

Bahrain

(BahrainRN1.1)

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This is one of a set of “random narratives” to complement our statistical findings in regard to civil war onsets. This is a draft on June 15, 2005; comments welcome. Comments from Fred Lawson have already been incorporated.

Our model “predicts” a negligible probability for civil war in Bahrain during the entire period of its independence from 1971-1999. To be sure, Bahrain relies heavily on oil, received independence in the period covered by the dataset, and it has had a five-year period of instability, all of which make states more vulnerable to civil war, according to our model.¹ But low population,² high GDP/cap, complete flatness of the country, and a firm autocracy all weaken the opportunities for a successful insurgency. While the average probability for the region is slightly below the world average probability for civil war, Bahrain had for an average year a thirty-seven times less chance of a civil war onset than the average country in its region.

There has been no civil war in Bahrain, so our model did not let us down! There seems at first blush nothing to explain. A narrative of Bahrain’s political conflicts, however, allows us to address several themes. First, Bahrain’s contemporary history helps illuminate why there is no positive relationship between grievance level and civil war. Bahrain’s contemporary history reads like a litany of grievances; yet these do not easily translate into sustained violence. Second, the social structure of Bahrain gives us insight into a corollary of our observation about “sons of the soil” and their high

¹ . Our estimated probability for civil war is two and a half times higher in 1971 than it is in 1973, when the effects of being a new state are, in our model, attenuated. When instability comes in 1974, the probability for civil war onset nearly returns to the level Bahrain had at the time of independence. However, with such a low base, these changes in magnitude have little consequence (and almost no visibility on our graph), as Bahrain remains throughout its history far below the world average.

² . When Bahrain received independence in 1971 it has less than half the population necessary to be included in our dataset. However, in 1990, when population surpassed 500,000, it met this criterion for entry. In 1971-74, it had the lowest population of any other country for any year in the dataset; this weighed heavily in the model’s predictions of its civil war susceptibility.

propensity to rebel. In Bahrain we see a large politically marginalized immigrant community that has virtually no chance to rebel. Third, commentators on Bahrain offer useful ideas on the mechanisms by which low population correlates with low chances for rebellion (at least in interaction with autocracy).

Grievances and No Civil War

Deep grievances, persistent riots, early stage insurgencies, and brutal suppression by the security forces of an autocratic state mark 20th century Bahraini politics and society. The sources of grievance are manifold. The Shi'ites, who constitute about two-thirds of the population, have long been politically marginalized by the Sunni tribal aristocracy. Within the Sunnis, Arab nationalists have sought to displace the Al-Kalifah tribal network that has long ruled Bahrain (though through a British political agent until full independence in 1971), often through violent means. Both Sunni and Shi'ites, allied as new social forces, have sought as well to challenge the tribal authority structure, first through petition, and ultimately in association with violent oppositional zealots. Finally, the so-called lower orders in the social structure have organized a plethora of strikes and mobilizations against the regime that have been brutally suppressed. On any scale of objective grievances, Bahraini subjects rank high; yet although there has been a long history of violence in modern Bahraini history, none of it has escalated into civil war proportions. Here then is an example of why independent coding of grievances yields no predictive value for the onset of civil war.

The Shi'ites are aggrieved, by any standard. Making up two-thirds of the population, they are socially divided from the politically dominant Sunnis. As Rumaihi notes, "The Sunni tribes looked upon themselves as 'pure' Arabs, because their ancestry was known...The Shia, who formed the aboriginal population, looked upon the Sunnis as 'conquering foreigners'. The mistrust was therefore mutual" (1976, 163).³ To be sure, the Shi'a are themselves divided on several dimensions. Some follow the Usuli legal tradition while others the Akhbari. Some are peasants more-or-less indigenous to the island (the Baharnah), while others are migrants from

³ . Note that Mamdani among other interpreters of Rwanda rely on a related distinction, one that was reified by colonial rule, to account for genocide!

