Russian Organized Crime

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Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the Russian Organized Crime committee! My name is Alina Utrata and I will be your chair for this upcoming weekend of drama, intrigue, negotiation and, hopefully, making the world a slightly more economically viable place for the Russian mafia.

I am currently a sophomore majoring in History. I first got involved with Model United Nations in my freshman year of high school, and I’ve stuck with it this long because nothing parallels the camaraderie of a MUN team. Together, we’ve suffered through the endless team meetings, position paper deadlines and late nights spent drafting resolutions. Whether I’ve been half-way across the country or just meeting new people at school, I’ve always found MUN’ers who can bond over the shared experience of pretending to be UN delegates for a weekend.

For that reason, I have co-opted two of my best friends here at Stanford, Christina Schiciano and Jackie Becker, to compose your dias. Christina is a sophomore practically fluent in Arabic; she is currently planning to pursue her studies on the Middle East. Jackie is a sophomore, also undeclared; she is interested in international politics and cultural norms, and involved in many drama and theatre productions on campus. These ladies are the two of the intelligent and dedicated people I’ve met on campus, and you are incredibly lucky to have them as your co-chair and crisis director.

We hope you are as excited as we are to embody Russian organized crime bosses. With recent events in Ukraine, the US-Russia relationship seems to be moving to the forefront of global politics once again. We hope that, aside from the obvious intrigue and drama of the criminal underworld, this will give you delegates another perspective into the development of Russian society and economy.

If you have any questions, please don’t hesitate to contact us or the SMUNC secretariat.

See you in the fall!

Sincerely,

Alina Petra Utrata  Christina Schiciano  Jackie Becker  
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History of Russian Organized Crime

Bratva. Red Mafia. Vory v zakone. Going by many names and possessing a criminal resume that includes just about every illegal activity in existence, Russian organized crime (ROC) is composed of several transnational criminal organizations operating worldwide. Contrary to popular belief, the Red Mafia is not one cohesive organization, but rather an umbrella term for a loose network of autonomous criminal groups. What these disparate groups share, besides their Soviet roots, is a passion for any and every remotely profitable criminal activity. ROC is, if nothing else, resourceful, having a hand in everything from human trafficking to fraud. Unlike other international criminals groups—such as La Cosa Nostra (which specializes in protection extortion) or the Mexican cartels (drug trafficking)—ROC is involved in almost every criminal activity. Name a crime, and the ROC circuit is bound to have it in its extensive repertoire: money laundering, kidnapping, prostitution, fraud, drug trafficking, human trafficking, weapons smuggling, extortion, auto theft, counterfeiting and, of course, murder.

Russian organized crime is also unique in that it does not possess a clearly defined, top-down hierarchy. Unlike the Italian mafias, with their capofamiglie, or the Chinese triads, with their “mountain masters,” the Russian Mafia structural ranking does not include irreplaceable leaders. It would be impossible to take down a few “heads” of the Red Mafia in order to topple the entire organization because they simply do not exist. This gives ROC an invaluable strategic advantage over those attempting to dismantle it.

The Fault in our Czars

Although many point to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the “free market free-for-all” that followed as the real beginnings of ROC, the origins of the country’s criminal culture can actually be traced back to imperial Russia. A small group of thieves began operating as a secret criminal society called Vorovskoy Mir, meaning “The Thieves’ World.” In imperial Russia, virtually everything belonged to the czar; thus, stealing became the mode du jour of making a statement against the oppressive regime. In early Russian society, “the only way to revolt. . .was to become a criminal.” The citizens of the Thieves’ World—known as the vory v zakone, or “thieves-in-law”—soon developed their own honor code, which emphasized loyalty to one another and resistance to the czar. The central tenets of this code were:

- Do not inform on one another.
- Do not cooperate with the government.
- Share profits equally with everyone.

The principle of splitting profits included, at this time, those who were not members of the vory themselves. Thus, to the many impoverished Russian peasants, the crimes of the vory were acts of heroism. These Robin Hood-type bandits also established a hierarchy within their group, utilizing a system of crude tattoos to display rank, a practice that has carried on to this day.

