				NO	. 137,	OR	IGINZ	AL				
	-	IN THE	SUPI	REME	COURT	OF	THE	UNITI	ED	ST	ATES	
STATE	OF	MONTA	ΔNΑ,)				
		Pl	aint	iff,)				
	7	vs.)	No	٠.	220137	ORG
STATE	OF	WYOMI	ING ar	nd)				
STATE	OF	NORTH	I DAK(OTA,)				
		D€	efenda	ants	•)				

TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONIC PROCEEDINGS STATUS CONFERENCE APRIL 18, 2013

Reported by: Antonia Sueoka, RPR, CSR No. 9007

1	TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES:
2	
3	SPECIAL MASTER BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR.
4	STANFORD UNIVERSITY
5	JERRY YANG AND AKIKO YAMAZAKI
6	ENVIRONMENT & ENERGY BUILDING, MC-4205
7	473 Via Ortega, Mail Code 4205
8	Stanford, California 94305
9	605.721.1488
10	susan.carter@stanford.edu
11	
12	
13	FOR THE STATE OF MONTANA:
14	MONTGOMERY & ANDREWS, P.A.
15	BY: JOHN B. DRAPER
16	JEFFREY J. WECHSLER
17	LAURA KATZ
18	SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL
19	325 Paseo de Peralta
20	Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501
21	505.982.3873; Fax 505.982.4289
22	jdraper@montand.com
23	jwechsler@montand.com
24	
25	

KRAMM COURT REPORTING Page: 2

1	TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES (CONTINUED)
2	
3	FOR THE STATE OF MONTANA:
4	MONTANA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
5	BY: TIMOTHY C. FOX
6	ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MONTANA
7	MARK MATTIOLI
8	CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
9	CORY J. SWANSON
10	DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
11	ANNE YATES
12	BRIAN BRAMBLETT
13	KEVIN PETERSON
14	SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL
15	215 North Sanders
16	Helena, Montana 59620-1401
17	406.444.5894; Fax 406.444.3549
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
2 5	

KRAMM COURT REPORTING

1	TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES (CONTINUED)
2	
3	FOR THE STATE OF WYOMING:
4	WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
5	BY: PETER K. MICHAEL
6	CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL (Counsel of Record)
7	CHRISTOPHER M. BROWN
8	JAMES KASTE
9	ANDREW KUHLMANN
10	DAVID WILLMS
11	SENIOR ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL
12	200 West 24th Street
13	123 Capitol Building
14	Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002
15	307.777.7841; Fax 307.777.6869
16	
17	
18	FOR THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA:
19	NORTH DAKOTA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
20	BY: JENNIFER VERLEGER
21	ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
22	500 North Ninth Street
23	Bismarck, North Dakota 58501
24	710.328.2210
25	jverleger@nd.gov

KRAMM COURT REPORTING Page: 4

1	TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES (CONTINUED)
2	
3	FOR AMICUS THE UNITED STATES:
4	UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
5	ENVIRONMENT & NATURAL RESOURCES
6	DIVISION OF NATURAL RESOURCES SECTION
7	BY: JAMES J. DUBOIS, ESQUIRE
8	999 18th Street, Suite 370 South Terrace
9	Denver, Colorado 80202
10	303.844.1375
11	james.dubois@usdoj.gov
12	
13	
14	FOR AMICUS ANADARKO PETROLEUM COMPANY:
15	BINGHAM, McCUTCHEN, LLP
16	BY: MICHAEL B. WIGMORE, ESQUIRE
17	2020 K Street N.W.
18	Washington, D.C. 20006
19	202.373.6000
20	michael.wigmore@bingham.com
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

KRAMM COURT REPORTING

TELEPHONIC STATUS HEARING, reported at Kramm Court Reporting, San Diego, California 92101, commencing on Thursday, April 18, 2013, at 10:32 a.m. before Antonia Sueoka, Certified Shorthand Reporter, CSR No. 9007, RPR, in and for the state of California,

