Narrative
Narrative of the Organization's History
Narrative of the Organization's History
Leadership, Name Changes, Size Estimates, Resources, Geographic Locations
Ideology, Aims, Political Activities, Targets, and Tactics
First Attacks, Largest Attacks, Notable Attacks
Foreign Designations and Listings, Community Relations, Relations with Other Groups, State Sponsors and External Influences
Mapping relationships with other militant groups over time in regional maps
Like other Tamil militant groups, EROS was fighting for an independent homeland for Sri Lanka’s Tamil Hindus in Northern Sri Lanka. EROS, however, as one of the oldest militant groups, had a stricter grounding in Marxist thought and advocated for a Marxist-style revolution and a mass-based approach to Tamil independence. Unlike the LTTE, their focus was on the spread of socialist ideology and obtaining widespread local support, not the militarization of their forces.[16] EROS also disagreed with the LTTE on the potential boundaries of a future, independent state of Eelam for Sri Lanka’s Tamils. EROS, along with the EPRLF, envisioned a larger area for Eelam that would include Sri Lanka’s central highland areas. These areas were populated primarily by Indian plantation workers that EROS viewed as an essential part of the “proletariat.”[17]
In 1989, after first boycotting the parliamentary elections, 10 of EROS’ leaders joined the Sri Lankan parliament, signaling the end of EROS’ military activities and its rebirth as a political party. According to Ratnasabapathy, the founder of EROS, “[EROS] came here today in the hope of using Parliament as a forum to propagate on behalf of the Tamil people, although we do not think Parliament can resolve the ethnic problems of this country.”[18]
While the EROS did conduct one high profile kidnapping in early 1986, this strategy ultimately proved unsuccessful. Instead, EROS mainly targeted sites of economic importance, as one of their major strategies was to sabotage the Sri Lankan economy and deter investors. For example, in 1984, EROS bombed an oil pipeline north of Colombo.[19] Other notable targets include the Katunayake International Airport in Colombo, the Central Telegraph office in Colombo, and several major markets in Colombo.[20]
Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.
It is reported that from 1986-1987, at least 400 people were killed in terrorist attacks perpetrated by EROS.[21]
January 28, 1984: EROS detonated a bomb at the Hotel Oberoi in Colombo where the government was holding a meeting to discuss future negotiations with Tamil militant groups (unknown casualties).[22]
October 1984: EROS bombed an oil pipeline north of Colombo (unknown casualties).[23]
April 25, 1985: EROS bombed the Army Headquarters in Colombo (unknown casualties).[24]
November 12, 1985: EROS bombed an inner-city train in Colombo (unknown casualties).[25]
January 17, 1986: EROS members kidnapped British journalist Penelope Willis from Mullaitivu and accused her of being a British spy working alongside the Sri Lankan government. Willis was released on February 18th, 1986 after negotiations between British diplomats, EROS, and the International Red Cross (0 killed).[26]
May 3, 1986: EROS bombed an Air Lanka Tristar Jet at Katunayake International Airport in Colombo. Seventeen of the twenty-one victims killed were foreigners (21 killed, 41 wounded).[27]
May 3, 1986: EROS bombed the Central Telegraph Office in Colombo. This attack was carried out on the same day as the bombing at Katunayake airport (14 killed, unknown wounded).[28]
April 21, 1987: A car bomb exploded in a major market in Colombo. It is believed that the LTTE collaborated with EROS to execute this attack (113 killed, 200+ wounded).[29]
This group has not been designated as a terrorist organization by any major national government or international body.
EROS was one of the first and only groups to develop a relationship with Eastern Sri Lanka’s Muslims, which constitute the second largest ethnic group in the region after the Tamils.[30]
Soon after its formation, EROS began cultivating ties with other revolutionary movements around the world, specifically the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). EROS’ leaders in London quickly developed a relationship with Syed Hameed, the PLO’s representative in the UK. Hameed susbsequently organized training for EROS and LTTE cadres in Lebanon.[31] Between 1976-1986, the PLO trained around 150 Tamil militants.[32]
EROS had a constantly changing relationship with the other “Big Five” Tamil militant groups operating in the 1980s. Initially, EROS and the LTTE formed an alliance when, in 1976, they agreed to use EROS-run training camps in Vavuniya as the main military training site for both groups.[33] In the mid-1980s, however, tensions began to rise between the LTTE and EROS, as the LTTE undertook a systematic campaign to eliminate what is deemed as the more moderate Tamil groups, including TELO, PLOTE, EPRLF, and EROS. After the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in 1990, EROS leader V. Balakumaran broke away from EROS with his supporters to join the LTTE, effectively disbanding the group.[34]
In 1979, a faction of EROS broke away to form the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF).[35] The faction, led by former EROS leaders Suresh Premachandran, Douglas Devananda, and others, split from EROS because of a growing rift between the group’s leaders in London and Jaffna. By the mid-1980s, the EPRLF had surpassed EROS.[36]
In 1985, EPRLF, TELO, TULF, and the LTTE joined forces to form the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF) to participate in the Thimphu Talks brokered by India. The group, however, was short-lived; in 1986, relations between the groups deteriorated as the EPRLF, TELO, and EROS loosened their demands on the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE undertook a campaign to eliminate these more ‘moderate’ groups.[37] PLOTE was not included.
