Al Ittihad Al Islamiya

Formed1984
DisbandedJanuary 4, 1997
First AttackJanuary 1992: AIAI members killed a female UNICEF doctor in the Somali city of Bosasso as she was drinking tea at an outdoor café. (1 killed, 0 wounded) [1]
Last AttackDecember 24, 1996: AIAI clashed with Ethiopian forces in the border region between Somalia and Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Defense Ministry accused AIAI of attacking across Somalia’s border into Ethiopia, while AIAI accused Ethiopia of occupying a Somali town. (unknown killed, unknown wounded) [2]
UpdatedJune 18, 2016

Narrative Summary

Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) formed in 1984 from the merger of two Salafi organizations, Al Jama’a Al Islamiya and Wahdat Al Shabaab Al Islam. However, AIAI did not formally announce its formation until years later. AIAI’s constituent groups, which had been active since the 1960s, were religious organizations founded by Islamic leaders whose aim was to combat Western influence and support the creation of an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa. Upon AIAI’s formation, Sheikh Ali Warsame—the leader of Wahdat Al Shabaab Al Islam—assumed control of the new group. AIAI formed with the goal of establishing an Islamic state, originally through peaceful means, but in the late 1980s, the group began to focus on armed resistance against Somalia’s dictator, Siad Barre. At some point, a Somali named Hassan Dahir Aweys assumed leadership of AIAI’s militant wing. During AIAI’s early years, before the group formally announced its formation, Al Jama’a Al Islamiya and Wahdat Al Shabaab Al Islam initially operated somewhat independently. [3] [4] [5] 

AIAI’s nationalist appeals and opposition to Barre drew wide support from Somalis. After Barre’s overthrow in the face of widespread opposition in 1991, AIAI officially announced its formation and explicitly stated its primary goal as the establishment of an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa. AIAI shifted focus to Ethiopia as its main enemy, beginning attacks across Somalia’s border into Ethiopia. Sometime in the early 1990s, AIAI allied with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), a separatist group comprised of ethnic Somalis living in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region; the two organizations frequently collaborated in attacking Ethiopian targets, especially Ethiopian soldiers, with the goal of controlling the Ogaden region. AIAI successfully completed attacks throughout Ethiopia, including in the capital of Addis Ababa. Although the group was unable to conduct large-scale strikes against Ethiopian targets, its attacks provoked the Ethiopian government. On August 9, 1996, after AIAI relocated its headquarters to a region of Somalia bordering Ethiopia, Ethiopian forces began an extensive military campaign against the group. The Ethiopian army entered Somalia, attacked AIAI’s strongholds, and ultimately destroyed the organization. [6] [7] [8] [9]

On January 4, 1997, Aweys announced that AIAI would transition to a political party, signaling the organization’s effective end as a militant group. However, there is no information on AIAI as a political party after Aweys’ announcement. AIAI has sometimes been blamed for attacks after 1997, but these attacks were generally conducted by former AIAI members rather than a centralized organization. AIAI as a cohesive militant group did not exist after 1997, although it may have continued for some time as a loose political front with vestigial militant factions. AIAI members often continued their militant activity through other groups, which were sometimes referred to as AIAI because of the high concentration of former members. In particular, many AIAI militants joined the predecessor of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that emerged in the late 1990s. Aweys, for example, became a leader of the ICU and its armed wing, which would become the militant group Al Shabaab. These groups shared AIAI’s goal of establishing an Islamic state. [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] 

