Bismarck's Cabinet

1866

Chair: Sean Hiroshima
Assistant Chair: Udai Baisiwala
Crisis Director: Jeff Jordan
I. Letter from the Chair

Dear Delegates,

It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to the Stanford Model United Nations Conference! First, please allow me to introduce myself: I am a senior majoring in International Relations with specializations in International Security as well as Central Asia and the Middle East. I am currently writing an honors thesis with the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).

While I greatly enjoyed acting as the Under-Secretary-General for General Assembly Committees for last year’s SMUNC, I sincerely believe that I had a greater impact on the delegates as chair for IAEA at SMUNC 2011 and OAS at SMUNC 2012. Administrative officers are always needed for any substantial undertaking of this sort, but in the case of Model United Nations, it is the chair who makes the conference engaging and inspires the delegates. My interests in international relations were born when I attended SMUNC as a high school student; with this committee, I hope to bring to you the same intellectual excitement and political thrills that I experienced when I was a delegate.

I arrived at the concept of a committee based on Bismarck’s Prussia only through many years’ research and contemplation; this committee is designed to present an alternate history that will allow you, a group of intelligent, critical students, to decide the future of Prussia, Europe, and the international system as a whole. Through analyzing and debating the questions of German unification and European unity, this committee will allow you to explore many of the dilemmas that have plagued statesmen for centuries. I encourage you all to read the following background guide carefully, and to conduct thorough research about this period in European history. However, I also want you to think deeply about what you personally think should be the goals of your country. Would you be comfortable with your state starting a war to increase its security, wealth or international standing? Do you believe that states are bound by the same standards of morality as individual human beings? This committee has been designed to bring all of these questions to the fore and force you to take a stance on every one of these issues. Will you seek to secure international peace, or seek national glory? All possibilities are on the table! Research thoroughly, plan meticulously, think deeply, and be sure to leave no opportunity unexplored. I eagerly look forward to an extremely exciting and engaging conference!

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II. Introduction of the Committee

Otto von Bismarck dictated Prussian policy without any significant advisement from subordinate statesmen. Bismarck was able to ignore the opinions of others because he had the trust of the King and was appointed by him alone. Furthermore, Bismarck’s brilliant diplomacy allowed him to utilize this latitude to redraw the map of Europe to Prussian advantage without any significant assistance. However, this committee seeks to discover what might have happened if Bismarck appointed a cabinet and allowed it to decide the course of Prussian policy. Would a group of conservative Prussian statesmen and diplomats have made the same choices as Bismarck? This cabinet will create policy on behalf of Bismarck. Because I will assume the role of Otto von Bismarck, I will act simply as a moderator, and not as a substantive actor in the proceedings of the cabinet. However, if and only if this cabinet reaches an impasse, I will help guide the committee’s policy. This cabinet will be able to control every aspect of the state, from its military to its trade to its domestic social policies because Prussia is a Kingdom. However, for the same reason, this cabinet cannot dissatisfy its King. If the King wishes to alter a decision of the cabinet, he may do so; if the King wants the cabinet to adopt a certain policy, the committee should heed his desires. Because this committee poses a “what if” scenario, it will likely diverge from history; delegates are encouraged to pursue whatever policies they deem best as long as those policies remain within the limits of reason for a European state in 1866.

III. Rules and Procedures

This committee will be set in 1866 during the drawdown of the “German War” between Prussia and Austria. The first committee session will start at July 8, 1866 and the last committee session will end on June 1, 1875. Please see the “Historical Context” section for a brief overview of events occurring prior to this committee. However, events that occur between July 8, 1866 and June 1, 1875 in history may or may not occur in the committee; the course of events is totally dependent upon the decisions of the cabinet.

Delegate can pass any of the following documents:

1. **Resolution** (passed by a supermajority of 2/3) – a resolution is a multi-page document with a preamble and many clauses describing long-term policies of the cabinet. In this committee, resolutions should be used to instate only the following types of policies:
   a. An armistice temporarily ending armed hostilities during a war
   b. A peace agreement ending a war
   c. Coalitions (alliances with several other states)

2. **Directive** (passed by a simple majority) – a directive is a single page document with no preamble and several clauses describing a policy of the cabinet. An alliance (with only one other state) must be created using a resolution. Any other policies undertaken by the cabinet that do not require a resolution can be instated using directives.

