Mujahideen Army

FormedNovember 1, 2004
DisbandedGroup is active.
First AttackNovember 2004: The Mujahideen Army took an American, a Nepali, a Filipino, and two Iraqis hostage. All were released except the American, who was rescued by U.S. troops seven months later. (0 killed, 0 wounded) [1]
Last AttackAugust 2014: Fighting allegedly broke out between Mujahideen Army fighters and IS militants in al-Karma in eastern Anbar. The Mujahideen Army withdrew from the region the shortly after. (Casualties unknown) [2] [3]
UpdatedJuly 27, 2015

Narrative Summary

The Mujahideen Army (MA), also known as the Jaysh al Mujahideen, is a Sunni Iraqi militant organization that operates primarily in central and western Iraq. [4] Although the group did not begin conducting military operations until late 2004, according to the MA spokesman Abdul Rahman al-Oaisi, the group was operating as a social service organization  prior to the U.S. invasion in 2003, providing religious education and aid to students. [5] [6] Following the U.S. invasion, the MA’s main aim was to expel foreign troops from Iraq and establish Sharia law on a national level.  To this end, the group primarily targeted coalition forces from 2004 to 2011. In November 2004, the group gained international attention when it took five hostages—an American, a Nepali, a Filipino, and two Iraqis.  Four of the five hostages were quickly released but the American prisoner was not freed until U.S. troops rescued him 10 months later. [7]In December 2004, the group took another 10 hostages, all of whom were Iraqis working for a contracting firm with American ties and executed eight of their ten prisoners. [8] 

Throughout the 2000s, the MA was also vehemently opposed the Iraqi government, which it viewed as an American puppet. In 2005, former Iraqi Electricity Minister Ayhamal-Samarra'i claimed that he had met with the leadership of the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) and the Mujahideen Army to discuss ending the groups’ hostilities against the government. However both groups denied meeting with Samarra’i. [9]  But the same year, both the MA and the IAI allegedly reached out to Iraqi Prime Minister Jalal Talabani to encourage him to include more resistance groups in the political process. [10]

In late 2005, the Mujahideen Army was allegedly cooperating with AQI, although it remains unclear in what capacity the two groups were linked. [11] Yet, by the late 2000’s the MA and Al-Qaeda were frequently at odds over Al-Qaeda’s indiscriminate tactics.  In 2008, an AQI leader accused the MA of issuing orders to kill AQI members and of participating in the Sunni Awakening. The Mujahideen Army rejected those claims as "hideous slander" and in turn accused AQI of targeting members of the Mujahideen Army. [12] 

The Mujahideen Army was particularly active in 2006, engaging U.S. coalition forces as well as issuing public threats in response to international events. Early in the year the Mujahideen Army called for attacks on Danish soldiers in response to offensive cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad that had been published in several Danish newspapers. [13] Around the same time the group also threated to “destroy the cross in the heart of Rome and hit the Vatican” itself in retaliation for controversial comments made by Pope Benedict XVI about Islam. [14] The MA also claimed credit for shooting down an American Apache helicopter in January 2006 and an American Black Hawk helicopter in January of the next year, both outside of Baghdad. [15] [16]

In May 2007, the Mujahideen Army, IAI, and Ansar al-Sunnah Sharia formed the Reformation and Jihad Front (RJF).  The stated aim of the RJF was to end the U.S. occupation of Iraq and exorcize Iranian influence from Iraq. [17] [18] In November 2007, the RJF joined with Hamas Iraq and the Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance (JAMI) to form the Political Council of the Iraqi Resistance (PCIR). [19] However, in 2008, the MA withdrew from both the RJF and the PCIR.  It remains unclear what precipitated this decision. [20] 

Unlike its ally, the Islamic Army in Iraq, the Mujahideen Army did not enter the political process following the withdrawal of American troops in 2011. In fact the Mujahideen Army has since criticized the IAI for working within a system it believes to be controlled by the U.S. and that does not institute Sharia law. [21] Rather than join such a system, the MA largely faded from prominence following the U.S. withdrawal.  It is unclear whether the group disbanded or simply did not undertake any publicized attacks in the period from 2011-2014. However, in the face of a revived Iraqi Sunni insurgency, the group re-emerged in 2014 and quickly resumed operations in Anbar, Hamrin and in and around Baghdad.  [22] 

