

**Female Socialization:
How Daughters Affect Their Legislator Fathers' Voting on Women's Issues**
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Economists have long concerned themselves with environmental influences, such as neighborhood, peers and family on individual's beliefs and behaviors. However, the impact of children on parents' behavior has been little studied. Parenting daughters, psychologists have shown, increases feminist sympathies. I test the hypothesis that children, much like neighbors or peers, can influence adult behavior. My laboratory is the United States congress. I demonstrate that conditional on total number of children, each daughter increases a congress person's propensity to vote liberally on reproductive rights issues. The effect is better explained by a shift in parental preferences, than by a shift in knowledge of constituency views or in the cost of living under a conservative reproductive rights regime. The result demonstrates not only the relevance of child to parent behavioral influence, but also the importance of personal ideology in a legislator's voting decisions as it is not explained away by voter preferences.

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I Introduction

By the early eighties, after nearly two terms in congress, Senator Pete W. Domenici (R-NM) had made a name for himself. “He was a gray, pragmatic fiscal and social conservative who opposed abortion, gun control and same-sex marriage and supported school vouchers, tax cuts and mandatory three-strikes sentencing. He was no bleeding heart, no cause pleader.”¹

That is until the withdrawn, indecisive and confused behavior of his daughter Clare was diagnosed as atypical schizophrenia.

Now Domenici is Congress’ leading advocate for health insurance parity for mental illness. He is not alone. Domenici built a multiparty coalition that has included five legislators, all of whose lives have been touched by mental illness. Senator Paul Wellstone’s (D-MN) older brother was severely mentally ill. Senator Alan Simpson’s (R-WY) niece and Senator Harry Reid’s (D-NV) father committed suicide. Representative Patrick Kennedy (D-RI) has battled depression. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) is Patrick’s father.²

While the coalition failed in passing legislation, their union did succeed in illustrating that a legislator’s family members may influence his legislative decision making. The idea that family, in particular children like Domenici’s daughter Clare, can influence parental behavior seems to accord with common sense. Yet, it is a concept that has been neglected by economists. Economists have compiled a large literature on the impacts of the environmental influences of neighborhood, peers, parents and siblings on behaviors from educational attainment³ to welfare take up (Bertrand et. al, 2000) to wedding a working woman (Fernandez et. al, 2004).

Yet, only recently have we begun to consider the impact that children can have on their parent’s behavior. Two recent papers demonstrate that child gender can affect parental decisions surrounding marriage, divorce and custodial arrangements (Ananat and Michaels, 2005 and Dahl

¹ Sontag, Deborah. “When Politics is Personal.” *The New York Times*. September 15, 2002.

² Ibid.

³ Recent examples are Black et. al (2003), Dahl and Lochner (2005), Hanushek et. al (2003), Hoxby (2000) Ruhm (2004) and Sacerdote (2004).

and Moretti, 2004). Reichman et. al. (2003) identify a link between child health and father's presence in the household.

This paper considers whether children can influence parental behavior outside of the household, in the way that we believe neighbors and peers continue to exert influence over an individual's behavior even when the individual is not in the presence of a neighbor or a peer. Psychologists have demonstrated a link between offspring gender and parental beliefs on not only parenting issues (Brody and Steelman, 1985; Downey, Jackson and Powell, 1994) but also on issues of political significance. Warner (1991) examines the impact of daughters on parental attitudes toward women, in Detroit and Toronto. She finds that women with girls in both countries and men with girls in Canada are significantly more likely to hold feminist views. Warner and Steel (1999) find that US fathers are significantly more likely to support pay equity, comparable worth, affirmative action in regards to gender in employment and Title IX policies if they parent only daughters.

The shift in fathers' attitudes is particularly interesting given the "gender gap" in political beliefs in this country: a larger fraction of women than men favor the Democratic Party (Edlund and Pande, 2002).⁴ Women are slightly more likely to believe abortion should be legally available. (Forty-four percent of women and forty-two percent of men agree with that statement.) Outside of reproductive rights, we see even larger differences between the views of the sexes. Women are four percentage points more likely to favor more crime spending (61% vs 57%), five percentage points less likely to favor increased defense spending (20% vs 25%) ten percentage points more likely to support laws protecting homosexuals from discrimination (68% vs 58%)

⁴ This gender gap has been increasing since the late 1960's. Before this time women voted more conservatively than men. (Edlund and Pande, 2002).

and eleven percentage points more likely to believe that there should be more government services (41% vs 30%).⁵

I take the evidence of attitudinal shift concerning women's issues to the political arena to ask whether parenting daughters increases a congress person's propensity to vote liberally on women's issues bills. The answer is yes. Using congressional voting record scores compiled by the American Association of University Women (AAUW) and the National Organization of Women (NOW), I find that each female child is associated with a score increase that is approximately one quarter of the difference in score accounted for by a congressperson's own gender. By turning to the universe of votes recorded in the 105th congress, I demonstrate that the realm of influence of female children extends across those issues on which males and females differ significantly, but is most prevalent on a women's issue on which gender differences are small: reproductive rights. The concentration of the daughter effect to the reproductive rights arena is not surprising given that past research has demonstrated a link between parenting daughters and liberal beliefs on women's issues. Reproductive rights is an issue that is thought of as uniquely female; for those voting on these issues the females in their lives would be particularly salient. A second reason for the pattern of the daughter effect is that reproductive rights is a moral issue. Ansolabehere et. al (2001b) and Snyder and Groseclose (2000) have found that legislators are subject to less party pressure and are therefore more free to vote their own views on moral issues.

What is the cause of this correlation between daughters and voting on women's issues? One possibility is the attitudinal shift that Warner (1991) and Warner and Steel (1999) have demonstrated comes from parenting daughters. A second possibility is the increased cost of a more restrictive reproductive rights regime for parents of daughters. However, the fact that we see this correlation even for votes concerning access to abortion for citizens of developing countries

⁵ Author's calculations using the 1992-2000 National Election Surveys. T-tests show that the gender differences on views on crime, defense, protection of homosexuals and public services are significant at the 1% level. Gender differences on abortion are significant the 10% level.

suggests that the regime cost explanation is incomplete at best. A third possibility is that daughters lower a congress man's cost of obtaining information on the views of the females in his electorate. However, that the effect is concentrated, not on the issues on which men and women differ the most, but rather on the issues on which female is most salient, belies the relevance of this explanation. This leaves us with the preference shift explanation with which we began. Further support for this mechanism is that the effect appears to be increasing in daughter's age.

Because the context of this study is congress, this work speaks not only to the environmental effects literature, but also to the literature that seeks to understand whether the ideology of a legislator factors into his legislative decision making. Personal preference or ideology has been repeatedly shown to be a factor in a congressperson's voting decisions. (See for example Levitt, 1996; Snyder and Groseclose, 2000 and Ansolabehere et. al 2001b). But what shapes ideology? Race and gender are two components. Pande (2003) exploits the random reservation of village leadership positions in India for members of particular tribes and castes, to demonstrate that leaders increase transfers to members of their own ethnic group. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) employ an analogous design in the same country to show that women leaders invest more in water, fuel and roads (which are needs of rural women) than their male counterparts.

While the correlation between daughters and legislative voting speaks to the environmental influence of children on parents, the conditional correlation does not demonstrate the relevance of ideology for a politician's behavior. Perhaps constituents with liberal views on female issues choose legislators with more female children, believing that these individuals can better represent their interests. However, this does not appear to be the case. I demonstrate that the correlation between daughters and women's issue voting is not explained away by controls for constituency desires. Further, Representatives with the least incentive to vote according to constituency will show the largest correlations between their daughters and their voting record.

Not only do these findings provide additional evidence that a congress person's personal ideology or identity matters in legislative voting, but they further uncover a dynamic component of that ideology: children.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section II I summarize the data and methods. I present results demonstrating the impact of child gender on legislator parents' voting behavior in Section III. The mechanisms behind the basic results are discussed in Section IV. Section V provides evidence on the question of the importance of ideology in a representative's behaviors. Section VI concludes.

II Data and Methodology

The primary data source for this analysis is a cross section of Representative and district characteristics from the 105th United States Congress (1997-1998). The dataset includes a total of 434 legislators (observations).⁶ I focus primarily on the cross section because of the infrequency with which Representatives augment their family size. The mean Representative is 52 years of age at the beginning of the 105th congress. For the most part, these men and women have completed their reproductive lives before they enter Congress. Of the individuals who served in the House between 1991 and 2004, only nine percent saw some change to their number of children during the 14 year time period.⁷

I rely on two dependent variables primarily, the legislator voting scores produced by the National Organization of Women (NOW) and the American Association of University Women (AAUW) respectively. Both organizations are liberal leaning interest groups who concern themselves with issues of interest to women. While AAUW and NOW share a similar agenda—

⁶Michael Pappas (D-NJ) is not included in this analysis because I was unable to obtain information on the gender of his child.

