Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

Formed1995
DisbandedGroup is active.
First AttackMarch 25, 1995: Gunmen attacked a vehicle carrying U.S. consulate officials, killing 2. In 2003, the U.S. alleged that LeJ was behind the attack and placed the group on its list of foreign terrorist organizations (2 killed).[1]
Last AttackMay 28, 2010: LeJ militants ambushed a police vehicle and killed four officers in the Satellite Town area of Quetta (4 killed).[2]
UpdatedAugust 3, 2012

Narrative Summary

LeJ is a violent, anti-Shiite militant group in Pakistan with ties to several other groups in the region, including Al Qaeda.  Since its formation in the mid-1990s, LeJ has carried out a number of attacks on minority groups in Pakistan with the aim of establishing Pakistan as an orthodox Deobandi state.

LeJ was founded by former SSP officials Riaz Basra, Akram Lahori, and Malik Ishaque. Scholars dispute the exact date of the formation of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ).  LeJ was formed after the 1990 assassination of the founder of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), LeJ’s parent organization.  This account contends that LeJ remained part of the SSP until 1995, when it formally split to protest an emerging dialogue between the SSP and Shiite parties.[3]  Others say LeJ was formed immediately after one of its founders, Riaz Basra, escaped from police custody in 1994.[4]  Still others contend the group was in 1995 or 1996, in response to the SSP's participation in cross-sectarian reconciliation efforts.[5] Although scholars differ on when the split between SSP and LeJ occurred and the nature of their ongoing relationship, they do not dispute the strong links between the groups. 
 
LeJ has had a long relationship with the Pakistani state.  Beginning in the 1980s, LeJ's parent organization SSP, and then later LeJ itself, received financial support from the central Pakistani government.[6]
This funding was intended to counter the rising influence of Iran's revolutionary Shiism, as well as to use the groups as an asymmetric element of its strategy toward India.[7] LeJ and most other Sunni militant groups in Pakistan gladly accepted financial support, but cooperated only when the government’s goals accorded with their own.
 
The Pakistani government began cracking down on LeJ in 1998 and formally banned the group in 2001 (and SSP in 2002).  The groups responded by directly targeting top Pakistani leadership (first prime minister Nawaz Sharif and later general Pervez Musharraf) and later expanded their attacks to broader state interests.  Under the government of Asif Ali Zardari, a Shiite, LeJ and SSP have stepped up their attacks and become increasingly involved in a wider militant movement that continues to target non-Deobandi minorities and the state itself.
 
Although officially banned in 2001, LeJ continues to play a central role in the escalating cycle of sectarian violence in Pakistan and is now believed to be allied with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).[8] Some analysts claim that Punjabi militants allied to the TTP, including LeJ members, now pose “a more serious threat to Pakistan's stability and global security” than the TTP itself.[9] 
 
LeJ’s violent tactics and ties to other terrorist groups make it one of the deadliest organizations in Pakistan.  Although its hardcore supporters number only in the hundreds, LeJ has been responsible for the majority of sectarian killings in Pakistan in the past decade.[10]    Throughout its history, LeJ has reportedly maintained ties with a number of high-profile terrorists, including Ramzi Yousef, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.[11] Matiur Rehman, who took over LEJ after the arrest of Basra's successor, allegedly coordinates Al Qaeda's relations with the jehadi community in Pakistan.[12]

