

# In Search of a New Radical Left:

## The Rise and Fall of the *Anpo* Bund, 1955-1960

**Kenji Hasegawa**

An hour before midnight on May 19, 1960, 500 police officers entered Japan's Diet and physically removed protesting Socialists from the chamber. One hour and six minutes later, Kishi Nobusuke's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) convened a new plenary session and voted for the passage of the revised US-Japan security treaty. With this, the controversial security treaty was set for automatic approval thirty days later, at midnight on June 19. The biggest national crisis in postwar Japan followed this legislative coup. Thousands of outraged protestors continually surrounded the Diet building in protest against Kishi's "undemocratic" act. It is for these post-May 19 protests, where unprecedented numbers of citizens took to the streets to "protect democracy," that the 1960 *Anpo* is most often remembered.

However, for the Bund, a group in search of a new radical left independent of the Japanese Communist Party, the *Anpo* struggle began earlier. Bund leaders Shima Shigeo and Ikuta Koji were members of the radical student movement of the early 1950s. Generally regarded as a "lost generation" betrayed by false promises of an imminent revolution, many of these student radicals grew disillusioned and quit radical activities. Shima and Ikuta were exceptions, continuing to involve themselves in the student movement throughout the 1950s. They established the Bund in December 1958 and gained control over the national student organization *Zengakuren* by the summer of 1959. Soon thereafter in late 1959, the Bund-led *Zengakuren* burst onto the

national scene through their disruptive protests against the security treaty.

Conservative political leaders intent on passing the revised security treaty fearfully eyed these students who threatened to wreak havoc on their plans. The students also drew the ire of established leftist forces, which viewed them as a group of "infantile radicals" that undermined a united anti-*Anpo* campaign. But some were sympathetic to the students. The then-progressive intellectual Shimizu Ikutaro looked back on the *Anpo* protests in September 1960 and criticized the established leftist groups' tempered tactics. Only the *Zengakuren* students seemed sincerely intent on stopping *Anpo* through their radical protests. It thus seemed unfair to Shimizu that these students were being criticized for their feckless behavior. For Shimizu, they were the "unlucky heroes" of the failed *Anpo* struggle.<sup>1</sup>

While the young radicals were pilloried by some and praised by others, it was beyond doubt that they mattered. 1960s *Anpo* was the apex of the radical student movement's influence in national politics. Their influence was great, but mixed. On the one hand, their disruptive protests against the security treaty from late 1959 served to attract attention to the issue, thereby laying the basis for the later mass protests that Kishi provoked. On the other hand, their radical tactics further divided an already fractured leftist coalition against the security treaty. In addition, their bloody clashes with the police struck fear in the hearts of many, likely contributing to the nation's eager embrace of political consensus after *Anpo*. While the Bund burst onto the national scene

<sup>1</sup> Shimizu Ikutaro, "Anpo senso no 'fuko na shuyaku'," *Chuo Koron*, September 1960, p.178-189.

in late 1959, they retreated just as abruptly in less than a year. As the *Anpo* struggle ended with automatic ratification on June 19, the Bund dissolved into conflicting factions and Shimizu's "unlucky heroes" quickly exited from the national political stage.

Why did the radical students establish the Bund? What did they hope to achieve? What defined the Bund and set it apart from other leftist groups? How and why did the Bund protest against *Anpo*? Why did it dissolve so quickly after the protests? The answers to these questions will help us situate the Bund in the postwar student movement, as well as in the 1960 *Anpo* protests.

### **Rokuzenkyo and Disillusionment with the Communist Party**

In the immediate postwar era, the Japanese Communist Party attracted many youths distrustful of authority. They knew by observing the world around them that adults, especially teachers, could not be trusted. Growing up in the late 1940s, Ono Akio often went to the library and devoured books with wartime "not to be read" signs on them. This was how he learned about the Communist Party, a group whose members had been imprisoned during the war for being staunch opponents of the war. Ono discovered the Communist Party and actively sought them out. He joined the party on his eighteenth birthday and became a *Zengakuren* leader in the early 1950s.<sup>2</sup>

One sees a similar pattern with Bund leader Ikuta Koji. Ikuta started to become an active communist in high school. According to a friend, leftist thought replaced baseball as Ikuta's favorite topic of conversation in high school. He would lend friends revolutionary literature then later ask them, "How was it? Wasn't it good?" His enthusiasm for Nikolaj Ostrovskij's *How the Steel was Tempered* was especially well-known among his friends, and there were not few who were "pretty much forced to read it."<sup>3</sup>

By the time Ikuta entered high school in 1949, the reverse course of the American occupation was in full swing. The outbreak of the Korean War the following year became a topic of heated discussion among high school students, especially among members of the debating club that Ikuta joined his freshman year. A debater with a Communist older brother proposed that they look not only at "bourgeois newspapers" but also the Communists' opinion. The debating club members agreed and some of them visited the Communist Party office. This was Ikuta's first contact with the Communist Party. It did not take long for the debating club to conclude that the war was American aggression.<sup>4</sup> In the course of debating the causes of the Korean War, the debating club started reading *The Communist Manifesto*, and later adopted Stalin's *The Basics of Leninism* as their textbook.

In October 1950, the main members of the debating club joined the Communist Party's youth group (*Minshu Seinendan*). Four months later, Ikuta joined the Communist Party along with debating club *senpai* Shiratori Kazuyoshi. Shiratori, determined to become a professional revolutionary, grew disillusioned with formal education and quit school his senior year. Ikuta, on the other hand, became senior class president. His father died in 1950, but his older brother took over the family business and assured him financial support for a national university. Ikuta thus scaled back his Party-related activities toward the end of his senior year and started studying intensively in order to get into Tokyo University (Todai). He graduated from Shizuoka Jonai High School as valedictorian and entered Todai in the spring of 1952. The morning after graduation, no longer under the threat of expulsion, Ikuta was handing out leftist pamphlets to younger students outside the school gate. Upon entering Todai, he became a leader of the Communist Party's military organization. These were physically trying times for Ikuta: friends remember him becoming emaciated and reeking from lack of nutrition and bathing.<sup>5</sup> Ikuta participated in the

<sup>2</sup> Ono Akio. *Zengakuren*. Tokyo, 1969. 306.

<sup>3</sup> Ikuta fusai tsuito kinen bunshu kankokai. *Ikuta fusai tsuito kinen bunshu*. Tokyo, 1967, 66.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p.77.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p.472.

Communist Party's "Molotov cocktail struggles" of the early 1950s until the party abruptly abandoned its violent tactics in 1955.

On July 28, 1955, the Japanese Communist Party held the Sixth National Party Congress (*Rokuzenkyo*), where the party leadership conducted a self-criticism of the party's violent tactics. The party leaders saw their past tactics as "leftist adventurism," based on the mistaken assumption that Japan was ripe for revolution. On the contrary, they now thought that reactionary forces were firmly entrenched. The Communist party needed to stop alienating the majority of Japanese people through their violence and build a wider support base.<sup>6</sup>

Morita Minoru, the Communist Party's *Todai* cell representative, was charged with reporting the *Rokuzenkyo* decisions to *Todai* party members. Morita remembers that student activists were shocked when he reported the party's self-criticism. Many student party members had been expelled from school or even disowned from their families by devoting themselves to the party's extremist activities. Given their sacrifices, the students felt betrayed. The future Bund leader Shima Shigeo was incensed. "What have I been doing these past five years?" he shouted angrily. "Was my self-criticism for factionalism also a mistake? What is right?"<sup>7</sup>

Confusion and anomie reigned among Communist activists in the aftermath of the Sixth Party Congress. It was the end of the "dark valley" of the postwar student movement characterized by ascetic lifestyles, internal spy-hunting, and military preparations for an imminent revolution. *Rokuzenkyo* signified the bankruptcy of the armed struggle tactics of the early 1950s. For the Communist Party's military organizations, it was the inglorious end to a misguided and meaningless struggle. Similar to what happened on a national level after August 1945, the issue of responsibility

and victim consciousness came to the fore. "*Rokuzenkyo* novels" about the wasted youth of student Communists proliferated.<sup>8</sup> One such novel was Shibata Sho's best-selling *Saredo wareraga hibi*. It portrays the aftermath of *Rokuzenkyo* in the following passage:

But there was no revolution. The following summer, the long confusion over party policy ended. The military organization was dismantled, and we returned to our schools.

