
Navigation Programs Update

Presented by: Deborah Lawrence

Presented to: Stanford PNT Symposium

Date: October 2014



Topics

- GPS Intentional Interference and Spoofing Threats & Recommendations
- Alternate Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (APNT) Update
- Complementary Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Tiger Team (CPNT3)
- Instrument Landing System (ILS) Drawdown Decision
- VHF Omni-directional Range (VOR) Minimum Operational Network (MON)
- Questions



GPS Intentional Interference and Spoofing - Threats & Recommendations Update

Background

- FAA is dependent on GPS for navigation, surveillance, and network/infrastructure timing
- Majority of NextGen benefits currently rely on GPS, and this reliance will increase in the future
- GPS is a very weak signal and therefore vulnerable to unintentional or intentional interference
 - The GPS signal is almost a billion times weaker than other navigation signals (DMEs, VORs, ILS, etc)
- Inexpensive jamming and spoofing equipment, as well as tactics are widely available on the internet

Operational Mitigations

Loss of GPS

- ATC vectors
- Reversion to backup navigation (if available)
- Procedural separation if ADS-B is lost in non-radar coverage

Undetected spoofing

 ATC should detect erroneous position in radar airspace (pilot may not sense change in trajectory)

Infrastructure use of GPS and impacts not well known

 NSPD-39, PPD-21, and E.O. 13636 require back-up capability and resiliency against GPS disruption and cyber attack

Recommendations in the short term, within FY14 (1 of 2)

- Require future aircraft equipment to cease GNSS use when intolerable interference or spoofing is detected
 - Develop a plan to address spoofing detection provisions within relevant domestic and international standards
 - Focus on low-cost techniques
- Engage Department of State in its update of ITAR to explore an adaptive GPS antenna exemption for civil aircraft
- Accelerate the Alternative PNT (APNT) program as a mitigation for GNSS intentional interference and spoofing to
 - Enable continuity and capacity
 - Enable cross-checks between GNSS PNT and APNT
- Update pilot and controller training materials to address interference and spoofing

Recommendations in the short term, within FY14 (2 of 2)

- Determine whether enhancements to the ADS-B network are required to:
 - mitigate intentional interference and spoofing
 - enable the identification and annunciation of geographical areas impacted by jamming or spoofing in real time
- Update interagency GPS interference procedures to include spoofing
- Review SC-216 products to ensure adequate information security guidance is available for installed aircraft GNSS equipment
- Provide guidance on use of GNSS for air traffic control system timing
 - A non-GNSS alternative or backup timing source should be provided for critical systems
 - This guidance might include a standard for time receiver autonomous integrity monitoring for GNSS-dependent timing systems in the NAS
- Promote legal prohibition on owning GNSS jammers




Recommendations in the Long Term

- Provide guidance to aircraft manufacturers and navigation equipment integrators stressing the importance of cross-checks of GPS sensor data against other position sources, and on the optional use of higher cost spoofing mitigation solutions
- Continue to develop standards for aviation use of the third civil GPS frequency (L5) and additional GNSS signals
- Implement digital signatures within the satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS) messages on L5
 - Encourage the inclusion of digital signatures within the GPS L5 navigation data

APNT Update

Why Alternate PNT?

- Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience
 - Advances a national unity of effort to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and <u>resilient</u> critical infrastructure
- FAA needs to maintain aviation operations in the event of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) interference event or outage
 - Maintain safety and security
 - Maintain a reasonable level of capacity and efficiency
 - Minimize economic impact



APNT Alternative: TIS-B

Alternative	Descr	ription	Strengths	Weakne	esses	Risk
Services provided: Position Navigation Time	position re SSR of r reporting (with in pr • Provides a service us communic uplink on and 978M • Aircraft ar to navigat	aircraft with eports from non-ADS-B aircraft oximity) an advisory sing a cations 1090MHz lHz e intended e using its position as and d by the stem.	 Existing ground infrastructure Existing signal Aligns with ADS-B IN Plan 	 Safety assurnavigation revalidation May require interference Navigation a Surveillance on 1090MHz Common mo May have lincoverage at altitudes in reareas Concerns or rate and varial latency 	equires TIS-B monitor and both rely Z - ode failure nited radar low emote update • N	New interface with Navigation/FMS software) Set / Schedule— Medium Program may retire TIS- 3 (under discussion) Safety assurance process Converting an advisory service into a safety critical service Aircraft: FMS integration
	Existing Aircraft Equipage					
Performance Summary	RNAV 1	0.05 nm	Air Carrier	Regionals & Business	GA	MOPS Changes
	~Yes	~No	No, ~2%	No, ~2%	No, ~2%	Yes