Leadership

  1. Asif Ramzi (Unknown to 2002): Ramzi was considered LeJ’s second-in-command, and served as the main connection between local militants and Al Qaeda in Pakistan. Ramzi reportedly served as a key link between local militants and al-Qaeda in Pakistan before he was killed in an explosion outside Karachi in 2002. Ramzi is believed to be responsible for the attacks on the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi in May 2002, and the U.S. consulate in Kirachi a month later.[13]
  2. Malik Ishaq (1995 to 1998): Ishaq was a co-founder and central ideologue of LeJ. Malik Ishaq was the group's earliest and most important ideologue. He has been imprisoned in Pakistan since 1998.[14]
  3. Riaz Basra (1995 to May 1, 2002): Basra was a co-founder and first commander-in-chief of LeJ until he was killed by Pakistani police in 2002. He was born into a poor farming family in Sargodha, a district in central Punjab. Following his education in a religious seminary in Allama Iqbal town, Basra participated in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. Forced home by an injury in 1986, Basra joined the newly formed SSP and quickly rose through ranks. In 1988, he became the chief of SSP propaganda operations and ran for a seat in the Punjab state assembly. In the mid-1990s, Basra helped form LeJ before leaving to Afghanistan where he fought alongside the Taliban. He plotted attacks against Pakistan and developed ties to other militant groups including al-Qaeda, the Islamic Movement for Uzbekistan, and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Basra was reportedly the chief of the Khalid bin Walid training camp in the Sarobi district near Kabul. After the fall of the Taliban, Barsa returned to Pakistan, where he was killed in a shootout with police in May 2002.[15]
  4. Matiur Rehman (2002 to Present): Rehman was responsible for reorganizing LeJ cells across Pakistan after Basra's death. His current status is unknown, but some reports indicate he has assumed a formal role in al-Qaeda’s Shura military committee. He also served as an important link between LeJ and other terrorist groups in the region. Rehman previously served as the deputy of Amjad Hussain Farooqi, a leader of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), helping al-Qaeda fighters escape to Pakistan. Rehman is believed to be linked to the 2008 plot to blow up several transatlantic flights originating in London.[16]
  5. Akram Lahori (2002 to 2004): Lahori was a co-founder of LeJ and took over as commander-in-chief in 2002 following Riaz Basra’s death. Lahori is believed to have planned a number of sectarian attacks in Karachi and was responsible for overseeing the training of suicide bombers. He also helped Basra operate the LeJ training camp in Sarobi, Afghanistan. Lahori was arrested in Orangi Town, Karachi, on June 17, 2004, and remains in police custody.[17]
  6. Qari Mohammad Zafar (2005 to 2010): Zafar became the central leader of LeJ in 2005. He is believed to be responsible for several attacks in Pakistan, including the March 2006 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Karachi. Following that attack, the U.S. offered a $5 million USD reward for information leading to his arrest. On February 24, 2010, Zafar was killed in a drone strike in North Waziristan. He is believed to have been replaced by Mufti Abuzar Khanjari.[18]
  7. Mufti Abuzar Khanjari (2010 to Present): Khanjari assumed leadership of LeJ following Zafar’s death.[19]

Ideology & Goals

LeJ's central goal is to establish Pakistan as an orthodox Sunni Islamic state.  The group maintains an anti-Shiite focus and uses terrorism to pressure the government into declaring the Shiite community a non-Muslim minority in Pakistan.[20]

Size Estimates

Designated/Listed

The U.S. Department of State added LeJ to its list of foreign terrorist organizations on January 30, 2003.  The U.S. alleged LeJ had been behind the March 1995 attack on consulate officials, which killed two people.  That attack was said to be in response to a U.S. request to Pakistan that it extradite Ramzi Yousuf, mastermind behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.[21]

LeT was listed by the United Nations as an Al Qaeda affiliate on February 3, 2003.[22] 

Resources

Beginning in the 1980s, LeJ's parent organization the SSP, and later LeJ itself, received financing and support from the central Pakistani government.[23] Most state financing was used to construct and operate Wahhabi and Deobandi madrassas, which have proliferated in Pakistan in recent decades, allowing for a larger pool of recruits of LeJ.[{S.V.R. Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan:  The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2000), p. 142.  Of the 2,463 madrassas registered in Punjab in 1996, 1,700 received foreign funding, according to Ayesha Siddiqa, “Terror’s Training Ground,” Newsline (Karachi): 9 September 2009.  See also, Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 94; and Jane Perlez, "Official Admits Militancy’s Deep Roots in Pakistan," The New York Times, 2 June 2010. 
 
Beyond recruiting, state financing has also enabled LeJ and allied groups to build their militant infrastructure and purchase material for its operations.  
 
LeJ gets additional resources from the narcotics trade and other criminal activities.[24] 
 
Although the Pakistani government officially banned the group in 2001, some elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence services continue to turn a blind eye toward LeJ.  This continued support, whether tacit or explicit, occurs for a variety of reasons including ideological compatibility, a view that LeJ retains value in the conflict with India, and/or fear that any crackdown on the group would elicit harsh retaliation.