In the midst of our confusion after the directive, the debates that outlasted the night over the not-to-be-criticized directive, the exhaustion and despair that followed, cloudy days, the smoke of burning documents from a small valley in the mountains, under the summer's sun, the smell of moist, shiny, newly dug up red soil, the old infantry rifles and *gobo ken* buried one after another in that soil, the various incidents that occurred among the humans there, the incidents that one never wishes to tell outsiders, in the midst of all this, I alone could not take any interest in anything but myself, and continued against my will to think, this is a happy thing, this is a happy thing.<sup>9</sup>

An anonymous opinion piece published in the *Todai* student newspaper conveys the sense of disillusionment and anger toward the Communist Party's mistreatment of its party members in the wake of *Rokuzenkyo*. Many people were driven to suicide as a result of the party's internal persecution. But this remained a neglected story. People, least of all the Communist Party leadership, did not seem to care about these tragic deaths. The author thus made a "proposal" in the form of the following poem:

Japanese Communist Party,  
Conduct a body count

<sup>6</sup> Scalapino, Robert. *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966*. Berkeley, 1967, p.88-96. Kobayashi Yoshiaki. *Sengo kakumei undo ronsoshi*. Tokyo, 1972, 109-116.

<sup>7</sup> Shima Shigeo was forced to conduct a self-criticism because he entered the International Faction of the Communist Party in 1950. As a former International Faction member, he was subjected to discrimination as a former "factionalist" despite his self-criticism. This no doubt added to his disillusionment with the Communist Party leadership. Nishibe Susumu. *60 nen anpo senchimentaru jani*. Tokyo, 1986, 131.

<sup>8</sup> Muto Kazuhiro, "Gakusei undo no 'chusei' to 'runessansu'," in Shiryō Sengo Gakusei Undo Geppo 3.

<sup>9</sup> Cited in Ono Akio, *Zengakuren keppuroku*, Tokyo, 1967, 163.

And lay the dead to rest with care in a  
communal grave  
You can put politics aside for a while  
Conduct a body count  
Lay the dead to rest with care in a  
communal grave  
Central Committee,  
District Committee,  
With your own hands take a plow and dig  
Dig a hole  
Set up a grave-post  
—If you cannot do this—  
Non-communists  
Us  
For the dead  
For us  
Is it all right to be silent  
They are idiotic  
Is it all right to make this a sign of our  
own idiocy<sup>10</sup>

As a result of *Rokuzenkyo*, the Communist Party's military organizations were dismantled, leaving many young activists abandoned. Student Communists found the party leadership's cavalier attitude in the wake of *Rokuzenkyo* unbearable. "Give me back my youth!" cried some devastated young radicals. But Ikuta was disgusted by those who ruefully mourned their wasted youth. "I don't have any regrets. I entered the Communist Party on my own volition!" he said. "I'm in no position to complain." But there was no doubt that *Rokuzenkyo* had a profound effect on Ikuta. With *Rokuzenkyo*, Ikuta's search for a new radical left independent of the Communist Party began.<sup>11</sup>

### **The Post-*Rokuzenkyo* Student Movement: Affirming Radical Struggle**

The post-*Rokuzenkyo* student movement shifted toward more "loveable" tactics. At the Seventh Central Conference, the *Zengakuren* leaders lamented that the student movement had lost touch with the students. Student leaders had

tried to use student demands and activities for political purposes, instead of "trying to realize student demands as they were."<sup>12</sup> Baseball and softball games, boat races, festivals, song and dance became important activities for building solidarity among students. As part of the *Zengakuren's* new policy of deepening ties with other students, student activists were encouraged to attend classes and talk with non-activist students.<sup>13</sup> Talking about "problems of love" was considered a mission: If a party member succeeded in making another student talk about such intimate matters, he had scored a victory toward gaining the trust of the student "masses."<sup>14</sup> The Seventh Conference closed with the following exhortation:

However dark and painful our life today may be, we must strongly unite as one, help each other, deepen our friendship, overcome adversity and continue studying. For the enjoyment of culture and sports, for a more cheerful and rich life, and for peace without which they would not be possible, let us unite and continue trying.... Let us strongly hold hands and march forward!

Some student activists were critical of the shift toward "loveable" tactics. One sees this in Oshima Nagisa's 1960 film *Nihon no yoru to kiri*. In the film, disgruntled student activists question how dancing with girls could lead to revolution.<sup>15</sup> Shima and Ikuta must have had similar doubts. As the following exchange in the *Zengakuren* Seventh Committee shows, their *Today* cell refused to embrace "festivalism."

Central Committee: [Today] student leaders are working hard, but they are unapproachable. I think that the basic problem is that student leaders need to stand on the same ground as students and think together with them.

Today Bungakubu: There is a problem in what you just said.... [You] are still talking about

<sup>10</sup> Tokyo Daigaku Gakusei Shinbun, October 8, 1956, 1.

<sup>11</sup> Ikuta, 69, 472.

<sup>12</sup> Shiryō sengo gakusei undo, v.3, 474.

<sup>13</sup> Shiryō sengo gakusei undo, v.3, 453.

<sup>14</sup> Morita Minoru, *Sengo sayoku no himitsu*, Tokyo, 1980, 96.

<sup>15</sup> In one scene, the folk dance party sponsored by the Communist Party ends and a Communist leader exhorts, "Let us fight energetically again tomorrow!" *Nihon no yoru to kiri* was released on October 9, 1960, then banned three days later when Socialist leader Asanuma Inejiro was assassinated. Oshima Nagisa, *Nihon no yoru to kiri*, Tokyo, 1966, 380.

how to make the student government closer to the students, or to stand on the same ground with the students. *The improvement of our activities is not a means of attracting everybody.*<sup>16</sup>

The choice between “loveable” tactics and a more confrontational style was a major point of contention in the post-*Rokuzenkyo* student movement. With protests over the university tuition raise in 1955 and over the Sunagawa land surveys the following year, the student movement moved away from “festivalism” and toward “radical struggle.”

In December 1955, the government proposed a national university tuition hike. Coming at a time when student leaders critical of “festivalism” were searching for ways to rebuild their movement, the tuition hike provocation was for them a welcome source of energy. The January 1, 1956 *Todai* cell newsletter published the rumor that the organization of private university managers announced, “If we are going to raise tuition, now, when the students are stagnant, is the right time.” According to the newsletter, the tuition hike was more than “simply an economic problem.” Rather, it was linked to changes in education policy and the reactionary trend in national politics.<sup>17</sup> A fearful Ministry of Education opposed “unnecessary tuition hikes which may stimulate the student movement,” but to no avail. For Shima and Ikuta, the tuition hike issue was a gift: it was a well-timed, politically contentious issue that directly affected students. The protests succeeded, and student leaders critical of “festivalism” grew confident that they could overcome the party’s “backward” leadership and revive the student movement.