Since returning to prominence in 2014, the Mujahideen Army has not only fought the Iraqi Security Forces and the Shiite militias working with the government, but has also come into conflict with the Islamic State. [23] [24] The MA had also previously opposed Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), IS’s predecessor organization, in the late 2000’s for its tactic of targeting Shiite civilians. While the MA is Salafist and staunchly anti-Shiite itself, it avoids targeting Iraqi civilians regardless of their religious affiliation. [25] [26] Similarly, in January 2014 the MA issued a harsh condemnation of IS in which it was particularly critical of IS’s Takfiri ideology, the belief that Muslims of other sects are infidels.  In addition, the statement condemned IS’s religious messages and the fact that many members of IS’s leadership arose from U.S. prison camps. [27] [28] Shortly after this statement was released, the two groups came into direct conflict in al-Karma in eastern Anbar. In July 2014, Sumaria News reported that the Mujahideen Army had distributed pamphlets in al-Karma that claimed IS’s caliphate was on religious grounds. [29] [30] In retaliation, IS kidnapped several MA fighters and shelled the homes of the MA’s members in al-Karma. Several skirmishes between IS and MA throughout August 2014, resulted in the withdrawal of the MA from al-Karma. [31] [32] A similar pattern had previously occurred in Fallujah, where the MA had initially established a foothold, only to be pushed out by IS. [33]

Leadership

  1. Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi (Unknown to Present): Nuaimi is believed to be the leader of the Mujahideen Army.[34]
  2. Ahmad Ni'mah Khudayyir Abbas (Unknown to October 2005): Ahmad Ni'mah Khudayyir Abbas, more commonly known as Abu Shihab, was the group’s propaganda chief and was in charge of overseeing all of the MA’s IED and mortar attacks. He was captured by U.S. troops in the Abu Ghraib district to the west of Bagdad in October 2005.[35]
  3. Haqi Ismael al-Shortani (July 7, 2015 to Present): Shortani is believed to be in charge of all of the military operations of the Mujahideen Army. [36]

Ideology & Goals

The Mujahideen Army is a Salafi Iraqi militant organization. [37] The group is anti-Shia, but does not condone the killing of Shiite civilians, instead concentrating its attacks on Shiite militias, U.S. forces (from 2004-2011), and government forces. [38] [39] The group’s main goal throughout the 2000’s was to expel foreign troops from Iraq and establish a Sunni Iraqi government guided by Sharia law. [40] Since the U.S.’s withdrawal in 2011, the group has shifted its focus to overthrowing the Iraqi government, although its long-term goal of establishing a Sunni theocracy remains unchanged. The MA has also always been vehemently anti-Iranian, and seeks to remove all Iranian influence from Iraq. [41] [42] [43]

Size Estimates

There is very little information on the size of the Mujahideen Army.  However according to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), the Mujahideen Army “appears to be a relatively small but well-organized Sunni insurgent group.” [44]

Designated/Listed

The Mujahideen Army is not listed as a terrorist organization on any major national or international designation lists.

Resources

Very little is known about the Mujahideen Army’s resources, although the group has claimed that many of its weapons were stolen from Iraqi Army supply depots. [45] When captured in 2005, Mujahideen Army Lieutenant Abu Shihab also admitted that the group raised a significant amount of money by posing as a childrens charity in order to receive donations from unwitting Iraqi citizens. [46]

Geographical Locations

The Mujahideen Army operates mostly within Anbar, in and around Bagdad, and in Kirkuk to the north. [47] [48] MA leadership, however, has claimed that the group has cells all across Iraq. [49] 

Targets & Tactics

From 2004-2011, the Mujahideen Army primarily targeted U.S. coalition forces and Iraqi government forces.  Since re-emerging in 2014, the group has primarily aimed its attacks at Iraqi Security Forces and Shiite militant organizations working with the Iraqi Government.  Although the group is anti-Shiite, it generally does not target Shiite civilian populations. [50] [51] [52] In the mid-2000s, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) accused the MA of killing several of its members; the MA has always denied these accusations. [53] Beginning in 2014, the group has clashed with AQI’s successor organization, IS, especially in the Anbar province. [54] [55]

The Mujahideen Army commonly uses IEDs, car bombs, rockets, and mortars in its attacks and has been known to kidnap foreign nationals and Iraqis working for foreign firms. [56] It has also claimed responsibility for three separate attacks in which it allegedly used missiles to down U.S. helicopters. [57] [58] Additionally, the MA has released several English language propaganda videos and statements meant to target American audiences and encourage them to overthrow the U.S. government. [59]