Persia (the Hawala).⁴ And there is as well as group of Shi'a tradespeople (called Al-Hasa) who are treated as social outcasts. Several of these Shi'a groups have particular grievances -- for example the Al-Baharnah have decried the destruction of their imagined egalitarian past that was allegedly destroyed when the now-ruling Al-Khalifah's conquered the country in the late 18th century. However, all the Shi'a face the same fate of being in the majority without political representation (Lawson 1989, 3-11).

Shi'ites reacted to oppression through a series of uprisings that have been quickly quashed by political authority. In 1923, when the Al Khalifahs lost control over the custom's house to the British, they sought to compensate through a big tax hike on the mostly Shi'ite laborers working on their estates. The Shi'ite laborers responded with riots, sufficiently threatening to draw the British into local politics and give their support to the ruling Shaikh. In the early 1950s, there were numerous local Sunni/Shi'ite riots, mostly over issues concerning local representation in councils. Provocative ritual processions by both sects would activate gangs of partisans into violent confrontations. In one of these street fights, in which a Shi'ite crowd threatened to free prisoners in a fort, the police opened fire on the crowd, and killed four Shi'ite protesters. In 1978, urban Shi'ite clerics bridged the divide between the Persians and the peasants, and mobilized in the poorer districts of Manama to protest government corruption. This violence was the tip of an iceberg as the Iranian government -- then in the hands of the clerics -- was thought to be involved in uniting the Shi'ite Bahrainis to overthrow the Al-Khalifa dynasty (Lawson 1989, 83-7). The Shi'a (with Iranian support) conflict against the government reached its apex in a failed coup attempt in December 1981. The regime, however, reacted to the coup by rather indiscriminate retaliation against all Bahraini Shi'ites. The State Security court gave harsh sentences to seventy-three people, and took away university acceptances to many Shi'ite students. Shi'ites were then banned from senior positions in the power ministries. Unemployment among them soared, while they watched as a large foreign workforce was drafted for employment. Shi'ite clerics began facing dismissal due to the contents of their sermons. In 1994, the government had to call in Saudi

⁴ . Bahrain consists of thirty-three islands, only a few of them with human habitation. Eighty-five per cent of the land mass is taken up by the largest island, al-Awal. I refer to Bahrain as an "island" because all of the action described herein takes place on the single island of al-Awal. Bahrain in our dataset is not coded as having non-contiguous territory -- something that would have added to its susceptibility to civil war onset. The outer islands fail both criteria for being coded as non-contiguous territories: they are all less than 100 km. from the main island; they all have less than 10,000 in population.

National Guard troops to help suppress a Shi'ite popular rebellion. In 1996, in response to a general societal call for democratization, there were "mass arrests", and prisoners held incommunicado, and their houses "systematically ransacked" by government forces. Although both Sunnis and Shi'ites were involved in the protests, Shi'ites were singled out for government attack (Wilkinson, for Human Rights Group, 1996, pp. 6, 8, 13).

While the Shi'ite grievances might have ignited a sectarian rebellion, the grievances of the lower orders, perhaps allied with what Khuri calls the "new social forces", were on the apparent brink of igniting a social revolution against the "tribal" autocracy (Khuri 1980, p. 10). The Al-Khalifa "tribal" dynasty, largely through British oversight and mediation, maintained rule for much of the 20th century and barely avoided collapsing due to its own internecine struggles. However, pearls and oil brought vast social and economic change. Also the British reforms instituted after World War I rationalized tribal rule through the creation of local councils, a bureaucracy and courts. These social, economic and political changes built on old national and cultural divisions to create new social divisions that were a challenge to the regime.

The first element of the new social forces is that of the commercial bourgeoisie. Among the Sunnis, the Al Khalifas (who follow Maliki law) have long sought alliances with the Sunni commercial elites. They have been able to coalesce politically with the descendents of the Persian pearl merchant families who follow the Shafi'ite school of law. But the Al Khalifas remained in some tension with the Sunnis that trace their origins from the Arabian side of the Gulf, and follow Hanbali law (Lawson 1989, 3-4). Those like the Hanbalis with economic power who kept outside of political power have had in all modern societies revolutionary potential.

