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International Politics in East Asia Since World War II

PRAEGER SPECIAL STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

CHAPTER

3

CHINA'S NEW ALLIANCES AND THE KOREAN WAR, 1949-54

In the first twelve months of its self-declared existence as a nation-state—from October 1949 to October 1950—the People's Republic of China faced a series of harrowing decisions that involved its very survival in international politics. These decisions involved the attempt to apply in international affairs the Marxist-Leninist principles that Mao Tse-tung had interpreted so successfully in achieving revolutionary victory within China. This implied a smooth transition toward the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950; but, in fact, the cause of China's national integrity and historical distrust of Stalinist Russia worked to make this a far more tentative and fragile understanding than has been fully realized in the West. Political realism as much as the theoretical imperatives propounded by Mao became the determining factor in Communist China's foreign policy.

Once having formally embraced the Soviet alliance, Peking proceeded to regularize her internal and external affairs. But the last step in completing the military stage of the revolution by the conquest of Formosa and the replacement of Nationalist China in the United Nations was delayed by the costly and dangerous Korean War. Communist China was drawn into direct armed conflict with the United States; this continuing conflict effectively paralyzed the normalization of power relationships in East Asia for the next 20 years. In this chapter we shall see how the first few years of China's international relations became inseparable from its involvement in the Korean War.

MAP 3

The Korean War



FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NEW CHINA

Nationalism and Communism combined in mysterious proportions to fuel the drive of the Chinese People's Republic in foreign affairs. This was clear in Mao Tse-tung's significant declaration of July 1, 1949, entitled On the People's Democratic Dictatorship. Mao exalted the recent Chinese victory in a spirit of uninhibited nationalism; citing the history of the aggression of imperialist Western powers against China, he praised the victory now won by the Communist party in ending the period of Western tutelage. The weapon used in defeating China's foreign and domestic enemies was, he declared, Marxism-Leninism, which China had learned of through her Russian teachers. In international relations he discerned an intense struggle between those nations in the "international reactionary camp" against those nations making up the "international revolutionary forces." Mao vividly described how China could not afford to be timid in attacking reactionary groups both at home and abroad. The reactionaries were like the "wild beast" that confronted Wu Sung, a character in the popular novel The Water Margin Story: "As Wu Sung saw it, the tiger on the Chingyang Ridge was a man-eater, whether irritated or not. Either kill the tiger or be eaten by him—one or the other."[1]

Probably Mao's denunciation of the Western powers was all the more intense since Washington had ignored his suggestion that Ambassador Stuart visit Peking. Now Mao argued that China must ally itself "with the Soviet Union, with the People's Democracies and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an international united front." He emphatically denied that China needed assistance from the British and American governments and asserted that China could look only to the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union for "genuine and friendly help." Mao insisted that aid must be rejected if it was offered by the capitalists of Britain and the United States; but he appeared to leave an opening for greater flexibility when he praised the goodwill of the Communist parties and progressive groups in these two nations who would establish trade and diplomatic relations with China. Mao's emphasis, however, was on China's alignment with the Moscow-led camp in foreign affairs; this was termed "leaning to one side," and Mao proudly affirmed this stance as the basis of China's foreign policy.

The implications for Asia of a new and powerful China that saw itself as the revolutionary model par excellence for colonial and semicolonial nations was soon spelled out in Marxist-Leninist terminology. The occasion was the meeting in Peking in November 1949 of the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries. Before this audience of Communist and left-wing labor leaders Liu Shao-ch'i urged support for wars of national liberation throughout Asia.

Liu's remarks, however, should not be interpreted as advocating total revolution throughout Asia. When he pointed to the struggle and victory of the Chinese Communist party as exemplifying the proper strategy for revolutionary success, he was clearly suggesting that the battle for liberation in the colonial areas was to be carried out by the indigenous Communist parties themselves. Moral encouragement would be forthcoming from Peking and perhaps a limited amount of supplies, but China shrank from any declaration of armed assistance. Liu clearly affirmed that "armed struggle is the main form of struggle in many colonies and semi-colonies . . . this is the path of Mao Tse-tung." But obviously it was necessary for each colonial people to determine its own strategy based on its stage of economic and political development. In fact, Liu attempted to cool left-wing enthusiasm by recommending action within a united front that would be led by "the proletariat and based on a worker-peasant alliance, but including most of the petty bourgeoisie and part of the national bourgeoisie."[2] The emphasis on a united front would be regarded as too soft by many revolutionary leaders in Asia.

Clearly, Liu was suggesting that revolutionary action in Asia should be based on the Chinese example; but this was balanced by Mao's admission that China had learned much from the Russian experience.[3] While pointing to the Soviet Union as its patron and ally, the Chinese Communists frankly asserted that Mao Tse-tung creatively applied Marxist ideas to the China scene and, on the basis of such experiences, made original contributions to Communist doctrine. According to Mao's former secretary, Ch'en Po-ta:

> It was Comrade Mao Tse-tung who, studying the Chinese Revolution according to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, arrived over twenty years ago at the unequivocal conclusion of staging a protracted

> revolutionary war in the rural areas, and then trying to seize the cities after first holding the surrounding rural areas, and of establishing and maintaining revolutionary state power in numerous small bases, from which the political authority of the entire country would be seized after the gradual extension of our power by means of prolonged struggle. This is the new Marxist conclusion reached in colonial and semi-colonial areas.[4]

Like Stalin, Mao has been celebrated by his cohorts as one of the select few to understand the proper application of Marxist principles.

All this was in the realm of theory; it remained to be seen what China would do within a concrete situation. When specific policy guidelines were laid down, they seemed to reflect the aims and ambitions of any strong Chinese dynasty of the past. These were spelled out in the so-called Common Program adopted on September 29, 1949.[5] Chapter 7 of the program concerned itself with various practical diplomatic problems. It asserted that the principal object of foreign policy is the safeguarding of the independence, freedom, and integrity of China's territorial sovereignty and opposing the imperialist policy of aggression and war. In carrying out this directive, the government was to examine the treaties and agreements previously concluded "and recognize, abrogate, revise or renew them according to their respective contents." The government stood ready to negotiate and establish diplomatic relations on a basis of equality with foreign governments that broke with the Kuomintang and adopted a friendly attitude toward the People's Republic. Trade and commerce might also be resumed on a basis of equality and mutual benefit. Law-abiding foreigners in China were to be protected, and the rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad would be defended.

Even though the objectives cited in the Common Program were conventional in many ways, the leaders of Communist China consciously sought to put aside the traditional diplomacy of former dynasties and the recently collapsed republic. This was seen most clearly in the new dialectic of struggle pronounced by Mao. Yet this sharp emphasis on ideology in international affairs only came after Mao's proposal for a meeting with the American ambassador had gone unanswered. Once Washington had

closed the door to negotiations, China found it difficult to avoid an affirmation of loyalty to the Russian camp. Certain additional considerations may have eased Mao's uncertainty as he approached the Soviet Union.

First, the Chinese leaders must have experienced a deep sense of isolation at the very moment that they emerged as a potentially great power in the Asian world. The United States had furnished Chiang Kai-shek with financial support and supplies virtually to the end of the civil war; Russia had dealt closely with Chiang until mid-1949 and had shown a desire to preserve some form of Nationalist regime intact on the mainland. In practice neither of the two great world powers supported Communist China; but China could at least stress the fact that in theory one of them should have.

Of course, once the Chinese Communists had achieved victory, Moscow had every reason to encourage friendship between the two Communist giants, even though it was conceived as a friendship between master and disciple and one in which Russian interests were to be catered to. China had every reason to broadcast all indications that Russia was a true ally; otherwise, the new regime might have found itself absolutely friendless, and splendid isolation was as yet too daring a conception for the Chinese. This may partially explain Mao's heavy emphasis on Russia's role in Communist world history. In On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, Mao seemed to say that things were not as fearsome as they seemed to be for China in the wilderness of international relations, since Russia had faced the same difficulties and mastered them after the October Revolution in 1917. If this suggestion is valid, Mao was seeking to bolster his courage by reading the Chinese experience as being basically similar to the Russian. "There was," he argued, "the same feudal oppression. There was similar economic and cultural backwardness." But with revolutionary energy the Russian proletariat "suddenly erupted like a volcano." Mao seemed quite sincere here. He sought to rise above the harsh reality that Stalin had been untrustworthy and devious over the past two decades; he allowed himself to be a historical visionary in his moment of triumph. Yet it was also true that Mao was turning to the Russians as a practical and psychological necessity.

Second, the practical need to turn to the Russians was reinforced by the politics of the cold war, which had worked to distort all normal and rational political calculations. With both East and West proclaiming the reality of an international struggle between neatly divided

ideological camps, separated by an "iron curtain," a strong faction in the Chinese Communist party must have argued that there was no option other than to align according to ideology. One recalls the apprehensiveness that reportedly dominated the Chinese Communist inner-party debate in 1948 concerning the likelihood of a massive world war between the capitalist and the socialist forces.[6] If this construction of the realities of international politics was true, a Marxist-Leninist power indeed had no choice other than to "lean to one side."

The heat of ideological commitment, however, is subject to rapid cooling when absorbed in the pragmatic realities of day-to-day diplomatic encounters. Thus, Russia became China's great friend and the United States its great enemy in the abstract; but, when practical questions arose, there was a much wider range of issues for immediate dispute between Russia and China than between China and the United States. In the early months of the new regime, "leaning to one side" simply underscored the recognition that in the dangerous world of international politics the Chinese had great need for an ally; and, for the moment, the possibility of an understanding with the Soviet Union appeared to be the lesser of two evils.

With the establishment of the new regime, on October 1 Chou En-lai announced his interest in establishing regular diplomatic relations with the other countries of the world, and invitations were sent inviting negotiations to this end. In reply, Secretary of State Acheson set three conditions to which a nation must conform to receive recognition from the United States: It must be in effective control of the country; it must recognize and carry out its international obligations; and it must rule with the acquiescence of its people.[7] Meanwhile, Peking continued to insist, as a precondition for diplomatic relations, that each nation sever its relations with the Kuomintang and adopt a "friendly attitude" toward the People's Republic. Furthermore, the Western powers were still confronted by the realization that Peking intended to act unilaterally on past treaties and continued to classify most of them as reactionary.

Meanwhile the exuberant antiforeignism of the new masters of China further acerbated relations with the West. The British suffered most heavily in mid-April 1949, when H.M.S. Amethyst was fired upon and forced aground by units of the People's Liberation Army as the craft sought to complete a mission along the Yangtze

River between Shanghai and Nanking. Nineteen of her crew were killed in the encounter and the vessel and its crew were blockaded for about three months before they escaped. The rude incident contrasted sharply with the era of British might and grandeur on the Yangtze. Accusation and counteraccusation were exchanged between the British and the Chinese Communists. Finally, on April 25 Mao Tse-tung and General Chu Teh issued a proclamation promising to respect the lives and property of all foreign nationals as long as they obeyed the laws of the People's Liberation Army.

The Americans also felt the rampant anti-Western feeling unleashed in China; the United States consulates in the major cities and the embassy in Nanking were classified as "reactionary." These facilities began to close up in the fall of 1949. American, British, and French officials were arrested on numerous charges and forced to stand trial before people's courts. In December 1949 Washington warned American ships to stay away from Shanghai. Some missionaries complained of bitter encounters with the Communists and many of them prepared to leave China. Agencies of the United Nations with branches in China were forced to suspend operations under Communist pressure. Businessmen suffered increased bureaucratic obstruction. Western educational institutions were gradually forced to close their doors, although Yenching University in Peking remained open until April 1952.

Even if these numerous abrasive incidents had not occurred, there was no reason to think that the United States was ready or eager to extend diplomatic recognition to China. As early as May 6, 1949, the State Department acted to persuade the major non-Communist powers with interests in the Far East of the disadvantages of initiating any moves toward the recognition of the People's Republic. Accordingly, these nations agreed to consult among themselves before making any move toward recognition. In July there was increasing evidence of inflexibility as Secretary of State Acheson issued a top-secret memorandum to Ambassador-at-large Philip Jessup instructing him to draw up an action program designed to contain Communism in Asia.[8]

This increasingly unfriendly American attitude toward China undoubtedly found its source in the shock felt following the sudden collapse of the Nationalist government and in the realization, to use the distraught terminology of the cold war, that the world's most populous nation had now fallen victim to world Communism. There was also

the need to respond in some way to the growing Republican demands in Congress for increased support of Chiang's government now holed up in Formosa.

As the situation developed it appeared that the State Department felt itself caught between opposing pressures. On the one hand, supporters of Chiang carried on a vehement campaign inside and outside Congress equating recognition of Communist China with capitulation to a Moscow-led world conspiracy; on the other, voices of moderation at home and abroad were raised in favor of recognition. On September 13 the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and France met in Washington. During the meeting Secretary Acheson apparently continued to insist that it would be unwise to recognize Mao's government, but British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin indicated that his government could not delay recognition much longer. Early in October a round-table conference of 25 leading scholars and businessmen interested in China was convened at the State Department. There was a general agreement by the participants that the new Chinese government should be granted recognition, and fairly soon. But the difficulties in following this policy were accentuated on October 24 when the American consul-general in Mukden and his staff of four were jailed by the Communists for a month's time and then deported from China. The United States branded this as a clear violation of the principles of international comity, and the congressional Republicans had one more emotional cause with which to attack the government's China policy.

