TELEPHONIC STATUS HEARING HEARING BEFORE SPECIAL MASTER BARTON THOMPSON

CAUSE NO.: 220137 ORG

July 29, 2011

Reported by: LINDA K. POOL, CSR 8941, CCRR

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1	TELEPHONIC STATUS HEARING
2	reported at 2224 Third Avenue, San Diego, California
3	92101, commencing on Friday, July 29, 2011, at
4	10:00 a.m., before Linda K. Pool, Certified Shorthand
5	Reporter in and for the state of California, California
6	Certified Realtime Reporter.
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1 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA; FRIDAY, JULY 29, 2011 2 10:00 A.M. 3 4 Let's begin. And in a minute, MR. THOMPSON: 5 I will have counsel for each of the parties identify 6 themselves. 7 I need to apologize at the very outset to everyone that I just got back from Kenya on Wednesday 8 9 evening. And as always, the jet lag has kicked in on the second day. But I have had an opportunity to 10 thoroughly review all of the papers that were submitted 11 12 while I was gone and have found them guite useful. 13 so again, I just want to apologize if I sound a little 14 bit sleepy, you'll understand why. 15 So why don't we begin with identification of counsel for the parties. 16 17 So is counsel for Montana on the line? 18 Yes, Your Honor. This is MR. DRAPER: 19 John Draper. Also on the line with us is Jeffrey J. 20 Wexler, 21 Jennifer Anders, and Andrew Huff, H-u-f-f. 22 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Draper. 23 So next, counsel for Wyoming. 24 MR. MICHAEL: Yes, Your Honor. Peter Michael. And with me here at the conference room is Jay Jerde, 25

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- Andrew Kuhlmann, Kaycee McMullin, David Willms, and a student intern, Curran Trick.
 - THE REPORTER: I am going to need help with the spellings of those names.
 - MR. MICHAEL: Certainly. I can give you my phone number as well, let me do that, in case there's a spelling later on. (307) 777-6196.
- And Peter Michael is Peter, normal spelling,

 and Michael, just like you would spell the first name,

 M-i-c-h-a-e-l. Jay Jerde is J-a-y J-e-r-d-e.
- Andrew Kuhlmann is normal spelling for Andrew, and last name is K-u-h-l-m-a-n-n. David Willms, normal spelling for David, and the last name is W-i-l-l-m-s.
- Kaycee McMullin is K-a-y-c-e-e M-c-M-u-l-l-i-n. And the final name is Curran Trick. That's C-u-r-r-a-n, and the last name is T-r-i-c-k.
 - MR. THOMPSON: And next is counsel for North Dakota on the line?
 - MS. VERLEGER: This is Jennifer Verleger. And to finish my phone number from before for the court reporter, it's (701) 328-3640.
- MR. THOMPSON: And next is counsel for the
 United States, which is Amicus in this case, on the
 line.
- MR. JAY: This is William Jay, assistant to

the Solicitor General from the United States. Last name is spelled J-a-y. Also on the phone is Jim Dubois.

MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Jay.

And next is any counsel for Amicus Northern Cheyenne tribe on the line?

MS. WHITEING: Yes, Your Honor. My name is Jeanne Whiteing, J-e-a-n-n-e, last name W-h-i-t-e-i-n-g.

MR. THOMPSON: And then finally is there any counsel for Amicus Anadarko?

MR. WINGMORE: Yes, Your Honor. This is

Michael Wingmore, M-i-c-h-a-e-l W-i-n-g-m-o-r-e, on the

line for Anadarko. I'm with Binghman B-i-n-g-h-m-a-n,

McCutchen M-c-C-u-t-c-h-e-n.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay. Thank you. And is there anyone else on the line who has not been identified?

Okay. Great.

So there are four specific items on my agenda for the telephone conference this morning. And in the order I'd like to discuss them, the first is the issue that I posed in case management, Order No. 7, as to whether Montana's argument that Wyoming has a set delivery obligation that varies only with water supply conditions is precluded by the Supreme Court's May 2nd, 2011, decision and/or my first interim report.

The second item on the agenda is the parties'

lists of issues of fact of law, and I have some questions regarding those lists, and then I would also like the parties' reactions to other parties' lists.

Then the third item is an identification of any legal issues that might be resolved at this stage in order to expedite for focused discovery, or that might otherwise expedite resolution of this case.

Then the fourth and final item on my agenda is the proposed case management plan. And then after that, if the parties have any other issues that they would like to address, we can turn to those.

So let me ask whether or not any of the parties have any comments on that agenda or would like to take it in any different order? I'll take that an ascent, then.

So let me start out with the issue which I've posed in this Case Management Order No. 7. As I mentioned, I had an opportunity now to read both Montana's and Wyoming's letter briefs regarding the question, and I've also had an opportunity to read the United States' letter brief on the issue of July 27th of 2011.

I've also gone back and reviewed both the Supreme Court's May 2nd decision and also my own first interim report. And rather than asking people to repeat

the arguments that they've already made, let me just tell you what my current thinking is regarding the issue that I've posed and then let the parties, and after that, any of the Amicus make any comments or give any authorities regarding my current thinking.

So I can look at everything. My current thinking is that it's both fundamental to, and in many cases explicit in, both the first interim report and the Supreme Court's May 2nd, 2011, decision, that Article 5(a) of the compact ensures that Montana receive sufficient water to satisfy its pre-1950 appropriative rights and does not necessarily guarantee Montana a set amount of water that varies only with water supply conditions.

So stating that slightly differently, Article 5(a) does not necessarily require Wyoming to deliver the amount of water that its pre-1950 appropriators were using in 1950, which is what I understand Montana's argument to be. Instead -- and again, I think both the first interim report and Supreme Court's May 2, 2011, decision clearly states what Article 5(a) requires is simply that Wyoming delivers sufficient water so that the pre-1950 appropriative right can continue to be enjoyed.

That conclusion would seem to me to lead to

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several other conclusions regarding liability in this case, which hopefully will help in discovery and then in any factual resolutions in this case.

The first conclusion is that in order to show that Wyoming has violated the compact in any particular year, Montana would need to show that at least some pre-1950 appropriative rights went unsatisfied. And if all pre-1950 appropriative rights in Montana were satisfied, then Wyoming's obligations under Article 5(a) of the compact would seem to be met.

Second of all -- and this is where I see this issue being potentially relevant, is where a pre-1950 appropriative right has been abandoned and no longer exists. There would not appear to be any obligation to deliver the amount of water that was originally used Now, this cuts both ways. under that right. So it would mean that Montana would not -- under the conclusions that I think are pretty clear in both the first interim report and the Supreme Court's decision --Montana wouldn't be able to demand water that was no longer needed under any continuing pre-1950 appropriative right. But similarly Wyoming wouldn't be able to claim under Article 5(a) a right to water that was originally used by a pre-1950 appropriator in that state, but that's since been abandoned. So I think that

actually cuts in both directions, although I know Montana is most concerned about it.

Now, those are the things that that conclusion seems to be most relevant to. But the conclusion would also seem to be relevant to but does not directly answer a variety of other questions that still need to be resolved. And I want to emphasize, you know, the limited nature of what I think has already been decided.

So one question that still needs to be resolved -- and again, the Supreme Court's opinions of my first interim report I think speak to this but don't necessarily resolve it, is what exactly Montana must demonstrate in order to prove a violation of Article 5(a).

