilism” means for Nietzsche is “That the highest values devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking; “why?” finds no answer” (1968:9, original emphasis).

In Zarathustra’s language: “A thousand goals have there been so far, for there have been a thousand peoples. Only the yoke for the thousand necks is still lacking: the one goal is lacking. Humanity still has no goal” (1954:172).

The debates as to the meaning of nihilism—whether Nietzsche got it right, when it is a sickness and when actually an accomplishment, and so on and so forth—are quite irrelevant here (Cf., however, Vattimo 1988; Gillespie 1996). For my purposes, the following words of a Nietzsche scholar are sufficient to delineate the general problem in which I have chosen to dwell rather more consciously:

“In the interim, things are not quite right—who does not sense it? Wherever we turn there is a cacophony of voices. Everything seems adrift yet strangely unchanging. We decry the absence of leadership, but who can lead without a specifiable goal? We experience simultaneously the concrete intensification of modern principles and their theoretical disintegration. Intensification, fragmentation, cacophony of voices, and the monotony of constant, circling, changeless change. Who does not see it? But who has not grown weary of the endless, occasionally hyperbolic, restatements of the problem?” (Smith 1996:5-6).

To this cogent capture of “the problem,”—of which itself is of course a restatement!—I shall only add perhaps that I take the following axiomatic:

What once might have been a historico-culturally specific “sickness” is more and more a world-wide epidemic. Nihilism, vaguely associated with the meaninglessness of the quest for meaning, has spread with increasing efficiency, through the power/knowledge matrices of

---

1The questions addressed in this paper, I shall emphasize, are not the ones produced within the matrix of questions in question, but are those that produce that very matrix—i.e. the question of the meaning and the relevance of scholarly inquiry and the question of “the value of truth.” My excuse for leaving my “research questions” unattended here is not merely that this paper was written at an early stage of my fieldwork research and that my effort was therefore more motivated towards producing questions than presenting answers. What is more important to underline here perhaps is the need never to undermine the pretty tricky power that the questions have in creating their own answers. The dilemma involved in the alleged will to revelation through posing questions (which is also an act of concealment through posing oneself as if posing questions) has been with us at least since Heraclitus: “If he doesn’t expect the unexpected, he will not discover it” (1987:19). The manner in which each inquirer deals with this fundamental paradox of inquiry is of course an entirely different story, into which I shall not venture here in any direct manner.
globalization. This, to me, is the post-metaphysical conditions of possibility of knowledge. The changeless change is seen as much from Istanbul as from New York. And the cacophony is heard even from the lonely villages of Central Anatolia.²

Hence my very own quest: Why keep seeking to know? Why spend a life in this business? What, if anything, beyond the pedestrian pragmatics of academic professionalism, motivates people to bother?

To refer this impasse back to the why-how dilemma inherent in nihilism: How do the knowledge seekers, archaeologists in particular, go on with the quest for knowledge when the question “why?” finds no immediate answer?

“You are far too keen on where and how...” Jesus Christ Superstar cries out to God in the musical, “...but not so hot on why!”

Christ, the nihilist.

2.

Now, Nietzsche’s radical affirmation of the body and his consideration of the philosopher as a “cultural physician” have, I think, everything to do with this “sickness” called nihilism that he diagnosed and prophetized the emerging spread of. The entire Niezschean endeavor can indeed be seen as a struggle to restore to life that which the enlightenment enterprise of secular knowledge demystified and did away with—namely, its meaning.

The momentous struggle Nietzsche embarks upon, that is, the struggle to restore meaning to life, can be heard loud and clear in Zarathustra’s following words:

“Remain faithful to earth, my brothers, with the power of your virtue. Let your gift-giving love and your knowledge serve the meaning of the earth.... Lead back to the earth the virtue that flew away, as I do—back to the body, back to life, that it may give the earth a meaning, a human meaning” (1954:188, my emphasis).

This call to the seekers of knowledge follows directly from Nietzsche’s observation of a profoundly significant rupture in the history of thought, whereby the will to knowledge has brought about the collapse of the very metaphysical foundations on which modern knowledge had hitherto rested. The long process of the secularization of knowledge has, in the exclamation “God is dead!” (Nietzsche 1974:167), finally revealed that modern knowledge had been produced at the nexus of a fundamental paradox: Man, the free agent of rational knowledge, had a God-given destiny, into which he was welcome to inquire freely.