3. **Personal Directive** – a personal directive is a single page document with no preamble and several clauses describing an action that a single delegate wishes to
undertake. Personal directives do not need to be passed by the cabinet, and do not need to be announced to the cabinet. Once a delegate writes a personal directive he/she will pass it up to the Dias, and it will be reviewed; the delegate will be informed if the action can be undertaken by private note. The delegate will always be informed of the outcome of his/her personal directive. Creating a personal directive does not ensure that the action it describes can or will be completed successfully. These should be used sparingly.

This committee will also use a system of classification. Documents must be marked clearly with the intended level of classification before they are brought up for discussion by the committee. Please note that the level of classification can be changed by amendments. Resolutions, directives, and personal directives can be classified using any of the following designations:

1. **Unclassified** – the contents of any document designated as “unclassified” will be made available for public viewing upon request from a Prussian citizen; however, an unclassified document will not be automatically announced by the Prussian government without explicit orders from the cabinet.

2. **Secret** – the contents of a document designated as “secret” will be withheld from the public for 10 years; however, a secret document can be declassified during the conference by a short directive. Such a directive should also include clauses explicitly stating whether the contents of the declassified document should be announced publicly or simply be made available for public viewing.

3. **Top Secret** – the contents of any document designated as “top secret” will be withheld from the public for 25 years, and therefore cannot be declassified during the conference.

Please note that while the Prussian government and its agents will protect classified documents by any and all means available to their disposal, spying and espionage could lead to the unintentional leaking of information – a classification level does not guarantee absolute secrecy.

**IV. Historical Context**

In 1847, Prussia was an absolute monarchy, ruled by a Hohenzollern King, with an entrenched noble class, known as the Junkers, who were distinguishable by the von in their names – by the end of 1848, liberal revolution would give Prussia a constitution and a bicameral parliament whose two chambers had equality with the King himself. However, the upper house (Herrenhaus) was composed of members appointed at the will of the King, rendering it his puppet, and dividing the parliament in his favor. The lower house (Landtag) was originally intended to be elected by universal suffrage; however, the King was able to change the voting scheme and instead established an electoral system in which the people would vote for electors, who would in turn select the members of the Landtag. In order to mitigate power of the poor, who constituted the majority and would almost certainly vote liberally, the King separated votes into three classes by amount of taxes paid (Drei-Klassen-Wahlrecht) and gave each class equal weight – thus, the wealthiest, who paid the most taxes and therefore constituted the first and second classes, would always outweigh the poorest in elections even though they were far fewer in number. However, this elaborate scheme did not keep liberals who would seek to increase the
Landtag’s power from eventually gaining seats. The conflict between this liberal Landtag and the conservative King finally reached a crossroads in 1862.

A long-standing argument over military reforms proposed by the King and his ministers became particularly heated as liberals added seats to their majority in the Landtag in the May 1862 elections. The Crown wanted to increase the size of the army and increase the length of conscription for all Prussians; on the other hand, the liberals favored militias over the Junker-run army, viewing militias as a way to distance military power from the King and give citizens a vested interest in their own defense. The liberals also wanted to decrease the length of conscription. Thus, the liberals in the Landtag were unwilling to authorize expenditures on military reforms, and the King threatened to proceed with or without a budget. Both sides refused to yield as it became clear that the resolution to this crisis would either validate the King’s supremacy over the Landtag, or increase the Landtag’s ability to dictate to the King. On the verge of abdicating the throne to his son in frustration, the King called Otto von Bismarck, a vehemently conservative Junker, to meet with him at Babelsberg, just outside of Berlin. Bismarck was a proponent of *Lückentheorie*, which argued that the Prussian constitution provided no means to settle a dispute between the crown and the parliament; Bismarck asserted that, given such an impasse, the King must always reign supreme. Comforted by Otto von Bismarck’s confidence and conservatism, the King discarded all thought of abdication and named Bismarck Prime Minister. Within two weeks, Bismarck was also named Foreign Minister.