As I mentioned a moment ago, I think both explicit to and fundamental in the first interim report in the Supreme Court's decision is the requirement that Montana show that a pre-1950 appropriative right has not been satisfied. But the Supreme Court's decision in the first interim report doesn't necessarily resolve, for example, the questions raised by Wyoming in its June 2008 letter brief, as to whether or not Montana would need to show damages by individual appropriators, whether or not Montana needs to notify Wyoming ahead of time that they believe that a pre-1950 appropriator is

not receiving sufficient water, whether or not Wyoming can assert a claim of futility, and exactly what, if any, intrastate remedies Montana has to turn to before asserting a claim against Wyoming.

So those questions still need to be resolved.

Although, again, the first interim report and the

Supreme Court's opinion certainly are relevant to those.

A second issue that still needs to be resolved is what the appropriate remedy is for any past violations.

A third question is the appropriate relief to ensure that there are no future violations. And I realize that at this point I'm -- I'm simply trying to illustrate what, for example, Montana might be able to argue.

As to appropriate relief regarding future violations, Montana might be able to -- well, successfully argue that the appropriate approach in the future is for Montana to let Wyoming know what pre-1950 appropriative rights exist and the quantities needed to satisfy them and that that could then form the bases for state line deliveries, which is somewhat similar to, I think, what Montana might be arguing right now.

You know, I think that question as to what the nature of that future relief would be like is I think

still open. Although again, the Supreme Court's opinion in the first interim report are relevant to it.

Then a fourth issue which I think is still open is what happens if there are any changes in the pre-1950 appropriative rights. As I mentioned a moment ago, if an appropriate right has been abandoned, then I think it's clear in both the first interim report and Supreme Court's opinion that you can't argue that you're still entitled to water because the pre-1950 appropriative right doesn't exist anymore.

But, for example, you could have water transfers. And so if somebody ordered a pre-1950 appropriative right transfer to somebody else, it would seem that the pre-1950 appropriative right still exists.

So I mention all of those issues with a little bit of elucidation not to suggest a particular conclusion, but simply to say that I don't think that is an issue -- or those are issues that have been resolved yet. But I do think that both the first interim report and the Supreme Court's May 2nd opinion clearly state that what Article 5(a) protects are the pre-1950 appropriative rights and don't guarantee Montana a set amount of water that varies only with water supply conditions.

That's my current thinking, and I am open to

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     comments by counsel for both Montana and Wyoming to
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     start as to their thoughts on that.
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               So let's start out with Mr. Draper.
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                            Thank you, Your Honor. This is
               MR. DRAPER:
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    John Draper.
               Our thought on the question of the A-line
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    delivery obligation is whether it can be at -- vary only
    with water conditions, is I think what our purpose here
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     is.
               (Pause in the proceedings.)
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               MR. THOMPSON: I'm still here. Let me just
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    make sure. Mr. Michael, are you still there?
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               MR. MICHAEL: Yes, we're still here, Your
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    Honor.
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               MR. THOMPSON: Is the court reporter still
     there?
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               THE REPORTER: Yes, I'm still here.
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               MR. THOMPSON: I'm going to assume for the
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    moment that everyone is on the line. And if anyone has
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    dropped off, they can come back on. But I'm most
21
     concerned to make sure the court reporter and counsel
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     for Wyoming and Montana are on the line.
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               So I'm sorry, Mr. Draper, for that
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     interruption.
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               MR. DRAPER:
                            Thank you, Your Honor.
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Our purpose in bringing this action in part was to establish what you referred as an appropriate remedy for future compliance, one that is workable -- MR. JAY: Joining the meeting.

MR. THOMPSON: Sorry, Mr. Jay. You haven't missed very much.

MR. JAY: Sorry. I was getting a lot of static on the line, and then the conference system or my own phone threw me off.

MR. THOMPSON: No problem. So again,
Mr. Draper. You were talking about the purpose of
Montana bringing the action.

MR. DRAPER: Yes.

-- was in large part to obtain a remedy for future compliance consistent with the compact, one that can be administered into practical matter and is simple to apply. We tend to think of that in terms of a state line delivery obligation. That's where the two states meet on this river. We do not want to impose any internal restrictions on water administration in Wyoming that are not necessary as long as Wyoming is meeting its obligations under the compact.

We have seen in the first interim report and in the Court's decision that the element -- one of the four elements that we alleged was causing insufficient

water past the state line is not recognizable as a cause of action with respect to the increased assumption on existing irrigated acreage, but we did not understand that to limit our allegations in -- in the Bill of Complaint.

I think Wyoming pointed out in Paragraph 8 of our Bill of Complaint, we had specifically referred to the obligation that we believe exists for a certain amount of water under specific conditions to be passed through the State line. We have seen that that can vary by virtue of a change in consumption on lands that were being irrigated as of January 1, 1950.

It may be that it can vary for other reasons, such as the ones that Your Honor has just mentioned if your notions on that turn out to be final ruling. But we believe it's important to be seeking a remedy here, and I think this is in the interest of all the parties and of the Court, that it's simple to apply, does not require further intervention by the Court in the future once this case reaches that remedy, and can be applied with a minimum of conditions and interrelated actions that have a strong potential for making the interstate relationship on these rivers impractical.

If there are -- if there are ways that the allocation between the States can vary, other than the

increased consumption on the irrigated lands such as the abandonment possibilities that Your Honor mentioned, first I think, and it's my way of thinking, that can be taken into account in setting a state line delivery requirement.

If those notions are in here in the compact and do have an effect on what the obligations are on Wyoming, those can be adjusted from time to time as those circumstances change. But at any given time, any given year, I would hope that we end up here with a remedy that is easy to apply and that can be applied real time so that in a given year there is the ability for Montana to enjoy the water that is protected by the compact be delivered to it.

So the notion of a delivery protocol, I don't think is inconsistent with that. I didn't understand the court to be saying that it was; that our allegation in Paragraph 8 was somehow deficient in that regard with respect to the other three alleged types of violations.

I think that that is not inconsistent with what Your Honor has mentioned in terms of your initial thinking on these issues. I do believe that it is appropriate for the state to be allowed to directly confront the issue which has not been put to bed in terms of whether there is such a loan and on what

conditions it can vary, and the Special Master has been very careful in that regard not to apply a decision to the State without direct briefing.

I recall that the Special Master withdrew the initial decision on the tributary question raised by Wyoming when Wyoming objected that it hadn't had an opportunity to fully brief that issue, and then it was subsequently handled through a motion of summary judgment.

So I think in sum that it is appropriate for the Special Master to allow briefing on the issue of the State line delivery requirement and what it -- what it consists of, and the Master can then guide the parties directly to what that is going to be determined to be, and it will set the limits for the first phase of discovery, which is to determine whether the compact has been violated and, if so, to what extent in terms of acre feet leading to the second phase, the question of what remedies are appropriate under those circumstances.

MR. THOMPSON: Mr. Michael?

MR. MICHAEL: Yes, Your Honor. Just a few comments on what you had said.

I just kind of repeat back to you what I understood what you were saying was that you essentially agree with the position that Wyoming and the United

States have taken with respect to this concept of a set quantity variable only by hydrologic conditions being the interpretation of 5(a). I'm hearing you say that you believe that's been decided against Montana.

And where we were at our last case management conference was -- the question was should this issue be further briefed on its merits? We've done our preliminary briefing, and if what you just said -- I understand what you just said correctly, then we certainly have no reason to brief that issue again. It's been decided.

There are some issues that you identified which pretty much I go through the list and I agree with every one of them that are still out there. And the one that I guess I see that maybe is causing a little confusion here is the issue under remedy -- or after remedy you talk about relief for future violations. You mention State line deliveries. And, of course, under the concept of a pre-1950 Wyoming -- or a pre-1950 Montana right not being satisfied if Montana were to notify Wyoming that's not happening, Wyoming does need to curtail posted uses in Wyoming under the -- what we are now bound by. That's the Court's theory in the case, which we did not take exception to.