⁷Of the 867 people who served in the House in the time period, I have child data for 828 of them. As a result of birth, adoption or marriage (stepchildren), sixty-nine of the 828 saw an increase in their number of children. As a result of death or divorce (stepchildren), six saw a decrease. Representative Deborah Pryce (R-OH) experienced child death, divorce and adoption for both an increase and a decrease to her family size in the time period.

the two selected seven pieces of legislation in common as the most important of the 105th congress—their voting record scores have varying strengths.

The great advantage of the NOW data, available only for the 105th congress, is the wide variety of topics with which the organization concerns itself. To create their scores, NOW chose twenty pieces of legislation that it considered critical for women. For each vote in accordance with the NOW position, the organization awarded 5 points to produce a score that ranges from 0 to 100 with a mean of 74 for Democrats and 12 for Republicans. The legislation included in the calculation encompasses a variety of issues including equality, economic security, women’s safety, education, lesbian rights, health and reproductive rights. By decomposing the NOW score, I can determine on which issues daughters impact their legislative parents’ voting decisions.

The great advantage of the AAUW data is its longitudinal nature. The organization has provided voting record scores for the 102nd and 104th through 108th congresses.⁸ These data allow me to show that the correlation between female children and voting is not simply a 105th Congress artifact.⁹ For each congress, AAUW selects 8 to 10 pieces of legislation in the areas of education, equality and abortion rights. Each House member’s rating score is simply the percentage of those pieces of legislation on which the member votes in accordance with the AAUW position, for a score that ranges from 0 to 100 with a mean of 86 for Democrats and 12 for Republicans for the 105th Congress.

In the most basic specification, using either the NOW or AAUW voting record scores, I treat each legislator in the 105th congress as an observation and run regressions of the form

$$(1) Y = \alpha + \beta_1\text{GIRLS} + \beta_2\text{FEMALE} + \beta_3\text{RACE} + \beta_4\text{PARTY} + \beta_5\text{SERVICELENGTH} + \beta_6(\text{SERVICELENGTH})^2 + \beta_7\text{AGE} + \beta_8(\text{AGE})^2 + \beta_9 - \beta_{12}\text{RELIGION} + \beta_{13}(\text{CLINTONVOTE96}) + \gamma + \phi + \varepsilon$$

⁸ Voting scores for the 103rd could not be located, according to the AAUW.

⁹ Unfortunately because of the lack of variation in number of children within congress person, fixed effect specifications prove uninformative.

where Y is a legislator vote rating score (either NOW or AAUW). GIRLS is the number of daughters that the individual legislator has and γ is a set of dummies representing the total number of children the legislator has parented.^{10,11,12} As shown in Table 1, in the 105th congress, the average legislator has 2.49 children, slightly more than half of whom—1.27—are girls.¹³ Republicans, on average, have more children (2.73) than Democrats (2.23). Republicans have a slightly smaller proportion of girls than their Democratic counterparts.¹⁴ In addition, I control for various legislator characteristics that the literature suggests are influential in determining a politician's behavior. As mentioned previously, race and gender (FEMALE) have been shown to have a causal impact on elected official's actions. In addition, legislator party, service length, age and religion¹⁵ have been shown to be correlated with voting decisions. (See for example Hibbing and Marsh, 1991 and Stratmann, 2000.) I include the share of the major party presidential votes cast in favor of Clinton in 1996 and a set of census region fixed effects (ϕ) as measures of the district's liberalness. (Stratmann, 2000 shows that as a district's residents become increasingly liberal so too does the voting record of its Representative.) Means for all variables used to estimate Equation 1 can be found in Table 1.¹⁶

¹⁰ The names of legislator's children are published in the *Congressional Directory*. In cases where the names of the children were ambiguous (with regard to gender) or omitted I consulted Internet resources, phoned the member's office (if s/he were still in office) or phoned a newspaper in the member's district.

¹¹ I have also tried entering the number of female children non-linearly. I present the linear specification because of its better fit. Results presented are robust to entering total number of children linearly.

¹² Conditional on total number of children, the numbers of female and male children are linearly dependent. Therefore one can interpret the results as either the effect of a having a larger share of girls or of having a smaller share of boys in the family. I refer to a daughter effect throughout the paper because that feels most natural in the discussion of women's issues.

¹³ The proportion of the means is of course not equal to the mean of the proportion. The mean proportion of girls is .45.

¹⁴ When measured as either the proportion of means or the mean of the proportions this difference is not statistically significant.

¹⁵ Party, service length and age can all be found in the *Congressional Directory*. Religious data come from three sources: the *Congressional Directory*, the *Almanac of American Politics* and the following website: http://www.adherents.com/adh_congress.html.

¹⁶ Results are robust to the inclusion of marital status dummies. However, I do not include these controls in my basic specification for three reasons: 1) There is no theoretical foundation from the psychological literature for such an inclusion. 2) Endogeneity of the marital decision would result in a biased coefficient. (State laws seem particularly problematic as instruments when dealing with the population who creates

There are two potential threats to employing this strategy for identifying the influence of daughters on legislator voting: 1) bias in the rating scores and 2) non-randomness of female births. I discuss each in turn.

The first potential threat is that NOW and AAUW, interest groups with liberal political leanings, have created biased rating scores. Clearly, the rating scores of both groups favor liberal representatives over their conservative counterparts. However, this skew poses no threat to the identification strategy. It is extremely unlikely that either group has an agenda that is in any way correlated with my key independent variable, the number of female children in a legislator's family. While the scores may be biased in the common parlance sense, they introduce no bias, econometrically speaking as I demonstrate in a robustness check that examines the correlation between daughters and voting behavior on all votes recorded for the 105th congress.¹⁷

The second potential threat is that child gender is not a random variable. Perhaps the same congressperson, whose preferences run counter to the NOW agenda, prefers male children over female children.¹⁸ The identification assumption would be invalid if such an individual took actions that either increased the probability that any particular child were male or increased the proportion of sons amongst his children. The possibility of increasing the probability that any individual child is male is basically non-existent for this population. With a mean age of 52 in 1998, these congress people did not have access to technology for fetal sex selection at the time of the gestation of their children. And there are no natural methods of intercourse timing that have a significant impact on child sex (Wilcox et. al, 1995). While adoptive and step parents may have

laws.) 3) There is little variation. Of the 423 members of the 105th congress for whom I was able to identify marital status, 90% were married.

¹⁷ Results are also robust to the substitution of the conservative leaning National Right to Life's voting scores in place of the NOW or AAUW scores.

¹⁸ For instance, Dahl and Moretti (2004) find that those who view themselves as liberal are 15 percentage points more likely than self-described conservatives to report a preference for daughters over sons.

more flexibility in choosing child gender, both types of parenting are likely to be rare in this sample.¹⁹

While there are no natural methods that will affect the probability that any one child is a boy, a couple with male preferences could follow a natural method to ensure a certain number of sons. For example, a couple could follow a stopping rule in which they continue having children until a son is born. While such a stopping rule can never alter the proportion of female children in the overall population, it will have within family consequences for the ratio of daughters to sons. As laid out in Clark (2000) parents with male preferences will have a higher proportion of sons in small families and a smaller proportion of sons in large families. The congressional data show evidence of male child preferences for both Republicans and Democrats, groups whose average NOW scores differ by 32 points (on a 100 point scale). Democrats with three children or fewer have an average proportion of girls of .45, while those with larger families have a proportion of girls of .52. For Republicans the proportion girl children is .41 for small families and .49 for larger families. In fact within every quintile of the NOW voting score, legislators with smaller families have on average a smaller proportion of girls than do those legislators with larger families suggesting that male child preferences are exhibited by both those who are liberal and those who are conservative on women's issues. This correlation between number of daughters and family size is not a threat to identification as it is not related to NOW score. Further, I fully saturate the model in number of children.

A congress person with male preferences is more likely to take a less extreme measure. He could distance himself from his female children, mentally or even physically as suggested by recent work documenting the correlation between marital dissolution and female children (Ananat

¹⁹ In 1970—the year in which the number of adoptions peaked in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century—170,000 adoptions occurred, compared to 3.7 million births. Step parenting is also likely to be rare in this population because of the low rate of divorce. Less than 4% of the sample is currently divorced. Nationwide in 2000, 15% of 45 to 54 year olds were currently divorce. (<http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/p20-537/2000/tabA1.pdf>)

and Michaels, 2005 and Dahl and Moretti, 2004). Such behavior would merely bias my findings toward zero as a portion of the “treated” sample is not actually receiving the treatment.

