Jund al-Aqsa

FormedSeptember 2013
DisbandedDecember 2016
First AttackFebruary 2014: Jund al-Aqsa attacked civilians and Syrian army soldiers in Maan, a predominantly Alawite village in the Hama governorate. The U.S. State Department referred to this attack as a civilian massacre in a statement designating Jund al-Aqsa as a foreign terrorist organization (60+ killed, unknown wounded). [1] [2]
Last AttackAugust 30, 2016: Jund al-Aqsa coordinated with the FSA to push the Syrian Army out of Halfaya, a town in the Hama governorate. The attack began after Jund al-Aqsa suicide bombers stormed Syrian army outposts. The Assad Regime responded with a series of airstrikes against opposition outposts (20+ killed, unknown wounded). [3]
UpdatedOctober 25, 2016

Narrative Summary

Jund al-Aqsa (formerly known as Sarayat al-Quds) was formed in 2012 by Shiekh Abdul Aziz al-Qatari as a subunit within Al Qaeda’s (AQ) Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Nusra). [4]  In response to tension between Al-Nusra and the Islamic State, Jund al-Aqsa left Al-Nusra in September 2013 in order to provide an alternate front to recruit reserve foreign fighters. [5] After splitting from Al-Nusra in 2013, Jund al-Aqsa continued to affirm its allegiance to AQ central command and Abu Muhammad al-Julani, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham’s (formerly Al-Nusra) leader. Jund al-Aqsa was active predominantly in Syria’s Idlib and Hama governorates. [6] [7]

Jund al-Aqsa began to coordinate independent attacks in early 2014, the most prominent of which occurred in February when Jund al-Aqsa targeted Syrian army soldiers in Maan, a predominantly Alawite village in the Hama governorate. [8] [9] However, Jund al-Aqsa still coordinated the majority of its attacks with Jabhat al-Nusra, and in 2015, the groups cofounded the Jaysh al-Fatah, an umbrella organization, with Ahrar al-Sham and four other small brigades. [10] As part of Jaysh al-Fatah, Jund al-Aqsa helped seize the city of Idlib from the Assad Regime for the first time in the Syrian conflict in March 2015, and eventually expelled the Assad Regime from the Idlib governorate in June 2015. [11] [12] Despite a series of successful military campaigns with Jaysh al-Fatah, Jund al-Aqsa left the umbrella group in October 2015 due to misgivings about fighting the Islamic State and Ahrar al-Sham’s tactics. [13]

Like Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Nusra), Jund al-Aqsa often coordinated its attacks with moderate Syrian opposition groups, such as the Free Syrian Army. [14] However, both Jund al-Aqsa and Al-Nusra began targeting the moderate Syrian Revolutionaries Front (SRF) after the SRF labeled the groups as apostates and kidnapped and killed some of their foreign fighters. Jund al-Aqsa and Al-Nusra responded to these killings by beginning a successful campaign to destroy the SRF in the Idlib governorate. [15]

In 2016, Jund al-Aqsa began coordinating military attacks with the Islamic State (IS) and many Jund al-Aqsa members began to support IS efforts to establish a caliphate in Syria. However, the group as a whole did not openly express support for the caliphate. [16] Despite its ties to IS, Jund al-Aqsa maintained close military ties with Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Nusra). When Al-Nusra ended its affiliation with Al Qaeda and became Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (Fatah al-Sham), Jund al-Aqsa released a statement expressing hope that Fatah al-Sham would establish “rule of shariah” in Syria. [17] 

In mid 2016, tensions increased between Jund al-Aqsa and Ahrar al-Sham after Jund al-Aqsa allegedly targeted Ahrar al-Sham’s headquarters in Binnish, Idlib. [18] Tensions flared again in October 2016 when Jund al-Aqsa kidnapped a member of Ahrar al-Sham in response to Ahrar al-Sham's arrest of a Jund al-Aqsa fighter who allegedly worked for the Islamic State. As a result of this incident, Ahrar al-Sham began to target Jund al-Aqsa. [19] [20] On October 10, Jund al-Aqsa merged into Fatah al-Sham, and Fatah al-Sham leaders negotiated a ceasefire with Ahrar al-Sham. [21] 