So there is in a sense a -- maybe I can call

it a State line delivery with a small v, which is
Wyoming has the capability of only operating -- having
its administrators operate within our jurisdiction. We
can't send our hydrographer commissioners into Montana
to shepherd water from the State line to a Montana
irrigator that's not receiving their water.

But under the circumstance of relief for future violations, surely one of the things that needs to happen in this case is if on a constant basis was, I think, the phrase you used, Your Honor, in your first interim report -- if on a constant basis Montana could show that in a particular water year at a particular time it was not receiving or notified Wyoming in its pre-1950 water use was not getting water and Wyoming had post-'50s on, Wyoming would have to cut that post-'50 water user off, and the water presumably would make its way to the State line and obviously if it's picked up by another pre-'50 in Wyoming maybe it's a futile call. That's an issue for another day, I think.

So there is this concept of this State line delivery in the relief part of the case remaining, but it's not a State line delivery of a mass quantity of water dictated by overall hydrology. It's simply a delivery that occurs through operation of this prior appropriation scheme that the Supreme Court identified

on Page 6 of its decision. We have a scheme by which a pre-'50 Montana can be satisfied if the Wyoming post-'50 needs to be shut off to do so.

So I want to make that distinction, I guess.

I think you had it in mind when you talk about the future concept of the State line delivery, that that's not the concept we just fought about and that the Court has already decided.

So I just wanted to make that little proviso. I think it's my understanding of where we are with what you said, and I agree with what you said about the overall issue of preclusion. Thank you.

MR. THOMPSON: So let me try and state again what my current thinking is and address specifically your question, Mr. Michael, and hopefully also be responsive to the particular concerns that Mr. Draper raised.

So again, I think it's clear on both the first interim report and the Supreme Court's May 2, 2011, decision, that what Article 5(a) of the compact is all about is ensuring the pre-1950 appropriative rights are satisfied, and if they're satisfied, then at the end of the -- of the issue under Article 5(a). I think that, as I say, is both fundamental to and explicit in both the first interim, the Supreme Court's May 2, 2011,

decision. At the moment I see no reason for rebriefing or reconsidering that particular question.

So that would seem to preclude what I thought was Montana's alternative argument, which is basically that what the -- what section or what Article 5(a) of the compact did was guarantee to Montana delivery of that amount of water that was being used by pre-1950 appropriators prior to the compact.

So it's not a set amount of water that varies from year to year only based on hydrological conditions. It is focused specifically on what is necessary to satisfy the rights of the pre-1950 appropriators in Montana, and that is the obligation under the compact to Montana.

As Mr. Draper mentioned, however, the remedy for future compliance, which is an issue for resolution later in this case, hopefully will be one which as Mr. Draper pointed out is workable and practicable for the parties and obviously needs to be consistent with the terms of the compact itself.

What I'm suggesting is still an open question is the nature of that remedy. So one possibility which, Mr. Michael, I know Wyoming has raised in its papers would be one that is basically sort of a straightforward call on the river. So if Montana discovers in any

particular year that at some point its pre-1950 appropriators are not getting sufficient water, they would call up Wyoming, say, "You know, we're not getting sufficient water to these particular users," and then Wyoming would need to reoperate its own diversion systems in order to ensure that sufficient water goes down to Montana to meet those pre-1950 rights.

And, of course, that's reserving a variety of questions that you've also raised regarding potential claim of futility, a claim that Montana really doesn't need the water because it's consolidated through an intrastate remedy. That would be one approach.

A second approach, which I could see

Mr. Michael arguing for Montana, might be instead one
that says what Montana would supply to Wyoming would be
a list of pre-1950 appropriative rights in Montana and
the amount of water necessary to satisfy those
particular rights, and then Wyoming would have an
obligation from the outset to ensure that sufficient
water was going down to meet that amount of water, and
Montana would not have to wait until somebody in Montana
complained that they weren't getting sufficient water
for Wyoming to initially take action to ensure that
those Montana appropriations are met.

Now, I'm saying that particular question I

think still needs to be decided, and I don't want to preclude Mr. Michael from arguing for a type of remedy which, again, focuses specifically on ensuring that existing pre-1950 appropriative rights are still met, which I think is what both the decision and the interim report both emphasize.

So it's still linked to that but could be a different approach which is similar to one Mr. Draper is arguing. And I can see him arguing that that's, you know, a more workable and practicable approach. So I'm just saying that particular question I think is still open.

But it would be linked to protection of pre-1950 appropriators, not to the notion that the compact guarantees a specific amount that only varies the hydrologic conditions and has nothing to do with the -- what our remaining pre-1950 appropriative rights and the amount of water needed to satisfy those rights.

So, Mr. Michael, does that help and does that cause you concern?

MR. MICHAEL: I understand what you just said.

I guess the question it does raise, though -- and, again, I'm understanding you're saying that in the context of injunctive relief.

MR. THOMPSON: That's right. Thinking about

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future relief in terms of any past injuries, there as I said I think under both the May 2 decision and also the first interim report, it would be incumbent upon Montana to show that at least some pre-1950 appropriative rights went unsatisfied in particular years. That would be a minimum.

And then the question is, you know, what in addition to that Montana would have to show.

MR. MICHAEL: I think we've made it quite clear -- this is Pete Michael again -- from Wyoming's standpoint that the other part of that is they would have to show it was caused by Wyoming satisfying some kind of a post-'50 at a time it had an impact. It couldn't be based on a pre-'50 and Wyoming having simply satisfied their rights.

MR. THOMPSON: That's correct under Article 5(a). But what is -- what would still be open is the question of if they had not notified Wyoming, for example, in a particular year that a pre-1950 appropriator had not received the water to which they are entitled in the compact, would that preclude any claim for damages or other relief for that prior year. Or, again, you know, the kind of issues you raised in your June 28 letter brief would still be open.

So you're absolutely right. They would have

to show at a minimum both at least some 1950

appropriative rights are unsatisfied and that they went

unsatisfied because Wyoming instead delivered that water

to post-1950 appropriators.

MR. MICHAEL: I'll just finish my thought and then I hear Mr. Draper wants to step in, of course.

As far as the future violation or remedies or injunctive type of future stuff, as far as I'm concerned, I'm perfectly satisfied to have -- that that has not been determined, that that's wide open; inconsistent with the compact, of course, and wide open in the sense that both parties can argue what would be consistent with the compact and also what we think would be advisable and appropriate.

So obviously that issue is still open, what it may be and I considered that such. So I don't have any concerns in that regard.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay. And Mr. Draper?

MR. DRAPER: Yes, Your Honor. This is John Draper.

I think the concept that you outlined is largely consistent with our thinking. I would point out that with -- that there is, I think, a strong argument that this -- this contact can be administered and enforced without the need in a given year for Montana

water officials to be going up into Wyoming and making an assessment of whether any post-'50 rights are on a particular day diverting water, and this goes hand in hand with the fact that as you begin a water year, you don't know what the water supply conditions are going to be on any given day. So you need a protocol that allows the State to understand what their obligations are as those water supply conditions vary.

It seems to me that it is a practical thing to determine and -- something that we expect to determine in this proceeding, to under -- under a range of water supply conditions what the pre-1950 Wyoming water rights are using and under both conditions what is passing the State line that's available for Montana pre-1950 users and that that protocol, it makes up things like abandonment, then those can be taken into account at the beginning of the season.

