

U.N. General Assembly denounces Communist China for Aggression in Korea. - Acceptance of Modified U.S. Resolution. - Rejection of Asian-Arab Resolution. - Political Committee Debates. - Good Offices Committee to seek Peaceful Solution with Peking Government. - Chou En-lai's Denunciation of U.S. Resolution. - Mr. Attlee on British Attitude to the Resolution. - Mr. Nehru on Indian Attitude to Far Eastern Crisis. - President Truman's Statement. - U.S. Congressional Resolutions.

A resolution calling on the United Nations to declare the Chinese Communist Government an aggressor was formally introduced in the Political Committee of the General Assembly on Jan. 20 by Mr. Warren Austin, the U.S. delegate. After noting that the Security Council, "because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea," the resolution (1) noted that the Peking Government had rejected all the U.N. proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to a peaceful settlement, and that its armed forces continued their invasion of Korea and their attacks upon the U.N. forces; (2) declared that the Peking Government, "by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea, and by engaging in hostilities against the U.N. forces, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea"; (3) called on that Government to cease hostilities against the U.N. forces and to withdraw its own forces from Korea; (4) affirmed the determination of the U.N. "to continue its action in Korea to meet the aggression"; (5) called upon all States to support the U.N. action in Korea, and to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors; (6) requested the Collective Measures Committee as a matter of urgency to "consider additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression, and to report thereon to the General Assembly"; and (7) affirmed that it continued to be the policy of the U.N. to bring about a cessation of hostilities and the attainment of U.N. objectives in Korea by peaceful means.

During the following ten days the U.N. resolution was debated by the Political Committee, encountering strong opposition from the Asian and Arab countries, who urged the acceptance of the 12-nation Asian-Arab resolution (see 11201 A) in its place. Serious doubts as to the advisability of an outright denunciation of Communist China as an aggressor were expressed on behalf of the British Government by Sir Gladwyn Jebb, but, after U.S. acceptance of Lebanese amendments to the wording of the resolution, the latter was adopted both by the Political Committee and the plenary session of the Assembly with the support of the Western countries (including Britain) and the Latin American nations, and against the opposition of the Soviet group, India, and Burma, whilst most of the Arab and Asian countries abstained.

Although the U.S. resolution was supported on Jan. 21 by the Colombian, Cuban, Dominican, Greek, Haitian, Panamanian, Peruvian, Turkish, and Uruguayan delegates, **Sir Benegal Rau** (India) urged the Committee to give careful examination to the Chinese counter-proposals, while **Dr. Palar** (Indonesia) believed that any move to condemn the Chinese Communists as aggressors "in the present delicate situation" would only make the maintenance of peace more difficult, and took the view that the Chinese counterproposals merited "the closest attention."

On the following day **Sir Benegal Rau** informed the Committee that he had received through the Indian Ambassador in Peking an amplification of the Peking Government's terms for a cease-fire in Korea, and an intimation that a limited cease-fire could be agreed upon immediately if the Seven-Nation Committee suggested in the Chinese counter-proposals were convened to negotiate on all outstanding problems in the

Far East; called for a 48-hour adjournment to enable the Political Committee to study the implications of the latest Chinese communication; and read the text of that message, which ran as follows:

- “(1) If the principle that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Korea is accepted and put into practice, the Central People's Government of China will assume responsibility for advising the Chinese volunteers to return to China.
- (2) Regarding the conclusion of the war in Korea, and a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem, we think that we can proceed in two steps: (i) a cease-fire for a limited time-period can be agreed upon in the first meeting of the Seven-Nation Conference, and put into effect so that the negotiations may proceed further; (ii) in order that the war in Korea may be concluded completely and peace in East Asia ensured, all conditions for the conclusion of the war must be discussed in connexion with political problems in order to reach agreement upon the following: `Measures for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea; proposals to the Korean people on the measures to effect a settlement of the internal affairs of Korea by the Korean people themselves; the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from Taiwan (Formosa) and the Taiwan Straits in accordance with the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, and other problems concerning the Far East.’
- (3) A definite affirmation of the legitimate status of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations must be ensured.”