All the while Great Britain was rapidly moving to the point of granting recognition to the People's Republic of China. This was in line with Britain's traditional outlook in world affairs; as Winston Churchill put it in a House of Commons statement on November 17, 1949: "The reason for having diplomatic relations is not to confer a compliment, but to secure a convenience." He went on to cite the foolishness of maintaining full relations with Moscow and ignoring its close collaborator, China. Although the British desired to act in cooperation with their American ally, it was difficult to delay action. British businessmen were clamoring for the prompt establishment of diplomatic relations in order to insure the safety of their vast but depleted investment interest and of the commercially valuable colony of Hong Kong. But the most compelling factor was the attitude of India, which along with Ceylon and Pakistan swung considerable weight within the British Commonwealth. Prime Minister

Jawaharlal Nehru of India was eager to regularize relations with China since he believed that Peking could be drawn away from Moscow, and beyond this he foresaw India and China acting together as a third force in Asia constituting a bridge between the United States and Russia.[9]

The State Department must have realized that the time had come to make some hard decisions concerning China policy when on December 16, 1949, Britian informed the United States that she would seek to establish diplomatic relations with China early in January 1950. Washington's reaction was somewhat ambivalent. Secretary of State Acheson replied to the British note expressing his regret over the decision on recognition. On December 29 Senator Tom Connally, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who usually voiced administration sentiments, declared that he was opposed to the recognition of Communist China until assurances were given concerning its respect for international law. In spite of this, certain elements in the State Department must have seen the British move as supplying a much needed opening for the implementation of a more flexible China policy.

By the end of the year there was a considerable movement toward the recognition of China. On December 30, 1949, India extended recognition to the People's Republic. Pakistan did the same on December 5, as did Great Britain on the following day. Between January 6 and January 18, Norway, Ceylon, Denmark, Israel, Afghanistan, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland recognized Peking. Even more important was the fact that Mao Tse-tung had arrived in Moscow on December 18, 1949, to begin negotiations for a new Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Soviet Union. Mao was about to test out just what his policy of "leaning to one side" meant in practice. Clearly the time was ripe for the United States to seize upon events and work to establish contacts with the People's Republic of China.

Early in January Washington began to issue a series of statements intended for the ears of Communist China. President Truman announced, on January 5, that the United States would not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa; this was the same day that the British government informed the Chinese Nationalist ambassador in London that recognition would be withdrawn from his regime and extended to the People's Republic. The American announcement was tempered by a simultaneous statement by Secretary of State Acheson to the effect that it would be premature for the United States to recognize Communist

China and that before such a move full consultation with Congress would be undertaken. This series of probes and trial balloons continued on January 12, with Acheson's famous address before a gathering of the National Press Club. He compared America's hands-off policy in Formosa with the aggressive designs upon China of an imperialist Russia; specifically, he charged that the Soviet Union was engaged in detaching Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang from China and attaching them to Russia. Obviously these words were beamed to Peking and to the Chinese negotiators in Moscow. This was followed on January 25 by a State Department news release containing specific data backing Acheson's charges. This statement emphasized that the expansion of Russian economic interests in Manchuria went far beyond the extent authorized in the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty.

To all appearances these signals failed to move Peking. The clear offer of immediate recognition was never forthcoming, although nothing would have been better designed to disrupt the concurrent negotiations under way in Moscow. In this respect China's response to the British offer of recognition is instructive. Just before the receipt of the British note on January 6, the People's Republic had taken a dangerous step. In Peking posters had been affixed to the British and American consulates as well as to the French and Netherlands embassies announcing that within several days these "former military barracks" would be confiscated by the Chinese government because of military necessity. It was an act of bravado that sought to demonstrate to the world that the new China had the power to seize the buildings once used to quarter Western soldiers.

But in the midst of this recklessness, China suddenly moved to conciliate the British, the nation that in many ways best symbolized the despised presence of Western power in Peking. Soon after the receipt of the British notice of recognition the posters were removed from the British consulate; and on January 9 the Chinese People's Republic announced its acceptance of British recognition, at least to the extent of agreeing to open negotiations on the question of receiving a British chargé d'affaires in Peking. In contrast to the immunity enjoyed by the British, on January 14 the Communist officials seized the specified diplomatic establishments of the United States, France, and the Netherlands. While it is possible to read too much into this series of events, it may well have been that the Chinese were trying to say that normal relations

were possible only once recognition was granted. They may have been hinting that such powers as the British, who offered recognition, would be treated tolerably well in spite of their past offenses against China; or at least that concrete negotiations could be begun with these powers, just as treaties were presently being renegotiated with Russia.

The seizure of the American consular buildings in Peking ended immediate hopes for negotiation. In quick response Washington announced on January 14 that all official personnel were to be withdrawn from Communist China. This was followed on January 18 by Secretary of State Acheson's statement at a press conference that seizure of the Peking consulate made it obvious that Communist China did not desire recognition. Both the United States and the People's Republic of China had leaned ever so tentatively toward increased diplomatic contact in the first days of January, but the pride and stubbornness of both powers had cut short this beginning.

It was also evident in the maneuvers for China's seat in the United Nations that January was a month of great but unfulfilled promise. The first round was instigated by Nationalist China's effort in November and December 1949 to win support in the General Assembly of the United Nations for a resolution condemning Soviet Russia's presumed intervention in China and bidding all member states to withhold diplomatic recognition from Communist China.[10] Peking's response came in the form of a telegram on November 18 demanding that the United Nations immediately deprive the Nationalist delegation of the right to represent China. After various maneuvers, on December 8 the Nationalist resolution was referred to the Interim Committee, where it eventually died.

Throughout the prolonged debate on these issues, the American representative, Philip Jessup, focused his attacks upon the Soviet Union; but all the while he made no effort to condemn Communist China. Undoubtedly this was part of the State Department's strategy to check the growing friendship between the two Communist states by warning China of Russia's imperialist ambitions.[11] In fact, the policies followed by the United States and Russia in the Security Council debates concerning the allocation of China's seat reveal a good deal concerning the options still open early in January 1950. The key issue was introduced by way of a demand telegraphed by Peking to the United Nations and the member states of the Security Council calling for the expulsion of the Kuomintang

representatives. The Soviet Union supported this demand in the form of a motion on January 10. Perhaps Moscow and Peking were surprised when the American delegate indicated that, while he would oppose the proposed measure, his government would not exercise its veto power and would accept the decision to admit Communist China if the necessary seven members of the council so voted.

On January 13 the Soviet resolution was voted on and rejected by a six-to-three count, with Britain and Norway abstaining. It was at this point that Jacob Malik, the Soviet delegate, walked out of the Security Council declaring the session illegal until the Kuomintang delegate was ousted. His apparently irate departure may possibly have been part of a calculated effort to block Communist China's bid for United Nations membership and thereby isolate and dominate Peking. The basis for this supposition lies in the belief generally held at the time that within a few weeks the Nationalist regime would certainly be unseated. There was a surge in the international community toward the recognition of Communist China; given a few weeks of maneuvering it would surely have had the votes in the Security Council for admission. It was Moscow's abrupt walkout from the Security Council that did most to block the anticipated resolution of the impasse.[12] If this line of reasoning is correct, Washington missed the opportunity of exposing this dubious Russian maneuver and thereby impeding the alignment of Moscow and Peking.

Meanwhile, emotions were aroused by China's seizure in mid-January of the consular properties in Peking. This allowed congressional critics of the administration's "soft" China policy to renew their protests, and it led Secretary of State Acheson to reiterate America's opposition to Communist China's membership in the United Nations. In February Secretary-General Trygve Lie failed to win American support for his effort to convince UN member states that one could properly vote to accept UN membership for a state it did not and would not recognize. At this point the United States moved from a passive to an active policy in opposing membership for Communist China; American representatives brought pressure to bear on one of the Latin American members of the Security Council to block its anticipated pro-Peking vote.[13]

In these weeks before the formal announcement of the Sino-Soviet alignment, the flexibility of American policy was clearly limited by the fierce opposition of the China-lobby Republicans in Congress, a public ill-educated to the intricacies of Asian questions, and the blind and

disabling fears of the cold war. In January 1950 the administration itself showed a certain lack of determination; it failed to go beyond a half-hearted gesture to Peking. This amounted to a suggestion that Russian imperial ambitions might be a greater danger to China than America's dwindling support for Chiang Kai-shek. In the final analysis Peking was defiant and Washington was impatient and unbending.

It was during this period of furious diplomatic byplay that the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and various subsidiary treaties were proposed, agonized over, and approved in Moscow. That the negotiations were substantial and prolonged is shown by the fact that Mao Tse-tung arrived in Moscow on December 18, 1949, and that the final accords were not signed until February 14, 1950, when Mao left the Russian capital. That the two foremost leaders of the Communist world agreed to compromise on issues of the greatest national significance makes this one of the most fascinating episodes in recent Far Eastern history. Such agreement was made possible only by the overarching fears generated by the psychology of the cold war.

A fear of the American power exhibited in the defeat of Japan convinced Peking to lean to one side. The keystone of the treaty, without which all other issues would have been as irresolvable as ever, was contained in the introductory paragraph. It explained that the treaty was to be effective for 30 years and that it was designed to prevent "the revival of Japanese imperialism and the resumption of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate in any way with Japan in acts of aggression. . . ."[14] Clearly the new treaty was aimed at the United States since the Americans were now dominant in Japan and there was ample historical and geographical reason to fear any strong power ensconced in the Japanese islands. Such security-minded powers as Russia and China could not dismiss the power potential of a Japanese-American alliance. Thus, Article 1 of the treaty provided that "in the event of one of the Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or any other state allied with her . . . the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal."

Concern over the Japanese issue was evident again in article 2, in which Russia and China committed themselves to the conclusion at the earliest possible date of a peace treaty with Japan to be signed jointly with their allies in World War II. This might be seen as a hint to the

United States that Far Eastern tension could be eased by a reassertion of joint control over Japan. The Soviet Union and China undoubtedly hoped that the proposed peace treaty would neutralize Japan. These were the crucial parts of the treaty, which was ratified on April 11, 1950, in Moscow and in Peking. So vital to both powers was this new treaty that certain bitterly contested issues were at least temporarily resolved in a series of subsidiary agreements announced along with the treaty.

The first of the subsidiary agreements centered on the cluster of issues pertaining to Manchuria and included such questions as the status of the Chinese-Changchun Railway, Port Arthur, and Dairen. Here, at least on paper, Peking appeared to emerge with the bulk of the concessions. The Soviet Union agreed to "transfer to China without compensation . . . all its rights to the joint administration of the Chinese-Changchun Railway." Russia also agreed that Soviet troops should be withdrawn from Port Arthur. Both of these clauses were to be fulfilled immediately after the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan but not later than the end of 1952. The Chinese-Changchun Railway was formally transferred to Chinese administration on December 31, 1952, at a ceremony held at Harbin. But it is interesting to note that the evacuation of Port Arthur was not carried out until after Stalin's death in 1953. The transfer was postponed at the end of 1952, pending the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan; but in October 1954 the USSR relented and announced its decision to withdraw in June 1955.

It was agreed with respect to the commercial port of Dairen that the question would be faced again at the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. It was also provided, however, that a joint commission should be set up to supervise the transfer to China of "all property in Dairen now temporarily administered or leased to the Soviet Union." Such transfers of property were apparently carried out as scheduled in 1950.

Stalin may well have sought to demonstrate his displeasure with the obstinate Mao by means of the meager allotment of financial aid granted to China in a second subsidiary agreement concluded at Moscow in February 1950. This provided for a Russian credit to China of $300 million with interest at 1 percent annually; this credit was to be available in equal payments over the next five years. It was to be used in payment for Russian materials and equipment needed to rebuild China's devastated economy. The loan was scheduled to be repaid by the end of 1963 in

deliveries to Russia of raw materials, tea, gold, and American dollars. Since there had been a tendency in the second half of 1949 for Peking to justify the "lean to one side" policy in terms of economic benefits that would be forthcoming from Russia, there is reason to think that the Chinese had expected much more economic aid from Russia.[15] In addition, the real value of the loan was reduced by 20 percent when Moscow revalued the ruble less than two weeks after the signing of the credit agreement with Peking.

Stalin's most obvious success in these negotiations was to secure an affirmation of Russia's direct interest in Sinkiang. Here Stalin's ambitions were high, for as recently as August 1949 his Consul-General in Sinkiang had offered to keep the Chinese Communists out of that westernmost province in exchange for Chiang Kai-shek's acceptance of a declaration that the province was an independent sovereign state (like Outer Mongolia and likewise subject to Moscow).[16] In an agreement signed on March 27, 1950, after Mao's departure from Moscow, it was announced that certain joint stock companies under Sino-Soviet control were to be established in Sinkiang. The object of the first two of these was to exploit petroleum and nonferrous metals. The expenses and profits were to be divided equally--the assumption presumably being that China furnished the territory and Russia the equipment for exploiting Sinkiang. At the same time there was agreement on the establishment of a joint stock civil aviation company with the projected establishment of three air routes between Peking and Moscow.

