

ASIAN VALUES

A New Model for Development?

This paper explores modernization theory, re-examining the argument that economic development inevitably leads to democratization. Using Singapore as a case study, the conditions that allow for the continuance of authoritarianism after economic development is achieved are considered. Analyzing the role of state capacity and mechanisms of state control, the author argues that institutional, rather than cultural, explanations are the determining factors in Singapore's continued authoritarianism.

Molly Elgin

Stanford University

[E]conomic freedom is an end in itself. [It] is also an indispensable means toward the achievement of political freedom.¹

— Milton Friedman

Milton Friedman's view of political freedom is common in the United States and many Western countries. The theory that rising incomes lead to political liberty is embodied in the declaration of the United States government that "only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to [...] assure their future prosperity."² Yet, criticisms of the theory that capitalism and democracy are inevitably linked have increased in recent years. Not least among the critics are government officials from countries such as China, Vietnam, and Russia, which, until the recent financial collapse, experienced record growth rates despite their non-democratic regimes. Do these countries present a new development model with a diminished role for democracy? Should developing countries look to Singapore's experience and reject modernization theory?

The most prominent alternative is based upon the "Asian values" thesis promulgated by Lee Kuan Yew, the former prime minister of Singapore, to explain how Singapore was able to develop without political liberalization. The Asian values thesis, as explained by Lee, claims that the cultural inclination to respect authority and hard work allows East Asian countries to pursue lib-

eral economic policies without democracy. However, even Lee is hesitant to call the Singaporean experience a model, for it is unclear that Singapore's development is replicable elsewhere. In other places that followed the liberal authoritarian trajectory, such as South Korea and Taiwan, the ultimate result was a transition to democracy.

It is clear that we need to re-examine these theories in light of the developments of the late 20th century. With that in mind, I will reconsider the argument that modernization inevitably leads to democratization. In particular, what conditions allow for the continuance of authoritarianism even after economic development is achieved? I will look into the case of Singapore to begin to answer this question and attempt to elucidate some of the factors influencing regime type.

Much of the debate on the relationship between regime type and economic development focuses on the argument of modernization theory, an idea that developed out of the work of political sociologists such as Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, but that found its 20th century voice in scholars such as Daniel Lerner and Seymour Martin Lipset. Lipset's work posited that political development is a reflection of the social and economic structure within a state. Though his work examined a variety of other important factors, such as enfranchisement and religious institutions, he focused on the effects of economic development in ensuring stable democracies. Modernization theory posits that as incomes rise,

a middle class develops, changing not only the social conditions of the middle class, but also political power dynamics. Citizens of the middle class associate with several competing political affiliations, creating cross-cutting interests and thereby moderating the tensions among competing pressure groups. Moderation enhances stability, leading to longer-term democratic regimes.³

But how does this theory apply to outcomes in the real world? The correlation between democracy and democratization to economic gain is convincing – of the top twenty-five richest countries, all but two (Hong Kong and Singapore) are democracies⁴ – democratic transitions, at a minimum, do not hurt economic outcomes, and may provide some benefits.⁵ Lipset proposes that wealth is causally related to democratic development, through both social and political means. Political means include the enhanced power of a growing middle class, but education also plays a role, changing views that increase the “receptivity to democratic political tolerance norms.”⁶ Though the meaning of this phrase is not entirely clear, Lipset explains an important shift to the political middle in democracies. This moderation limits the consequences of losing for the opposition, which in non-democracies can be quite high. A quick look to sites such as Freedom House or Human Rights Watch shows that members of the opposition in non-democracies often suffer imprisonment, bankruptcy, or death.⁷ Errors or disagreements can be tolerated in democracies because non-violent change is possible.

Modernization implies a sequencing of development, though sequencing in this theory is the result of the relationship between variables, rather than a consequence of design. Economic growth starts a chain of events leading eventually and inevitably to political reform: **economic reform – economic growth – social change – democracy.**

Sequencing theory takes this idea of sequencing and adds an element of design.⁸ The idea is that autocracies are less encumbered by the slowness of the democratic political system, and so

can enact economic and social reform that leads to political reform once a certain GDP per capita is reached. Some champions of democracy object to sequencing theory, arguing that the popular participation and checks on institutional power exhibited in democracies helps to promote economic growth. Siegle, Weinstein, and Halperin present data disproving the sequencing theory, showing that there is no difference in growth between poor democracies and poor autocracies overall. The finding is even more positive towards democracy if East Asia is eliminated from the data set; in that case, democracies exhibit a 50% higher growth rate on average than poor autocracies.