Leadership

  1. Said Arif (Unknown to May 2015): Arif served as Jund al-Aqsa’s military leader. The former Algerian army officer was on the U.S. State Department’s list of “Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” and had trained with AQ in the 1990s before he was convicted in 2006 as a member of the Chechen Network, a group that attempted to coordinate multiple terrorist attacks in France. In October 2013, Arif fled house arrest in France and initially joined Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria before defecting to Jund al-Aqsa. He was killed by a U.S. airstrike on May 20, 2015.[22]
  2. Abu Dhar Najdi (Unknown to October 10, 2016): Abu Dhar Najdi was Jund al-Aqsa’s last emir. Little verifiable information has been reported about him.[23]
  3. Shiekh Abdul Aziz al-Qatari (2012 to 2014): Qatari, also known as Mohammed Yusaf al-Athama, founded Jund al-Aqsa and served as the group’s Emir until his death in late 2014. Before he became active in the Syrian conflict, Qatari allegedly fought for Al Qaeda (AQ) in Afghanistan, and had close ties to Osama bin Laden and current AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Following his disappearance earlier in the year, Qatari was found dead in late 2014. He was allegedly killed by members of the Syrian Martyrs Brigade, which is part for the Syrian Revolutionaries Front.[24]

Ideology & Goals

Jund al-Aqsa sought to overthrow the Assad Regime and establish a state based on Islamic law. The Salafi-Jihadist group was in contact with prominent religious scholars such as Sheikh Maqdisi and Sheikh Suleiman Ulwan. [25]

Name Changes


Size Estimates

Designated/Listed

Resources

Jund al-Aqsa allegedly received funding from wealthy financiers from the Gulf states who did not want to fund groups engaged in infighting among the Sunni opposition. [28]

External Influences

No information available.

Geographical Locations

Jund al-Aqsa was active primarily in the Idlib and Hama governorates. [29] In addition, it coordinated attacks with the Islamic State in the Aleppo governorate. [30]

Targets & Tactics

Jund al-Aqsa primarily targeted the Syrian army and forces allied with the Assad Regime, such as Hezbollah. In October 2016, Jund al-Aqsa began to target Ahrar al-Sham, its former ally in the Jaysh al-Fatah umbrella organization, after Ahrar al-Sham accused Jund al-Aqsa of having ties to the Islamic State. [31] [32] In addition, the group targeted Alawite civilians and moderate groups that claimed Jund al-Aqsa fighters were apostates. [33] [34] [35]

Jund al-Aqsa often used suicide bombers in its attacks. However unlike other opposition groups, Jund al–Aqsa did not accuse other groups of apostasy (Takfir) in an effort to minimize conflict with other opposition forces. [36] [37]

Political Activities

Jund al-Aqsa, along with Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, refused to accept a national ceasefire that began on September 12, 2016. [38]

Major Attacks

  1. February 2014: Jund al-Aqsa attacked civilians and Syrian army soldiers in Maan, a predominantly Alawite village in the Hama governorate. The U.S. State Department referred to this attack as a civilian massacre in a statement designating Jund al-Aqsa as a foreign terrorist organization (60+ killed, unknown wounded).[39]
  2. December 15, 2014: Jund al-Aqsa coordinated with Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Nusra) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to capture a Syrian army base at Wadi al-Deif in the Idlib governorate. The opposition groups took 15 Syrian army soldiers prisoner (43 killed, unknown wounded).[40]
  3. March 2015: Jund al-Aqsa coordinated with Al-Nusra and the Jaysh al-Fatah umbrella organization to seize the city of Idlib from the Assad Regime. It was the first time that opposition groups controlled the city of Idlib since the outbreak of the civil war. The battle was part of a successful Jaysh al-Fatah campaign to push the Assad Regime out of the Idlib governorate by June 2015 (unknown casualties).[41]
  4. February 22, 2016: Jund al-Aqsa coordinated with the Islamic State and the FSA to capture Rasm al-Nafal, a village on the Khanasser-Aleppo road, from the Syrian army in order to cut off the Assad Regime’s only supply line to the Aleppo governorate. The Syrian army coordinated with Hezbollah and other pro-Regime forces to successfully recapture Rasm al-Nafal and other opposition held areas during the seven-day Khanasser offensive (237 killed, unknown wounded).[42]
  5. August 30, 2016: Jund al-Aqsa coordinated with the FSA to push the Syrian Army out of Halfaya, a town in the northern part of the Hama governorate. The attack began after Jund al-Aqsa suicide bombers stormed Syrian army outposts. The Assad Regime responded with a series of airstrikes against opposition outposts (20+ killed, unknown wounded).[43]

