

Representation of different ethical frameworks in integrated assessment models


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Outline


- **Taxonomy and some examples from the literature**
- Equity weighting
- Outlook

Taxonomy


- Pareto improvements/efficiency
- Self enforcing
- Ethics




Complication 1




Complication 2




Complication 2



Complication 2



Complication 3



Ethics

- Issue specific
- Comprehensive

Benefits

	USA	EU	China	...
2010	5	7	3	...
2011	6	8	6	...
2012	8	9	5	...
...

Costs

	USA	EU	China	...
2010	5	7	3	...
2011	6	8	6	...
2012	8	9	5	...
...



Net Benefits

Issue specific

	USA	EU	China	...
2010	5	7	3	...
2011	6	8	6	...
2012	8	9	5	...
...

$$Y\downarrow tr = Y \downarrow tr + B \downarrow tr - C \downarrow tr$$

	USA	EU	China	...
2010	Y _{tr}	Y _{tr}	Y _{tr}	...
2011	Y _{tr}	Y _{tr}	Y _{tr}	...
2012	Y _{tr}	Y _{tr}	Y _{tr}	...
...

Comprehensive

Ethics

Issue specific
Comprehensive

- Consequentialism
 - Utilitarian framework/equity weighting/inequity aversion (large literature)
 - Cost-effectiveness (large literature)
 - Burden sharing (large literature), no-envy (Varian, 1974; Tol, 2001)
- Rule based ethics (deontological ethics)
 - Kantian (Tol, 2001)
- Virtue ethics

Complications

- Time
- Risk

Outline

- Taxonomy and some examples from the literature
- **Equity weighting**
- Outlook


Previous Work

- Optimal taxation
 - Sandmo (2006)
- Equity weights
 - Azar and Sterner (1996), also Azar (1999), Fankhauser, Tol and Pearce (1997), Hope (2008), Anthoff, Hepburn and Tol (2009), Anthoff and Tol (2010)
 - RICE, PAGE and FUND: Nordhaus (2011), Hope (2011)
- Real World
 - DEFRA studies
 - Stern Review (?)

$$Welfare = u(c \downarrow r) + u(c \downarrow p)$$


$$u(c) = \ln c$$

rich



Simple Model with transfers

■ $C \downarrow r^N (x \downarrow r^{1*}) \&= & B \downarrow r^N (x \downarrow r^{1*} + x \downarrow p^{1*}) + B \downarrow p^N$
 $(x \downarrow r^{1*} + x \downarrow p^{1*}) @= \&\&= @ C \downarrow p^N (x \downarrow p^{1*}) \&= &$
 $B \downarrow r^N (x \downarrow r^{1*} + x \downarrow p^{1*}) + B \downarrow p^N (x \downarrow r^{1*} + x \downarrow p^{1*})$



Carbon tax

Carbon tax

Simple Model without transfers

~~■ $C \downarrow r^N (x \downarrow r^{1*}) \&= \& y \downarrow r^{1*} / y \downarrow p^{1*} \rightarrow 1 B \downarrow r^N (x \downarrow r^{1*} + x \downarrow p^{1*}) - y \downarrow r^{1*} / y \downarrow p^{1*} B \downarrow r^N (x \downarrow r^{1*} + x \downarrow p^{1*}) @ \neq \& \& C \downarrow p^N (x \downarrow p^{1*}) \&= \& y \downarrow p^{1*} / y \downarrow r^{1*} B \downarrow r^N (x \downarrow r^{1*} + x \downarrow p^{1*}) + y \downarrow p^{1*} / y \downarrow r^{1*} \leftarrow < 1 B \downarrow p^N (x \downarrow r^{1*} + x \downarrow p^{1*})$~~

1 + **1**

Carbon tax

$$W\!=\!\sum t\!\!\uparrow\!\!\! \otimes \!\!\sum r\!\!\uparrow\!\!\! \otimes P\!\!\downarrow\! tr~U(C\!\!\downarrow\! tr)(1\!+\!\rho)\!\!\uparrow\! -t$$

Roughly

Marginal Abatement Cost

or

Carbon Tax

Discount Factor

Marginal Damage Cost

$$MAC(t,i) = \sum_{s=t}^T \sum_{r=s}^T \beta^{|s-r|} MD(s,r)$$

Marginal Damage of Emission



	US	WEU	CHI	...
2010				
2011				
2012				
2013	<i>MD↓2013, US (2012)</i>			
2014				
2015				
2016		<i>MD↓2016, CHI (2012)</i>		
...				

Optimal Taxes - Efficiency

Marginal Abatement Cost

or
Carbon Tax

Ramsey Discount Factor


Marginal Damage Cost

$$MAC(t,i) = \sum_{s=1}^S t^{\alpha} T^{\beta} \sum_{r=1}^R 1/(1+\rho+\eta g_r t)^{\gamma} MDis,r(i)$$

Same for all Regions

Social Cost of Carbon

Ramsey Discount Rate




Optimal Taxes – No Transfers

Marginal Abatement Cost

or
Carbon Tax

$$MAC(t,i) = [y(t,i)] / \eta \sum s = t / I + \delta \uparrow s - t \sum r \uparrow (1/y_{s,r}) \uparrow \eta MD_{s,r}(t)$$


Marginal Damage Cost




Higher for rich regions
Lower for poor regions

Same for all regions


Modified Discount Rate




Optimal taxes in 2005



Mitigation- 2050



Mitigation - 2100




■ Transfers ■ No transfers

Business as usual warming: 3.17

Utility calibration	No transfers	Transfers
$\eta=1$		
prtp=0.1%	2.41	2.34
prtp=1.0%	2.92	2.91
prtp=3.0%	3.12	3.12
$\eta=1.5$		
prtp=0.1%	2.65	2.75
prtp=1.0%	2.96	3.03
prtp=3.0%	3.13	3.13
$\eta=2$		
prtp=0.1%	2.69	2.98
prtp=1.0%	2.95	3.09
prtp=3.0%	3.13	3.14

Optimal Taxes in 2005



Outline

- Taxonomy and some examples from the literature
- Equity weighting
- **Outlook**

Outlook

- Implementing existing economic theory
- Extend “standard” utilitarian framework
- Apply “non-standard” ethics to climate change
 - On a theoretical level match it to quantities in IAMs
 - On a practical level see whether it matters for policy choice
- Open questions
 - Does this pass the philosophers laugh test?
 - Non cooperative game theory (?)

Thank you!

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