More dangerous to identification, would be if the congress person with male preferences denied his female children. In other words, he could fail to list some or all of his daughters in the *Congressional Directory*—my most relied upon source for identifying congress people’s children—which would bias my findings upward. While this might be a concern in a telephone survey of divorced males in the American population at large, it is unlikely to be a threat in this sample. Members of congress are public figures. The *Congressional Directory* is a public document. The omission of a child in this document could easily be uncovered and would likely be punished by the press and then the voting public.²⁰ In fact, a Google search turned up a website that “outed” divorced Republicans. About Bob Dole, the site noted that the former Senator had “divorced the mother of his child.”²¹

Thus conditional on total number of children, the number of female children appears to be random. In the next section, I exploit this fact to run models of the form of Equation 1 to identify the impact of children on parental attitudes and behavior. More specifically, I examine how the gender of his offspring affects a legislator’s voting on women’s issues.

III Basic Results

A legislator’s voting record score is increasing in the number of female children parented. This relationship can be seen in graphical form. Figure 1A presents the mean NOW score, by party and number of female children. Figure 1B presents the same relationship using AAUW score. The top half of Figure 1A shows the relationship for politicians with two children. (Two is the modal number of children in the sample.) Democrats are pictured on the left side of the graph. Those with one daughter earn an average NOW score that is four points higher than those with no

²⁰ Evidence that selective child reporting is not occurring is the fact that for the 16 divorced members of the sample the average proportion of female children (.44) is not statistically or economically distinct from the average (.45) in the remainder of the sample.

²¹ www.dailykos.com/story/2004/3/24/181127/078

daughters.²² Those with two daughters have an average score that is an additional ten points higher than those with only one. Although their mean NOW score is lower, the same relationship holds for Republicans with two children, pictured on the right hand side of the top graph. The average NOW score is six points higher for Republicans with one daughter compared with those with none. The marginal increase for the second daughter is one additional point.

Three is the second most popular number of children for this population. The bottom half of Figure 1A presents the analysis for legislators with three children. Once again for the Democrats (bottom left) the mean NOW score increases with each additional female child. For Republicans the pattern is not quite as clear. The mean score is greater for those with three daughters over those with one daughter over those with no daughters. However, those with two daughters break the trend. This group has the lowest mean NOW score amongst Republicans with three children.

Figure 1B presents the same analysis using the AAUW data. Once again we see voting record score strictly increasing in number of female children for both Democrats and Republicans with two children and for Democrats with three children.

The positive relationship holds in the face of controls for additional legislator characteristics. Table 2 presents results from regressions of the form of Equation 1. As shown in the first cell in column one, each female child is associated with an increase of about two points in a legislator's NOW rating score. To put that number in perspective, note that female legislators show a conditional increase in their NOW score of over 10 points over their male counterparts. In other words, the impact of the gender of each child on one's NOW voting record score is approximately 20-25% of the impact of one's own gender.

²² Each vote in agreement with the NOW position is worth five points.

The relationship between female children and voting record score is robust to changes in data source and year. Remaining in the 105th congress but moving to AAUW²³ voting record scores (Column 2) I show that each female child is also associated with a two point increase in voting score which is again about 20-25% of the size of the female dummy coefficient. Regardless of outcome measure, control variables enter the equations with similar signs and magnitudes. As the number of children that a legislator parents increases, his or her voting record score decreases.²⁴ Not surprisingly, Republicans have significantly lower voting record scores than Democratic House members. And legislators from districts that gave increasingly larger shares of their vote to Clinton (over Dole) score increasingly higher. Legislator race, age and service length have small insignificant associations with voting record score. Catholics have significantly lower voting record scores than Protestants (the omitted group); those of other religions have significantly higher scores.

As stated earlier, the advantage of the AAUW voting records is that they are available for multiple years. In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 I demonstrate that the relationship between female children and legislator voting on women's issues holds across time. Column 3 presents results from the 102nd Congress, where once again each female child is associated with an increase in a legislator's AAUW score, in this case about three points. (The Number of Female Children coefficient is not statistically significant in this regression due, in part, to a reduction in sample size which has increased standard errors. The farther one goes back in time, the more difficult it becomes to obtain information on the children of the Representatives of the time period.) The 102nd Congress represents not only a change in time frame from the 105th, but also a change in legislator-constituent pairing, as the 102nd concluded before the redistricting that created the political map for the 103rd-107th congresses.

²³ The sample size differs with outcome variable because NOW did not compute voting record scores for four House members who did not complete the full term. In all, seven Representatives did not complete the 105th congress. Results are robust to their exclusion from all analyses.

²⁴ Children may proxy for intensity of religious views. Controlling more finely for religious denomination, does not alter the more children, more conservative voting pattern result.

In a subsequent redistricting, the political map for the 108th Congress was carved. In this time period (2003-2004) we once again see a significant increase of about two points in a legislator's AAUW score for each female child parented.²⁵

Turning attention to subgroups of Representatives, I demonstrate in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 that male legislators show a significant increase in voting record score for each female child, while female Representatives show an insignificant decrease. (In Table 3 each cell presents the coefficient on the variable Number of Female Children from a different regression.) However, due to the imprecise nature of the female children coefficient in the female Representative regression, no conclusions can be drawn about the impact of female children on the voting behavior of female Representatives. In the remainder of the paper, I will at times refer to the influence of daughters on "congressmen" instead of "congress people" for this reason.

Scores are increasing in female children for both Democratic and Republican House members. But, the point estimate is larger for Democrats. (See columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.) Again, the difference is not statistically significant. In fact, comparing coefficients from decile regressions, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the impact of female children on women's issue voting is the same throughout the voting record score distribution.

That impact seems to grow along with the daughter. Table 4 shows the results from Equation 1 augmented to include a dummy for whether the oldest daughter is an adult and the interaction of that dummy with the number of female children. Because of the difficulty in locating child age information, this specification is run on the most recently completed congress,

²⁵ While NOW counts a missed vote as a vote against their position, abstentions do not appear to bias results. The AAUW reports percent voting in favor of their position as a fraction of all votes included in their rating system and as a fraction of only those votes in which the congress person actually voted. Throughout the paper I make use of the former for comparability with NOW. However, results are qualitatively unchanged when I substitute the latter. For example the daughter coefficient in column 2 of Table 5 becomes 2.43(1.11) when only legislation voted on is considered. There is no significant correlation between number of female children and missed AAUW votes. A regression of a dummy for any missed votes on number of female children and the other covariates yields a coefficient of .017(.021). Fourteen percent of the members of the 105th congress missed at least one AAUW vote.

the 108th, using only AAUW data.²⁶ I was able to find child age information for 367 members of this congress. In column 1, I repeat the basic specification using this smaller sample. Each female child is correlated with a two point increase in voting record score, although the effect is insignificant. In column 2 I add the dummy for adult daughter and its interaction with number of female children. Once again, each daughter is correlated with a two point increase in voting score. Controlling for own age, congress people with older daughters appear significantly more conservative on women's issues as the coefficient on the dummy for oldest daughter adult is negative and significant.²⁷ Nonetheless, members with older daughters, see the largest impact of female children on their voting record as shown by the positive coefficient on the interaction term. The number of female children and the interaction term are jointly significant at the five percent level.

Moving from subgroups of legislators to subgroups of legislation, I next decompose the NOW voting record score into its twenty component votes in order to investigate on which issue we see the greatest association between female children and voting patterns. The answer, shown in Table 5, is reproductive rights. In this table, each row refers to a different piece of legislation included in the voting record score. Legislation is grouped into seven topic areas: equality, reproductive rights, safety, economic security, education, lesbian rights and health. Each row presents the coefficient on Number of Female Children from a regression of the form of Equation 1 in which the outcome variable is a dummy indicating whether the legislator voted in accordance with the NOW position on this piece of legislation. The largest contributors legislation-wise to the 2.27 point increase in voting record associated with each female child are the votes on reproductive rights. The average propensity to vote along with the NOW position on these bills increases from 2.9 percentage points (for a bill to withhold funds from the FDA to review drugs that induce medical abortions) to 4.9 percentage points (for a bill requiring parental consent for

²⁶ Recall that NOW data are not available for this congress.

²⁷ This suggests that those who begin having children at a younger age are more conservative. The correlation between dummies for oldest child adult and oldest female child adult is .78.

teens to obtain prescription contraception). The propensity to vote with NOW on each reproductive issue increases an average of 3.7 percentage points with each female child. The average increase across the remaining votes is only 1.4 percentage points. While 2/3 of reproductive rights legislation voting is significantly correlated with number of daughters, only two pieces of legislation outside of the reproductive rights area show significant correlations. (Descriptions of legislation are found in Appendix Table 1.)