There once was a time, one might tell the story of our bygone moment of Enlightenment, when we made ourselves believe that we were acting as the free and enlightened children of God the

² My intention here is neither to gloss over, nor to substantiate this “globalized” claim. Nor do I claim by any means that the globalization of the problem addressed here directly implies a cultural homogenization. Far from it, the specific manifestations of the globalizing conditions of possibility of knowledge promoted ever more promptly and efficiently by the capitalist markets and the techno-science, do need (and often get) to be substantiated in terms of their consequences for various cultural contexts. In taking this broad observation as a context in which to pose a general question here, I do not pretend to have set up an immediately accessible background for my inquiry. Rather, I merely try to establish a common denominator of intelligibility for “the one question” I ask in this paper. It might also be relevant to emphasize in this respect, that the primary context of my “ethnography of archaeological knowledge” is as much the networks of academic exchange, as it is the socio-political ones of contemporary Turkish society. Thus, even if the pertinence of the claim of a globalizing nihilism to Turkey has to be left begging of ethnographic evidence here, the claim of its pertinence to academia at large shall perhaps remain somewhat less needy.
Almighty. We, the enlightened, liberated ourselves, or so we thought, from the sleep-walking that has passed as “life” in the domain of many a king, and “Dare[d] to know!” (Kant 1995:1). Our chase after divine wisdom, our desire to think His thought after Him, turned, with a “pious” slight of hands, into our secularized and liberated quest. And “truth” was the name of this renewed object of our desire. But the process of claiming this “freedom” cost us not only our God, but oops!, the “freedom” we thought we were getting as well. We did not merely end up destroying the creator we had created for ourselves. But lo! We can’t worship “truth” herself any longer either:

“The true world—we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent world perhaps? But no! With the true world we have abolished the apparent one. INCIPIT ZARTHUSTRA” (1954:486, original emphasis).

Zarathustra begins!

Janis Joplin did get it right then: “Freedom is just another word for nothing left to loose!” Including freedom itself, that is...

3.

What I mean to get at with the above parody of the transition from the modern to the post/modern—a transition delivered through the transformation of our very own doubtful doubts of our own beliefs (Descartes) into our very own and very believable beliefs in the reality of our own doubts (Nietzsche)—is that, after the death of God, the quest for knowledge can no longer justify itself on the basis of a self-legitimizing idea of “truth” either.

Truth, whenever one can pin it down, is “the weakest form of knowledge” (1974:169), Nietzsche argues. It is a form of error that we just cannot refute (1974:219). Or “in moral terms: the obligation to lie according to a fixed convention” (1954:47).

But what is even worse, illusion and not truth is the necessary condition of life, Nietzsche declares. Not only is it true (!) that “truth [does not] remain truth when the veils are withdrawn” (1974:38). But furthermore, “Truth kills,” he writes into his early notebooks, “—it even kills itself” (1999:92)!

(It was, after all, the very quest for truth which ended up revealing its own untruthful metaphysical ground, wasn’t it? By killing God, truth has also destroyed its own conditions of possibility, rendering itself an elusive paradox.)

Thus, Nietzsche tells us, we should stop playing the deadly game of hide-and-seek with the femme fatal who always proves to be a step ahead of us whenever we mess with her.

“Supposing truth is a woman—what then?” (1966:1) Then we stop trying, like the dogmatist, to go headlong into her face with “the gruesome seriousness, the clumsy obtrusiveness with which they have usually approached truth so far” (ibid.). Then we stop trying in vain to convince her with the drab arguments of our reason to come to us, and try in stead to win her heart.

Then we give up, that is to say, if one is to snap out of the hyper-metaphorical universe into which Nietzsche all too expertly sucks one into and speak a rather more mundane language—then we give up on the metaphysical navel gazing of various shades and forms and conspicuousnesses around the quest for knowledge and turn our gaze towards the only legitimate purpose that knowledge can possibly serve—namely, life itself.
It is in this vain that Nietzsche attacks the “mindless historicism” of his age. And it is for their participation in the decadence of the purposeless and impotent quests after knowledge that he scolds scholars as “spoiled idlers in the garden of knowledge” (1980:7).