Assuming that the world was indeed polarized into two armed camps inescapably opposed to each other, Mao had little choice other than to align himself with Moscow. Since neither Peking nor Washington chose to persist in questioning this assumption it became the truth of the day, and Mao accepted alignment with Moscow even though it meant the continued intrusion of Russia upon Chinese sovereignty in certain key areas. Mao was not to repeat the mistake of Chiang Kai-shek and wait until too late for an understanding with Moscow. Furthermore, with the Americans occupying the territories of China's recent arch-enemy, Japan, and with the Nationalist forces still controlling Taiwan, chances for a satisfactory understanding with the Americans were not good. Thus, Mao put aside some of the long-range aims of Chinese nationalism; strategically he had no other choice if the assumptions of the cold war were true. China was now to embark upon its new role in foreign affairs with at least a minimum assurance of Soviet ideological and strategic support.

Apparently Stalin begrudged even the few concessions that he granted to Peking. Mao was later to report to the 12th Plenum of the Central Committee in 1967 that Stalin did not wish to sign the treaty.[17] Doubtless Stalin hoped that by means of the treaty he could keep China subject to Russia at least for the time being. Unity was necessary as the issue of the peace treaty with Japan was an increasingly immediate and dangerous one. Thus, differences were papered over because of the momentary tensions of the cold war and the need to stand together at least until the final fate of Japan and Taiwan had been worked out.

KOREA: LIBERATION AND OCCUPATION

Because of its geographical position, the Korean peninsula has been a territory upon which the powers of northeast Asia have repeatedly converged. Until the end of the nineteenth century, China and Japan struggled for dominance there. With the decline of China, Russia became Japan's greatest competitor for supremacy in Korea. Japan triumphed in successive wars for the control of the peninsula first against China and then Russia. This paved the way for the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910. Thereafter, Japan worked to exclude Western interests in Korea. The United States, which in 1882 had been the first Western power to break through Korea's isolation and establish diplomatic relations, stood aside on the bidding of Theodore Roosevelt, and thus Japanese domination proceeded unimpeded by the West.[18]

As a Japanese colony from 1910 to 1945, Korea was systematically denationalized and assimilated. The first decade of Japanese control was devoted primarily to the creation of effective administrative machinery in which Koreans were permitted to occupy only the petty offices. From 1920 to 1930 the Japanese concentrated on merging the Korean economy with their own. This was accomplished by creating a community of interest between themselves and the upper classes of Korea. New requirements were regularly imposed upon Korea after 1930 as it became the advanced base for Japan's continental conquests. A huge superstructure of government dominated the life of the peninsula through a tightly organized bureaucracy under a governor-general responsible to the Overseas Ministry in Tokyo. In 1942 Korea was assimilated completely to Japan and placed under the authority of the Home Ministry.

The 35 years of Japanese rule coincided with movements of great magnitude within Korea. Population rose dramatically from 13 million in 1910 to over 43 million at the end of the 1960s.[19] In 1919 Korean nationalism asserted itself for the first time in a mass mobilization as diverse groups came together to support the reading of a declaration of independence in Seoul's Pagoda Park. Japanese reaction was quick and the movement was brutally suppressed. The methods of Japanese dictatorship prevented the nationalists from developing a set of native leaders experienced in administration. The Korean rank and file were prevented by the Japanese from acquiring the political education essential to self-government. The industrial economy of the peninsula was made increasingly dependent upon its relationship to the Japanese economy and to Japanese technical skill. Agriculture was dedicated to the production of rice for Japan. It was this lack of leadership and political education, as well as the dependence of the economy upon Japan, that was responsible in part for the qualification set forth in the Cairo Declaration of 1943 that Korea "<u>in due course</u> shall become free and independent"[20] (emphasis added).

When Russia, in February 1945 at the Yalta Conference, indicated her willingness to participate in the war against Japan, the military staffs of Russia and the United States decided that the Japanese in Korea should surrender in the north to the Russians and to the Americans in the south. American officials, their attention riveted on planning for the invasion of the Japanese home islands, evinced little interest in the Korean problem during the Potsdam Conference. By midsummer the unexpectedly swift collapse of Japan forced a spate of hectic, last-minute decisions.

On the night of August 10, representatives of the State Department, the War Department, and the Department of the Navy met to prepare policy for negotiating with other powers concerning the surrender of Japan. Secretary of State Byrnes had given general directions that he wanted American forces placed as far north as possible in Korea. But the military had warned that with a scarcity of troops and the pressure of time, it would be difficult to extend the occupation very far to the north before Soviet troops could reach the area. During the meeting, Colonels Dean Rusk and C. H. Bonesteel were ordered to retire to an adjoining room and come up with a proposal. In hopes of obtaining American control of Seoul, they supported a line drawn north of the city along the 38th

parallel. Later Rusk remarked that he was surprised that the Russians agreed to this proposal when because of their military position they could claim a line farther to the south.[21] In any case, it was assumed that this division of the peninsula was to be temporary.

Although Korea had not suffered directly from aerial attacks or invasions, its economy under the Japanese war effort experienced both the pains of exploitation and the stress of modernization. At the end of the war in the summer of 1945, Korean production came to a standstill, inflation swept the land, and unemployment engulfed the workers. In addition, there was the predictable disruption as the army of Japanese administrators and technicians faced repatriation to their homeland, leaving untrained and inexperienced Koreans in their place. However perilous might be the future of the economy, Koreans greeted liberation with an outburst of joy and eager expectation. Confident--doubtless overconfident--of their ability to man their own industrial machinery and organize for their own political future, they reached out expectantly to grasp the levers of power.

The allied powers may well have agreed that Korea would receive its independence in due course, but to Korean nationalists, on the left and on the right, the moment had arrived to establish an autonomous regime. The first initiative came unexpectedly from the Japanese government-general, headed by General Abe Nobuyuki, who sought to assure minimal security for Japanese lives and property by encouraging the creation of a transitional government. On August 15 Lyuh Woon-hyung, an energetic and magnetic Korean leader, agreed to head the new administration. Immediately he set to work to create a ruling committee, the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI), which was designed to include rightist and leftist nationalists as well as Communists. However, during the first few days of its organization the committee took on an overly large proportion of leftist leaders. Long-existent political animosities played a role here as did the widespread support for leftist programs. More immediately significant was the rumor that Russian occupation forces were about to arrive; in fact, the Japanese authorities apparently assumed that the American occupation would be confined to the Pusan-Makp'o area far to the south.[22] This led Lyuh to drop plans for the inclusion of certain rightist and conservative leaders in his governmental committee. The arrival on August 17 of the senior Communist leader Pak Hon-yong and his

strong position in the newly formed government gave a further leftward orientation to the proposed regime.

In the weeks immediately after liberation, Lyuh's committee encountered no effective opposition. It sought to authenticate itself as the true heir of the independence movement by assuming the role of the Korean provisional government, which had waited in exile since 1919 for the day Korea would be free. Led by Dr. Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku, this group operated in the war years from Chungking and Washington. Indeed, during the period of colonial rule, Rhee was regarded in Korea as the symbol of promised nationhood. In their absence (Rhee had not been in Korea since 1911) and without their consent, the CPKI named Rhee President of the Republic and Kim Ku Minister of the Interior. Lyuh was selected as Vice-President, and almost all the vice-ministers were Communists or leftists.

The CPKI was able to extend its base of support into the countryside by means of the simultaneous and largely spontaneous rise of people's committees throughout Korea. These local groups accepted, more or less, the centrally formed committee as the focus for the new government. Lyuh's committee called a meeting of representatives of these local committees for September 6. It was at this meeting, largely controlled by representatives of the CPKI, that the title "People's Republic" was proclaimed and Lyuh was named chairman of the People's Legislative Committee. As the Americans prepared to land in large force to occupy the territory south of the 38th parallel, a popular new framework of government had been shaped in rough form and its leaders stood ready to present themselves to the liberators.

Under the direction of General MacArthur in Tokyo, Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge began landing his 24th Army Corps in Korea on September 8, 1945. At Seoul and other centers south of the 38th parallel the Americans set up an interim military government. The American command was tragically ill-prepared to assume the burdens confronting it in a Korea now brought to fever point in its excited expectancy of independence. Hodge could only assume that he was to conduct affairs according to official guidelines; it was not his role to predict at what future date Korea was to achieve its independence.

It soon dawned upon the Koreans that there was to be but one recognized government in the southern part of Korea and that was the American military government. The demise of the People's Republic was the most regrettable

casualty of this early period. Poorly informed concerning the nature of the indigenous government, Hodge sought to put off a direct meeting with Lyuh for over a month. By that time suspicion concerning the Communist orientation of the group had influenced policy in Washington and at Hodge's headquarters. Thereupon Hodge was informed by Washington that U.S. policy prohibited the recognition of any so-called Korean provisional government by the occupying forces. On December 12 Hodge outlawed the Republic, thus ending the only cohesive effort made by Koreans themselves to build a stable political organization based on broad popular support.

Not only were these early Korean efforts at self-government shunned by the Americans; but Hodge, after snubbing the Koreans, appeared to be sustaining the role of the hated Japanese colonialist. At MacArthur's orders, Hodge worked with the Japanese Governor Abe Nobuyuki until September 12, 1945, and retained some of his subordinate officials for some weeks thereafter. So irate had the Koreans become at this initial blunder that Hudge sought to make amends in inexcusable haste. He reversed himself almost completely, even to the point of refusing to retain the Japanese technicians who were vitally important for Korean industries. By January 1946 only 60 of the original 70,000 Japanese administrators and technical experts were still on hand.[23] Such governance by fits and starts worked to sustain and broaden the chaos that was beginning to engulf the political and economic life of Korea. All the while guidance from Washington was inadequate and insensitive to the realities of Korea; in total, American actions in the early months of occupation were inept and ill-informed.

Meanwhile, very little was being done in the American sector toward the social and economic rehabilitation of the peninsula. In southern Korea, particularly, the Japanese had left a bitter heritage. In the rice-producing areas there, the Japanese had maintained rigid economic control and had employed the Koreans either as tenants or as farm laborers. In 1945 more than three-fourths of the cultivated land was being farmed by tenants. Unlike the north, the south had never become an industrial or commercial region. When the Americans occupied the southern sector, the peasants were land hungry and determined to confiscate properties previously hend by Japanese landowners and native gentry. As in Japan the Americans insisted upon preserving the rights of private property and providing for gradual change in land tenure.

General Hodge was frequently confronted with the fact that Koreans were not only angered by the gradual American policy but outspokenly wrathful. They accused the Americans of supporting the landlords, capitalists, and reactionaries. This, of course, added one more disruptive element to the chaotic politics of the southern zone.

In northern Korea the Russians had the advantage of a greater familiarity with the language and politics of the people, as well as a clear-cut notion of what they wanted to achieve. Immediately the Soviet military authorities had taken advantage of local political elements; they had established liaison groups to work with the provisional people's committees. This Russian effort at organization was assisted by local Korean Communists and also by that large number of Koreans who had formerly lived in Manchuria and in Soviet territory but now had returned to their homeland with the Soviet forces. Kim Il-sung, who supposedly arrived in North Korea in September 1945 along with the Russian army, was elected Chairman of the Provisional People's Committee of Northern Korea in February 1946. As leader of the Russian-oriented Korean Communists, he was able to outmaneuver domestic Communist factions as well as the so-called Yenan groups, which favored a closer attachment to Communists in China in an intense and bitter power struggle. With Soviet support Kim Il-sung was able to thrust himself into the position of central leadership and to bring North Korea into general alignment with Soviet policy.[24]

Under Russian auspices North Korea underwent a rapid economic and social revolution. A program of land redistribution, restoration of industrial enterprises, and reorganization of education was hurriedly pushed. Russian policy permitted the Koreans to confiscate the lands of Japanese and local "collaborationists"; it clearly met with wide approval. According to the Soviet program, the individual peasant did not own his land but held it under the village council. The peasant's continued use of land allotted to him apparently depended upon his willingness to work along with the village council and its Communist leaders. By and large, the impression that the Soviet regime meant to act decisively on behalf of the Korean peasant gave the northern administration a decided edge in popularity over its southern rival.