In the light of the latest message from Peking, the 12 nations sponsoring the Asian-Arab resolution (Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen) tabled a resolution on Jan. 24 calling for the establishment of a Seven-Nation Committee consisting (as proposed by the Peking Government) of representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, India, Egypt, and the People's Republic of China) with the following terms of reference: “To meet as soon as possible for the purpose of securing all necessary elucidation and amplification of the Chinese People's Republic reply of Jan. 13, 1951, and of making any incidental or consequential arrangements towards a peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern problems.” When the Political Committee reconvened on Jan. 25, **Sir Gladwyn Jebb** (Great Britain) declared that there could be no doubt that the Peking Government had taken an active part in aggression against the Korean Republic, and that from the moral point of view its action had been reprehensible, stating in this connexion: “In nothing that I am saying is there the slightest attempt to condone the attitude of the People's Government. They have undoubtedly pursued a policy which, if unchecked, can lead to chaos in the civilized world as we know it. It may even bring to nothing all the patient efforts which have been made since the war to build up a system of collective security on which not only the small nations but the greater nations as well must rely.” After reiterating that H.M. Government had from the outset deplored the Peking Government's acts, and would leave nothing undone to put a check to aggression, he pointed out, however, that the Political Committee was confronted with two opinions on how best to uphold the rule of law and deal with a culprit, (a) that there was no alternative but to proceed to condemnation and punishment, and (b) that it was still possible for the culprit to “see the light” and be persuaded. “Either method, if successful, will have the effect of upholding the law,” he said; “are we then to proceed by the method of penalties or by that of attempted reform ?” Sir Gladwyn went on to declare that the British Government were not prepared at the present stage to say whether Communist China was irrevocably bent on a policy of militant aggression or whether her leaders fully comprehended the “dangerous precipice” which gaped before them; “until the situation had been further clarified,” he declared, “until we have the answers to some of these major questions, we should not do well to consider measures which in fact prejudice them. Such measures, if applied, might well result in further crises with consequences none of us could foretell.” After pointing out that the military measures taken by the U.N. had so far been confined to the limited field of Korea, he added: “Once we go beyond that field, may it not be that the punishment may cause wider havoc than the crime ? May it not be that the cure may be worse than the disease ?... When it comes to considering further measures I should be less than frank if I did not express the gravest doubt regarding the wisdom of any such action before the intentions of the Peking Government were further explored.” In conclusion, Sir Gladwyn asked the U.N. to continue to study the “ambiguities” of the Peking Government's replies, said that the British Government would support any proposal to set up machinery seeking further clarification, and emphasized that they would like to see action in which (1) the position of the U.N. would be maintained, (2) the U.N. would stand firm in Korea and do its utmost to repel aggression, (3) the U.N. would accept no settlement contrary to the principles which had been laid down, and (4) the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem would be “explored to the limit.” On the question of China's representation in the U.N., he reiterated the British position that the Peking Government was entitled to a

seat in the world organization, and emphasized that this position was neither “a concession, appeasement, or weakness, but recognition of a fact.”

Mr. Lester Pearson (Canadian Secretary for External Affairs, and a member of the U.N. Cease-Fire Committee appointed earlier to negotiate with Peking) made a statement on Jan. 26 expressing support for the U.S. resolution and declaring that Canada would vote for the condemnation of Communist China and a study of possible sanctions. At the same time, however, he put forward a series of suggestions for immediate action to bring about a solution of the Far Eastern crisis, as follows: (1) the convening of a conference (either at Lake Success or New Delhi) within a week, consisting of the U.S.A., Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, India, Egypt, and the Peking Government; (2) this conference would establish a Cease-Fire Committee as its first task; (3) after ceasefire arrangements were completed, the conference would discuss a peaceful solution of the Korean problem and the withdrawal of all foreign forces; (4) the conference would then discuss Far Eastern problems generally, with priority for the Peking Government's demand for recognition by the U.N.; (5) any Government specially concerned with any particular Far Eastern problem should be invited to attend the conference; (6) this plan (i.e. the six proposals) would be submitted to Peking, and a reply requested within 48 hours.

