No. 137, Original

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSCRIPT OF FINAL PRETRIAL HEARING

STATE OF MONTANA

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF WYOMING

and

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

Defendants.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR. Special Master Stanford, California

James F. Battin United States Courthouse 2601 2nd Avenue North Billings, Montana 59101 9:16, Tuesday, October 15, 2013

> Vonni R. Bray, RPR, CRR P.O. Box 125 Laurel, MT 59044 (406) 670-9533 Cell (888) 277-9372 Fax vonni.bray@gmail.com

Proceedings recorded by machine shorthand Transcript produced by computer-assisted transcription

1	APPEARANCES
2	FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF MONTANA:
3	Mr. John B. Draper, Special Assistant AG Montgomery & Andrews
4	325 Paseo de Peralta, 87501 P.O. Box 2307
5	Santa Fe, NM 87504-2307 Telephone: (505) 986-2525 Fax: (505) 982-4289
6	E-mail: jdraper@monand.com
7	Mr. Jeffrey J. Wechsler, Special Assistant AG Montgomery & Andrews
8	325 Paseo de Peralta, 87501 P.O. Box 2307
9	Santa Fe, NM 87504-2307 Telephone: (505) 986-2637 Fax: (505) 982-4289
10	E-mail: djwechsler@montand.com
11	Mr. Cory Swanson Deputy Attorney General
12	602 Sanders P.O. Box 201401
13	Helena, MT 59624 Telephone: (406) 444-4774 Fax: (406) 444-3549
14	E-mail: coswanson@mt.gov
15	Ms. Anne Winfield Yates DNRC Chief Legal Counsel
16	1625 Eleventh Avenue P.O. Box 201601
17	Helena, MT 59620-1601 Telephone: (406) 444-0503 Fax: (406) 444-2684
18	E-mail: ayates@mt.gov
19	Mr. Kevin R. Peterson DNRC Legal Counsel
20	1625 Eleventh Avenue P.O. Box 201601
21	Helena MT 59620-1601 Telephone: (406) 444-5785 Fax: (406) 444-2684
22	E-mail: KevinPeterson@mt.gov
23	Mr. Tim Fox MT Attorney General
24	P.O. Box 201401 Helena, MT 59620-1401
25	Telephone: (406) 444-2026 Fax: (406) 444-3549

1	APPEARANCES CONTINUED
2	FOR DEFENDANT STATE OF WYOMING:
3	Mr. James C. Kaste Water & Natural Resources Division
4	Sr. Assistant Attorney General 123 Capitol Building
5	Cheyenne, WY 82002 Telephone: (307) 777-3535 Fax: (307) 777-3542
6	E-mail: james.kaste@wyo.gov
7	Mr. Chris Brown Water & Natural Resources Division
8	Sr. Assistant Attorney General 123 Capitol Building
9	Cheyenne, WY 82002 Telephone: (307) 777-3406 Fax: (307) 777-3542
10	E-mail: chris.brown@wyo.gov
11	Mr. Andrew J. Kuhlmann Water & Natural Resources Division
12	Assistant Attorney General 123 Capitol Building
13 14	Cheyenne, WY 82002 Telephone: (307) 777-3537 Fax: (307) 777-3542 E-mail: andrew.kuhlmann@wyo.gov
15	Mr. Peter J. Michael
16	WY Attorney General State Capitol Building Cheyenne, WY 82001
17	Telephone: (307) 777-7841 Fax: (307) 777-3542
18	
19	FOR DEFENDANT STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA:
20	Ms. Jennifer L. Verleger Assistant Attorney General
21	500 North 9th Street Bismarck, ND 58501-4509
22	Telephone: (701) 328-3640 Fax: (701) 328-4300 E-mail: jverleger@nd.gov
23	
24	
25	

```
1
              TUESDAY, OCTOBER 15, 2013, 9:16 A.M.
              SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Everyone can be
2.
3
   seated.
            So good morning, everybody. And I hope you
   are as impressed with these facilities as I am.
4
   is a truly wonderful courtroom.
5
              So why don't we begin with introductions.
6
                                                          So
7
   if, Mr. Draper, you want to introduce people for the
   State of Montana.
9
              MR. DRAPER: Thank you, Your Honor.
10
   morning. With me, starting at the end, is Attorney
   General Tim Fox, for Montana.
11
12
              SPECIAL MASTER: Good morning, General Fox.
13
              MR. DRAPER: Next to him is Cory Swanson,
14
   Deputy Attorney General of Montana.
15
              MR. SWANSON: Good morning, Your Honor.
16
              SPECIAL MASTER: Good morning.
             MR. DRAPER: Next to me, Jeff Wechsler from
17
18
   our firm, Montgomery & Andrews. Also over here in the
19
    jury box is Kevin Peterson of the Montana Department of
   Natural Resources and Conservation. And with us is my
20
21
   assistant, Donna Ormerod.
2.2
              SPECIAL MASTER: Good morning.
23
                           Thank you, Your Honor.
              MR. DRAPER:
24
              SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you, Mr. Draper.
25
              So, Mr. Kaste, for the State of Wyoming.
```

```
1
              MR. KASTE:
                          Good morning, Your Honor.
   James Kaste from the State of Wyoming. With me on the
2.
   end, of course, is Peter Michael, the Attorney General
 3
   of the State of Wyoming.
4
              SPECIAL MASTER: So if I can interrupt there
5
   to welcome General Michael and also to congratulate him
6
7
   formally on becoming the Attorney General for the State
   of Wyoming.
8
9
              MR. MICHAEL: Thank you very much, Your
10
   Honor.
11
              MR. KASTE:
                          Next to Attorney General Michael
   is Bern Hinckley. Mr. Hinckley is one of the expert
12
13
   witnesses Wyoming intends to bring to this trial.
14
   he'll be sitting with us most of the time. He's our --
15
   basically our representative for these proceedings.
              Next to him is Andrew Kuhlmann from the
16
   Attorney General's Office. And Chris Brown from the
17
18
   Attorney General's Office.
19
              SPECIAL MASTER: Good morning, Mr. Brown.
20
              And, Ms. Verleger.
21
             MS. WERLINGER: Jennifer Verleger from North
2.2
   Dakota.
              SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Again, good morning
23
24
   to everybody.
              So my guess is that at least this morning and
25
```

maybe even for the first couple days of the trial, at least some of us will still be trying to figure out all of the various equipment that is around the courtroom and figuring out how to use it. So I view this as going to be a little bit sloppy from the technical standpoint.

2.

2.2

So there's a variety of things I want to cover this morning. And my hope is, my expectation is that we might be able to finish this up before lunch this morning, and that would give everyone this afternoon an opportunity to get organized and be prepared for the start of trial tomorrow.

So a couple of things on the very front end of my particular list I wanted to take care of. The first is, as you all know, we are visitors in this particular courthouse, which means that there will be some days when we probably will not be able to use this particular courtroom. And there may be some days when we won't even have a room in this particular courthouse. So we'll all be itinerant, in that sense of the term, and moving around.

I've asked whether or not there will be a place where people might be able to store some of the boxes if, for example, we have to move out of the courthouse for a day or two but you don't want to be

able to take everything with you. At a minimum, we can store them down in the chambers where I'm currently 2. situated. And it might also be that there will be a 3 storeroom or something of that nature where we'll be 4 able to store the boxes. 5 But, again, please stay with me on this, and 6 7 we'll try and work through these various interruptions as best as possible. 9 Second of all, Mr. Draper sent me an e-mail last week, which I think probably all of you received, 10 or if you didn't receive the actual e-mail, you at 11 least know about it, that we probably can use the 12 13 hearing room for the Montana Oil and Gas Commission 14 when we're not in this particular facility. And I've seen pictures of the interior of that facility. And it 15 looked to me better than probably anything we're likely 16

19 figure it out.

20 But I had two or three questions. The first

21 was for counsel for Wyoming: Have you thought about

22 the use of that particular facility, and is it okay

23 with you? And then the second or follow-up question to

24 that was, I thought if we did have time this afternoon,

to be able to obtain in a hotel. And it's not quite

situated like a courtroom, but I think we can probably

17

18

25

if we could arrange it, it might be useful to go over

```
there and actually take a look at that hearing room,
   give some thought to how exactly we would set it up so
2.
   that if we do have to move over there, we're prepared.
3
              MR. KASTE:
                          That facility sounds fine for the
4
5
   state of Wyoming. If we have some time this afternoon,
   that would be great.
6
7
              SPECIAL MASTER: Okay.
                                      Mr. Draper, do you
   think you could check with Montana and see whether we
8
9
   might be able to get into that room this afternoon?
10
              MR. DRAPER: I'd be glad to do that, Your
   Honor.
11
              SPECIAL MASTER:
12
                               Thank you very much.
13
              Then a second, very small but potentially
14
   very important, matter is that my courtroom deputies
   were looking at the consolidated exhibit list that I
15
   have and that is up on the official website, and it
16
   appears to be missing page 63. So if Montana and
17
   Wyoming could check to see whether or not indeed there
18
19
    is a page 63.
                   It looks like there must be because the
20
   exhibit numbers actually jump from Wyoming 177 to
21
   Wyoming 188. If you could make page 63 available to us
2.2
   so that we can complete our copy. Okay. So, again,
    just a small administrative matter.
23
2.4
              So next what I would propose is that we turn
   to the various in limine motions that the State of
25
```

```
Wyoming filed. And on most of them, what I propose is
   I let you know how I would propose to rule on them.
2.
   And then I would be happy to invite any argument that
 3
   either side has that will inform whether or not I
4
   should actually rule the way I intend. And then there
5
   are two of them that I actually would appreciate some
6
7
   additional argument on.
              So the first motion I want to turn to is the
8
   motion in limine to exclude the affidavits identified
9
10
   as exhibits by Montana. And my current inclination is
   to grant this particular motion. It does not appear to
11
   me as if Rule 807 would apply in this particular
12
13
   situation.
14
              And the reason is that under Rule 807, the
   affidavit, in order to be admissible, needs to be more
15
   probative than other testimony or evidence that could
16
   be offered. And given, then, in all of these cases,
17
18
   the witness will actually be testifying live, it's hard
19
   to see how the affidavit is any more probative than the
    live testimony itself. And there is nothing in any of
20
21
   the papers that would suggest to me that the exception
2.2
   applies in this particular case.
23
              So on this particular motion, then, as I
24
   said, my inclination is to grant the motion.
25
              So, Mr. Draper.
```

```
1
              MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, we'll accept that
   ruling, and I don't think further argument is
2
3
   necessary.
              SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you very much,
4
5
   Mr. Draper.
              So that means that Montana Exhibits 125 to
6
   130, 228, 242, 276, 277, and 370 are all excluded,
7
   recognizing, of course, that if something came up that
   made it necessary to introduce one of these affidavits,
9
   because one of the witnesses could not testify live,
10
   you're always welcome to then make a motion to bring
11
   one of those exhibits in. But at the moment, all of
12
13
   those exhibits are excluded.
14
              The second motion, then, is the motion in
    limine to exclude the scientific literature identified
15
   as exhibits by Montana. And in the case of this
16
   particular motion, my current inclination is to grant
17
18
    the motion in part and to deny it in part.
19
              And let me just explain what I would propose.
   So for any scientific literature to be admissible as
20
21
   evidence in this particular proceeding, Montana will
2.2
   need to meet the requirements of both parts A and B of
   Rule 803(18). And so that would mean that both the
23
   expert witness would need to rely on that particular
24
   scientific literature on direct examination, and in
25
```

1 addition to that, establish the scientific literature 2 as reliable authority.

2.2

But assuming that the expert witness has done that, what I would propose is, rather than having the expert witness actually have to read the portion of the scientific paper that he is relying upon into the record, at that point, I would admit whatever portion of that scientific paper the witness has said that he is relying on in his testimony.

In the case of a jury, I think it's important that you actually have just that portion read into the evidence. But I actually don't see the reason to do that in this particular proceeding. And in addition to that, I would appreciate, frequently actually, knowing the particular context of it. Because I think sometimes that context can either undermine or affirm, actually, the way in which the expert is utilizing that particular scientific paper.

So, Mr. Kaste. It's your motion.

MR. KASTE: I can't be as easy as Mr. Draper. Obviously, the rule says quite clearly, that the publication is inadmissible. The statement referenced by the witness is. And I understand that there's not a jury in these proceedings. But, nevertheless, neither you nor the Court ought to be traipsing through

scientific literature unaided by the testimony of the witness. And the testimony of the witness is going to be through particularized statements. If in his discussion you need more information from him in order to contain context, I think that that conversation ought to occur between you and the expert witness as we conduct their testimony.

2.2

It makes everybody, I think, very uncomfortable to give you a big stack of information with no guide from the expert witness and send you back in chambers to do what amounts to an independent investigation. And I really strongly object to deviating from the procedure that's so clear in the rules.

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. So, Mr. Kaste, I understand your point. Let me just say on that that one of the things that I would not expect would be to have the witness say, well, you know, I actually relied upon on that entire paper, and then admit the entire paper. Instead, what I'm expecting is that there will be certain portions of it that would be admitted into evidence. And furthermore, to the degree I have questions about, I will have read these, actually, ahead of time. And so I will have an opportunity to actually talk to the witness at that particular point.

So, hopefully, that allays your fears a little bit. But I actually do think, in this particular case, it would be valuable, rather than having it read in, to actually be able to look at portions of it and actually introduce that as an exhibit, again, as material that the witness is actually relying upon.

2.

2.2

MR. KASTE: I understand. I'm not going to argue with regard to the ruling. It makes sense to me. But it does raise a concern about previewing the exhibits that have not yet been admitted. I understand that that's your plan. And I just want to raise everybody's awareness to the idea that until an exhibit is admitted and foundation has been laid, the Court usually doesn't read it and certainly doesn't take that into consideration until it's come from the witness on the stand.