External Influences

LeJ has received money from several Persian Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates[25] These countries funded LeJ and other Sunni militant groups primarily to counter the rising influence of Iran's revolutionary Shiism.

Geographical Locations

LeJ is active throughout Pakistan, however its primary areas of operation are south and central Punjab province, the greater Karachi area, and some parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, specifically North Waziristan.[26]

Targets & Tactics

LeJ is a takfiri group, meaning it declares those who do not subscribe to its own version of Islam as infidels.[27]  LeJ has used takfiri reasoning to justify the assassination of those who stand in the way of its goals.  Traditionally, LeJ has focused its attacks on Shiites, Ahmadis, and Barelvis of Pakistan.  LeJ also targets activists of opposing groups, state officials, and civilians of non-Deobandi sects, including doctors, businessmen, and intellectuals.[28]  The group targets non-Deobandi mosques and other places where minority groups worship. LeJ has also "targeted Sunni officials, including Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Lahore in January 1999 . . . [and] repeatedly targeted Iranian diplomats, personnel and interests in Pakistan." .[29]   Increasingly, LeJ targets Pakistani state institutions.[30]

When LeJ first began using violent tactics, it primarily fired upon its targets from moving motorbikes.  The group gradually began to use timed explosive devices, hand grenades and machine guns.  A more recent innovation is the combined use of hand grenades to kill and create panic before opening autormatic fire on those running from the initial explosion.  The group has also been known to conduct suicide bombing attacks[31]

LeT activists are believed to undergo rigorous physical and ideological training prior to being sent on missions. Missions participants are divided into small cells that are then dissolved after action.  The militants are "taught to die rather than be captured by the security forces," and if they are captured, militants are impelled to prefer death "in an interrogation cell rather than [to] disclose any secret that could harm other Mujahids."[32]

Political Activities

In 1988, before LeJ was founded, Riaz Basra ran for a seat in the Punjab provincial assembly.  Apart from that campaign, LeJ leaders have no history in electoral politics, the group does not use non-violent tactics and its ranks consist almost exclusively of militants.[33]

Major Attacks

  1. 1999: LeJ attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Lahore. (0 killed, 0 wounded).[34]
  2. March 17, 2002: In what is believed to be the first suicide attack by a jihadi outfit in Pakistan, two LeJ members attacked the International Protestant Church in Islamabad. (5 killed, 46 wounded).[35]
  3. May 2002: LeJ operatives exploded a car bomb outside the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi, targeting a shuttle bus of French civilians working on a submarine project for Pakistan's government. (14 killed, 20+ wounded).[36]
  4. June 2002: LeJ detonated a car bomb outside the U.S. Consulate in Karachi. (11 killed, 26 wounded).[37]
  5. May 2005: An LeJ suicide bomber targeted a Shiite mosque in Islamabad. (25 killed, 100+ wounded).[38]
  6. 2006: LeJ is suspected in the massive suicide bombing of a Barelvi congregation at Nishtar Park in Karachi.The bombing killed nearly the entire leadership of Sunni Tehrik, which had organized the gathering to honor the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad. (57 killed, 100+ wounded).[39]
  7. September 2008: A massive truck bomb nearly destroyed the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, an attacked timed to coincide with a dinner at the president’s nearby residence. (56 killed, 266+ wounded).[40]
  8. October 2009: Fighters from LeJ (with support from JeM and TTP) are suspected in an attack on the headquarters of the Pakistani Army in Rawalpindi. To end the assault, the government reportedly flew in SSP and LeJ leaders to negotiate with the attackers. Negotiations failed after the attackers accused the party leaders of being “traitors,” and commandos ended the crisis by overwhelming the assailants with force. (16 killed).[41]

Relationships with Other Groups

LeJ is an offshoot of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), an anti-Shiite religious-political organization.  Although scholars differ on the exact nature of their ongoing relationship, the strong links between the groups are not disputed.