During the subsequent discussions on Jan. 26–27, full support for the U.S. resolution was expressed by **Sir Carl Berendsen** (New Zealand), **Mr. J. P. Jooste** (South Africa), **Dr. Carlos Muniz** (Brazil), and other delegates, whilst **M. Tsarapkin** (U.S.S.R.) and **Dr. Katz-Suchy** (Poland) supported the alternative Asian-Arab resolution recommending exploratory talks with Peking. **Mr. Eban** (Israel) agreed that Communist China should be denounced as an aggressor, but urged that the question of sanctions should be avoided pending new efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in Korea. **Mr. Warren Austin** (U.S.A.), however, declared that the U.S. Government was strongly opposed to the Asian-Arab resolution and would not support it in any form, however amended; insisted that the U.N. was faced with two vital questions, (1) whether it was “capable of pronouncing a moral judgment that is in accordance with obvious facts,” and (2) whether it was “capable of formulating measures and means for taking collective action based on these facts and moral judgments”; and added: “The world waits with bated breath to see what takes place in this Committee in answer to those questions. . . . Let us ask ourselves with honesty and candour whether the U.N. should put itself in the position of suppliant to a transgressor and make further appeals to him. It is the view of the U.S. Government and people that the U.N. has already delayed too long in naming the aggressor. We are conscientiously opposed to any further U.N. action which avoids the central issue.”

In view of the unwillingness of many delegations, including the British, to accept the American resolution in its original wording, inter-governmental exchanges of views took place, as a result of which the Lebanese delegate, Dr. Charles Malik, introduced an amendment in the Political Committee on Jan. 29 suggesting some textual modifications to the resolution and involving a certain amount of rephrasing so as to make it more generally acceptable. Specifically, the amendment, proposed (1) that the original phrase in the U.S. resolution declaring that the Peking Government “has rejected” all calls by the U.N. for a cease-fire should be reworded to read “has not accepted,” etc.; (2) that the report of the Collective Measures Committee on the possible use of sanctions should be deferred if the Good Offices Committee reported satisfactory progress in its efforts to achieve a solution of the Korean crisis by peaceful means.

This amendment was accepted by the U.S. delegation, and the U.S. resolution in its modified phrasing was approved by the delegates of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, and a number of Latin American countries in the debate on Jan. 30. **Sir Gladwyn Jebb**, announcing that he had been instructed to vote for the U.S. resolutions as modified by the Lebanese amendment, declared that the U.N. had no option but to condemn Chinese Communist aggression, and that there would be “no majority in this Committee for negotiations on an honourable basis unless we first establish—to our own satisfaction at any rate—our moral ascendancy”; at the same time he emphasized that the Lebanese amendment left the door open for further negotiations with the Peking Government. The amended resolution was attacked by **M. Tsarapkin** (U.S.S.R.) and **Dr. Katz-Suchy** (Poland) as “designed to widen even further the scope of the war” and as intimating that the U.S.A. had shown itself opposed to peace by negotiation; at the same time M. Tsarapkin supported the Arab-Asian resolution, incorporating a Soviet amendment calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and of U.S. troops from Formosa.

After rejecting the Asian-Arab resolution (calling for a Far Eastern conference with the participation of the U.S.A., Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, India, Egypt, and the Peking Government) on a series of paragraph-by-paragraph votes, the Political Committee approved the modified U.S. resolution on Jan. 31 by 44 votes to 7, with 9 abstentions. The resolution was adopted by the plenary session of the Assembly the following day by an identical vote, the detailed ballot being as follows:

For the resolution—Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China (Nationalist), Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Persia, Peru, Philippines South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against the resolution—Burma, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, India, Poland, Soviet Union, Ukraine.