The procedure is a little bit backwards when you read it in advance. And I'm sure that you're sensitive to our concern with things that aren't properly admissible or portions of things that aren't properly admissible might have passed before your eyes before you make the decision in the case. And as long as, I guess, we're all sensitive to that concern and the Court is sensitive to that concern, I don't have

```
any big problem with the procedure that you're
proposing, that you read every exhibit in advance of
the testimony of the witness from whom it will be
offered.

But it's fairly abnormal. In my experience
```

2.2

But it's fairly abnormal. In my experience, the Court assesses admissibility first. And then we look at substantive content of the exhibit at the time the witness testifies. And that's the basis upon which the Court makes its decision and not what I -- I hate to describe as an independent investigation that occurs in chambers. That's my concern. And I trust you can differentiate what you hear today and what you may be doing in the evenings in chambers.

SPECIAL MASTER: So, Mr. Kaste, I think you can rest assured that, in fact, I will be able to distinguish between those.

The other thing -- I guess, two additional points that are worth mentioning in this particular context. The first is that I can't guarantee, as I probably just suggested, that I'm going to read every word of every exhibit ahead of time. But I will have at least taken a look at them. I think it's going to make the proceedings go more quickly.

And ultimately, I probably would have taken a look at all of them anyway because either they will be

admitted into evidence or you or Mr. Draper will have objected to them and I will uphold the objection. But I'll probably have taken a look at them in upholding the objection.

2.2

So I think it's inevitable that I'm going to end up probably seeing more than will ultimately be part of the record. And everybody should be confident that I will be very careful not to take those pieces of evidence into account in the final decision.

Now, your comment, though, I think does raise another important point, which is that to the degree that there is a lengthy scientific paper and the witness says, well, I relied upon this paper in formulating my testimony in this particular case, the one thing that I don't want you to have to worry about is that you then have to rebut everything that's in that particular paper because you don't know exactly what I'm going to consider.

So that's, again, why I think it's going to be very important that rather than the witness saying, I relied upon this entire paper, that we can be very specific as to the portions of that paper that the witness has relied upon so that, again, you're not having to worry about the entire document coming into evidence and then somebody citing it for a portion

1 that's totally different than what the witness actually
2 relied upon.

So, Mr. Draper, that means that I will want, when any of your experts are on the stand, that they be very specific in the portions of the paper that they relied upon. I might very well have a question that I might, then, ask with respect to another portion of the paper, if I think it's relevant to what the witness just said, in which case, you would be able to ask about that, Mr. Kaste. And similarly, if you had another portion of the paper that you thought undermined the way in which the witness relied upon the one passage that they're using, you would be free to then, of course, raise that. But I think that's going to be better than having the possibility of having a 30-page piece of scientific analysis that comes into the record because the witness is really only relying upon one part.

Mr. Draper.

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

MR. DRAPER: Thank you, Your Honor. I think the concerns that Mr. Kaste has voiced come directly out of the jury system. You are not a jury, obviously. You are an expert finder of fact. And the ultimate finder of fact here is the Supreme Court consisting of the nine Justices. The concern that motivates those

rules are not present here. In fact, the opposite
concern is present here, that somehow a case of this
type will be decided on less than a full record.

2.2

In the past, entire sections of books, entire articles have been admitted in these proceedings. They have not led to any miscarriage of justice. I would hope that we would not get into the process during testimony, if these become a matter of controversy, of chopping up scientific papers and trying to parse them out paragraph by paragraph as to which ones are going to come in and which aren't. And you end up with some kind of mangled kind of a document that doesn't make sense. Many times they will be an organic hole. And it's not appropriate to admit just the conclusion or just one section of the analysis and leave out the rest.

So the discussion that's been generated by Mr. Kaste, I think, is a dangerous one. And in terms of your looking at the exhibits, years ago I used to be in Mr. Kaste's opinion. And I think in front of a jury where they're the finder of fact, you need to be very careful. But here, we consider, for instance, prefiling testimony. That means exhibits and all of the testimony that goes with them. And the idea is that the judge, the special master is reading all of

that ahead of time and without the benefit of live
testimony.

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

So that whole notion that he's pushing on you here is just out of place. And I would caution you very strongly against taking that too far.

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Thank you. So several things: First of all, I do not interpret what Mr. Kaste said a moment ago as either pushing me or impugning my ability to actually resolve this case but probably simply to try to warn me to make sure that, in fact, I don't consider things that I ultimately don't admit into evidence. And taking it in that particular But I think light, I think it's a fair comment. everybody understands I'm not going to be considering exhibits that ultimately do not come into evidence when I ultimately make my recommendations to the United States Supreme Court. So I appreciate your defense of that, Mr. Draper.

And, you know, I realize that in this particular case, there might be disputes over exactly what can come in on a scientific paper. As I said, my only concern, the thing I want to be careful about is simply that a scientific paper does not come in for one proposition and then it's ultimately quoted for a totally different proposition that doesn't have the

correct foundations.

2.2

For that reason, to the degree that a witness can, I'd like them to be as specific as possible as to the portion of the paper that they relied upon. If the answer is, you can't really chop this up, and the bottom line is, I relied upon the analysis that you find in this particular paper, then in that particular case, I probably will let the entire exhibit come in.

But I just want to be very careful in balancing the concern about letting things come in that are not admissible on the one hand; the other hand, making sure that this proceeding goes smoothly and that, ultimately, you have a complete record that permits me, and ultimately the United States Supreme Court, to reach the correct result.

MR. KASTE: If I may, just briefly, Your Honor, I think Mr. Draper raises a fairly fundamental point of disagreement between the parties about how these proceedings ought to operate. Mr. Draper is right; certainly some concerns with regard to the Rules of Evidence are primarily motivated by our need to adequately inform a jury of laymen. And you're not one of those. Nevertheless, the Rules of Evidence are applicable in both jury and nonjury proceedings. And it is our firmly held view that a complete record only

contains evidence that is relevant and otherwise admissible. You know, a complete record doesn't include a picture of me and my kids. It isn't relevant.

2.2

2.4

And that the Rules of Evidence, while merely a guide in these proceedings, reflect the combined wisdom of the legal community over the last several hundred years. I think it would be folly for us not to pay attention to what they have to say about what is and is not appropriate evidence. And I certainly think that the Supreme Court, perhaps more than any court, ought to have a record well-grounded in the Rules of Evidence.

And so it is going to be Wyoming's position throughout these proceedings, that if something does not comply with the Rules of Evidence, it ought not to be admitted despite the fact that there's not a jury sitting in this box. And I understand that your position is that where there's a close call, you're going to err on the side of admission for the benefit of the Court. And I appreciate that stance.

But there are going to be some things here, for example, like the affidavits, that aren't close calls. And it is our expectation that they will be excluded from this case. And so I'm going to get up at

```
various points in this trial, and I'm going object
   based on the Rules of Evidence. And if our fundamental
2.
   understanding about what is and isn't appropriate in
3
   these proceedings is wrong, you're going to have to let
4
5
   me know that.
              SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Kaste.
6
7
              Mr. Draper?
                          One point there, Your Honor.
8
              MR. DRAPER:
   Mr. Kaste has informed you that if it doesn't conform
9
   strictly with the Rules of Evidence applicable in the
10
   district courts, that he's going to be objecting and
11
    that he expects you not to admit such evidence.
12
13
   that is directly contrary to Rule 17 of the Supreme
14
   Court. Directly.
15
              And it has -- and the Court, over the
16
   years -- and we're talking hundreds of years -- has
17
   emphasized that these are not proceedings that are
18
   subject to those rules. They are used as quides.
                                                        It's
19
   good to know what those policies are.
20
              And then you need to determine, we all need
21
   to determine, how do they apply in this context?
2.2
   to have a strict application, as Mr. Kaste suggests --
23
   and apparently he's going to badger this proceeding
   with those kinds of objections -- is not the
24
```

appropriate approach to this case.

25

```
1
              SPECIAL MASTER:
                               Okay.
                                      Thank you,
   Mr. Draper.
2.
              So let me try and make several points with
 3
   respect to this discussion. The first is, as
4
   Mr. Draper just pointed out, and as I know Mr. Kaste is
5
   aware, under the Supreme Court rules -- I looked at
6
   both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
7
   Federal Rules of Evidence for guidance, but I'm not
   bound by them.
9
10
              In thinking about the proceedings, I would
   probably draw a distinction between two or three
11
12
   different types of evidentiary disputes that I can
13
    imagine that we would have. The first would be over
14
   the relevance of particular testimony. And this, for
15
   example, brings up the questions that we'll come to in
   a moment under the Daubert rule.
16
              To the degree that I believe that it's
17
18
   possible that the Supreme Court would go a different
   direction than I would in the actual resolution of the
19
20
   case and that if they are going to go a different
21
   direction, that they will want to have that evidence
2.2
   upon which to rule, then I will be inclined to admit
   more than I otherwise would. Because, again, the
23
   ultimate decision maker in this particular case is the
2.4
   United States Supreme Court. My role is simply to pull
25
```

together a record and then to make my recommendations
to the Supreme Court as to how they should rule based
on that particular record.

2.2

2.4

I think that set of questions is different than a variety of other evidentiary questions, such as, for example, the question on the affidavits which the first motion in limine was directed to, where the question is really not as to the relevance, but, instead, it's as to whether or not there is a better way of actually having evidence enter the record. So rather than having affidavits, we have a live witness. There's no reason to have the affidavit in there. The affidavit could simply cause mischief in that particular situation.

And on those, my inclination will generally be to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence because they have been developed over time in order to determine what evidence should be admitted and what evidence should not be admitted.

Even there, though, there are times where, because of the nature of the proceeding, I will vary from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In this particular motion with respect to the scientific literature, is a good example of that.

To the degree that there are particular

1 evidentiary issues, Mr. Kaste, or, Mr. Draper, where you disagree with my variance from the Federal Rules of 2. Evidence, what my hope is is if that's a type of 3 objection that is coming up frequently, that we can 4 simply have a standing objection so we don't have to 5 discuss the objection every single time that it comes 6 7 up. But I don't want to prevent either side from, obviously, raising any objections they want to. 8 again, as a general matter, the Federal Rules of 9 Evidence is what we will look to in determining whether 10 or not particular evidence should be admitted. 11 Okay. So then on the motion in limine to 12 13 exclude the scientific literature, again, any 14 scientific literature that is going to be introduced has to have the foundation elements of both parts A and 15 B of Rule 803(18). But I will permit the scientific 16 literature itself to be admitted with that particular 17 foundation -- or I should correct myself, the portion 18 of the exhibit that the expert witness has relied upon. 19 20 Okav. The next motion in limine is the 21 motion to exclude the report and testimony of Douglas 2.2 Littlefield. So let me start out on this one with just 23 a question for Montana. At this particular stage, how 24 do you see Mr. Littlefield's testimony as being To what questions do you intend to have 25 relevant?

Mr. Littlefield address himself? MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, Dr. Littlefield will 2 be testifying to matters that respond to your motion --3 or your ruling on the motion related to specific water 4 administration applying to the compact and the 5 historical context in which matters were discussed 6 7 during negotiations that relate to that general issue. SPECIAL MASTER: And given that I already 8 9 ruled in the memorandum of opinion on Montana's motion 10 for summary judgment, that Montana does not have to follow any particular procedure but does need to follow 11 a procedure which complies with the compact, is 12 13 Mr. Littlefield's testimony still important to you? 14 MR. DRAPER: Yes, Your Honor. The -- it will 15 be sculpted to fit the ruling that you have made in the pretrial motion ruling. And we'll seek to set the 16 context for which -- in which you will make your 17 ultimate decision, applying the standard that you have 18 set out there. 19 20 SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Thank you. So let me 21 tell you what my inclination is on this particular 2.2 motion. And I'll let you speak, Mr. Kaste. But just 23 to let you know, and here's one where I'm going to err in favor of allowing in something that, depending on --24 you know, it's not absolutely certain. But if I were 25

1 ruling on this in a role other than Special Master, I
2 might come to a different ruling.

2.2

2.4

But I'm going to -- my inclination is to deny the motion for the reasons which were discussed in Montana's response to -- well, to your motion, but with the following caveat, which is that my hope is that the testimony of Mr. Littlefield will be structured in two ways: No. 1, to meet the various standards and requirements which I mentioned in my ruling from the bench in Denver. And I noticed, Mr. Draper, you did incorporate that language into your reply.

But in addition to that, at this particular stage of the proceeding, there's really no reason for Mr. Littlefield to range widely on the actual history of the compact itself. But at this particular stage, as I understand the relevance of Mr. Littlefield's testimony, it really goes to whether or not the particular procedures and standards that the State of Montana utilizes are permissible under the compact. And so my hope is that the testimony will go to those specific issues rather than talking very generally about the meaning of the compact. Because, again, I think that both the Supreme Court's ruling itself in this particular case, as well as my various memorandum opinions set out the general structure for how the

compact should actually apply in this particular case. 2 I'll also mention that I have been influenced on this particular motion by the fact that, if I 3 4 recall, under your time estimates, Mr. Draper, Mr. Littlefield is only going to be on the stand for, I 5 think, two to three hours. My hope is that it is much 6 7 less than that. But my -- if this were going to be a longer piece of testimony, I might feel different about this. 9 10 Mr. Kaste? MR. KASTE: I kind of figured that was 11 And -- but it does give us all an opportunity 12 13 to focus in on something that I think has been 14 neglected at times as we're preparing for trial, which 15 is that waste of time, which is in the rules, is an important concern for everyone involved and that, 16 again, this is going to be a place where Wyoming and 17 Montana probably have a difference of opinion about 18 what is and what is not a waste of time. And it's 19 20 probably an issue that I'm going to bring up from time 21 to time as it appears that we're running far afield 2.2 from the issues that are actually before you for trial. 23 And Mr. Littlefield's testimony, to our way of thinking, is far afield given the various 24 interpretations that the compact said. And we sort of 25

```
know what the rules are. But I understand completely
   your inclination to give the Supreme Court more
2.
   information rather than less. And as long as we can
 3
   try and move this thing along and actually shed some
4
   focus on what matters, I won't interrupt very often.
5
   And I don't intend to interrupt very often. But there
6
7
   will be times, I suspect, where I think we're running
   far afield. And I'll try to bring them to your
   attention and be the one not to be running far afield.
9
10
              SPECIAL MASTER:
                               Okay.
                                      So thank you,
11
   Mr. Kaste. And I can let you know that both you and
   Mr. Draper are free to do that at any particular point
12
13
   in time. And I'll also do it myself if I think we're
14
   actually covering territory that has already been
15
   decided in response to one motion or another.
16
              Mr. Draper.
                          Thank you, Your Honor.
17
              MR. DRAPER:
                                                   This
   exultation of time limits over other values in this
18
19
   case by Mr. Kaste, I think, is inappropriate. Our main
   responsibility is not to rush through this.
20
21
   requires a certain amount of time, that's what's
2.2
   needed. And it's a responsibility of all the parties
23
   and the Master to be sure that we provide the kind of
   record that the Court wishes to have in this case and
24
25
   that we not artificially truncate it or truncate parts
```

```
of it because we're in a mad dash to finish by some
   artificial deadline. And the less time we spend
2.
   arguing about this, the more time we can actually get
 3
4
   substantive evidence on the record.
                                         Thank you.
              SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. So thank you,
5
   Mr. Draper. And your last point has not gone
6
7
   unnoticed. We shouldn't spend much more time on this
   particular motion in limine, or we may spend more time
   on that than Mr. Littlefield actually spends testifying
9
10
    in the case. So, again, I'm going to permit
   Mr. Littlefield to testify subject, again, to the
11
   limitations and restrictions that I set out from the
12
13
   bench in Denver and, in addition, to the request that
14
   the testimony be addressed to help shed historical
15
    light on the questions that are still remaining in this
   case rather than questions that have already been
16
   resolved in this particular proceeding.
17
              Okay. The next of the motions is Wyoming's
18
19
   motion in limine to exclude the expert testimony by
2.0
   Steve Larson. And Mr. Kaste also will not be surprised
21
   by this:
             That inclination here is actually neither to
2.2
   grant nor deny your motion at this particular point
   but, instead, to hold for resolution later in the
23
   proceedings. So I think Daubert is relevant in a
2.4
25
   proceeding of this nature. But I don't see any
```

prejudice here to waiting to rule until after the presentation of the testimony.