The second element of the new social forces are the lower social orders. As Bahrain became an almost totally urban society in the second half of the 20th century, the urban proletariat were the largest group among the subordinate classes, and they are both Sunni and Shi'ite. Although at times standing against each other in sectarian conflict, the indigenous urban proletariat stood together (not against the commercial bourgeoisie) but against the foreign workers (making up about a third of the total population) who were taking jobs and lowering wages for the indigenous population. They were for different reasons than the commercial bourgeoisie, aggrieved.

The third element of the new social forces are the educated intellectuals. They have been for a century divided between radical Arab Nationalists and traditionalist pan-Islamicists. As early as 1908, there was a public debate between them, with the Arab Nationalists emulating Kemal while the pan-Islamicists feared the implications of a Turkish-like revolution for their religion. The Arab Nationalists were political radicals (and were largely Sunnis). In the early 1920s a Literary Club was formed in Bahrain to read the literature of Arabs abroad, and especially the leaflets published by Arab secret societies in Istanbul, Beirut and Paris, and clandestinely brought to the island. In the late 1930s, a new generation of Bahrainis educated in Beirut and Cairo brought current Arab Nationalist ideals with them. In the mid 1960s, young Bahrainis were the first from the Gulf states to attend an Arab communist conference that was held in Beirut, bringing new radical ideas to their island. Meanwhile the pan-Islamicists (who are mainly Shi'ites) have stood against the secular changes that have occurred in Bahrain due to the modernizing of the economy, having to do with education of women and the penetration into the society of modern communication (See Rumaihi, 1976, Introduction to Part IV; Khuri 1980, 197-99).

The regime feared the revolutionary potential of a united Sunni/Shi'ite bourgeoisie, and one that could get the support of the subordinate classes against the tribal oligarchy ruling the island. In 1938 the Sunni and Shi'ite commercial bourgeoisie, building networks and editing publications pushing for "enlightened" (that is anti-sectarian) politics, organized together a demonstration against the British and their use of foreign laborers. A National Front was organized amid rioting in 1947-48 in opposition to the British plan to divide Palestine. When Shi'ite/Sunni street fights were rife in the early 1950s, these merchants through the editorial board of the *Voice of Bahrain* tried to cauterize the sectarian violence, getting no support whatsoever from their government. They linked their movement to a taxi driver's strike (over government hikes in insurance rates) and set up a demonstration in the only non-sectarian mosque in Bahrain, with a plan to create a "united front". This was the origin of the nonsectarian Higher Executive Committee that demanded a liberal state. The regime refused to recognize the HEC, which was able to mobilize rather large (each with about 10,000 attendees) public gatherings in support of their program.

As with all moderate nationalist movements that get rebuffed, the zealots took matters into their own hands. These wildcats began targeting pro-government citizens with assault, burning of property, and accusations

of treason. In March 1956, things began to get out of hand. The British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd, touring Bahrain, was attacked with stones and mobs in Muharraq, as his arrival coincided with a crowd leaving a soccer match. This was not planned or desired by the HEC but it was the zealous fulfillment of the anger expressed by HEC leadership. Shortly thereafter, there was another spontaneous event that erupted between Shi'ite stall-holders and municipal police, when a peddler without a license refused to leave the premises. When the police came, fellow peddlers besieged the police. The police retaliated and killed five, forcing the HEC to call a strike, for which they had made no preparations. Without any leadership, the strike became a haven for looters.

In the face of imminent threat, the Al Kalifah ruler agreed to recognize the HEC, but only under a new name, and the HEC was renamed as the Committee on National Unity. It pressed for a series of liberal reforms, but was regularly rebuffed in weekly meetings with the ruler during the summer of 1956. Eventually the CNU broke off negotiations. Meanwhile students and state employees, organized as the Ja'fari League, reignited the violence, organizing roadblocks, rock throwing incidents and wildcat strikes. The failure of negotiations and the social unrest impelled CNU leaders to form a paramilitary group called the "scouts".