“The scholar expends his entire strength in affirmation and denial, in criticizing what has already been thought—he himself no longer thinks...The instinct for self-defense has in his case become soft; otherwise he would have defended himself against the books. The scholar—a décadent.— This I have seen with my own eyes: natures gifted, rich and free already in their thirties ‘read to ruins’, mere matches that have to be struck if they are to ignite—emit ‘thought.’—Early in the morning at the break of the day, in all the freshness and dawn of one’s strength, to read a book—I call that vicious!” (1979:64, original emphases).

4.

How, then, is knowledge supposed to be for life, according to Nietzsche, who attempts to scandalize the truth seeking scholar, whose ritualistic solitude amongst his/her books is constitutive of his/her very mode of existence? What kind of an alternative to our scholarly-business-as-usual does he propose?

Nietzsche is vague yet very straight forward on this.

As he states rather cool-headedly in On the Genealogy of Morals: “From the moment faith in the God of the ascetic ideal is denied, a new problem arises: that of the value of truth. The will to truth requires a critique—let us thus define our own task—the value of truth must for once be experimentally called into question” (1967:153, original emphases).

Or in the poetic form it takes in Zarathustra’s language: “With knowledge, the body purifies itself; making experiments with knowledge, it elevates itself; in the lover of knowledge all instincts become holy; in the elevated the soul becomes gay” (1954:189).

Now, this idea that Nietzsche promotes—the idea of a philosopher who is a cultural physician that cures through knowledge experiments on the body—is rather literal, for example, in the sentences that immediately follow the above words of Zarathustra, revealing Nietzsche’s psychologism that precedes Freud:

“Physician, help yourself; thus help your patient too. Let this be his best help that he may behold with his eyes the man who heals himself” (1954:189).

But one should not be misled here. True; Nietzsche’s aesthetic justification of life is no public game, but is rather aimed at specific kinds of individuals. And true; he clearly is no liberal democrat either. He does speak on an art, that is, an art of life cultivated through philosophy, a sickness cured through the physicians work on himself—“an art for artists and artists only” (1974:37). And true; Nietzsche is supposed to be “the first psychologist.” And so on. But his philosophy certainly does not engage in a naïve form of individualism.

This is clear in his mistrust of consciousness and of language as such, for example, which is also crystalized in his attack on Descartes:

“There is thinking; consequently there is that which thinks”—that is what Descartes’ argument comes to....When there is thinking, something must be there which thinks—that is merely a formulation of our grammatical habit, which posits a doer for what is done...” (1954:455).
Elsewhere in *The Twilight of the Idols*, he writes: “I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar” (1954:483).

So much for all the so-called “textuality,” by the way! All those meta-texts like “culture” we anthropologist are in the habit of reading! But that is a story for another day. Though I should make in passing the Kantian point that Nietzsche radicalizes and poeticizes—The point that we can only know what we ourselves have made. If you can read texts, well, you must have written them first:

“Ultimately one cannot extract from things, books included, anything other than he already knows” (1979:70).

A hint for archaeologists, perhaps? Or a banal blasphemy?

Anyway. The point I am trying to get at with all this grass-hopping is that Nietzsche’s “physician-philosopher” is not merely an individual creature in and of itself. It is rather an attempted link to “Humanity” with a capital H.

According to Simmel, “Nietzsche overcame the limitations of merely social existence” (1950:63). This he accomplished by jumping over all sorts of averages that the society sets in front of the individual, by linking the most personal to the most general, to what is Human.

I will not venture that far here into “Humanity,” but will only try to link this “physician-philosopher” business to our body-talk here.

The following words from a passage in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* called “On the Despisers of the Body,” where Nietzsche seems to manage fitting something like the entire history of western philosophy into two pages, is more or less the reason why I traveled half a planet to read this paper.

The one point reads thus:

> “Body am I, and soul”—thus speaks the child. And why should one not speak like children? But the awakened and knowing say: body am I entirely, and nothing else; and soul is only a word for something about the body. The body is a great reason, a plurality with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a shepherd. An instrument of your body is also your little reason, my brother, which you call “spirit”—a little instrument and toy of your great reason. “I” you say, and are proud of the word. But greater is that in which you do not wish to have faith—your body and its great reason: that does not say “I,” but does “I” (1954:146).

We boast “I!”, whereas it is our bodies that do the “I” that speaks. My body. Your body. The bodies of knowledge called “disciplines.” Same difference.

5.

Now, if I may venture into this analogy—into “the bodies of knowledge”...