2.

2.2

At that point, I think the Supreme Court will deserve my guidance. And at that point, I could decide one of three different things: I could decide that, in fact, Mr. Larson's testimony is so unreliable for the arguments that -- for the reasons that Wyoming has suggested that, in fact, the testimony should be excluded under the Daubert rule.

Second of all, that it is not so unreliable that it should be excluded from Daubert but that given all of the, again, arguments that Wyoming has made now and will probably make again, that Mr. Larson's testimony should be discounted. Or I could decide that Mr. Larson's testimony is actually quite reliable and very probative on the issues in this particular case.

And because I could decide any of those three things based on what I know right now, again, I'm not going to deny the motion. But I'm just going to hold the motion in abeyance until after Mr. Larson has testified. That will permit me to have a much better basis than I have right now as to the reliability of Mr. Larson's testimony.

As I've already mentioned, if I ultimately conclude that Mr. Larson's testimony should be excluded

```
entirely for reasons of reliability, I will not
   consider that in making my recommendations to the
2.
   Supreme Court. And I will actually inform the Supreme
 3
   Court that should not be part of the record upon which
4
   they should decide the case.
5
              If for any reason they were to disagree with
6
7
   me, though, we also wouldn't have to come back and hear
   Mr. Larson testify separately. The downside,
9
   obviously, here is time both in Mr. Larson's testimony
   and in the testimony of the expert witness that Wyoming
10
   has to respond to Mr. Larson. But in this particular
11
   case, I think that that downside is outweighed by the
12
13
   advantages of waiting. I also think that the merits of
14
   this particular motion demonstrate the wisdom of
15
   waiting.
              Wyoming, I think, raises significant
16
   concerns, but it's not clear to me, based on the record
17
18
   right now, that those concerns are great enough to
   actually exclude his testimony on the basis of Daubert.
19
   And I have some support in this from Special Master
20
21
   Kayatta in Kansas v. Nebraska. And I will spell
2.2
   Kayatta for you later.
              MR. KASTE: No, that's not a surprise.
23
24
   you. We'll renew the motion at the appropriate time.
25
              SPECIAL MASTER:
                               Okay.
                                      Thank you.
```

Okay. So the next motion in limine is the motion in limine to limit the presentation of evidence in this case to the nine years that survived Wyoming's initial summary judgment motion. So, Mr. Draper, based on some of the telescoping of my views on this and some of my prior opinions, you probably won't be surprised on this. But I'm going to grant this motion in part but also deny it in part.

2.

2.2

And in particular, my inclination -- I should give you a chance, Mr. Draper, before I give my final ruling to respond if you want. But my current inclination is to exclude the evidence regarding what I'll call the summary judgment years -- and the summary judgment years are 1952 to 1986, 1990 to 1999, and 2005 -- to exclude the evidence for those years for the purpose of establishing liability for those years or seeking any relief retrospective or prospective for those years.

Looking back at both the motion and also my rulings on Wyoming's motion for a partial summary judgment, I think it is clear that those motions were addressed to any form of relief. And I see no basis for distinguishing, in this particular case, between liability on the one hand and relief on the other. In other words, there's nothing special about notice that

would suggest that it is a matter of the relief rather than a matter of the liability itself.

2.

2.2

So both based on, again, the language of the motion, in my opinion, and on the conclusion that the issue is really one that goes to the liability question rather than the relief issue, I would exclude the evidence, again, for purposes of establishing liability for those years, which is really what we've been talking about for the last year and a half in any case.

However, I will permit evidence from or about those years for the limited purpose of trying to establish liability for the years that actually are in issue at this particular stage of the proceeding, which is 1987 to 1989, 2000 to 2004, and 2006. And my understanding from Wyoming's reply is that they actually concede that, in fact, evidence from those years can be admitted for context and background.

I realize that, of course, that opens up the potential for trying to get all of that evidence in as context and background. But I trust that counsel for Montana is not going to try and bring in all of the evidence for those years unless they are useful as background for the years that are actually in issue in this particular case. And, of course, Wyoming can object if they think that particular evidence from

those years is irrelevant to the years that are actually at issue.

2.

2.2

My inclination is also not to require Montana to identify potential exhibits at this particular point in time that fall outside the exception. Instead, I think, given the way -- and we'll come back to this later -- that I suggest I want to structure the trial where actually Montana notifies Wyoming ahead of time for each witness what exhibits they plan to use for that particular witness, that will give Wyoming an opportunity to take a look at an exhibit and decide whether or not they actually want to object to the introduction of that particular exhibit.

I'll also note in this particular situation that I think that given the years that Montana is actually able to introduce evidence to establish liability, which are the years 1987 to '89, 2000 to 2004, 2006, you will be able to establish a record there that when this case -- or if this case gets to the United States Supreme Court, if the Supreme Court disagrees with me on the question of notice, we should in any later proceeding be able to deal with those additional years without much difficulty.

So I do not see much in the way of a downside for excluding those years. And, again, although I

```
agree that the motion was specifically with respect to
   damages and other remedies, that liability question
2.
   flows neatly from that. And I think Wyoming would have
 3
   every reason to object if, at this particular stage, I
4
   read their earlier summary judgment motion more
5
6
   narrowly.
7
              MR. DRAPER:
                           Your Honor, if I may.
                              You may, Mr. Draper.
8
              SPECIAL MASTER:
9
              MR. DRAPER:
                           Thank you. I think your ruling
10
   on damages is very clear, looking at the years. You --
   at our request, you put the word "damages" in the title
11
   of your ruling. Obviously, retrospective relief, that
12
13
   was a motion process that got started by Wyoming.
14
   actually a type of remedy.
15
              We're not in the remedy phase at this time.
   You eventually entered the case management plan that
16
   bifurcated the case between the liability and remedies
17
   phases. So to reach out into the remedies phase and to
18
   go beyond the -- not only the boundaries of the phase
19
   we're currently in, but beyond the boundaries of the
20
21
   motion that was filed, on the basis that it applied to
2.2
   damages or other relief, well, that's other
23
   retrospective relief. It's not -- damages could be in
   the form of money, or it could be in another form, like
24
   water, in particular, as you may recall from the 1987
25
```

case in the Pecos River litigation. The Court made that clear that there were different forms of 2. retrospective remedies. And damages is obviously a retrospective remedy. And that is a limiting factor of 4 the order that you entered.

3

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

You have said that you're inclined to believe that the rationale that led you to your decision with respect to damages and other, I would say retrospective remedies, should also apply to notice for purposes of prospective remedies. And while, as you have put it, there's something to be said for that, it's not something that you have asked to be briefed. It's something that was a subject with respect to damages, of summary judgment dispositive motions. And to rule in a motion in limine context and reach out and include in that an area that you did not discuss in those motions and your rulings and to limit the evidence based on that without the appropriate briefing and consideration that should go into such a limitation, I think is going too far.

We would also note -- you may, I believe, have noticed that we have submitted additional information that very late in the game was provided to It very clearly chose notice being given in the us. early 1980s. And this information was not provided to

```
us until after you had been asked to make your
    decisions and had made your decisions. So there is
 2.
    reason to disbelieve some of the basis on which those
 3
   motions were offered. And in particular here, the
 4
    extension of that to cover liability issues, whether
 5
    the compact was violated or not, and whether a state's
 6
 7
    going to be precluded from presenting evidence on that,
    I think, is going too far. Thank you.
 9
              SPECIAL MASTER: Okay.
                                      Thank you,
10
   Mr. Draper.
              So, Mr. Kaste, any response from you? And I
11
    quess the one thing that I would like to have a
12
13
    response on is the additional evidence that Mr. Draper
1.4
   referred to.
15
              MR. KASTE:
                          Okay. That was brought out in
16
    the brief recently. I forget exactly what month that
17
    occurred in.
                  In July, one of the employees of the
    State of Wyoming, looking in a drawer that has nothing
18
    to do with the Tongue River, related to a tribe that is
19
   not the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, pulled out an old
20
21
    file.
          And in that file were some handwritten notes by
2.2
    John Buyok, who used to work for the State of Wyoming.
23
    And it was provided to me that day. And it was
24
   provided to Montana as soon as I got a Bates stamp on
25
    it, but I think the next day. And I called
```

Mr. Wechsler immediately and said, guess what?

2.2

As happens in many, many cases, particularly ones where discovery is extensive, there's a drawer that somebody goes, oh, yeah. And they pulled it out. Montana was provided this information before the close of discovery. Late. And we acknowledge that it was late.

But, nevertheless, when you look at the content of the materials, they are very consistent with what you already know about the 1982 Yellowstone River Commission Compact minutes, which 1981, there was some concern about the flow in the Tongue River. There was some communications between some state employees. And it's really, when you look at it, fairly early in the year. They're May communications, and they're an inquiry about what would you do kind of things.

There were -- those communications ended up being reflected in the 1982 minutes as the language that you previously saw that said, if Montana is going to do this, they know they need to give us a call. And I forget the exact language from the 1982 minutes of the Yellowstone River Compact Commission meeting. But you've seen them and discussed them in the course of your prior rulings, that they were precipitated by certain discussions between the states about the way

```
the river was running at the time. And they culminated
    in this statement in 1982, if Montana is going to do
2.
   this, they are going to have to notify Wyoming.
3
   believe the exact word used in the minutes is "notify."
4
   And that's a pretty strong indication that the content
5
   of the communications reflected in those handwritten
6
7
   notes are not a call. They're just not.
              And I have to apologize on behalf of our
8
   staff, the staff of the State Engineer's Office, for
9
   not having located these documents prior to the time
10
   that they were disclosed. They were clearly relevant.
11
   They should have been located and produced at the very
12
13
   beginning of this case. But it happens sometimes in
14
   litigation that you find something important late in
15
    the game. But I can tell you for a fact that Montana
   had those the day after I did.
16
              And I really don't think that they create a
17
   sufficient question about a call in 1981 to warrant
18
19
   reversal of your prior ruling. And, in fact, I believe
20
   the communications were from Mr. Fritz to Mr. Buyok.
21
   Mr. Fritz was deposed. I think he described in his
2.2
   deposition about what he could recall from
   communications with Wyoming. I believe he did an
23
2.4
   affidavit. Maybe not Mr. Fritz. But the opportunity
   to obtain that information from Mr. Fritz has been
25
```

there the whole time. And so if he thought he made a call in 1981, he could have testified to that and did 2. 3 not. So I don't think that it warrants reopening 4 5 that particular year. And, of course, it relates to one year, not the multitude of years covered by your 6 7 prior rulings. So like I say, we come in hat in hand on that one. I hope that that doesn't mean we've been 9 less than diligent throughout the remainder of discovery. We certainly have tried our best. 10 With regard to your ruling, if nothing 11 Mr. Draper said is close to changing your mind, then I 12 13 don't think I have anything really to say. I think the 14 ruling is dead-on. And I think the last thing anybody needs in this case is more briefing. 15 16 SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Mr. Draper. MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, we believe that this 17 18 is serious new evidence that was provided after you 19 made your ruling. It makes it very clear that Montana -- as it says here on page 48187 of the Bates 20 21 number, "Montana is wondering if the junior to 1950 2.2 rights in Wyoming can be regulated to provide water to 23 supply Tongue River Reservoir." 24 They're expressing just the kind of notice

that you said you wanted to see, that they are

25

```
expressing to Wyoming their own shortages and wondering
   if they can't get some more water down. Now, if that
2.
   doesn't amount to a call, I don't know what does.
 3
   is right in a period where because this information was
4
   not available to either state at the time, that we are
5
   precluded as a matter of law from showing any damages,
6
7
   and you are now extending that to liability.
              The important thing is that it was provided
8
9
   after the summary judgment motions that were based on
   this kind of information and, I think, initiates those,
10
   certainly as to the specific time period involved and,
11
    in general, showing that even back at that period,
12
13
   there were these types of complaints being made and, I
14
   think, to some extent, undermines the basis, then, for
15
    the ruling on summary judgment. Thank you.
16
              SPECIAL MASTER: Okay.
                                      Thank you,
17
   Mr. Draper.
18
              Mr. Kaste.
19
              MR. KASTE:
                          If it would help, Your Honor, I
   don't have any concerns if Mr. Fritz wants to talk
20
21
   about what he did or didn't do in 1981. That's fine
2.2
   with me.
              If he wants to come in and say, yep, I looked
23
   at those notes, here's what the content of my
   conversation was with Montana, great.
2.4
25
              What we know already is that the year 1981
```

And if

would likely be covered by your recent ruling that damages wouldn't be available in that year because 2. there's not sufficient evidence to demonstrate damages 3 were warranted. This year would fall into the same 4 category as 1987 through 1989. It's years in which, I 5 mean, the evidence is remarkably stale. There has been 6 7 plenty of testimony in front of you already in the summary judgment proceedings that Montana has been concerned, of course, about its water supply for a long 9 10 period of time. And there is, of course, a significant 11 distinction between mere concern and inquiries about what Wyoming would do, and an actual call which is a 12 13 demand that Wyoming take action for the benefit of 1.4 Montana. But if Mr. Fritz would like to testify about 15 his conversations or his dealings with Mr. Buyok in 16 1981, I don't care. I view this as the same situation 17 as 1987 to 1989. In the main, neither party has 18 19 sufficient evidence to do much with it. And it's just so old as to not be terribly helpful. 20 21 But I agree, we did get this out a little 2.2 But I do think the fact that we got this sent out a little late is somewhat mitigated by the fact 23 that you're only hearing about it now. Because it 24

happened this summer. It happened months ago.