Leadership


  1. Al Afghani (Unknown to Unknown): Also known as Ibrahim Hajj Jama and Abubakar al-Seyli'I, Afghani was described as a military commander of AIAI. Previously, Afghani had fought in Afghanistan, thus gaining his name. He reportedly had strong links to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. [17]
  2. Al Afghani (Unknown to Unknown): Also known as Ibrahim Hajj Jama and Abubakar al-Seyli'I, Afghani was described as a military commander of AIAI. Previously, Afghani had fought in Afghanistan, thus gaining his name. He reportedly had strong links to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. [18]
  3. Hassan Dahir Aweys (Unknown to 1997): Aweys served as AIAI’s top military commander. He was allegedly recruited into AIAI by Warsame in the late 1980s or early 1990s, around the time of Barre’s overthrow. In 1997, Aweys announced that AIAI would cease to function as a militant organization and instead become a political party. After the effective collapse of AIAI as a militant group, Aweys assumed a leading role in the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and its armed wing, which would become the militant group Al Shabaab. Aweys later held leadership positions in other militant organizations, including the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS) and Hizbul Islam. [19]
  4. Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki (Unknown to 1997): Turki reportedly led a faction within AIAI. He had close links to Al Qaeda, which he allegedly assisted in its attack on the U.S. embassy in Nairobi in 1998. Like Aweys, Turki also served as a prominent leader in the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) after AIAI’s collapse. Sometime after the ICU disbanded in the mid-2000s, Turki founded a Somali militant group called the Ras Kamboni Brigade. He died of illness in May 2015. [20]
  5. Sheikh Ali Warsame (1984 to 1997): Warsame was a founding member of AIAI and served as the group’s top leader. Warsame had previously led Wahdat Al Shabaab Al Islam, one of the two Salafi organizations that merged to form AIAI. As AIAI’s leader, Warsame was the group’s major ideological influence and reportedly demonstrated reluctance for militant activity even while leading AIAI. Despite this reluctance, he may have recruited Hassan Dahir Aweys, who would become AIAI’s military commander. [21]

Ideology & Goals

From its beginnings, AIAI espoused a Salafi ideology and pursued as its main goal the creation of an Islamic state in East Africa. The group advocated the institution of Shariah law as a solution to all of Somalia’s problems, and the group also condemned traditional Sufi practices. In the late 1980s, AIAI began to focus on forcibly overthrowing Somalia’s dictator, Siad Barre, who was overthrown in 1991 by through the efforts of several opposition groups. [22] [23] Several months after Barre’s overthrow, AIAI released a document called “The Manifesto of an Islamic Party,” in which it explicitly indicated an Islamic state as its primary goal and condemned the formation of political alliances with non-Islamist organizations. AIAI shifted focus to Ethiopia as its main enemy, launching attacks in support of a separatist movement in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, where many ethnic Somalis resided. AIAI collaborated with an Ogaden separatist group in attacking Ethiopian targets with the goal of controlling the Ogaden region. [24] [25] 


Name Changes

There are no recorded name changes for AIAI.

Size Estimates

There are no available size estimates for the time that AIAI was an active militant group. The U.S. State Department and other organizations have estimated AIAI membership at around 2,000, but those estimates occurred after 1997 and likely reflected AIAI’s vestiges rather than AIAI as a centralized group. [26] [27]

Designated/Listed

The United States, United Kingdom, and United Nations designated AIAI as a terrorist organization after 1997.

Resources

AIAI received funds, training, and logistical support from Al Qaeda, with Osama bin Laden himself allegedly contributing up to $3 million. The government of Sudan also supported AIAI through funds, training, and weapons. Additionally, AIAI received donations from diaspora communities in Europe, North America, and the Arabian Peninsula; private financiers in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Middle East; and organizations such as the Muslim World League, the International Islamic Relief Organization, and Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation. These contributions from overseas sources comprised the largest portion of AIAI’s financing. [28] [29] [30] [31]

AIAI also financed itself through criminal and business activities, which included imposing taxes on the Somali port of Bosasso and demanding protection fees in some regions of the country. AIAI provided security escorts for the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in return for large payments. [32] [33] [34] 

External Influences

AIAI’s only reported external influence was the Sudanese government, from which the group received funding, training, and weapons. Sudan may have also allowed AIAI members to maintain safe houses and training facilities in Khartoum and surrounding areas. Specific details about the duration and extent of the relationship between AIAI and Sudan are not known. [35]

Geographical Locations

AIAI mainly operated within Somalia. After the fall of the Barre regime in 1991, AIAI took control of the country’s northeast region, including the port city of Bosasso. AIAI established several strategic facilities at Bosasso as well as a large base near Qaw, to Bosasso’s west. In the mid 1990s, conflict with other militants forced AIAI to move its operational base to Gedo, a region close to the Ethiopian border.