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The Vorovskoy Mir, and the code of conduct that governed it, solidified and expanded in post-
czarist Russia, particularly during the era of the Soviet gulag and prison system. During the 1917
Bolshevik Revolution, armed gangs of the vory v zakone controlled the streets of Moscow,
exploiting the chaos into which Russian society had fallen. It was especially easy for the vory to
take power and establish bureaucratic connections during this time, since many of them had
supported the revolutionaries in their fight against Czar Nicholas II. However, as soon as Joseph
Stalin took power following Vladimir Lenin’s death in 1924, the vory were thrown into Stalin’s
gulags, where Russia’s criminal underworld truly took shape.

Betrayal in the Gulags

While Hitler’s invasion of Russia during WWII caused countless casualties on the battlefield, it
also led to one of more violent periods in the history of Russian organized crime. In 1941, as the
German army approached, Stalin desperately looked for ways to bolster the Russian army’s
numbers. Turning to the seemingly endless supply of able-bodied men overflowing the gulags
and prison system, Stalin promised the vory a chance to win back their freedom by defending
Russia against the imminent attack. Joining the army to fight for Stalin (cooperating with the
government) was a flagrant violation of the criminal code of honor, yet for many, this offer was
too tempting to refuse. Thousands of prisoners signed up to defend against the Nazi threat and
regain their freedom; that freedom, however, proved to be only momentary.

Following the conclusion of the war in 1945, Stalin reneged on his initial promise, throwing the
voy soldiers right back into the gulags that they had so desperately tried to escape. This marked
the beginning of what would be known as the “Suki Wars.” Though the prison system had never
been a particularly safe haven to begin with, the return to the gulags was a death sentence for the
voy who had fought in the Red Army. To the vory v zakone, cooperating with the government
was tantamount to treason; therefore, the thieves who had remained in prison saw the actions of
the thieves-turned-soldiers as the ultimate betrayal. These “traitors,” called suki, were
systematically slaughtered in the gulags as a punishment for their treachery and cowardice. The
prison guards did nothing to stop the massacre, and in fact often encouraged the violence, as they
viewed it was a quick and cost-effective method for thinning the criminal ranks within the prison
system.

It is unknown just how many suki were killed during this extermination process, but in 1953,
eight million prisoners were finally released. By then, the culture of the Russian criminal
underworld had been irreparably altered—no longer did a criminal need to abide by the
antiquated rules of the old “Thieves’ World.”
“Modernity” in Russian Organized Crime

The 1990s in post-Soviet Russia have seen a surge of alliances being formed between Moscow OC groups and other regional groups and the ROC’s increasing foray into more advanced criminal enterprises. Yet despite entry into fields such as bank fraud and rigging auctions in order to acquire former state enterprises through privatization, violence remains a staple of ROC activities. ROC groups are heavily armed, and contract killings have become increasingly problematic for law enforcement officials.

The diffusion of ROC groups across Russia has led to territorial murders, bombings, kidnappings and gun battles, indicative of a ruthless underworld struggle for control in a still-forming economy. Rival groups are far from the only targets in this situation. Unlike other crime groups, the ROC views journalists (especially those reporting on ROC members in an unfavorable light) as legitimate targets, thus undermining what little progress has been made towards a free press. Perhaps even more sinister is the expanding web of international alliances now boasted by ROC, which poses a threat both in terms of traditional crime and also potential nuclear expansion.

The Faceless Mafia

In the increasingly criminal-syndicalist environment of modern-day Russia, the clichéd image of the “gangster”—a cigar-swinging figure of notoriety—has become outdated. Instead, most affiliates of ROC (by the very nature of how these diverse operations are structured) blend well into their respective environments, and are far more difficult to identify than the notorious crime bosses of other regions.

This is due in part to the structure of the Russian government. In modern Russia, the “state” is still characterized by the same vertical power structure required by Soviet rule. This power structure lends itself well to self-serving officials and serves to augment corruption. Therefore, ROC is not just an outside threat posed to the government: rather it is integrated into the state itself.