25

Montana felt that it made such a difference in their case, that they should raise it and bring it to your 2. attention and ask for some reconsideration of things 3 4 that occurred in the past, I think the burden was on 5 them to bring it to your attention. Burden was on us to get it out to Montana, and in a timely way; we did 6 7 that. From there, I think all you can assume from their delay is that it must not have been all that 9 important. But I think it's fine if Mr. Fritz wants to 10 testify about 1981. And I think you would likely hear 11 12 testimony about the minutes from 1982 and Montana's 13 understanding of the need to make an affirmative 14 request for regulations and for action in Wyoming. 15 They knew that in 1982. And Wyoming's position, of course, in this litigation will be they didn't do that 16 until 2004. 17 18 SPECIAL MASTER: Mr. Draper. Thank you. I would hope that 19 MR. DRAPER: 20 Mr. Kaste would have no objection to the admission of 21 this material as an exhibit in this proceeding. We've identified it as Exhibit M136. 2.2 MR. KASTE: Well, now I do kind of have an 23 24 objection. Because a person with the foundation

sufficient to warrant the admission of this exhibit

25

```
probably doesn't exist in these proceedings. Mr. Fritz
   can be asked if this material would refresh his
2.
   recollection. From the absence of a witness with
 3
   foundation, I'm a little bit concerned. Frankly, I
4
   don't care. It means so little to what we're here to
5
   do today, I don't care.
6
7
              MR. DRAPER: I don't know if that was an
   agreement --
8
              MR. KASTE:
                          Stipulated.
9
10
              MR. DRAPER:
                          Okay. Stipulated.
                                               Yes.
                                                     Ι
   would point this out, Your Honor: All of a sudden,
11
12
   this is our fault. It was provided to us in June when
13
   the expert reports and rebuttal expert reports were
14
   already complete. Discovery was essentially over
15
   except for a few exceptions.
              And we also would point out that the
16
   dispositive motion had already been ruled upon.
17
   that point with all the other things going on, we have
18
19
   brought it to your attention. It came in a flood of
20
   documents. We had to sort it out and realize what was
21
   going on. And, obviously, it's material that should
2.2
   have been presented to us much earlier. It's kept in
   their normal business records. And it has resulted in
23
   a prejudicial ruling that shouldn't have been entered.
24
   Thank you.
25
```

```
1
              SPECIAL MASTER:
                               Okay.
                                      Thank you,
   Mr. Draper. So actually, one last question,
2
   Mr. Draper. So when is it in your order of witnesses
3
   that Mr. Fritz is likely to be testifying?
4
              MR. DRAPER: He's listed as our tenth
5
   witness, Your Honor, and is tentatively scheduled for
6
7
   later in October. We haven't been able to finally nail
   down that time with him.
              SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Thanks. Let me make
9
10
   several points with respect to this particular motion.
   So first of all, again, if you look back to both
11
   Wyoming's motion as well as my memorandum opinions,
12
13
   they all address both damages as well as other
14
   remedies. And it doesn't say "other retrospective
15
   remedies." It says "other remedies."
16
              Mr. Draper, I think you've served the State
   of Montana well in carefully reading everything.
17
                                                      And I
18
   specifically recall your asking me to rename the
   memorandum opinion so that it paralleled what Wyoming
19
   had actually entitled its particular motion.
20
21
   again, although the heading specifically says
2.2
    "damages," if you read the motion, you read the
   memorandum opinions, it's with respect to all remedies.
23
              As for the question of whether or not this
24
   should also extend to liability, I, number one, do not
25
```

see any reason -- no one has given me any reason -- to actually distinguish between liability on the one hand 2. and remedies on the other hand with respect to the 3 question of notice. And, again, there's nothing 4 special about notice that would suggest that it should 5 go to the question of just damages or just remedies 6 7 rather than the question of liability more generally. Given my earlier ruling that Montana needed 8 to provide some type of notice to Wyoming that, in 9 fact, its pre-1950 appropriators were not getting the 10 water that they needed, if you, say, had a 60-year 11 period of time during which maybe Montana actually 12 13 never received all the water that it needed to meet its 14 1950 appropriators but never said anything to Wyoming, 15 and then came in and tried to argue that Wyoming was liable and that Montana should get prospective relief, 16 I don't see how you could actually justify the 17 prospective relief given, again, the requirement of 18 19 providing some type of notice to Wyoming with, again, 20 the exceptions that I set out in my earlier memorandum 21 opinion. 2.2 And I mentioned this in my ruling on Wyoming's motion for summary judgment. I specifically 23 suggested that I thought this was a good basis for a 24

motion in limine. Montana has had an opportunity to

25

reply to Wyoming's motion in limine in this particular situation. So I also do not believe that Montana has 2. been deprived of an opportunity to actually argue 3 whether or not it should apply equally to questions of 4 liability. 5 So for that reason, I'm going to -- well, 6 7 actually rule as I suggested earlier, which, again, excludes the evidence regarding those summary judgment years for the purposes of establishing liability but 9 not for the limited purpose of trying to establish 10 liability for the years that are actually in issue. 11 12 However, I'm going to reserve the right to 13 actually change the specific years for which I granted 14 summary judgment based on what Mr. Fritz testifies, if and when he takes the stand and if and when you show 15 him this particular exhibit. So if, for example, he 16 responds that he actually does remember 1981 he brought 17 18 up, the question that people in Montana who had pre-1950 rights, they weren't be satisfied. And he 19 20 brought that up, and Wyoming basically said, no, 21 compact doesn't have anything to do with that, then I 2.2 reserve the right to conclude, based on that, that, in fact, 1981 should be an issue. 23 I don't expect that would change my ruling on 24 any years other than 1981 and, again, based on what he 25

remembers when his memory is refreshed, a couple years around then. But it will all depend on what Mr. Fritz 2. testifies at that particular point in time as well as 4 what Wyoming's witnesses also testify.

3

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

I would have preferred that Montana had actually brought this up earlier and asked to have that portion of my ruling reconsidered based on the evidence that was presented by Wyoming. And I hope if either side suddenly gets presented with new evidence that's relevant, they immediately bring that up. But at the same time, I don't want to deprive Montana of the opportunity of utilizing this particular exhibit if, in fact, it just does change the basis for my summary judgment motion for a couple of years.

Okay. So any question about the rulings? Okay.

So that, then, brings me to the final two motions in limine, which both deal with the Tonque River Reservoir and storage in the Tongue River Reservoir. And on these, I will tell you at the very outset that my inclination is probably not to grant the motions at this particular point in time because I think they both raise relatively complex issues that I'm not confident I have enough in front of me in the limine motions to address. But on both of these, I

1 actually would appreciate some additional guidance and 2 argument from counsel.

2.2

So rather than taking them together, why don't we actually take them separately, at least for argument purposes. And then we can come back and discuss them together.

So why don't we start, actually, with Wyoming's motion in limine to exclude the evidence or argument that the 1999 Tongue River Reservoir enlargement is protected by Article V, A of the Yellowstone River Compact. And, Mr. Kaste, since this is your motion, why don't I start with a couple questions for you. And you're also welcome to raise any additional points that you want.

So let me just say at the -- the first thing is that I received replies from Wyoming on all of the various motions in limine. But looking back at all of the e-mails that Ms. Carter forwarded me, I didn't find any reply with respect to this one.

MR. KASTE: I didn't file one. I don't have to. What is your -- I'm interested in knowing what your primary concern is about this motion 'cause I want to address that. I think, honestly, Montana has raised an interesting and relevant point with regard to the nature of carryover in the reservoir. And maybe, for

purposes of this case, does it matter if the carryover storage is always carried at the bottom of the reservoir?

2.2

And good point, frankly. Good point.

Nevertheless, we think, and I'm still working the math on this thing, that at no point should we be in a position to condoning that the enlargement of the reservoir as it pertains to the arrangement between the states and the Yellowstone River Compact has a priority date that is consistent with the original date of the reservoir. That would just be a fiction, one to which neither Wyoming nor North Dakota acceded when Montana entered into the Northern Cheyenne Tribe Compact with the other parties in negotiations that we weren't in.

I think that the priority date of the reservoir could very well affect Wyoming adversely in the future. And we know, of course, that Wyoming was very concerned about that and attempted to create an agreement that we thought protected ourselves from any adverse effects that may result from the enlargement.

In addition, an issue that we haven't raised in our motion but probably should have, and you see it in Montana's responses, is this idea that the Tribe's right and Montana's right is commingled, which could very easily have adverse effect on Wyoming as well.

Because if the enlargement's down at the bottom and the tribal right is separated and it doesn't get used in any given year, then the amount of water that Wyoming is essentially responsible for making sure Montana has in order to fill its reservoir, is significantly different than if that water is somehow commingled, and Montana said we're entitled to a larger amount of water.

2.2

I think the right thing do with regard to this motion is to sit back, relax, and see what questions you have at the end of this trial. Because like I said, Montana has raised a good point about the arrangement of the reservoir. And they have raised a point which is consistent with the operation of the reservoirs in Wyoming. And like any case, as you move along and move along, you think, wow, I should have thought of that a year ago. But nobody ever had. And, of course, the importance of the reservoir to this case has blown itself to the forefront over time.

So I don't know if I need to do anything formal or not, but I frankly think we ought to sit back, relax, and see what the evidence is with regard to this reservoir, whether we need to decide this issue. And if we determine we do, I'm going to be adamant that that is post-1950 rights, post-Yellowstone

River Compact.

2.

2.0

2.2

With regard to the other one, I think that that one's one that we ought to decide up-front because it dramatically affects what is and is not relevant in these proceedings.

But if you'd like to allow Montana to address this motion, I'm happy to sit down. Or I can move right into the next one.

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Let me just give you a notion of where I am with respect to this particular motion. And I'm actually pleased to hear you suggest that the best thing to do with respect to this particular motion is to sit back, hear the evidence, have it fully briefed at the very end of the trial, and then make a determination.

I think there's a variety of issues here, and the amount of briefing that has gone into them is insufficient to really permit me to rule on this particular motion at this particular point in time.

And it's difficult also for me to do that without really understanding the full extent of the evidence that's likely to come in on this particular question.

It probably would have made this case a lot easier if I had ruled for Wyoming with respect to your interpretation on the Northern Cheyenne Compact. It

```
would have made things a lot simpler. But as I said in my memorandum of opinion, I ultimately concluded that Wyoming's interpretation of it simply stretched the language too far. But it's left the question, then, of what do you do with the additional capacity that was added to the reservoir?
```

2.2

I think that raises both the various questions that Montana has raised in its replies and, in particular, that question of, as you empty the reservoir, what water actually gets emptied first versus emptied last? But it also raises some fundamental questions about exactly what the impact of the Northern Cheyenne Compact is on the allocations of water between Montana and Wyoming.

And if you look to see what precedent exists out there already with respect to Federal Reserve water rights and their implications for compacts, the most obvious precedent, I think, is Arizona v. California, which provided that the Federal Reserved Water Rights in that particular situation was to be taken out of the amounts allocated to the individual states.