Abstentions—Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

The resolution as finally adopted was worded as follows, the textual modifications inserted at the suggestion of the Lebanon being italicized:

“The General Assembly,

Noting that the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea;

Noting that the Government of the People's Republic of China *has not accepted* United Nations proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement, and that its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea and their large-scale attacks upon U.N. forces there;

Finds that the Government of the People's Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea, and by engaging in hostilities against U.N. forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea;

Calls upon the Government of the People's Republic of China to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the U.N. forces and to withdraw from Korea;

Affirms the determination of the United Nations to continue action in Korea to meet the aggression;

Calls upon all States and authorities to continue to lead every assistance to the U.N. action in Korea;

Calls upon all States and authorities to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea;

Requests a committee composed of the members of the Collective Measures Committee as a matter of urgency to consider additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression and to report to the General Assembly, *it being understood that the committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee, referred to in the following paragraph, reports satisfactory progress in its efforts.*

Affirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of U.N. objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests the President of the General Assembly to designate forthwith two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end.”

Statements on the attitude of the British and Indian Governments to the resolution were made in the plenary session by Sir Gladwyn Jebb and Sir Benegal Rau.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb, giving what he described as “a short explanation of the understanding which has enabled me to vote in favour of the U.S. resolution,” spoke as follows: “Now that we have established our moral position by condemning the Central People's Government for engaging in aggression, the most important thing is to concentrate on the problem of a peaceful settlement—or, as I would prefer to say, on an agreed solution—of the Korean question, rather than on the question of potential sanctions. Apart from the fact that the consideration of sanctions should not even be started by the Assembly for a long time yet, so as not to prejudice any hope of an agreed solution that may remain, my Government, quite frankly, has the gravest doubts whether any punitive measures can be discovered which are not dangerous, double-edged, or merely useless, or any which will materially assist our brave troops now fighting in Korea. The study group to be set up (i.e. the Collective Measures Committee) may well report in this sense, or it may report that certain minor measures could profitably be taken. But it is obviously doubtful how far its report, whether negative or mildly positive, can assist in the attainments of any agreed solution on the one hand, or any imposed solution on the other. My delegation would deprecate any haste in the presentation of its report, and more particularly any attempt on its part to force the hand of the Good Offices Committee.” Sir Gladwyn added that the British Government attached great importance to the suggestions outlined by Mr. Lester Pearson, which contained “many valuable ideas which may well form the basis of an eventual settlement.”

Sir Benegal Rau set forth India's reasons for voting against the amended U.S. resolution as follows:

- “(1) It will prolong hostilities in Korea indefinitely, may extend the area of conflict, and may even lead ultimately to global war.

- (2) To combine proposals for negotiation with a previous condemnation of a Government with which you are going to negotiate deprives the condemnation of any moral force, and at the same time deprives negotiations of the best chance of success.
- (3) So many mistakes have been made about the Chinese People's Republic during the last 12 months that the resolution does not seem fair in its condemnation.
- (4) The issue of aggression is not so simple as it looks. According to the highest authority, condemnation of the Chinese People's Republic as an aggressor implies the previous recognition of that Government, and since there is no such recognition there can be no such condemnation. Again, according to high authorities, only the Security Council can find that a nation is an aggressor.
- (5) Finally, the 12-Power (Arab-Asian) resolution, had it been adopted, would have produced a cease-fire within perhaps a week and a definite programme for the removal of various misunderstandings. The present resolution does not end hostilities, nor does it hold any reasonable prospect”

M. Nasrollah Entezam, the President of the General Assembly, made the following statement after the final vote:

“Although the Assembly has voted to brand Communist China an aggressor, it is clear that the United Nations has not closed the door to negotiations and to hopes of a peaceful settlement. I shall hasten to set up a Good Offices' Committee. It is now for other parties to take advantage of the United Nations' desire to negotiate.”

A statement by Chou En-lai (Premier and Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist Government) was broadcast by Peking radio on Feb. 4 in which the U.S. resolution was denounced as “illegal, slanderous, null and void,” and in which it was intimated that the Peking Government would not recognize the Good Offices Committee set up under the resolution.