To create its voting record score NOW selected only a tiny fraction of the nearly 1200 votes recorded for the 105th congress. While it is unlikely that NOW's selection method was a function of the degree to which legislators with daughters voted in accordance with their position, it is possible that their method was based on a function of some other characteristic of the legislation. Snyder (1992) argues that interest groups choose a disproportionate number of close votes exaggerating the degree of extremism and bipolarity in congress. And in fact while 75% of votes chosen by NOW were close²⁸, only 45% of all votes taken in that congress were close.²⁹ Such selection concerns motivate an investigation of how daughters correlate with voting across vote types. To this end I have taken all House roll call votes³⁰ for the 105th congress, classified them by issue type according to Ansolabehere et. al (2001b) and rerun the decomposition exercise with this greatly expanded sample of 873 votes.³¹

Moving to the expanded sample, the story remains one of reproductive rights. As Table 6 demonstrates, moral and religious issues (which include abortion and contraception) show the greatest significant correlation between daughters and liberal voting.³² (This statement is true

²⁸ Of the 16 that actually were votes as opposed to the four bills which never made it to a vote for which NOW awarded points for sponsorship.

²⁹ Lopsided (close) defined as more (less) than 65% on the winning side as in Snyder and Groseclose (2000).

³⁰ Available on Charles Stewart's web page at http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html.

³¹ 1187 votes were recorded across the two sessions of this congress. For 1164 of those, yes and no votes (as opposed to a simple quorum) were recorded. 1036 of the remainder showed variation within the votes. Ansolabehere et. al (2001b) assigned issue types to 876 of these. I eliminated the three votes classified as civil rights due to the small sample.

³² Across vote types, daughters, if significantly correlated with voting behavior, correlate positively with more liberal voting as measured by the relative behavior of Democrats and Republicans.

across vote types: procedural, passage and amendment and regardless of whether the vote is close. See Appendix Table 2 for these results.) For 48% percent of all moral and religious votes, the coefficient on the Number of Female Children variable is significant (Table 6).³³ (Forty-eight percent is far greater than the approximate 10% we would expect by chance under a true null.) Ansolabehere et. al's 42 moral and religious issue votes include 29 on abortion (51% significant), two on contraception (both significant), six on church and state issues (two significant), and five others³⁴ (of which only the one on gay adoption showed a significant correlation). At fully 18 percentage points smaller, Social Security, labor policy and executive branch regulations show the next highest frequency of significant daughter coefficients. While Social Security and labor are issues on which men and women disagree,³⁵ the executive branch regulations warrant explanation. The fact is that more than half of the votes that produced significant daughter correlations could easily have been classified as labor regulations. Four of the seven focus on reducing paperwork for small business, education and non-profit organizations.³⁶

The conclusion of both decomposition exercises is that while there is some correlation between parenting female children and voting liberally on issues on which men and women differ significantly (such as health, education and defense), the relationship between daughters and voting is strongest on an issue on which the sexes do not differ greatly—reproductive rights.

Why are votes on reproductive rights particularly influenced by a legislator's proportion of female children? For two reasons, I hypothesize. First, reproductive rights is generally thought of as precisely a women's issue. Unlike lesbian rights which focus on a subset of the female population or economic security issues which focus on a group that is broader than the female population, the focus of reproductive rights is exactly the female population. It is likely when a

³³ At the 10% level; the same pattern of results holds at a 5% significance level.

³⁴ On gay adoption, marijuana, teens and tobacco and suicide (2).

³⁵ As shown earlier, women are more likely to favor the Democratic Party and increased spending on health, education and welfare.

³⁶ The other three are on disclosing information about increased federal expenditures, disclosing information about health and human safety issues and one on Clinton's assertion of executive privilege in the Lewinsky scandal.

congressperson confronts a vote on reproductive rights, he thinks that this is a vote that will impact females. For parents of daughters, the issue then takes on “increased salience” (Warner and Steel, 1999).

A second reason—unique to the congressional context—that reproductive rights voting is more greatly tied to female children than other NOW issues is that reproductive rights is a moral issue. Ansolabehere et. al (2001b) and Snyder and Groseclose (2000) find that political parties less frequently exhibit pressures on congress people’s voting on moral and religious issues in this country. In Britain, Hibbing and Marsh (1987) show that partisan forces are also much weaker on so called “free votes,” which “frequently deal with controversial issues, such as abortion, capital punishment, homosexuality, and the like”.³⁷ More influential on these controversial decisions, the authors demonstrate, are legislator personal characteristics such as religion, age and education. The decomposition results suggest that the relevant characteristics extend beyond the personal, to the environmental.

But clearly the environmental influence of female children is not the only possible mechanism to link daughters with voting on women’s issues. In the next section, I consider alternative interpretations for these results.

IV Mechanisms

The results of Section III document a correlation between parenting female children and voting liberally on women’s issues. While this work was motivated by the hypothesis that children can influence adult attitudes and behaviors in the same way that peers and neighbors do, alternative interpretations of the results must be considered. Rather than altering preferences, parenting a daughter may lower information costs or increase the cost of living under a regime with conservative reproductive rights laws. Both scenarios seem unlikely.

³⁷ Given party and other political pressures, the attitudinal shifts caused by raising daughters may be more widespread than the behavioral shifts measured here.

The information cost story says that parenting a daughter provides information on the desires of one-half of a legislator's constituency. Parents of daughters alter their legislative votes to align with these newly learned desires. The difficulty with this explanation is that a legislator can learn more about the views of the average woman (relative to the average man) from his daughter on issues such as crime, defense and discrimination, than he can on reproductive rights. Of the four issues men and women differ least on reproductive rights. Yet, reproductive issues show the largest daughter effect. Increased information does not appear to be the mechanism underlying the results.

Nor is the mechanism likely the cost of a conservative reproductive rights regime for those with daughters. The increased cost could stem from the embarrassment of having a pregnant daughter or the monetary hardship of an unwanted grandchild. But costs can not explain the significant daughter effect on House Vote 178 (in the 105th) which sought to curtail abortions overseas.³⁸ Nor can costs explain the voting pattern on House Vote 447 which dealt with funding of abortions in federal prisons.

This leaves us with the preference shift explanation with which we began: Psychologists have demonstrated that parenting daughters increases feminist beliefs. Support for the preference change mechanism comes from the limited child age data that I have been able to collect: The effect of daughters on legislative voting appears to be increasing in daughter's age, suggesting that the act of parenting and spending time with female children is the cause of change. The preference shift explanation seems the best fit for the findings.

V Impact of a Politician's Identity

Because the context of this study is the United States congress, the data speak not only to how children can impact a parent's attitudes and behaviors, but also to how the attitudes of a congress person affect his representation of his constituency. An open question in political

³⁸ A later amendment to the same bill (House Vote 194) did not show a significant daughter effect. This vote was included in the NOW score.

economy is to what extent does the identity of the representative (as opposed to the constituency views) influence legislative voting. Previous research has found that both the race and gender of the politician affect the manner in which she distributes resources. The findings of Section III suggest that children may also shape an official's political behavior. However, the difficulty of such an interpretation is the possibility of omitted constituency variables from Equation 1. Perhaps female children do not cause a representative to vote more in line with the NOW and AAUW positions, but rather citizens who have such liberal views believe legislators with more female children better represent them. Note however that sixty percent of self-reported voters failed to identify even one of their district candidates for House of Representatives just weeks after the election.³⁹ It seems unlikely that voters are aware of the gender composition of candidate's children. Nonetheless, there exists the potential for an omitted explanatory variable that correlates with both legislator child gender composition and district opinion on women's issues.

I provide evidence on the causal link between child gender and legislative voting in two ways. First, I expand the model of Equation 1 to allow for covariates to control for constituency characteristics and opinions. I do not find evidence of a large, or systematic omitted variables bias. Second I test the causal interpretation of the basic results by appealing to the following logic: If the number of daughters variable proxies for the will of the constituency then those legislators who have the most incentive to listen to their constituencies should show the greatest correlation between number of daughters and their voting record. But, I find that the opposite is true. Legislators with the safest seats—those with the least electoral incentive to adhere to constituents' views in place of their own ideology—show a significantly higher correlation between daughters and voting record than their peers with less safe seats.⁴⁰ Thus I provide

³⁹ Author's calculations using National Election Survey data for the years 1992-2000.

⁴⁰ Unfortunately two cleaner methods of controlling for constituent views proved uninformative. The first is to exploit the panel nature of the AAUW data and control for constituent views by means of congress person fixed effects. This method suffers from two liabilities: 1) It only captures the immediate (at most

suggestive evidence of another form of personal identity that matters in a legislator's decision making: his family, more specifically, the gender of his children.