1 THURSDAY, APRIL 18, 2013, 10:32 A.M. 2 3 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So this is a hearing in 4 Number 137 Original, Montana vs. Wyoming. And it is a 5 telephonic hearing on Montana's objections to Wyoming's 6 expert designation and expedited motion for supplemental 7 depositions. 8 And since this is a motion by Montana, why don't 9 we start with counsel for Montana. So you want to state 10 an appearance? MR. DRAPER: Yes, Your Honor. This is John 11 12 Draper. Also on the phone today from Montana is Attorney 13 General Tim Fox. With Attorney General Fox is Chief 14 Deputy Attorney General Mark Mattioli, in addition Deputy 15 Attorney General Cory Swanson, and Chief Counsel for the 16 Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation 17 Ann Yates, along with other lawyers from that department, 18 Brian Bramblett, and Kevin Peterson. 19 With me here in Santa Fe is Jeff Wechsler and 20 Laura Katz. 21 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Thank you very much, 22 Mr. Draper. 23 So next, then, counsel for State of Wyoming? 24 MR. KASTE: Your Honor, this is James Kaste from

Wyoming's Attorney General's office. With me today are

25

1 Pete Michael, Andrew Kuhlman, David Willms, and Chris 2 Brown. 3 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Thank you. 4 And I received an e-mail message earlier in the week that the State of North Dakota did not believe that 5 6 they would be able to participate. 7 Is there anyone on the line from the State of 8 North Dakota? 9 MS. VERLEGER: This is Jennifer Verleger. And 10 I'm here for now. We're in the middle of a mediation, but 11 the mediator is with the other side, so I'll hang around 12 for as long as possible. 13 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. Well, it's great 14 to have you on the call and certainly understand the 15 situation and hope the mitigation goes well. 16 So next for the various Amici. So, first of all, for the United States? 17 18 MR. DUBOIS: This is Jim DuBois for the United 19 States, Your Honor. Good morning. 20 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. Good morning. 21 And next for the Northern Cheyenne Tribe? 22 Okay. And then -- so no one for the Northern 23 Cheyenne Tribe on the phone at the moment. 24 And then for Amicus Anadarko Petroleum? 25 MR. WIGMORE: Yes, Your Honor. This is Michael

1 | Wigmore for Anadarko.

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. Thank you.

And is there anyone on the line that I have forgotten?

Okay. If not, so I have reviewed all the -- all of the papers, including the State of Wyoming's expert designation. And I did receive Montana's reply in support of its objections and expedited motion this morning.

And I think maybe the best place to start is to see whether or not we can come to some agreement as to exactly who is an expert for purposes of the expert designation.

And one of the things I found in reading through most of the papers was that it's difficult to -- to actually talk about some of the issues because we're dealing in the abstract at the moment without any specific testimony in mind.

But, Mr. Kaste, you've received, I assume,
Mr. Draper and Montana's reply this morning. And I guess
I would be interested in your thoughts on that reply, and
then we can maybe get into the question of exactly what an
expert is for purposes of designation.

MR. KASTE: This is James Kaste.

We did receive the reply from the State of
Montana this morning, had a chance to go through it, and

confirms in my mind what I was thinking yesterday, which is, as is the case with the majority of this litigation, much to-do about nothing.

Obviously, we, State of Wyoming, has retained three experts to give opinions about the litigation that they have developed for purposes of this litigation, and Wyoming employs a whole host of subject matter experts who are also fact witnesses in this case.

Now, there is some, I guess, imprecision in the Civil Rules of Evidence and the rules related to disclosure. And we talked generically about expert witness testimony, which is simply testimony based upon scientific, technical, or otherwise -- other specialized information.

As it relates to the issues in this case, every one of Wyoming's employee witnesses who may testify will certainly meet that standard. They will testify about how they operate the streams here in Wyoming, and that is by its very nature scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized information.

As a result, Wyoming believes people like that at least ought to be on the list, at least ought to be identified. That's just good practice. And they are identified on our list to say exactly what we said. They have factual information and have formed opinions in the

course of their ordinary employment which have been the subject of their depositions, and they'll testify thereto.