According to government investigators, by 1992 “more than half the country’s criminal groups had ties to government.”² Perhaps the only thing that distinguishes law-abiding members and those involved in ROC is the higher standard of living enjoyed by the latter. Members of ROC tend to be high spenders, gravitating towards mansions and other displays of wealth in an effort to glean respect from their peers. Yet even this isn’t a perfect system for identifying potential members of ROC, nor is casual observation sufficient to indict any of these individuals. Modern ROC is as diverse as the population of Russia itself, featuring many strata of economic well-being and cultural backgrounds.

The Four Pillars of Crime

Prior to delving into the web of intricacies that comprise modern ROC, it is crucial to identify the four central pillars of this criminal system. These pillars are the sectors of society from which current Russian organized crime draws from.

The first pillar is the historical vor v zakone. In recent years, the traditional rules and laws that governed the vor have been disregarded. This has resulted in significantly less respect for the vor.

Another pillar is the nomenklatura, the former Soviet power elite of prominent business members and Communist Party members. The shadow-tyenova, or shadow economy, that thrived under the Soviet system is still being taken advantage of by these individuals. This is evident through the widespread corruption, bribes, payoffs, and self-enrichment on every level of government.

The third pillar is a collection of various ethnic and national groups, most notably the Chechens and Azeris. These groups represent the most violent sector of ROC, yet are also a minority. Unlike traditional all-Italian or all-Irish mobs in places like New York, only 70 of 3,000 ROC groups are based on ethnicity. This becomes curious when combined with the fact that most measures against ROC—both domestic and international—are aimed at these groups. The 1993 call by Yeltsin to remove “unregistered aliens” from Moscow led to “the expulsion or beating of thousands of otherwise innocent traders” and signified heightened racism rather than a genuine attempt to cull drug trafficking.

The final and most notable pillar is literally named the “authorities”, or avtoriteti. Perhaps the most substantial subsection of ROC, these criminal groups are associated with control over a specific area or criminal activity and often feature a central leader for each group; in other words, the closest pillar to the traditional US idea of a “gang.” Yet these individuals are also typically well integrated into their respective areas and can be hard to identify. The diversity of Russian criminal groups and the sociopolitical clout of the more prominent members make it difficult for the (increasingly few) legitimate authorities left to enforce Russian law.

The advancement of each of these pillars can be linked to the Soviet collapse, from which the criminal enterprises benefited greatly. Former members of the KGB, for example, soon became part of the nomenklatura, providing insight into “safe” financial conduits for money laundering. Likewise, policy makers made a fatal error when they attempted to develop a market economy prior to creating the sort of civil society that a free market could thrive in. As a result, the end of the Soviet Union marked a race for control over available resources, including industries, banks, and defense facilities. To this day, nomenklatura capitalists use ROC as a vehicle to lay claim to the spoils of the former Soviet Union.

The Corruption Cycle

3 Ibid.
Position plurality within the political and economic sectors allowed Russian politicians to swell their personal coffers. Until recently, having stakes in private companies while occupying a political office wasn’t even recognized as a crime, and even now that law is only loosely enforced. In this way, ROC has capitalized on economic reform and privatization in order to augment its own wealth and influence, a goal also advanced through extortion.

Within Russia, businesses large and small find it essentially impossible to operate without paying “protection” money. Often, these businesses pay 10-60% of their pre-tax income to various ROC groups. Yet it is no small coincidence that Russia has experienced eight straight years of economic decline while the shadow economy—characterized by evasion of state regulation, use of force and intimidation, and use of hard foreign currency as capital—amounts to over one-third of Russia’s annual GDP. This process of self-enrichment also marks a part of a particularly destructive cycle within Russia. By extorting business owners and diverting official funds for personal aims, ROC greatly decreases the capital available for the Russian government itself: tax revenue is greatly decreased, and large sums of money are laundered away.

With inadequate resources, the Russian government becomes unable to pay the salaries of its civil servants or fund proper equipment. This leads to a greater degree of corruption and incompetence. With an average salary of a measly $100 a month, traffic police often accept bribes in lieu of issuing tickets; similarly, equipment is so lacking that some Russian policemen are forced to “pursue criminals by bus and taxi.” This leads to a disillusioned populace, with some viewing ROC as alternatives to state authority and others mourning the loss of personal security and national identity. Frustration and desperation lead many to become corrupt themselves or to join the ranks of ROC, thus perpetuating the cycle.