The first evidence that the correlation between daughters and voting record can not be fully explained by constituent characteristics comes from models in which I amplify Equation 1 to include additional controls for district characteristics and opinions. As shown in Table 7, these additional controls do not significantly change the point estimate of the impact of the number of children on NOW voting record score. Column 1 provides the basic result (from Equation 1) for comparison: an increase of 2.27 NOW points associated with each female child.

In Column 2 the model is amended to include controls for district income, race, gender mix and education.⁴¹ (Means for all additional independent variables can be found in Appendix Table 4.) The coefficient on number of children remains statistically significant at 1.96, which is not statistically different from the coefficient in the basic model. The amplified model further shows that each .01 increase in the fraction of the population that is college educated is associated with a significant .45 increase in legislator's NOW score. However, each increase in the fraction of the population that is female is associated with a significant decrease in the legislator's NOW score, suggesting a backlash against women's issues as the female population grows.⁴² In Column

two year) impact of female children on voting. Given the Table 5 results demonstrating that adult daughters have a larger impact than younger daughters this seems inappropriate. 2) There is little within person variation in number of children. Results from the fixed effects model are presented in Appendix Table 3. A second strategy would have been to move to the Senate and control for constituent characteristics using state effects. However, the correlation between daughters and Senate voting record is insignificant, both with and without the inclusion of state dummies. Further the correlation is unstable as it switches from positive to negative depending on the congress. It is not clear whether the lack of relationship between daughters and voting in the Senate is due to sample size or an underlying difference in Senatorial and Representative behavior.

⁴¹ Census data by district are available from <http://www.american.edu/dlublin/research/data.htm> and from www.census.gov.

⁴² Fraction female is not simply a proxy for percent elderly. The coefficient remains negative and significant with the inclusion of a percent elderly variable. Faludi (1991) documents the historical phenomenon of societal backlash in response to gains made by American women.

3 the model is further amplified to include data on state religious preferences;⁴³ the coefficient on Number of Female Children changes little to 1.92.

Next, I use more direct measures of constituency preferences. In column 5 I add to the basic model variables on public opinion on the various issues included in the NOW rating score. Drawn from the National Election Survey (NES), the additional variables are the fraction of the state population who believe (around the time of the election for the 105th congress) 1) abortion should always be legal; 2) women and men are equal; 3) federal crime spending should be increased; 4) government should spend more on services⁴⁴; and 5) that there should be laws to protect homosexuals from discrimination. These variables speak to the degree to which district views are in line with NOW views and whether a correlation between district views and legislator child gender composition is biasing my results.⁴⁵ Column 4 suggests that if a bias exists, it is extremely small. The correlation between NOW voting and Number of Female Children remains a significant 2.39 which should be compared to the coefficient 2.36 (1.14) from a basic regression run with the sample for which opinion data exist. The relationship between NOW voting score and population views on equality, crime, spending on services and discrimination against gays proves insignificant. On the other hand, as the share of the state population who feel abortion should always be legal increases, so too does legislator NOW score. This is notable because as the decomposition exercise demonstrated, the relationship between number of female children and voting on women's issues is driven largely by the reproductive rights issue. This fact suggests that if an omitted variable bias exists, the culprit variable is likely one on popular opinion on abortion rights. As column 4 shows, the addition of such a variable does not change the basic result: each female child is associated with a NOW score increase of approximately two points.

⁴³ The sample size falls by three in this column because religion data, drawn from Kosmin and Mayer (2001), are not available for Alaska and Hawaii.

⁴⁴ The question mentioned in particular health and education.

⁴⁵ The limitation of these variables stems from the small sample sizes used in the NES which forces me to aggregate to state, rather than district, level in order to create reasonable cell sizes. Even at this level, I can only construct measures for thirty-five states. Individual observations for the remaining fifteen are limited or non-existent.

In the final column of Table 7 I include all district characteristic and opinion variables in a single regression model. Results are mixed. On the one hand the p-value on the coefficient of 1.71 grows to .11; the coefficient just misses statistical significance at conventional levels. On the other hand it is not significantly different from the coefficient in the basic model.

While results from the 105th congress suggest that the absence of constituent controls is biasing results slightly upward, results from more recent congresses suggest that the bias is not systematic. In Table 8 I run the basic and amplified models (Table 7, columns 1 and 5) for the 105th-108th congresses using AAUW data. Results from the 105th congress do not vary with voting record score choice, as shown in Row 1 of Table 8. As do the NOW data, AAUW data demonstrate that a move from the basic to most amplified model produces a drop in the magnitude and significance of the female children coefficient. However the pattern does not continue in more recent congresses. In the 106th and 108th congresses, the difference in the key coefficient across models is only .08 and .25 respectively. In the 107th, the daughter coefficient is larger in the amplified than in the basic models. In no year is the coefficient from the expanded model significantly different from that of the basic model.⁴⁶ The evidence, while not conclusive, suggests that the correlation between number of female children and voting on women's issues can not be explained away by constituency characteristics.⁴⁷

Further evidence that the Section III results cannot be explained by constituency characteristics comes from examining the voting behavior of those legislators with the greatest incentive to vote according to constituent desires. Assuming legislators are interested in reelection, we would expect such incentives to be strongest for those who are most likely to face difficult reelection battles. Therefore, if the correlation between number of girls and voting record

⁴⁶ Results from an analysis of pooled data from the 104th to 107th also show a slight increase in the daughter/women's issue voting correlation from the basic to the amplified model. See Appendix Table 3.

⁴⁷ Further evidence that the child gender effect is not fully captured by the constituency comes from models in which legislator child gender is regressed on the district characteristics. As shown in Appendix Table 5, only district views on crime spending significantly predicts a legislator's proportion of female children. Further the fit of the model (over a model which predicts proportion female children using only legislator characteristics) is not improved (in an adjusted R² sense) by the addition of district characteristics.

is reflecting omitted constituency desire then we should see larger correlations for legislators whose reelection is most uncertain. To test this supposition I regress voting record score on number of daughters, a measure of seat safety and the interaction of these two variables.⁴⁸ A negative coefficient on the interaction variable would be evidence that those who have the most incentive to follow their constituency are those with the greatest correlation between daughters and voting record. Such a finding would suggest that daughters are simply proxying for omitted constituent concerns.

As the results in Table 9 demonstrate, I find exactly the opposite. Those who have the least incentive to follow their constituency are those who show the greatest correlation between daughters and voting record. In Columns 1 and 3 the measure of seat safety is derived from the results of the most recent House election. I create a dummy variable on safety of the seat which equals one if the legislator received more than 60 percent of the vote in the most recent election.^{49,50} Across voting record scores, female children are correlated with more liberal voting. The positive interaction term indicates that those who have the least reason to adhere to their constituency (because they hold the safest seats) show an even greater correlation between female children and liberal voting on women's issues than their peers in less safe seats. While none of the coefficients is significant on its own, in both specifications Number of Female Children and the interaction term are jointly significant at the ten percent level. In other words, the impact of female children on those with safe seats is statistically significant.

One limitation of this analysis is the possibility of reverse causality. Perhaps Representatives win by large margins precisely because they adhere to the will of their constituencies. Perhaps a greater correlation between number of girls and voting record amongst those with the safest seats is evidence in favor of the constituency driving the girls/voting record

⁴⁸ The seat safety measure is also fully interacted with the number of children dummies and includes all covariates of Equation 1.

⁴⁹ Sixty-four percent of those serving in the 105th congress won more than 60% of the vote in the 1996 elections.

⁵⁰ Results are robust to changes (in terms of share of vote) to the definition of seat safety.

correlation. Historical evidence casts doubt on this story. Ansolabehere et. al (2001a) have shown in a study of House elections from 1874 to 1996 that the degree to which candidates moderate their views (in favor of their constituency) increases in electoral competitiveness.

As a check against the reverse causality story, I employ a second measure of seat safety, derived from the educational level of the constituency. Schmidt et. al (1996) find that Senators whose voting record deviates from their party position are less likely to win reelection. The effect of a deviation on lose probability is greater for those Senators from more educated districts. The authors cite Husted et. al (1995) who show that better educated voters⁵¹ are more informed voters. Applying the Schmidt et. al findings to the impact of female children on voting record, I conclude that if daughters simply proxy for the will of the constituency then a Representative's correlation between daughters and voting record should be increasing in the education of the constituents. However, if daughters impact the personal ideology of the Representative (independent of constituent views) than the correlation between daughters and voting record should be decreasing in the education of the constituents. In other words, only those Representatives who feel they can most easily get away with (not lose their seat for) relying on their personal ideology will do so.

To test between these competing theories, I regress voting record score on Number of Female Children, Fraction College Graduates and the interaction of the two variables. The ideology interpretation is most consistent with the findings shown in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 9. Across interest groups, both the Number of Female Children and the Fraction College Graduates are positive predictors of a more liberal female voting record score as we have seen previously. The key coefficient is the negative interaction term. Representatives whose constituencies are least likely to punish them from deviating from constituency wishes are those for whom number of female children has the strongest impact on voting record.^{52,53} The daughter effect seems more

⁵¹ Whites, homeowners and older voters are also better informed about their Senators' voting records.