However, the causal logic and underlying theory about the relationship between economic and political freedom is heavily debated: socio-economic development does not necessarily lead to political freedom. Samuel Huntington famously pointed out that modernization does not necessarily mean political development and that disorder is more commonly the outcome when political mobilization outpaces political institution building.⁹ Michael Ross’s research finds an equally disturbing result: democracies perform no better than autocracies in terms of the well-being of the poorest citizens.¹⁰

In fact, some would argue that autocracies, because they are insulated from political pressure, are better able to improve economic conditions. The Lee thesis, named for the former Singaporean prime minister, maintains that this is especially true in developing countries, because the denial of basic civil and political rights can actually help economic development. Democracy, the argument goes, is a luxury that the poorest countries cannot afford.¹¹ After all, “capitalism came before democracy essentially everywhere, except in [the United States], where they started at the same time.”¹² The implication of this theory is that development policies should focus on economic development through authoritarianism and worry about democracy later, if at all.

In contrast, Amartya Sen points out that there is little evidence, and certainly no defini-

tive proof, that authoritarian regimes encourage economic growth.¹³ Dani Rodrik and Romain Wacziarg counter the Lee thesis with a study that shows that the short-term benefits of democratization are especially true for the poorest countries. Democracy tends to follow periods of low growth, they find, which calls into question the sequencing arguments, and does tend to be associated with a decrease in growth volatility.¹⁴ In empirical analysis, there is much ambiguity, calling attention to the fact that there are many factors influencing political and economic development. The diversity of experience among countries does, however, call for more investigation.

As is evident from this review of the literature, there is no consensus on the relationship between economic growth and political freedom or democracy. Przeworski sums up much of this debate by saying that institutional factors do seem to matter in terms of development, but it is evidently not the regime type that matters.¹⁵ This raises the question of what does matter. Developing the theory to understand more completely the circumstances that allow political and economic freedom to work together, as well as the factors influencing their separation, is a task left unresolved by the literature to date.

Although most of the world's wealthiest countries are democracies, there are certainly developed countries that do not fit the democratic mold. Singapore, a seemingly notable exception to modernization theory, will be the focus of this paper. Exploring Singapore's growth as a non-democracy may provide more insight into the mechanisms of growth, the role of institutions in development, and the prospects for political change in countries that have experienced rapid economic growth.

The extreme disparity between the freedom of Singapore's economic sphere and that of its political sphere is striking. According to the Economic Freedom of the World Index, Singapore is ranked first in the world in economic freedom.¹⁶ Singapore did especially well in the freedom to trade internationally and lower regulation, ranking in the top ten. In evaluating political free-

dom in Singapore, however, Freedom House assigned scores of 5 and 4, respectively, to political rights and civil liberties, classifying Singapore as "partly free".¹⁷ Polity IV declares: "over the past forty years [Singapore's ruling party] has created a hegemonic party system under the guise of democratic governance." In number terms, on a 21-point scale of regime authority, with -10 being a hereditary monarchy and +10 a consolidated democracy, Singapore rates a 2.¹⁸ What do these numbers say about our intuition regarding the relationship between economic and political freedom? Is Lipset wrong about the path towards democracy?

Does the case of Singapore defy modernization theory? Before analyzing this case, some background is necessary. Singapore was first a British trading center and then a separate British colony. Following independence from Great Britain, Singapore entered the Malaysian Federation in 1963, and was expelled in 1965 as a result of disputes between Singapore's ruling People's Action Party (PAP) and Malaysia's ruling Alliance Party and high levels of racial tension that included riots. The violence and uncertainty of the years in the Malaysian Federation had a profound impact on fledgling Singapore, and continue in many of the nation's policies today. With tensions between the Chinese and Malay populations, and a threat of invasion or forced re-entry into the Federation, Singapore's new government took immediate steps to ensure national sovereignty. In the first year of separation from the Malaysian Federation, Singapore joined both the United Nations and the Commonwealth, and began establishing diplomatic relations with other countries, bolstering the nation's international recognition.¹⁹ Two years later, in 1967, Singapore co-founded the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and established mandatory national military service.²⁰ All of these steps can be seen as a concerted effort on the part of Singapore's leaders to establish an international presence and to bolster legitimacy through external recognition.