After reiterating the Peking Government's desire for a peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern problems, and declaring that the Asian-Arab resolution had “definitely shown a genuine desire for peace,” the Chinese statement continued:

“The majority of nations in the U.N., under the domination and coercion of the U.S. Government . . . rejected in the First (Political) Committee on Jan. 30 the 12-nation resolution and amendments submitted by the Soviet Union, and adopted the U.S. resolution, which slanders China as an aggressor in Korea. On Feb. 1 these nations again adopted the U.S. resolution in the General Assembly.

This, in the most naked way, proves to the peace-loving people of the world that the U.S. Government and its accomplices want, not peace, but war, and that they have blocked the path to a peaceful settlement.

The U.N. General Assembly, encroaching upon the powers of the Security Council, has blatantly adopted the U.S. resolution slandering China without the participation of representatives of the People's Republic of China. This is illegal, slanderous, null and void, and the Chinese people firmly express their opposition.

This resolution is an utter perversion of the truth. While it is obviously the U.S.A. which engineered the Korean incident and invaded Korea and Taiwan (Formosa), the resolution alleges that the People's Republic of China is invading Korea.... It demands the adoption of measures against the righteous actions of the Chinese people in aiding Korea to resist American aggression so as to protect their homes, and further demands the withdrawal of the Chinese volunteers from Korea.

The U.S. Government has repeatedly rejected the various proposals made by China and the Soviet Union for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem, and even rejected the 12-nation resolution for the convening of a seven-nation conference. Yet the U.S. resolution alleges that the People's Republic of China did not accept the various U.N. proposals for the cessation of hostilities in Korea in order to achieve a peaceful settlement. It is true we cannot accept the treacherous U.S. proposals of a cease-fire first and negotiations later, and therefore proposed a seven-nation conference to negotiate for the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of troops, and a settlement of all related problems. But when we made the further statement that, after the convocation of a seven-nation conference, a cease-fire for a limited period could be agreed upon before further negotiations on all related problems, the U.S. Government lost no time in intimidating and coercing the majority of the nations in the U.N. into hurriedly rejecting the resolution for a seven-nation conference. Is this not clear proof of the intention of the United States to extend war and oppose peace?... The Chinese people henceforth recognize all the more clearly the aggressive ambitions of American imperialism, will be the more determined to defeat aggression, and will understand better how to take all necessary measures to cope with the attempts of American imperialism and its accomplices to extend aggressive war.

The Indian delegate to the U.N. was right in his statement that the action taken by a majority of nations in the General Assembly meant: 'No cease-fire, no negotiations, and no peaceful settlement.' This is the aim of the U.S. Government in coercing these nations. This is the real purpose of the U.S. resolution. More specifically, the aim of American imperialism is to continue its invasion and occupation of Korea and Taiwan and its intervention in Vietnam and South-East Asia, to proceed with a separate peace treaty with Japan and the rearmament of Japan, and to co-ordinate it with its rearmament of Western Germany, so as to realize its dream of exclusive domination of the world by driving the peoples of Asia, Europe, and the world into the abyss of war..."

Chou En-lai's statement ended by describing the Good Offices Committee provided for in the resolution as "an attempt to deceive good-hearted but naive peace-loving people"; described the creation of such an organ as "illegal" and the resolution itself as "an insult to the Chinese people"; and declared that the People's Republic of China "will absolutely pay no attention to such an organ."

In London, the Korean crisis was considered by the Cabinet at a lengthy meeting on Jan. 22 after the Prime Minister had seen the Indian High Commissioner (Mr. Krishna Menon) at Downing Street. The following statement on the British Government's attitude to the discussions then in progress at the U.N. was made to the House of Commons by Mr. Attlee on Jan. 23:

"H.M. Government welcomed the initiative taken by a number of Asian and Middle Eastern States in December to bring about a cease-fire in Korea in order to explore the possibilities of a negotiated settlement. Their first proposals were rejected by the Chinese People's Government on the ground not only that the cease-fire principles were unacceptable in themselves, but that the Cease-Fire Committee was an illegal body because of the exclusion of representatives of that Government from the United Nations. In the face of this rejection, which coincided with strong military pressure endangering U.N. forces in Korea, a new and very dangerous situation was created. In spite of the rejection of their proposals, the Cease-Fire Committee displayed the utmost patience and perseverance and proceeded to draft a set of 'general principles' which, in their view, might form the basis for a settlement in the Far East. Before these 'principles' had been tabled in the Political Committee, the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth met in London in accordance with long-standing arrangements.... We agreed on the urgency and importance of promoting a satisfactory settlement in the Far East, and expressed our earnest hope that the fresh approach which had then been made in the Political Committee of the Assembly might lead to a settlement of outstanding issues in the Far East. This fresh approach referred to the principles for a settlement which had been tabled by the Cease-Fire Committee by an overwhelming majority, though the Soviet and satellite delegates, in spite of all their protestations about peace, saw fit to vote against these principles. They were then referred to the Central People's Government of China.

The Chinese reply was received on Jan. 17. It seemed to H.M. Government that the reply, though most disappointing, did not finally close the door to negotiations. It seemed to us that before we could decide on the interpretation to place upon the Chinese reply, it would be necessary to try to elucidate it, and the Foreign Secretary instructed H.M. Chargé d'Affaires in Peking to put to the Chinese Government certain points in their reply and to request an explanation. The most important issue was the reference to a cease-fire, and on this point the Chargé d'Affaires, who was received by the Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs on Jan. 21, was informed that, as the Chinese Government saw it, there should be two steps in regard to concluding the war in Korea and reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. The first step should be a cease-fire for a limited period, which could be agreed upon at the first meeting of a conference of the Powers and immediately put into effect so that negotiations might proceed. The second step, in the Chinese view, was to discuss a number of problems, among them the withdrawal of foreign (including Chinese) troops from Korea, proposals for the future of Korea itself, the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from Formosa, and other problems concerning the Far East. At the same time, the Vice-Minister made it plain to the Chargé d'Affaires that the People's Government of China must be given their rightful place in the United Nations.

This then is the point which we have reached in regard to Korea. We must decide whether the Chinese reply genuinely holds out any prospect of a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem and of relations between China and the rest of the world on a basis in harmony with the principles of international conduct enshrined in the Charter. At the same time it is necessary to study the Chinese reply in the context of what they are in fact doing and have done in Korea. Do their actions in Korea support the view that they are prepared to accept normal principles of international conduct? This is not an easy decision to take. The wording of the Chinese reply, even with the help of the further explanations now given to us, is not altogether clear, and we cannot be certain as to their real intentions.

In a situation of this sort it is essential that we should continue to take counsel with our friends. In particular we must give all weight, in this Asian dispute, to the views of Asian countries. As I read it, there is a general feeling among the countries of Asia that we must patiently pursue every possibility of a peaceful settlement with China so that the now emerging China may be given an opportunity, should she so desire, to play her part in the community of nations on equal terms with other members.

These are the considerations which we have in mind in considering what our policy should be in view of the resolution now tabled in the Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly. For our part we have not lost hope of a negotiated settlement of the Korean war, nor have we lost hope that China may yet be ready to play her traditional part in world affairs and live on friendly terms with other members of the world community. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the United Nations should not at this stage take a new and important decision. The resolution at present before the Political Committee seeks to condemn Chinese actions in Korea as the acts of an aggressor, to invite the Collective Measures Committee to study what additional measures can be taken against China, and to set up a Committee of Good Offices.

It follows from what I have said that H.M. Government welcome the proposal to set up a Committee of Good Offices, which will provide machinery for exploring every possibility of a negotiated settlement. H.M. Government likewise recognize the stark facts of the situation in Korea, and agree in condemning Chinese intervention in support of an aggressor which has thwarted and frustrated the purposes of the United Nations. But we do not believe that the time has yet come to consider further measures. To do so implies that we have abandoned hope of reaching a peaceful settlement, and this we have not done."