Political Activities

The Mujahideen Army believes that the political process in Iraq is controlled by the United States and Iran and is illegitimate because it is not based on Islamic law. [60] [61] [62] [63] In early 2010, the group issued a fatwaclaiming that the upcoming parliamentary elections were nothing more than a "hopeless attempt to legitimize a government that implements American objectives." [64] [65]

 Regardless, there have been several alleged instances of communication between the Mujahideen Army and the Iraqi government.  For instance, In December 2005, both the MA and the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI) allegedly reached out to Iraqi Prime Minister Jalal Talabani to encourage him to include more resistance groups in Iraq’s political process. [66] Also in 2005, former Iraqi Electricity Minister Ayhamal-Samarra'i claimed that he had met with the leadership of the IAI and the Mujahideen Army to discuss the possibility of ceasing hostilities and brining the two groups into the political process. Both groups denied that the meetings had occurred or that they had authorized anyone to speak with Samarra'i. [67] Similarly, in early 2006 the Mujahideen Army denied allegedly contacting the U.S. with the aim of ending its military operations. [68] Following the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, the MA has remained critical of the Iraqi government and has repeatedly denounced the IAI for joining the political process. [69]

Major Attacks

  1. November 2004: The Mujahideen Army took an American, a Nepali, a Filipino, and two Iraqis hostage. All were released except the American, who was rescued by U.S. troops seven months later. (0 killed, 0 wounded).[70]
  2. December 2004: The MA took ten Iraqis hostage and eventually executed eight of the ten. All of the hostages worked for an contracting firm with American ties. (8 killed, Unknown wounded).[71]
  3. June 27, 2005: The Mujahideen Army claimed responsibility for shooting down an American helicopter in Baghdad with a missile. Confrontations with armed men were reported in the area following the crash. (16 killed, Unknown wounded).[72]
  4. January 2006: The Mujahideen Army claimed credit for downing an American Apache helicopter north of Baghdad. (Casualties unknown).[73]
  5. January 2007: The Mujahideen Army claimed responsibility for shooting down an American Black Hawk helicopter outside of Baghdad. (13 killed, Unknown wounded).[74]
  6. May 2009: The Mujahideen Army claimed credit for killing an American soldier in northern Baghdad. (1 killed, 0 wounded).[75]
  7. August 29, 2009: he MA allegedly bombed a U.S. intelligence vehicle north of Baghdad. (Casualties unknown).[76]
  8. September 15, 2009: The MA launched a series of mortar attacks in the Green Zone in Baghdad. (2 killed, Unknown wounded).[77]
  9. February 22, 2014: The Islamic Army of Iraq claimed that it and the Mujahideen Army had coordinated an attack on government forces near al-Karma. The groups purportedly downed a government helicopter during the fighting. (Casualties unknown ).[78]

Relationships with Other Groups

The Mujahideen Army has often called for unity among the Ahl al-Sunna, the Sunni community or “family of the Sunna” in Iraq. [79] The MA has, in particular, been known for its long-standing alliance with the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI). Although the groups have worked together since 2004, they did not officially announce their operational cooperation until 2005. [80] [81] However, tensions have risen between the two allies since the IAI decided to join the political process in Iraq following the U.S. withdrawal. [82] [83]  The Mujahideen Army has denounced the IAI not only for what they perceive to be participation in corrupt political system controlled by the U.S. and Iran, but also for the IAI’s alleged absence from “the battle” in western Iraq. The IAI repudiated the latter claim, insisting that the MA must not be in the field if it could not see the IAI’s presence there. Despite these tensions, however, the two groups do still cooperate. Both are aligned against IS and purportedly carried out a joint attack on Iraqi Security Forces outside of al-Karma on February 22, 2014. [84]  

On May 2, 2007, the MA, IAI and Ansar al-Sunnah Sharia announced the formation new umbrella organization, the Reformation and Jihad Front (RJF), that would cooperate in their efforts to expel U.S. troops from Iraq and exorcize Iranian influence from Iraq. [85] [86] In November 2007, the RJF joined with Hamas Iraq and the Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance (JAMI) to form the Political Council of the Iraqi Resistance (PCIR). [87] However the MA withdrew from both the RJF and the PCIR in 2008 for unspecified reasons. [88]