The Growing Threat

Disillusioned citizens pose a greater threat than simply a moral one. The ROC exploits corruption, poor living conditions, and unpaid military salaries—problems that ROC helps perpetuate—in order to influence key players throughout the Russian sociopolitical sphere. With the protectors of Russian nuclear arsenals being among those experiencing low morale and late paychecks, there is a heightening concern that we will soon face the crisis of ROC-controlled nuclear weapons.

Already there have been indications that ROC has begun dealing in these destructive tools, and the predictions of Russian officials are no more promising. In 1994, a number of Russian generals and admirals rated the likelihood of nuclear migration from Russia to the Middle East as “highly probable.” No doubt this is in part due to the recent trend of ROC expansion, which has seen groups form alliances with foreign organized crime groups in order to gain access to new overseas markets. The impetus for this expansion likely lies in the fact that products commandeered from domestic factories are seen as legal goods as soon as they leave Russia’s

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borders. As a result, stolen items are often brought into neighboring countries for exchange into hard capital. In fact, as described by renowned author Stephen Handelman:

“So much illicit metal from Russian defense factories passed through Estonia on its way overseas—an estimated half a million dollars’ worth a day in 1992—that the tiny Baltic republic earned the distinction of being one of the world’s largest exporters of metal without operating a single metal plant.”

Even more concerning is the formation of alliances between ROC and other violent international crime agencies. Cases such as “Red Daisy” in 1994 have linked the ROC network to La Cosa Nostra (LCN), the latter being an Italian-American criminal organization centralized within the United States. This case was the most notable example of a new trend within the Russian criminal sphere of collecting fraudulent fuel excise taxes, again demonstrating the expanding repertoire of modern ROC groups.

This more advanced form of crime demonstrates ROC’s adaptability to the global shift towards technological advancement; some of the most common crimes perpetrated by ROC today involve bank fraud and cyber crimes. The relevance of the latter is demonstrated by the retaliatory creation of the “Federal Program for Uncovering and Stopping Computer Crime” in June 1996, which shows at least a superficial effort by the Russian government to curb this form of crime. This link between ROC and LCN is also concerning as it furthers concerns of external crime agencies gaining control of the nuclear arsenals formerly controlled by the Russian government.

Change

Russian organized crime, dissimilar to its western counterparts, features a significant degree of integration into the rest of society including its economy and political structures. In this environment, crime is often used as a means to achieve political ends. Public frustration with this fact can be marked by the strong support for neo-fascist party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the 1993 parliamentary elections, who ran on a “law-and-order” platform and advocated the “return to Russian civil war-era decrees ordering shooting of criminals on sight.”6 The willingness to promote extremely Draconian methods of law enforcement implies an equally strong desire for change; yet with ROC structured the way it is, that call may be unanswered for quite some time.

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6 Ibid.
The Crisis

During 1996 Yeltsin issued multiple decrees intending to crack down on corruption. While there were several attempts to find government moles, they have gone mostly unenforced. Russian organized crime groups continued to operate mostly unhindered.

All of that changed in the June 1996 presidential election. Amid rumors that he might lose the runoff election in the wake of a military coup, Yeltsin began taking measures to ensure his victory. One of those was to garner support of the ardently anti-corruption General Aleksandr Lebed. Yeltsin agreed to give Lebed a position on the Security Council and dismissed several government officials who had done little to combat corruption. Russian organized crime groups watched the development with increasing concern.

Then in July, Lebed began a series of sting operations against the Moscow gangs. Along with giving himself new powers on the Security Council to combat corruption, Lebed issued a decree in July 1996, which included:

- “19,000 additional personnel for “rapid deployment units” on the streets;
- 1,000 extra men for the special tax police;
- 650 new judges for Moscow’s criminal courts, with their salaries to be doubled;
- authorization for the police to confiscate assets and cash from criminal “front” companies and add the proceeds to police funds;
- the temporary removal of officials suspected of corruption from their offices pending completion of investigations;
- the creation of a federal protection program for witnesses, judges, and prosecutors; and
- the authority for the mayor of Moscow and for the governor of Moscow region to “introduce additional measures” to enforce law and order in separate territories”.