At the same time, the government embarked

on a strategy to bolster internal legitimacy. To reduce ethnic tension, a Constitutional Commission on Minority Rights and policies integrating schools and neighborhoods was introduced in late 1965. The country's hardships may have aided in its rapid progress: with the withdrawal of the British, the major economic and security base of the country faced a crisis. This climate of crisis helped the PAP to sweep the legislature, providing an unopposed political climate to introduce drastic reforms. These included strict labor laws, a family planning program, and mandatory savings through the Central Provident Fund.²¹ The reforms, and the general global economic upswing of the 1960s, helped establish Singapore as an industrial base and led to its incredible economic growth, which has averaged 9% since independence. Singapore's GDP growth since independence is shown in the chart below, along with a chart comparing the percentage change in GDP among members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

One often-cited explanation of Singapore's success is the "Asian values" thesis. Lee Kuan

Yew, Singapore's first Prime Minister, is one of the main proponents of this hypothesis. He does, however, explain that Eastern and Western countries are different and what works to promote development in the West will not work in East Asia. Lee says instead that East Asian values emphasize that an individual is not a separate entity, but part of a family, which is then part of society. Mere policy prescriptions, he explains, do not capture the cultural contributions to economic growth. Cultures with less emphasis on scholarship, hard work, and thrift, he says, will grow much more slowly than the countries of East Asia did.²³ Asian values, the thesis goes, created a new path to economic growth that is inconsistent with democracy.

The Asian values thesis is grounded in the ideas that there is a set of Asian values that instills standards such as hard work and discipline, and that these social structures transfer to political structures. Russell Dalton and Nhu-Ngoc Ong have investigated these claims using the World Values Survey and comparing six countries with Confucianism-influenced culture with four




Chart 1: Rapid GDP growth in Singapore between 1960 and the present.²²




Chart 2: Regional context of Singapore's economic growth. [\$ = US\$]

(Source: Australia National University Division of Economics, <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/economics>)

Western countries.²⁴ Their analysis of the survey responses shows no distinguishable difference between the East and West on deference towards authority. Singapore unsurprisingly ranks 2nd on the “high authority” index, which measures attitudes towards authority in social structures, but behind the United States. Approval of democracy and the democratic process is high across all of the ten countries studied, though Singaporeans are more lukewarm towards the democratic process than citizens of the other countries. Dalton and Ong find that there is no link between respect for authority in the family and respect for regime type in Asia, calling into question the idea that Confucian values represent a significant cultural challenge to democracy in East Asia. But now that we have rejected the notion that Asian culture provides the basis for authoritarian social and political institutions, let us take the analysis a step further.

According to the World Values Survey, Singapore tends to be more approving of authority and less approving of democratic processes than

the rest of East Asia. Is Singapore more “Asian” than the rest of Asia? Or are there unique institutional factors that shape these attitudes? And can these institutional factors explain the perpetuation of authoritarianism in Singapore? I will argue that Singapore's particular political climate and institutions play a larger role in explaining Singapore's preservation of authoritarian rule even as a high-income country than do Asian values. This is not to say that there are no cultural influences on the development process, but that they are not exclusively explanatory.

In seeking to explain Singapore's seeming defiance of modernization theory, I will first analyze the role of state capacity and mechanisms of state control in maintaining authoritarianism. The idea of state capacity involves not necessarily just what the government does but what it is capable of doing. Michael Mann specifies two aspects of state capacity, despotic and infrastructural. Mann defines despotic power as “the range of actions which the elite is empowered to take without routine, institutionalized negotiation

with civil society groups".²⁵ Infrastructural power, on the other hand, is the power of the state to penetrate and coordinate the actions of civil society through its own infrastructure, allowing for the possibility that the state is a mere instrument of forces within civil society, as opposed to an organization imposing order from above, as despotic capacity implies.²⁶

Singapore has both high despotic and high infrastructural capacity, both of which are very carefully controlled. In Singapore, maintaining a careful balance of despotic and infrastructural capacity ensures the survival of the current regime. Balancing the two types of capacity enables the state to both provide for its citizens and repress them in carefully calculated ways. First, I will look into Singapore's infrastructural capacity, focusing on the intentional development of human capital through the provision of public goods and the process of developing stakeholders in a non-democracy. Then I will explore Singapore's despotic power with a discussion of institutionalized fear perpetuated through control of information and a lack of independence of the judiciary. Finally, I will return to Lee Yuan Kew's thesis, looking at some ways in which Singapore has mimicked democracy and refuting the idea that Asian values have given rise to Singapore's institutions and economic growth.