And so that would suggest, at least superficially, that in this particular case, that I'm perfectly fine if Wyoming wants to settle with the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, but at that point, it

```
basically comes out of any water that was allocated to
   Montana under the compact. But, of course, this is a
2.
   different compact. And as Wyoming has stressed from
 3
   the very outset, it doesn't allocate a specific amount
4
   of water to Montana. But, instead, as the United
5
   States Supreme Court has decided in this particular
6
7
   case, it actually starts out by providing that
   Montana's pre-1950 appropriative rights shall continue
   to be enjoyed and then allocates additional rights
9
10
   after that. And none of those particular questions
   have been briefed in this particular case so far.
11
              Ultimately, I think we're going to have to
12
13
   address those particular questions. As I said, the one
14
   precedent -- the best precedent that's out there, I
15
    think right now, is the Arizona v. California case.
                          Well, I'm hopeful that we
16
              MR. KASTE:
   actually don't have to address those things and that at
17
18
   the end of the case, we'll be able to show that
   utilizing the methodology employed by Montana's experts
19
   with the appropriate parameters on the operation of the
20
21
   reservoir, it fills. And hallelujah if we don't have
2.2
   to get into those hard questions with regard to that
23
   other compact. And certainly that's what we hope to
24
   prove in the case.
              But I do think it's best if we just sit on
25
```

this and think about it for a while before we do anything. So if I need to formally withdraw the motion 2. in limine with the option to renew it in the future, 3 4 I'll do that. If not, I'll move to the other one. SPECIAL MASTER: So I would suggest at this 5 stage that we simply move to the other one. 6 I think 7 this will be something that will be resolved at the end of the trial. 8 MR. KASTE: Well, the other motion, of 9 course, is Wyoming's motion in limine to limit evidence 10 related to discretionary operational decisions at the 11 Tongue River Reservoir. And, obviously, you've seen 12 13 from Montana's witness and exhibit list, that part of 14 their rationale for operating the reservoir is, hey, we have to make these decisions about how to operate our 15 reservoir. And as I told you in the summary judgment 16 proceeding, I think that that is perfectly appropriate 17 for Montana to make various decisions based on safety 18 19 and other considerations with regard to the operation 2.0 of their dam. 21 Nevertheless, our obligations to each other 2.2 in this case are governed by the compact. And the compact has a definition of beneficial use in it which 23 is limited. And the Court has already decided in its 2.4 ruling that beneficial use describes a type of use. 25

And those types of uses that are governed or that are 2. covered by the language "beneficial use" in the compact do not extend to these operational decisions. 3 4 extend to the satisfaction of downstream senior rights. And in this case, the only real quantification of those 5 rights is 50 CFS. So to the extent that Montana 6 7 bypasses more water than that, they do so at their own The consequences of those decisions cannot be 9 borne by Wyoming. They must be borne by Montana. 10 And I think it's very clear, both from the language of beneficial use and I think we cited Arizona 11 v. California in our brief that says that our rights, 12 13 our junior rights are subject only to senior rights. 14 Of course, the senior rights in this case are the 15 downstream stock water appropriations. They are not preventing ice jams, flood control, fish, protection of 16 infrastructure on the dam. Those are valid 17 considerations. But they're Montana's. They're not 18 19 Wyoming's. And Montana cannot force the consequences 20 of those considerations on to Wyoming consistently with 21 the plain language of the Yellowstone River Compact. 2.2 Accordingly, it makes no sense to listen to Montana justify those decisions in these proceedings. 23 Hey, I decided to dump water downriver because I wanted 24 to provide habitat for fish. Great. Doesn't matter 25

```
for purposes of accounting between the states. Why
would the Court want to listen to that? Don't know.
Hence, the motion.
```

2.2

And there's a significant amount of testimony designated by Montana on that issue, to talk about reservoir issues that have, for example, Mr. Smith who runs the reservoir say, I did that for a good reason. I'm going to say, sure you did. Agreed. But it doesn't matter for purposes of the breach of contract claim that we're here to decide. Because that contract is very clear. And it does not require Wyoming to pay for Montana's voluntary decisions.

We will honor the downstream senior rights from the Tongue River Dam. We will not, and we don't think we are obligated to honor voluntary decisions. And I understand that there is a balance that Montana faces. And there is risk involved. That's the nature of having a reservoir; that's the nature of having to protect fish; that's the nature of trying to ensure that these other people and these considerations are addressed. It's just a part of the deal. But it's their part; not ours.

And so having this testimony, having these exhibits, having these people come in and talk to you about decisions that cannot affect the balance or the

accounting balance between the parties is ultimately a waste of time. And that's our position. It's a waste 2. of your time, my time, the Court's time. And I agree 3 with Montana: It requires you to decide a legal issue 4 in these proceedings. But we really ought to know what 5 the rules are before we play the game. And it would be 6 7 helpful for all involved if we knew that the rules are as they are provided for in the compact.

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. So that's very helpful. So actually, before you speak, Mr. Draper, let me just give you a sense of, based on my reading of the papers so far, where I would be if I were at this point in time to give you a sense of what I think the rule probably is here and, I think, in the process also give you a sense of where I'm still not quite sure what the rule is.

So first of all, I did read Federal Land Bank v. Morris, which is a Montana Supreme Court decision in 1941. And having read that, I would agree with Wyoming that the Morris case would seem to clearly adopt the one-fill rule. And that given Wyoming follows a one-fill rule, you know, it would seem to me that that would be a rule that the compact would also follow in this particular case. And, in fact, I guess it would surprise me if it -- if the one-fill rule didn't apply

here. And, in fact, it could open up Montana's claims even farther. Because if, in fact, the one-fill rule didn't apply here and, therefore, Montana was free to keep filling up the reservoir over and over again as a matter of a pre-1950 right, at least as I understand the issue and the way in which the one-fill rule operates, if it didn't apply, basically Montana would be able to empty the reservoir and then ask for even more water to come down so they could fill it up over and over again as many times as they wanted to. So it would sort of surprise me if the one-fill rule actually did not apply.

2.

2.2

Second of all -- and here I feel a little bit less certain, so, therefore, would appreciate a little bit more guidance. I assumed that if in 1951, when the compact was negotiated, that let's assume that Montana were to -- their practice was to just fill up the Tongue River Reservoir as soon as they possibly could. So they didn't let any water flow out of the Tongue River Reservoir. They just filled it entirely as fast as Montana could. And then in the 1980s, they decided for fish and wildlife purposes that they would start releasing some water during those winter months for fish and wildlife. And as a result of that, they now ask for even more water to come down from Montana.

At that point, that would seem to me to be an enlargement of Montana's right because they are now asking for water, not just to fill the reservoir as they did before, but also for fish and wildlife purposes. And the fish and wildlife uses would not seem to be a beneficial use for purposes of the compact.

2.

2.2

I recognize that both Montana and Wyoming now recognize that fish passage is a beneficial use. But if you actually look at Article II, H of the compact, it provides that, "The term 'beneficial use' is herein defined to be that use by which the water supply of a drainage basin is depleted when usefully employed by the activities of man." And that would clearly, to me, suggest that beneficial uses for purposes of the compact refer to uses where you actually take water out of the river, use it for, as described here, an activity of man, and that that actually ends up utilizing some of the water of the river so that it gets depleted.

So if that were what was at issue, again, my inclination based on what I've seen in the paper so far, is that that's actually an enlargement and to the degree that Montana is asking for additional water at that point, that it's actually asking for water for a

purpose which is not protected under the compact. Not only is it not a beneficial use, but it also wasn't a use back in 1950. So it's not a pre-1951 beneficial use.

2.2

But then I get to my final set of situations, which is, let's assume that Montana, prior to 1951, did not fill the reservoir up immediately, but they actually let water run through and down into the Tongue River for various purposes -- might have been for the safety of the reservoir at that particular point in time, might have been to avoid having ice on the river downstream, could have been for a variety of different purposes -- and now, basically, Montana is following pretty much the same practice as before in letting a certain amount of water run downstream but protecting all of the rest.

On that one, it's far less clear to me, based on what has been provided to me so far, as to exactly how you would resolve that particular issue. It's, first of all, not clear that the one-fill rule applies to that particular situation. Because in that particular case, it's not that Montana is filling the reservoir and then letting water out for another purpose; they are simply letting the water run through.

Now, I recognize there -- not to complicate

this too far, but I recognize there that when you have an actual in-stream reservoir rather than an off-stream reservoir, that the distinction between actually capturing water and letting it out and letting the water run through might not be as clear as one would like it to be. But, nonetheless, it's not clear to me that the one-fill rule actually applies in that particular case.

2.2

And I was interested in the decision of the presiding judge in the Snake River Basin adjudication. And I am about to refer to the memorandum decision dated March 20, 2013, that was Exhibit A to Wyoming's motion in which, first of all, in discussing the one-fill rule -- and this is footnote 6 on page 9 -- the presiding judge in that particular case notes that, "The department utilizes an accounting methodology for the purpose of determining when a storage water right has been filled and that the methodologies employed by the department for determining when a right has been filled are beyond the scope of these proceedings."

And then looking at subpart 4C of the presiding judge's opinion, it's entitled "This basinwide proceeding does not address the issue of when the quantity element of a storage water right is rightfully considered to be filled or satisfied," and

then in passing says, "The more important issue pertains to when the quantity element of a storage 2. right is considered a fill. Namely, is water that is 3 diverted and stored under a storage right counted 4 toward the quantity of that right if it is used by the 5 reservoir operator for flood control purposes?" 6 7 then goes on to note that's an accounting issue which the basinwide proceeding that this opinion is part of does not address. 9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

And then a little bit further on in the opinion, notes that, "The authority and responsibility for measuring and distributing water to and among the appropriators is statutorily conferred to and vested in the Idaho Department of Water Resources and its director."

And I don't have enough of the factual background of the Snake River adjudication to know specifically what that is in reference to. But it would seem to suggest that under the one-fill rule, there's still the separate question of, well, if you fill the reservoir for purposes of then letting water out for flood-control purposes, is that water really part of the fill, or can you actually say, well, actually that water was never part of the reservoir for purposes of the one-fill rule, and, therefore, you can

1 still let all of that flood water out and then fill it 2 back up again.

2.2

So the Snake adjudication decision actually doesn't seem to address this last set of questions that I'm interested in here. And I still, despite having asked both sides for information on this, am not sure exactly how Montana and Wyoming deal with that type of issue to the degree that the issue has actually arisen with respect to a particular reservoir.

Again, here I'll just come up with a total hypothetical. But I could imagine, for example, that a State might have a rule that says, okay, during the period from May to July, you can fill this particular reservoir at the following rate. I have no idea whether Montana follows that, whether Wyoming follows that type of a rule. But there must be some type of rule as to when you can fill it and what happens, if during the period of time that you fill it, you don't fill it.

And so that's what I'm still struggling with. And to be honest, I don't have enough in front of me to actually address that last set of questions. And it's that type of question that I actually think that, not only might citations to opinions help me in this particular case, but the testimony in this case might

be able to help me understand how the two states actually address this. Because number one, as I 2. mentioned in my original recommendations to the United 3 States Supreme Court in my first report, ultimately I'm 4 going to look to see what Montana and Wyoming do in 5 trying to determine what the compact means by prior 6 7 appropriation law. And in addition to that, as I suggested in 8 9 connection with my ruling on Montana's motion, the last 10 thing I think that the negotiators of the compact intended was setting up a totally different body of law 11 if they could avoid it. And so at the moment, I'm 12 13 looking for guidance on exactly how Montana and Wyoming 14 address, as I say, that last set of issues. 15 And so at the moment -- and you can dispel me of this, and Mr. Draper can dispel me of what I've 16 suggested so far as the way I see the law shaping up. 17 18 What I can do is I can give you guidance at this point 19 in time as to what I think the law is that I will apply at the end of the proceeding. 20 21 And as I said, based on what I've seen so 2.2 far, it appears that both states follow a one-fill 23 rule. Based on the language of the compact, if there's a brand-new release of water from the reservoir that's 24

for purposes that did not exist in 1950 and are not a

25

beneficial use under the compact, and the compact specifically talks about beneficial uses depleting the 2. water, then that would seem to me to be a new use for 3 which the compact does not provide protection. 4 5 But to the degree that they're basically letting the same amount of water go down as they did --6 7 let me restate that. To the degree that Montana is letting the 8 9 same amount of water flow through the reservoir as they 10 did before, then that might very well be permissible. And I just need to know more about how the two states 11 handle that type of an issue. 12 13 MR. KASTE: Well, I understand. And this is where the rubber meets the road in this case. 14 15 the important thing that you're going to have to What are the rules regarding the operation of 16 decide. Tonque River Reservoir? And how do we count? Because 17 it makes all the difference in the world to both states 18 how you count. And the reservoir is the water right 19 20 that matters in this case. It's the life blood for 21 Montana farmers all summer long, and it's the big 2.2 puddle Montana wants Wyoming to fill. That's what 23 matters. And it's all going to depend on how you 24 And our position -- and we're going to have the 25 count.

```
folks from Wyoming come in and explain to you what we
   do in Wyoming. 'Cause I agree with you that that case,
2.
   the Idaho case doesn't get to the guestion of, how do
 3
4
   you count?
5
              Fair enough.
                            In Wyoming, we issue fill
   orders on October 1. And we tell people in no
6
7
   uncertain terms -- although, you'll hear Bill Knapp
   testify, I haven't been doing a good job of sending out
    those notes, but they all know that your obligation is
9
   to fill your reservoir when water's available during
10
   the filling season. If you don't, you make that
11
   decision at your own expense, not your neighbor's
12
13
              If you don't fill when you had the
14
   opportunity to store water and then you come to the
   hydrographer commissioner and say, I want you to shut
15
   off my upstream junior during the irrigation season
16
   because I didn't fill, the hydrographer is going to
17
   look at what went out of your dam and say, no, I'm not
18
   going to honor that call because you missed your
19
   chance. And I'm not going to put your bad decision on
20
21
   your neighbor.
2.2
              That's going to be the evidence from
   Wyoming's witness about how we do it in Wyoming.
23
   our position, of course, in this case is that how you
24
   count is dictated by the language of the compact and
25
```

that you're entitled to certain beneficial issues. And the fact that you may have chosen to release water in the past does not give you the unfettered discretion to continue to choose to discharge that water in the future. Beneficial uses are defined.

2.2

And in the past, where Montana didn't come to Wyoming and say, we want you to take action to restore our reservoir because of our decisions, doesn't matter to Wyoming. Whether Montana historically bypassed water for any number of reasons, until they come knocking on our door, it's not our job to get into Montana's business. But once they come knocking on our door, then Montana has to demonstrate that it caught the water that was available or the consequences of that decision fall on Montana as a virtue of the plain language of the compact.

Not -- and Montana can't go, well, we wasted water for a long time, so it must be okay now. No, that doesn't count. That -- the compact doesn't recognize that if you historically wasted water, you get to keep wasting water. That's 180 degrees different than the doctrine of beneficial use and the doctrine of appropriation provide. They're looking to eliminate this, to provide opportunities to put this water to good use. And the fact that you may have been

wasting it for years and sending it straight down to Yellowstone without giving anyone an opportunity to use it without taking the opportunity to store it, it is in no way, then, should it give you the opportunity to do that in the future at Wyoming's expense.

2.

2.2

That's going to be your position in the litigation on the legal side. Factually, we try and do a pretty good job to make sure our reservoir owners take advantage of the opportunities presented to them. In the Tongue River Basin, you're going to learn it doesn't really matter because all of our high mountain reservoirs are at the very top of the system, the Big Horns, there isn't anyone above those reservoirs.

These people face the risk of their decisions completely. If they don't catch the water when it's available and they let it go by, that's it. The mountain is dry. They have no recourse.

Montana's in a very different position because its reservoir is located in the middle rather than the top of the system. But that doesn't mean that the rules ought to apply differently. The rule ought to be the same; catch it when it's available or bear the consequences of your own decisions.