It shall have risen to the level of scholarly collective consciousness, at least since Michel Foucault’s work, that the bodies of knowledge we call “disciplines,” discipline the bodies of the practitioners of knowledge we call “scholars,” according to their specific needs for self-
perpetuation and self-transformation. That is to say, in the case of these bodies too the specific body is what makes the specific production of knowledge possible. And in this case too, the part of the body that speaks “I” on behalf of that body—let us call that the “reflexive faculty”—is necessarily only a part of the story.

When "the-body-that-does-I" turns reflexive and starts asking the question of the-reason-why onto itself, it is always the-voice-that-speaks-"I" that the body puts to task in order to produce the answers (or sometimes merely the questions) that it needs. But the fact is that the voice that is thus to satisfy and hence to justify the specific body of knowledge is itself always-already justified by that body itself. The tautological circularity of the self-constitution of the body through self-reference, in which the voice(s) that it produces are instrumental, is escapable neither in self-legitimization, nor actually in self-criticism. This is true because it is these performative operations of the body onto itself, through which the energies of that body are ritualistically reunited and reaffirmed.

Nor, one must add, can these tautologically and internally functional linguistic performances of the body guarantee it, “the-body-that-does-I,” a justification vis-à-vis the external world—improve its environmental adaptation, so to speak. The arguments of self-legitimization (such as: “People need pasts and archaeology provides them that.” or “The historian is the guardian of our collective memory.”) fail to link the internal dynamics of self-(re)production behind the operations of the-body-that-does-I to the instrumental effectiveness of the-voice-that-speaks-“I”. What such self-legitimizing arguments do, rather, is merely to give us an idea about the externally determined discursive possibilities of self-legitimization. And there hardly is a representational necessity that metaphysically guarantees the isomorphism between the discursive possibilities of the voice that speaks and the operations of the body that does.

Reflexivity in short is more about functionality and instrumentality than about truthfulness. For truthfulness, had it spoken, could likely say more vulgar things like: “Who cares!” “Why bother!” “Why spend so much money!” “Why not give it to charity!” “And, really—what is the relation of obsidian cache with our collective memory anyway!”

The Nietzschean alternative to self-legitimization through recourse to a legitimizing discourse is an autochthonous self-affirmation—an admittedly problematic, even dangerous idea.

The question that arises from a Nietzschean critique of the bodies of knowledge that are disciplined through the modern will to knowledge—a will to knowledge that has forgotten its very own “whys”—is this: What kind of bodies of knowledge are to be affirmed in order to improve our health? What kind of bodies are we to esteem valuable for our collective vitality?

And this in fact is a crucial point—that we esteem. Nietzsche considers the species called “the man” a “dreadful accident” that has erred in a hundred ways (1954:189). Yet that species is still a great promise, because s/he can esteem. To translate this deliberately archaic language into a cooler-headed contemporary one: The quest for meaning cannot be separated from the duty of evaluation. Science, in this sense is an utterly irresponsible enterprise, to the extent that it remains outside of the matrices of evaluation and revaluation.

What kind of bodies of knowledge, then? What kind of bodies to produce the voices that shall speak “I”? 
Very swiftly: Paradoxical bodies. Not least because it simply is a paradox to hope for a body to produce a voice, which can speak in order to betray the very disciplinary relation it has to the body of knowledge that produces it.

But the love and affirmation of the self (qua body), just as the love of life itself, is only possible as a paradoxical relation for Nietzsche: "What does he know of love who did not have to despise precisely what he loved" (1954:177)?

This paradoxical tension between love and ressentiment, the affirmation of life and the desire to change it, is literally at the heart of Nietzsche’s philosophy:

Zarathustra’s very first words as he comes down from his mountain: “I love man” (1954:123).

Zarathustra’s second words as he comes down from his mountain: “Did I speak of love? I bring man a gift” (1954:123).

And this gift, of course, is the Overman—the idea that “man” is something that must be overcome. This gift, which Nietzsche himself esteems as the highest gift ever been made to humanity, is also the greatest burden, an anthropologist would know very well. As Marcel Mauss (1990) taught us, a gift comes with an obligation to reciprocate. And self-overcoming is this obligation Nietzsche puts us under.

What kind of bodies, then?

The bodies that experiment with knowledge. The bodies that risk destroying themselves in trying to overcome themselves. The bodies that attempt to cleanse themselves through destruction—like gods destroy: in order to create anew!

How to destroy in order to create?