In discussing Singapore's infrastructural state capacity, I will utilize not only Mann's definition of the penetration of society, but also Theda Skocpol's interpretation of the capacity of the state as an actor to accomplish policy goals.²⁷ Concerted efforts by the government to improve the quality of life of its citizens have yielded impressive results. Singapore ranks 20th in the world in terms of Gross Domestic Product per capita²⁸ and 25th in terms of the human development index, which captures important social measures, such as life expectancy at birth, education, and the adult literacy rate.²⁹ To approximate both Skocpol's and Mann's conception of infrastructural capacity, I use the World Bank Indicators of governance, which measure the capacity of the government to formulate and implement sound

policies and citizens' responses to policies.³⁰ I have included a comparison of government effectiveness among Southeast and East Asian countries to provide a clearer picture of Singapore's comparative ability to create and implement reform. The bars in the charts indicate the percentile at which the country ranks, meaning that if the bar is close to 100, that country's governance is rated among the top in the world according to that specific measure. Here we notice that Singapore is rated as one of the top of the world in indicators of stability, lack of risk, and implementation of policy, but in the bottom half of countries in terms of voice and accountability, which is expected for a non-democracy. It is the strength of the other indicators in comparison to the weakness of accountability that puzzles us. According to modernization theory, the social change created by economic growth should lead to democracy, yet as chart 3 makes clear, political reform falls far behind economic and social reform in Singapore.

How is this dichotomy possible? As with most things in Singapore, through very careful control. Government policy has very carefully not only created growth, but also moderated the deleterious effects on the least well-off and prevented the formation of a strong civil society. In the process, the state has created stakeholders, citizens with a direct interest in the state. This is accomplished through several mechanisms. One of the most powerful is the Housing and Development Board. Originally founded in 1960 to combat the housing shortage in Singapore, the HDB has implemented the successful Home Ownership for People Scheme, which allows married Singaporeans to buy houses, aided since 1968 by government subsidies.³¹ The result is that by 2003 over 90% of Singaporeans owned their homes.³² It is important to note that this ownership functions more as a lease, however, as HDB maintains the management and regulates owners rights, including limiting the ability to sublet, resale, or accumulate equity. The HDB housing ownership scheme is important to our analysis for two reasons: (1) It demonstrates Singapore's




Chart 3:
World Development Indicators of Singapore's Governance.

(Source: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi, *Governance Matters VIII: Governance Indicators for 1996-2008* (2009).)




Chart 4:
Regional Context: Government Effectiveness in East/Southeast Asia.

(Source: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi, *Governance Matters VIII: Governance Indicators for 1996-2008* (2009).)

infrastructural capacity. (2) By, in essence, co-opting the middle class, the state is preventing the formation of social groups that could pres-

ent a challenge to the authoritarian system. (This second point is more subtle.)

Another benefit of the HDB to the per-

petuation of Singapore’s authoritarian regime is that the government closely regulates living arrangements. This control provides two benefits that limit the formation of Lipset’s “cross-cutting interests”. The first and perhaps more obvious one is the neutralizing of ethnic tensions. As mentioned earlier in this paper, the ethnic tension and race riots Singapore experienced in the early days of independence played a profound role in shaping Singapore’s growth and development agenda. One aspect of this included the integration of schools and mandatory education programs so that Chinese children could learn about Malays and Singapore’s other ethnic minorities, and vice versa. Since its inception, the state saw reducing ethnic tensions as one of its primary tasks, accomplished mainly through education³³ and housing “ethnic balancing”.³⁴ Another potential way that housing regulations restrict the formation of cross-cutting interests is that housing is strictly limited to “nuclear family units”³⁵, perpetuating the traditional role of the family and emphasizing family loyalty and lessening the need to develop a strong civil society.³⁶ This hypothesis would certainly require further analysis, but it is interesting to note the family restrictions in Singapore’s housing regulations and to consider the effects.