A further statement was made by Mr. Attlee to the House of Commons on Feb. 1 setting forth the reasons why the British Government had supported the modified U.S. resolution in the General Assembly. "I said on Jan. 23," said Mr. Attlee, "that the Government wished to explore every possibility of a negotiated settlement while fully recognizing the facts of the situation in Korea and the nature of the Chinese intervention there. We did not believe, however, that the time had yet come to consider the adoption of further measures. It was for this reason that we could not have supported the U.S. resolution in its original form. Paragraphs 2 and 8 of the resolution in their unamended form were not acceptable to the Government.... It was the Government's view that it was not correct to say that the Chinese Government 'had rejected' all U.N. proposals, and as regards Paragraph 8 it was our view that it was premature to consider additional measures until the Good Offices Committee, established under Paragraph 9 of the resolution, had reported.

After exchanges of view with the Commonwealth Governments and the U.S. and other Governments, these paragraphs were amended. Paragraph 2 was amended to read that the Chinese Government 'had not accepted U.N. proposals' instead of 'had rejected all U.N. proposals,' and in the case of Paragraph 8 an important addition was made. The effect of this addition was to defer consideration by the Assembly of further measures in the event of the Good Offices Committee reporting progress. Thus the essential principle is maintained that the U.N. will continue its efforts for a peaceful settlement, and that there can be no question of the U.N. proceeding to further measures until it has become apparent that those efforts have failed.

I would especially call the attention of the House to the final paragraph in the resolution, which affirms that it continues to be the policy of the U.N. to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of U.N. objectives by peaceful means, and requests the President of the Assembly to designate two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end.

It seemed to us that the resolution in its amended form offered the best hope in existing circumstances of obtaining a settlement by negotiation, and accordingly our representative was instructed to vote in favour of it. From the close contact which we have maintained with many of the Governments supporting the resolution, it is clear that they share our view of the importance and urgency of the task entrusted to the Good Offices Committee, and wish to see it begin its work as soon as the resolution has been approved by the General Assembly.

The attitude of the U.S. Government as sponsor of the resolution is of particular importance. In this connexion let me recall the statement made by the President of the United States on Jan. 25 in Washington (see below), when he is reported to have said: 'Let me stress again that the American resolution contains, as all our proposals have contained, a method of bringing about a cease-fire and opening the way for a peaceful settlement of outstanding issues.' In the light of that statement, and as a result of the close contact maintained between our two Governments, we feel confident that the U.S. Government will give every assistance to the Good Offices Committee in its efforts to promote a peaceful solution.

The United Nations has pointed the way and shown the will for peace. China has much to gain by co-operation and much to lose by withholding it. It is my earnest hope that the People's Government of China will respond to any efforts which may be made by the Good Offices Committee to bring about a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement in the Far East."

Shortly after his return to India from the London Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, Mr. Nehru delivered the following broadcast on Jan. 24 on the Indian Government's attitude to the Korean and other Far Eastern problems:

"The most urgent problem today is that of the Far East, where brutal war has raged for many months in Korea and innumerable innocent lives have been sacrificed. It is true that there was aggression, there, but it is also true that none of us are wholly free from blame. For the past year or more we persistently proposed that new China should be given a place in the counsels of the world at Lake Success. Yet this was not done, and most people realize now that the fate of the world might well have been different if that obvious fact had been recognized. There has been reluctance and hesitation to accept the great changes that have come over Asia. There is still an attempt sometimes to treat the great nations of Asia in the old way. Yet the major fact of the age is the emergence of this new Asia. This must be recognized if we are to deal realistically with the world of today. Because the U.N. did not recognize it, difficulties arose and continue to trouble us.

Again, there was the question of crossing the 38th Parallel in Korea. Adequate notice and warning was given, but it was not heeded, and further complications ensued. Can we not say, now wiser after the event, that this was a major error which should have been avoided? It serves little purpose to go back to past history, except to learn from it for the future. We have to deal now with the present and the future, and sometimes it appears that we have failed to learn these lessons of the past. A proposal has been made in the U.N. to name China an aggressor. This proposal cannot lead to peace. It can only lead to intensification of conflicts, and might perhaps close the door to any attempt at a solution by negotiation. It is a tremendous responsibility for any person to take such a step. At no time should this door be closed, for if we close it we also close the door to a civilized approach to any problem.