Danger: “Tremble carcass!” Nietzsche, in what is a rare act for him, quotes Turenne, a seventeenth century French general speaking to his own body: “Tremble carcass! You would tremble a lot more if you knew where I am taking you” (1974:277).

Danger again: “[T]he secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment is—to live dangerously! Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius! Send your ships into uncharted seas! Live at war with your peers and yourselves! Be robbers and conquerors as long as you cannot be rulers and possessors, you seekers of knowledge! Soon the age will be past when you could be content to live hidden in forests like shy deer” (1974:228-229, original emphasis).


And foolishness again: “We must discover the hero no less than the fool in our passion for knowledge; we must occasionally find pleasure in our folly, or we cannot continue to find pleasure in our wisdom. Precisely because we are at bottom grave and serious human beings...nothing does us as much good as a fool’s cap: we need it in relation to ourselves” (1974:164, original emphases).
And laughter: “To laugh at oneself as one would have to laugh in order to laugh out the whole truth—to do that even the best so far lacked sufficient sense for truth, and the most gifted had too little genius for that. Even laughter may yet have a future... Perhaps laughter will [one day] have formed an alliance with wisdom, perhaps only ‘gay science’ will then be left. For the present, things are quite different. For the present, the comedy of existence has not yet ‘become conscious’ of itself. For the present, we still live in the age of tragedy, the age of moralities and religion” (1974:74).

And finally dance:—Dance is through what Zarathustra calls us to this profoundly serious task of laughter and foolishness. A call that is truly visceral:

“Who among you can laugh and be elevated at the same time? Whoever climbs the highest mountains laughs at all tragic plays and tragic seriousness... I would believe only in a god who could dance. And when I saw my devil, I found him serious, thorough, profound and solemn: it was the spirit of gravity—through him all things fall. Not by wrath does one kill but by laughter. Come, let us kill the spirit of gravity!” (1954:153)

7.

A final note from another sort of stranger, before I ask the one question I wish to ask.

In an essay titled “Who is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?” Heidegger writes: “…And we will remain strangers as long as we don’t think these thoughts but go on forever reporting them” (1985:71).

Somewhat foolish of me to quote this after having done all the reporting I could in these few pages? Well, all the better. What, after all, becomes of thoughts once they hit the paper—what other than “bird-carcass”?:

“Alas, what are you after all, my written and painted thoughts! It was not long ago that you were still so colorful, young, and malicious, full of thorns and secret spices—you made me sneeze and laugh—and now? You have already taken off your novelty, and some of you are ready, I fear, to become truths: they already look so immortal, so pathetically decent, so dull! And has it ever been different?.... Alas, always only birds that grew weary of flying and flew astray and now can be caught by hand—by our hand! We immortalize what cannot live and fly much longer…” (1966:237).

8.

I began this paper by mentioning my curiosity as to how it is that archaeologists find meaning in the practice of “finding meaning in the past.” And I shall end it with a question that accompanies that curiosity, a question that is rather more foolish in its challenge:

More than a century after Nietzsche’s scold to scholars as “spoiled idlers in the garden of knowledge” (1980:7), to what extent is the enterprise of archaeological knowledge production capable of becoming an experiment with knowledge?

A dangerous experiment on the body, by the body itself—for “cleansing” the body. An experiential experiment. A foolish experiment that awaits cosmic accidents to happen. A self-
aggrandizing experiment that seeks to create those accidents. A profoundly profane experiment. An experiment towards “giving the earth a meaning, a human meaning”...

Can we participate in such an experiment?

Can we let the bird, lest it wished to fly away?

Can we escape the garden?

Acknowledgements

My thanks go to the organizers. Without the cue that the conference provided, the implicit analogy in “the bodies of knowledge” would not have occurred to me. Likewise, I am indebted to the audience for constituting a critical context in which I was able to present my reading of Nietzsche to a group of archaeologists for the first time. This experience has been invaluable for me in writing a similarly spirited paper for a different context (Erdur, 2002), as well as in continuing to think around the issues of purpose and social responsibility related to knowledge production.
REFERENCES CITED

Allison, D. B., editor.

Dening, G.

Erdur, O.

Gillespie, M. A.

Heraclitus.


Kant, I.

Mauss, M.

Nietzsche, F.


1980 *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life*. Translated with an

1999 *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s.*

Simmel, G.

Smith, G. B.

Vattimo G.