While Bismarck was appointed high office in order to solve the domestic constitutional crisis, he instead focused on foreign affairs. The largest question facing Prussia internationally was its relationship with Austria, particularly as it related to the fate of Germany. Following the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which ended the Napoleonic Wars, around 300 German principedoms and duchies were consolidated into just under 40 states, the two dominant of which were Prussia and Austria. Together, these states formed the German Confederation (*Der Deutscher Bund*), which was intended to be cohesive enough to defend itself from foreign intrusion (e.g., from France) but not quite cohesive enough to wage a war of expansion on its own. Since 1815, Prussia had to endure Austrian dominance of the German Confederation. Bearing heavily on the question of the future for relations between Prussia and Austria was the idea of a unified Germany in which all the Germanic states would be combined into a single state. An assembly in Frankfurt formed during the fervor of 1848 attempted to create such a unified Germany. In their debate over a unified Germany, two plans were dominant: first, the “small-German” plan (*klein-deutsche*) argued that there was room for only one of the two dominant powers in the Confederation in a unified state, and thus advocated for a Germany including Prussia and the lesser German states, but excluding Austria. The “large-German” plan (*groß-deutsche*) advocated for a unified state including both Prussia and Austria. While the Frankfurt Assembly came close to achieving a unified Germany, even offering an imperial crown to the King of Prussia, their plans were wrecked when he refused the crown because he abhorred the idea of being offered power by an assembly of the common people. Prussia later offered a similar plan with the Erfurt Union, which would have consolidated Prussia and all the German states other
than Austria, but it was defeated by pressure from Vienna, ending in the Treaty of Olmütz, which was considered a great humiliation for Prussia. However, the idea of increasing Prussian power by consolidating all the lesser German states and placing them under its dominion remained attractive to many Germans; furthermore, the rise of nationalism throughout the German states, including Austria and Prussia, made a unified state including all German peoples into a moral imperative for many. Some of these nationalists believed that not including Austria in a German state would be a moral atrocity. Whether Bismarck wished to preserve the German Confederation but increase Prussian influence within it or create some form of a unified German state had yet to be seen. However, a new crisis would reveal much about Bismarck’s policy toward Austria and Germany.

In 1863, the King of Denmark announced that he would annex the Duchy of Schleswig and create a new charter for the Duchy of Holstein; this was in direct violation of the London Protocol, which stated that the two German duchies should remain together. While the King of Denmark had assumed that Britain and Sweden would defend Denmark for geopolitical reasons despite his violation of the London Protocol, he was sadly mistaken. Thus, Bismarck began overtures to both Russia and France concerning Prussian intervention in Denmark. Because of Bismarck’s recent help to the Tsar in suppressing insurrection in Poland, Russia pledged its neutrality. France also promised to remain neutral because Napoleon III secretly desired small swaths of land in the Rhine in return for his neutrality. Given these assurances, Bismarck entered into an alliance with Austria against Denmark, which refused to heed Prussian and Austrian demands. Thus, war broke out, and the Austro-Prussian forces soundly defeated Denmark. However, after the war was brought to a close, Austria and Prussia had to develop a policy concerning the future of the two duchies—following intense negotiations, no firm decision was reached, and the two powers shared administration of Schleswig and Holstein, leading to increased tensions. A crisis over the duchies loomed closer as Prussia threatened outright annexation of both Schleswig and Holstein, even moving one of its naval bases to the port of Kiel, which is right in the midst of the duchies. However, a lull in the crisis arose when Austria and Prussia signed the Gastein Convention, which separated the duchies, giving Schleswig to Prussian and Holstein to Austria. However, tensions over the administration of the duchies continued as Prussia adopted a very heavy-handed form of governance in Schleswig, while Austria was far more relaxed in its management of Holstein. Relations between Austria and Prussia deteriorated even further when Bismarck announced a plan for partial unification of Germany in which a national assembly would be elected by universal suffrage to administer all the German states. However, Bismarck was also considering the possibility of a war and therefore contacted France and Italy to determine their positions. France, again, promised neutrality in the hope of gaining in the Rhineland; Italy wanted to recapture Venetia from Austria. Italy vacillated between supporting Austria against Prussia in exchange for Venetia, and supporting Prussia in order to start a war and thereby take Venetia. However, Italy finally signed an alliance treaty with Prussia after encouragement from Napoleon III. A last ditch effort at negotiations was made by two low-level noblemen, the Gablnez brothers (one of which was
Prussia, and one of which was Austrian), but they failed to find a solution. Thus, in early June of 1866 war broke out between Austria and Prussia.