Are they expert witnesses in the classic sense of a paid expert brought in to give litigation or opinions formed solely for purposes of the litigation? Absolutely not. But are they technically giving expert testimony? Yeah, they are, even though it really is a mixture of lay and expert testimony by virtue of the sub -- or the subject matter of the testimony.

So, like I said in our motion, out of an abundance of caution and in order to be technically correct, these people are on the list. I see no reason to take them off the list, but I see no reason to overreact in any way and take any additional action with regard to this designation.

You know, the only possible conceivable thing that could be done in the event the Court determines that for some reason these employees somehow terribly wrong for us to be honest and up front to stick them on the list, if that was somehow bad, then the Court is going to have to make us take them off the list, but no further depositions or supplementation or any of that -- any activity of that nature is warranted.

So in answer to your question, my answer is technically all of them are experts. There are only three

of them are experts for whom there's specific opinions and the basis, therefore, need to be disclosed in the course of this designation.

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So in the reply papers that Montana submitted this morning, at Pages 4 to 5, there's a paragraph that talks specifically about what Mr. Boyd might offer in the way of testimony on the return flows. And as I said, I think to the degree that we can talk concretely, it will be helpful, and so I'm just going to quote from the papers.

Montana says: For example, in its designation,
Wyoming suggests that Mr. Boyd may offer testimony on
return flows. "As a percipient witness, Mr. Boyd can
offer testimony on the return flows that he measured or
observed in the years at issue; however, he cannot attempt
to offer opinions about return flows that he did not
measure or observe or on the impact of return flows to
Montana."

And as I read Montana's papers, what they're saying is is that if by designating Mr. Boyd as an expert, all Wyoming is attempting to do is make sure that no one later can object on grounds of surprise when Mr. Boyd offers testimony on return flows that he measured or observed in the years at issue, even though his measurement or observation is in his capacity as an expert

in that area, but that if what Mr. Boyd is going to do is to attempt to offer opinions about return flows that he did not measure or observe or on the impact of the return flows to Montana, that that is expert testimony and that he does need to be designated as an expert witness and that they should be able to depose him on those particular questions at the moment.

So my question is to you, Mr. Kaste, would you agree with that distinction between the two different types of testimony and -- I'll make this a compound question -- is it your intent only that Mr. Boyd would be offering testimony about, in this particular case, return flows that he measured or observed?

MR. KASTE: Yep. I mean, I think we made that clear in three separate pieces of paper now when we said that they were going to testify about facts they observed and the opinions that they formed from those facts.

You know, when you get a person like Pat Boyd on the stand who is really a, you know, a technician might be a good way to describe him, but he's the guy that goes out as the hydrographer commissioner and observes the streams in action and makes determinations at the time to turn on or turn off headgates. And he's going to testify to his actions in those years that are at issue, and part of that is going to be, "Well, on this day I went out and I shut

1 this headgate off."

"Well why did you do that?"

And the answer that flows from the "why" question is going to be a mixture of fact and opinion and is going to be based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.

Am I going to ask him, "What do you think, have you formed an opinion about what goes on in Montana that you formed specifically for purposes of this case?" No.

And I think we said that three different times to Montana that we're not going to be offering these witnesses to give testimony that they formed specifically from -- for this litigation as opposed to fact and opinion testimony that they formed in the ordinary course of their job. And I would expect the employees to testify for the State of Montana to give similar kinds of testimony.

You know, I can imagine Mr. Moy, who wasn't designated, get on the stand and say, "You did this in a particular year; why did you do that?" And he is, you know, by all accounts an expert in his particular field and has a certain amount of expertise, and he's going to say why. And that's going to implicate, technically, the language of 702.

So I don't know how many times I have to tell them, to reassure them of the fact that these are going to

be limited to the perceptions of our witnesses, but this
will be the fourth time.

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So I understand what you're saying, Mr. Kaste. In fairness to Montana, though, the designations were broad enough that it was not clear. And so one of the things I am trying to decide right now is whether or not there is still any disagreement between the parties that might come back and haunt us at a later point in time. So that's the reason why I'm trying to get into this particular hypothetical. And I appreciate your directness in the answers to them.

So let me just continue on Mr. Boyd and try to extend it in the way of a hypothetical.