AIAI’s major activities beyond Somalia occurred in Ethiopia, although the group may have also conducted attacks in Kenya and Djibouti. AIAI launched attacks throughout Ethiopia, including in the country’s capital city. The group was especially active in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, where it supported a separatist movement of ethnic Somalis. [36] [37]

Targets & Tactics

During AIAI’s early years, the group’s leaders did not agree on armed jihad as the primary activity for AIAI. Warsame, for example, demonstrated reluctance for militant activity and favored advocating the creation of an Islamic state through other means. However, AIAI soon turned to armed struggle against the Barre government, which was deposed in 1991. Using firearms and explosives, AIAI also conducted attacks on international aid organizations as well as other militants in Somalia. [38] [39] [40]

After the fall of Barre’s regime, AIAI turned its focus to Ethiopia, supporting a separatist movement of ethnic Somalis living in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region. AIAI collaborated with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) to conduct attacks on Ethiopian targets, especially soldiers. Although it focused its militant activity on the Ogaden region, AIAI also launched attacks throughout Ethiopia, including several bombings of public places in Addis Ababa in the late 1990s. [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] 

In areas of Somalia under its control, AIAI imposed its harsh interpretation of Shariah law. It also established Islamic social programs, including orphanages and schools. [46] [47] 

Political Activities

On September 22, 1991, AIAI formally declared its existence and stated its goals by releasing a document called “The Manifesto of an Islamic Party.” However, AIAI operated as a militant organization rather than a political party from its founding to 1997, and it never engaged in negotiations with Somalia’s government. On January 4, 1997, AIAI military commander Hassan Dahir Aweys announced that the group would begin to operate as a political party, thus ending its centrally directed militant activity. However, there is no information on AIAI as a political party after Aweys’ announcement. [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] 

Major Attacks

  1. January 1992: AIAI members killed a female UNICEF doctor in the Somali city of Bosasso as she was drinking tea at an outdoor café. (1 killed, 0 wounded).[55]
  2. July 1992: AIAI members targeted the offices of an international relief organization in the city of Marka with a rocket-propelled grenade. (0 killed, 0 wounded).[56]
  3. 1993: AIAI and Al Qaeda allegedly cooperated in an attack on U.S. soldiers in Somalia. (18 killed, unknown wounded).[57]
  4. May 1995: AIAI conducted a grenade attack on a market in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia. (15 killed, unknown wounded).[58]
  5. May 1995: AIAI conducted a grenade attack on a market in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia. (15 killed, unknown wounded).[59]
  6. January 1996: AIAI claimed responsibility for a hotel bombing in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. (6 killed, 20 wounded).[60]
  7. February 1996: AIAI claimed responsibility for the assassination of General Hayelom Araya, head of Operations in the Ethiopian Ministry of Defence, although the Ethiopian government accused Eritrean agents of perpetrating the attack. (1 killed, 0 wounded).[61]
  8. February 1996: February 1996: AIAI claimed responsibility for a hotel bombing in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia. (1 killed, 3 wounded).[62]
  9. February 1996: AIAI claimed responsibility for a hotel bombing in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia. (1 killed, 3 wounded).[63]
  10. July 1996: AIAI attempted to assassinate Ethiopia's Minister of Transport, Abdul-Mejid Hussein. (0 killed, 1 wounded).[64]
  11. August 5, 1996: The Wabe Shebelle Hotel in Addis Ababa suffered a bombing attack. The Ethiopian government accused AIAI of perpetrating the bombing. (2 killed, 11 injured).[65]
  12. August 11, 1996: Suspected members of AIAI shot and killed two Ethiopian businessmen in the Somali city of Beledweyne, reportedly in retaliation for Ethiopia’s military actions in Somalia earlier that month. (2 killed, 0 wounded).[66]
  13. December 24, 1996: AIAI clashed with Ethiopian forces in the border region between Somalia and Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Defense Ministry accused AIAI of attacking across Somalia’s border into Ethiopia, while AIAI accused Ethiopia of occupying a Somali town. (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[67]