Prussia won several victories on the battlefield against Austria. On July 3rd, 1866, the Prussian army decisively beat the Austrian army at Königgrätz; it was thereafter clear that Prussia would win the war. However, it had yet to be seen what demands Prussia would make on Austria in the peace arrangements. Enter Bismarck’s cabinet. Will you seek to create a German state? Or will you simply seek to aggrandize its influence within the German Confederation? Moreover, the constitutional crisis still plagues Prussia, and could create another domestic crisis. How could the differences between the Crown and the Landtag be resolved?

V. International Political Context
In 1866, Prussia sat at a crossroads. Internationally, it could either return to the old policy of an institutional balance of power or pursue a new policy of Realpolitik. Let us examine exactly what these two paths entail:

**BALANCE OF POWER**
The concept of the balance of power was already extremely well established by the time Bismarck rose to power in Prussia. The main goal of the balance of power is the protection of the great power states’ sovereignty and survival. If one state is allowed to become more powerful than the other states, it could eventually become so powerful that it could simply impose its will upon the other states, infringing upon their independence. Furthermore, the preponderance of power enjoyed by such a state would allow it to erase borders and swallow up other states at will, menacing the survival of the states. Thus, it is the responsibility of all states to ensure, by war if necessary, that no one state becomes so powerful that it can upset the balance. Also, each state must restrain itself from expansionism lest it become the actor that upsets the balance. States are assumed to be a part of an international society in which they share common ideas and values, namely the theory of the balance of power; the theory dictates what policies states are willing and unwilling to undertake in pursuit of an outcome benefiting all great power states.

For instance, under Napoleon I, France undertook a policy of expansion, consolidating its power and conquering new territories. Because France was becoming so powerful that it could soon feasibly fight and defeat all the other major powers, the great powers formed coalitions to check Napoleon’s expansion. While the ebb and flow of alliances with and against Napoleon were complex, resulting in no less than seven distinct coalitions over almost two decades of fighting, it is important to understand that the great powers were willing to join together and fight the expansion of one state to ensure the independence and survival of all states. However, the way in which the balance of power was institutionalized by the Congress of Vienna, which ended the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, redefined the international system. The delegates designed several mechanisms to restore and protect the balance of power:
1. **Redrawing the map of Europe.** By creating the German Confederation in the middle of the Continent and reducing France to its ancient borders, along with some other more minor border changes, the delegates believed that they created stable and sustainable geopolitical structure. The German states were now strong enough to protect themselves from outside incursion, but not strong enough to start expanding; France was limited but not humiliated.

2. **Creating binding alliances.** The Quadruple Alliance, between Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia was chiefly designed to keep France from rising again. The Holy Alliance, between the “Eastern Courts” of Russia, Austria and Prussia was also created to maintain the balance, but was also intended to protect the monarchical governments of its members from democratic revolutions. These alliances forced states to cooperate against an expansionist state, but also restrained each state’s ability to expand their own borders. For instance, Russia, Austria and Prussia would likely join together to fight an expansionist France because of the Holy Alliance between them. Russia was able to restrain Austrian and Prussian policies through the Holy Alliance. However, Russian policies were also restrained by Austria and Prussia through the Holy Alliance.

3. **Creating the congress system.** In the case of an international crisis, all the great powers would convene together at a “congress,” or convention, and decide how the crisis should best be resolved in order to preserve the balance of power. In fact, the great powers agreed to virtually continuous consultations to maintain the balance of power following the Congress of Vienna.

However, the balance of power system was wrecked in 1852 when the Holy Alliance was torn asunder by the Crimean War. France expanded its influence in the Ottoman Empire against the wishes of Russia; as the other powers became involved, Austria had to pick a side. While Austria was bound to Russia by the Holy Alliance, it also had interests in the Ottoman Empire, and was wary of the possibility of Russian expansion. Finally, Austria decided to side against Russia, and the Holy Alliance was destroyed. While Russia, Prussia and Austria had previously been restrained by the Holy Alliance, the Crimean War freed them from their obligations and they could potentially pursue policies of aggrandizement. Part of the important mechanisms that maintained a balance between the states no longer had sway over them. While the ideas of the balance of power were still popular in 1866, the outcome of the Crimean War meant that Prussia could either restore the balance of power system or abandon it completely. The other theory of international conduct opposed to the balance of power was *Realpolitik.*