In late 2005, the Mujahideen Army was reportedly "associated" with AQI, although it remains unclear in what capacity the two groups were linked. [89] However, in the late 2000’s the Mujahideen Army frequently denounced AQI for its indiscriminate tactics and extremist ideology. In 2008, an AQI leader accused the MA of issuing orders to kill AQI members and of participating in the Sunni Awakening. The Mujahideen Army rejected those claims as "hideous slander" and in turn accused AQI of targeting members of the Mujahideen Army. [90]  

The Muhjahideen has also had a highly contentious relationship with AQI’s successor organization, IS. In January 2014 the MA issued a harsh condemnation of IS, rebuking the group for its takfiri ideology–the belief that Muslims of other sects are infidels—and its attempts to force other groups to swear allegiance to al-Baghdadi as caliph. [91] [92] In spring 2014, the two groups came into conflict in al-Karma in eastern Anbar.  In July 2014, the MA allegedly distributed pamphlets to the citizens of al-Karma which condemned IS’s caliphate as illegitimate on religious grounds. [93] [94] Shortly after IS kidnapped several MA fighters and destroyed the homes of MA members in al-Karma.  By August 2014, violence had broken out between the two groups in the region, and in the face of IS’s superior military strength, the MA was eventually forced to withdraw from al-Karma. [95] [96]

According the Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi, the leader of the Mujahideen Army, the Mujahideen Army has no connection to the organization of the same name currently fighting Assad government forces in Syria near Aleppo. [97] 

Community Relationships

The Mujahideen Army has close ties to the Sunni tribes in the Anbar region. There is also evidence of the MA attempting to provide for local populations in addition to simply fighting government forces. [98] [99] [100] For instance, when in 2014 the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) blocked all roads to and from Garma in an effort to isolate the region, the MA fought to establish and defend a corridor through the ISF lines. They used the corridor to bring emergency supplies into Garma and to give local herdsman access to the route along which the sell their livestock.  [101]