Another important event in the wake of *Rokuzenkyo* was the Sunagawa struggle. In mid-1955, the Japanese government began a land survey in Sunagawa, a small village bordering Tachikawa Air Base, an American air transport center. The purpose of the survey was to prepare

for the extension of the base’s runway. In autumn 1955, following an initial wave of protests, Socialist representative Kato Kanju and the LDP government agreed to cancel the *Sohyo*’s (General Council of Japanese Trade Unions) mass mobilization to Sunagawa in exchange for a temporary halt of the survey. The local opposition group felt betrayed by this deal. Eager to break their reliance on the Socialists and *Sohyo*, the local opposition group approached *Zengakuren* in the fall of 1956 when the Hatoyama cabinet announced plans to resume the surveys.<sup>18</sup> The *Zengakuren* responded with alacrity. They set up a local struggle headquarters in Sunagawa, and from October 1, they mobilized from 700 to 2000 students each day. On October 12 and 13, students clashed physically with surveyors and police, leading to 500 injured and 4 arrests.<sup>19</sup>

The Sunagawa struggle anticipated the confrontational style of the *Anpo* protests. Like *Anpo*, Sunagawa also attracted widespread media attention, facilitating mass student mobilization. Timing and location helped too, as students had just finished the September exams and Sunagawa was easily accessible by bus. Morita Minoru, the *Zengakuren*’s peace group leader (*heiwa bucho*), led the student mobilization. He sent Sunagawa-bound buses to college campuses. On the way to Sunagawa, Morita spoke to the passengers through the bus guide microphone to harden their resolve. At thirty-minute intervals, the buses stopped and Morita changed buses for another agitation speech. He told the students that Sunagawa was going to become a nuclear base. The government had to be stopped at all costs: it was ignoring the constitution and trampling on the rights of local farmers.

Ikuta led one of the three groups of students that occupied strategic locations around the base. Many students spent the nights in local houses and schools, and Sunagawa came to resemble a communal boot camp. Students woke up to the *rajio taiso* (radio calisthenics) and prepared for physical clashes with the police during the day.

<sup>16</sup> Shiryo sengo gakusei undo, v.3, 469.

<sup>17</sup> Shiryo sengo gakusei undo, v.4, 3-8.

<sup>18</sup> Morita, 130-132.

<sup>19</sup> Koan chosacho, *Sengo gakusei undoshi*, March 1966, 65-66.

Like the *Anpo* protests, their style of confrontation was physical but mainly non-violent. Students wore a straw bag around their stomachs for protection against police batons, but most students did not wear helmets or carry weapons.

The first clash came on October 12. The police attacked the protesters, attempting to break up the crowd by removing each individual protester and physically pushing them away from the group through a tunnel lined by police officers. But some determined students returned to the rear of the crowd to be “tunneled” multiple times. On October 13, the police stepped up the assault, and the number of injured protestors mounted. In a much-romanticized episode, a chorus of “Akatonbo” arose from the protestors. According to Morita, students sang to keep their spirits up. At first they sang revolutionary songs, but not many students knew them. They thus switched to “Akatonbo,” which everybody knew. On October 14, the police and survey team did not come. The following day, the government announced its decision to cancel the surveys, giving rise to euphoric celebration by the protestors.<sup>20</sup>

Sunagawa was a powerful experience for many participants. A student protestor from Ochanomizu Women’s University described her experience as follows:

For the half a year that I had been in college, everything was vague, I did not feel alive, I could not figure out what I was nor should be, and each day was stifling and frustrating.... “Sunagawa” was in the news almost every day. The student government was appealing, “The expansion of Sunagawa is the first step toward making Japan a base for atomic and hydrogen bombs, and will threaten Japan’s peace. We wish for peace. Let us go to Sunagawa to protect Japan’s peace...” I felt no resistance to this logic, and to participate seemed to me a very natural thing.

She did not participate as a member of her student government, but rather went to Sunagawa

with a friend from high school. There was “something casual” about her actions, but once in Sunagawa, she was overcome by intense anger.

The yam farms interspersed with old thatched-roofed houses ended with one metal fence. On the other side, a perfectly flat airfield extended itself with infinite vastness and arrogance... When I saw this for the first time... And when the American plane flew in low trying to disperse us, violently blowing up dust, I lay low in the ditch amidst the suffocating sandstorm and heard the student government flag snap. When I heard this, I felt for the first time an anger bordering on madness... piercing through me.<sup>21</sup>

Another protestor influenced by Sunagawa was Karoji Kentaro, president of the *Zengakuren* at the time of the *Anpo* protests. In 1956 he was a freshman at Hokkaido University working part-time in a factory. Karoji joined the Sunagawa protests with his co-workers, and later told Morita that he entered the student movement as a result of his experience there.<sup>22</sup>

### **Breaking with the Communist Party, 1957-1958**

Tension rose between Mainstream *Zengakuren* leaders and the Communist party in the aftermath of the Sunagawa protests. The faction loyal to the Communist Party, led by Waseda University’s Takano Hideo, downplayed the effectiveness of the protests. According to the Takano faction, the real reasons for the government’s cancellation of the Sunagawa expansion were not the protests, but rather the increasing conflict between Japanese monopoly capitalists and the U.S., the global trend toward peace, and domestic public opinion. They called for a turn toward “economic struggles” instead of “political struggles” like Sunagawa. Shima, Ikuta, and the mainstream *Zengakuren* leaders thought this was nonsense.

<sup>20</sup> Morita, 130-145.

<sup>21</sup> Matsushita Minako, “‘Heiwa’ e no shiko wo kizamareta Sunagawa jiken,” *Asahi janaru*, December 20, 1959, 6-18.

<sup>22</sup> Morita, 142.

The conflict between the Takano and mainstream factions erupted in the Tenth *Zengakuren* Central Conference held in January 1957. For the mainstream faction, the international situation called for urgent action, as imperialists were preparing for anti-revolutionary warfare in former colonies. Without a “vigorous class struggle” against the imperialists, lasting peace was not possible. By contrast, the Takano faction thought the imperialists were on the defensive. They should struggle for peace by “containing imperialism,” but above all they needed to gain the widespread support of the Japanese people. The Conference ended with the mainstream faction in control. As a result, the *Zengakuren*’s activities in 1957 were marked by active participation in protests against rearmament.<sup>23</sup>

Toward the end of 1957, Ikuta was working toward the publication of the New Year’s issue of *Marukusu Lenin Shugi*, the *Todai* cell newsletter distributed independently from the Communist Party’s central leadership. The issue started with a New Year’s appeal by Ikuta, a forceful affirmation of the *Zengakuren*’s political activities of 1957. Ikuta applauded *Todai* student activists who had “fought valiantly without fear of suppression,” and stressed the importance of class struggle. “As a member of the organized vanguard of the working class,” he wrote, “our cell will fight...for the... forceful advancement of the student movement, and the struggle...against international imperialists and especially Japanese monopoly capital.”<sup>24</sup> This emphasis on the class struggle contrasted with the Communist Party’s focus on American imperialism. Although outright cooperation with the “big bourgeoisie” was out of the question, the Communist Party thought it was possible to “separate the big bourgeoisie dissatisfied with occupation policy from the pro-American, traitorous bourgeoisie, or to neutralize them.”<sup>25</sup>

Another divergence from the Communist Party concerned the evaluation of the international

situation. For the Communist Party, the rise of revolutionary national independence movements and the relaxing of Cold War tensions called for more moderate tactics. Ikuta, by contrast, thought the world proletariat should follow the inexorable tide of history by defeating the imperialists and establishing a classless society. In order to protect peace, what was necessary above all was “to organize an uncompromising struggle, with the world’s proletariat at the center, against imperialists.” The party needed to overcome its mistaken moderation by conducting a “truly Bolshevik self-criticism” at the Seventh Party Congress. Ikuta’s closing statement included a phrase then prohibited by the Communist Party: “Long live the victory of proletariat world revolution!”<sup>26</sup>

In the same issue of *Marukusu Lenin Shugi*, Yamaguchi Kazumasa wrote the influential essay “The Road of the October Revolution and Our Road.” In this essay, Yamaguchi denounced the Party’s pro-SCAP stance in the immediate postwar era. Even after the cancellation of the 1947 General Strike and the announcement of the Marshall Plan had revealed “the real intentions of American imperialists,” party leader Nosaka Sanzo stuck to moderate tactics. This diverted energy from “the class struggle whose showdown was approaching on the international level.” The same criticism was directed toward the party’s post-1950 policies. After an ineffectual period of guerilla tactics, the party leaders dissolved the proletariat’s vanguard forces under the “empty slogan of ‘the enemy is superior, we are inferior in strength’.” Yamaguchi concluded that a revival of Leninist international class struggle was necessary.<sup>27</sup>

Student radicals intensified their theoretical offensive against the Communist Party. At the Eleventh *Zengakuren* Central Conference of May 1958, the final clash between the mainstream and Takano factions occurred, and the radical mainstream faction expelled Takano’s “right-wing opposition

<sup>23</sup> Koanchosacho, “Sengo gakusei undoshi,” 68-70.