SSP and LeJ allegedly split because the groups disagreed over how best to pursue the goal of conforming Pakistani society to its rigid interpretation of Deobandi Islam, with LeJ advocating harsher, more violent tactics.[42]  One scholar notes that financial motivations likely played a role in the split:  “The size of the financial endowment of the SSP's madrassas has been so great that after the assassination of its first two leaders (Haqnawaz Jhangvi and Isrur-ul-Haq Qasimi) in 1989 and 1991 respectively, factional conflicts over the control of the purse and the madrassas ensued.”[43]  Others dispute that a genuine split ever occurred.  These observers describe LeJ as the armed wing of SSP and say the split was contrived "to protect the political integrity of SSP and enable the so-called breakaway faction to transform itself into a purely paramilitary-terrorist organization."[44] 

Regardless of the exact timing and circumstances of the split – or whether the split actually occurred – the ongoing links between SSP and LeJ are well documented.   The groups operate in “the same sectarian circles and appeal to the same constituency.”  LeJ “proclaims fidelity to the founder of the SSP, and there is little that distinguishes between the ideological positions of the two organizations.”[45]

In the 1990s, many LeJ and SSP members fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan.  The Taliban and LeJ are both Deobandi organizations that “hail from the same madrassa structure and networks – and even training camps in NWFP and southern Afghanistan.”[46]  The links between them “are solid because of the common ground they share… both are united in their vehement opposition to the Shia sect and Iran.”[47]  Additionally, “it is reputed that the Taliban commander, Mullah Omar, routinely called on Deobandi madrassas across Pakistan to provide him with recruits whenever Taliban troops had to be bolstered.”[48]

LeJ founder Riaz Basra, a veteran of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, was given sanctuary in Afghanistan by the Taliban regime when he was wanted by Pakistani authorities.[49]  LeJ members fought alongside the Taliban and are believed to be involved in the 1998 massacre of Hazaras (Afghan Shiites) in northern Afghanistan.[50]  Basra was also appointed the “chief of the Khalid bin Walid training camp in the Sarobi district near Kabul."  While there, he and other LeJ members “developed close ties with Al Qaeda.”[51]

The ties forged between LeJ and Al Qaeda in the training camps of Afghanistan survived the Taliban's fall.  After the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, LeJ members helped al Qaeda leadership escape into Pakistan and elsewhere.  According to interrogations of Sheikh Ahmed Saleem, who was involved in planning the 1998 East Africa bombings, LeJ provided him and other Al Qaeda leaders “false passports, tickets, and money and helped him smuggle al Qaeda gold out of [Afghanistan].”[52]

Since their return to Pakistan after the Taliban's fall, LeJ and SSP have become “a mainstay of Al Qaeda planning in Pakistan.”[53]  Some Pakistani authorities believe LeJ “might be working in the Sind capital as…a special Al Qaeda unit that trained under Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and is tasked with specific high profile targets, including Musharraf.”[54]  Terrorism investigations in Pakistan suggest some LeJ attacks, such as the June 2006 attack on the Karachi Corps Commander, are carried out jointly with Al Qaeda.[55]  On July 14, 2008, a top Al Qaeda operative and two accomplices – both LeJ members – were arrested in Multan.  The Al Qaeda operative was a Tanzanian national named Muhammad al Misri, who authorities allege “is closely linked with al Qaeda's top hierarchy” and is also suspected in a “series of suicide attacks on Pakistan following the crackdown on the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque)” in Islamabad.[56]

LeJ also has ties to Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), a Deobandi group formed by Masood Azhar in 2000. The groups cooperate in part because of their common ideologies.   JeM fighters have allegedly received military training in LeJ camps in Afghanistan.[57] Recent cooperation between LeJ, SSP and JeM – and the trio's growing ties to the TTP – have led some analysts to consider the three groups (or at least some of their members) part of the Punjabi Taliban.[58]

LeJ also has links to Central Asian militant groups. In 1999, SSP and LeJ fighters joined IMU leader Juma Namangani in Afghanistan and took part in the IMU kidnapping of Japanese geologists. LeJ members also fought in Afghanistan alongside the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).[59]

LeJ has several rivals.  LeJ emerged out of opposition to Shiite political solidarity and have opposed Shiite political groups – particularly Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan and its militant offshoot, Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan – throughout their existence.  LeJ's narrow interpretation of the Deobandi school of Sunni Islam has also brought it into conflict with groups representing other Sunni schools, especially the Barelvi group known as Sunni Tehrik.