⁵² Regressions by party show that this finding is true for the average member of each party.

⁵³ Once again, the effect holds for the pooled 104th-107th congress sample.

closely related to personal ideology than constituency. Thus here is quantitative support for the anecdotal observation that legislators' daughters influence their voting decisions.

VI. Conclusion

While the notion that a legislator's children influence his congressional voting behavior appears commonsensical, there has, to this point and to my knowledge, been no evidence to quantitatively substantiate this intuition. This paper begins to fill this hole in the literature. I find that conditional on number of children, parenting an additional female child increases a Representative's propensity to vote liberally on women's issues, particularly reproductive rights. Such a voting pattern does not seem to be explained away by constituency preferences, suggesting not only does parenting daughters affect preferences, but also that personal preferences affect legislative behavior.

Consequently these results speak to two literatures. To the realm of environmental effects, such as peers and neighborhoods, this work suggests that we should add offspring effects. Not only should we consider the impact that parents have on children's attitudes and behavior, but we should consider that there may be reverse causality in the parental/child attitude relationship.

A second contribution of this work is to the literature on congressional voting. This paper not only provides a robustness check on the finding that ideology impacts legislative voting, it also serves to identify a component of that ideology: child gender composition. Unlike gender and race, previously identified components of ideology, family is dynamic. Therefore the findings highlight a danger of modeling ideology as a fixed effect.

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TABLE 1: SAMPLE MEANS FOR 105TH CONGRESS

Variable	Full Sample	Democrats ¹	Republicans
<i>Independent Variables</i>			
<i>Legislator's Children</i>			
Number of Female Children	1.27	1.19	1.35
Number of Children	2.49	2.23	2.73
<i>Total Number of Children (%)</i>			
Zero	13.82	14.98	12.78
One	9.22	13.04	5.73
Two	31.8	33.82	22.91
Three	21.66	20.29	15.86
Four	13.13	10.14	16.30
Five	7.14	6.28	7.93
Six	1.15	.97	1.32
Seven	.92	0	1.76
Eight	.69	.48	.88
Nine	.23	0	.44
Ten	.23	0	.44
<i>Legislator Characteristics</i>			
White	.87	.75	.98
Female	.11	.16	.06
Mean age	52	53	51
Service length	8.7	9.69	7.79
Protestant	.60	.49	.69
Catholic	.30	.37	.23
Other Christian	.04	.00	.07
Other religion	.06	.11	.01
None	.01	.03	0
Clinton Vote in 1996	.56	.59	.52
<i>Dependent Variables</i>			
NOW Score (N=430) ²	41.31	73.87	12.10
AAUW Score	47.42	86.22	12.04
N	434 ³	207	227 ³

¹Including Representative Bernard Sanders (I-VT).

²NOW did not calculate scores for four individuals who did not complete the entire term.

³Michael Pappas (D-NJ) is not included in this analysis because I was unable to obtain information on the gender of his child.

TABLE 2: IMPACT OF FEMALE CHILDREN ON LEGISLATOR PARENT'S VOTING ON WOMEN'S ISSUES

	(1) NOW 105 th	(2) 105 th	(3) AAUW 102 nd	(4) 108 th
Number of Female Children	2.27** (1.04)	2.36** (1.12)	2.88 (1.81)	1.88* (1.13)
<i>Number of Children</i>				
1	-3.03 (3.49)	-3.28 (3.74)	-3.06 (6.56)	-7.62** (3.59)
2	-5.52* (2.82)	-4.4 (3.04)	-9.98* (5.46)	-9.38** (3.07)
3	-7.37** (3.28)	-7.4** (3.52)	-17.39*** (6.06)	-13.74*** (3.57)
4	-10.97*** (3.78)	-10.84** (4.06)	-13.72* (6.96)	-10.23** (4.28)
5	-10.28** (4.72)	-13.04** (5.1)	-17.57** (8.23)	-16.25** (5.21)
6	-12.41 (8.29)	-17.82* (8.96)	12.91 (15.34)	-24.38* (9.67)
7	-10.58 (9.59)	-11.81 (10.38)	-18.49 (22.36)	-2.59 (10.8)
8	-28.89** (11.31)	-43.63*** (12.23)	-22.39 (19.38)	-23.84 (12.31)
9	-13.96 (17.68)	-15.83 (19.13)	-29.24 (23.41)	-39.64* (19.78)
10	-23.06 (17.23)	-26.67 (18.66)		-13.92 (18.26)
11				NA ¹
12				-23.92 (19.15)
<i>Other Legislator Characteristics</i>				
Female	10.64*** (2.71)	9.08*** (2.93)	12.55** (6.35)	6.86** (2.69)
White	1.73 (3.45)	.03 (3.68)	-3.63 (6.45)	2.20 (3.15)
Republican	-44.91*** (2.11)	-60.47*** (2.28)	-44.91*** (3.55)	-65*** (2.4)
Age	.66 (.80)	.86 (.86)	.67 (1.54)	2.33 (.85)
Age squared	-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.02** (.01)
Service length	.23 (.30)	-.21 (.32)	-.40 (.52)	-.09 (.32)
Service length squared	-.01 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.01 (.02)	.00 (.01)
N	430	434	399	434

(Continued on next page.)

TABLE 2: IMPACT OF FEMALE CHILDREN ON LEGISLATOR PARENT'S VOTING ON WOMEN'S ISSUES (CONTINUED)

	(1) NOW 105 th	(2) 105 th	(3) AAUW 102 nd	(4) 108 th
<i>Other Legislator Characteristics (Cont'd)</i>				
No Religion	7.16 (7.03)	5.59 (7.61)	6.61 (12.38)	-8.3 (7.36)
Catholic	-4.00** (1.94)	-4.53** (2.09)	-8.97** (3.6)	-5.38** (2.04)
Other Christian	.75 (4.60)	3.19 (4.99)	-10.46 (9.8)	3.67 (4.59)
Other Religion ²	10.84** (3.76)	9.67** (4.05)	16.96** (6.01)	-.2 (3.96)
Democratic Vote Share (Most recent presidential election)	84.36*** (10.88)	62.3*** (11.63)	75.22*** (18.18)	66.23*** (10.69)
N ³	430	434	399	434

Note: All specifications include regional dummies. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%.

¹There are no Representatives with eleven children in the 108th congress.

²The omitted religious category is Protestant.

³Although there are 435 Representatives in each congress, I only have child total and gender information for 434 members of the 105th and 108th congresses and 399 members of the 102nd congress. NOW did not compute voting record scores for 4 members of the 105th congress who did not complete the term.

TABLE 3: IMPACT OF FEMALE CHILDREN ON LEGISLATOR PARENT'S VOTING ON WOMEN'S ISSUES, BY LEGISLATOR GENDER AND PARTY, 105TH CONGRESS
(Each cell presents the coefficient on number of female children from a different regression.)

Data Source	All Legislators	<u>Gender</u>		<u>Party</u>	
		Men	Women	Democrats ¹	Republicans
NOW	2.27** (1.04)	2.42** (1.09)	-2.19 (5.97)	2.88* (1.61)	1.28 (1.32)
AAUW	2.36** (1.12)	2.44** (1.17)	-4.63 (6.77)	2.19 (1.44)	1.83 (1.56)
N	434	387 ²	47	207 ³	227 ³

Note: All specifications include Democratic vote share of major party vote in 1996 presidential election as well as legislator race, gender, party, age, age squared, service length, square of service length, and religion, child number and region dummies.

***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%.

¹ Including Representative Bernard Sanders (I-VT).

²N=383 for the male NOW regressions. N= 226 (Republicans) and 204 (Democrats) for the NOW party regressions. NOW did not compute voting record scores for 4 members of the 105th congress who did not complete the term.