Lebed’s anti-corruption reforms are not toothless, and there are rumors in Moscow that perhaps Lebed intends to put an end to ROC influence once and for all. Meanwhile, people have begun to discuss Yeltsin’s increasingly obvious ill health, and speculate about what would happen if he were to die so soon after the election.

In this environment of fear and uncertainty, the Russian Organized Crime groups are facing a common enemy: General Lebed. The Moscow mafia gangs, historically bitter rivals, are so concerned by these developments that they have agreed to come together to discuss what can be done to preserve their influence over Moscow. Under the auspices of a birthday party for the mother of Lechi the Beard, the Russian organized crime bosses have agreed to meet to discuss the growing threat. Committee will begin at the start of the meeting, in July 1996.

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In real life, the response to General Lebed’s decrees was a wave of bombings across Moscow to serve as a warning to the General to back off. For the purposes of this committee, you can assume this has not happened yet.
Committee Structure

Each mafia gang in Moscow will be represented by a number of delegates embodying leadership positions. Although some delegates have been denoted “leaders” of the gang, leadership positions within the gangs are flexible. As noted in the background guide, ROC hierarchy is flexible, and the organization will not crumble with the loss of one leader. It will be up to the delegates to establish or usurp positions of power during committee. In other words, you are free to attempt to stage coups, spy, betray or sabotage members of your gang or other gangs in joint or personal directives in any way you see fit.

The dais will be placing a high value on committee decisions that are not illogically self-destructive. In other words: although this is a mafia committee, we don’t want you to interpret crime bosses as trying to destroy the world for their own entertainment. Mafia gangs are primarily business operations, and indeed the Moscow gangs have historically divided up sectors and municipalities amongst themselves to avoid unnecessary competition or conflict. Your goal in committee should be to increase the economic power of yourself, your gang and Russian organized crime in the wake of a government anti-corruption crackdown.

To this extent, here are some topics you should research and think about for committee:

1. **Violence.** Should there be a terror campaign throughout the city, or would that instigate a massive crackdown? Should Russian organized crime move away from violence?
2. **Government cooperation.** Do you think you should cooperate with the government? Should you bribe them and cultivate ties? Should you threaten them?
3. **Inter-gang cooperation.** Do you want to cooperate with other gangs, or exploit them and their economic influence?
4. **International expansion.** Should you focus solely on the economic potential of Moscow, or look elsewhere? Is international expansion a good idea? Should you cooperate with other international criminal gangs, or just other Russians? With the rumblings of the Chechen war, should you encourage the Chechen gangs to leave for Chechnya to take over their business or would that leave a power vacuum that the government could easily crush?
5. **Business sectors.** Do you want to focus on specific business sectors? Or is it better to be more broad? Do you want to steal or take over sectors that other gangs historically have control of? And is there any type of trade that is too dangerous for even the mafia to be involved in?
6. **Corruption.** Historically, the vory have been men of honor. Do you want to operate by higher standards? Are citizens legitimate targets in this business, or are there lines that can’t be crossed?
7. **Population.** The gangs and citizens in Moscow are closely connected. What type of relationship should you have with them? Should you extort exorbitant fees from them for protection? Should you provide basic social services or should you try to take as much as you can? And is there any danger to if the population turns on you?
8. **Economic control.** The various ways that the gangs control finances are listed below. Is that acceptable to you? Or are there members of your gang that have too much power?
Character List

Note: Some of the characters below were or rumored to be dead in July of 1996. For the purposes of this committee, we will assume they are alive and have been living underground, only to re-emerge for the purpose of this meeting. Unless otherwise noted, the start of committee session will be the “reveal” that they are still alive. Delegates are welcome to react to the still-alive members however they like.