Relationships with Other Groups

AIAI allegedly maintained ties to Al Qaeda. Senior AIAI leaders, including Hassan Dahir Aweys and Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, were closely linked to Al Qaeda members. AIAI received funds, training, and logistical support from Al Qaeda, with Osama bin Laden himself allegedly contributing up to $3 million. Bin Laden reportedly dispatched Al Qaeda members to Somalia in the early 1990s to assist AIAI in organizing its fighters and establishing local social services. Additionally, members of AIAI and Al Qaeda cooperated on at least one attack, and AIAI fighters may have assisted Al Qaeda in bombing U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998. [68] [69] 

After the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991, AIAI allied with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in its fight to control Ethiopia’s Ogaden region. The alliance began in the early 1990s when ONLF members fleeing Ethiopia received protection from AIAI in Somalia. The two groups cooperated in launching attacks on Ethiopian targets, especially soldiers, with AIAI providing funding for those attacks. The ONLF and AIAI maintained a close relationship until AIAI’s collapse in 1997.

After its collapse in 1997, many of its former members joined and led new militant jihadi organizations. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU), for example, was heavily influenced by AIAI members when it emerged in the early 2000s, and Hassan Dahir Aweys served as a prominent leader of the group. Because several Somali militant groups contained a high concentration of former AIAI members, those groups were sometimes called AIAI, even though AIAI did not exist as a cohesive militant organization after 1997. [70] [71] [72] [73] [74] [75] [76]

Community Relationships

Between 1984 and 1991, AIAI membership grew substantially among Somalia’s disadvantaged populations. AIAI disseminated its ideology through its members, who worked in the civil service as well as military and academic institutions. AIAI also supported the foundation of small businesses, which were established based on AIAI’s Wahhabi ideology. Although it was a generally nonviolent organization in its early stages, AIAI members clashed several times with Sufis in the mid-1980s because of the group’s opposition to Sufi practices. These clashes, which occurred in Mogadishu, sometimes involved fatalities. [77] [78]

After the collapse of the Barre government in 1991, AIAI gained control of some areas of Somalia and functioned as a government. In the territory under its control, AIAI strictly enforced Shariah law and provided security. The group also established Islamic social programs, including orphanages and schools, as well as various banks, shopping centers, aid organizations, and other businesses. AIAI established Islamic courts and provided employment to many Somalis. Additionally, the group provided security escorts for the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in return for large payments. [79] [80] [81]

Despite AIAI’s initial popularity, some Somali citizens disagreed with the group’s policies. In the Gedo region on Somalia’s border with Ethiopia, for example, residents resented AIAI’s strict enforcement of Shariah law, prohibition of the carrying of weapons by citizens, and the banning of ghat, a popular semi-narcotic herb in Somalia. [82]