But that as the water supply conditions vary during the season, there is -- there is a protocol that allows Wyoming to know what its obligations are. And on the other hand, it also means that without the necessity for daily calls that come on and off the river that Montana can expect that the water that should be coming to it under the ruling of the Court as to what the extent of its allocation is under the compact will

arrive in a self-executing manner and that there is not a need for either the State as a whole or individuals to be placing calls against Wyoming as a state or as individuals in Wyoming.

It seems to me that your concept is more than consistent with our thinking, as long as it's understood that for any given season there is -- at least there is an expectation of what needs to be supplied under whatever water conditions turn out to exist in that -- in that season, and that concept is not inconsistent with your notion that abandoned water rights on either side of the line could affect that protocol.

And yet the idea that there might be a need to go into Wyoming, state representatives from Montana, on an ongoing basis to check post-'50 uses and to put in a call in order to be entitled to receive the water that is necessary seem to go beyond what the compact requires.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay. Thank you.

So I think I understand, you know, what you're arguing for, Mr. Draper. And what I'm suggesting is that I think the question of how the compact should be administered in the future in order to ensure that Montana's rights under Article 5(a) are met is a question that still needs to be resolved.

So you are free, as the remedy states, to argue that it is both consistent with the powers of the Supreme Court and consistent with the terms of the compact that there be a protocol that provides some foresight as to what Wyoming would need to provide in Montana in order to meet those pre-1950 appropriative rights of Montana.

Mr. Draper is free to argue that it should be based purely on a call system where Montana alerts
Wyoming to the degree that Montana's rights under
Article 5(a) are not being met.

And this is the key thing: Whatever that remedy be, it needs to be focused on ensuring that pre-1950 appropriative rights in Montana are satisfied and is not determined by some specific amount that varies according to hydrological conditions but does not deal with what water is currently necessary in order to satisfy those pre-1950 appropriative rights.

Furthermore, again, thinking about any past injuries, those past injuries in order to establish a past injury, Montana would need to show that at least some pre-1950 appropriative rights were not satisfied in a given year; furthermore, that they were not satisfied because of one of the specific allegations in Montana's complaint that -- that remains in this case. So, in

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other words, delivery of water to post-1950 appropriator ground water diversions and the like.

So again, I think the exact relief is something which is still open for future discussion and decision. But again, this all needs to focus on those pre-1950 appropriative rights and not the amount the water, for example, that Montana was using in those pre-1950 appropriative rights at the time of the compact.

Any other comments from first Mr. Draper or Mr. Michael?

MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, this is John Draper. We have been talking in terms of future remedies. You turned our attention appropriately to the past remedy, and there is an overlap there. For instance, if there is a call requirement and that's something that has to be presumably established as having occurred in the past.

So these issues do relate to the past damages, past alleged violations, and whether -- whether there's been some economic injury in those past years to water users as a result of not receiving their water, whether that's a relevant consideration which needs to be a part of what Wyoming is alleging, those factors have to be determined, I think.

MR. THOMPSON: So Mr. Draper, I agree with you, I think, as I understood what you said, with the question that those issues still remain to be resolved. But again, what I think is clear is that with respect to past injury is at a minimum, Montana needs to show that at least some pre-1950 appropriative rights went unsatisfied, and second of all, they went unsatisfied because of deliveries to post-1950 appropriators or ground water users in Wyoming.

And as to whether or not there would be any additional requirements for Montana to establish liability for prior years, those are questions which I believe still remain to be resolved and have not been explicitly decided by either the Supreme Court's decision or my first interim report, although obviously elements of both the opinion or the first interim report might speak to or be relevant in the time at issue.

MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, this is John Draper.

I agree with what you just said.

MR. MICHAEL: Your Honor, Peter Michael. I also agree with that. There are some issues that obviously have been spoken to and fully briefed and argued, and we know what those are. It was our initial theory of the compact it's been taken care of and we've lost. And also the issue of groundwater has been fully

1 briefed and Wyoming's lost, and we've taken our lumps 2 and not taken exception.

But I agree on the other issues that you've mentioned, that absolutely they are for future determination with respect to past violations.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay. Do you any of the -- does either North Dakota or any of the Amicus want to add anything?

MS. VERLEGER: Nothing from North Dakota, Your Honor.

MS. WHITEING: Your Honor, this is Jeanne Whiteing for the Northern Cheyenne tribe.

I just want to point out that there is a group of water rights that are not involved in this current case that are also addressed in the compact, and that is the reserved water rights of Indian tribes. And the extent to which either state may have obligations relating to those water rights, as I understand it, are not at issue in this case, but to the extent that the parties to this proceeding are expecting that there will be a full resolution of how the compact works from this point forward, I just want to point out that those are issues that would have to be addressed at some point in the future.

MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Ms. Whiteing. I

agree with you entirely on that, and I think it's important to make clear that Article 6 of the compact explicitly states that nothing in the compact can be construed or interpreted as adversely affecting any rights to the use of waters of the Yellowstone River and its tributaries held by Indian tribes and its reservation.

So what we have been discussing so far has involved only the state pre-1950 appropriative rights that are addressed in Article 5(a) of the compact, and that obviously any remedy with respect to Montana's Bill of Complaint do not address all of the water rights to the Yellowstone River. Because, as you point out again, Indian water rights are not addressed by the compact, and nothing in the compact should be interpreted as adversely affecting it.

MS. WHITEING: The only thing I would add,
Your Honor -- this is Jeanne Whiteing -- they actually
are addressed insofar as they say that the compact shall
not be interpreted to adversely affect those rights.

MR. THOMPSON: That's fair. That's fair enough. I stand corrected in my specific comment.

Any other comments on this? So what I would propose doing is probably putting what we have discussed down in just a very short memorandum opinion so that

there's no confusion whatsoever on this particular
point, and I will do that and circulate that within the
next week.

So hopefully that will resolve the specific issue, as I said, I pose in Case Management Order No. 7, and in this I will explicitly note what I think are issues which are still open and will need to be resolved later in this case. Okay?

So why don't we turn, then, to the second item on the agenda, which are the two parties' initial lists of issues of law and fact.

Why don't I start out by asking both parties whether they've been able to see the other parties' issues of law and fact and whether they have any concerns.

MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, this is John Draper. I frankly have not had a chance to do a close comparison. There are many areas I think where they overlap and will be affected by the order that you're going to be vetting out and will be refined in light of that other.

So I don't have any other comment at this point other than that.

MR. THOMPSON: I'm just writing down initial reactions.

MR. MICHAEL: This is Peter Michael. I actually have several that I did want to mention.

MR. THOMPSON: I thought you might.

MR. MICHAEL: Page 2 of Montana's issues of law -- I'm sorry. No. 17 on the question of whether Wyoming has violated Article 5(a), the question of whether it could be a pre-'50 call from Montana on a pre-'50 water right in Wyoming, that's the way I read Montana's Issue No. 17. They're referenced to Beam versus Morris, for example.

And I think that issue is gone from the case, and I think that should not be identified as an issue going forward.

The Court on Page 6 of its Slip Opinion mentioned that explicitly and, in fact, referenced Montana's brief on exceptions, you know, noting that Montana -- indicating that Montana conceded that point. And we go all the way back to the beginning of the case when Montana conceded in the very first pleading before you were involved.

So I guess what we've got to put on the table in some fashion, because I don't think we can keep relitigating that. I shouldn't say "relitigating."

It's never been litigated. It was conceded from the beginning of the case. That's No. 1.