TABLE 4: IMPACT OF FEMALE CHILDREN ON LEGISLATOR PARENT'S VOTING ON WOMEN'S ISSUE, BY CHILD AGE, 108TH CONGRESS, AAUW DATA

Variable	(1)	(2)
Number of Female Children	2.06 (1.26)	2.24 (1.9)
Oldest Daughter is an Adult		-9.02** (3.87)
Oldest Child is an Adult		
Number of Female Children*Age of Oldest Child		2.60 (2.56)
N	367	367

Note: All specifications include Democratic vote share of major party vote in 1996 presidential election as well as legislator race, gender, party, age, age squared, service length, square of service length, and religion, child number and region dummies., Number of female children and its interaction with age of oldest child joint significance test gives $P > F = .03$ (column2) and $P > F = .05$ (column3)

***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%.

TABLE 5: DECOMPOSITION OF IMPACT OF CHILD GENDER MIX ON NOW VOTING RECORD SCORE, 105TH CONGRESS

(Dependent variable equals one if the legislator voted with the NOW position)

Bill	Coefficient on Number of Girls	Standard Error
<u>Equality</u>		
Equal Rights Amendment	-.003	(.019)
Pay Equity	.002	(.021)
<u>Reproductive rights</u>		
Abortion Ban	.034	(.020)
Teen Access to Abortion	.037	(.02)
Contraceptives for Federal Employees	.032	(.024)
RU-486	.029	(.023)
Teen Access to Contraceptives	.049	(.023)
International Family Planning	.034	(.023)
Contraceptive Use	.046	(.025)
<u>Women's Safety</u>		
Violence Against Women	.033	(.021)
Hate Crimes	.027	(.022)
<u>Economic Security</u>		
Affirmative Action in Federal Contracts	.016	(.023)
Working Families Flexibility	.030	(.018)
Bankruptcy	-.01	(.02)
<u>Education</u>		
Private and Religious Schools	.01	(.02)
Affirmative Action in Higher Education	.017	(.023)
Tax Free Education	.033	(.015)
<u>Lesbian Rights</u>		
Discrimination in Federal Employment	.025	(.022)
Equal Health Care Benefits	.013	(.021)
<u>Health</u>		
Patient's Rights	<u>-.01</u>	(.015)
	.454	x5 ¹ = 2.27

Note: All specifications include Democratic vote share of major party vote in 1996 presidential election as well as legislator race, gender, party, age, age squared, service length, square of service length, and religion, child number and region dummies. **Bolded coefficients are significant the 10% level. Bolded and italicized coefficients are significant at the 5% level.**

¹NOW awards five points per vote in agreement in their position.

TABLE 6: DAUGHTER INFLUENCE ON LEGISLATIVE VOTING BY ISSUE TYPE, 105TH CONGRESS

Issue	OLS: Fraction of Votes with Significant ¹ Daughter Coefficients	N
Moral, Religious Issues	.48	42
• Abortion	.51	29
• Church and State	.33	6
• Contraception ²	1.00	2
• Other	.20	5
Social Security, Medicare	.29	7
General Budget, Taxes, Spending	.18	99
Executive Branch Regulations	.30	23
Crime Policy, Civil law	.10	59
Business Regulation	.15	68
House Rules, Elections	.10	139
Health, Education, Welfare	.20	74
Labor Policy	.29	31
Agriculture, Fishing	.08	36
Defense, Veterans	.22	76
Public Works, Transportation	.14	51
Foreign Aid, Trade, Immigration	.13	137
Energy, Environment	.10	31

Note: Data on legislative voting records is available on Charles Stewart's web page at http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html. Vote issue types follow Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2001b) and were provided by the authors. Civil rights and gun control categories not used because of sample size. None of the bills the authors labeled as civil rights votes showed a significant coefficient on number of girls. The authors categorized no bills as gun control in the 105th congress. In addition to number of daughters, each regression includes Democratic vote share of major party vote in 1996 presidential election as well as legislator race, gender, party, age, age squared, service length, square of service length, and religion, child number and region dummies

¹At the 10% level.

²This subcategory is my own creation.

TABLE 7: IMPACT OF FEMALE CHILDREN ON LEGISLATOR PARENT'S VOTING ON WOMEN'S ISSUES (EXPANDED MODEL), NOW DATA, 105TH CONGRESS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Number of Female Children	2.27** (1.04)	1.93* (1.07)	1.96* (1.01)	1.92* (1.02)	2.39** (1.14)	1.71 (1.11)
<i>District Characteristics</i>						
Democratic vote share (1996 presidential election)	84.36*** (10.88)	85.39*** (12.46)	85.1*** (12.85)	86.91*** (13.89)	84.39*** (12.16)	90.71** (15.11)
Median income (1000\$)			.15 (.18)	.09 (.18)		-.03 (.2)
Fraction white			-1.45 (7.84)	2.08 (8.68)		6.31 (9.7)
Fraction female (of district voting age population)			- 127.47* (69.26)	-117.44 (71.87)		-100.96 (75.71)
Fraction college graduates			45.29** (18.53)	49.38** (18.78)		54.38*** (19.9)
Constituent religion variables				√ ¹		√ ¹
<i>District Opinions</i>						
Fraction of state population who believe ...						
Abortion should always be legal					27.48** (10.33)	21.42 (13.87)
Women are equal to men					-7.82 (21.44)	6.55 (23.63)
Federal crime spending should be increased					18.89 (17.79)	-9.51 (21.89)
Government should spend more on services (health, education)					-9.94 (15.71)	-23.14 (16.66)
There should be laws to protect homosexuals from discrimination					-2.21 (12.97)	5.09 (13.33)
Region Effects	√		√	√	√	√
State Effects		√				
N	430	430	430	427 ²	386 ³	385 ^{2,3}

Note: All specifications include legislator number of children, gender, race, party, age and its square, service length and its square and religion and child number dummies. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%.

¹Test of joint significance of religion dummies fails to reject that the coefficients on the dummies jointly differ from zero.

²Constituent religion data are not available for Alaska and Hawaii. Basic model without Alaska and Hawaii produces a coefficient on number of children of 2.27 (1.05).

³District opinion data are not available for Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Nevada, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota and Vermont. Basic model without these states produces a coefficient on number of children of 2.36 (1.14).

TABLE 8: IMPACT OF FEMALE CHILDREN ON LEGISLATOR PARENT’S VOTING ON WOMEN’S ISSUES (EXPANDED MODEL), AAUW DATA

(Each cell presents the coefficient on number of female children from a different regression.)

Basic Model	Basic Model w/Expanded Sample	EXPANDED MODEL
	<u>105th Congress</u>	
2.36**	2.28*	1.35
(1.12)	(1.21)	(1.21)
[434] ¹	[389]	[389]
	<u>106th CONGRESS</u>	
1.65	1.99	1.53
(1.14)	(1.37)	(1.29)
[435]	[349]	[349]
	<u>107th CONGRESS</u>	
2.39**	2.48*	2.85**
(1.09)	(1.29)	(1.28)
[435]	[358]	[358]
	<u>108th CONGRESS</u>	
1.88*	1.77	1.83
(1.12)	(1.25)	(1.26)
[434]	[354]	354]

Note: Basic specifications include legislator number of children, gender, race, party, age and its square, service length and its square and religion, child number and region dummies. Expanded specifications include all of the covariates in the basic model plus district income, fraction white, fraction female, fraction college graduates, state religion dummies and fraction of state population who believe abortion should always be legal, women and men equal, federal crime spending should be increased, government should spend more on social services and that there should be laws to protect homosexuals from discrimination. The NES did not ask the crime spending nor the homosexual discrimination question during the time of the election for the 106th congress; I have substituted responses from the time of the election of the 105th congress. The NES did not ask any of opinion questions during the time of the election for the 108th congress; I have substituted responses from the time of the election for the 107th.

¹Sample size [in brackets] varies due to availability of opinion questions in NES.

TABLE 9: IMPACT OF FEMALE CHILDREN ON LEGISLATOR PARENT'S VOTING ON WOMEN'S ISSUES, BY SEAT SAFETY, 105TH CONGRESS

	NOW		AAUW	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Number of Female Children	1.42 (1.83)	5.96** (2.92)	.56 (1.967)	4.78 (3.22)
Seat Safety		-.373 (4.48)	-1.52 (4.87)	
Number of Female Children*Seat Safety ¹	1.41 (2.26)		2.67 (2.45)	
Fraction College Graduates in District		55.29 (30.26)		24.11 (33.03)
Number of Female Children*Fraction College ²		-18.53 (14.07)		-12.58 (15.22)
N	430	430	434	434


Note: All specifications include legislator number of children, gender, race, party, age and its square, service length and its square and religion, region and child number dummies and child number*safety dummies. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%.

¹Test of joint significance of number of female children and number of female children*safety yields (1) Prob>F=.07 and (3) Prob>F=.07.

²Test of joint significance of number of female children and number of female children*fraction college graduates yields (2) Prob>F=.03 and (4) Prob>F=.09.