<sup>24</sup> Ikuta, 352-354.

<sup>25</sup> Kobayashi, 111.

<sup>26</sup> Ikuta, 354-359.

<sup>27</sup> *Kisetsu henshu iinkai ed. Mikan no ishi*. Tokyo, 1985 133-162; Kurata Keisei, *Anpo zengakuren*, Tokyo, 1969, p.38; Kobayashi, 143-146.

faction” from the *Zengakuren*.<sup>28</sup> It was at this point that the Communist Party intervened to regain control over the student movement.

On June 1, the Party Headquarters convened a meeting between party leaders and the representatives of *Zengakuren*. The party intended to bring the students into line, but the students intended to rebel. A verbal confrontation between angry students and party leaders was followed by a physical scuffle. When *Akahata* later denounced the students, they grew even angrier. According to *Akahata*, the meeting was marked from the start by dissent. Students insisted that a student should chair the meeting but the party leaders refused. The students reacted violently, denouncing the leaders as class traitors and physically attacking a party leader. The meeting was adjourned, but the students prevented the party members from leaving the room and continued the meeting. They demanded that the meeting be officially recognized. They then shouted, “Student party members, join the *Zengakuren* Central Committee group,” and left the party building. All decisions made during the unfortunate meeting, *Akahata* announced, were void.<sup>29</sup> According to Morita, the students were angered by the Communist Party’s efforts to divide the *Zengakuren*. The meeting, moreover, was made official by Konno Yojiro, the top authority present. For this, Konno was severely chastised by party head Miyamoto Kenji and “banished” to Tohoku as punishment.<sup>30</sup>

The June 1 Incident shocked Ikuta. A fellow activist who visited Ikuta following the incident remembered him repeating angrily, “There is no more hope for the Communist Party.” He was convinced that the students themselves needed to establish a new party. The skeptical activist told Ikuta that establishing a new party was unrealistic, but the undaunted Ikuta responded, “I don’t know

what you think, but I guarantee it. In five years there will be a revolution in Japan!”<sup>31</sup>

The final break with the Communist Party came after the Seventh Party Congress of July 1958. Shima and Ikuta attended the Congress for a final attempt to confront the Party leadership and force change from within. As they failed and the Congress ended with the party leadership “shamelessly unrepentant,” the two radicals gave up what little hope they had of the party’s “revolutionary revival.”<sup>32</sup>

Shima and Ikuta quickly started to organize their new party. From September 1958, they started distributing the clandestine newsletter *Puroretaria tsushin*, calling on disgruntled student party members to join their faction. In his essay in the October 28 issue of the *Tsushin*, Shima emphasized that the “student movement’s turning point” was at hand.<sup>33</sup> But he thought two groups were preventing the student movement’s success. One of these groups was the Communist Party; the students needed to check the party’s divisive “nasty scheming.”<sup>34</sup> The other group was the theoretically minded student activists who occupied themselves with “empty revolutionary slogans.”<sup>35</sup> Clearly Shima’s break with the Communist Party was nearing; the break with “empty slogans” would come later in another factional conflict.

Just as Shima and Ikuta started moving toward independence from the Communist Party in the winter of 1958, mass protests erupted over Kishi’s attempt to revise the Police Bill.<sup>36</sup> This controversy occurred as the Kishi administration accelerated preparations for the revised security treaty and can be considered, in George Packard’s words, the “dress rehearsal” for the 1960 protests.<sup>37</sup> The protests were directed against the Kishi administration’s initiative to expand the

<sup>28</sup> Kurata, p.40; Kobayashi, 152.

<sup>29</sup> “Zengakuren taikai daigiin gurupu kaigi no fushoji ni tsuite.” *Akahata*, June 5, 1958.

<sup>30</sup> Morita, 180-183.

<sup>31</sup> Ikuta, 106-107.

<sup>32</sup> Ikuta, 201-202, 478.

<sup>33</sup> *Shiryō sengo gakusei undo*, v.4, 419.

<sup>34</sup> *Shiryō sengo gakusei undo*, v.4, 424.

<sup>35</sup> *Shiryō sengo gakusei undo*, v.4, 430.

<sup>36</sup> In another case of remarkable timing, Ikuta fell ill with an acute case of hemorrhoids and retreated to a hospital in Shizuoka, not to return to Tokyo until March 1959. He was thus removed from the Bund’s founding and its early development, but remained in contact with Shima.

<sup>37</sup> Packard, George, *Protest in Tokyo*. Princeton, 1966, 101.

prerogatives of the police. Widespread protests over what people viewed as “undemocratic” legislative maneuvers by Kishi were further fueled by memories of the wartime police state, of which Kishi himself had been a prime member. The younger generation with no direct experience of wartime repression also joined in protest against the bill which, as one popular weekly magazine warned, would “get in the way of dating.”<sup>38</sup>

The protests forced Kishi to shelf the bill. The leftist opposition gained confidence in their ability to disrupt Kishi’s reactionary program. But Shima focused on the established leftist leadership’s incompetence that surfaced in the course of the protests. The Police Bill controversy, Shima explained in an interview in 1960, occurred when leftist forces were stagnant. But with Kishi’s move to revise the Police Bill, a storm of mass protests erupted. The peak of the protests came in early November, when Kishi unexpectedly extended the Diet session. At this crucial moment, Shima raged, the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, and *Sohyo* failed to harness the mass’s energy, instead turning toward moderate tactics and playing into the conservatives’ hands. These established leftist groups were insufficiently radical “opportunists” and could not be considered the “working class’s party.”<sup>39</sup> As the Police Bill controversy subsided in late November, Shima and the radical students were finalizing preparations for the establishment of their own radical leftist party.

On December 10, 1958, forty-five students gathered in Kuromoncho, Tokyo, for the founding ceremony of their new organization. The ceremony opened with Shima’s speech, followed by a critique of the existing international

communist movement by the young Todai radical Aoki Masahiko (aka Himeoka Reiji). The proposal to establish a new organization was subsequently approved unanimously. The name of the group was, following Karl Marx’s first organization, the Communist League (*Kyosanshugisha domei*), or, in the pithier German version, the Bund. The ceremony did not end with mere formalities, as factional politics and conflicts over personnel quickly surfaced. In the preparatory meeting held the night before the ceremony, even the post of Chief Secretary seemed uncertain. One member commented that, of course, Shima should occupy the post, but Shima balked. Shima said he needed to first carefully consider accepting such heavy responsibility before accepting the post the following day.<sup>40</sup> “I still cannot forget that night’s heavy atmosphere,” wrote a Bund member present at the meeting.<sup>41</sup>

The real problem over personnel concerned *Kakukyodo* (Revolutionary Communist League), a Trotskyist group critical of the Communist Party uniting under the Fourth International. “Trotskyist” was the Communist Party’s vituperative label for factionalists. Despite the party’s move away from rigid Stalinism, Trotsky’s works remained taboo. But it was this very nature of Trotsky’s works that appealed to Bund leaders. In 1960, Shima explained in an interview that while the party denounced the Bund as “Trotskyists,” Bund members wore the label proudly.<sup>42</sup>

While contrarian Trotskyist theories and *Kakukyodo* influence aided the Bund’s move away from the Communist Party, Bund leaders also increasingly distinguished themselves from the *Kakukyodo*’s “dogmatic” Trotskyism.<sup>43</sup> Ikuta

“ON DECEMBER 10, 1958, FORTY-FIVE STUDENTS GATHERED IN KUROMONCHO, TOKYO, FOR THE FOUNDING CEREMONY OF THEIR NEW [COMMUNIST] ORGANIZATION ... THE PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A NEW ORGANIZATION WAS SUBSEQUENTLY APPROVED UNANIMOUSLY. THE NAME OF THE GROUP WAS, FOLLOWING KARL MARX’S FIRST ORGANIZATION, THE COMMUNIST LEAGUE (KYOSANSHUGISHA DOMEI), OR, IN THE PITHIER GERMAN VERSION, THE BUND.”