References

  1. ^ "Mujahideen Army." National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 1 March 2008. Web. 28 January 2010.}
  2. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.
  3. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Jaysh al-Mujahideen Iraq Statements: Clashes with the Islmaic State: Translation and Analysis.” 26 August 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  4. ^ Kohlmann, Evan F. "State of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq: August 2007." The NEFA Foundation, p.16, August 2007. Web. January 28, 2010.
  5. ^ Bakier, Abdul Hameed. “Iraq’s Islamic Mujahideen Profiled by Jihadi Websites: Part Two.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Focus 5(41, 3 December 2008. Web. 23 July 2015.
  6. ^ Kohlmann, Evan F. "State of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq: August 2007," The NEFA Foundation, p.16, August 2007. Web. 28 January 2010.
  7. ^ "Mujahideen Army." National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 1 March 2008. Web. 28 January 2010.
  8. ^ "Mujahideen Army." National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 1 March 2008. Web. 28 January 2010.
  9. ^ "Iraqi armed groups deny contacts with ex-minister," Al-Jazeera TV, 8 June 2005. Web. 12 Jan. 2010.
  10. ^ "Mujahideen Army." National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 1 March 2008. Web. 28 January 2010.
  11. ^ "Jaysh al-Mujahideen terrorist lieutenant and propaganda chief captured." Press Release, Multi-National Force—Iraq, 24 November 2005. Web. 29 January 2010.
  12. ^ "The Mujahideen Army rejects 'slander' from Abu Hamza al-Muhajir." The NEFA Foundation, 2 November 2008. Web. 29 January 2010.
  13. ^ "Beirut sorry for Danish mission attack." Al Jazeera, 6 February 2006. 29 January 2010.
  14. ^ "Vatikan verschärft Sicherheitsvorkehrungen", Der Spiegel, 16 September 2006. Web. 23 July 2015. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/drohungen-gegen-benedikt-nervositaet-vor-papst-auftritt-in-rom-a-437461.html>
  15. ^ “The Mujahideen Army Issues a Video Depicting the Downing of an Apache Helicopter in al-Taramiya.” SITE Institute, 16 January 2006.
  16. ^ “The Mujahideen Army Issues a Video Downing of an Black Hawk Helicopter in al Niba’i..” SITE Institute, 26 Jan. 2007.
  17. ^ Bakier, Abdul Hameed. “Iraq’s Islamic Mujahideen Profiled by Jihadi Websites: Part Two.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Focus 5(41), 3 December 2008. Web. 23 July 2015.
  18. ^ Gabbay, Michael. "The 2008 U.S. elections and Sunni insurgent dynamics in Iraq." CTC Sentinel, 1(10), September 2008. Web. 29 January 2010.
  19. ^ Bakier, Abdul Hameed. “Iraq’s Islamic Mujahideen Profiled by Jihadi Websites: Part Two.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Focus 5(41), 3 December 2008. Web. 23 July 2015.
  20. ^ Gabbay, Michael. "The 2008 U.S. elections and Sunni insurgent dynamics in Iraq." CTC Sentinel, 1(10), September 2008. Web. 29 January 2010.
  21. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Interview with the leader of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen: Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi.” 17 March 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  22. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.
  23. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Interview with the leader of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen: Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi.” 17 March 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  24. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.
  25. ^ Muhammad, Abd-al-Azim, "Iraqi Al-Mujahidin Army spokesman explains policies towards Shi'i, US," Interview, Qatari Al-Jazeera satellite TV, 15 November 2006.
  26. ^ Gabbay, Michael. "The 2008 U.S. elections and Sunni insurgent dynamics in Iraq." CTC Sentinel, 1(10), September 2008. 29 January 2010.
  27. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Jaysh al-Mujahideen Iraq Statements: Clashes with the Islmaic State: Translation and Analysis.” 26 August 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  28. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Sample of Jaysh al-Mujahideen Iraq Operations: Translation and Analysis.” 30 June 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  29. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Sample of Jaysh al-Mujahideen Iraq Operations: Translation and Analysis.” 30 June 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  30. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.
  31. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.
  32. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Jaysh al-Mujahideen Iraq Statements: Clashes with the Islmaic State: Translation and Analysis.” 26 August 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  33. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Jaysh al-Mujahideen Iraq Statements: Clashes with the Islmaic State: Translation and Analysis.” 26 August 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  34. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Interview with the leader of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen: Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi.” 17 March 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  35. ^ "Jaysh al-Mujahideen terrorist lieutenant and propaganda chief captured.” GlobalSecurity.org, 23 October 2005. Web. 2 February 2010.
  36. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.
  37. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.
  38. ^ Muhammad, Abd-al-Azim, "Iraqi Al-Mujahidin Army spokesman explains policies towards Shi'i, US." Qatari Al-Jazeera satellite TV. 15 November 2006.
  39. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Interview with the leader of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen: Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi.” 17 March 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  40. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Interview with the leader of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen: Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi.” 17 March 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  41. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Interview with the leader of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen: Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi.” 17 March 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  42. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.
  43. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Jaysh al-Mujahideen Iraq Statements: Clashes with the Islmaic State: Translation and Analysis.” 26 August 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  44. ^ "Mujahideen Army." National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 1 March 2008. Web. 28 January 2010.
  45. ^ Kohlmann, Evan F. "State of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq: August 2007." The NEFA Foundation, p. 16, August 2007. Web. 28 January 2010.
  46. ^ "Mujahideen Army." National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 1 March 2008. Web. 28 January 2010.
  47. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.
  48. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Interview with the leader of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen: Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi.” 17 March 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  49. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.
  50. ^ Muhammad, Abd-al-Azim, "Iraqi Al-Mujahidin Army spokesman explains policies towards Shi'i, US." Qatari Al-Jazeera satellite TV. 15 November 2006.