Political order proved more elusive in South Korea. The American authorities had already bypassed the People's Republic of Lyuh Woon-hyung. In November, even though the military government allowed the entry of Kim Ku's Korean

provisional government from Chungking, it was made clear that this did not imply support for that would-be government. Leadership fell somewhat by default to Syngman Rhee, who arrived in Korea from the United States in October 1945, and who was warmly supported by General Hodge in spite of State Department reservations. The upshot was that, while the American military government maintained itself as the sole governing authority in the South, Rhee was free to build upon his past prestige toward a position of political power. Hodge's permissiveness may have been based on his fear that Communist elements might succeed in the South. Such groups, he suggested in a communication to General MacArthur, were no doubt "Russian instigated" but he explained he was unable to prove it. Meanwhile, Rhee continued his public outcry concerning the threat of Russian Communism.[25]

Washington, however, was determined to arrive at a settlement with the Russians in Korea. The State Department's design provided for the political unification of the two zones, at least on a high political level. Whatever the form of the eventual provisional government, it would be subject to the ultimate authority of a trusteeship controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union. The task of laying down the guidelines for a settlement in Korea became one of the crucial items to be worked out at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1945.[26] During the conference the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China finally agreed that a joint United States-USSR commission should be set up to prepare for the establishment of a provisional democratic Korean government. The commission was also to make proposals regarding the establishment of a four-power trusteeship to prepare Korea for its independence within five years.

The decisions made at Moscow forced a sudden about-face in the policies Hodge (guided perhaps by MacArthur) had been following in Korea. On January 29 Hodge received instructions from Washington not to associate his military government too closely with Rhee or Kim Ku. Apparently the State Department was genuinely hopeful of reaching some accommodation with the Russians at the forthcoming meetings of the joint commission. Accordingly, the Americans could hardly allow themselves to be accused of supporting the violently anti-Soviet Rhee. Equally important, Washington had finally convinced the Russians to go along with the idea of a Korean trusteeship. This policy ran directly contrary to Rhee's

sentiments. In fact, Rhee and those rightists gathered around him had directed their most vehement criticism against the whole idea of trusteeship. While the Korean Communists and leftists may have equally opposed trusteeship, they accepted the Russian lead and stifled their objections.

In March 1946 delegations from the Russian and American commands in Korea met for the first sessions of the joint commission. A bitter argument immediately ensued as to which political groups in the North and in the South should be eligible for consultation in the formation of the anticipated provisional government.[27] The Russians insisted that those opposed to trusteeship should not be consulted. This, of course, would have led to the exclusion of Rhee and most of the rightist political leaders. By May it was evident that the negotiators could not break the deadlock over this issue. The sessions were adjourned, with bitter feeling on both sides.

It is difficult to interpret American policy in the period that followed since at times Washington and its military representatives in Korea appeared to be working at cross purposes. In spite of certain inconsistencies, it seems that Washington was seeking to realign the political forces in the South so as to be in a better negotiating position for a second round of talks of the joint commission.

Accordingly, the Americans set about encouraging the development of a political third force distinct from the Communists and the right-wing leadership of Rhee. In July the State Department ordered the American military government to work for the establishment of a coalition of moderates as the first step toward an interim government.[28] The coalition formed around the leadership of the popular moderate leftist Lyuh Woon-hyung and the moderate rightist Kim Kiu-sic. It maintained itself in spite of incessant attempts to sabotage its operations by extreme rightists and the Communists. In October it recommended the creation of a Korean Interim Legislative Assembly (KILA). This met with American approval. However, in the elections that followed, based on the old Japanese franchise, the rightists achieved an overwhelming victory. Charges of electoral fraud followed. In order to achieve a political balance, General Hodge chose a sizable number of the appointive members of the assembly from left-wing and moderate factions. Thus, the assembly was able to meet for the first time on December 12, 1946, with Kim Kiu-sic as its chairman.

This was a disruptive period in which to sponsor a new governmental structure. The brutal repression of Communists by the Korean police had led to a violent revolutionary outbreak at Taegu in October in which 53 policemen were mutilated and killed. The backlash was devastating. By the end of the year 1,500 people had been prosecuted in connection with the uprising, and the arrest of key Communist leaders such as Pak Hon-yong was ordered. On the other hand, relations between Hodge and the Rhee faction had grown worse. In January 1947 a resolution was passed in the Assembly condemning Hodge's policy and trusteeship.[29]

In spite of all this the moderate coalition managed to maintain itself into the summer of 1947. But by this time it suffered two severe blows. Lyuh Woon-hyung, the coalition's most forceful leader, fell victim to a sudden right-wing campaign of terror; he was assassinated on July 19 in broad daylight in sight of the Seoul police station.[30] More important, the failure of the second session of the joint commission meeting in Seoul in the summer of 1947 ended all immediate prospects for a negotiated unification of Korea. In the early stages of this second round of discussions, it had seemed that the United States and Russia were edging toward a compromise solution over the means by which Korean consultees for the new "trusteeship" government would be chosen. But relations between representatives of the two powers sharply deteriorated in July. The ban of mass demonstrations against the decisions made in Moscow was suddenly rescinded by the American command; large-scale demonstrations broke out, including a physical attack on members of the Soviet delegation on July 26.[31] This signaled the breakdown of negotiations even though various proposals were exchanged into August. With the demise of the joint commission, the raison d'etre of the coalition had vanished. American support for the group evaporated, and the United States turned reluctantly to Syngman Rhee.

A general reevaluation of American policy in Korea was unavoidable. American negotiators were now convinced that any nationwide government in Korea acceptable to Moscow would soon be dominated by the Communists. The obvious solution was the establishment of the separate South Korean regime sought by Rhee. But at a time when American resources were being extended all over the world, the United States had no desire to take upon itself direct responsibility for South Korea. Nor would an economy-minded Congress be likely to take kindly to extensive expenditures

in Korea. It was in this context that the State Department and the Defense Department formally decided that control of Korea was not vital to American security. Secretary of Defense Forrestal reported on September 26, 1947, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff held that "in the event of hostilities . . . our present forces in Korea would be a military liability."[32] The next best alternative was to work for United Nations recognition and support for an anti-Soviet government in South Korea. Congress might be expected to vote an adequate amount of aid to support such a government; and, of course, military advisers would be available to train the South Korean army.

In September 1947 the United States requested the General Assembly of the United Nations to exert its influence on behalf of a settlement in Korea. The Russian delegate maintained that the question of Korean unity and independence, like other problems related to the conclusion of the peace treaties, was outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations. By November 1947 the United Nations nevertheless voted, with the Soviet bloc abstaining, to dispatch a temporary commission to Korea. Its task was to conduct elections for leaders, who would take the initiative in organizing a united Korean provisional government representing all elements of Korean opinion. Once organized the main task of such a provisional government was to bring a quick end to the joint occupation and to proceed with the establishment of an independent and permanent government.

Once the UN temporary commission arrived in Korea, in January 1948, it was confronted by a political decision of the utmost importance. As might have been anticipated, the Soviet command ignored the commission's request to visit North Korea. For the commission to monitor elections in the South alone would be tantamount to encouraging the establishment of a separate national government in that part of Korea. This was likely to be challenged by the establishment of a competing "national government" in the North. As one critic put it, the United Nations would seem to many "to be assisting in the perpetuation of the division of Korea and in the intensification of internecine strife, instead of helping to achieve independence for a United Korea."[33] The commission called upon the Interim Committee of the UN to resolve this problem. In the meeting of the Interim Committee that followed, the American delegation vigorously supported the carrying out of separate elections in the South. At the same session the position of the United

States in supporting Syngman Rhee and other anti-Soviet conservatives was roundly criticized. Approval was finally given for separate elections with the provision that elections be held in a "free atmosphere" and that the elected National Assembly be regarded as a "stage" toward the creation of a Korean government.

The temporary commission buried its own doubts about the wisdom of the elections and prepared to carry out what appeared to be the mandate of the Interim Committee. It recommended various changes concerning election laws and procedures to the American command, which would oversee the elections. The election laws were liberalized to a degree and the restrictions placed on nonrightist political groups were somewhat limited. Yet a "free atmosphere" was difficult to achieve since violent attempts at leftist disruptions were matched by the brutal activities of rightist police units.

Moderate and radical parties throughout the peninsula bitterly opposed the elections of 1948 on the grounds that an election in the southern zone would only serve to effect a permanent division of the country. The only Korean groups supporting the United Nations and the idea of separate elections were the extreme conservatives. Nonetheless, the temporary commission ultimately certified the rightist victors in the elections as the duly elected representatives of the Korean people. Moderate circles in Korea questioned the validity of the elections as a free expression of the will of the Korean people. Still, the way was cleared for the promulgation of the new Korean Constitution of July 12, and eight days later Syngman Rhee was chosen as the first president of Korean Democratic Republic. On August 12 General MacArthur proclaimed the inauguration of the "Republic of Korea" and the transfer of sovereignty to the Rhee government at Seoul.

In the Soviet zone events also moved rapidly in 1947-48. Continuing to work through local committees, the Soviet command permitted the organization of political parties but only within the framework of the National Democratic Front, a unitary party organization closely linked to the Soviet forces. In February 1948 a constitution for the Korean People's Democratic Republic was being drafted. Before proclaiming a separate regime, the Soviet leadership sought to promote unity in the entire peninsula on a basis favorable to themselves. This was engineered through a coalition conference called at Pyongyang in April 1948. Present at this meeting were the representatives of certain of the nonrightist elements

of South Korea as well as the leaders in the National Democratic Front of North Korea. Rhee and his colleagues were conspicuous by their absence. Kim Ku and Kim Kiu-sic, the best known of the Southern political leaders at the conference, represented the wide range of Korean opinion that was opposed to separate elections and was committed to internal means of unification. After two days of discussion, the coalition conference issued a declaration that (1) stressed the need for forming quickly a unified Korean government, (2) rejected totalitarian processes and "monopolistic capitalism," (3) called for an immediate withdrawal of Russian and American occupation forces, and (4) opposed the establishment of foreign military bases on Korean soil. In spite of these efforts, by the summer of 1948 the division of Korea had to be accepted even by the most unrelenting nationalists.

Soviet moves thereafter paralleled the actions in the South. On May 1, 1948, the North Korean People's Committee promulgated its constitution with the object of making it apply to the whole of Korea. On September 9 the North Koreans proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and called it the only legitimate government of the peninsula. The Soviet Union extended official recognition to the new regime on October 13 and early in 1949 concluded a general agreement on economic and cultural cooperation with the North Koreans. Interestingly enough, in contrast to its agreements concluded with other friendly states, the USSR did not work out a mutual defense pact with the Pyongyang government.[34]

Meanwhile, the American effort to disengage from Korea and create a South Korean government with the moral backing of the United Nations was being pushed to its final stage. At the General Assembly meeting in Paris in late 1948, the American delegation urged the adoption of a resolution on Korea that would approve the work of the UN temporary commission and grant recognition to the Republic of Korea. John Foster Dulles, the American representative, dismissed objections that the wording of the resolution in favor of the Seoul regime might imply that it was being recognized as the sought-after national government for all of Korea. It followed that the American formula was accepted. With this the United Nations also voted to establish a new commission to aid "the lawful government of Korea to achieve the goal of a free and united Korea."

Equally significant was the failure of the General Assembly to respond to the warnings of the temporary

commission concerning the premature withdrawal of the occupation forces. Just the opposite happened. An American-inspired draft resolution, which called for the withdrawal of occupation forces, was given final approval in December 1948. American withdrawal, which had begun on September 15, 1948, was delayed in November as a result of a plea by the State Department; this resulted in a 7,500-man combat team remaining in South Korea until late June 1949. The Soviet Union had informed the U.S. government on September 19, 1948, that all of its troops would be moved from Korea by the end of the year. The Russians adhered to their announced schedule. Doubtless they had considerable confidence in the North Korean army, which they had helped to train and had supplied with tanks and heavy artillery. This was by far a more effective military organization than that possessed by the South Korean government.[35]

Further difficulties were created by the fact that American financial aid and military assistance for the Republic of Korea fell short of expectations. In September 1948 a financial and property pact was concluded between Washington and Seoul. It settled accounts for the three years of military occupation and involved nearly $400 million in additional grants and loans. An agreement for aid under the Economic Cooperation Administration was signed in December 1948; it provided help in launching a long-term program of economic rehabilitation. However, by 1950 it was evident that the South Korean economy had continued to deteriorate; the Rhee government appeared unwilling or unable to control the inflation that sapped the energies of the nation. On February 14, 1950, Congress passed a bill providing for further financial aid of $60 million to Korea; but Secretary of State Acheson warned the Rhee government in April that unless satisfactory economic reforms were undertaken the aid from the Economic Assistance Program might be curtailed. With respect to military assistance, a U.S. military advisory group of 500 officers and men had stayed on after the withdrawal of occupation forces to aid in the training of the Republic of Korea army. Heavy equipment was in short supply even though an $11-million aid pact, part of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, was passed in March 1950. This program was barely launched in June 1950 when civil war began.