<sup>38</sup> Kowada Jiro and Osawa Shinichiro, *Sokatsu Anpo hodo*, Tokyo, 1970, 18.

<sup>39</sup> “Torottsukiisto to iwaretemo,” *Chuo koron*, April 1960.

<sup>40</sup> Shima, *Bunto shishi*, 6-57.

<sup>41</sup> Tomioka Masao, “Bunto kessei wo junbi shita mono,” *Shiryō sengo gakusei undo geppo* 4, 4.

<sup>42</sup> “Torottsukisuto to iwaretemo.”

<sup>43</sup> Tomioka, 3.

advised Shima to dissolve the *Kakukyodo* faction. He wanted the Bund to be their own party and did not want to depend on the Fourth International. He thought the *Kakukyodo* members were untrustworthy and should be kept away from important posts.<sup>44</sup> At the Thirteenth *Zengakuren* Conference held three days after the Bund's founding ceremony, the older Bund leaders including Shima and Morita resigned their posts as student leaders. A struggle between the *Kakukyodo* and Shima's faction resulted in a compromise that left the *Kakukyodo* with substantial influence in the *Zengakuren*.<sup>45</sup> The conflict between *Kakukyodo* members intent on gaining control over the new organization, and those like Shima and Ikuta determined to expel them, began with the birth of the Bund and lasted until late 1959.

One of the sources of Shima's rebellion against the Communist Party had been its failure to take the students seriously. He did not repeat this mistake. In good *senpai* style, he opened his home to student activists who often came to work and talk late into the night. One of these activists was Karoji Kentaro. Karoji entered Hokkaido University in 1956 and became president of the student government the following year. It was to "seduce" Karoji into heading the *Zengakuren* that Shima traveled to Hokkaido in May 1959. Shima was impressed by Karoji's organizational skills. He was one of the reasons why Hokkaido had become a stronghold for the Bund.<sup>46</sup> Shima also thought that Karoji had the right looks: he was always smiling and had a rough, "bright sturdiness" about him.<sup>47</sup>

With persistent pleading and some beer, Shima was able to persuade the reluctant activist to move to Tokyo and head the *Zengakuren*. At the Fourteenth Conference held in June 1959, the Bund gained control over the *Zengakuren* leadership. With the twenty-two year old Karoji as president, the executive leadership included

young Bund members like Aoki Masahiko and Shimizu Takeo. Their average age was under twenty-one, the youngest leadership since the founding of the *Zengakuren*.<sup>48</sup>

#### Four Ideas that Defined the Bund

Factional struggles against the Communist Party and the *Kakukyodo* shaped the Bund. The Bund was also influenced by the rapid social changes of late 1950s Japan. What kind of organization resulted from these actions and circumstances? One can gain an understanding of the Bund through four ideas that defined it: "class struggle," "mass struggle," "antiauthority," and "brightness."

*Class Struggle.* On the theoretical level, the Bund distinguished itself from the Japanese Communist Party by embracing Marxism. The naming of the Bund, as well as their "borrowing" the original Bund's platform at the founding ceremony,<sup>49</sup> reflected their "back-to-Marxist-basics" approach. The emphasis on class struggle and the denunciation of "loveable" tactics derived from the radical students' critique of the Communist Party leadership. For example, in preparation for the Seventh Party Convention, Ikuta wrote that the Communist Party's nationalistic characterization of Japan as a nation dominated by the United States was wrong: "Today's Japan is clearly a divided, conflicted society, and there is no national interest that transcends class."<sup>50</sup> The established left's "betrayal" of class struggle became a recurring theme in Bund statements. Thus, while Shima would later claim that he attempted to create a revolutionary movement "freed from Marxism as a rigid monolithic ideology,"<sup>51</sup> the Bund's thought remained heavily Marxist, even more so than the Communist Party. The Bund's understanding of the *Anpo* revision process was a case in point. While the Communist Party emphasized resistance against US imperialism, the Bund was

<sup>44</sup> Ikuta, 433.

<sup>45</sup> Shima, p.58. Kobayashi, 190.

<sup>46</sup> Shima, 83.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 173.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

<sup>49</sup> Shima Shigeo. *Bunto shishi*. Tokyo, 2001, 63.

<sup>50</sup> Ikuta, 328.

wary of nationalistic ideologies that lost sight of the centrality of class struggle. They theorized that *Anpo* reflected the resurgence of Japanese monopoly capital and *Japanese imperialism*.

*Mass Struggle*. Whereas the Bund emphasized “class struggle” to distinguish itself from the Communist Party, it stressed “mass struggle” in its conflict against the *Kakukyodo*. Instead of focusing on the *Anpo* struggle, the *Kakukyodo* wanted to concentrate its energies on the Miike struggles given their stronger class nature.<sup>52</sup> By contrast, Bund leaders saw in *Anpo* greater potential for radical mass protests and denounced the *Kakukyodo* as “Trotskyist dogmatists.”<sup>53</sup> Action in the form of “mass struggle” was the Bund’s *raison d’être*.

Above all, students were the “masses” in the Bund’s “mass struggle.” Shima did not want to downplay the student movement with a narrow conception of “class struggle.” Some radicals were critical of putting too much energy into the student movement, but Shima was wary of a “workers firstism” that undervalued the students. Although the proletariat and the working class remained “sacred” concepts in the Bund, Shima later explained, he knew that workers movements were not always revolutionary. Because of their freedom, students were in a position to readily conduct radical struggles.<sup>54</sup> Shima’s emphasis on capturing the student masses resembled the Communist Party’s “broad-basism.” But for the Bund, “mass struggle” needed to be based on radical “struggles.” They thus rejected both the *Kakukyodo*’s “leftist sectism” which failed to organize the student masses, as well as the Communist Party’s “opportunism” based on moderate tactics.<sup>55</sup>

*Antiauthority*. Shima Shigeo explained in an interview with the sociologist Tsurumi Kazuko that he became disrespectful of his teachers in high school. After August 1945, he saw them quickly renounce militarism and embrace “democracy” and also saw them sell products from the school farm on the black market. His father was another authority figure that the disenchanted youngster rejected. Shima opposed the Red Purge as a form of rebellion against his father, who was executing the policy for the conservative government.<sup>56</sup>

Shima was fourteen years old in 1945. Many youths of his generation grew up as patriotic young militarists. Like Shima, they saw their militaristic teachers do an abrupt about-face and learned the sad “truth” about the past war. Sakata Minoru comments that the early teens is a time in psychological development when rebellious tendencies are especially strong. For Shima’s generation, this life stage coincided with their

colossal disillusionment with authority after August 1945. Hence, argues Sakata, this generation lived the postwar era with an unusually strong hostility toward authority.<sup>57</sup>

Shima considered antiauthority the “major rallying point in [the Bund’s] thought.”<sup>58</sup> The rebellion of radical student protestors in the *Anpo* protests was directed not only against the conservative establishment, but also against the established leftist forces. Ikuta wrote in the founding document of the Bund that they needed to “liberate the proletariat from all illusion concerning the established Communist leadership, construct an independent revolutionary left based on the revival of a truly revolutionary Marxism, and unite the

“  
SAKATA MINORU COMMENTS THAT THE EARLY TEENS IS A TIME IN PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT WHEN REBELLIOUS TENDENCIES ARE ESPECIALLY STRONG. FOR SHIMA’S GENERATION, THIS LIFE STAGE COINCIDED WITH THEIR COLOSSAL DISILLUSIONMENT WITH AUTHORITY AFTER AUGUST 1945. HENCE, ARGUES SAKATA, THIS GENERATION LIVED THE POSTWAR ERA WITH AN UNUSUALLY STRONG HOSTILITY TOWARD AUTHORITY.”