Now, I'm sure Montana is going to put on evidence about how, well, we've done this in the past.

```
We've done this in the past. We've done this in the
           And our argument to you today and all throughout
 2.
    these proceedings are going to be, so what? Doesn't
 3
   matter. You should not allow their discretionary
 4
 5
    decisions in the past to form the basis of charging
    Wyoming now or in the future.
 6
 7
              That's all I got.
              SPECIAL MASTER: Okay.
 8
                                      Thanks.
 9
              Mr. Draper.
10
              MR. DRAPER:
                           Thank you, Your Honor.
                                                    Let's
         You've discussed two of the Wyoming motions with
11
    Mr. Kaste.
12
13
              SPECIAL MASTER: Right. And I think on the
14
    first motion, as I understand it, we -- there was an
15
    agreement that we will not need to rule on that
   particular motion at this particular point in time.
16
                                                          So
    you're free, if you want to, to address the merits.
17
18
    But at this point in time, I plan to deny that motion
19
    recognizing, again, that this is an issue that will
2.0
   need to be resolved at the end of the trial.
21
              MR. DRAPER: Very good. And I think you're
2.2
   motion will be vindicated by testimony that you will
23
   hear from both sides with respect to some of the issues
24
    on that enlargement question, how the reservoir is
    operated and what is even necessary to make the kind of
25
```

decision that the motion contemplated.

2.2

On the effort by Wyoming to exclude evidence relating to the operations of the Tongue River
Reservoir, I think that would be -- I think it's based on a critical misunderstanding of what needs to be heard. There's some legal issues there but also factual, as it's been operated that way prior to the compact. But was it being operated at the time of the negotiations that way? Is Wyoming entitled to say, well, you were operating it that way when we agreed to this; we can do that. But now we're not going to agree to give you any of your rights under the compact because we don't like the way you're operating it.

It will be a lot of factual evidence that has to come in that will be relevant. I think you indicated your sense of that. You have expressed the opinion in your ruling on the motion with respect to intrastate administration of water, that it is an initial presumption that Montana's existing regulation and administration of its water rights are acceptable under the compact. It's Wyoming's burden to convince you otherwise.

The operations that have been occurring historically which have not been radically changed, there would be that situation which you posited if

Montana wanted to suddenly recognize other uses including in-stream uses or other values that might today -- people might be more sensitive to and then require that Wyoming fund those. That's not what we're asking for. We're asking for protection of the uses and the reasonable operation of Tongue River Reservoir as it existed at the time of the compact. And Wyoming was on full notice of that. And so it's a little bit misplaced to say, well, if you were wasting water at the time of the compact, that doesn't mean that you get to continue to waste the water.

2.

2.2

That's their position. But it makes me think of that statement in the senate report about the compact which said, it is not the intent of the compact to change the water that is let down. Something along those lines. I haven't quoted it exactly.

But it is not the intent of the compact to change that. And that's what they are trying to do. That's exactly what they are trying to do. And I think, looking at your ruling on the effect of the compact on intrastate operations and the conditions under which water must be administered in order for Montana to obtain its rights, that you will need to look at, is this a reasonable operation of the reservoir? We claim that it is. We have experts in

```
the field of reservoir operations who will so testify.
    And it's that kind of evidence that you need to hear.
 2.
    You need to have a chance to ask questions.
 3
   needs to be the opportunity for Wyoming to
 4
    cross-examine. But that's exactly the kind of
 5
    information you need in order to make an appropriate
 6
 7
    ruling here.
              I agree it is an important issue.
 8
 9
    further State very strongly for the record that the
10
    statements you made regarding the adoption of the
    one-fill rule by Wyoming is something that we and the
11
    Attorney General of Montana disagree with.
12
13
              SPECIAL MASTER: I'm sorry. I didn't hear
14
    that last point.
15
              MR. DRAPER: Your statement with respect to
16
    the adoption of the one-fill rule by Montana, we
    disagree with that. And I wanted to make that very,
17
18
    very clear on the record.
19
              However, I think also your comment regarding
    questioning whether it really determines the issue
20
21
    here, is a very apt one. And it's not -- we're not
2.2
    seeking to operate the reservoir in any different way.
23
    It fills once a year. But it has a reasonable
24
    operation that's been practiced since before the time
    of the compact, that involves releases through the
25
```

```
reservoir, like reservoirs do. When we were up on the
   tour at the Park Reservoir, we heard about how they
2.
   release water through there in the winter. It happens.
 3
   And it's part of reasonable reservoir operations.
4
   that is something that's imminently a good subject for
5
   expert testimony and for percipient testimony of people
6
   who are involved in those operations.
7
              So I think that granting the motion at this
8
9
   point would be incorrect. It's something, again, that
10
   one can hold in abeyance. But it should not be
   granted. Because it would take away from you the
11
   opportunity to hear all this important evidence that is
12
13
   part of it.
                There's legal aspects, but there are
14
    important factual aspects, which you pointed out in
15
   your ruling. Whether it's reasonable, that takes
   evidence. And as with these other subjects, Wyoming is
16
    trying to keep that evidence from you. And we would
17
18
   oppose that in the strongest terms.
              So I think that would be at least the initial
19
   reaction. If you have any further questions, I'd be
20
21
   glad to answer them.
2.2
              SPECIAL MASTER: I think that's fine.
                                                     Thank
23
   you.
2.4
             Mr. Kaste, one last comment?
                                 I think Mr. Draper has put
25
              MR. KASTE:
                          Yeah.
```

1 it in just the right terms for us. Is the question
2 before you reasonable reservoir operations? Or is the
3 question before you beneficial use as defined by the
4 compact?

2.2

And our position is going to be that the compact says right in it beneficial uses. Those are the only appropriative rights that are protected, and that's it. And beneficial use is defined. And Montana says I want you to read into this compact an element of reasonableness. And I understand you're going to take all of this evidence. And I appreciate the fact that you are because this -- like I said, this is the important question in the case.

But I think what Montana, at the end of the day, is going to have to do is convince you to read into that compact language which does not exist in it. And our position is, if you read the plain language, these operational decisions, although reasonable -- and I do not have a witness who is going to come in and say, you guys operated your reservoir in a crazy, unreasonable way, unsafe or anything like that. I do not challenge the nature of their decisions for these other purposes. I don't want them to break their dam. I don't want them to endanger people. And I'm not going to offer any evidence along those lines.

But at the end of the day, you're going to have to decide, do read into this compact an element of reasonableness that is not apparent in the plain language? And that, I think, sets up the issue for you in just the right way. 'Cause it really, at the end of the day, is going to be an interpretive question from the compact. And the facts can inform, once you read that reasonableness element in, did they meet it or not? But you've got to start with that foundational decision, whether that's in or out of the compact.

2.

2.2

So I think that Mr. Draper set the issue up very well for you. And I understand, of course, the ruling we'll hear from both sides about what we do from reservoirs. And it will be very interesting.

SPECIAL MASTER: So let me just actually add a couple of additional points here, which is that there is at least two different ways in which I think you could look at the amount of water that Montana releases through the reservoir during the winter months rather than retaining the water in the reservoir itself.

One way of thinking about it is that -- you know, what their argument is is basically, well, we're putting that water to a beneficial use. Beneficial use is for fish purposes or to avoid the river icing over or to avoid floods, whole variety of different

purposes.

2.

2.2

And I agree to the degree that the argument is, hey, we're putting that water to a beneficial use, then one would think that you have to look at the definition of beneficial use in the compact itself.

Again, Article II(H), that refers to depletion of the water when usefully employed by the activities of man.

But the other way of thinking about it is that it goes to what your reservoir right is to begin with. So, again, I'm just going to throw a hypothetical because at this point, that's all I can do until I've actually learned more about the facts of this particular case and what Wyoming and Montana do.

But let's assume that there is a reservoir that historically a -- the owner of the reservoir cleans out and does repair work on during the winter months. And what they have historically done is to fill that reservoir in March. And they have a senior priority, in fact, to fill that reservoir during the March period.

There, if the argument is that, well, you know, you don't have any complaint against the junior appropriators who are holding back some more water in March because you can fill it in January and February, depending on what the law and practice is in a

1 particular State, that might be a perfectly reasonable It might be an invalid argument. 2. argument. So the question there goes to what the actual 3 right is to fill the reservoir under a particular 4 priority. And that's what I'm hoping to get some 5 additional guidance on from both of the two states. And on that particular issue, as to whether or not it's 7 ultimately consistent with the compact, that's going to depend partly on what the case law is out there. it might also depend on what the practices are. 10 the practices are most likely to come into evidence. 11 12 So we have a strange situation here where some of the 13 factual evidence might very well inform the legal 14 determinations. So it's impossible to say exactly what 15 the law is until we actually have some of the factual evidence come in on the record. 16 So I mention that only because I'm really 17 18 hoping I get guidance from both states on that 19 particular point. 20 So at this point in time, I'm going to deny 21 the motion but -- and I'm also not going to, at this 2.2 point, give you a definitive legal ruling because, 23 again, I haven't really had the law briefed in a way that I think would actually permit me to make 24 recommendations to the Supreme Court at this point. 25

However, as I suggested earlier, if based on 1 what I have right now, if I were to rule, I would say, 2. number one, that the one-fill rule does apply in 3 Montana. And I understand Montana's argument is that 4 it doesn't. But having read the Federal Land Bank v. 5 Morris case, there's an entire paragraph that seems to 6 7 adopt the one-fill rule. So unless somebody is holding back a legal opinion from me, it, you know, might be It wasn't absolutely clear to me as to whether 9 it was dictum. But it's the best guidance we have from 10 11 the Montana Supreme Court on that particular question at the moment. So if I were required to rule, that 12 13 would be my ruling there.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

Similarly, to the degree that Montana decided to start releasing additional water from the reservoir for a purpose which is not a pre-1950 beneficial use, that also would seem to me to be inadmissible under the compact. And the ultimate question then becomes, what is the nature of Montana's pre-1950 appropriative right to fill the Tongue River Reservoir? And on that, at this point, I feel that I need, both, to listen to the evidence; as well, to have a full briefing on the law at the end of the proceedings to make a determination on that particular question.

The other thing I'll add is, again, based on

my ruling on Montana's summary judgment motion, the question is not simply, does Wyoming have a different 2. Because I've already ruled that Montana is not 3 rule? required to adopt Wyoming's practice. But, instead, 4 is -- first of all, what is Montana's practice in this 5 particular area? And what was it in 1950 as to how you 6 7 went about actually determining what a right under the prior appropriation system to fill a reservoir consists And whatever that right is, however that's 9 defined, is that consistent with the compact, including 10 language in the compact as to beneficial use and 11 recognizing this is all supposed to be consistent with 12 13 a general prior on appropriator system? And also, in 14 addition to whether or not it is consistent with the 15 compact, whether or not this is the approach that Montana follows everywhere. Because if there's one 16 thing they follow with the Tongue River Reservoir and 17 18 they're trying to get Wyoming to accept, but, in fact, elsewhere they do something that looks very similar to 19 Wyoming, again, that -- at that point would no longer 20 21 seem to be an approach that would be properly adopted 2.2 under the Yellowstone River Compact. So, again, what I'm going to be looking for, 23 both in the evidence and also in the final legal 24 arguments, is the question of what does a pre-1950 25

storage right actually consist of? What does it mean? Does it mean that you have a right to a certain amount 2. of water but you better get out and capture it right 3 away? Or does it consist of a right to fill your 4 reservoir during a set period of time subject, perhaps, 5 to letting some water continue to flow downstream? 6 then -- and this is where I think the clear law comes 7 into play -- is that consistent with the compact? then back to the factual, is it the way in which 9 Montana has handled everything and not just this 10 particular reservoir? 11 So that's what I'll be looking for. And I 12 13 know that Wyoming would have liked me to actually make 14 a legal ruling today. But hopefully that at least 15 provides some additional quidance as to where we should be steering, both in terms of the evidence and also 16 what I'm looking for from the standpoint of ultimate 17 18 legal issues. And also in the hope that although both sides, in their pretrial memorandum, suggested that 19 20 this case could not be settled, and the fact that 21 you're all here right now suggests it's not likely to 2.2 be settled while we're sitting here, I still hope that parties discuss things. And if that discussion of the 23 24 law helps on that, then I hope it does. So any other questions on that? 25 Okay.

```
1
              MR. KASTE:
                          No, Your Honor.
2.
              SPECIAL MASTER: Okay.
                                      Thank you, Mr. Kaste.
             MR. DRAPER: Nothing further, Your Honor.
 3
              SPECIAL MASTER:
                              Okay. So we have, like,
4
   about 35 minutes left before the noon hour. And
5
   recognizing we haven't taken any break, probably the
6
7
   best thing to do is to maybe take a 10- or 15-minute
   break right now. And then we can come back and handle
   a variety of other administrative matters. And one of
9
   those is I want to come back to the time limit that
10
11
   Wyoming requested last week.
12
              So we are, then, in recess for the next 10 to
13
   15 minutes.
                        (Recess taken 11:25 to 11:42
14
15
                        a.m., October 15, 2013)
16
              SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Everybody can be
   seated.
17
18
              Okay. So there's several other things that I
19
   wanted to cover. I don't think this will take a great
20
   deal of time. So the first thing gets back to the time
21
   limits. And as I mentioned before when I was talking
2.2
   to a variety of federal judges over the summer, a
23
   number of them actually recommended time limits these
24
   days. I recognize that this is a Supreme Court
25
   proceeding. But, of course, the Supreme Court itself
```

has time limits. And the Supreme Court does not permit oral argument to go on at length. And my guess is actually they would appreciate me trying to keep this proceeding moving as quickly as possible.

2.2

2.4

But I also -- I'll recognize it's a little bit unusual in these type of proceedings to not have time limits. I'd be the first special master to try it. So what I'm going to do is, because I also trust counsel, is I'm going to put a soft time limit on here, which is basically at the moment, I'm going to just let things play out. As I mentioned on the telephone call on Friday, my hope is that Montana will be able to come in on the lower end of their time estimate for how long it will actually take them to put on their case in chief, particularly given that Wyoming says they're not going to need anywhere close to the amount of time for cross-examination as you provided for them.

But I reserve the right at any particular point in time to actually impose a time limit if I do not see the proceedings moving along at an appropriate pace or if I think they are just taking -- we're going off on too many tangents. Now, I realize that it would be a bit unfair to do that and then tell you what the time limit is.