Then the second one follows immediately on Page 2, which is the question, Has Wyoming violated Article 5(b)? And I think in our last case management conference that came up. I maybe mentioned it in passing, but back when we had our argument at Stanford on a motion for summary judgment -- partial summary judgment, there was a lot of discussion about 5(b). My recollection is at this point -- and I think again it's in your interim report about where we stand there, that Montana -- I think everybody kind of stood down, was kind of what happened there. In other words, there wasn't a clear decision or -- or decision by you or recommendation by you as to whether Montana had actually pled a 5(b) violation.

I think your tendency was to say the pleading was broad enough to include a 5(b) violation. And I remember you questioned Mr. Draper several times on that asking him if Montana intended to proceed with the 5(b) violation at this point.

I think the United States' position on 5(b) was that it was not included in the pleadings and should not be something that we should be litigating in this case, and Montana would have to amend its pleading, which I guess is frowned upon by the Supreme Court if the case has been going on for a while.

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So I see this question coming up again. It kind of stirs up all that. And I guess the question then stands at this point, it's not my question, but I wonder if Montana does intend at this point to proceed with a 5(b) claim as well as a 5(a), because obviously that will have a huge impact on discovery in case management.

MR. DRAPER: These were issues that we listed as issues that will or may need to be resolved. The question of whether there's been an allocation among the Article 5(a) rights in here, say, has been questioned by implication at least by some of the filings in this case. If what I read is correct, our understanding of the case is that the allocation was that at the time of the compact, and it's not subject to the point of interstate litigation that we have seen across state lines. But depending on how that issue is resolved, we included that.

As to the question about Article 5(b) violations, we've always strongly rejected the notion that we are somehow limited to 5(a), and I think the understanding the Master has set out this morning that water rights under 5(a) can be abandoned. What that does, if that's true, is it pushes more water into the 5(b) area.

I mean if, for instance, all the water rights in a extreme area in Montana/Wyoming were abandoned on both sides of the state line, we'd only be dealing with 5(b) water. So these are dynamically interrelated sections of the compact. You cannot divorce them. We have pled this and expect to raise any specific 5(b) violations as discovery shows that that is appropriate.

The Master has noted certainly on the face of our Bill of Complaint, I've said it probably enough, to pursue that and not be in some kind of straight jacket would say that if there's violations of 5(b), that those -- that has not been pled and it's not a basis of which the Court granted our motion for lead.

We stated it clearly in our motions, and the Court granted it without exception to that -- to the breadth of that pleading.

So I think the discussion this morning has elucidated how those sections of Article 5 are interrelated. And depending on what the ultimate legal rulings are as to how the amount of 5(a) water that continues to exist, how that can change and everything else by the terms of the compact if it's not in 5(a) it's in 5(b), and so water can shift between those two sections, as to how it's treated under the compact depending on what's found with respect to the continuing

existence an amount of Article 5(a) rights.

In sum, that's why, in part anyway, that the Article 5(b) questions were included in our list of possible issues.

MR. THOMPSON: So it sounds to me as if with respect to Paragraph 17, at least at the moment there's no dispute among the parties on that question. But just to make clear, it does seem to me that the U.S. Supreme Court in its May 2, 2011, opinion explicitly addressed that particular question.

Mr. Michael pointed out on Page 6 in the final paragraph where the Court noted that for the Court's purposes Montana's pre-1950 water users are similar to junior appropriators. As between the states, the compact assigned the same seniority levels to all pre-1950 water users in Montana and Wyoming, and I think that's consistent with the first interim report, consistent with the history of the -- of the compact, and what the parties have agreed in the past.

So I do not see Paragraph 17 as one that will require any additional resolution. I think the issue in Paragraph 17 has been addressed.

With respect to Article 5(b), as I mentioned at the hearing in December of 2009 that was here at Stanford, I could imagine stipulations in theory with

1 Article 5 might be relevant. For example, if Wyoming 2 were to argue that Montana has some kind of an 3 intrastate remedy that it could impose -- sorry -- that 4 Montana has an intrastate remedy that it could use to 5 satisfy the needs of pre-1950 appropriators, if that particular remedy were then to in some way undermine 6 7 Montana's rights under Article 5(b), then that wouldn't seem to be a -- a viable approach to meeting the need of 8 9 a pre-1950 appropriative right. Article 5(b) I think has also been relevant in 10 11 interpreting Article 5(a). So at least at the moment, 12 I'm not concerned about the mention of Article 5(b). I 13 do have concerns, though, that several of the issues of 14 law which are listed under that Subsection (c) would seem to go beyond the complaints, focus on those 15 pre-1950 appropriative rights. 16 So particular 17 Paragraphs 20 to 22, it's not clear to me how those are 18 relevant to determining the rights of those pre-1950 --19 the rights of Montana to sufficient water to satisfy the 20 needs of those pre-1950 appropriators. 21 I want to make it very clear that this case is 22 not about water rights generally under Article 5 but 23 instead is about the rights under a prior corporation

And if there's any difference of opinion on

doctrine in Montana that existed as of January 1, 1950.

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that, that's something that we need to have a discussion
with on that.

MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, this is John Draper. I would stand by what I said at the hearing in December of 2009 at Stanford. We read this action broadly enough under 5 to include all violations of the compact under Article 5. And if -- if the discovery in this case reveals that there are obligations under 5(b) that Wyoming has breached, we have pled this sufficiently to pursue those breaches.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay. I'm trying to -- this probably isn't the most appropriate place for resolving this particular question, and I understand you to be saying right now that you are not making the argument at the moment. Is that correct?

MR. DRAPER: This is John Draper. Could you clarify your question?

MR. THOMPSON: So as I understood what you just said, you just said that you think the complaint is broad enough that if you saw a violation of Article 5(b) with respect to water rights that postdate January 1, 1950, you believe that the Bill of Complaint is broad enough to encompass that, but you're not saying that right now you are planning to necessarily make that claim. Depends on what you find?

1 MR. DRAPER: That's correct, Your Honor.

MR. THOMPSON: But does this suggest that you then intend to conduct discovery on satisfaction of water rights that postdate January 1, 1950?

MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, this is John Draper. The answer -- the short answer is yes. We're going to need to investigate the post-'50 uses in Wyoming. Those are the ones that on the one hand threaten a violation of our Article 5(a) rights. And at the same time, it follows the accounting that's necessary and done, there's the potential that it will have violated a right that Montana enjoys under Article 5(b).

I don't see it as being a separate area of discovery. It's simply an area that has to be investigated. And as Your Honor has pointed out repeatedly, it's -- one of the key elements under 5(a) is the extensive use of articles of 5(b), i.e., post January 1, 1950, water in -- or rights in Wyoming and what impact they have on Montana that you focused on, the Article 5(a) pre-1950 uses, and they will also become apparent what those impacts have been on uses generally.

MR. MICHAEL: Your Honor, may I comment? This is Peter Michael.

MR. THOMPSON: Yes.

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MR. MICHAEL: I understand that your first lead into this issue where you discuss the areas where Montana's 5(b) rights could be relevant in terms of interpretation tool or also on the proviso that if they haven't satisfied their water rights with interested remedies, they shouldn't have to do that if it would put them unfairly behind under 5(b), and I understand that completely, and I think that's totally correct.

The problem I face when we go on and say now this case is a 5(b) case, is it doesn't just affect what discovery Montana does, it affects what discovery Wyoming does. Because if it was a 5(a) case, I don't really care -- well, there's a possibility we may care about 5(b) uses in the context you mentioned. We may care whether a post-'50 water right in Montana was still on when pre-'50 Montana was not getting sufficient water. Again, that's in the 5(a) context. We might want to find that out.