References

  1. ^ Bryden, Matt. “No Quick Fixes: Coming to Terms with Terrorism, Islam, and Statelessness in Somalia.” The Journal of Conflict Studies 23, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 24-56. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  2. ^ “Issue Paper SOMALIA CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS APRIL 1995 - JANUARY 1997.” Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, February 1997. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  3. ^ Page, Jacqueline. “Jihadi Arena Report: Somalia - Development of Radical Islamism and Current Implications.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 22 Mar. 2010. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.
  4. ^ West, Sunguta. “Somalia's ICU and its Roots in al-Ittihad al-Islami.” Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 15 (August 4, 2006). Web. 28 Mar. 2016.
  5. ^ Loewenstein, Lara. “Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya and Political Islam in Somalia.” The SAIS Europe Journal, 1 Apr. 2010. Web. 28 Mar. 2016.
  6. ^ “US Department of the Army: Analysis of Somalia, December 1993.” U.S. Department of the Army, 17 Dec. 1993. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  7. ^ Page, Jacqueline. “Jihadi Arena Report: Somalia - Development of Radical Islamism and Current Implications.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 22 Mar. 2010. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.
  8. ^ West, Sunguta. “Somalia’s ICU and its Roots in al-Ittihad al-Islami.” Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 15 (August 4, 2006). Web. 28 Mar. 2016.
  9. ^ Loewenstein, Lara. “Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya and Political Islam in Somalia.” The SAIS Europe Journal, 1 Apr. 2010. Web. 28 Mar. 2016.
  10. ^ “US Department of the Army: Analysis of Somalia, December 1993.” U.S. Department of the Army, 17 Dec. 1993. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  11. ^ Page, Jacqueline. “Jihadi Arena Report: Somalia - Development of Radical Islamism and Current Implications.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 22 Mar. 2010. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.
  12. ^ West, Sunguta. “Somalia’s ICU and its Roots in al-Ittihad al-Islami.” Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 15 (August 4, 2006). Web. 28 Mar. 2016.
  13. ^ “Issue Paper SOMALIA CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS APRIL 1995 - JANUARY 1997.” Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, February 1997. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  14. ^ Associated Press. “Explosion in Ethiopian Hotel Kills 1.” The Intelligencer, 12 Sept. 2002. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  15. ^ Yan, Holly. “What is Al-Shabaab, and what does it want?”. CNN, 2 Apr. 2015. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  16. ^ Chazan, David. “Who are al-Ittihad?”. BBC News, 30 Nov. 2002. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  17. ^ {{Roggio, Bill, and Thomas Jocelyn. “Senior Shabaab commander rumored to have been killed in recent Predator strike.” The Long War Journal, 9 July 2011. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.}}
  18. ^ {{Roggio, Bill, and Thomas Jocelyn. “Senior Shabaab commander rumored to have been killed in recent Predator strike.” The Long War Journal, 9 July 2011. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.}}
  19. ^ {{Page, Jacqueline. “Jihadi Arena Report: Somalia - Development of Radical Islamism and Current Implications.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 22 Mar. 2010. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.}} {{West, Sunguta. “Somalia's ICU and its Roots in al-Ittihad al
  20. ^ {{Ereli, Adam. “Designation of Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki under Executive Order 13224.” Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., 3 June 2004. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.}} {{“Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI).” Mackenzie Institute, 20 Nov. 2015. W
  21. ^ {{Page, Jacqueline. “Jihadi Arena Report: Somalia - Development of Radical Islamism and Current Implications.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 22 Mar. 2010. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.}} {{West, Sunguta. “Somalia's ICU and its Roots in al-Ittihad al
  22. ^ Page, Jacqueline. “Jihadi Arena Report: Somalia - Development of Radical Islamism and Current Implications.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 22 Mar. 2010. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.
  23. ^ Loewenstein, Lara. “Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya and Political Islam in Somalia.” The SAIS Europe Journal, 1 Apr. 2010. Web. 28 Mar. 2016.
  24. ^ “Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI).” Mackenzie Institute, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  25. ^ Loewenstein, Lara. “Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya and Political Islam in Somalia.” The SAIS Europe Journal, 1 Apr. 2010. Web. 28 Mar. 2016.