After the start of the First Eelam War in 1983, EROS established close ties with RAW, the external unit of the Indian Intelligence Services. Soon thereafter, EROS members began training at Indian camps.[38]
[1] Samaranayaka, Gamini. Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971-1987. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2008.
[2] Bandarage, Asoka. The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, and Political Economy. New York: Routledge, 2009.
[3] Samaranayaka, Gamini. Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971-1987. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2008.
[4] “Is LTTE ideologue Balakumar dead or alive?” 28 July 2010. Lankan Newspapers. Web. Accessed 31 July 2013. <http://www.lankanewspapers.com/news/2010/7/58890_space.html>
[5] “Is LTTE ideologue Balakumar dead or alive?” 28 July 2010. Lankan Newspapers. Web. Accessed 31 July 2013. <http://www.lankanewspapers.com/news/2010/7/58890_space.html>
[6] “Is LTTE ideologue Balakumar dead or alive?” 28 July 2010. Lankan Newspapers. Web. Accessed 31 July 2013. <http://www.lankanewspapers.com/news/2010/7/58890_space.html>
[7] Sambandan, V.S. “EROS founder member dead.” The Hindu. 11 January, 2005. Web. Accessed 31 July 2013. <http://www.hindu.com/2005/01/11/stories/2005011101701400.htm>
[8] Sambandan, V.S. “EROS founder member dead.” The Hindu. 11 January, 2005. Web. Accessed 31 July 2013. <http://www.hindu.com/2005/01/11/stories/2005011101701400.htm>
[9] Sambandan, V.S. “EROS founder member dead.” The Hindu. 11 January, 2005. Web. Accessed 31 July 2013. <http://www.hindu.com/2005/01/11/stories/2005011101701400.htm>
[10] “A Tribute to Eliyathamby Ratnasabapathy.” Tamil Information Centre. 16 December 2006. Web. Accessed 31 July 2013. <http://tamilweek.com/news-features/archives/698>
[11] Cruez, Dexter. “Former Tamil Rebels Take Parliament Oath.” 21 July 1989. Web. Accessed 31 July 2013. <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1989/Former-Tamil-Rebels-Take-Parliament-Oa...
[12] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[13] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[14] “Growth of Sri Lankan Tamil Militancy in Tamil Nadu.” Jain Commission Interim Report. Web. Accessed 31 July 2013. <http://tamilnation.co/intframe/india/jaincommission/growth_of_tamil_mili...
[15] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[16] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[17] Samaranayaka, Gamini. Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971-1987. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2008.
[18] “A Tribute to Eliyathamby Ratnasabapathy.” Tamil Information Centre. 16 December 2006. Web. Accessed 31 July 2013. <http://tamilweek.com/news-features/archives/698>
[19] Samaranayaka, Gamini. Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971-1987. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2008.
[20] Samaranayaka, Gamini. Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971-1987. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2008.
[21] Samaranayaka, Gamini. Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971-1987. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2008.
[22] Samaranayaka, Gamini. Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971-1987. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2008.
[23] Samaranayaka, Gamini. Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971-1987. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2008.
[24] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[25] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[26] Samaranayaka, Gamini. Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971-1987. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2008.
[27] Samaranayaka, Gamini. Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971-1987. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2008.
[28] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[29] Bandarage, Asoka. The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, and Political Economy. New York: Routledge, 2009.
[30] “Growth of Sri Lankan Tamil Militancy in Tamil Nadu.” Jain Commission Interim Report. Web. Accessed 31 July 2013. <http://tamilnation.co/intframe/india/jaincommission/growth_of_tamil_mili...
[31] “Growth of Sri Lankan Tamil Militancy in Tamil Nadu.” Jain Commission Interim Report. Web. Accessed 31 July 2013. <http://tamilnation.co/intframe/india/jaincommission/growth_of_tamil_mili....
[32] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[33] “Growth of Sri Lankan Tamil Militancy in Tamil Nadu.” Jain Commission Interim Report. Web. Accessed 31 July 2013. <http://tamilnation.co/intframe/india/jaincommission/growth_of_tamil_mili...
[34] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[35] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[36] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[37] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[38] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.