But we really wouldn't care about all the 5(b) users on the Tongue and Powder River in Montana from 1950 to the present and ask Montana to tell us every drop of water that was diverted because, of course, as you know, 5(b) is based on quantity diverted to come up with the numbers through a particular date in a water year.

So if we're going to be looking for that kind of a violation, we not only need to know what post-'50 rights in Wyoming were diverted in various times, we also need to know what post-'50 rights were diverted in Montana at various times. And, in fact, under 5(b), presumably Montana could prove a violation from any day from 1950 to the present, unless there's some kind of laches argument or something on our behalf.

But in a 5(a) case, as I mentioned in our last case management call, if we move forward and decide whether Montana had to notify Wyoming, we may be reducing this case down to a very small case on just several years where Montana did notify Wyoming, for example, 2004 and 2006.

But if it's a 5(b) case, it's wide open for an enormous amount of discovery, if it's a direct 5(b) case. And we're not just worried about 5(b) case as a tangent to the 5(a) issue. So that's vital to have this resolved. I don't see any way around it.

MR. THOMPSON: I agree entirely that I think it needs to be resolved before we move into discovery. And let me use that into a segue into what I identified as the third item on the agenda, which is identification of any other legal issues that could be resolved at this stage that could expedite or focus discovery or

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1 otherwise expedite the resolution of the case.

MR. DRAPER: This is John Draper, Your Honor.

3 | If I may, since we are leaving that 5(b) discussion,

point out that nothing I heard Mr. Michael say expanded

the investigation of 5(b) uses beyond what is going to

happen at B in any event. There's no extra 5(b)

7 | discovery that needs to be done. It will all be sorted

8 | out. There's allegations -- or the possibility has been

suggested, well, Montana has let post-'50 users use the

water, and that's why the pre-1950 users were not

getting the water.

So that all requires post January 1, 1950, uses to be quantified and determines whether they're interfering in either state with pre-1950 users.

So I don't see any additional discovery here at all. I just wanted to mention that for the record. Thank you.

MR. THOMPSON: Thank you. So let me again turn to the third question, which was identification of other legal issues.

MR. MICHAEL: This is Peter Michael. The one that I've already mentioned, obviously last week or when we had our last case management conference a couple weeks ago, was this issue of notification or call. I do think that is one.

I think many of the other issues, no. The ones you've identified at the beginning of this conference, I think most of those are going to -- we'll just discover those and move forward in the normal course of events.

But I think this call issue really has the potential to really trim this case down and really save a lot of resources. The reason, again, is what I just said. If it is required as a matter of law for Montana to have notified Wyoming sometime between 1950 and 2011 as far as the past violation as a condition of that -- of their claim that they had to give some notification to Wyoming, I think that's a really important issue. Because if it's -- if it's decided there was a notification requirement and then it turns out that Montana didn't do so and, in fact, I'll just reference the Court.

In our argument back in Denver in early 2009 on the motion to dismiss, I notice when I was looking through that transcript, Montana's attorney Sarah Vaughn mentioned in response to specific questions from you when or if Montana made a call, she mentioned 2004.

I don't think she mentioned 2006. But I'm not aware of any other year. So boy, could that trim this case down if that issue is decided and save the parties

enormous amount of discovery. And that was the point I was making a minute ago about the 5(b) argument.

If the 5(b) argument is related -- is linked to the 5(a) argument, then the 5(b) argument would only apply in -- we'd only look at post-'50 uses in the years when Montana made a call, which would be 2004 and 2006, to my awareness.

And if that were the case, then we really wouldn't be looking at a massive amount of discovery on 5(b) diversions. We'd only be looking at two years. That's the one I really think needs serious consideration as a preliminary issue to save the parties a lot of time and maybe move this case along a lot faster, ultimately a lot faster. It would slow it down in the short term but faster in the long term.

MR. THOMPSON: Assuming it's resolved in your favor, right?

MR. MICHAEL: Assuming it was, right. If it wasn't, you know, it wouldn't have had much impact.

MR. THOMPSON: Mr. Draper?

MR. DRAPER: I don't disagree that if -- if it's a possibility that a call had to be made that we need to resolve that initially because that will -- if it were determined that Montana has no rights here unless it makes a contemporaneous call, that would limit

1 | the past claim for past violations considerably.

MR. THOMPSON: So in addition to the thoughts of Mr. Draper and Mr. Michael, any thoughts from any of the Amicus or from North Dakota?

MR. WINGMORE: Your Honor, this is
Michael Wingmore on behalf of Anadarko. The one issue
that I think could also help to narrow the scope of
discovery is it was pointed out in both Wyoming and
Montana's statement of issues that there are remaining
and legal factual issues relating to groundwater. And
as Mr. Michael had noted, I think the Special Master has
determined that some groundwaters may be covered by the
compact. It is not -- the compact is not limited solely
to surface water diversion.

Given that groundwater is likely to continue to be a significant issue in this case, the way we see it is that there -- it may be beneficial for the Special Master to initially rule on which of the groundwaters may implicate Montana's compact rights because then the discovery can be limited to those types of groundwaters.

For example, if, you know, just looking at opposite ends of the spectrum, you know, if the Special Master rules that only alluvial groundwaters are covered, that takes out a lot of issues with respect to not alluvial ground waters. While, on the other hand,

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if all Montana would have to show some hydrological connection, that certainly covers a much greater extent of the Yellowstone River Basin.

So I think it may be beneficial to initially resolve from a legal standpoint which groundwaters may be covered by the compact because then the factual issues of what groundwaters, in fact, satisfy that threshold are the only ones that are relevant to the case.

MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Wingmore.

Anyone else? Okay.

So my initial thoughts would be that it certainly at this stage would be valuable to resolve at least two of those questions at the outset. One is the question that you raised, Mr. Michael, with respect to whether or not to establish a prior violation of the compact it would have been incumbent upon Montana to have issued a call against Wyoming.

I think that is an issue that could be resolved without any type of -- of factual discovery, at least it sounds like it from both you and Mr. Draper's comments, and that that could potentially help in focusing and narrowing discovery.

The second issue that I'm inclined to try to resolve at this stage is the extent of claims that

Montana could make under Article 5(b). As I mentioned a moment ago, and I understand, Mr. Michael, you don't have any objection, that certainly there could be issues of Article 5(b) which are relevant in understanding what Wyoming's obligations are with respect to pre-1950 appropriators, but then there's the additional question as to whether or not under Montana's Bill of Complaint it also can raise issues with respect to water rights in Montana other than pre-1950 appropriative rights under Article 5(b).

And I think it's important that we resolve that question now so that both for purposes of discovery and for purposes of both parties preparing ultimately for trial that that particular condition be resolved.

With respect to Mr. Wingmore's suggestion that we try to resolve the groundwater question at the outset, the concern I have there is the same concern that I had in initially addressing Wyoming's motion to dismiss, and in my first interim report, that I find it hard to address that request without some factual investigation and background. I mean it's a difficult question to address purely on the law and in the abstract, but I would be interested in the thoughts of both Mr. Michael and Mr. Draper on that particular question as well as North Dakota and the other Amicus.

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So why don't I just go down and get the thoughts of counsel on what I've just suggested which is, you know, that we try to resolve at the outset the extent of the Article 5(b) questions and the question about whether or not Montana has to notify Wyoming that pre-1950 prior appropriators were not receiving the water to which Montana believes they were entitled.

Second of all, as I said, I would be interested in people's thoughts as to whether or not it's feasible to address the groundwater issue prior to at least some discovery on that issue.

So why don't I start out with you, Mr. Draper.