So let me just say right now, I'm going to be

just keeping informal track on the expectation that both sides will not need more than about 65 hours of 2. time to actually finish both their direct and 3 cross-examination. And if, indeed, Montana were to 4 come in at the low end of their estimate, Wyoming comes 5 in at what they estimate their total amount of time is, 6 you both would need about 60 hours of time. 7 So I've added in an additional five hours. But, again, I don't plan to impose that 9 10 unless I see actually some need to do so. And I'll let you know along the way as to whether or not I see 11 anything going amiss. But hopefully that will just 12 13 provide you all with an incentive to move through 14 diligently with, again, recognizing that that's an informal limit. And I would even adjust that depending 15 on how things proceed along. 16 Okay. Any objection to that? Again, I'm 17 18 just going to be watching. I'm not doing anything at 19 this particular point in time. 20 MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, I think it will be 21 helpful if you see at any point the evidence, the 2.2 testimony going in a direction that you think is not -is a tangent, to ask us where this is going and make 23 sure that it is relevant. Otherwise, we'll make the 24 25 proper adjustments so that we are focusing all the time

on testimony and evidence that is directly relevant to this case.

2.2

SPECIAL MASTER: I appreciate that. And that's what I assume on both sides. And that's why I actually don't think I need to impose a time limit at this particular point. But, again, I'm reserving the right just to let you know what that time limit would be if I actually imposed it.

And if we're able to do that, we'll be out of here before Thanksgiving, which I think everyone would prefer. So that's the time limit.

Case schedule. So we can be let in downstairs at 8:00, and we have to be out of here by 5:00. So I'm actually looking to counsel for a little bit of guidance on this. But my preference would be that we probably start at 9:00, recognizing that to get in here and actually get organized might be difficult by 8:30 -- but I would be willing to start at 8:30 if both sides are able -- and that we finish up by 4:30 so we have an opportunity to finish up and get out of the building. But that with, like, a one-hour lunch break and a 15-minute break in the middle of the morning and middle of the afternoon gets us a full six hours of testimony each day.

But I'm willing to push it to the other ends

if counsel thinks that's possible. MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, I would go with your 2 recommendation to begin with. Let's try it for a few 3 days and see if some adjustment is needed. 4 5 SPECIAL MASTER: Mr. Kaste, your thoughts? MR. KASTE: 8:30 is a possibility. As long 6 7 as we stay to relatively short breaks, I'm willing to start at 9:00 if that's your preference. 9 SPECIAL MASTER: Why don't we go ahead and 10 start at 9:00 each morning for the moment and see how it goes. If I don't see us getting a full six hours of 11 12 testimony in each day, though, then I'll move it to 13 8:30. And similarly, my guess is an hour is sufficient 14 for lunch. If for any reason that proves wrong, again, 15 I'll move it to 8:30 if necessary. But I just want to make sure we do get a full six hours of testimony each 16 day. 17 So we'll then start at 9:00. We will take a 18 break, that I'll call sometime in the morning, for 15 19 20 minutes. We'll take a one-hour lunch break generally 21 about noon each day. And then we'll do another 2.2 15-minute break sometime in the afternoon which, again, 23 I'll call. And we will adjourn at 4:30. If for any 24 reason I don't feel that we've gotten in the six hours

of testimony or it seems appropriate, again, we can go

25

until 4:45. I just want to make sure I give you enough time to collect your papers and get out of here before the marshal actually locks the doors downstairs.

2.

2.2

And I'm looking down at my deputies to see whether they're nodding their heads, and they seem to be doing that.

Okay. So that's it on the daily schedule.

As I mentioned the other day, I do expect to ask questions of various -- of the witnesses. And, of course, you're free to object to my questions just like you would object to any other. And then I will rule on my question, which might sound a little bit silly. But I actually will listen to your objection, and it might very well be that you'll point out a problem that I didn't recognize.

Then, finally, I just want to go back to a proposal which I had made earlier and I would like to maintain, which is -- and actually, this might change the timing that I just mentioned. What I would suggest, as I mentioned before, is that generally two days before a day of testimony, that if whoever is presenting their case two days hence can let the other side know what witnesses you expect to call and what exhibits you currently expect to use as part of your questioning of that witness.

I recognize things can change. So I'm not saying if you don't put down every single exhibit, if for any reason you realize you have to have another exhibit later on, that will be fine. But my expectation will be that you will provide counsel with a list of all the exhibits you expect to utilize.

2.

2.2

At that point, I would ask the other side to take a look at those exhibits and let both counsel and me know by the -- at the end of trial the day after, whether you will have any or expect to have any objections on that particular exhibit. Again, I recognize that sometimes you won't know an objection until you see how that exhibit is actually being utilized. But to the degree you see a likely objection, if you could raise it at that point in time, that will permit me, then, the night before the day of trial, to consider those objections and if it seems appropriate to hear them at the very beginning of the next day so that we don't have to use testimony time to resolve those objections.

And, again, I recognize that you won't necessarily know every objection at that point. To the degree that there are objections to be heard, what I would suggest is we probably start, like, 15 minutes early for each of those days. So, in other words,

```
start at 8:45 so that we can try to resolve those
   objections and still get the six hours of trial.
2.
   there are not any objections that need to be resolved
 3
   prior to that day's testimony, we'll just start at
4
          So witnesses will start at 9:00. But there will
5
   always -- or if necessary, there will be a 15-minute
6
7
   session before where we'll resolve those questions.
              Any suggestions on that? Because I'm open to
8
9
   any suggestions to improve that.
10
              MR. KASTE:
                          That sounds great. I wanted to
   let you know Montana has already done that for the next
11
   two days. And so we have their list of witnesses and
12
13
   their intended exhibits. And I would propose we talk
14
   about Montana's exhibits just briefly today.
                                                  I think
15
    there are a couple things we might want to talk about
   with regard to the list we received. But we are
16
   already doing that -- or Montana is. But it's a good
17
18
   proposal.
19
              SPECIAL MASTER:
                               Okay. Great.
   Mr. Draper, the one request I would make is that if
20
21
   when you furnish the list of your witnesses and
2.2
   exhibits to the State of Wyoming, if you could also
23
   give a copy to my courtroom deputy, then she can
   provide it to me, and I'll be prepared. And I know I
24
   haven't asked that before. So that's fine.
25
```

```
1
              So that was actually the last thing on my
           So are there other things that either of the
2.
   agenda.
   parties wanted to talk about? And if not, maybe we can
3
4
   go ahead and talk about those exhibits at this point.
                          Well, with regard to the
5
              MR. KASTE:
   exhibits, first of all, I am very sorry. We gave
6
7
   you --
              SPECIAL MASTER: The mic, I don't think, is
8
9
   on.
10
              MR. KASTE: We gave you a ridiculous list of
   exhibits, and I apologize. The time between the
11
12
   summary judgment proceedings and the date that the
13
   exhibit lists were due was very short. And I think we
14
   worked frantically to overinclude everything. And I
15
   would be willing to bet you have a big, giant stack of
   boxes back there.
16
              SPECIAL MASTER:
                               I do.
17
18
              MR. KASTE:
                          And I'm sorry. That's a failing
   of counsel to not dwindle this down to what's
19
20
    important. That being said, I have another box for you
21
   of the joint exhibit, that is the 2002 Wyoming Basin
2.2
   Plan prepared by HKM. It's a joint exhibit that is
23
   four or five volumes long. It was -- it's our
24
   obligation to provide that copy to you, and I have that
   for you to take with you and stick with the other
25
```

boxes.

2.2

But like I say, I am sick to look at our exhibit list and find duplicates and things that I have no intention of attempting to admit in this case. And for that, I apologize to everyone involved that has to lug those boxes around.

With regard to those exhibits, because there is such a volume, there were some copying errors that we have identified. And the primary one is that if you turn -- particularly early on in Wyoming's exhibits, you turn a tab, and it says Wyoming 12, whatever it may be. And you may not see the first page of that exhibit there. It is likely the last page of the previous exhibit. So as you're going through, if there's some confusion, please look at the preceding exhibit pages to find that first page.

You know, we had an enormous copy job and farmed it out. And for the most part, they did a really great job. But there are a couple of errors. Like I said, principally at the beginning of Wyoming's exhibits, the paper is all in there. It's just not necessarily in there with regard to that tab. So one or two pages off, that tab is.

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. And I assume that's true both of the hard copy as well as the electronic

```
copy?
              MR. KASTE:
                          The electronic copy should be
2
          The hard copy has those copying errors
3
   fine.
   associated with this. The electronic copy, I think we
4
   created out of PDF documents. And those were whole.
5
   They couldn't have a divider jammed in the wrong spot.
6
7
              SPECIAL MASTER:
                               Okay.
                          But we do have hard copy exhibits
8
              MR. KASTE:
9
   of everything available if you need something or you
   can't find something. There's a lot to try and keep
10
   track of. And like I say, I have five more volumes for
11
   you to take with you as we leave today.
12
13
              SPECIAL MASTER:
                              Okay. Great. Thank you.
14
   And I assume with this new exhibit, this is something
15
   that Montana is fine with. It was just you were
    supposed to furnish it, and you've now furnished it.
16
              MR. KASTE: Yes.
                                It's Joint Exhibit 58. And
17
   it's Wyoming Basin Plan, which I think we had greater
18
19
   electronic access to than Montana.
20
              SPECIAL MASTER: Great.
                                       Thank you. So my
21
   one request there is going to be only, because I have a
2.2
   bad back, if I could borrow one of Wyoming's counsel to
23
   carry it down or up -- downstairs.
2.4
             Mr. Draper.
                           That all sounds consistent with
25
              MR. DRAPER:
```

what we arranged with Wyoming. It probably would be good for us to take a look at your set of exhibits at 2. some point and make sure everything got here in good 3 shape and it's arranged the way you want it. We sent 4 our copy of the Montana exhibits intending that it 5 would be the record copy of the exhibits and also all 7 the other joint exhibits, except for the ones mentioned by Mr. Kaste. 9 Now, we also -- we have brought with us an 10 extra set of the Montana exhibits if you would like 11 those as a working copy. The record copy probably needs to be handled carefully. But if it suits you, 12 13 this is something that's been done in other original 14 proceedings, if the special master wishes to have a set 15 that is -- in this case they are bound in binders -- to use during the proceedings or make notes or anything 16 like that, we have that available if you -- that would 17 18 be helpful. 19 SPECIAL MASTER: Wyoming, are you planning on doing the same? Or did you just have the one set, 20 21 which is all I requested. 2.2 MR. KASTE: Oh, I got more than one set. And 23 no elevator to my room. I mean, we spent a couple 24 hours dragging boxes up. Like I said, I can give you

another bound set. I can give you a set of any loose

25

```
exhibit that you want. We have, I believe, two
   additional copies of all of our exhibits, Montana's
2.
   exhibits, the joint exhibits. Any piece of paper that
 3
   you would like that you feel would be helpful to you
4
   either as a working copy or an official copy, let us
5
   know, and we got it.
6
              That does raise an interesting point that I
7
   quess I'm unclear on. Montana described the copy that
8
   they sent to you as the record copy. My understanding
9
   is if it isn't admitted in evidence, it's not going to
10
11
   go to the Supreme Court. And so my assumption would
   be, at some point after these proceedings, we'll have a
12
13
   list of things admitted in evidence and that it would
14
   make probably some sense to compile those things and
15
   submit them with your report to the Court. But it's
   not my understanding that everything we put on that
16
   list -- because I'm embarrassed of our list, frankly --
17
18
   would go to the Supreme Court.
19
              I don't know how you intend to proceed, but
   if it isn't admitted, I don't think the Court ought to
20
21
   have it. And I don't think we ought to burden them
2.2
   with things that weren't admitted in these proceedings.
23
   He may have a different opinion.
2.4
              SPECIAL MASTER:
                               Mr. Draper.
              MR. DRAPER: Yes, that's not the normal
25
```

practice in these cases. If an exhibit is not admitted, it's considered lodged. And, for instance, 2. there may be issues about whether the exhibit should 3 have been admitted. All of that is transported to the 4 clerk's office. And there is -- any exhibits that are 5 proposed by either side but not admitted would still be 6 7 part -- a separate part perhaps, but a part of the material that is transmitted to the Court when it goes 9 up to them. 10 MR. KASTE: And maybe I don't understand the distinction, if there is one, between proposed and 11 offered. I mean, having shipped it to the Court is one 12 13 thing. But whether you offer it or not -- and I 14 understand an offered but rejected exhibit, the Court 15 may want to see that. But I can't imagine we're going to ask the Court really to take 500 some exhibits. 16 SPECIAL MASTER: Yeah, so just to give you a 17 18 sense of the procedure which I understand that I follow 19 with the Court, I will actually maintain, during the course of this entire proceeding, the copies of all of 20 the exhibits, both those that have been entered into 21 2.2 evidence and those that have not been entered into 23 evidence. So when I issue my report to the Supreme Court, I actually retain the copies of the exhibit 24 during that period of time. 25

The Court can request copies of any of the exhibits, at that particular point in time, that they would like to see. But they actually retain, physically, in my possession. Because the last thing the Supreme Court wants is to have all of these boxes being shipped back and forth between the Supreme Court and my offices.

2.

2.2

2.4

At the very end of the case, when I'm dismissed as Special Master, at that point, everything which I have received at any point in time goes to the United States Supreme Court where it presumably goes into a warehouse that looks similar to the one in the Indiana Jones movies, where it remains forever.

So I don't think you have to be concerned that there is going to be a record that includes a lot of things that I've never actually looked at, because no one ever ended up using it as evidence, sitting in a Supreme Court clerk's office and the clerk is taking the time to actually look at some of them.

MR. DRAPER: Yes, that's my understanding of your description. And sometimes the Court will call up the record on a particular report, for instance. But what you say is my understanding as well.