APNT Alternative: NextGen DME

Alternative	Descrip	tion	Strengths	Weakness	ses	Risk/CNS Benefits	
Services provided: □Position ☑Navigation □Time	Current DM criteria base AC90-100A All en route Class B terrarea covera supported, IRU require Elimination critical DME	ed on and minal age without ements of all	 MOPS/TSO already exist (RTCA/SC-227) Current air carriers and regionals are currently equipped Leverages existing airborne and ground infrastructure Proof of concept not required Updated MITRE DME analysis may determine if a reduction in DME's is feasible 	DME location require optimization GA is not eq Provides navigation on backup Updated MIT DME analys determine if additional DI are needed	ns <u>C</u> uipped nly CRE is may	Ground system – Low CNS Bundle Pros No MOPS required No cost to user CNS Bundle Cons Does not support CNS bundle business case	
	ADS-B		Existing Aircraft Equipage				
Performance Summary	RNAV 1	0.05 nm	Air Carrier	Regionals & Business	GA	MOPS Changes	
	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	

APNT Alternative: Hybrid Ranging

Alternative	Descript	ion	Stre	ngths	Weak	nesses	Risk	
Services provided: Navigation Time	 Use a combin DME and AE ground static provide GPS independent aircraft Modify DME a pseudo rar signal Modify ADS-to enable 10 UAT pseudo Pseudo-rang signal includ precise time transmission 	DS-B ons to PNT to s to add nging B GS-s 90 Mhz/ ranging ging es of	performa the altern Signal an diversity Provides support for PBN a in the eve interferer The Hybr alternativ the curre CONOPS Resistant	atives a system to positioning and ADS-B ent of nce rid e supports nt APNT	MOPS ICD • No us	res new S/TSO/ er age base	 Technical - Medium Spectrum 1090 Mhz GS Synchronization (ADS-B and DME) Cost - Med/High Ground Station Synchronization ADS-B Contract Mod Avionics and aircraft modifications Schedule - High Develop APNT MOPS Aircraft FMS Integration 	
	ADS-B					isting Aircraft Equipage		
Performance Summary	RNAV 1	0.05	Air	Regiona		GA	MOPS Changes	
	Yes	nm Yes	Carrier No	Busine No	255	No	Changes Yes	

CPNT3 Update

Complementary PNT Tiger Team (CPNT3)

- On October 10, 2014 the Space-Based Positioning, Navigation & Timing National Executive Steering Group initiated the CPNT Tiger Team
- The Tiger Team will:
 - Re-explore eLORAN as a back-up GPS technology
 - Evaluate other technologies as a back-up to GPS
 - Investigate the ability to provide P, N & T separately
- The Tiger Team will out brief their findings to the PNT Executive Committee on December 15, 2014

ILS Drawdown Decision

Preliminary Drawdown Assumptions

- The drawdown decision is scheduled for the 2nd Quarter FY2016
- Instrument Landing System (ILS), standalone Localizer (LOC),
 Simplified Direction Finder (SDF), and Localizer Direction Aide (LDA) facilities installed in the CONUS are considered for removal
- Retain all 180 CAT II/III ILSs installed at 92 airports to support International agreements
- Retain 129 CAT I ILSs and 12 LOC-only systems at 141 VOR MON recovery airports
- ILS will be retained at runways with Precision Runway Monitoring (PRM) radar & Converging ILS operations
- At least one ILSs will be retained at the busiest airports where air carriers have not yet equipped with WAAS

Preliminary Drawdown Numbers

- There are 1126 CAT I ILS's in the NAS and 129 are required for VOR MON recovery
 - This leave approximately 997 for consideration
- 50% of the ILSs (≈ 498) may need to be retained at the busiest Metroplex airports where air carriers have not yet equipped with WAAS
- There are 208 LOC, LDA/SDF procedures in the NAS
- 75% of the LOC, LDA/SDF (≈ 208) are removal candidates
- In total, there are 706 ILS, LOC, LDA/SDF facilities which can be removal candidates