General structure of gangs in Russia

Although there are over 150 gangs in Moscow, we will focus on the six main gangs. These are the three Chechen gangs, the two Slavanian gangs, and the 21st Century Association. Within the gangs, although members may have specialties, they all jostle for power and prestige. Unlike the ethnically-based crime groups in the US, Russian gangs don’t have an irreplaceable or centralized leader. The governing structure tends to be loose and associative, and gangs can survive losing one of their leaders without losing control over the gang. It is up to the delegates to establish loyalty, power and friends within their own gang.

Three Chechen Gangs

Although there are three Chechen gangs, there are such close ties between the members that they are difficult to separate. The gangs are the Tsentralnaya, the Ostakinskaya and the Aytomobilnaya, and there are some shared departments between the three gangs. The Chechens have an “obshak”, or pooled criminal resources, that allegedly contains billions of rubles. They use this to pay lawyers, bribe officials and help out other Chechens in jail. They have about 1500 members, a number that has decreased substantially as many Chechens have returned to Chechnya to fight in the Chechen war. They have contacts in government, especially in the Moscow Regional Department for Organized Crime. They conduct car, arms and drug smuggling, illegal oil deals, banking, counterfeiting and various casinos, hotels and restaurants, as well as many activities abroad in Europe.

Nikolai Suleimanov a.k.a. Khoze — came to Moscow in the early eighties and set up other Chechen bosses; leading “authority” of the Chechens until he was shot dead in 1994. For the purposes of this committee, he realized with such a high profile he couldn’t be effective in fighting the war in Chechnya; thus he staged his own death in order to use his skills to help the rebel cause. He has returned cautious of getting too involved in Moscow and hoping to focus efforts on the war.

Aslan — along with Lechi, the new authority of the Chechen gangs; committed to ensuring continued dominance of Chechens in Moscow and their new leadership positions; in favor of dramatic, violent action to send a message to the government.
**Lechi the Beard** — along with Aslan, new authority of Chechen gang; has family members in Chechnya who send him information about the war; in favor of moving away from violence.

**Musa Starshii** — has control of the Obshak, giving him considerable influence over the Chechen gangs (although Khoze was more powerful before his “death”); was hiding in Chechnya after killing one of the Kvantrishivili Brothers (see below), and only returned after he thought the other brother had been killed.

**Khozha N.** — leader of the former gang the Lazanskaya, now has quite a bit of influence in the Chechen gangs because of links to powerful people in Chechnya; liaison between Chechnya and Moscow; favor establishing government contacts in order to gain power.

**Ruslan A.** — leader of the former gang the Lazanskaya; also has links to politicians in Chechnya; wants to establish more government contacts within Moscow.

**Akhmet M.** — one head of the shared Chechen security and intelligence department; in charge of keeping track of corrupt government officials and finding out government plans.

**Vakha Mladshii** — one head of the shared Chechen intelligence department; the brother of Musa Starshii; in charge of looking into competitors activities.

**Lysiy** — leader of Tsentralnaya and Aytomobilnaya gangs; was a student in Moscow before Khoze found him and helped him set up his own gang; favors focusing on developing the gang outside Moscow.

**Magomed O.** — leader of Ostankinskaya gang; controls most of the Russia-Transcaucasia transportation business; main priority is ensuring transit routes into other countries stay open; doesn’t want any violent action that might hamper trade.

**The Slav Groups**

The Slav groups are the Solntsevskaya and the Podolskaya. They are generally considered rivals of the Chechen gang. In 1990-91 they waged a deadly war against the Chechens. Although some of the killings were about the strategic war, a lot of them were in order to steal over business contracts.

**Solntsevskaya Gang**

The Solntsevskaya is the largest gang in the country, with 3,500 to 4,000 members. They are heavily armed, with 500 Kalshnivoks, 1000 and PM pistols, several dozen Uzi rifles, some anti-tank weapons and grenade launchers. Solntsevskaya is mostly active in the Solntsevo district, but also in the center and south of Moscow. Their main operations are drug production, smuggling and retail, arms and car smuggling, extortion, running various hotels and restaurants, banking, investment and other economic crimes. They ask have contacts in the US and Europe, and are
possibly trafficking South American cocaine. They also have connections with the infamous Russian gang figure “Yaponets” or “the Japanese.”