We now move to a discussion of Singapore’s despotic capacity. The capacity may not seem as evident as in some other authoritarian regimes where political violence is more common, but it is powerful nonetheless. Rather than resort to violence, Singapore’s despotic capacity is maintained through institutionalized fear, the climate of fear created by Singapore’s strong state capacity, and characterized by its use of what Cherian George has termed calibrated coercion. Institutionalized fear is a difficult concept to explain, but I present it here as a perception of vulnerability, defined by the proximity of invasion, economic disaster, or internal disorder. These are difficult attitudes to measure, but I will do so (imperfectly) through responses to the World Values Survey. Before presenting the survey responses, though, a quick anecdote may help explain the concept of insti-

tutionalized fear. Donald Emmerson, an expert on Southeast Asia, tells a story of a late-night arrival in Singapore. On the way downtown from the airport, his taxi driver was speeding a little, setting off the speeding alarm set up in Singaporean taxis. Emmerson jokingly told the driver he could unplug the system, to which the driver responded that if he unplugged the system, all other taxi drivers would follow suit, and mass chaos would reign in the streets of Singapore.³⁷

The story is a convenient way to portray the feeling of vulnerability in Singapore: that if the carefully ordered society is not preserved, chaos may result. Tellingly, in response to the statement “Most people can be trusted”, only 17.6% of Singaporeans answered that they agreed. In contrast, 36.9% of Taiwanese agreed, 35.5% of Americans, and 45.5% of Indonesians.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Public Trust</i>
Singapore	17.6%
Taiwan	36.9%
United States	35.5%
Indonesia	45.5%
China	52.5%
South Korea	27.3%

*Table: Levels of Public Trust*³⁸

The comparison with other Confucian-valued countries, above, shows us that this fear and lack of trust is not cultural. Also we would not propose that Singaporeans have some sort of intrinsic inclination to fear. Rather, these survey responses and anecdotes allow us a glimpse into the unique political and social environment leading to these attitudes among Singaporeans.

To see how this sense of fear is further institutionalized, we look to the courts. Singapore’s ruling party practices a “soft autonomy” which sometimes does not seem all that soft. The favored method of crushing the opposition is through lawsuits, suing opponents until they are bankrupt and thereby stifling the voice of dissent. Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam, the recently deceased leader of the opposition, is one such example – he was sued multiple times, with total

damages of approximately S\$1.6 million.³⁹ His crime was to openly oppose the ruling People's Action Party (PAP), which has ruled Singapore since 1959.

The strategy extends to the press and the international press – the International Herald Tribune has been forced to pay fines in order to keep their Singaporean leadership.⁴⁰ Media is tightly controlled in Singapore, and even the suggestion of PAP criticism is harshly rebuked. In 1994, an American professor, Mr. Lingle, living in Singapore published an article that did not specifically name Singapore, but mentioned that some Asian countries are in the habit of bankrupting their opponents. When the government sued him, this put the prosecutor in the unusual position of having to prove that Mr. Lingle was in fact talking about Lee Kuan Yew and his son, who replaced Lee as Prime Minister. There is nothing secret, then, about the means that the PAP uses to obstruct opposition. Even the openness with which the PAP goes after its opponents speaks to the desire to maintain stability and order: citizens are aware of exactly how they will be dealt with if they take on the government.

The development of infrastructural capacity may actually help despotic capacity. By building infrastructure, the state is able to gather more information and monitor more closely threats to its survival. The internet provides an interesting example of how infrastructure can lead to an increase in the growth of despotic capacity. Information Technology (IT) is vital to Singapore's interest to remain an economic stronghouse. But, with the benefits of IT comes the difficult-to-control internet, and any source of unregulated expression is immediately suspect in Singapore. The leadership's strategy to deal with the internet is telling of their overall approach to governance. The government has invested heavily in IT infrastructure, and Singapore has one of the highest internet penetration rates in the world.⁴¹ Heavy regulation ensures that the potential for political expression is limited. The government carefully monitors usage; hosts are responsible for content posted to their site, and

government regulation prohibits material that might threaten the “public interest, public morality, public order, public security, [and] national harmony” or that “offends [...] good taste and decency”.⁴² Interestingly, though, sites that criticize the PAP have been allowed to continue posting content, provided that the sites register with the government. This strategy ensures that the internet does not become a tool of the opposition, because usage is relatively free, but the government is always watching. As with many other things in Singapore, expression is allowed, but in strictly circumscribed ways.