There have also been divisions within LeJ’s ranks.  A faction led by Qari Abdul Hai split from LeJ in October 2000.  The split occurred during a discussion of the group's future activities in a shura council meeting at LeJ's headquarters in Afghanistan.  Riaz Basra wanted to resume attacks on Shiite targets and renew efforts to obtain the release of imprisoned LeJ allies.  Hai opposed Basra's proposal, saying that armed activity in Pakistan, where the military regime of Pervez Musharraf had recently taken power, would incite harsh action against the LeJ.  The Taliban attempted to mediate the dispute, but Basra refused to participate in the reconciliation efforts, saying he had fired Hai from LeJ.  Hai obtained the support of several important LeJ leaders, and his group now operates in the Karachi area, at times under the banners of Harkatul Mujahideen al-Alami and Lashkar-e-Umar.[60]  

Community Relationships

The primary social service provided by LeJ is religious education.  Madrassas in Pakistan have proliferated in part as a result of the rising cost of state-sponsored education.[61]  “While it is true that these madrassas are the main source of education in the backward areas of southern Punjab, they also serve as a major source of recruitment for fresh militants.”[62]  According to experts, several thousand of the madrassas are believed to “churn out militant students,” but it is not clear how many madrassas provide recruits directly to LeJ.[63]

References

  1. ^ Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 96, 98.
  2. ^ South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Terrorist Group of Pakistan.” http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm
  3. ^ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” in Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2002), pp. 92-93.
  4. ^ Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks, The Afghan-Pakistan Connection (London: Hurst, 2004), p. 25-26.
  5. ^ Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2005), p. 208; Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (New York: Viking Penguin, 2008), p. 237; Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 94; Amir Mir, The True Face of Jehadis (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004), p. 177.
  6. ^ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan:  The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2000), p. 157.
  7. ^ C. Christine Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 27 (2004), p. 492; Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2005), p. 205.
  8. ^ Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 4 (April 2009), p. 1; Jane Perlez, “Pakistan Attacks Show Tighter Militant Links,” The New York Times, 15 October 2009.
  9. ^ Ahmad Majidyar, “Could the Taliban Take Over Pakistan’s Punjab Province,” American Enterprise Institute, Middle Eastern Outlook, No. 2 (June 2010), p. 5.  “[Punjabi militants] are more hard-line, more fundamentalist, and more connected to a global agenda” than Pashtun militants, according to Imtiaz Ali, who Majidyar quotes from Ayesha Nasir and Barbara Slavin, “Punjabi Taliban Threat Growing,” World, Wasington Times, 21 October 2009; Jane Perlez, “Pakistan Attacks Show Tighter Militant Links,” The New York Times, 15 October 2009.
  10. ^ Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 98.
  11. ^ Amir Mir, The Fluttering Flag of Jehad (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2008), p. 231.
  12. ^ Amir Mir, The Fluttering Flag of Jehad (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2008), p. 232.
  13. ^ Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 98.
  14. ^ Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 98.
  15. ^ Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 94.
  16. ^ Amir Mir, The Fluttering Flag of Jihad (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2008), p. 232.
  17. ^ B. Raman, “Taliban & LEJ Send Strong Message to Kayani & Pasha,” International Terrorism Monitor, Paper No. 628 (March 2010).
  18. ^ B. Raman, “Taliban & LEJ Send Strong Message to Kayani & Pasha,” International Terrorism Monitor, Paper No. 628 (March 2010).
  19. ^ B. Raman, “Taliban & LEJ Send Strong Message to Kayani & Pasha,” International Terrorism Monitor, Paper No. 628 (March 2010).
  20. ^ Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 94.
  21. ^ Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 98.
  22. ^ "Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities." The consolidated list is available here http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/consolist.shtml.
  23. ^ S.V.R. Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan:  The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2000), p. 157.
  24. ^ S.V.R. Nasr, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” in Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2002), p. 96.
  25. ^ Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2005), p. 205.
  26. ^ Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 4 (April 2009), p. 3.
  27. ^ S.V.R. Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan:  The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2000), p. 163; Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 433.
  28. ^ Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2005), p. 167; Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, p. 178.