Mikhailov Sergei aka Mikhas — leader of Solntsevskaya, former engineer; worried by effects of the war against the Chechen gangs, doesn’t want another resurgence of violence in the streets.

Viktor Averin aka Avera — Mikhas’s second in command; one of the founding members of the group; thinks Mikhas’s caution towards using violence is troubling and that Yaponets may have too much influence with him.

Tsihelashvilli Datiko Pavlovich aka Tashkent Dato — known as the “owner” of Siberia; itching for an opportunity to use the heavy weapons of the gang.

Dzhemal Khachidze aka Dzemal — met Mikhas when they were just card con-artists; now an influential member in the gang; is particularly fond of subtle murders and assassinations.

Yevgeny Lyustarnov — responsible for finances of the gang; favors violent retaliation.

Gennady Shapovalov aka Shapoval — one of the main authorities; favors violent retaliation.

Andrei Skoch aka Scotch Tape — responsible for relationship with government officials; doesn’t want anything to happen that could ruin his reputation with the government.

Sergei Timofeiev aka Sylvester — formerly a tractor driver; gangs leading authority; people think he was blown up in Moscow in 1994, but has secretly been living abroad in Caracas, presumably for reasons to do with cocaine. Very against violence in the streets of Moscow threatening prospects for international trade expansion.

Podolskaya Gang

The Podolskaya is a relatively new gang with only 500 members but is heavily armed, ruthless, organized and disciplined. It is mostly active in the suburbs of Podolsk, with no competition from other gangs. Their main operations are extortion, gambling, money laundering, drugs and arms smuggling and illegal production of spirits, and casinos. Their main international operations are in the Netherlands where they counterfeit alcohol.

Andrey Lalalin aka Luchok - leader of gang; favors focusing on the gangs operations in Podolsk and in hopes of allowing other gangs to take the brunt of the offensive in central Moscow.

Rospis — closest aide to Luchok; agrees that they should try to focus only on the sectors and regions they currently control and focus on expanding overseas.

Kremer — closest aide to Luchok; completely disagrees with Luchok, feels that the Podolskaya must get involved with other gangs if they are to establish themselves as a real major gang.
Alexander Zakharov aka Zakhar — another main authority in the gang; has links to Balashiknskaya gangs; undecided about gang’s involvement in Moscow, worried about ripple effects of a government crackdown in wake of violence action.

21st Century Association
This gang was originally an umbrella organization for new cooperatives in Moscow, but quickly developed into a criminal gang because their members brutality. It is the most ruthless gang in Moscow. They have about 1000 members throughout Russia, with operations in multiple Russian regions. They have close ties with local and municipal government officials; however, its “scandalous reputation” has made it nearly impossible to cultivate national government ties. The Association controls hotels, casinos, and restaurants as well as insurance, investment, banking and pension services, and they are involved in the oil industry. It has also set up several charities for ex-sportsmen and military personnel, not for philanthropic reasons, but to take advantage of tax loopholes.

Anzor - a Georgian graduate of the elite Soviet Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Relations; trained as a lawyer and has links with upper class; feels intimidation is the only way to affect government

Joseph K. - second in command of the associations; also in favor of brutal and ruthless violence, but has been encouraging the gang to hedge their bets and at least see what the other gangs are going to do before they act

Amiran Kvantrishvili and Otari Kvantrishvili — most infamous members and ruthless criminals; killed by Musa Starshii in 1993 and 1994; for the purposes of this committee, Anzor and Joseph K. helped them stage their deaths in order to allow them to secretly expand operations in the US and Western Europe. Otari generally has better government contacts that Amiran and favors violence significantly less.

Vyacheslav Kirillovich Ivankov
Colloquially know as “Yaponchick” (“Little Japanese”), Ivankov was recently a resident of the Russian prison system on charges of firearms, forgery and drug-trafficking. Kvantrishvili used his contact in the Russian supreme court to get Ivankov released after nine years; in return for this he pledged his loyalty to the group. He considers himself the model of modern chivalry.