Again, what I want to make sure is that you and Montana are not saying basically the same thing, but, in fact, interpreting what you're saying in very different ways, because then we could just end up with the same problem four months from now. I want to avoid that. So I don't think this is the case.

But let's assume that Mr. Boyd, for example, actually used some type of a mathematical model that could extrapolate from a particular gauge that was measuring some return flow as to overall return flow. Certainly, to the degree that he used that model, I would assume that at trial he would testify that he used such and such a model

in actually determining the return flow. If he also wanted to testify as to the reliability of that particular model, was that -- which side of the line would you put that?

MR. KASTE: Well --

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: You see, This is a problem for me only because, as I say, I'm dealing with this totally in the abstract. This might not even be an issue.

MR. KASTE: I seriously doubt that it would. But I guess there's a distinction to be made. Was the model created after the litigation was initiated by Mr. Boyd in order to explain events or is it a model that has been in the office and that they rely on?

And there are -- there are certain things like that. Like we have stream diagrams and, oh, there are a couple of cheat sheets that the Sheridan office uses there to help guide them as they regulate the streams.

Those kinds of things, I think it would be perfectly appropriate for a person like Mr. Boyd to say, "Oh, I have that cheat sheet and I use it," and if he participated in the development of it, to explain how he development -- how he developed it and whether he thought it was reliable because he developed it.

Now, those cheat sheets, of course, have been

produced in the course of discovery and discussed during the course of the depositions because they're just, you know, the facts on the ground about how we regulate here in Wyoming. That's fair game.

Now, if after the litigation began, Mr. Boyd created a mathematical cheat sheet that helped explain actions that we took in the past for purposes of this litigation only, that would have to be disclosed, and that would have to be discussed specifically in the course of his expert designation. There's no such -- there's no such thing like that, and we're not purporting in the course of our disclosure that any of these witnesses have done any activity like that, except the three people that we retained to do the scientific analysis specifically for purposes of this litigation, and those individuals gave extensive reports and were disclosed in a very different manner than the kind of hybrid-fact experts that we have identified as our employees.

So there's a dividing line there between prelitigation and post, and the prelitigation materials like that have all been disclosed and discussed in the course of discovery.

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. So let me turn, then, over to Mr. Draper. And so I am interested in your thoughts on that, along the questions that I had with

1 Mr. Kaste.

And, also, I am assuming that whatever the dividing line is here is one that applies both to Montana and Wyoming.

MR. DRAPER: Yes, Your Honor. This is John Draper.

I've been listening with interest to your colloquy with Mr. Kaste. Basic facts are here that Wyoming designated these 13 individuals that are in question as experts and is seeking to have them accorded the special status of an expert in this litigation, and yet they are refusing, at least so far, to follow Rule 26 requirements that every expert including the type of expert we're talking here about who doesn't submit his formal report, but nevertheless have submitted on his or her behalf a summary of the facts and opinions to which that expert will testify.

I think what I've hearing from Mr. Kaste is that these 13 witnesses are, in essence, fact witnesses, but at the same time he is refusing to agree to have them stricken from the expert designation list.

And I think your hypothetical was particularly helpful where you talked about Mr. Boyd and the difference between measuring quantity of water physically on the one hand versus using that information to extrapolate to

determine the amount of return flows that were not directly observed. And I think when you make that step that you posited in your hypothetical, you're going from being a fact witness to an opinion witness.

If it's just -- you haven't done it if you're

Mr. Boyd and you say, "I measured this flow and someone
gave me this mathematical model and told me that it had
been used in the office, and if I put this number in here,
I should look at the number that comes out and enter that
in my records." That's still being a fact witness.

But if Mr. Boyd says, "And from that I could tell what the unobserved return flows were based on this model," then he has stepped over that line and gone into the area of expert testimony. And if he does that, then he needs to have been designated as an expert and have met the requirements for expert designation, which in this case is submitting a summary of the specific opinions and facts to which he will testify, and that has not been done.