Relationships with Other Groups

Although Jund al-Aqsa pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda’s (AQ) central command, it was not an official AQ affiliate. [44] However, some of Jund al-Aqsa’s military leaders were members of the Khorosan group, an experienced cell of approximately two-dozen AQ jihadists who were sent to Syria by central AQ leadership in order to develop international terror plots. [45] [46]

Jund al-Aqsa was initially a subunit within Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Nusra), but left the group in September 2013 in order to provide an alternate front to recruit reserve foreign fighters. [47] [48] Despite leaving the group in 2013, Jund al-Aqsa continued to pledge allegiance to Al-Nusra’s leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani, and continued to coordinate attacks with Al-Nusra. [49][50] Jund al-Aqsa also coordinated attacks with Al-Nusra as part of the Jaysh al-Fatah umbrella group until October 2015, when Jund al-Aqsa left the umbrella organization due to misgivings about fighting the Islamic State and Ahrar al-Sham’s tactics. [51] Through late 2015 and early 2016, Jund al-Aqsa remained close to Al-Nusra, and several of its senior members joined Al-Nusra after tension arose amongst Jund al-Aqsa’s leadership. [52] When Al-Nusra ended its affiliation with AQ and renamed itself as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (Fatah al-Sham), Jund al-Aqsa released a statement expressing hope that Fatah al-Sham would establish “rule of shariah” in Syria. [53]

Unlike Fatah al-Sham, Jund al-Aqsa coordinated attacks with the Islamic State (IS) and in October 2015, the group cited misgivings about targeting IS as a reason for leaving the Jaysh al-Fatah umbrella organization. [54] [55] In addition to military cooperation, many Jund al-Aqsa members support IS efforts to establish a caliphate in Syria. However, the group as a whole did not openly express support for the caliphate. [56]

Jund al-Aqsa also coordinated attacks with Ahrar al-Sham, a prominent Sunni-Salafi opposition group. However, tensions with Ahrar al-Sham first arose in October 2015 when Jund al-Aqsa cited Ahrar al-Sham’s military tactics as a reason for leaving the Jaysh al-Fatah umbrella organization. [57] Tensions flared again on September 4, 2016, when heavy fighting broke out between the two groups after Jund al-Aqsa allegedly carried out suicide bombings at Ahrar al-Sham’s headquarters in Binnish, Idlib. [58] In October 2016, Jund al-Aqsa kidnapped a member of Ahrar al-Sham in response to Ahrar al-Sham’s arrest of a Jund al-Aqsa fighter who allegedly worked for the Islamic State. As a result of this incident, Ahrar al-Sham began to target Jund al-Aqsa. [59] [60]

Like Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (Fatah al-Sham), Jund al-Aqsa often coordinated its attacks with moderate Syrian opposition groups, such as the Free Syrian Army. [61] However, both Jund al-Aqsa and Fatah al-Sham began targeting the moderate Syrian Revolutionaries Front (SRF) after the SRF labeled the groups as apostates and kidnapped and killed some of their foreign fighters. Jund al-Aqsa and Fatah al-Sham responded to these killings by beginning a successful campaign to destroy the SRF in the Idlib governorate. [62]

Community Relationships

No information available.

References

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  3. ^ Al-Khalidi, Suleiman. “Syrian rebels make gains in Northern Hama province, capture strategic town.” Reuters. Thomas Reuters, 30 Aug. 2016. Web. 25 Sep. 2016.
  4. ^ Hussein, Tam. “Why Did Jund Al-Aqsa Join Nusra Front in Taking Out ‘Moderate’ Rebels in Idlib?” Huffington Post. Huffington Post, 11 Jun. 2014. Web. 23 Sep. 2016.
  5. ^ Lister, Charles. “Al Qai’da Plays a Long Game in Syria.” CTC Sentinel. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Sep. 2015. Web. 23 Sep. 2016.
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