Given PAP's widely accepted legitimacy, the PAP's tactics seem unnecessary. Even if dissent were permitted, it does not seem likely that the PAP would even come close to defeat in elections. Policies promoting the provision of public goods and rapid economic growth have improved the quality of life for most Singaporean citizens, and dissent and revolution are mostly unknown sentiments. So why does the PAP continue to ruthlessly go after its opponents? One possible explanation is that the way in which dissent is routinely oppressed (though in non-violent ways) continues the atmosphere of fear. By cracking down on the opposition, disagreement with the government becomes an inherently antisocial activity. The targeted but complete defeat of opponents perpetuates the idea that with political freedom comes chaos – it makes the opposition seem like a more serious threat to society. This idea may seem counterintuitive, but it is part of a very carefully calibrated coercion on part of the Singaporean government.⁴³

The calibrated part is possible because Singapore has a high level of state capacity. State capacity facilitates Singapore's method of oppression, “calibrated coercion”. Cherian George coined the phrase “calibrated coercion” to describe the much-nuanced oppression in which the Singaporean government partakes. The use of the judiciary is one example; the control of the media and the internet provides another useful example. Singapore's breed of carefully balanced policy would not be possible in an autocracy

with less state capacity. Singapore's policies depend on the government's capacity to sanction non-compliance, increasing people's tendency to defer to the government.

It may be, too, that Singapore's size and economy enable it to exert control more effectively than other countries might. Singapore ranks 192 out of 251 countries in terms of total area⁴⁴ and has a highly homogenous economy that implies less incentive for competing sector interests. With no agricultural sector, and about 2/3 of its GDP composed of services, many of the sector-specific interest groups that arise in more diversified economies seem unnecessary. Combined with the state's intentional integration of ethnicities, discussed above, this carefully calibrated control may not be replicable elsewhere.

In light of this analysis, let us return to Lee Kuan Yew and the Asian values thesis as a rejection of modernization. The preceding analysis shows that rather than arising from a specific set of Asian values, most of the deference to authority in Singapore is created and perpetuated by the state. Careful balancing of despotic and infrastructural capacity prevents the path to democracy. Rather than cause us to reject the modernization thesis, Singapore may be the exception that proves the rule. Certainly, modernization does not necessarily lead to democracy, but the case of Singapore shows us that maintaining a non-democracy in an advanced economy involves high levels of carefully calibrated control. What

we also notice is that some of Singapore's success can be attributed to the adoption of elements of democracy: creating stakeholders, property ownership, and relatively free flow of information. Singapore even conducts elections, though of course these lack meaningful contestation.

In terms of policy, then, it would be useful to adopt a more nuanced view of modernization theory that incorporates its likely effects on democracy but also is responsive to specific country factors. The prospects for democracy in Singapore are not great, but in formulating policy, we should not fail to recognize the significant human development of which even non-democracies are capable. That being said, the role of voice and accountability that democracy provides is, as Milton Friedman said, a good in and of itself. The discussion above showed that there is a cost to limiting political freedom, even with a high level of public goods provision. Regarding democracy promotion, therefore, we should not neglect the importance of voice and accountability, especially in our efforts towards developing countries. Though Singapore has achieved quite a bit, the analysis here shows that it would be hard to replicate this high level of control elsewhere, and the costs to human development could then be enormous. Given the costs of a lack of voice and political expression, the tradeoff between decision-making ability and accountability embodied in Lee Kuan Yew's thesis should be decided on the side of democracy.



ENDNOTES

- 1 Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962): p. 8.
- 2 National Security Council, *The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, White House website, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html>>.
- 3 Seymour Martin Lipset, *Some Social Requisites of Democracy*, *The American Political Science Review* (1959): pp. 83-84.
- 4 United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Indicators*, UNDP website, <<http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/5.html>>, taken from World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2007*, Washington, DC, aggregates calculated for HDRO by the World Bank.
- 5 Dani Rodrik and Romain Wacziarg, *Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic Outcomes?*, CDDRL Working Papers, 29 (2004): p. 8.
- 6 Seymour Martin Lipset, *Some Social Requisites of Democracy*, *The American Political Science Review* (1959).
- 7 See the Freedom House website, <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/>>.
- 8 See Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