So I would say that what we have here is a situation where Wyoming has not been forthcoming. They designated 13 people. They want them accorded a special status of being an expert, which allows them to do things that nonexperts cannot do at trial, and yet they are not forthcoming about the information that the Rule 26

requires. They have not given us the specific opinion in which they're going to testify and they have not given us a summary of the facts. So I think your hypothetical helped to bring out that distinction.

And there are many good reasons for the way the rules, which we believe are totally consistent, the way they put the dividing line between fact testimony and expert testimony, and that as I think Your Honor has alluded to, that it's really the testimony here that must be looked to to see whether we're talking about an expert designation or not.

If there is a claim, which apparently there is, by Wyoming that some or all of these 13 people have some kind of expertise that qualifies them to give expert opinions, that is something that needs to be tested against the opinions. Is it in an area that they claim to be experts? We have no idea. And that's the kind of rationale that is underlined rules, that I could go on at some length about why the rules are as they are, but the simple fact is they have not been forthcoming as the rules require and provide us the information that we should have and allow, and then as a follow-on to that, permission to take an expert deposition on the expert opinions that are properly revealed.

So maybe I'll stop there and see if you have

1 further questions for me, Your Honor.

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So I think there's two or three different issues that we need to resolve.

The first question is: Under what circumstances does somebody who is testifying as a percipient witness and testifying only to either things that they did or events that they were witness to need to be designated as expert witnesses?

And I understand from the papers that Wyoming's major concern there is that since a number of their witnesses, including people like Mr. Boyd, are acting in their employment in a scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized capacity, that they wanted to make sure that if they got to trial and start asking Mr. Boyd questions, that there's no objections that, in fact, that testimony is that of an expert, and since they didn't designate Mr. Boyd, they can't actually put Mr. Boyd on the stand.

And, you know, if that's the only issue here, then I think it can be readily resolved by simply -- simple ruling on my part that to the degree that somebody who is a percipient witness, they will be able to testify to everything that they observed and did even though it is based on scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge. So I think that is fairly easy to resolve.

My concern is that there is still some

disagreement between the two sides as to what actually falls into that particular category.

So one thing that would be helpful just as background, Mr. Draper, so -- so I didn't actually see your expert designation. So in addition to your designation of retained experts, did you designate any of your percipient witnesses also as experts?

MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, this is John Draper.

We did not designate any percipient witnesses as part of our expert designation. We designated experts who were specially hired for this and also experts who are in the employee -- in the employ of the State of Montana. And we submitted a summary of the facts and opinions for those who were employees, and we've submitted reports for those who have been specially engaged for this litigation.

And, of course, we will have percipient or fact witnesses, state officials and so on, who will testify as to facts, but we did not include them on the expert disclosure list because simply testifying to a fact as some action that was taken or even why the action was taken.

If you ask -- if you ask an official why he took an action, he can tell you as a matter of fact why he took it. And that is not expert testimony. So we felt that our distinction between those two categories, the experts

on the one hand and the fact witnesses on the other, was properly drawn. And we disclosed either through reports or through summaries of facts and opinions of all of the information required by Rule 26 with respect to our experts.

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: And so, again, to the degree that you had a witness who you placed on the stand who has been involved in measurements of, say, flow across the border or -- you know, and they testify as to what was measured at a particular stage, they then talk about modeling that they engaged in in order to actually try to extrapolate from that piece of information as to what the overall flow was, that would all be, in your view, factual testimony, not expert testimony. Is that right? I am just going to take this a step at a time.

MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, this is John Draper again.

As to what is actually observed or experienced, that is fact testimony. If they -- if a witness seeks to assert a fact that he did not observe, something that is the result of analysis that by its nature takes expertise in hydrologic modeling, for instance, then I think you have crossed into the area of expert testimony. But certainly, as I mentioned with respect to Mr. Boyd, if he simply is stating that he performed certain functions,

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

that -- that is unobjectionable as a statement of fact.

If he then is asked to go into whether those -whether the results represent something in particular and
whether it is reliable to rely on those quantifications
that he did not actually measure, then I think you're in
the area of expert testimony.

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: I understand.