The burden of maintaining internal stability in South Korea was a considerable one. Since May 1949 the occasional guerrilla activity along the border had escalated into expeditions or reconnaissances in force in which the Northern and Southern governments exchanged blows. A

major North Korean sortie toward Kaesong on May 3, 1949, was followed by at least 400 separate engagements along the border over the next six months.[36] As early as 1948 what has been described as an "organized guerrilla movement" began to make itself felt in the interior of Korea. The attacks on villages and installations had become a serious problem by late 1949. There was some evidence early in 1950 that the South Koreans had become better able to contain them.[37]

Nationwide elections were held in South Korea on May 30, 1950. President Rhee, who was already engaged in a bitter struggle with his National Assembly, had sought to postpone the balloting, but pressure from Washington held him to the assigned date. Rhee's Liberal party suffered heavy reverses at the polls, and when the Assembly convened on June 19, the newly elected independent candidates held 133 of the 210 member seats. With Rhee's supporters now clearly in the minority, it appeared that a showdown between president and parliament was inevitable. On the one hand, the election testified to the achievement of relative political stability in the South; on the other, the state might well be wrecked in the expected effort by the Assembly to curb the near-absolute power of Rhee's presidential office.

Soon after the elections the Pyongyang government put forward specific proposals for the political unification of the peninsula. The first set of proposals called for preparations for elections throughout Korea to select members for an Assembly that would first meet on August 15. Arrangements for the elections would be made between representatives of both Northern and Southern political parties, but Rhee and a few others were to be excluded from all participation. A special mission was dispatched from Pyongyang to bring the text of these proposals to political leaders in the South; however, these Northern representatives were seized and imprisoned soon after they crossed the border. As the newly elected National Assembly met in Seoul on June 19, a fresh proposal by Pyongyang was set forth. It called for the two legislative assemblies, North and South, to amalgamate; this single assembly would prepare a new constitution and in the interim govern a unified Korea. Obviously North Korea was appealing over the head of the Rhee government in order to attract the support of other elements in the South. It is difficult to evaluate the more specific intent of these political probes, but they were soon rendered null and void by the sudden eruption of hostilities along the 38th parallel.

THE KOREAN WAR

Official Washington was stunned by reports that the armed forces of North Korea had launched a general attack against the Republic of Korea at 4:00 a.m. on June 25, 1950 (Korean time).[38] At the request of the United States an emergency meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations was held 13 hours after the attack. The council unanimously passed an American-sponsored resolution that branded the attack as a breach of the peace and called for an immediate cessation of hostilities.[39] The ready passage of this measure was made possible only by the absence of the Soviet Union, which was still carrying on its boycott of the United Nations because of its refusal to seat the People's Republic of China.

Once having won its case in the Security Council, Washington directed General MacArthur, the American supreme commander in Tokyo, to dispatch equipment to Korea from the mutual defense stocks in Japan. On June 27 President Truman ordered American air and sea forces to give cover and support to the retreating Republic of Korea (ROK) forces. This came as the Rhee government was in the process of evacuating Seoul, and as the Security Council adopted an American resolution invoking military sanctions against North Korea and requesting all member states to give assistance to the Republic of Korea in repelling the attack. On June 30, in response to a request from General MacArthur, President Truman authorized the use of American ground combat forces in Korea. In the next few months other United Nations members committed units to MacArthur's command, but the Americans constituted the bulk of his forces.

To assert that the United States went to war in Korea in response to the North Korean invasion across the 38th parallel fails to answer many serious questions raised by America's full-scale involvement in a war on the mainland of Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had argued in 1947 that Korea was not vital to America's defense in Asia. Early in May 1950, Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had implied in an interview that there was little that the United States could do if the Communists chose to overrun Korea from the north. The diplomatic and military stance that America had assumed in Korea up to June 1950 suggested that little would be lost if Korea fell to Communism. Why then did Washington so quickly decide to reverse past policy and commit ground forces to combat in Asia?

The most immediate answer is that the attack was assumed to be a direct challenge by Moscow to America's containment policy. But was the Korean invasion undertaken under direct orders from the Soviet Union? One scholar has recently asserted that the fundamental cause of the Korean War remains "an open question." He adds: "We should be honest enough to admit that we simply do not know enough about this period to reach any conclusion."[40] The best that the historian can do is to set forth the logic behind the suggestion that the Korean attack was part of a grand Communist strategy and suggest the reasoning behind the contrary argument that the conflict arose out of purely local events.

First, a reasonable case, based on the criteria of power politics, can be constructed to support the view that the Korean invasion was directed by Moscow and served its vital interests in Asia. The successful unification of Korea as a Russian satellite would reinforce the Soviet position in an area where Moscow had suffered serious reverses in the previous two years. Stalin had hoped to win concessions in Manchuria and in Sinkiang from Chiang Kai-shek. The Soviet Union might even have been the arbiter of a China territorially divided along the Yangtze River between the Communist north and the Nationalist south. (See Chapter 2.) But with Mao Tse-tung's nearly total victory on the China mainland, Russia was forced to deal with a reinvigorated China that refused to bargain away interests in its border lands.

Stalin could not hope to make good his losses in China by way of an enlarged interest in the determination of Japanese affairs. Just as Russian hopes on the Chinese mainland suffered a severe setback in 1949, so did Moscow's claim to share in determining the future of the new Japan. In 1949 the United States began to move ahead in working out a separate peace treaty with Japan that would ignore Moscow's claim to joint influence and allow the establishment of American military bases in Japan. In short, Russia found itself excluded from exercising a determining influence in the affairs of the two most vital power centers of East Asia. But a Russian-controlled Korea might restore the balance. Japan could not ignore the influence on its affairs of a Korea in Russian hands just across the Sea of Japan from its home islands. Communist China would be keenly aware of the additional influence that Moscow could bring to bear on Chinese policy by control of Korea. All in all control of Korea would underline for the world the Soviet Union's determination to remain a dominant force in East Asian politics.

Second, the Soviet Union may have calculated that a successful takeover of South Korea could be accomplished without the risk of direct American involvement. Here Moscow may have been influenced by the statements and policies of the Truman administration. Secretary of State Acheson in his famous National Press Club speech of January 12, 1950, had drawn a line specifying America's defense perimeter in Asia. He indicated that it ran from the Aleutians to the Philippines and included Japan and the Ryukyus, but he omitted and thus excluded Korea and Formosa. With respect to the military security of these other areas, he explained that "Should an attack occur . . . the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression." The public actions of the Truman administration further confirmed the low priority afforded to maintaining the Republic of Korea. The mere fact that the United States gave every indication that it would not extend military protection to the long-favored Nationalist regime now on Formosa implied the same treatment for Korea. In addition, the fact that the military advisory group in Korea was to be gradually reduced appeared to support the assumption of disengagement.

Finally, Moscow may have feared that it would lose control of the feverishly nationalistic North Korean regime if it did not cater to and support its military assault upon the South. The threat always remained that Kim Il-sung's faction, which favored a close alignment with the Soviet Union, would be outmaneuvered by the domestic Communist faction of Pak Hon-yong or the Chinese-oriented faction of Kim Tu-bong. It also has been argued that the invasion would have been impossible without "Russian foreknowledge and approval, if not initiative."[41] Exponents of this view cite the tight network of Russian advisers and Soviet-Korean officers, both in the Defense Ministry in Pongyang and on the division level. There is also evidence that, in April and May 1950, Russia supplied additional heavy artillery, tanks, and airplanes, which heightened the military superiority of the Northern government over the South.

Undoubtedly the crucial element in this argument is the presumption that Moscow exercised such complete control over the action of its satellite, North Korea, that a major military action was inconceivable without its

foreknowledge and approval. There are strong arguments to support this type of speculation, but we simply do not know enough about the mechanism of Soviet control to affirm it. In addition, the argument set forth above concerning the strategic value of a Russian assertion of power in northeast Asia is a highly abstract one. This type of reasoning is useful and necessary; but it is dangerous to take any one analysis of such recent and controversial events too seriously. Without a doubt Stalin hoped to block the further extension of American control of Japan and its future; but what he was willing to do about it is a more complex question. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was in the midst of a European-oriented propaganda campaign espousing peaceful coexistence; a Russian-inspired thrust in Korea would destroy much of what had been accomplished in this campaign.

It would have been unlike the ever-cautious Stalin to initiate a gamble like the Korean invasion. The overall fact that should have guided action was the weakness of the Seoul regime. In due time it might have been expected to collapse internally, just as had Chiang's Nationalist government. Stalin was certainly wise enough to perceive the possibility that an immediate military conquest in Korea might force the Americans to stiffen their still somewhat ambiguous and wavering position in Japan. Also, the possibility existed that the unification of Korea would weaken the Soviet-oriented Kim Il-sung faction and strengthen the domestic Communists of Pak Hon-yong. At the same time, a satisfied Communist regime in a united Korea might have been a less dutiful ally for Moscow than the existing government of North Korea. The clear evidence of increased Russian military aid for Kim Il-sung's forces in the two or three months before the war is subject to various interpretations. It may have been granted to enforce Kim's leadership in a period of factional disputes. It also worked to bring increased pressure on the South in the period just before the May elections when the Northern regime desired to create uncertainty and disruptions by all means.

It thus would not be unreasonable to suggest that one should look first to Korea itself for the origins of the Korean War. When the Japanese colonial hold on Korea was broken in 1945, no nation exhibited a more exuberant desire for independence and nationhood than Korea. When international politics worked to create two separate Korean states in 1948, the passion for unity shifted into new channels; it then emerged as the demand for national

unity to be controlled either by Seoul or Pongyang. The fact that Korea was experiencing the chaos and factionalism typically seen in those Asian states newly freed from colonialism should be the beginning point in attempting to analyze the origins of the war. This being the case, both the United States and Russia may merely have found themselves suddenly committed to support the abrupt actions of unruly satellites.

Of the two immediate contenders, it would appear that North Korea was the chief aggressor. This might assume a certain impatience or lack of wisdom on the part of Pyongyang since Rhee had just lost control of the National Assembly, and rising economic chaos in the South seemed to indicate that the regime might soon collapse. However, Kim Il-sung may have perceived that while Seoul's future was dim, it would be able to sustain itself over the short run. Even though Rhee had suffered a reversal in the May elections, the mere fact that the elections were carried out with widespread participation demonstrated the strength of the regime. Rhee was ready to meet any challenge from the assembly and would probably have been willing to circumvent its authority had major confrontation taken place. Furthermore, North Korea was undoubtedly fearful that as the United States reinforced its position in Japan, South Korea might be drawn into the American defense perimeter. Pravda's accusation that Japanese heavy armaments would soon be made available to the Republic of Korea may have reflected parallel fears in Pyongyang. Equally disquieting was the visit to Seoul of the special American envoy, John Foster Dulles. In addressing the National Assembly in Seoul, Dulles asserted, "You are not alone. You will never be alone so long as you continue to play worthily your part in the great design of human freedom."[42] All these factors may have encouraged Pyongyang to believe that if military action were to be successful it had to come quickly.

Within the context of the limited civil war already under way in Korea, an additional extremely important factor to be considered is the struggle for control within the Korean Communist party, exacerbated as it was by the danger of extinction facing the Southern section of the party. In 1945 the future Vice-Premier of North Korea, Pak Hon-yong, was perhaps the nation's best-known Communist leader; but he and his faction of domestic Communists had been forced increasingly to yield the leadership to Kim Il-sung's pro-Soviet faction. Pak's supporters were largely in the South and they had taken the

brunt of Rhee's aggressive police and military campaign against dissidents. Pak was understandably more concerned with the fate of his followers than was Kim. By the spring of 1950, the Southern-based Communists were so depleted that they were no longer able to maintain the level of guerrilla activity that had been so successful in 1949. It has been argued that Pak became one of the prime advocates of war against the South because of his desire to save his South Korean followers from extermination by the Rhee regime.[43]

Pak, it should be added, was likely to gain increased support in a Korean government and party reorganized to include the active participation of North and South. In the presumed inner-party debates of early 1950, Pak could appeal to the patriotic instincts of the leadership while Kim would be forced into the less attractive role of a timid defender of the Soviet line. In the month or two before the war, Kim may well have yielded to the nationalist urgings of Pak and agreed to the invasion in order to keep control of his own party. This speculation would be in line with the fact that after the war Pak Hon-yong was executed, apparently as a scapegoat for the failure of the war.[44]

Of course, the drive for national unity was as intense in the South as in the North. Early in May 1950, Syngman Rhee reiterated his willingness forcefully to unite his country if necessary; he alerted the Northern population to wait for "unification through a joint struggle with us in the South. . . . The longed-for day will come soon."[45] It has recently been pointed out that North Korea's explanation of the origin of the war was never given a hearing by the chairman of the United Nations Security Council, who denied an appeal by Pyongyang to appear and present its case.[46] The case against the North appeared too clear-cut to be questioned. The swift progress of the North Korean thrust left few doubts that it was well planned. Finally and officially, there was the report of the United Nations military observers in Korea which called it a full-scale Northern invasion.

In spite of the weight of this evidence, a recent analysis by Karunakar Gupta has raised new and serious questions about responsibility for the war.[47] He considers the accusation set forth by Pyongyang that South Korean troops provoked the conflict by attacking the major North Korean border town of Haeju on the morning of June 25. The UN Commission on Korea reported this accusation only to add that it had no evidence to support it. The

sudden attack by the North Koreans, according to the commission, came at 4:00 a.m. on that day. After the first full day of fighting there was only one substantial military achievement reported by Seoul. This was the capture of Haeju. Here was a considerable achievement for an army otherwise on the defensive. Haeju was five miles into North Korea; as a rail junction and commercial center, it was the gateway to Pyongyang. Gupta points out that the town was reportedly seized by the ROK First Infantry Division; but this division, posted around Kaesong, was apparently thrown back when that town fell to the North Koreans at 9-9:30 a.m., on June 25. The unanswered question is how the First Division could have scored its success at Haeju unless it struck before or at the same time as the North Korean invasion.