<sup>51</sup> Tsurumi Kazuko, *Social Change and the Individual*. Princeton, 1970, 332.

<sup>52</sup> The strikes at the Miike coal mines occurred contemporaneously with the *Anpo* struggle.

<sup>53</sup> *Shiryō sengo gakusei undo*, v.5, p.127. Kobayashi, 202-203.

<sup>54</sup> Shima, p.82. See also Karoji Kentaro’s explanation in “*Zengakuren no ronri to kodo*,” *Asahi janaru*, 10 December 1959, 10.

<sup>55</sup> *Shiryō sengo gakusei undo*, v.4, 428-430.

<sup>56</sup> Tsurumi, 375.

<sup>57</sup> Sakata Minoru, “*Sengo sedai ‘gentaikens’ no keifu*,” *Asahi janaru*, October 1, 1980, 143.

<sup>58</sup> Tsurumi, 332.

revolutionary proletariat under it.”<sup>59</sup> Rejection of authority led the young Shima and Ikuta to the Communist Party. They subsequently came to regard the Communist Party as the tyrannical authority figure.

*Brightness.* One cannot capture the essence of the Bund through its theories alone. Its style of protest and the ambience of the organization go further in conveying what the Bund meant for its members. In his interview with Tsurumi Kazuko, Shima described the Bund as a “bright” organization:

At the time of the anti-*Anpo* campaign, the situation in Japan on the whole was not dark and oppressive as it was at the time of the Red Purge. The general atmosphere surrounding us was full of light, and we also felt full of light within ourselves. Our primary motivation was to revive our own humanity. We had been reading Marx’s earlier writings and came to realize that our basic problem was self-renewal, for we had been alienated to such an extent under the capitalist system as to become part of the machine, completely losing our humanity. We feel there is a clear line of demarcation between ourselves and the communists of the prewar days. Their primary motivation was the spirit of martyrdom. They said they were sacrificing themselves for the sake of the proletariat. In contrast, emancipation of ourselves as human beings has become our primary concern since the time of the anti-*Anpo* campaign.<sup>60</sup>

For Shima, much of the “brightness” of the Bund derived from finally breaking with the Japanese Communist Party. From age nineteen to twenty-six, Shima wrote, his life was dark. During this time, his father died, he struggled to survive economically, and he often fell ill. But above all, the Communist Party was the source of his

unhappiness. When they became Bund leaders, Shima and Ikuta could finally criticize all establishment forces without holding back. In contrast to the dark, stifling Communist Party, the Bund was “bright, full of life, and completely free.”<sup>61</sup>

Another aspect of the Bund’s “brightness” was the refecation of the times: 1950 and 1960 were different worlds. By the late 1950s, the era of high growth was starting. The spread of popular weekly magazines and compact paperback books, the launching of electric household appliances, and the feverish spread of hoola-hoops and *dakkochan* dolls signaled the arrival of a “consumption revolution.”<sup>62</sup> Although material affluence was just as much, if not even more, linked to the resurgence of “Japanese monopoly capitalism” as Kishi’s initiative to revise the security treaty, the Bund’s theorists did not reject this new “brightness.” The Bund did not subscribe to a theory of middle-class alienation like some western New Left groups. Late 1950s Japan likely retained sufficient vestiges of widespread poverty to discourage the spread of anti-consumerist ideologies. It is quite possible that the Bund attracted students who tended to embrace wholeheartedly the new “bright” consumer culture. Some critics called Bund radicals “red *kaminarizoku*” and “red *taiyozoku*,”<sup>63</sup> epithets suggestive of the convergence of consumerism, counterculture, and the student movement.

As the high growth era started, a new generation of youth was coming of age. Too young to remember August 1945 and educated fully under the “6-3” democratic education system instituted by SCAP in 1947, they can be considered the first purely postwar generation. When the Bund was established, this new generation was entering college. During and after the *Anpo* protests, scholars and government officials showed remarkable concern about this new generation. Was Japan going to be overrun by a new generation of student revolutionaries?

<sup>59</sup> *Mikan no ishi*, 21.

<sup>60</sup> Tsurumi, 376.

<sup>61</sup> Shima, p.65; Ikuta, 202.

<sup>62</sup> This term appeared in the 1959 White Paper on Citizen Life (*Kokumin seikatsu hakusho*). Kishimoto Eitaro ed., *Gendai no howaito kara*, Kyoto, 1963, 60.

<sup>63</sup> *Kaminarizoku* (biker gangs) and *Taiyozoku* (materialistic playboys based on Ishihara Shintaro’s widely read novel *Taiyo no kisetsu*) were two major models of delinquent youths of this period.

The surveys showed that there was no such danger. A survey conducted in Todai's Komaba campus in the wake of the *Anpo* protests revealed that even there, widely considered the center of the radical student movement, a vast majority of students were not sympathetic to *Zengakuren* leaders.<sup>64</sup> Another 1960 survey in Hosei University vividly showed a new trend in the students' temperament. Asked about how they wished to live their lives, the students' answers were the following:

1. 42.0% Live according to my interests without thinking about money or honor.
2. 20.0% Live each day cheerfully and without worry.
3. 9.7% Overcome the injustices of the world and live justly.
4. 5.0% Devote self fully to the public without thinking about self.
5. 4.2% Work hard and become rich.<sup>65</sup>

Only a few years earlier, the majority of students had chosen number 4 as their answer. Public mindedness was on the decline, *petit bourgeois* mentality on the rise. Other surveys gave a similar picture.<sup>66</sup> This was clearly not a recipe for a violent student-led revolution.

"Living according to one's interests" did not preclude participation in the Bund-led student movement. According to Eda Satsuki, a member of the purely postwar generation who entered Todai in 1960, participating in student protests left him with ample free time to enjoy fun activities such as *gohai* (co-ed hiking trips) with Tokyo Women's University students.<sup>67</sup> The Bund was an "open" organization that welcomed the participation of part-time activists like Eda. The "brightness" of the Bund tended to attract students with an outgoing and rowdy temperament. Ozaki Moriteru, a student counselor at Todai, noted the contrasting styles of the two *Zengakuren* meetings

held on July 2, 1960. The Bund-led mainstream faction's meeting was often filled with loud laughter, and he could feel the "young passion" of the students. Guest speakers were invited with the warning that they would be heckled, and indeed, they were subject to a chorus of the then-fashionable "*nansensu!*" and various other jeers. By contrast, the anti-mainstream faction's meeting resembled an academic seminar. The audience was quiet and polite, with many students taking notes. Ozaki also noticed that women students dressed differently. While those attending the mainstream meeting tended to wear stylish one-piece dresses and large straw hats, the dress of those attending the anti-mainstream meeting was more subdued.<sup>68</sup>

"Class struggle," "mass struggle," "antiauthority," and "brightness" defined the Bund, but they hardly constituted a political vision. For this, they needed a platform, which Bund leaders began to draft in June 1959. "There is no vanguard party without a platform," Shima told Bund members.<sup>69</sup> Ikuta drafted the platform and Bund leaders discussed it for three days. But despite these initial efforts, the platform was never completed.

The Bund was fraught with numerous contradictions that had accumulated in the course of Shima and Ikuta's search for a new radical left. How could the Bund prioritize "class struggle" and world revolution while gaining the support of non-radical student "masses"? How could they maintain their hopes for revolution amidst an incipient "bright" culture of mass consumption that they themselves could not reject? No party platform could have resolved these contradictions. The platform was abandoned because Bund leaders had little to gain and much to lose by obsessing over such irresolvable dilemmas. Theory was subordinate to action for the Bund, and as Kishi pushed ahead with preparations for the security treaty revision in late 1959, the time

<sup>64</sup> 93.6% of those surveyed answered that they felt either "very distant" or "somewhat distant" from the student leaders. Naikaku kanbo naikaku chosashitsu, *Gendai gakusei no seikatsu to ishiki*, July 1961, 69.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p.45-46.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p.38-50.