But then came the war in Suez, and the radicals were able to take over the reigns of the CNU. In what Khuri calls "moments of emotional contagion" (1980, p. 213), mobs went after British property. However, the regime was able to call upon its own police force along with various tribal allies allied to Al Khalifah, who formed a 200-member anti-riot squad trained to protect the royal family. Reinforcements came from Iraq, Yemen and from among the bedouins of Jordan. The ruler also relied on a special branch of the police commanded by a British officer, who killed several protestors (Wilkinson, 1996, p. 4). The popular uprising was thereby contained.⁵

Khuri (1980, 195) lists a litany of violent confrontations between the new social forces and the tribal based state: the students' strike of 1928, the pearl divers' riots of 1932, the middle class demonstrations of 1938, the labor strikes of 1942, 1948 and 1965 (directed against the Bahrain Petroleum

⁵ . This chronology of the rise of radical nationalism in the 1950s is based on Khuri (1980, pp. 203-13) and Lawson (1989, pp. 61-68)

Company), and the post-Palestine partition demonstrations of 1947-48. He astutely notes, however, “Aside from the protests and rebellions of the early twenties and the uprising of the mid-fifties, none of the instances of political unrest could be strictly considered an organized, collective protest or rebellion.” They were all popularly referred to as revolutions against tribal authority, but were not. Rather, according to Khuri, “they were abrupt, spontaneous, and sometimes sectarian and segmented reactions to particular incidents...fading away as soon as they were formed...”

Khuri’s answer (1980, p. 6) to the question of “why no rebellion?” is interesting but unsatisfying. He argues that “Because [in Bahrain] the employment market fluctuates swiftly, grievances are not given time to stabilize and therefore cluster in repeated protests. It appears that continued rapid economic and social change militates against the rise of organized protests or rebellion.” He therefore speculated that “More likely, such protests and rebellions can be expected to occur as soon as the economic system and the job market begin to stabilize, bringing to light the conflicts of collective interests.” Khuri, a skilled anthropologist, may not have a fully worked-out theory of rebellion, but he observed clearly the lack of relationship between grievance levels in the society (which were high) and rebellion (which was paltry).⁶ This is a case, therefore, that provides rich descriptive material on one of our more general findings -- that we shouldn’t expect to see a mapping of high grievances onto a higher likelihood of revolutionary violence.

Low Population and Civil War

Bahrain’s population at the time of its independence was about a quarter-million citizens, one of the smallest states in our sample. By 1998, it had a population of 641,000. With current population, to attain civil war status, 0.2 percent of the population would need to be killed. In China, only .0008 percent of the population needs to be killed for it to count as a rebellion by our standards.

⁶ . Elsewhere (1980, p. 217) he suggests that the lack of revolutionary coherence was due to the cross-cutting cleavages in Bahrain, namely the sectarian and the social, which did not map on to each other. There is merit to this point. In fact, the higher the number of grievances, other things equal, the more likely there will be cross-cuttingness, thereby lowering the probability of a unified rebellion of the aggrieved. This too may help explain the lack of a statistical relationship between grievance level and civil war onset.

But the percentage of the population that needs to be killed isn't the only factor that makes high population correlate with greater susceptibility to rebellion. The patrimonial system through which authority is exerted, if population is low, can be highly adaptive to social change and the need to recalibrate rewards (Lawson 1989, relying on Iliya Harik, p. 73). In Khuri's formulation (1980, pp. 245-6), Bahrain is a "metrocommunity", a form of rule that requires intimate knowledge by the rulers of their constituents. He notices that the Al-Khalifah sheiks know practically every family in Bahrain, its history, its size, and its social status. They are thus able to micromanage gift-giving, favors, and government posts to co-opt rival claimants to power. Speaking of the then current leader and his family, Khuri points out that one of the ruler's brothers "talks" to "modernists" and "freedom fighters"; the ruler's eldest son "talks" to youths in the cultural and sports' clubs. Through techniques Foucault made famous in his description of Bentham's panopticon, a unified family can -- if it is willing to use brutal suppression and call in foreign troops -- maintain order in a changing society. The point here is that there is a form of rule capable of warding off civil war onset in modernizing societies that can work only in low-population countries.