Whatever uncertainty exists as to who struck first on the morning of June 25, a strong North Korean offensive was soon under way. Just how strong and how successful it appeared to be would vitally affect the American decision to intervene. By the end of the first day of fighting, the South Koreans, while they had been forced back, appeared to be able to maintain a reasonable defensive posture. But over the next two or three days the situation changed with amazing speed. Only as the ROK army apparently broke and rapidly fell back along the entire line of battle was there mounting pressure for American intervention on a large scale. Again the way is open for speculation, and two historians have raised certain intriguing questions concerning the military policy of the Rhee government.[48] Was it possible that Rhee (possibly in coordination with General MacArthur's headquarters in Japan) deliberately withdrew his forces and enabled the Northern armies to sweep ahead? This tactic would have been adopted to force a substantial American intervention to save the Rhee government. This suggestion involves an extraordinarily bold speculative leap. But it is based on various unexplained facts. Certain American military observers pointed out that Rhee's army though in retreat was for the most part intact as a fighting unit. In addition, the capital city of Seoul was simply abandoned without a fight on June 27. This and other factors have led Joyce and Gabriel Kolko to suggest that this was a contrived retreat. Thus, one more open question must be added to the long list concerning the Korean War.

In a hectic few days, Washington was forced to consider various possible interpretations of the events leading to the outbreak of the war in Korea. It is unclear

whether serious doubts were raised about Moscow's culpability for the invasion. On June 27 Truman attributed the attack to "Communism" now passing from subversion to armed invasion; and, to the American public, Communism automatically implied "Moscow-controlled." Washington seemed to be unaware that it may have been forcing Asian events into a European framework. The significance of the force of domestic Asian nationalism, which had provoked turmoil throughout the former colonial areas, apparently was disregarded as policy makers concentrated on the larger issues of the cold war.

The United States had certain options. It might be satisfied with the condemnation of North Korea's aggression in the United Nations. The offer of additional arms and equipment to South Korea, as well as naval and air support, might constitute a middle-ground response. Finally, the United States could act decisively and unrestrainedly and move American ground forces into action in Korea. Reacting to the unexpectedly rapid disintegration of the South Korean military defense and to the pleas of General MacArthur, the administration moved quickly to the last alternative. The need to maintain America's overall strategic credibility in the cold war, as well as the fear of domestic political reaction, undoubtedly contributed to Truman's decision to opt for full military support of the Rhee regime.[49]

In the early weeks of the war it appeared doubtful that American air power and the limited number of troops that were transferred rapidly from Japan could maintain a footing in Korea. The area held by General MacArthur's forces was reduced gradually to a small perimeter around the southern seaport city of Pusan. Little more was left to the United States than a beachhead. It was to this shaky toehold, however, that supplies, equipment, and men streamed from Japan, the United States, England, and Australia. From this staging area at Pusan, MacArthur's troops launched a major offensive on September 15. The land attack against the North Koreans was timed to coincide with the landing of a large amphibious force at Inchon near Seoul. This was regarded as a considerable gamble by marine and naval experts, but MacArthur insisted on going ahead.[50] The result was a sweeping victory over the North Koreans, whose army was virtually destroyed; throughout the war it was never again able to fight above the corps level. At the end of September the North Koreans retired north of the 38th parallel. The United Nations command was immediately faced with

the decision as to whether it should hold fast at the 38th parallel or engage in pursuit of the North Koreans perhaps as far as the Yalu border of Manchuria to the north.

The pressures that led to the decision to establish a unified Korea by driving north beyond the 38th parallel had been mounting at least since mid-July when MacArthur indicated privately that this might be necessary. On the other hand, the Russians had begun in August to push vigorously for a negotiated settlement; and in October the Chinese Communists sought to make clear that they would intervene in the war if the U.S. forces pushed north of the 38th parallel. As we shall see, the Russian bid was rejected because the Americans refused to accept negotiations following a moment of humiliating retreat. The Chinese threat was dismissed because the Americans would not take the Chinese seriously in a moment of military victory.

Since the UN decision to intervene in Korea had been taken at a time when Russia had absented itself from the Security Council, Soviet news releases branded the military sanctions as illegal because neither Russia nor Communist China had participated in the discussions. From the Communist viewpoint, the attack on the Republic of Korea was a spontaneous action of the Korean people mounted in response to an armed attack by Syngman Rhee's "fascist dictatorship." Russia abruptly decided to end its boycott of the United Nations on August 1. According to the established system of rotation, Jacob Malik, the Russian representative, became president of the Security Council for the month of August. It was from this position that the Soviet Union launched its effort to end the war by negotiation.

According to Allen S. Whiting's analysis of these negotiations, Malik's objective was to end the Korean War short of total defeat and without the commitment of Sino-Soviet military force.[51] In these circumstances Malik was forced to submit an armistice proposal that, at least in the short run, would appear to diminish Soviet prestige in Northeast Asia. On August 4 he proposed that invitations to attend the current discussions on the end of hostilities and the withdrawal of foreign troops be extended to "both the representatives of Syngman Rhee and the representatives of Kim Il-sung." By extending parity to both regimes Moscow appeared to recognize the de facto existence of the South Korean government. This must be regarded as a rebuff of Pyongyang's claim to be the sole legitimate government in Korea.

Apparently, the Soviet Union was also willing to relegate the claims of the People's Republic of China to a secondary position in its efforts to resolve the Korean tangle. As early as July 13, peace efforts undertaken by Prime Minister Nehru of India had linked a Korean settlement with the seating of the People's Republic in the Security Council. The Soviet Union endorsed the India proposal; but on July 18 it was rejected by Secretary of State Acheson. Malik made no effort to revive this bid when he expounded his main resolution on August 4. In the Soviet proposal, Peking was to be invited to attend forthcoming discussions, but this was to be an ad hoc invitation with the Nationalist representative still holding China's permanent seat. In addition, Malik failed to mention Peking's claim to Taiwan or Chou En-lai's protest concerning American naval protection for that island. Of course, these issues would complicate negotiations, but Moscow certainly had no desire to underwrite a further gain for Communist China at a moment when Russia's own position in Asia was vulnerable.

On August 17 Warren Austin, the U.S. delegate to the United Nations, firmly rejected the Russian bid for negotiations. He gave no hint of compromise. On the contrary, Austin pointed to the firm hold that the UN forces had already established in Korea. This would be a basis for future action, which he saw as culminating in elections for the whole of Korea. Malik's reply came in the form of a warning, on August 22, in which he pointed to the consequences of widening the conflict. More important, Austin's stern words may have excited fears in Peking; on August 20 the People's Republic of China declared its own deep interest in the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. Thereafter, the attitude of Peking became vital to the developing situation in Korea.

CHINA ENTERS THE WAR

Various theories as to Communist China's foreknowledge or participation in the planning of the North Korean attack have been advanced. These range from the assertion that Peking, in cooperation with Russia, sought to time this attack to coordinate with a major thrust forward in East and Southeast Asia, to the milder suggestion that it was highly likely that China was aware of the forthcoming attack and partook in some way in the planning.[52] In light of our recent knowledge of the intensity of the Sino-Soviet dispute, it has become less easy to

assume or affirm this cooperative stance on the part of Peking. One recent study pictures the North Korean attack as a Russian-supported effort to place China in the jaws of a giant nutcracker extending from Mongolia through Manchuria into Korea.[53] Without going this far, it can reasonably be maintained that the Chinese probably had no substantial or detailed foreknowledge concerning the attack in Korea; however, Peking was undoubtedly aware that tension was rising in the peninsula and that prudence required moving elements of its Fourth Field Army to Manchuria. The movement of this relatively small unit of the Chinese People's Liberation Army to Manchuria is often cited as evidence of Chinese support for the North Korean attack. It seems just as likely that this force was part of a design to discourage a Russian power play in the Manchurian area, especially in light of the increased arms pouring into North Korea from Russia.

Whatever the validity of this speculation, Peking soon found that the Korean War had created an entirely new political situation in East Asia. The quick and full response of the Truman administration went beyond Korea; Washington was taking this occasion to stake out a more forward defensive position with respect to Communist China, on the assumption that Peking was privy to the North Korean attack. President Truman's statement of June 27 ordered the American navy to defend Taiwan against possible attack from the Chinese mainland; in addition, he called for a speedup of military assistance to the French forces in Indochina and the strengthening of U.S. forces in the Philippines. Anxiety in Peking no doubt increased when on July 31 General MacArthur visited Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan. After the meeting the "Gimo" announced that plans had been laid for a joint defense of Formosa and Sino-American military cooperation.[54]

Communist China began to fear the worst; but Washington was also concerned by the implications that might be drawn from MacArthur's visit. A hurried visit to Tokyo by American presidential adviser Averell Harriman was designed to caution MacArthur about overextending U.S. commitments in Asia. Apparently, MacArthur was not receptive to this advice. By August 26 an address that MacArthur had prepared for delivery at the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention was made public. In the text he lashed out against advocates of appeasement and defeatism, claiming that they "do not understand the Orient. They do not grasp that it is in the Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive resolution and dynamic

leadership."[55] Almost immediately after, on August 27 and 30, Chou En-lai cabled the United Nations protesting alleged American air attacks north of the Yalu frontier.

MacArthur's insistence on resolute action was sharply accentuated by the overwhelming success of the daring Inchon landing, which did so much to destroy the effectiveness of the North Korean army. Those few voices in the Truman administration or in the United Nations that might have opposed the extension of military action into North Korea found that they had lost their resonance. MacArthur's star was at its zenith. Even earlier there was evidence that certain elements in the administration were intent upon pushing to the north. This was the implication of some of the earlier statements of Warren Austin in the United Nations. The policy became more precise in a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directive sent to MacArthur on September 27, which gave approval to the occupation of North Korea, so long as there was no entry of Soviet or Chinese Communist forces into North Korea, no announcement of such an entry, and no threat of such intervention.[56] The dispatch further directed MacArthur to limit the occupation of the provinces bordering Manchuria and the Soviet Union to ROK units; it was hoped that this would diminish the chances of provoking China.

To insure broad international support for the drive across the 38th parallel, an eight-power resolution was introduced in the United Nations; it would permit MacArthur to take "all appropriate steps" to reestablish stability and unity in Korea. This was passed by the General Assembly on October 7, with only the Soviet bloc and India objecting. The resolution also provided for new elections through both parts of Korea under UN supervision, the withdrawal of UN armed forces after they completed their task, and the creation of a new UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Immediately upon the passage of this resolution, MacArthur ordered the First Cavalry Division to attack across the 38th parallel. On October 19th Americans captured Pyongyang. A week later the first South Korean troops reached the border of China at the Yalu River.

Apparently Washington chose to ignore the various statements which Peking had begun issuing from late August and continued into October; these pronouncements revealed a steadily increasing commitment of Communist China to North Korea. The most pointed of these admonitions came on October 2. Chou En-lai summoned the Indian foreign minister, K. M. Panikkar, to a midnight conference.

Chou warned that while the crossing of the 38th parallel by South Korean troops could be ignored, "American intrusion into North Korea would encounter Chinese resistance."[57]

Pannikar passed the message on to official Washington. If anything, this appeared to heighten the administration's determination to push ahead. On October 9 MacArthur was officially instructed to proceed with his advance into North Korea even if Chinese intervention occurred, so long as "in your judgment" there was a reasonable chance of success.[58] But the Truman administration may have had sudden doubts about MacArthur's reliability or judgment. On that same day two American F-80 jets had penetrated 60 miles into Soviet territory and had attacked an airfield near Vladivostok. Very soon after it was announced that President Truman would fly to Wake Island in the Pacific for a special meeting with MacArthur to take place on October 15.