  26. ^ “Appendix C: Background Information on Other Terrorist Groups.” U.S. State Department, 30 Apr. 2003. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  27. ^ "al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI)." National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2010. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  28. ^ “Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI).” Mackenzie Institute, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  29. ^ Page, Jacqueline. “Jihadi Arena Report: Somalia - Development of Radical Islamism and Current Implications.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 22 Mar. 2010. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.
  30. ^ “SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE PURSUANT TO RESOLUTIONS 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) AND 2253 (2015) CONCERNING ISIL (DA'ESH) AL-QAIDA AND ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS GROUPS UNDERTAKINGS AND ENTITIES.” United Nations Security Council. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  31. ^ "Chapter 8; Other Groups of Concern." Country Reports on Terrorism 2005. US Department of State, 30 Apr. 2006. Qtd. in “Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI).” The Investigative Project on Terrorism. Web. 17 June 2016.
  32. ^ “Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI).” Mackenzie Institute, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  33. ^ “V. Sudanese Government Military Support for Armed Opposition Forces.” Human Rights Watch. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  34. ^ Sii’arag, A. Duale. “The Birth and Rise of Al-Ittihad Al-Islami in the Somali Inhabited Regions in the Horn of Africa.” Maanhadal. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  35. ^ “Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI).” Mackenzie Institute, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  36. ^ “Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI).” Mackenzie Institute, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  37. ^ Terdman, Moshe. "Somalia at War-Between Radical Islam and Tribal Politics," The S. Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies, March 2008. Web. Accessed 9 July 2013.
  38. ^ Loewenstein, Lara. "Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya and Political Islam in Somalia," Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs. Web. 9 July 2013.
  39. ^ “Appendix C: Background Information on Other Terrorist Groups.” U.S. State Department, 30 Apr. 2003. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  40. ^ “Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI).” Mackenzie Institute, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  41. ^ “US Department of the Army: Analysis of Somalia, December 1993.” U.S. Department of the Army, 17 Dec. 1993. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  42. ^ Page, Jacqueline. “Jihadi Arena Report: Somalia - Development of Radical Islamism and Current Implications.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 22 Mar. 2010. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.
  43. ^ West, Sunguta. “Somalia’s ICU and its Roots in al-Ittihad al-Islami.” Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 15 (August 4, 2006). Web. 28 Mar. 2016.
  44. ^ Loewenstein, Lara. “Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya and Political Islam in Somalia.” The SAIS Europe Journal, 1 Apr. 2010. Web. 28 Mar. 2016.
  45. ^ “Appendix C: Background Information on Other Terrorist Groups.” U.S. State Department, 30 Apr. 2003. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  46. ^ “Appendix C: Background Information on Other Terrorist Groups.” U.S. State Department, 30 Apr. 2003. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  47. ^ Ploch, Lauren. “Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response.” Congressional Research Service, 3 Nov. 2010. Web. 30 Mar. 2016.
  48. ^ Page, Jacqueline. “Jihadi Arena Report: Somalia - Development of Radical Islamism and Current Implications.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 22 Mar. 2010. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.
  49. ^ West, Sunguta. “Somalia’s ICU and its Roots in al-Ittihad al-Islami.” Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 15 (August 4, 2006). Web. 28 Mar. 2016.
  50. ^ “Issue Paper SOMALIA CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS APRIL 1995 - JANUARY 1997.” Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, February 1997. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  51. ^ Associated Press. “Explosion in Ethiopian Hotel Kills 1.” The Intelligencer, 12 Sept. 2002. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  52. ^ Yan, Holly. “What is Al-Shabaab, and what does it want?”. CNN, 2 Apr. 2015. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  53. ^ Chazan, David. “Who are al-Ittihad?”. BBC News, 30 Nov. 2002. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  54. ^ Loewenstein, Lara. “Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya and Political Islam in Somalia.” The SAIS Europe Journal, 1 Apr. 2010. Web. 28 Mar. 2016.
  55. ^ Bryden, Matt. “No Quick Fixes: Coming to Terms with Terrorism, Islam, and Statelessness in Somalia.” The Journal of Conflict Studies 23, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 24-56.
