Referentialism has underappreciated consequences for our understanding of the way in which mind, language, and world relate one to another. In exploring these consequences, this book defends a version of referentialism about names, demonstratives, and indexicals in a manner appropriate for scholars and students in philosophy or the cognitive sciences.
To demonstrate his view, Taylor offers original and provocative accounts of a wide variety of semantic, pragmatic, and psychological phenomena such as empty names, propositional attitude contexts, the nature of concepts, and the ultimate source and nature of normativity.
is Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Stanford University.
- I What's in a Name?
- II The Psychology of Direct Reference
- III Rencanati's Accommodationist Neo-Russellianism
- IV Meaning, Reference and Cognitive Significance
- V How to Select a Mode of Reference
- VI Emptiness without Compromise: A Referentialist Semantics for Empty Names
- VII Singular Beliefs and their Ascriptions
- VIII We've Got You Coming and Going
- IX Sex, Breakfast, and Descriptus Interruptus
- X Same Believers
- XI Narrow Content Functionalism and the Mind-Body Problem
- XII Supervenience and Levels of Meaning
- XIII What in the Nature is the Compulsion of Reason?
- XIV Toward a Naturalistic Theory of Rational Intnetionality