ILS			WAAS	
	Total in NAS	Candidates		
Category-II/III	180			
Category-I	1126	498	LPV	3402
LOC, LDA/SDF	290	208	LP	538
Total	1596	706	Total	3943

ILS Drawdown Savings


- WAAS LPV/LP procedures require 1/3rd the cost of ILS to establish and 1/7th the cost to maintain on a per unit basis
- Removal of 706 ILS, LOC, LDA/SDF facilities could reduce recurring maintenance costs by approximately \$50M
- ILS removal payback is approximately 4.2 years
- WAAS also enables removal of VOR, NDB, and ADF procedures to accrue additional savings
- A more detailed analysis needs to be performed to refine the ROM estimates

VOR MON Update

VOR MON Program Goals

- The FAA will transition to Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) from the conventional VOR-defined routes and procedures
- PBN provides an opportunity to reduce the aging infrastructure
 - The FAA currently has ~967 federally-owned and operated VORs (including VORTACs and VOR/DMEs)
 - Most are 30+ years old
- The VOR MON Program will implement the MON by targeting the discontinuance of approximately 50% of the VORs in the NAS
 - VOR MON will provide backup coverage during a GPS outage as well as basic navigation capability
 - Support Right Sizing Initiatives

VOR MON Strategy and Notional Timeline



** The number of VORs comprising the MON may increase or decrease depending on the requirements for DoD / TOC



VOR MON RTCA Tasking

- In July 2013, the FAA tasked the TOC to establish a VOR MON Task Group
- Task 1 (Review and Validate Selection Criteria)
 - Completed November 2013
 - Recommended service volume expansion below 5,000' AGL
 - Recommended VOR retention around areas of known GPS testing
- Task 2 (Review and Validate draft MON list)
 - Completed February 2014
 - Prioritized evaluation criteria for selecting VORs
- Task 3 (Recommendations to Waterfall Schedule)
 - Scheduled to start after completion of Task 4
- Task 4 (Recommendations on Outreach and Education)
 - Completed September 2014
 - Recommended to release full MON list as information early in process
 - Recommended that the VOR MON overarching theme should relate to the transition to Performance Based Navigation (PBN) and NextGen

VOR MON Challenges


- Instrument Flight Procedure (IFP) Development
- IFP Removal
- Routes
- Engineering Analysis
- Stakeholder Coordination
- Co-Located Facilities (HIWAS,RCO, ATIS, DME)
- Rulemaking

VOR MON Next Steps


- Continue detailed program planning
- Final Investment Decision ~ September 2015
- Finalize coordination with DoD/DHS in identifying necessary VORs for DoD use, expected by December 2014
- Continue stakeholder outreach

Conclusion

- GPS provides several benefits to advancing capabilities in the NAS, however, it is a weak signal and therefore vulnerable to unintentional or intentional interference
 - Short Term mitigations are being implemented
- The FAA needs to maintain aviation operations in the event of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) interference event or outage
 - Investigating back-up GPS options through the FAA APNT Program, GIISST, and CPNT Tiger Team
- The ILS drawdown decision is scheduled for the 2nd Quarter FY2016
 - Preliminary requirements are being developed
- The VOR MON Program will implement the MON by discontinuing approximately 50% of the VORs in the NAS
 - FID Planned for Sept. 2015










Overall Instrument Approach Procedure (IAP) Impact Summary

11798 IAPs identified in CONUS*



6763 IAPs are unaffected by VOR MON

 *From digital - Terminal Procedures Publication (d-TPP) Volume 1310



Affected SIDs/STARs/ODPs

2084 ODPs/SIDs/STARs identified in CONUS*

1287 may be affected by VOR MON

997 are unaffected by VOR MON

893 SIDs & ODPs

394 STARs**

- * From digital Terminal Procedures Publication (d-TPP) Volume 1405
- ** Duplicate STAR listings removed as single graphic and textual plate serves multiple airports

Category	Conventional	RNAV
Affected SIDs & ODPs	691	202
Affected STARs	239	155

© 2013 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