SPECIAL MASTER: That's right. But my guess is they will not call that up unless it is mentioned in

```
my report or in one of your briefs or it's a piece of
   evidence that, you know, either the State of Wyoming or
2.
   the State of Montana believes should have been in the
 3
   evidence and the Court wants to take a look at to
4
   decide whether or not I made a mistake on my
5
   evidentiary ruling.
6
7
              MR. KASTE: Do you want the original
   stickered exhibits, or are the bound copies that have
8
   been provided already what you're looking for?
9
10
              SPECIAL MASTER: So right now the original
   stickered exhibits sit with the two states; is that
11
   correct? Or did you send -- did you send the stickered
12
   and you sent copies?
13
14
              MR. DRAPER: Well, it's not the old days of
15
   stickers. It's now electronically --
16
              SPECIAL MASTER: You have to understand, I've
   not been a litigator for several decades.
17
18
              MR. DRAPER: So we have provided you what we
19
   understand to be -- should be the record copy of the
2.0
   exhibits.
21
              SPECIAL MASTER:
                               Okay.
2.2
              MR. DRAPER: And that needs to stay pretty
23
   intact as we proceed along. And if you'd like -- and I
   understand we didn't actually bind these. These are in
24
25
   boxes with a file folder where you can pull out an
```

exhibit and look at it if you find it convenient. 2 But the original stickered -- the original record copy, we believe, is now here at the Court in 3 accordance with the part of your order that requested 4 we send a hard copy here. 5 SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. And so I'm just 6 7 curious, in today's world where there are no longer stickers, how do you distinguish between the two? MR. KASTE: I still put stickers on the stuff 9 10 that has ink on it and then make copies. I don't know what other people do. But these kind of documents that 11 are -- most of which don't actually have the original 12 13 ink on them, these electronic stickers work great. they're much easier for our staff to utilize. 14 15 MR. DRAPER: So it's a little advantage we 16 used to have, we don't have anymore, to feel that sticker to see if it's the real one. 17 18 SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. So from Wyoming, are 19 the exhibits that you have submitted already, would those be fine to use as the official? 20 21 MR. KASTE: Yes, with the caveat that we 2.2 goofed up a couple of those copies. 23 SPECIAL MASTER: Understood entirely. Okay. 24 And do you have a set of them that are not mixed up like that? 25

```
1
              MR. KASTE: Well, actually, we have a set
   of -- we have two sets of loose exhibits, meaning
2.
   they're in a Redweld and a manila folder, that if
3
   necessary -- and it's kind of what I like to do anyway.
4
   Take that piece of paper out, hand it to the witness,
5
   talk to him about it, and that sort of thing. And we
6
7
   can provide you with any one of those documents or an
   entire set of them if you so desire. But they're not
   bound, and they're in boxes in a series of manila
9
   folders.
10
              SPECIAL MASTER: So how -- when you have a
11
   witness up here and you actually use an exhibit, how
12
13
   will you go about doing that?
14
              MR. DRAPER: My intention, subject to your
15
   direction, is we use -- we have, really, three other
   sets with us. We have one loose, like the ones that
16
   Mr. Kaste is describing. So we've got two copies there
17
18
   that can be used by the witness and by the examining
   attorney. Plus we have a bound set that we'll keep at
19
20
   counsel table for use there.
21
              So I'm expecting to send the witnesses to the
2.2
   stand with a hard copy of the exhibits that are going
   to be testified to. And it will also be available
23
24
   electronically on our screens as well.
25
              SPECIAL MASTER:
                               Okay.
```

1 MR. KASTE: And that's basically my intention as well, is to send the witness with a hard copy and 2 actually place the page that they're looking at on this 3 ELMO machine in front so that everyone in the courtroom 4 will have an opportunity to see it. That should pop up 5 on your screen as well. 6 7 SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Let me -- that sounds -- so several things: First of all, it would be 8 useful for me to have, at least for some of the 9 exhibits -- and maybe we should just make it a general 10 11 rule -- a paper copy when that person testifies. Because I might very well put my own notations and 12 13 marks, mark passages that I think are very important. 14 Obviously, we don't want to do that on the official set 15 of copies. And I know I can do that on the iPad, but it's just a lot more difficult for me to do it on the 16 iPad than to do it the old-fashioned way. 17 18 So I think subject, then, to consulting with 19 my courtroom deputies as to whether or not they want me to follow a different approach, what I would suggest, 20 21 then, is that you have a copy available for me to mark 2.2 up. And otherwise, we'll just assume that the copies that are -- that you sent me earlier, the hard copies 23 are the official copies for the U.S. Supreme Court. 24 Hopefully the U.S. Supreme Court will very soon decide 25

```
that electronic copies are perfectly fine and I'll
   never have to ship those anywhere. But if they don't,
2
   those will be the official copies of it.
 3
              Okay. And I hope that you've worked with my
4
5
   courtroom deputies to make sure that, to the degree
   that you are going to be putting the exhibits up
6
7
   electronically, you're handling that and they don't
   have to worry about that; is that correct?
9
              MR. DRAPER:
                           That's right.
10
              SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Great.
                                              Okay.
                                                     But I
   think that handles the exhibits. So at 2:30 this
11
   afternoon, Mr. Draper informed me that we can go over,
12
13
   hopefully, and take a look at the hearing room for the
14
   Oil and Gas Commission.
15
              MR. DRAPER: Yes, Your Honor. And I've made
   copies, which I've given to Wyoming, of the sheet that
16
   has the address and the directions from this area.
17
                               Is it walkable?
18
              SPECIAL MASTER:
19
              MR. DRAPER: Pardon me?
20
              SPECIAL MASTER: Is it walkable?
21
             MR. DRAPER: No. It's probably about a 10-
2.2
   to 12-minute drive.
23
              MR. KASTE: Do you have a vehicle?
24
              MR. DRAPER: No, I don't have a vehicle.
                                                        So
   I will be --
25
```

```
1
              THE CLERK:
                          I have a vehicle.
2.
              SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Great. And you don't
   mind coming along on this?
3
4
              THE CLERK:
5
              SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Great.
                                              Then I do
   have a vehicle now.
6
7
             MR. DRAPER: All right. And they are
   expecting us 2:30 or 3:00. It sounds like they've got
8
   a little bit of flexibility. And our quide will be Tom
9
   Richmond who is the director of that body.
10
11
              SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Great. So, then, the
   only thing that I think remains, then, are the
12
13
   questions of the exhibits for the next two days.
14
              MR. KASTE: Yes. Like I said, Montana has
15
   provided their list for witnesses and exhibits for the
16
   next two days. And I want to talk about expert
17
   reports. Because there is an expert report and a
18
   rebuttal report on this list. And I have every
19
   expectation that those are going to be admitted in this
20
   case. But I want to make sure that we play by the same
21
   rules.
2.2
              An expert report is definitionally hearsay.
   All kinds of statements are made out of court for the
23
   proof of the truth. And typically, most cases, they
24
   are not admitted. But in these kinds of cases, they
25
```

probably will be and ought to be. And I want to make sure that if we're going to admit one expert report, 2 we're going to admit them all, including mine. 3 mine on the list as well. So if we're not going to do 4 5 that, then I object to those as hearsay, which is on the list. 6 7 But if we are, we want the rule to apply to the same with regard to the remaining exhibits to 8 Montana's list, I think I'm going to likely have 9 10 some -- maybe some foundational concerns depending on what the witness says about some of these documents. 11 It's a lot of everything the expert reviewed, which I 12 13 don't think is necessary for these proceedings to have 14 that expert admit everything that they reviewed in the 15 case. But it's Montana's case. If they want to try 16 that, great. That would be one of those times where I 17 probably stand up and go, really? This is kind of a 18 waste of our time. I believe that the expert can read. 19 I don't need to see every study that he relied on in 20 21 forming his opinions. But, otherwise, I don't have any 2.2 huge objections to the contents of these exhibits. 23 SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. And, Mr. Draper? 24 MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, yes, it's, I think, just routine that we're going to propose and, I would 25

```
hope, have accepted into evidence the expert reports of
    the experts. Yes, in a very dry world it's hearsay, of
 2.
    course. But in all kinds of expert proceedings where
 3
   you have expert triers of fact, you do this every
 4
    single day. So there's nothing unusual about it. And
 5
   we're not planning to object to theirs either. So
 6
 7
    that's perfectly fine.
              I would mention, you said we needed to make
 8
 9
    any authenticity objections by today. And so we looked
    over the Wyoming exhibits, and we have a document
10
    specifying the ones that we have authenticity
11
    objections to. As I understand your order, this is
12
13
    simply notice to the other party that when we get to
14
    that day, two days before the witness is going to
15
    testify to these exhibits, we get those resolved one
    way or the other.
16
              SPECIAL MASTER: That's correct.
17
                                                So the
18
    exhibits you're -- that you have concerns about the
19
    authenticity, that's for which day?
20
              MR. DRAPER:
                           Their whole exhibit list.
21
              SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Yes. That's correct.
2.2
    Those sort of issues, we'll deal with at the time.
    hopefully those sort of things, particularly if it's a
23
    question of authenticity, it can be resolved ahead of
24
    time.
25
```

MR. KASTE: Well, typically, with regard to authenticity, that's a claim that I need to bring the custodian of the records. And those are typically handled well in advance. If I need a witness, if that's the claim, I need a different witness to authenticate this document. But if Montana says, I don't care about the authenticity, if there's no objections to any of it, there's a whole bunch of those, so there will be nobody probably give us testimony on that. But if Montana has concerns about the authenticity of any of Wyoming's exhibits as opposed to other objections, relevance, foundation, things like that, I think we're entitled to know about those now so I can get the custodian here.

MR. DRAPER: And we're simply following your

2.2

MR. DRAPER: And we're simply following your order, Your Honor. And we're going to give it to him now. And I would say that these are -- it doesn't appear to me that these are instances where there's some chance an exhibit was fabricated or something but more that there is no identification of who the author might be. So we have no way of determining whether it's an authenticity objection or not. So that's the primary way, or for instance, an example would be some document that we asked everybody about that we took the deposition of, they didn't know what it was. And now

```
they're presenting it as an exhibit. Maybe that can be
    resolved by them saying, oh, we discovered who did
 2
    that, and it is X. But anyway, we're prepared to give
 3
    that in accordance with your order at this time.
 4
 5
              SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. So to the degree that
    the objections are ones that opposing counsel may need
 6
 7
    additional time in order to address -- and, Mr. Kaste,
    I understand your point that authenticity might be one
    of those.
 9
10
              If you could let Mr. Kaste know those now,
    then that will permit him to think about how those
11
    might be addressed. And, again, as to the degree these
12
13
    things can be worked out, particularly on questions of
14
    authenticity, that would be great.
15
              So I'm just curious, how many exhibits are we
    talking about?
16
17
              MR. KASTE: A dozen.
                                    Actually, I quess more
    like two dozen.
18
19
              SPECIAL MASTER:
                              Okay. Okay. So one of the
    things we'll be doing is ending early today. So this
20
21
    might be something that the two counsel might want to
2.2
    get together with in order to try to resolve those
23
    rather than having to actually bring somebody to court.
24
    Although, if that's necessary, then that will be.
25
    Okay.
```

```
1
              MR. DRAPER:
                           Yeah, that -- I think these are
   the kinds of things that can be worked out. If not,
2.
   it's a while before they start their case.
3
              SPECIAL MASTER:
4
                               Okay.
5
              MR. KASTE: And it very well could be that
   some of these exhibits are the ones that -- you know,
6
7
   honestly, we put together an exhibit list that included
   every deposition exhibit out of necessity more than
   anything. And it very well could be these are ones
9
10
   that we don't have any intention of admitting. We'll
   take a look.
11
12
                                      Then just to answer
              SPECIAL MASTER: Okay.
13
   your question, Mr. Kaste, I do plan to permit expert
14
   reports to be admitted once they -- once the expert has
15
   actually testified that, in fact, it's their report on
   all the opinions and are their opinions. And hopefully
16
   that will save time in the end.
17
18
              MR. KASTE:
                          It will certainly help you keep
19
   things straight.
20
              SPECIAL MASTER:
                              Okay. So any other issues
21
   with respect to exhibits over the next two days?
                                                      Any
2.2
   other housekeeping matters we have to deal with?
23
              MR. DRAPER: As to the timing of your visit
24
   there, shall we agree that we'll meet there at 3:00 at
   the Board of Oil and Gas Conservation?
25
```

```
1
              SPECIAL MASTER: I guess my preference would
    actually be to do it at 2:30 if people don't have any
 2
    objection, in part, because I'm looking at my courtroom
 3
   deputies. I don't want them to have to be sitting
 4
    around with nothing to do in that interim period.
 5
   might not be the case. They might have tons of things
 7
    they have to do. But I just want to make sure they can
    leave early.
 8
              MR. DRAPER: Very good. I just want to make
 9
    sure we have a definite time we're all aiming for.
10
11
              SPECIAL MASTER: Let's plan on 2:30.
12
              MR. DRAPER: Very good.
13
              SPECIAL MASTER: So then we will have that
14
    tour at 2:30. And then we will be back in session at
15
    9:00 a.m. sharp tomorrow morning.
              And, Mr. Draper, if you can give the list of
16
    witnesses and exhibits to my deputy afterwards, then
17
18
    I'll have that, too.
19
              MR. DRAPER: I'll do that, Your Honor.
                                                      And
    also a copy of the authenticity objections.
20
21
              SPECIAL MASTER: Excellent. Okay.
                                                  Then with
2.2
    that, I think we are adjourned, and I'll even use this
    this time.
23
24
              (Proceedings adjourned at 12:21 p.m.,
              October 15, 2013.)
25
```

1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2. I, Vonni R. Bray, a Certified Realtime 3 Reporter, certify that the foregoing transcript, 4 consisting of 108 pages, is a true and correct record of the proceedings given at the time and place hereinbefore mentioned; that the proceedings were 6 7 reported by me in machine shorthand and thereafter reduced to typewriting using computer-assisted 8 9 transcription. 10 I further certify that I am not attorney for, nor employed by, nor related to any of the parties or 11 attorneys to this action, nor financially interested in 12 13 this action. 14 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand at Laurel, Montana this 2nd day of February, 2014. 15 16 17 18 Vonni R. Bray, RPR, CRR 19 P. O. Box 125 Laurel, MT 59044 (406) 670-9533 - Cell 20 (888) 277-9372 - Fax 21 vonni.bray@gmail.com 22 23 2.4

25