  51. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Interview with the leader of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen: Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi.” 17 March 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  52. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.
  53. ^ "The Mujahideen Army rejects 'slander' from Abu Hamza al-Muhajir." The NEFA Foundation, 2 November 2008. Web. 29 January 2010.
  54. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.
  55. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Jaysh al-Mujahideen Iraq Statements: Clashes with the Islmaic State: Translation and Analysis.” 26 August 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  56. ^ Muhammad, Abd-al-Azim, "Iraqi Al-Mujahidin Army spokesman explains policies towards Shi'i, US." Qatari Al-Jazeera satellite TV,15 November 2006.
  57. ^ “The Mujahideen Army Issues a Video Depicting the Downing of an Apache Helicopter in al-Taramiya.” SITE Institute, 16 January 2006.
  58. ^ “The Mujahideen Army Issues a Video Downing of an Black Hawk Helicopter in al Niba’i.” SITE Institute, 26 Jan. 2007.
  59. ^ "The Mujahideen Army Releases Video in English." SITE Institute. 28 March 2005.
  60. ^ Muhammad, Abd-al-Azim, "Iraqi Al-Mujahidin Army spokesman explains policies towards Shi'i, US." Qatari Al-Jazeera satellite TV. 15 November 2006.
  61. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Interview with the leader of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen: Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi.” 17 March 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  62. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.
  63. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Jaysh al-Mujahideen Iraq Statements: Clashes with the Islmaic State: Translation and Analysis.” 26 August 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  64. ^ "Iraqi 'resistance' rejects elections, some not to target election centres," Aljazeera, 27 February 2010.
  65. ^ "Iraq could sink into violence." Aljazeera.net, 16 February 2010. Web. 1 March 2010.
  66. ^ "Mujahideen Army." National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 1 March 2008. Web. 28 January 2010.
  67. ^ "Iraqi 'resistance' rejects elections, some not to target election centres." Aljazeera, 27 February 2010.
  68. ^ "Iraqi 'resistance' rejects elections, some not to target election centres." Aljazeera, 27 February 2010.
  69. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Interview with the leader of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen: Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi.” 17 March 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  70. ^ "Mujahideen Army." National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 1 March 2008. Web. 28 January 2010.
  71. ^ "Mujahideen Army." National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 1 March 2008. Web. 28 January 2010.
  72. ^ "Iraq's Mujahidin Army said claiming downing of US chopper." Al-Jazeera TV, 27 June 2005.
  73. ^ "Dual claim on copter crash." The Daily Telegraph, LexisNexis, 17 January 2006.
  74. ^ Young, Fiona. "13 die as chopper downed." LexisNexis Academic, Sunday Mail, 21 January 2007.
  75. ^ "Iraqi al-Mujahidin Army claims credit killing of US soldier in Baghdad." LexisNexis Academic, Al-Jazeera satellite news, 27 May 2009.
  76. ^ "Insurgent group claims attack on US vehicle in Iraq." LexisNexis Academic, Al Jazeera TV, 29 August 2009.
  77. ^ "Biden Meets With Iraqi Officials, a Day After Mortar Attack." Voice of America News, 16 September 2009. Web. 27 February 2010.
  78. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Interview with the leader of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen: Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi.” 17 March 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  79. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Interview with the leader of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen: Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi.” 17 March 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  80. ^ Roggio, Bill. "Dispatches from the jihadi belt." The Long War Journal, 24 June 2005. Web. 29 January 2010.
  81. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.
  82. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Interview with the leader of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen: Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi.” 17 March 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  83. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.
  84. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Interview with the leader of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen: Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi.” 17 March 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  85. ^ Bakier, Abdul Hameed. “Iraq’s Islamic Mujahideen Profiled by Jihadi Websites: Part Two.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Focus 5(41), 3 December 2008. Web. 23 July 2015.
  86. ^ Gabbay, Michael. "The 2008 U.S. elections and Sunni insurgent dynamics in Iraq." CTC Sentinel, 1(10), September 2008. Web. 29 January 2010.
  87. ^ Bakier, Abdul Hameed. “Iraq’s Islamic Mujahideen Profiled by Jihadi Websites: Part Two.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Focus 5(41), 3 December 2008. Web. 23 July 2015.
  88. ^ Gabbay, Michael. "The 2008 U.S. elections and Sunni insurgent dynamics in Iraq." CTC Sentinel, 1(10), September 2008. Web. 29 January 2010.
  89. ^ "Jaysh al-Mujahideen terrorist lieutenant and propaganda chief captured." Press Release, Multi-National Force—Iraq, 24 November 2005. Web. 29 January 2010.
  90. ^ "The Mujahideen Army rejects 'slander' from Abu Hamza al-Muhajir." The NEFA Foundation, 2 November 2008. Web. 29 January 2010.
  91. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Jaysh al-Mujahideen Iraq Statements: Clashes with the Islmaic State: Translation and Analysis.” 26 August 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  92. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Sample of Jaysh al-Mujahideen Iraq Operations: Translation and Analysis.” 30 June 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  93. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Sample of Jaysh al-Mujahideen Iraq Operations: Translation and Analysis.” 30 June 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  94. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.
  95. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Jaysh al-Mujahideen Iraq Statements: Clashes with the Islmaic State: Translation and Analysis.” 26 August 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  96. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.
  97. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Interview with the leader of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen: Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi.” 17 March 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  98. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.
  99. ^ Jawad al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “Interview with the leader of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen: Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi.” 17 March 2014. Web. 22 July 2015.
  100. ^ "Mujahideen Army." National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 1 March 2008. Web. 28 January 2010.
  101. ^ Adnan, Sinan & Reese, Aaron. “Middle East Security Report 24: Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency.” Understanding War, October 2014. Web. 23 July 2015.