**REALPOLITIK**

Realpolitik is based in the theory of Realism, and assumes that anarchy is the defining characteristic of the international system. Because there is no international police force to enforce laws or conventions, there exists a state of anarchy in which the powerful states get their
way through sheer force. Each state is responsible for its own welfare and security, and should pursue whatever policy necessary to satisfy its national interests, regardless of the morality or immorality of the policy. Rather than stating that the immoral is just, the practitioner of Realpolitik would argue that morality is inapplicable to the state. As the Cardinal de Richelieu once stated, “Man is immortal; his salvation is hereafter. The state has no immortality; its salvation is now or never.” A state gains nothing by being moral if it will be destroyed for its adherence to virtue. Realpolitik argues that the pursuit of moral policies over policies rooted in the material needs of the state is irrational. Therefore, any policy is justified by Realpolitik as long as it is undertaken for the national interest. In short, might is right.

Furthermore, Realpolitik requires the state be free from permanent alliances. That is not to say that the practitioner of Realpolitik will not create alliances – however, he would only enter into an alliance because it suited the national interests of his state at that point in time. Moreover, he would not hesitate to break off an alliance as soon as it ceased to serve the national interest; nor would he hesitate to make an alliance with a state that was once his greatest enemy. As British Prime Minster Lord Palmerston once asserted, the state does not have permanent allies or permanent enemies, but only permanent interests. An enemy can quickly become an ally, or vice versa, as long as the national interest dictates such an exchange is advantageous to the state. Thus, Realpolitik stands in direct opposition to the measures undertaken by the Congress of Vienna. While the balance of power system assumes that states will all restrain themselves by entering into permanent alliances and engaging in congresses in order to preserve the balance of power, Realpolitik posits that such a policy is irrational and would dangerously restrain the state’s latitude. In order to survive, Realpolitik argues, the state must be free to start and end wars; enter into and break alliances; and pursue policies based strictly in the national interest and not in some conception of a society of states.

With these two theories, different policies concerning the future of Prussia present themselves. Either Prussia can pursue to restore the balance of power as created by the Congress of Vienna, or it can pursue its national interest. There may even exist some middle path. In the midst of the German War, the decision was yet to be made.
VI. List of Cabinet Members

The italicized names are the ones that each person preferred to be called in every day conversation. “Graf” indicates that the person is a Count. “Freiherr” indicates that the person is a Barron. “Prinz” indicates that the person is a Prince. These characters are listed in no particular order. Again, please note that I will be playing Bismarck.

1. Minister of War - Albrecht Theodor Emil Graf von Roon
2. Interior Minister - Friedrich Albrecht Graf zu Eulenberg
3. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs - Karl Hermann von Thile
4. Foreign Minister for the Ministry of Commerce - Martin Friedrich Rudolph von Delbrück
5. Governor of Holstein - Edwin Karl Rochus Freiherr von Manteuffel
7. Field Marshall and Chief of the General Staff - Helmut Karl Bernard Graf von Moltke
8. Major General, Member of the General Staff, Chief Quartermaster of the 2nd Army - Albrecht von Stosch
9. Major, Member of the General Staff, Staff Member for the 1st Army - Georg Leo von Caprivi de Caprera de Montecuculi
10. General, Commander of the 1st Army Corps - Eduard Ernst Hannibal Vogel von Falckenstein
11. Major General - Gustav Friedrich von Beyer
12. Commander of the Army of the Elbe - Karl Eberhard Herwarth von Bittenfeld
13. Ambassador to Russia - Heinrich Alexander Graf von Redern
14. Ambassador to Austria - Karl Anton Phillip Freiherr von Werther
15. Ambassador to France - Heinrich Ludwig Robert Graf von der Goltz-Heinrichsdorf
17. Ambassador to Italy - Karl Georg Ludwig Guido von Usedom
18. Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire - Dr. Maria Joseph Anton von Brassier de St. Simon-Vallade
19. Ambassador to Bavaria - Heinrich VII. Prinz Reuß zu Köstritz
20. Ambassador to Saxony - Karl Ernst Gustav von der Schulenburg-Priemern
21. Ambassador to Hannover - Gustav Prinz zu Isenburg-Büdingen
22. Ambassador to Württemberg - Julius Ernst Constantin Heinrich Karl August Freiherr von Canitz und Dallwitz
23. Ambassador to Baden - Albert Georg Friedrich Graf von Flemming
24. Ambassador to Hesse (Darmstadt) - Otto Albert Friedrich Robert von Wentzel