I am convinced that there is an overwhelming desire for peace all over the world, whether in the East or the West. My visit to Western countries has convinced me of this. The information I have received from our Ambassador in Peking has also convinced me that the People's Government of China is eager to have negotiations for a settlement of the Korean and other problems of the Far East. Their reply to the resolutions of the U.N. Political Committee, embodying certain principles, was considered by some people as a rejection of those principles. After the closest scrutiny, I was totally unable to understand this criticism. That reply was a partial acceptance of those principles, and certain further suggestions were made which were obviously meant to be discussed.

Subsequent to this, further clarification has come from the Chinese Government, and this has made it even more clear that they are desirous of negotiations for peace in the Far East. It is easy to argue about words and phrases, and such argument can continue indefinitely. But the occasion demands the highest statesmanship and approach to these vital problems in a temper of peace and friendliness. It is clear to me that enough has been said on both sides for negotiation in conference to be the next fruitful step. The time has come, therefore, for the representatives of the Powers concerned to meet together and discuss their problems, instead of talking at each other across thousands of miles.

If the problem of the Far East is tackled with success, this will itself remove the great tension that exists today all over the world, and it will be easier to deal with the other problems of Asia and Europe. We have thus a great opportunity today of turning the tide of events not only away from war, but in the direction of enduring peace. I appeal to the great nations of the West, who are repositories of that magnificent culture which we have admired, and whose astonishing scientific and technical achievements have opened out a new era for mankind, to cross this door of opportunity in search of peace. To the nations of Asia I can speak, perhaps, in even more intimate language, and express the fervent hope that they will stand by the methods of peace whatever happens."

President Truman, in his press statement on Jan. 25 to which Mr. Attlee made reference (see above), set forth the attitude of the U.S. Government to the discussions in the U.N. Political Committee as follows: "Ambassador Warren Austin has fully and forcefully presented the views of this Government on our attitude towards aggression by the Chinese Communists. These views have the solid support of the Executive, Congress, and people of the United States. Each member of the U.N. must make its own decision on this issue. For my part, I believe in calling an aggressor an aggressor. The question of what can and should be done about the aggression in Korea must of course be discussed with all other friendly

nations. Obviously this is no time for rash or unwise action. This is a time for clear thinking and firmness. Let me stress again that the American resolution contains—as all our proposals have contained—a method for bringing about a cease-fire and opening the way for peaceful settlement of outstanding issues.” The U.S. House of Representatives, by an overwhelming voice vote with only two or three dissenters, had on Jan. 19 adopted a bipartisan resolution, sponsored jointly by the Democratic and Republican House leaders (Representatives John W. McCormick and Joseph W. Martin respectively), asking that the United Nations “should immediately act and declare the Chinese Communist authorities an aggressor in Korea.” On Jan. 23 the U.S. Senate likewise unanimously adopted two resolutions, both sponsored by Senator McClellan (Democrat, Arkansas), which called on the United Nations (1) to proclaim Communist China an aggressor, and (2) to bar her from membership of the U.N. Organization.—(United Nations Bulletin, Lake Success - U.N. Information Centre, London - New York Times - New York Herald Tribune - Times - Manchester Guardian - The Hindu, Madras - Indian High Commissioner's Office, London)

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Note. The Collective Measures Committee referred to in the U.S. resolution condemning China as an aggressor was created in conformity with Mr. Acheson's peace plan which, under the title “United Action for Peace,” was adopted by the General Assembly on Nov. 3, 1950 (11069 A). It consists of 14 members representative of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Egypt, France, Great Britain, Mexico, the Philippines, Turkey, the United States, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia, and its duties, as defined in the “United Action for Peace” resolution, are to study “the measures which might be used and the resources, including armed forces, which are or might be made available to the United Nations in order to maintain international peace and security.”

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