- 9 See Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Yale University Press, 1968).
- 10 Michael Ross, *Is Democracy Good for the Poor?*, *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 50, no. 5.
- 11 Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Random House, 1999): p. 15.
- 12 Bruce R. Scott, quoted in: Patricia Cohen, *An Unexpected Odd Couple: Free Markets and Freedom*, *The New York Times*, World Section, June 14, 2007.
- 13 Amartya Sen, p. 150.
- 14 Rodrik and Wacziarg, p. 205.
- 15 Prezworski and Limongi, p. 65.
- 16 Fraser Institute, *Economic Freedom of the World: 2008 Annual Report*, Fraser Institute website, <<http://www.freetheworld.com/>>.
- 17 Freedom House, *Freedom in the World – Singapore (2008)*, Freedom House website, <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/>>. Countries are ranked 1-7, with 1 the most free and 7 the least.
- 18 Polity IV Project, *2006 Country reports – Singapore*, <<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Singapore2006.pdf>>.
- 19 US Library of Congress, *Country Histories: Singapore*, <<http://countrystudies.us/singapore/10.htm>>.
- 20 Gavin Peebles and Peter Wilson, *Economic Growth and Development in Singapore: Past and Future* (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2002).
- 21 US Library of Congress, <<http://countrystudies.us/singapore/11.htm>>.
- 22 Singapore Department of Statistics, *Time Series on Annual GDP at Current Market Prices*, <<http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/economy/hist/gdp2.html>>.
- 23 Comments from Fareed Zakaria, *A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew*, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 73 (1994): pp. 113-114.
- 24 Russell Dalton and Nhu-Ngoc Ong, *Authority Orientations and Democratic Attitudes: A Test of the “Asian Values” Hypothesis*, *Japan Journal of Political Science*, 6 (Cambridge University Press, 2005): pp. 211-231.
- 25 Michael Mann, *The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results*, p. 113; first published in the *European Journal of Sociology*, available at <<http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/mann/Doc1.pdf>>.
- 26 *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.
- 27 Theda Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Current Research*, in: Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge University Press, 1985): p. 8.
- 28 Calculated based on a selected country report for advanced economies obtained from the *World Economic Outlook Database*, October 2008, at the International Monetary Fund website, <<http://www.imf.org/>>.
- 29 Human Development Index, *Human Development Report 2007/2008*, available at <<http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>>.
- 30 *World Bank Governance Indicators*, World Bank website, <<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>>.
- 31 Housing and Development Board website, <<http://www.hdb.gov.sg/>>.
- 32 Singapore government website, *Statistics*, <<http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/keyind.html>>.
- 33 Diane Mauzy and R. S. Milne, *Singapore Politics Under the People’s Action Party* (New York: Routledge, 2002): p. 100.
- 34 Freedom House Country Reports, *Singapore (2008)*, <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/>>.
- 35 Housing and Development Board website, <<http://www.hdb.gov.sg/>>.
- 36 Discussion based on DDRL class 2008-10-6 with Avner Greif, hypothesizing the effect of the Catholic Church’s policies restricting the formation of family ties on institutional growth and development in Europe.
- 37 Donald Emmerson, *Singapore and the “Asian Values” Debate*, *Journal of Democracy*, 6:4 (Oct. 1995): p. 95.
- 38 *The World Values Survey*, <<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>>, selected samples: Chile [2000], China [2001], Great Britain [1999], Republic of Korea [2001], Singapore [2002], Taiwan [1994], United States [1999], Indonesia [2001].
- 39 *International Herald Tribune*, Asia/Pacific section, September 30, 2008, available online at <<http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/09/30/asia/AS-Singapore-Obit-Jeyaretnam.php>>.
- 40 William Glaberson, *Paper to Pay \$214,285 in Singapore Libel Case*, *The New York Times*, November 29, 1995, World section.
- 41 See <<http://www.sba.gov.sg/>>.
- 42 *Internet Code of Practice*, <<http://www.sba.gov.sg/>>, 1996.
- 43 Cherian George, *Managing Civil Disobedience*, *Singapore Straits Times*, October 10, 2005, letters section.
- 44 *Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook*, <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2147rank.html>>.

MOLLY ELGIN

Molly Elgin graduated in June 2010 from Stanford University with a Master in International Policy Studies, with a concentration in Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. She is currently Chief of Staff at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. Her main research interests include international influences on political development, political transitions, and economic development, particularly in Asia. She earned her undergraduate degree in International Political Economy summa cum laude from Tulane University in 2004.