Beyond the fact that the President and the general were going to discuss the latest phase of the war, the precise object of Truman's abrupt mission to meet MacArthur is unknown. Nonetheless, one can ascertain that Truman wanted MacArthur clearly to understand that American objectives in Asia did not go beyond the UN-authorized task of uniting Korea. MacArthur may well have been warned that additional provocative air attacks on Russia could endanger the peace; and he was undoubtedly cautioned that under no conditions was the war to be extended into China. Truman also asked MacArthur's opinion as to the chances of Chinese or Soviet intervention in the war. The general replied that there was very little chance of that. He explained: "Only 50-60,000 Chinese could be gotten across the Yalu River . . . if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter."[59]

On October 24 MacArthur ordered his [illegible] units to drive ahead to the Yalu with all speed. Soon the JCS sent a hurried message to the general advising that this order overrode their imposed limitation [illegible] use of non-Korean forces in the border provinces. [illegible] simply replied that the move was taken because [illegible] military necessity. One must conclude that the general [illegible] his point since no further objection on this [illegible] was raised in Washington.[60]

It was at this juncture, on October [illegible], that UN forces made their first contact with [illegible] from the Chinese People's Liberation Army. [illegible] units inflicted severe damage on various [illegible] and soon after staged attacks on advancing [illegible]. Employing the tactics of guerrilla [illegible] been perfected against the Japanese and the Nationalists, the "volunteers" spread panic in the ranks of the South Korean forces. But suddenly, on November 7, the Chinese troops were withdrawn from battle. The disengagement and the ensuing lull in active combat continued until late in the month when a Chinese force of about 300,000 men unleashed a massive attack upon the UN forces.[61]

These abrupt and shifting Chinese tactics have mystified commentators somewhat. The brief engagements and the withdrawal that followed may have been the product of strategic concepts developed by Mao Tse-tung. The objective may have been to draw UN forces more deeply into an exposed and over-extended military position. More simply the Chinese tactic may have been employed to test the strength of the advancing UN forces. Beyond this there is also the very real possibility that the withdrawal of the Chinese units was part of one last effort to bring about negotiations now that the Chinese intention to intervene had been made as evident as possible. A delegation from Peking had arrived at the United Nations on November 24. The Chinese had come in response to an invitation to engage in a general discussion of the Korean problem, including their charge of U.S. aggression in Asia. Now that Peking had shown its hand in Korea, this would be an excellent opportunity for informal negotiations. However, a rapid series of military developments forced to one side all efforts at negotiation.

Apparently, Washington failed to take seriously the implications of the two-week period of Chinese armed involvement. At a National Security Council meeting on November 9, it was decided that MacArthur should be permitted to continue his drive to the north. Intelligence reports, passed on to Washington through MacArthur's headquarters, were wildly misleading and vastly underestimated the number of Chinese troops in North Korea and the capacity of the Chinese to bring additional units into Korea.[62]

Rather than take the politically unpopular course of opposing MacArthur, it was much easier for Truman and Acheson to assume that the Chinese would not intervene in force. This political miscalculation was, of course, disastrous; but MacArthur's extravagent military tactics contributed almost equally to the calamity. The general who had gambled so successfully at Inchon once again cast aside the normal rules of military caution. In violation of the U.S. Army unity of command doctrine, he had divided his armies. General Walker's Eighth Army was ordered to proceed up the western side of the Korean peninsula while,

on the other side of the rugged mountains dividing Korea, General Almond's X Corps pushed up the eastern side. According to one authority, "the redeployment of Almond's Corps created a situation in which--if the Chinese should attack in force--the possibility of total disaster was inherent, for neither Almond nor Walker could come to the aid of the other."[63]

On November 24 MacArthur began his "win the war" offensive, promising his troops that they would be home for Christmas. Suddenly, on November 26, a vast Chinese army, apparently undetected up to that time, rose up to turn back MacArthur's drive for the Yalu. All across Korea a massive American retreat was under way; as MacArthur put it in his own communiqué of November 28: "We face an entirely new war." By December 4 Pyongyang had fallen; Seoul was evacuated in the first few days of the new year. The American Eighth Army had undertaken a 275-mile retreat, the longest in American military history. The Americans had simply outrun the Chinese, but the rapid retreat preserved in being a fighting force. The Eighth Army was able to turn and reorder its line of defense. General Matthew Ridgway--replacing Walker, who was killed in a tragic accident--ordered his UN forces to dig in and hold the Pyongtaek-Samchok line, about 70 miles below the 38th parallel.[64]

In Washington American officials held their breath awaiting the final outcome of the retreat, which the American troops with biting humor called the "great bug out." There was also a certain touch of panic. It was reported that Truman's initial reaction was to assert before a meeting of the National Security Council on November 28 that the time may have come for an atomic showdown with Russia.[65] When, two days later, the President replied to a question at a press conference that the use of the atomic bomb had not been ruled out, there was an intensified concern, especially among America's allies. Great Britain was particularly shocked by this suggestion. Prime Minister Clement Attlee departed almost immediately for Washington. He arrived on December 4 for a series of conferences. By this time Truman had been assured that the Americans would hold in Korea; he informed Attlee that use of the A-bomb had been ruled out and that it was American policy to avoid full-scale war with China. On the other hand, it was made clear that the United States would continue its defense of South Korea in the face of all odds, even though the policy of "liberating" North Korea was set aside.

On the more sensitive China question, no concessions would be offered to Peking either on its entry into the United Nations or on the question of America's defense of Taiwan. The U.S. position on these issues was virtually cemented in place in those days of humiliating retreat in Korea. There was, however, a kind of give-and-take. In spite of MacArthur's insistence that the defense of the UN position in Korea required the bombing of Chinese bases in Manchuria, the administration declined to expand the war. However, on December 16 Washington seized all Chinese Communist assets in the United States and imposed an embargo on trade with China.

In the General Assembly of the United Nations fear mounted that the Korean conflict would spread beyond that beleaguered peninsula. On December 14 it passed a resolution sponsored by 13 Asian and Arab nations appealing to the Communists not to advance farther than the 38th parallel pending peace negotiations. At the same time, a three-member commission was created to arrange for a cease-fire. In a statement issued on December 22, Chou En-lai rejected these truce proposals, asserting that the issues involved were not confined to Korea. Before any cease-fire, Chou declared, the United States must agree to the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, the withdrawal of "aggressive American forces" from Taiwan, and the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.[66] On December 19 the Chinese representatives left the United Nations to return to Peking.

As President Truman put it, the Chinese had entered the war "with both feet," contrasting sharply with its initially cautious policy. At first China had gradually accelerated its warnings as to UN infringement in North Korea. By late October Chinese forces briefly entered into battle, but withdrew, possibly to create the occasion for negotiations. As far as overall motivation is concerned, the Chinese could not help but be deeply concerned by the aggressive advance of American forces under MacArthur. The succession of victories by America's Asian pro-consul might well establish an unbreakable momentum that would burst on into China proper and propel MacArthur's ally, Chiang Kai-shek, back into contention for leadership. Obviously, it would be best to halt the Americans before they reached Chinese soil. In addition, American occupation forces in North Korea would be a threat to Manchuria, China's most valuable industrial province, with its electric power facilities on either side of the Yalu. Positive benefits might also be reaped

by a successful intervention. Thwarting the American objectives in Korea might encourage those elements in Japan who were working against an armed alliance with the United States. Finally, a Chinese Communist victory in Korea would be one more indication that the forward advance of Communism was undiminished in Asia.

More difficult to measure is the role of the Soviet Union in China's decision to intervene. Russia was faced by a cruel dilemma as it contemplated the fall of one of its satellites: The Soviets might intervene themselves but this threatened to unleash a disastrous global conflict; or they could support the Chinese, which might risk losing influence in North Korea to China. Still, there was the hope that a China dependent on Russia for arms and supplies might find it necessary to give due weight to the wishes of the Soviet Union in North Korea. China had solid reasons of her own for intervention; at the same time, Peking probably bargained hard for the promise of Russian support in arms and equipment in exchange for the intervention of Chinese manpower. But Soviet military aid had to be paid for; later, Peking was to complain that a large part of the earlier Soviet loan was expended in payment for this aid.[67]

Meanwhile, the battle raged on in Korea. At one point, General MacArthur was fearful that a total evacuation of Korea would be necessary; this, however, proved to be an exaggerated estimate. In mid-January, General J. Lawton Collins, representing the JCS, visited Korea; he reported that the Chinese advance had been stopped and that American morale was being rapidly restored under General Ridgway.[68] On January 25 Ridgway launched his own counterattack. Its primary objective was the destruction of Chinese military units; but by the end of March, UN forces had again edged their way north as far as the general line of the 38th parallel.

The renewal of the UN offensive raised again the question of objectives. Warnings were repeated about the danger of spreading the war. Especially loud were the demands that the war should not be allowed to settle down to a long and bloody stalemate. In Tokyo, MacArthur had urged military action in North Korea and against China proper. This viewpoint was supported in the United States, particularly among critics of the Democratic administration. In the United Nations fears were openly expressed that MacArthur's determination to end the stalemate would bring general war.

On March 23 MacArthur seized the initiative.[69] Without consulting the United Nations or the military chiefs

in Washington, he asserted that the Chinese had no chance of winning the war, that if the United Nations should decide to attack China directly the Peking government would be in danger of "imminent collapse," that the Korean problem should be divorced from "extraneous" issues such as the Taiwan question, and that the Chinese commander, Lin Piao, should be sent to meet him on the field of battle to arrange a cease-fire. Peking dismissed MacArthur's offer as a bluff, but the general's superiors in Washington were outraged by his pronouncement.

A new peace proposal was concurrently being prepared in Washington. It suggested that since the battle lines now lay in the general vicinity of the first attack, the time was ripe for a cease-fire and a broader settlement for Korea; then it might be possible to settle peacefully "other problems" pertaining to the Far East.[70] MacArthur was informed of this peace overture on March 20. It was obvious that the general's hopes for a second offensive into the North might have to be set aside for the foreseeable future; and, worse from his point of view, the way was open for a negotiated settlement of the Taiwan question, since Truman's statement seemed to imply that support of Chiang Kai-shek might not be absolute. But all this was effectively torpedoed by MacArthur's sudden and unauthorized ultimatum of March 23. Undoubtedly knowledge of the forthcoming presidential statement influenced MacArthur in the timing and tenor of his ultimatum to Peking.[71]

It was at this point that President Truman privately decided that MacArthur must be relieved of his command; he only awaited the appropriate time to undertake this dramatic move. Meanwhile, the United States officially denied that it had any intention of asking the United Nations for permission to carry the war to the Chinese mainland in the event that Peking turned down MacArthur's offer. The general was informed that any general offensive into North Korea was a matter for higher political consideration. MacArthur was instructed to clear with his superiors in Washington any further pronouncement of a political nature.

This hardly put an end to the bitter political infighting raging between Washington and Tokyo. In a letter released on April 5 to Joseph W. Martin, the minority leader of the House of Representatives, MacArthur advocated the opening of a second front in Asia by employing the troops of Chiang Kai-shek for an attack on the mainland. Now the lines were clearly drawn. One faction felt that the main effort to contain Communism should be

rected toward Europe. This group deplored the contin-
g war in Korea and feared that further involvement in
a would undermine the strength of the free world. For
em a negotiated but honorable peace in Korea was essen-
l. The opposing faction believed in MacArthur's words
t "the Communist conspirators have elected to make
eir play for global conquest" in Asia. To him and his
porters negotiation was tantamount to surrender.

The climax to the "great debate" on American policy
e on April 11, 1951, with the dismissal of MacArthur
m his Far East command. Such an abrupt ending to
Arthur's professional career brought the basic conflict
early into the open. President Truman announced in dis-
sing MacArthur: "I have concluded that he is unable to
e his wholehearted support to the policies of the Uni-
States Government and of the United Nations in matters
taining to official duties." In the congressional in-
tigation that followed MacArthur's return to the United
tes, Secretary Marshall once again expressed the admin-
ration's view that MacArthur, a theater commander, by
licly expressing his displeasure with the foreign and
itary policies of his government had created a "wholly
recedented situation." The entire problem contributed
the political and emotional tensions then stirring in
United States in the so-called McCarthy era. The pro-
sional anti-Communists and the critics of the Truman-
eson policy in Asia lined up solidly behind MacArthur
a struggle that increasingly embittered American do-
tic politics.

PROLONGED NEGOTIATION AND POSTWAR KOREA

The dismissal of MacArthur led to no immediate break-
ough in the Korean stalemate. In the midst of the con-
versy, the Chinese Communists launched a new mass at-
k on April 22. General Ridgway, MacArthur's successor,
st rolled with the new Chinese punch and then gradually
an to counterattack. On May 2 the Chinese armies began
retreat. It became apparent that the Chinese were
her unable or unwilling to mount a sustained offensive
South Korea. At this juncture the diplomats quietly
to work to bring the war to a halt.

Even though the MacArthur controversy had hardened
rican policy toward China with respect to the defense
Taiwan and opposition to China's entry into the United
ions, on June 2 Secretary of State Acheson indicated

that the way might now be open to some sort of settlement in Korea. A Soviet response to this probe came on June 23. Malik informed the United Nations that Russia would like to see the negotiation of a cease-fire in Korea based on the 38th parallel. In explaining the Soviet peace feeler, Malik stated that political and territorial questions should not be a subject of the truce agreement and that these matters could be taken up at a later time. Soon after, the United Nations instructed General Ridgway to broadcast a suggestion to Pyongyang and Peking for the commencement of talks. Almost immediately, Kim Il-sung and the Chinese commander, General Peng Teh-huai, agreed to negotiations. On July 10, 1951, discussions were begun between delegations headed respectively by Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy of the United States and Lieutenant-General Nam Il of North Korea. However, it was evident that the Chinese delegates directed the strategy of the North Korean team.