So, again, going back to my hypothetical -- and, again, I realize this doesn't bear any resemblance to the actual facts of this particular case -- but if the function of a Montana official to actually try to determine how much water is going over the border from Wyoming in a particular river or a stream and there is a gauge that he measures, and then he applies a particular model that he has applied for 20 different -- you know, for 20 years and has close familiarity with it and he uses that and comes up with a particular figure, the fact that he actually took the measurement of the gauge, he used his model, he came up with a particular figure for what he thought the flow over the border was and then maybe took some action on that, all of that, to the degree it is simply talking about the steps he took and his experience in doing it and how he went about doing it, all of that strikes me at least as factual testimony, but then once he is then asked, "In your opinion, is that a" -- you know,

1 "is that a reliable and valid model for actually determining the amount?" that would be opinion testimony. 2 3 Is that a correct statement of how you would view it? 4 5 MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, this is John Draper. 6 Yes, that is. 7 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. And, Mr. Kaste, as I understand it, though, you would -- you know, you, I 8 9 would assume, plan to ask some of those latter type of 10 questions? 11 MR. KASTE: Well --12 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Is that -- and, again, 13 I don't want to make an issue that isn't here, but I just 14 want to make sure that we don't -- decide we don't have an 15 issue and then find out we do later. 16 MR. KASTE: Well, I'm trying to think of a situation where we do something like that, and one that is 17 18 springing to mind --19 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: I mean --20 MR. KASTE: Let me just say, what it highlights 21 to me is that the proper resolution of these issues will 22 be in response to the specific questions at trial. And 23 I'm -- I will ask a guestion of a witness at trial, and as 24 you would in any case, the opposing party can get up and

say, "Wait a minute, you dirty cheaters, you're surprising

25

me with testimony that wasn't designated, and it's expert testimony. I object." And then you can rule on it at that time in the context of those specific facts. And the ruling at that time should be pretty easy. Right now I think it's almost impossible.

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So I agree we're working in the area of hypotheticals, and that's always very dangerous. And -- but here's my -- here's my concern, and it's the one thing I want to avoid.

So I agree with the papers of Montana this morning, and, you know, you haven't had a response to me to respond to it in full, so you might agree with it, also, that what is determinative of opinion testimony is not the expertise of the witness, but the nature of the question. And, in theory, where it is going to probably be an opinion is where you are likely to want to frame the question of, "In your opinion, is this model a valid model?" Or you, know, "In your opinion, were those Montana water rights we didn't see used for a period of time, you know, in your opinion based all your years of expertise in Wyoming, you know, would those have been abandoned?" You know, that sounds an awful lot like opinion testimony to me.

We can -- obviously, we have to wait until trial to actually make a determination as to what specific

1 questions are expert questions and opinion questions. But to the degree that there is a significant category of 2 3 questions that you believe you will be asking your 4 witnesses that would fall into that latter category of, 5 you know, they're really asking somebody for their 6 opinion, not what they actually did, not how many years 7 they did it, not the actions that they took on it, but 8 whether or not, for example, a particular methodology is reliable, then if at that point you ask a question and you 9 10 did not actually say that that is going to be one of the specific opinions that you were going to ask, then at that 12 point -- and there's not been any further deposition, then 13 Mr. Draper at that point in the middle of trial is going 14 to say, "You know, this was what we talked about before, 15 you know; Wyoming just asked an opinion guestion, and we 16 didn't have our opportunity to depose them, and they 17 didn't really satisfy Rule 26." 18 And I'll be honest, I'll be sympathetic to that

because it does sound more like an opinion at that stage.

> MR. KASTE: I am --

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: I just want to make sure, you know, then that we don't have a huge category here that we're missing.

> I'm telling you, I told you in MR. KASTE: No.

11

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

my papers, and I'll tell you again, these people are going to be asked about their jobs and their involvement in this litigation. And that's it. But that testimony about their job is going to have, you know, the reasons why they do things are based on their knowledge of scientific, technical, or otherwise special information. They're going to say, "I did this because I know thus and so."