Tariel Oniani
Infamous for his special knack at money laundering, Oniani recently joined the 21st Century Association after returning from Paris, where he had been charged for several unsavory crimes.
Directives

Unlike GA committees, crisis committees pass directives. Directives are generally shorter than resolutions and several are usually introduced during one committee session. Different types of directives are explained below. The chair has to approve directives before they are voted upon. Once a directive has been passed, crisis will decide how to respond.

The chairs will be placing a high emphasis on historical accuracy, creative and comprehensive directives. What that means is we don’t want to see directives that say, “Ask contact in Russian government to repeal anti-corruption legislation.” Instead, we want to see you utilizing your character’s background and influence, focusing on interests your gang’s economic interests, and coming up with complete and thoughtful directives that achieve your objectives. The more thought-out your story line is, the more likely it will be successful in crisis.

Committee Directives

Committee directives need unanimous approval from all the gangs. This does not mean unanimous approval of the committee, but that there must be a simple majority of the gang in order to constitute a “yes” vote. Committee directives are meant to be intentionally hard to pass because it would be a rarity for all Russian organized gangs to operate together, although not unfeasible.

Joint Directives

Joint directives can be between individuals or gangs. If the directive is between gangs, there must be at least two signatories from each gang. The chair will conduct a formal vote between gang blocs; there must be a simple majority of the gang in order to constitute a “yes” vote.

If the directive is between individuals, include all the delegates names in the sponsors’ list; it will not be formally voted on in committee. Individual joint directives can be secret or public. If marked public, the directive will be read out when directives are introduced but will not be formally voted on.

Personal Directives

Delegates may also issue personal directives. These may either be secret or public, with public directives read out when directives are introduced.

Communiqués

Communiqués are public declarations or private communications with individuals or groups. Crisis will embody the people you are trying to contact, and update you on your communiqué
accordingly. Rules for committee, joint and personal communiqués follow the same rules as directives.

Please note that you shouldn’t assume your communiqués are secure just because you mark them as secret. You may want to include specific measures to prevent sabotage or sensitive information getting leaked.

Final Notes
Crisis will be in a perpetual moderated caucus unless otherwise motioned and voted on. The rules of parliamentary procedure are laid out in the SMUNC Delegate Handbook.

The chair welcomes delegates to try and “get into character.” You may attempt to speak in a Russian accent, but the dais may disallow it if we determine that the hilarity of such exercises is impeding the committee’s progress. However, delegates must keep to socially appropriate behavior and language in their speech at all times, regardless of arguable historical accuracy. That means swearing (in English or Russian), racist or sexist slurs, or any other comments that could be considered disrespectful are not allowed. If you have any questions, please ask the chair.
Position Papers

As per SMUNC policy, position papers are required for committee and to be eligible to win awards. However, our position papers are not as rigid as GA position papers and the chair highly recommends taking this opportunity to get into character and explore the intrigue of the Russian mafia.

Position papers should be one page, single-spaced. The first section should include background information about your character and your gang. What areas of Moscow or Russia do they operate in? What business sector do they focus on? Do they have government contacts? The second section should focus on your gang or character’s relationship with other gangs. Who are they friends with? Who are they enemies with? Who have they assassinated or stole from recently? Who is threatening their interests? The final section should lay out your preliminary committee strategy, for both you as an individual and for your gang. Are you going to prioritize your gang’s interests, or your own? How are you going to ensure Russian organized crime’s continued dominance? Which gangs do you want to work with, which do you not? What trade or investment is a good idea? Here is where you should use your creativity!

Although some mafia figures are famous and therefore have lots of personal information online, don’t worry too much if you can’t find much about your specific character or if there is contradictory or “sketchy” information. Instead, focus on finding information about your gang and use what information you know about it to develop your committee strategy. If you have questions about your characters’ specific powers, please ask the chair.

Additionally, although we are crime bosses, even the Russian mafiosi think intellectual property theft is crossing a line. Cite your sources. Don’t plagiarize.
Works Cited


<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1w8zME-uDtW>.


<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QAJwINlqvyI>. 