<sup>67</sup> Eda Satsuki, *Shuppatsu no tameno memorandum*, Tokyo, 1997, Chapter 3.

<sup>68</sup> Ozaki Moriteru, *Daisan no sedai*. Kyoto, 1960, 126-127.

<sup>69</sup> Nagasaki Hiroshi, *Nihon no kagekiha*. Tokyo, 1988, 25.

for action was nearing. In October 1959, Shima gave a stirring speech to Bund members exhorting them to fight the *Anpo* struggle with all their strength.<sup>70</sup> Within a year of its founding, the contradiction-filled Bund marched headlong into the *Anpo* struggle.

### The Bund and the *Anpo* struggle

On a clear late-autumn day, the Bund manufactured the first explosion of the *Anpo* struggle. November 27 was the day of the People's Council's<sup>71</sup> Eighth United Action, a massive petition march on the Diet. On this day, the demonstrations did not end, as previous "united actions" had, with an orderly display of opposition. Already in early November, the Bund leaders had decided to use the November 27 United Action to storm the Diet. On November 16, the *Zengakuren* leadership called on students to "exert [themselves] fully to enter the Diet and pull Kishi out in front of the workers and students."<sup>72</sup> On the day of the United Action, Bund "action troops" entered the Diet compound and opened the Diet's front gate as the demonstrators approached. Another group led the demonstrators into the Diet compound as if it were the natural course of the march.<sup>73</sup> The Bund's plan succeeded. Students and laborers stormed the Diet for the third time since the end of World War II, euphorically snake dancing, rhythmically shouting "*Anpo hantai, Anpo funsai,*" urinating on the Diet wall, and generally savoring the breakthrough moment.

The ensuing Ninth United Action on December 10 was a disappointment for the Bund. The People's Council cancelled their march on the Diet and left the radical students with no opportunities to wreak havoc. Not to be denied, the Bund set its sights on January 16, when Kishi was to fly to Washington for the signing of the revised security treaty. The Kishi administration almost thwarted the Bund's plan by sneaking the Prime Minister out of the country early in the morning before *Zengakuren* demonstrations started. At the last minute,

“ AT THE LAST MINUTE ... THE ZENGAKUREN HASTILY MOBILIZED STUDENTS TO OCCUPY THE HANEDA AIRPORT TERMINAL BUILDING. THE STUDENTS BARRICADED THEMSELVES INSIDE THE BUILDING BUT WERE EVENTUALLY EXPELLED BY POLICE. KISHI DEPARTED FLUSTERED BUT UNHARMED. BUND LEADERS KAROJI, AOKI, IKUTA, AND OVER SEVENTY OTHER STUDENT ACTIVISTS INCLUDING KANBA MICHIKO WERE ARRESTED... ”

however, word leaked of Kishi's early departure time, and the *Zengakuren* hastily mobilized students to occupy the Haneda Airport terminal building. The students barricaded themselves inside the building but were eventually expelled by police. Kishi departed flustered but unharmed. Bund leaders Karoji, Aoki, Ikuta, and over seventy other student

activists including Kanba Michiko were arrested at Haneda. With the majority of its leaders imprisoned, some speculated that the Bund would dissolve. But the *Anpo* issue was starting to attract widespread interest. The Bund stepped up its campaign to "ride the wave" and take the offensive.<sup>74</sup>

By April, the activists arrested at Haneda returned to the Bund. They found that the anti-*Anpo* movement was gaining momentum, as a remarkable range of people began to voice their opposition to *Anpo*. They also drew inspiration from developments in Korea, where on April 19, student demonstrators overthrew the authoritarian President Syngman Rhee. The Bund set its

<sup>70</sup> Shima, 90-93.

<sup>71</sup> The People's Council (People's Council for Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty) was a *Sohyo*-led coalition of leftist forces.

<sup>72</sup> Naikaku kanbo naikaku chosashitsu, *Anpo kaitei mondai no kiroku*, December 1961, 493.

<sup>73</sup> Morita, 235.

<sup>74</sup> Packard, p.173-178. Morita, p.248-250. Shima, 99-104.

sights on April 26, the last day that the LDP could force the treaty through the Lower House for automatic ratification by the Upper House. While the People's Council organized a petition drive, the Bund ridiculed their "oshoko demo"<sup>75</sup> and planned to storm the Diet. The swelling of the *Anpo* wave corresponded with the entrance of a new cohort of impressionable freshmen into universities in early April, and approximately 30,000 students joined the April 26 demonstrations. This was the largest number of student demonstrators since the start of the anti-*Anpo* campaign.<sup>76</sup>

The anti-mainstream *Zengakuren* students marched separately. This division was not new, but tensions were also starting to surface within the Bund. Today Bund members did not want to abruptly plunge young freshmen into radical demonstrations. Convinced that the time was ripe for another explosion, Shima overruled the dissenting Today Bund students and went ahead with plans to storm the Diet. Seeing that the Today members refused to accept his plan, Shima discussed tactics with Karoji and other loyal activists until the dawn of April 26. They decided to urge students on the spot to follow the leaders over the police trucks and into the Diet. As planned, exuberant demonstrators followed student Bund leaders over the barricade into Diet compounds. Shima was so moved by this sight that he "could not hold back tears."<sup>77</sup> But it was clear that the Bund was beginning to unravel. Disgruntled Today Bund members were determined "not to be arrested in the name of those losers" who were heading the Bund. As Bund leaders scaled the barricade, Today Bund members called on students not to follow them.<sup>78</sup>

The LDP's unilateral approval of the revised treaty on May 19 transformed the anti-*Anpo* movement into a veritable national crisis. From this date, outrage against Kishi's "undemocratic" maneuver came to dominate any reasoned opposition to *Anpo* itself. "I am not about to debate with people supporting *Anpo* right now; there is no time for debating," appealed China scholar Takeuchi Yoshimi. "Let us first rebuild democracy."<sup>79</sup> Massive demonstrations continually raged around the Diet after May 19. It seemed that the overwhelming rise in "mass energy" that Bund leaders had been waiting for finally became a reality. But by this time, the Bund's end was nearing. "There was no longer any unity, nor were there any prospects for future action," Shima recalls.<sup>80</sup> The anti-mainstream *Zengakuren* began to adopt a Bund-like style of agitation, its directives emphasizing urgency with a plethora of exclamation points. But this was small consolation for the Bund, who became just another group of angry young demonstrators.

June 15 was the final explosion of the *Anpo* struggle. The two *Zengakuren*s gathered around the Diet along with a motley array of groups including actors, professors, Christians, and right wing youths eager to harass the protestors. Shima arrived early on the scene to survey the police formation on the Diet grounds and told the student leaders to target the South Gate.<sup>81</sup> The mainstream *Zengakuren* group gathered in front of the South Gate around 16:30. The leader then shouted for the rope, but it was nowhere to be found. For about an hour, the students discussed how to break into the Diet. A student leader later explained that this confusion resulted from the lack of a central

<sup>75</sup> "Oshoko" refers to the act of placing incense and praying at a Buddhist altar.

<sup>76</sup> There were 20,800 students in the November 27 demonstrations. Koan chosachitsu, December, 1960, *Anpo toso no gaiyo*, 183.

<sup>77</sup> Shima, 115-116.

<sup>78</sup> Nishibe Susumu. *60 nen anpo senchimentaru jani*. Tokyo, 1986, p.163. Karoji Kentaro was arrested on April 26. When he left prison in November 1960, he was greeted by representatives from three separate radical student groups. The *Anpo* struggle had ended, and the Bund had dissolved. See Tachibana Takashi, "60 nen anpo eiyu no eiko to hisan," *Bungei shunju*, February 1969, 246.