Its smallness permits Bahrain to be strong. The state has invested heavily in internal security. A set of decrees by the Amir in 1965 have come to be known as the "Law of Public Security", a law that allows extensive use of martial law. The regime has quickly deported opposition figures, ordered police to shoot at demonstrators and workers on picket lines, and has arrested leaders of political organizations, and jailed them without trial. In 1965, Special Branch personnel intimidated activists and police fired directly on demonstrators, killing "many" (Rumaihi 1976, 222-4). Through the 1980s, budgets for security have expanded faster than for any other item. In this period through 2001 a Human Rights Watch report (Wilkinson 1996, pp. 6-7) provides a gruesome documentation of the torture to death of political activists, trade unionists, and intimidation and deportation especially of Shi'ite activists. A combination of "metrocommunity" scale and political will to be brutal partly accounts for Bahrain's avoidance of insurgency.

Immigrants and Civil War

Foreigners constitute about a third of the population living on the island, and they have no political representation. The big wave of immigration came with the expansion of the oil industry. South and East

Asians are the largest foreign community. Given their proficiency in English, Indians in the 1930s were able to get jobs not only in the oil industry but also in all foreign controlled companies, mostly in oil services. South Asians also got jobs in the government as clerks and police officers. Up until independence, as British citizens, they had direct access to the Political Agent to deal with any labor problems. They were permitted access to Western clubs that Bahrainis were excluded from. In the pre-independence period, government employees, including Indians but not Bahrainis, got liquor allocations as part of their job perquisites, which many sold on the market for a nice profit. Writing in the 1971 anthropological present, Rumaihi (1976, pp. 29-30) judges “They consider themselves superior to the indigenous population...they have their own clubs and societies...They are resented by the Bahraini population mainly on economic grounds.”

The Iranian nationals have been the second-largest foreign group. They are resented by the local population on purely political grounds (as there are many Bahrainis with Iranian roots). This has to do with Iran’s one-time claims to sovereignty over Bahrain. The Iranian nationals are a prosperous trading group, speak Persian among themselves, and send their children to private schools with Persian as the medium of instruction. In the 1950s, rumors were rife that they had a cache of arms in their Ferdows Club. This was false, but many Bahraini elites believed that they represented a fifth column. In 1971 Iran renounced those claims, but successful Iranian banks and air service continued to provoke local resentment as well.

From this description, it should be clear that the foreigners have not been all that bad off, and have been able to get good jobs. In fact, their presence, as noted earlier, helped the Sunni and Shi’ite working class citizens unite against them. Nonetheless, as oil production decreases and the job situation tightens even for foreigners, their lack of political representation is threatening to the Bahraini ruling family. As Khuri observes (1980, p. 246), foreign labor “leaves...the ruling families ...off balance” while assimilation of them is “unlikely.”

However, insurgency organized by them is even more unlikely, no matter how deep their grievances are dug. Given our focus on the conditions that favor insurgency, immigrant populations live in what is akin to “easy terrain”. Without a rural base, even if there were cause, immigrant rebels face formidable problems in sustaining a rebellion. Insurgents without a

regional concentration in a rural homeland will find it difficult to hide from state forces. Furthermore, urban migrants tend to come as individuals, not as communities, and therefore seek individual solutions to political and economic problems they face, such as making private deals for protection with friends or political patrons in the autochthonous group. Rebels from an immigrant group, therefore, will not easily get social support from noncombatants who are ethnic brethren. Most important, migrants often have, compared to the autochthonous population, a relatively cheap alternative to war: viz., exit to their own home area. Among urban immigrant populations, people have transferable skills lowering the costs of exit. This is especially the case for trading communities, the one group of migrants that tends to have dense social networks in the country of residence. If traders face pogroms, they tend to use their networks and their considerable skills to resettle overseas rather than to arm against their assailants. But contract workers, as in Bahrain, have similar horizons.