MR. DRAPER: Thank you, Your Honor. That's -that approach sounds fine to us, to treat the two issues
you specified now in terms of briefing, and to wait
until we know more about the facts relating to the
groundwater before trying to resolve that issue.

MR. THOMPSON: Mr. Michael?

MR. MICHAEL: Yes, Your Honor. Peter Michael.

I tend to agree, I guess, with what Mr. Draper said. I think the groundwater is the chicken and the egg problem. And to not have any facts on the table, I understand how valuable it would be to move on that, but I think you've got to have some facts. I guess I disagree with Mr. Wingmore on that.

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On the other two, though, I think you've got it just right, and I agree with that.

MR. THOMPSON: North Dakota?

MS. VERLEGER: I agree with everything that's said.

MR. THOMPSON: Many of the Amicus, and I understand, Mr. Wingmore, you know, why you would like to resolve the groundwater issue at the outset. If we could, then you would no longer need to participate in status conference calls or otherwise think about the case if the groundwater issue were resolved in a way that's favorable to you. But having thought about this extensively in connection with my memorandum opinion on the motion to dismiss and then again in putting together the first interim report, I'm pretty firm that it's difficult to address that question without at least some factual background.

MR. WINGMORE: This is Michael Wingmore.

We appreciate that, Your Honor. We understand it is a very complex issue. That would be fine with us. I think at some point we may seek to try and have that issue resolved once there is some factual development along those lines.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay. Either Northern Cheyenne Tribe or United States?

MS. WHITEING: This is Jeanne Whiteing. We don't have any additional issues to suggest, other than what has been laid out here.

MR. JAY: This is William Jay. We don't have anything further to add at this point to what Your Honor and the parties have already.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay. So in a moment, I want to come back, then, and talk about how we might brief both of the two questions that, as I suggested, I think we need to resolve at this point, both the Article 5(b) question and then the notification question.

But before that, let me just go on to proposed case management plan. So I've reviewed that, and one of my concerns under it is the amount of time that it contemplates for the -- of discovery on this first phase of the case which, as I understand it, would be one year after the date for the initial disclosures under Paragraph 8B(1), and then it looks like possibly something in the nature of six months or more after that for expert witnesses.

And the need to resolve these two issues before at least some of the discovery is conducted could delay this even -- even further, although I know resolution of it could shorten the amount of time needed.

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So I can tell you right now that what I want to do is try to shorten the amount of time that the proposed order provides for discovery. And in connection with that, I want to try to resolve these two issues as quickly as possible, and it sounds to me, particularly given the issue with respect to notification by Montana, that it might be difficult to even begin discovery to initially have those disclosures and begin discovery until that issue is resolved.

Let me rephrase that as a question, which is -- and this is to Mr. Draper and Mr. Michael: Do you see discovery beginning? And that would include the disclosures under Paragraph 8B(1) before we can resolve those first two questions?

MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, this is John Draper.

First, I'd like to clarify that the time frame that the parties have agreed here to suggest to you, that time period, the deadline set there is for producing not only expert reports but also other exhibits and witnesses. So it's the whole -- it's everything. They are not just some partial disclosure at the end of that period of preparation of expert reports and so on.

So that contemplation of the parties as we proposed this to you is that time frame that we sit

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there as one year would include all of that, preparation of exhibits other than expert, of course, identifying all the witnesses.

So to your specific question, I think it -- it would be most efficient to resolve those two issues that you've mentioned first, and that would make sure we didn't get off into areas of discovery and disputes over that. That would be unnecessary if we were to know your rulings on these issues.

Perhaps something could be formulated to handle resolution of those issues, and maybe in conjunction with that, maybe shave some time off of the periods that we have jointly proposed.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay. So let me see. Let me start out with understanding the proposed case management plan. So then the expert -- so as I understood this, you had the initial disclosures that are set out in Section 5(b)(1). After that, you would have the discovery take place, and then I understood Section 7A, the disclosure of the expert reports would begin one year after the initial disclosure under Section 5(b)(1).

And then there's a fair amount of time built in for objections to the adequacy of Montana's expert witness disclosures and in Wyoming's expert witness

disclosures and then any rebuttal experts. And so it looked to me as if when you added everything up, by the time you were able to finish discovery and have all of the expert reports provided that it would be not one year, but probably over a year and a half. Am I wrong in my understanding?

MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, this is John Draper.

That's essentially correct, the one-year deadline is for Montana to provide all of this, expert reports, witnesses to Wyoming, and Wyoming would be then put on a schedule to do its responsive reports and interview witnesses.

MR. THOMPSON: Then after that, Montana would -- there would be a date set for Montana, then, to provide rebuttal testimony.

MR. DRAPER: That's correct. This is John Draper again.

MR. THOMPSON: So as I said, that's what concerned me, is when I added everything up, I began to see us out in 2013, and I know these cases take a long time to resolve, but I'm hoping to move this along a little faster than that.

So let me, Mr. Michael, ask you, do you agree with Mr. Draper that we really should hold off on the initial disclosures in the beginning of discovery until

we resolve these two issues?

MR. MICHAEL: Yes, I agree with that, Your Honor, but I would also agree, and maybe he also said this, is that Montana initially, you know, thought that about a year for it to do its discovery and get its experts in order, and that all depends on the scope of the case, of course. And now with your decision today, discussion of state line delivery thing, that we maybe have trimmed it already. And then with the other two issues that we're going to be trying to get rid of, clear out the underbrush here shortly, seems to me that maximum flexibility would be in order and, in fact, this management order should not commit to the initial time period.

I understand why Montana wanted that, and I was amenable to that. But I think probably imposing flexibility again on that makes sense given your other rulings today. And we get back together after we decide what the scope of the case is and decide how much -- and Montana can ask. They will have a better position to say how much time they think they need for their case.

We had always taken the position, and Montana had agreed with us, that we would leave flexibility open for the responsive experts so that if we looked at Montana's expert reports and we decided that they were

fine, that we weren't going to hire our own experts, we could move things very quickly, but if we needed to hire experts and respond, we wanted to have the chance to ask you for the amount of time we thought we needed, but we didn't want to commit to that. We wanted to maintain flexibility, and Montana agreed with that.

So I would impose more flexibility here and leave -- you know, leave the first time frame open until we get these several issues resolved.

MR. THOMPSON: Let me just ask a couple questions regarding the case management plan. So the first is -- and in my jet lag condition, I might simply have missed it -- is there a date for the disclosures required under Article 8(b)(1)? I didn't see any time requirement on that.

MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, this is John Draper.

In Page 8 of my printout, there's a submission of substantive discovery, subheading Written Discovery and under that Initial Disclosures.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay. No later than 90 days. Yes. Okay. Thank you.

And then also in Paragraph 8 -- so going to the -- to the 8(c)(3), and this is in -- so this is the section on Expert Reports. I just want to clarify in Section (3)(a), last sentence says, "On or before the

1 date certain 45 days following the prior date certain." 2 So I assume that prior date certain as you contemplated 3 it was one year after the initial disclosure under 4 Section 5 -- under Section 8(b)(1). Is that correct? 5 MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, this is Mr. Draper. I'd have to take a closer look at that. I'm not quite 6 7 sure how to interpret that, quite frankly. I think what you were 8 MR. THOMPSON: 9 suggesting here was that Montana would provide its disclosure of expert testimony, and that under Section 10 (7)(a) requires that it be one year after the initial 11 12 disclosures, and then within 45 days, Wyoming would need 13 to file its objections if they needed the advocacy of 14 Montana's expert witness disclosures. Yes, I think that's correct, Your 15 MR. DRAPER: 16 This is John Draper again. 17 MR. THOMPSON: Okay. So let's turn back, 18 then, to the dates for a hearing on those initial two 19 legal questions. Again, the section -- I'm sorry -- the 20 Article 5(b) and then the notification, those two 21 questions. 22 I remember everybody's about to leave on 23 vacation. So why don't we start out by asking what 24 people's vacation schedules are. Mr. Draper?