<sup>79</sup> Nagasaki, 33-34.

<sup>80</sup> Ikuta, 207.

<sup>81</sup> Shima, 123.

leadership that looked after the whole.<sup>82</sup> It was clear that by this time, the Bund leaders were no longer functioning as the planners and coordinators of student protests.

Determined to conduct a “protest meeting” inside the Diet compound, Mainstream *Zengakuren* students started to pry open the South Gate around 17:30 with rhythmic calls of “*yoisho, yoisho.*” An opening appeared, and students started pouring in. A series of violent clashes between students and police ensued. Kanba Michiko was killed and over 1,000 people were injured. As a result of the shocking June 15 incident, Kishi finally gave up hopes for Eisenhower’s visit to Tokyo that had been planned to coincide with the ratification of the new security treaty. The mainstream press called for the restoration of order. “Expel violence and protect parliamentarism,” proclaimed the June 17 front-page joint statement by the seven major newspapers.

On June 18, with the revised security treaty’s automatic ratification imminent, over 80,000 student protestors gathered around the Diet.<sup>83</sup> But the Bund was powerless. Only a few Bund members attended when Shima convened a meeting that morning.<sup>84</sup> Shima remembered the moments before automatic ratification at midnight as follows:

I was in front of the Prime Minister’s residence with tens of thousands of students and citizens surrounding the Diet. In front of the demonstrators who snaked danced around the Prime Minister’s residence, and among the students who just sat there..., powerless, I was crouched, vomiting as if to squeeze out the contents of my empty stomach.

By my side, Ikuta was standing beside the Communist League flag, yelling angrily with arms flailing, ‘Damn it, damn it, this energy! We can’t do anything with this energy! There is no more hope for the Bund.’<sup>85</sup>

Less than two years earlier, Shima and Ikuta had decided that there was no more hope for the Communist Party and established the Bund. As the *Anpo* protests ended with the treaty’s automatic ratification, they were confronted with the bitter reality of their own limitations.

The Bund’s *Anpo* struggle ended in defeat. They were unable to prevent the ratification of the treaty. They were also unable to maintain unity at what seemed to be the most opportune moment, when the *Anpo* protests swelled into unprecedented proportions. At the Bund’s Fifth Conference in July 1960, Bund leaders were forced to come to terms with their own failures. The Conference started with a moment of silence for Kanba Michiko. Shima then started to report his evaluation of the *Anpo* struggle. Overcome by chest pains, he was unable to continue. Ikuta took over, reading the report with the ill Shima lying down. As expected, an onslaught of criticism against the Bund leaders ensued. Ikuta did not attempt to defend himself. Nor was Shima able to counter the criticisms, and after the Conference, the Bund dissolved into separate factions.<sup>86</sup>

### **Moving on and Remembering: Shima and Ikuta after Bund**

For about a year after the *Anpo* struggle, Shima languished at home, drinking alcohol and smoking cigarettes. His wife Hiroko supported them financially until she finally

<sup>82</sup> “6.15 Ryuketsu jiken no kiroku,” *Asahi janaru*, 3 July 1960, 10.

<sup>83</sup> Koan chosacho, *Anpo toso no gaiyo*, 183.

<sup>84</sup> Shima, 128.

<sup>85</sup> Ikuta, 194.

<sup>86</sup> Shima, 137-139.

fell ill from overwork. Ikuta rescued them by helping establish a private classroom that Shima managed for the next four years. In 1963, Shima returned to Todai Medical School and graduated the following year. After two years of internship, he became a practicing psychiatrist.<sup>87</sup>

Unlike Shima, Ikuta had remained in school throughout his activist days. As he continued to devour books on economics after *Anpo*, he grew disillusioned with Marxist economics and started studying econometrics. In the third year of his PhD program in the Todai Economics Department, Ikuta decided to transfer to the University of Pennsylvania's Department of Regional Science upon the recommendation of his adviser. Ikuta wrote to a friend that this was a "good excuse" for him to "escape to America."<sup>88</sup> His planned escape did not go smoothly however, as he was almost denied a visa because of his past involvement in "anti-American activities." A frantic Ikuta came to Shima's house and rummaged through Bund documents, searching for evidence that could absolve him. He found nothing but damning evidence. Nevertheless, Ikuta eventually obtained his visa and successfully entered the United States in August 1964. He was nearing completion of his dissertation when a nighttime fire consumed him and his wife in their apartment on March 23, 1966. After their funeral, as friends and families met in a coffee shop in Tokyo, Shima proposed the publication of a book in remembrance of the Ikutas. The book was completed a year and a half later.<sup>89</sup>

Ikuta's death provided Shima with the impetus to tell his and Ikuta's story of their involvement with the Bund. Shima was motivated to tell his story a second time when another tragedy struck. In 1991, Shima's second son Satoru, a twenty-three year old university student, was diagnosed with

leukemia. To tell his terminally ill son about his experience as a Bund leader, Shima wrote "Bunto shishi" ("A Personal History of the Bund") in two months, finishing it in early 1992. Shima handed the manuscript to his hospitalized son, who teasingly commented that his father had grown old to write such a thing. Satoru died in April 1993. He was twenty-four years old, the same age as Kanba Michiko when her life prematurely ended in 1960.<sup>90</sup> The manuscript was later published in a book entitled *Bunto shishi*. Soon after its publication, Shima Shigeo died on October 17, 2000 at the age of sixty-nine.

### Conclusion

For Shima Shigeo and Ikuta Koji, the Bund was the culmination of their search for a new radical left. Their search coincided with the politically contentious issue of security treaty revision and the dawning of the high growth era. The confluence of these factors shaped the Bund, a "bright," young, action-oriented revolutionary group whose members became the "unlucky heroes" of the *Anpo* struggle. The Bund was an organization fraught with contradictions. It was a revolutionary organization intent on producing a classless society. It was also a "bright," mass organization that sought to attract a large number of student activists. Above all, it was an action-oriented organization that sought to produce political crises by planning radical protests. *Anpo* was the Bund's political stage. Without it, the Bund, full of contradictions and devoid of a viable political vision, was doomed. But the demise of the Bund began not after, but rather at the height of the *Anpo* struggle. The reason for this early decay was the perennial problem of factionalism, which would continue to define the post-*Anpo* radical student movement.

The legacies of the Bund are many and mixed. In the history of the radical student

<sup>87</sup> Tachibana Takashi. "60 nen anpo eiyu no eiko to hisan." *Bungei shunju*, February 1969.

<sup>88</sup> Ikuta, 437.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, p.492-495. The personal essays and documents it contains are richly informative of the Ikutas and the history of the Bund.

<sup>90</sup> Shima, 216-221.

movement, the Bund was pivotal in ushering in a new era by divorcing the movement from the Communist Party. After the Bund's dissolution, numerous "New Left" groups sprang from its remains. The Bund also left a distinct mark on postwar history through the 1960 *Anpo*. While they were unable to prevent the revised US-Japan security treaty's ratification, the Bund-led radical students played a major role in making the 1960 *Anpo* the biggest national crisis in postwar Japan. The "incidents" they produced were central to the *Anpo* protests. Both Kishi's rushed escape from Haneda on January 16 and the cancellation of Dwight Eisenhower's visit to Japan resulted from the

students' radical protests, not the established left's tame demonstrations. But at the same time, the students' radicalism may have bred fear in the Japanese public, which, while virulently anti-Kishi in June 1960, was above all intent on protecting democracy and peace. Indeed, the horrified reactions of the major newspapers to the June 15 incident suggest that as protests intensified, fear of spreading violence began to eclipse outrage against Kishi. The Bund radicals may thus have facilitated the swift transition from 1960 *Anpo* to the ensuing high growth era remarkably devoid of political contention. Perhaps this, above all, made these radical students the "unlucky heroes" of the *Anpo* struggle.