  29. ^ S.V.R. Nasr, "Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan," in Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2002), p. 99.
  30. ^ Jane Perlez, "Pakistan Attacks Show Tighter Militant Links," The New York Times, 15 October 2009.
  31. ^ Amir Mir, The True Face of Jehadis (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004), p. 179.
  32. ^ Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 95.
  33. ^ Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 4 (April 2009), p. 3.
  34. ^ Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks, The Afghan-Pakistan Connection (London: Hurst, 2004), p. 26.
  35. ^ Aoun Abbas Sahi, “The Punjab Connection,” Newsline (Karachi): 15 October 2008; Seth Mydans, “Bomb Attack Chills Churchgoers in Islamabad,” The New York Times, 1 April 2002.
  36. ^ Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 97. Raymond Bonner, “At Least 14 Die in Attack on French Group in Pakistan,” The New York Times, 9 May 2002.
  37. ^ Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 97. Seth Mydans, “Car Bomb Explodes Outside U.S. Office in a Pakistani City,” The New York Times, 15 June 2002.
  38. ^ South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Punjab Timeline – 2005,” accessed 28 June 2010; available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Punjab/timeline/2005.htm.
  39. ^ Amir Mir, The Fluttering Flag of Jehad (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2008), p. 214.
  40. ^ Salman Masood, “After Bombing, Pakistan’s President is Pressured,” The New York Times, 21.
  41. ^ Hassan Abbas, “Deciphering the Attack on Pakistan’s Army Headquarters,” The AfPak Channel, updated on 11 October 2009, accessed on 28 June 2010; available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/11/deciphering_the_attack_on_pakistan_s_army_headqua
  42. ^ Describing the split with LeJ, Chairman of the SSP’s Supreme Council Zia ul-Haq Qasmi said: “We parted ways because Lashkar-e-Jhangvi's way of pursuing its policies were different from the SSP's.  The Lashkar does not like our moderate policies.” (Mariam Abou Zahab, “The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan,” in Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2002), p. 127, n. 15.)
  43. ^ S.V.R. Nasr, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” in Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2002), p. 98.
  44. ^ Animesh Roul, “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi: Sectarian Violence in Pakistan and Ties to International Terrorism,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 11 (June 2005); Others also raise this possibility, including Amir Mir, The True Face of Jehadis (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004), pp. 177-178; and S.V.R. Nasr, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” in Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2002), p. 99.
  45. ^ S.V.R. Nasr, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” in Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2002), p. 99.
  46. ^ S.V.R. Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan:  The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2000), p. 164.
  47. ^ Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2001), p. 92.
  48. ^ S.V.R. Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan:  The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2000), p. 164.
  49. ^ Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 96.
  50. ^ Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2001), p. 74.
  51. ^ Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 96.
  52. ^ Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (New York: Viking Penguin, 2008), pp. 223-224.
  53. ^ Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (New York: Viking Penguin, 2008), p. 227.
  54. ^ Amir Mir, The Fluttering Flag of Jehad (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2008), p. 231.
  55. ^ Amir Mir, The Fluttering Flag of Jehad (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2008), p. 231.
  56. ^ South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Punjab Timeline – 2008,” accessed 28 June 2010; available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Punjab/timeline/2008.htm.
  57. ^ Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2005), p. 146.
  58. ^ Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 4 (April 2009), p. 1.}

    Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) is believed to have provided refuge for LeJ militants in Afghanistan following a LeJ's attempt to assassinate Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Lahore.{{S.V.R. Nasr, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” in Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2002), p. 99.

  59. ^ Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 175.
  60. ^ Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2005), p. 205.
  61. ^ Perlez, “Official Admits Militancy’s Deep Roots in Pakistan,” The New York Times, 2 June 2010.
  62. ^ Dr. Rasool Baksh Rais, professor of political science at Lahore University of Management Sciences, quoted in Aoun Abbas Sahi, “The Punjab Connection,” Newsline (Karachi): 15 October 2008.
  63. ^ Perlez, “Official Admits Militancy’s Deep Roots in Pakistan,” The New York Times, 2 June 2010.