  56. ^ Bryden, Matt. “No Quick Fixes: Coming to Terms with Terrorism, Islam, and Statelessness in Somalia.” The Journal of Conflict Studies 23, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 24-56.
  57. ^ “Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI).” Mackenzie Institute, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  58. ^ Bryden, Matt. “No Quick Fixes: Coming to Terms with Terrorism, Islam, and Statelessness in Somalia.” The Journal of Conflict Studies 23, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 24-56.
  59. ^ Bryden, Matt. “No Quick Fixes: Coming to Terms with Terrorism, Islam, and Statelessness in Somalia.” The Journal of Conflict Studies 23, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 24-56.
  60. ^ “Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI).” Mackenzie Institute, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 29 Mar. 2016. Rabasa, Angel, et al. Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006.
  61. ^ Bryden, Matt. “No Quick Fixes: Coming to Terms with Terrorism, Islam, and Statelessness in Somalia.” The Journal of Conflict Studies 23, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 24-56.
  62. ^ “Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI).” Mackenzie Institute, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 29 Mar. 2016. Rabasa, Angel, et al. Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006.
  63. ^ “Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI).” Mackenzie Institute, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 29 Mar. 2016. Rabasa, Angel, et al. Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006.
  64. ^ Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Peter Chalk. “Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI).” Mackenzie Institute, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  65. ^ Bryden, Matt. “No Quick Fixes: Coming to Terms with Terrorism, Islam, and Statelessness in Somalia.” The Journal of Conflict Studies 23, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 24-56.
  66. ^ Bryden, Matt. “No Quick Fixes: Coming to Terms with Terrorism, Islam, and Statelessness in Somalia.” The Journal of Conflict Studies 23, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 24-56.
  67. ^ “Issue Paper SOMALIA CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS APRIL 1995 - JANUARY 1997.” Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, February 1997. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  68. ^ “Terrorism in the Horn of Africa.” Special Report 113, United States Institute of Peace, January 2004. 30 Mar. 2016.
  69. ^ Marquardt, Erich. “Al-Qaeda’s Threat to Ethiopia.” Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 3 (May 5, 2005). Web. 30 Mar. 2016.
  70. ^ “US Department of the Army: Analysis of Somalia, December 1993.” U.S. Department of the Army, 17 Dec. 1993. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  71. ^ Page, Jacqueline. “Jihadi Arena Report: Somalia - Development of Radical Islamism and Current Implications.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 22 Mar. 2010. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.
  72. ^ West, Sunguta. “Somalia’s ICU and its Roots in al-Ittihad al-Islami.” Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 15 (August 4, 2006). Web. 28 Mar. 2016.
  73. ^ “Issue Paper SOMALIA CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS APRIL 1995 - JANUARY 1997.” Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, February 1997. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  74. ^ Associated Press. “Explosion in Ethiopian Hotel Kills 1.” The Intelligencer, 12 Sept. 2002. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  75. ^ Yan, Holly. “What is Al-Shabaab, and what does it want?”. CNN, 2 Apr. 2015. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  76. ^ Chazan, David. “Who are al-Ittihad?”. BBC News, 30 Nov. 2002. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  77. ^ Sii’arag, A. Duale. “The Birth and Rise of Al-Ittihad Al-Islami in the Somali Inhabited Regions in the Horn of Africa.” Maanhadal. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  78. ^ Loewenstein, Lara. “Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya and Political Islam in Somalia.” The SAIS Europe Journal, 1 Apr. 2010. Web. 28 Mar. 2016.
  79. ^ “Appendix C: Background Information on Other Terrorist Groups.” U.S. State Department, 30 Apr. 2003. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  80. ^ Ploch, Lauren. “Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response.” Congressional Research Service, 3 Nov. 2010. Web. 30 Mar. 2016.
  81. ^ Sii’arag, A. Duale. “The Birth and Rise of Al-Ittihad Al-Islami in the Somali Inhabited Regions in the Horn of Africa.” Maanhadal. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.
  82. ^ Terdman, Moshe. "Somalia at War-Between Radical Islam and Tribal Politics," The S. Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies, March 2008. Web. Accessed 10 July 2013.

Print this page

Map Al Ittihad Al Islamiya

Click on the maps below to visualize this group's interactions with other militant organizations

On Somalia map

CakePHP

Contents

Search