MR. DRAPER:

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Your Honor, as I mentioned in an

earlier filing, I'm here next week, but I'll be leaving the country at the end of the week. I get back on the 25th. So any consideration that can be given would be much appreciated.

MR. THOMPSON: And Mr. Michael?

MR. MICHAEL: I'm leaving tomorrow for just one week, Your Honor. So nothing significant. I don't have any other plans after that.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay. And if I remember correctly, also, we have -- the next telephonic status conference is set for September 29th. And let me also ask the parties, you know, I think these are important enough issues that I'm certainly willing to have a hearing in Denver on the question; or if the parties are willing, we can do it by telephone. I will ask whether either of you would like a formal, in-person hearing on this.

MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, this is John Draper. I think an in-person hearing would be appropriate. And either Denver, or if it's more convenient, we're certainly happy to come to Stanford.

MR. THOMPSON: Mr. Michael?

MR. MICHAEL: Your Honor, I have no preference. I think the telephone hearing, given the fact they're all legal issues, would be adequate but no

1 | strong preference.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay. Let me, only because I actually -- although I find these would be quite valuable and today's, I think, has worked quite well. I actually do think that a formal in-person hearing would be in order on these initial questions. Because as you pointed out, Mr. Michael, they would and they could significantly narrow the case. I think both of them raise some fundamental issues.

So what I would propose is that I have

Susan Carter phone around and see whether or not we can

find a date and a location somewhere in the vicinity of

when the next telephonic status conference was

originally scheduled for, September 29, in order to hear

these two questions and then set out a briefing schedule

consistent with that.

If for some reason it turns out it's going to be difficult to find a date when we can actually all get together in person, then we can move forward with a telephonic hearing. And what I will also do prior to the date of either the in-person hearing or the telephonic status conference is -- what I will do, based on the proposed case management plan the parties have furnished to me, is to make a couple of additions, for example, one of the things that I want to do is to

provide for regular -- I'm sorry -- to provide for regular status reports and conferences during the period of discovery. I will probably also try my own hand at some proposed deadlines for various aspects of discovery. And then at the end of the hearing that we have either the end of September or the beginning of October, you can give me any comments on that, and we can see whether or not we can finalize that case management plan and proceed immediately to the disclosures and then to discovery.

Does that all sound satisfactory to people?

MR. DRAPER: This is John Draper. Yes, it does, Your Honor.

MR. MICHAEL: This is Peter Michael. I do have one comment when you're ready to take it about the case management plan. There's one provision I wanted you to be aware of.

MR. THOMPSON: Go ahead.

MR. MICHAEL: On Page 19, the next to the last clause, Mr. Draper, when he printed this out, put a bracket around "completion of pleadings." We discussed it earlier this week, and then after our discussion, it occurred to me that Wyoming really couldn't certify that we weren't contemplating the possibility of amending a pleading.

And the reason I say that is, given the changes -- or the various rulings that have come down the case, somewhere around in the future I think we may want to add an affirmative defense of futile call, because I think that's probably an affirmative defense in the case. I haven't done my research on it. So I didn't want that to be inaccurate and say that we had not contemplated the possibility of an amendment. We may be wanting to do that.

I sent an email to Mr. Draper on that one. I think that's why he has a bracket around that "completion of pleading" section. So I guess I would suggest that we probably just remove it.

MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, this is John Draper. Yes. We had a provision in there that's been in our form that we were discussing starting in latter part of May, and the afternoon before we had to submit it, Mr. Michael did notify me that he wanted to pursue it along the lines he just mentioned, so I just put brackets on it to indicate that there was a question raised about that.

It's normal in my experience in the proceedings to complete the pleadings on a definite schedule, and I had thought we were complete, but if there is some respect in which Mr. Michael -- which

is the amended pleadings, I think we should do that in a timely fashion so we know what we're up against. And we need to keep in mind, also, that your rulings might affect the posture of the parties. At this point we're not aware of any.

MR. THOMPSON: So I think what I would be inclined to do there is what you suggested, Mr. Draper, to provide probably a deadline by which -- to ask the parties if they are planning to amend any of the pleadings, to do so.

So with that, then, again, what I'm proposing is we'll set a date for either a hearing or if it's -you know, if that just doesn't work out, or it's going to be too long, then we'll do it by telephone. And then in addition to that, I will, as I say, upon my hand, the modifications of the case management plan including I will grab something to replace Article XI of that plan.

I do not, by the way, just to emphasize, expect to do anything significant other than, as I say, provide for regular status reports and conferences and to try modifying the timing in order to try to get discovery completed and the case on to trial, at least the first phase, as on a slightly more expedited basis, other than I don't expect to modify anything other than, I guess, now Article XI. But I'll circulate that ahead

1 of time for people's comments.

So any other thoughts at this point regarding either the hearing or the case management plan?

MS. VERLEGER: Your Honor, this is Jen
Verleger from North Dakota. I just wanted to clarify,
and maybe it got lost in the transition between Mr.
Sattler and myself, but I had something on my calendar
for August 24th, another conference call. Is that off
the table at this point?

MR. THOMPSON: Yes, it is. I believe it was
Mr. Draper submitted a request to modify the original
version of Case Management Order No. 6. If I remember
correctly, Mr. Draper also had a conflict. And so as a
result, I eliminated the August status conference.

So at the moment, there is no status conference scheduled other than that one on September 29th, and I would ask the -- that all the parties keep that on their calendar for the moment so that if we can't find the date for an in-person hearing, we will go forward with a hearing on the two issues on September 29th.

MS. VERLEGER: Thank you.

MR. THOMPSON: Any other comments? Okay. Any other issues that anyone wants to raise?

Then if not, here are the various things that

will happen at this stage. So Susan Carter will be in touch with people to see whether or not we can find a date, have an in-person hearing either in Denver or at Stanford in the late September/early October time frame. If we can't find a time, then we will hold the telephonic status conference at the time for which it's currently set, which is 10 a.m. to noon on September 29th, 2011. So everyone should keep that on their calendar.

If we can find a date for an in-person hearing, however, we will cancel that telephonic status conference at that point and simply have a status conference at the end of the hearing.

I will issue a memorandum opinion which summarizes my holdings from the first part of this status conference with respect to the issue which I have raised in the last case management order. I will also, once we have a date for the hearing, issue a new case management order that specifically sets out two questions for resolution at that hearing as well as a briefing schedule for those issues.

I will also at the same time issue a proposed case management plan based on the proposed case management plan of the parties but modified, as I suggested earlier.

1 As I said, we will discuss that after the hearing on the two legal issues at the hearing to be 2 3 held in late September or early October. 4 I think that covers everything. Am I 5 forgetting something? Okay. If not, then I will give 6 you four minutes back to your lives. 7 MR. DRAPER: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you very much, Your Honor. 8 MR. MICHAEL: 9 MS. VERLEGER: Thank you. 10 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you all. 11 (The Deposition ended at 11:56 a.m.) 12 --000--13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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County of San Diego, )
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     State of California. )
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    respective counsel.
                   The dismantling, unsealing, or unbinding of
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          original transcript will render the
    the
                                                   reporter's
    certificate null and void.
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                    IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
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    hand this 11th day of August 2011.
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                         Linda K. Pool, CSR No. 8941, CCRR
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