Examination of the MAR dataset illustrates clearly that migrants do not fight ethnic wars against the state. In the MAR-provided narratives of all the minorities at risk, there were forty-five groups described as migrants to their present home, with only one having had a significant rebellion. Examples of migrants who were never engaged in rebellion against the state include Muslims in France, Roma in many countries, foreign workers in Switzerland, Lezgins in Azerbaijan, Turks in Bulgaria, Russians in the states of the former Soviet Union, Biharis in Bangladesh, Lhotshampas in Bhutan, Vietnamese in Cambodia, Chinese in Indonesia, Malays in Singapore, Mainlanders in Taiwan, Haitians in the Dominican Republic, Antillian Blacks in Panama, and Chinese in Panama. The one case where such a migrant group had a significant rebellion is that of the Mohajirs in Pakistan. This is an interesting anomaly, one that reinforces the general pattern if looked at closely, as we do later. Basically the peculiar nature of their migration (similar to the Zionists in post-partition Jerusalem, whose rebellion against the British is not included in the data set), the Mohajirs claimed they were autochthonous in the newly created Pakistan. Planting themselves as sons of the soil, they acted as if they were the owners of the Karachi region.

The fact that migrants do not engage in significant rebellions against the state does not imply that they are politically quiescent. While our analysis of MAR data show (see Table 1) that rebellion is more far more

likely for the long-settled populations,⁷ immigrants and autochthonous have more equal, but somewhat lower, rates of communal conflict and protest. (While there is a significant bivariate correlation between long-standing residence and communal conflict, there is no relationship at all between long-standing residence and protest). We therefore see the basis for our comparison between “Sons of the Soil” (those more likely to be rebellious against the state than immigrants) vs. “Newcomers to the Soil” (low rebellion but nearly equal in political protest).

Table 1
Mean Scores on Protest, Communal Conflict, and Rebellion at
Different Levels of Tradition
Maximum Values Since 1980

	REBELLION	COMMUNAL CONFLICT	PROTEST
Pre-1800 Group is within state	2.3 (n=248)	2.5 (n=219)	2.9 (n=245)
Group arrives after 1800	.66 (n=50)	1.7 (n=47)	2.6 (n=50)
CORRELATION with PERIOD OF ARRIVAL (significance)	.24 (.00)	.13 (.03)	.07 (.22)

In marwork11.dta, these variables are: ancestral, maxreb80, mxcomco80, mxpro80

And so, the Bahrain authorities, if Khuri is correct that they feel uneasy about the migrants, may be exaggerating the problem from the point of view of the state. It is possible that the Iranian migrants could become a 5th column if Iran decides once again to make claims on Bahrain. It is possible that the immigrants will stage protests against poor working conditions or unfair visa policies. And it is highly likely that there will be more communal conflict of native Bahrainis against the job-hogging strategies of the migrants. But the migrants themselves are not at all likely to stage an insurgency on their own behalf against the Bahraini authorities, no matter how illegitimate or brutal they may become.

Contemporary Developments and Conclusion

⁷ . In our reckoning, a score of “4” or above on rebellion constitutes a bona fide civil war. Scores for communal conflict and protest have similar ranges.

In the early 1990s there were movements toward liberalization. Political organizations were given license to form in 1991. But it was not until 1999, when Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah was installed as the new Amir, that big changes were organized. In early 2001 he began a series of political reforms. Political prisoners were released, and political exiles were permitted to return. The State Security Laws of 1965, allowing for arbitrary and incommunicado detention of suspects and unfair trials, were repealed. The State Security court, which convicted for thousands of Bahrainis on the foundation of forced confessions through torture, was abolished. In 2001, Bahrainis approved a National Action Charter in a referendum, and this led to elections in 2002, in which women had voting rights. This was no democracy. In the elections, Shi'ites boycotted on the principle that the legislature was ceded insufficient authority. They are basically right. Political parties are still prohibited. Moreover, while the Council of Deputies was elected by popular vote, the King appointed the higher Chamber, the Shura Council, and retained the power to dissolve the Council of Deputies and in fact to amend the Constitution as he pleases. Nor has the regime lost its willingness to meet protest with brutality. In 2003, security forces shot and killed one citizen and injured many others in seeking to step the anti-American tide in the wake of the Iraq invasion. The constitutional and political changes have somewhat affected freedom scores from Polity IV as of 2003,⁸ noting a discernible move toward anocracy (CIA World Factbook; Amnesty International Report 2003; and Human Rights Watch email update, June 2001). In our model, combine slow moves toward anocracy with declining GDP/cap (due to declining oil reserves), and it is possible to foresee a greater probability of civil war in the coming decade than in the first thirty years of independence.⁹