FIGURE 1A: MEAN NOW SCORE, BY NUMBER OF FEMALE CHILDREN, 105TH CONGRESS

Representatives with Two Children



Representatives with Three Children






FIGURE 1B: MEAN AAUW SCORE, BY NUMBER OF FEMALE CHILDREN, 105TH CONGRESS

Representatives with Two Children



Representatives with Three Children



APPENDIX TABLE 1: DESCRIPTION OF NOW HOUSE VOTES

Description of Bill	Percent Voting with NOW ¹
<i>Women's Equality</i>	
Equal Rights Amendment: Allows additional time for three more states to ratify ERA, which would meet constitutional requirement. Never voted on. (Sponsorship=+) ²	29
Pay Equity: Two bills never voted on. The first amends the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to prohibit discrimination (sex, race, national origin) in wages in comparable jobs within a workplace. The second provides additional remedies for women who are not paid equal wages for equal work. (Sponsorship =+)	24
<i>Reproductive rights</i>	
Abortion Ban: Overrides Clinton's veto of "partial-birth" abortion ban. (N=+)	30
Teen Access to Abortion: Makes it a federal crime to transport or accompany a minor across state lines for an abortion without parental notification. (N=+)	34
Contraceptives for Federal Employees: Requires FEHBP plans to treat five contraceptives with parity with other prescription drugs. (Y=+)	51
RU-486: Withholds funds from the FDA to review and approve drugs that induce medical abortions. (N=+)	46
Teen Access to Contraceptives: Requires teens seeking prescription contraception at Title X clinics to have parental consent. (N=+)	46
International Family Planning: Denies funding for family planning and population assistance to foreign organizations that perform or promote abortions. (N=+)	45
Contraceptive Use: Defines certain contraceptives as abortifacients, thus prohibiting their use under FEHBP plans. (N=+)	51
<i>Safety</i>	
Violence Against Women: Addresses problems of domestic violence, rape and sexual assault through community based programs. (Sponsorship=+)	33
Hate Crimes: Permits federal prosecution of violent bias crimes based on sex, sexual orientation and disability. Never voted on. (Sponsorship=+)	31

Note: Continued on next page.

APPENDIX TABLE 1 (CONTINUED): DESCRIPTION OF NOW HOUSE VOTES

Description of Bill	Percent Voting with NOW
<i>Economic Security</i>	
Affirmative Action in Federal Contracts: Repeals affirmative action programs in awarding federal transportation contracts. (N=+)	18
Working Families Flexibility: Gives employers more discretion as to when to provide comp time instead of paid overtime to employees. (N=+)	50
Bankruptcy: Treats credit card debt and child support/alimony in a similar manner when a debtor files for bankruptcy. (N=+)	27
<i>Education</i>	
Private and Religious Schools: Provides federal monies for a voucher program. (N=+)	53
Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Prohibits affirmative action for women and minorities in admission. (N=+)	57
Education IRA: Allows individuals to use IRA's for elementary and secondary school. (N=+)	46
<i>Lesbian Rights</i>	
Discrimination in Federal Employment: Overturns Clinton's Executive Order banning discrimination based on sexual orientation. (N=+)	58
Equal Health Care Benefits: Prohibits federal funds from being distributed to a locality that mandates that its contractors provide health care benefits to unmarked domestic partners of employees. (N=+)	49
<i>Health</i>	
Patient's Rights: Provides patient protections under HMO's. Doesn't allow for individuals to sue health plans for personal injury or wrongful death or see outside specialists. (N=+)	48

Notes: ¹ Percent of sample, not entire House.

² Y/N/Sponsorship=+ indicates on what basis a legislator was awarded points by NOW with regards to the piece of legislation. "Y"/"N" indicates a vote in favor/against. In some cases in which legislation never came to the floor for a vote, NOW awarded points for bill sponsorship.

APPENDIX TABLE 2: DAUGHTER INFLUENCE BY ISSUE AND VOTE TYPE, 105TH CONGRESS
 FRACTION OF VOTES IN WHICH DAUGHTERS SIGNIFICANTLY CORRELATED WITH VOTING
 (NUMBER OF VOTES IN PARENTHESES)

Issue	Overall	Procedural	Passage	Amendment	Lopsided Votes ¹	Close Votes ²
Moral, Religious	.48 (42)	.44 (9)	.67 (3)	.63 (19)	.29 (14)	.57 (28)
Social Security, Medicare	.29 (7)	--	-- ³	--	--	.20 (5)
General Budget, Taxes, Spending	.18 (99)	.26 (34)	.17 (18)	.21 (19)	.11 (36)	.22 (63)
Executive Branch Regulations	.30 (.23)	--	.29 (7)	.40 (10)	.17 (6)	.35 (17)
Crime Policy, Civil Law	.10 (59)	--	.11 (9)	.09 (35)	.06 (36)	.17 (23)
Business Regulation	.15 (68)	.33 (6)	.08 (12)	.12 (33)	.07 (42)	.27 (26)
House Rules, Elections	.10 (139)	.05 (42)	.06 (18)	.12 (59)	.13 (47)	.09 (92)
Health, Education, Welfare	.20 (74)	.17 (12)	.31 (13)	.24 (25)	.07 (30)	.30 (.44)
Labor Policy	.29 (31)	--	.50 (4)	.27 (22)	.27 (11)	.30 (20)
Agriculture, Fishing	.08 (36)	.00 (11)	--	.23 (13)	.05 (20)	.13 (16)
Defense, Veterans Issues	.22 (.76)	.17 (12)	.55 (11)	.15 (39)	.25 (48)	.18 (28)
Public Works, Transportation	.14 (51)	0 (7)	.20 (5)	.24 (25)	.03 (29)	.27 (22)
Foreign Aid, Trade, Immigration	.13 (137)	.13 (16)	.07 (30)	.16 (62)	.08 (72)	.18 (65)
Energy, Environment	.10 (310)	--	.11 (9)	.08 (13)	0 (11)	.15 (20)

Note: In addition to number of daughters, each regression includes all covariates from Table 2.

^{1,2}Lopsided (close) votes defined as more (less) than 65% on winning side as in Snyder and Groseclose (2000).

³Dashes indicate fewer than three votes in this category.

APPENDIX TABLE 3: IMPACT OF FEMALE CHILDREN ON
 LEGISLATOR PARENT'S VOTING ON WOMEN'S ISSUES,
 FIXED EFFECT AND EXPANDED MODELS , AAUW DATA,
 104TH -107TH CONGRESS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Number of Female Children	1.89** (.84)	-1.36 (3.37)	2.35** (.98)	2.10** (.91)
Number of children dummies	√	√	√	√
Congressional session dummies	√	√	√	√
Covariates from Table 2	√		√	√
Covariates from Table 8				√
Congress person dummies		√		
N ¹	1712	1712	1094	1094

Note: Standard errors corrected for clustering at congressional district level. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%.

¹Sample excludes five congress people who lost children over the course of the panel. There are 597 individuals in the regressions.

APPENDIX TABLE 4: SAMPLE MEANS TO ACCOMPANY TABLE 8

Variable	Mean Value
<i>District Characteristics</i> ¹	
Median Income (\$)	36,000
White	.81
Female (Voting Age Population)	.52
College Graduates	.2
Protestant (fraction of state population) ²	.48
Catholic (fraction of state population)	.25
Other Christian (fraction of state population)	.02
Other religion (fraction of state population)	.06
None (fraction of state population)	.20
<i>District Opinions</i> ³	
Fraction of state population who believe ...	
Abortion should always be legal	.43
Women are equal to men	.77
Federal crime spending should be increased	.68
Government should spend more on services (health, education)	.32
There should be laws to protect homosexuals from discrimination.	.66

¹District characteristics (other than religion) are available at <http://www.american.edu/dublin/research/data.htm>.

²Religion data come from Kosmin and Mayer, 2001. *American Religious Identification Survey*, The Graduate Center of the City University of New York.

³Opinion data come from the National Election Survey, 1996.

APPENDIX TABLE 5: EVIDENCE OF LEGISLATOR SELECTION FOR PROPORTION GIRLS, 105TH CONGRESS
 (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PROPORTION GIRLS)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Legislator Characteristics</i>					
Republican	-.032	-.038	-.034	-.044	-.034
	(.034)	(.036)	(.041)	(.042)	(.043)
<i>District Characteristics</i>					
Democratic vote share (1996 presidential election)			.036 (.209)	.013 (.378)	.117 (.281)
Median income (1000\$)				.05 (.03)	.03 (.04)
Fraction white				-.07 (.17)	.06 (.18)
Fraction female (of district voting age population)				-1.05 (1.41)	-.96 (1.41)
Fraction college graduates				-.40 (.36)	-.28 (.36)
Constituent religion variables				√	√
<i>District Opinions</i>					
Fraction of state population who believe ...					
Abortion should always be legal					.22 (.26)
Women are equal to men					.71 (.44)
Federal crime spending should be increased					- 1.33** (.40)
Government should spend more on services (health, education)					-.03 (.31)
There should be laws to protect homosexuals from discrimination					.04 (.25)
Adjusted R ²	.26	.25	.25	.24	.26
N	434	389	389	389	389

Note: All specifications include legislator number of children, gender, race, age and its square, service length and its square and religion, child number and region dummies. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%.