And I think that that, you know, is on that verge, but it doesn't cross into the area where they need to be specially designated because those opinions are not -- you know, those are the opinions inherent in the performance of their duties, and they're used to explain their conduct at the time, as opposed to developed specially for purpose of this litigation. And we are not going to ask them about opinions they have developed specially for purposes of this litigation.

And I'm perfectly fine dealing with this on a question by question basis because we're not going to ask these questions of these witnesses, and I suspect Montana -- or I hope Montana is not going to do the same with their undesignated witnesses.

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Yeah. Well, that's why, as I said a moment ago, the one nice thing about this particular question is it is going to apply equally to both sides.

Okay. So what I would then propose that we do, given that my understanding is that Wyoming designated these various other experts out of caution to make sure that, in fact, they were, you know, providing notice that these people would be testifying, but that they're only going to be testifying as percipient witnesses is -- is two things.

Number one, that we do remove these witnesses from Wyoming's disclosure, but that I also -- I'm sorry, that's just another line. I thought I'd lost you all.

Going back to my last point, that I enter a relatively short order making it clear that that witnesses for all sides can testify to facts as a percipient witness, even though those facts involve that person's role as a scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized employment.

Does that make sense?

MR. KASTE: That's acceptable to the State of Wyoming, Your Honor. And if you just want to do an order that says for purposes of this litigation, we'll proceed as if those folks are off the list and don't make me have to go cut and paste out these people and clutter the Court file with a revised designation, that would be fine.

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. I'd be happy to do that.

And what I will do, in fact, is I will -- you know, just do, again, to make sure that there's no disagreement here, what I would propose is that I do this as a draft order and then circulate to all sides, and if anyone has any concerns, they can let me know, and then I'll enter it as a final.

MR. FOX: Your Honor, this is Tim Fox. May I ask a question?

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Yes, you may.

MR. FOX: Just so we're clear on this end, so Wyoming is not going to be required to strike the 13 individuals from a revised expert disclosure pleading, but, in fact, the Court is ordering that they are stricken and they are not then designated as experts. Is that correct, Your Honor?

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: That is correct.

MR. FOX: Thank you, Your Honor.

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: And so, Mr. Draper, any comments on that solution?

Again, I just want to make sure that, you know, as I understand Wyoming's concern is that if they didn't designate them, they would run into problems because somebody would object that because of the fact that they have scientific or technical expertise, anything that they say is maybe expert testimony. I don't think that's

right. I don't think that is a valid objection. So I

just am going to basically strike all of those expert

designations, but at the same time make it clear that they

can testify as percipient witnesses even though it,

obviously, it's -- percipient witnesses are frequently

taking actions as a scientific or technical expert.

MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, this is John Draper.

That is fine with us, especially with the clarification provided by your discussion with Attorney General Fox.

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. Then I will go ahead and prepare something. As I say, I will circulate it around just to make sure that people are satisfied with the language. And so hopefully this has clarified this particular issue.

You know, I know that sometimes that discovery can be contentious, and, you know, this -- hopefully things like this can be resolved in the future without having a hearing. By the same time, though, looking at Montana's papers, I thought it was appropriate to -- well, to have a hearing because there were some clear uncertainties that made it necessary.

So I appreciate all of your time, and I will let you get back to your work.

MR. KASTE: Thank you very much.

1	
1	MR. DRAPER: Thank you, Your Honor.
2	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Thank you, all.
3	
4	(End of proceedings at 11:14 A.M.)
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
2) ss
3	COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO)
4	I, ANTONIA SUEOKA, Certified Shorthand Reporter
5	No. 9007, State of California, do hereby certify:
6	That said proceedings were taken at the time and
7	place therein named and were reported by me in shorthand
8	and transcribed by means of computer-aided transcription,
9	and that the foregoing pages are a full, complete, and
10	true record of said proceedings.
11	And I further certify that I am a disinterested
12	person and am in no way interested in the outcome of said
13	action, or connected with or related to any of the parties
14	in said action, or to their respective counsel.
15	The dismantling, unsealing, or unbinding of the
16	original transcript will render the reporter's certificate
17	null and void.
18	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
19	this 30th day of April, 2013.
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	Antonia Sueoka, RPR, CSR NO. 9007