For its first 30 years of independence, due to wealth, low population, easy terrain, and stable autocracy, the tribal authorities governing Bahrain have not suffered an insurgency. A focus on grievances or on exportable

⁸ . The Polity IV score, which had been -9 since 1993 (and a -10 before that), has crept to -7. The Polity coders note, "No parties are allowed in Bahrain. According to Rulers, in parliamentary elections on 24 October 2002 the moderate Sunni Islamists and independents won 16 of 40 seats. In a second round held on 31 October, the independents won 12 seats and the Islamists 9. The secular representatives or independents secured a total of 21 of the 40 seats" (<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/bah1.htm>), downloaded June 15, 2005.

⁹ . Even with substantial decline in oil production, Bahrain still crosses the threshold of 33 percent of its exports in oil to be coded as a country reliant on oil exports. In 1996, 67 percent of its exports revenues came from fuel.

wealth would have been surprised by this result. Our model, however, in its attention to GDP/cap and the terrain conditions favoring insurgency predicted what Khuri sought valiantly to account for, viz., that everyday protest in society met with brutality by the state does not make for a civil war.

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
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cname	year	pr	gdpenl	pop	mtn~t	Oil	ins~b	anocl
BAHRAIN	1971	.0002026	17.013	222	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1972	.0002026	17.013	230	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1973	.00008	14.856	237	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1974	.0001964	13.805	243	0	1	1	0
BAHRAIN	1975	.0002484	13.112	262	0	1	1	0
BAHRAIN	1976	.0006715	10.151	275	0	1	1	0
BAHRAIN	1977	.0003035	12.607	289	0	1	1	0
BAHRAIN	1978	.0002346	13.432	303	0	1	1	0
BAHRAIN	1979	.0001567	13.046	319	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1980	.000169	12.859	334	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1981	.000179	12.724	353	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1982	.0002752	11.463	374	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1983	.0004261	10.182	390	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1984	.0004155	10.294	407	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1985	.000413	10.348	425	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1986	.000544	9.547	442	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1987	.0006331	9.119	458	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1988	.0006973	8.855	473	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1989	.0006259	9.211	489	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1990	.0006733	9.017	503	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1991	.0007101	8.879	516	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1992	.0006458	9.189	520	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1993	.000548	9.695	537	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1994	.000477	10.144	557	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1995	.0005034	10.011	577	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1996	.0005322	9.872	599	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1997	.0005499	9.804	620	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1998	.0005625	9.764	641.27	0	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	1999	.0005963	9.615	.	0	1	0	0

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	29	.0004301	.0001979	.00008	.0007101
gdpenl	29	11.22852	2.347936	8.855	17.013
pop	28	414.1168	129.8146	222	641.27
mtnest	29	0	0	0	0

Oil	29	1	0	1	1
instab	29	.1724138	.3844259	0	1
anocl	29	0	0	0	0
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	845	.015935	.0215325	2.45e-10	.2603802
gdpenl	857	5.430375	7.802111	.048	66.735
pop	889	11482.33	14302.43	222	63451
mtnest	910	18.61816	21.26137	0	71.3
Oil	910	.4901099	.5001771	0	1
instab	906	.1335541	.3403605	0	1
anocl	890	.2348315	.4241318	0	1
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	6327	.0167543	.0228494	2.45e-10	.488229
gdpenl	6373	3.651117	4.536645	.048	66.735
pop	6433	31786.92	102560.8	222	1238599
mtnest	6610	18.08833	20.96648	0	94.3
Oil	6610	.1295008	.3357787	0	1
instab	6596	.1464524	.353586	0	1
anocl	6541	.2256536	.418044	0	1