These brief beginnings ushered in two prolonged and agonizing years of intermittent negotiations, first at the border town of Kaesung and then at nearby Panmunjon. The war of words was augmented by the ongoing probe of armies in and around the area of the 38th parallel. Action on the ground was largely confined to localized and sporadic bloody encounters. The air battles over Korea, however, took on a radically new character as the Soviet Union undertook a major effort to build up the Chinese air force. By October the Chinese were sufficiently effective over North Korea in "MIG Alley" for General Vandenberg to pronounce it one of the world's most powerful air forces.[72] Still, at no time were the Chinese able to effectively challenge UN control of the air in the area adjacent to the 38th parallel.

The most contested part of the negotiations centered on two chief issues. The first was the location of the cease-fire line. The Communists wanted to revert to the 38th parallel, but the UN negotiators wanted to hold fast at the more easily defended battle line, which would give the South Koreans slightly more territory. After five months of negotiations the Communists relented and tentatively agreed to a cease-fire along the battle line. As it happened, final agreement on the truce line was put aside as a heated dispute arose over the question of exchange of prisoners. The Communists vehemently insisted upon a general exchange of all prisoners, while the United Nations argued that prisoners of war should be free to decide whether or not they wished to return to their nation

of origin. The issue was of significance because of the human rights involved and because of its propaganda value, since large numbers of Communist prisoners, especially North Koreans, had made it plain that they had no desire to return to the Communist North.

There was little or no movement over this and over other issues in dispute from late 1951 into 1953. With the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower as president in late 1952, new initiatives were anticipated in the Korean War. Eisenhower followed through on his election pledge to visit Korea and see what could be done there; he came home determined to end the costly stalemate by one means or another. Meanwhile, there were indications that Peking might accept a compromise proposed by the Indian government. But in late 1952, informed sources suggested that Stalin would not compromise on the prisoner issue. Soon after, China fell in line behind the Soviet hard line.[73]

It was the death of Stalin in March 1953 that brought about a new flexibility in the Soviet attitude toward negotiation. On March 28 the Chinese command accepted a long-standing UN proposal for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. Soon after, Chou En-lai proclaimed the need for a "mutual compromise," and Peking began to ease away from its demand for the forced repatriation of prisoners. In spite of this, negotiations again reached an impasse in May. It has been suggested that at this point Secretary Dulles conveyed a threat to Peking that unless a compromise was worked out the war would be expanded to the Chinese mainland by atomic attacks.[74]

At any rate, by June 8 the United States and China had agreed to a compromise formula. India would chair a neutral commission to administer the exchange of prisoners; each side was given a chance to persuade reluctant prisoners to return, but the prisoner would have a free opportunity to make his own choice. Even this proposal was nearly demolished by the unpredictable Syngman Rhee, who was determined to fight on until all of Korea was united under his own rule. On June 18 the Korean president suddenly released 25,000 North Korean prisoners who had indicated that they did not desire to return to the North. The Chinese Communist response was recorded in terms of a determined offensive launched on July 17. The attack was a selective one directed against the highly touted Capital Division of the South Korean army while avoiding contact with the Americans. Finally, American persuasion and promises forced Rhee into line, and the armistice agreement was signed on July 27, 1953.

This destructive and fruitless war had finally come to an end, with North and South Korea still eyeing each other vengefully across virtually the same border as had existed before the conflict. Beyond Korea the war had a most basic impact upon world affairs in general and East Asian affairs in particular. That dimension of the cold war involving the buildup of mutually hostile military forces was sharply accelerated. In Europe the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had largely been a paper affair to the middle of 1950; but now, as America undertook its own military buildup in Europe and Asia, new appropriations were made available to the NATO forces, and the European nations were called upon to expand their troop contributions. In Asia, China's prestige was advanced enormously. "Volunteers" for the People's Liberation Army had fought the technically advanced American military to a standstill and had emerged from the war hardened and better armed; here the Russian contribution was notable even to the point of equipping a small but modern Chinese air force.

While China had grown stronger, American opposition to Peking had solidified. It was marked by unyielding opposition to China's entry into the United Nations and a firm refusal to grant diplomatic recognition. As a result of the war, China now faced a series of armed outposts along its outer periphery. The treaty with Japan was rushed to completion in 1951, and accompanying agreements assured that its islands would be the central anchor of a strong of bases confronting China. Taiwan was not only secured against Communist attack; by 1954 Chiang Kai-shek was armed and supported by a mutual security treaty with the United States. Earlier, President Truman had directed that U.S. forces in the Philippines be strengthened, and he ordered acceleration in the dispatch of military assistance to the forces of France in Indochina.

President Rhee's opposition to the cease-fire settlement had been overcome in part by the extension of certain American guarantees for the postwar period. Among these was the conclusion of a mutual defense treaty binding the United States and South Korea, which was signed on October 1, 1953; also, the United States agreed to finance various long-term aid programs for the Seoul government. The armistice agreement itself provided for a political conference to be held in three months to settle the withdrawal of foreign troops and to resolve the question of Korean unification. Agreement proved to be impossible at that time and also in 1954 at the Geneva conference, which

sought to resolve the Korean problem and terminate the Indochina conflict. In spite of Rhee's protests that war should be resumed to unify Korea, the two Koreas were forced to coexist along the approximate line of the 38th parallel. The UN command in South Korea stayed in being under U.S. control and with a continuing commitment of American security forces.

In the Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee's rule grew increasingly authoritarian after 1953, and the same determined will was evinced in Seoul's foreign policies. Continued hostility to Communism and Rhee's determination to unite Korea on his own terms were matched by his firm and demanding policies toward Japan. Korea's hostility toward Japan was rooted in the long period of colonial subjugation so recently terminated, but among the postwar grievances were financial claims based on the wartime use of Korean labor and property confiscations. Relations with Japan became especially embittered in mid-1955, when Seoul feared it detected the beginnings of a Japanese-North Korean rapprochement. South Korea broke off trade relations with Japan and reinforced its exclusive claim to various fisheries the boundaries of which cut into some of Japan's richest fishing grounds. Several Japanese fishing craft were seized and their crews placed in Korean prisons. Relations were further strained in 1959 when Japan announced the successful completion of negotiations for the repatriation to North Korea of large numbers of Koreans in Japan.[75]

But by 1960 attention was concentrated on domestic politics in South Korea where it suddenly became clear that Rhee had gone too far with his repressive policies. In the presidential election of that year, Rhee's chief opponent suddenly died of a heart attack a month before the balloting; that Rhee's presidential opponent had similarly died in the midst of the 1956 elections was hardly reassuring. Rhee achieved a sweeping victory for himself and his Liberal party, but it was won amid an atmosphere of terror. The opposition Democratic party marched out of the National Assembly in protest, and bloody riots broke out in various cities of South Korea. These student-led protests apparently made their point: The United States addressed a note to Rhee accusing him of using repressive measures unsuitable to a democracy. Further rioting broke out in Seoul, and on April 27 Rhee resigned and flew to Hawaii. Under a new constitution a "parliamentary system" was introduced to replace the highly centralized "presidential system." In July the much-respected

Dr. John M. Chang became premier as his Democratic party won control of the House of Representatives.

Without the centralized and authoritarian powers of Rhee, Premier Chang was called upon to cope with runaway unemployment and a deepening economic crisis. His efforts to reduce army expenditures met with firm opposition from the military. Chang had discarded the frantic rhetoric of Rhee's "March North" campaign, but his advocacy of all-Korean elections proved ineffective. Meanwhile, student pressure for unification mounted; thus, in April 1961 students demanded postal, economic, and cultural exchanges with the North. At this point the army determined to act. In the early hours of May 16, a military junta under the direction of General Park Chung Hee seized power in Seoul.[76]

Although the United States was embarrassed by the sudden coup, it chose to accept its results, even though a freely elected government in South Korea was replaced with a military dictatorship. In the ensuing months Washington brought strong pressure to bear for a return to the forms of democratic rule. When this was finally agreed to, it amounted to little more than a surface change; the "presidential system" was restored under a program of "guided democracy." In October 1963 General Park was elected president of the new constitutional regime. Political democracy and civil rights were to be sacrificed by the militarily controlled government for the sake of stability and economic advance. Indeed, the economic achievement that followed was considerable. To that time the Republic of Korea's economic performance was pitifully inadequate; but since 1962 the Gross National Product has increased at an annual rate of 8.5 percent, exports have risen by almost 50 percent, and industrial production by 14 percent annually. At the same time, it must be kept in mind that much of the economic advance since 1967 has come about as the result of artificial stimulation provided by the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, by 1970 it was suggested that South Korea had entered the stage of economic "take-off" and it was regarded as a "showcase" of the effects of U.S. economic aid in Asia.[77]

Before the mid-1960s, the considerable economic achievement of the North Korean government appeared to eclipse the slovenly performance of the Seoul regime. Even more impressive was the fact that Kim Il-sung's subtle diplomacy had achieved for North Korea an unexpected independence and freedom of action from the direct

control of both Moscow and Peking. Pyongyang was able to draw economic aid from both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and yet commit itself to neither. Within these limits, however, it was clear that Peking's influence on North Korea had increased as a result of the heavy military contribution undertaken by China during the Korean War. Chinese troops continued to occupy North Korea until late in 1958. Apparently, it was Kim Il-sung's government that originally sponsored the requested withdrawal, possibly with an advance understanding with Moscow.[78] The evidence that Kim was able to instigate the Chinese departure and to maintain the stability of his government after the withdrawal testified to the strong state that existed in North Korea.

Thereafter, Kim cautiously sought to maintain his independence from either camp as the Sino-Soviet split became more intense in the early 1960s; this was true even though his statements appeared to favor the Maoist ideology on revolution and revisionism. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China brought about a period of greater strain in relations between Mao and Kim, especially when more radical elements in Peking seemed to hint at the desirability of removing Kim from power.[79] However, by 1970 it was clear that friendly relations were reaffirmed between North Korea and Communist China.

The escalation of the war in Vietnam in mid-1965 led to the most serious crisis in the relations between the two Koreas since the end of the civil war in 1953. Specifically, this arose from South Korea's direct military participation in the Vietnam conflict, which brought with it an enormous increase in American aid to the Seoul regime. Pyongyang could not relax its military posture when over one and one-half billion dollars in military assistance grants flowed into South Korea between 1966 and 1971.[80] The Republic of Korea could boast of its enlarged political and military influence as a result of the solid showing of its troops in Vietnam. Furthermore, in a war that more than once threatened to extend into China, Korea was a logical battlefield for a confrontation between Washington and Peking. In response, North Korea increased its military allocations in its October 1966 budget. More important, its armed probes along the South Korean border sharply increased in 1967 and 1968.[81] When a commando team from the North attempted to assassinate President Park on January 21, 1968, the two states stood on the brink of war. Such anxiety was far from dispelled when two days later the North Korean navy seized the American intelligence ship Pueblo.

As the stalemate in Vietnam became an accepted fact, the tensions that gripped Korea began to subside. In 1969 there was a sharp drop in North Korean subversice activity along the border, and Pyongyang evinced greater moderation in its propaganda broadcasts. The two governments soon proclaimed their respective terms for better relations: Park's proposal in 1970 called for the gradual removal of North-South barriers; and in the spring of 1971 Kim Il-sung set forth his own eight-point reunification program. The moderate tone of these proposals was encouraging; but in essence they repeated the inflexible terms contained in earlier exchanges.

The announcement in July 1971 of Nixon's forthcoming visit to Peking appeared to encourage Seoul and Pyongyang to undertake a more serious effort to resolve the Korean problem. The first solid turning point came in July 1972, when at the conclusion of secret talks between the two governments it was announced that an agreement had been reached on seeking an improvement of relations with the ultimate aim of reunification of the peninsula. By November both sides agreed to cease all hostile propaganda, and the structure of a North-South coordinating committee was announced. Seoul was clearly aware that it was necessary to look toward some future understanding with the North, since it was uncertain how long the American security force of 43,000 men would remain in Korea. For its part, Pyongyang no doubt felt sufficiently strong economically and politically to proceed with negotiations. Not only was it confident of support from Peking, but also its relations with Japan promised an increase of trade and perhaps increased Japanese investments.[82]

In spite of these steps toward institutionalizing contact between North and South Korea, the achievement of actual unification was in no way assured and the practical problems associated with unity remained unsolved. Still, the joint communiqué of July 1972, in which both sides recognized the strength of Korean national identity, may prove a stronger force in the long run than the legacy of the recent past.

Summary

The first postwar decade in East Asia was marked by continuing upheaval and international warfare both in Korea and in China. The end of Japan's colonial and semi-colonial overlordship left a residue of competing indigenous parties and ideologies in both "liberated" nations.

The Korean War not only devastated that unfortunate peninsula, but it also drew China into a major and exhausting conflict during its first uneasy year of nationhood as an independent Communist state. Intervention by China saved the People's Democratic Republic of Korea from extinction in 1950; and, as we have seen, the relationship between the two states, although occasionally tense, has remained close over the past 20 years. Indeed, North Korea's new spirit of limited cooperation with South Korea was undoubtedly facilitated by China's promise of continuing protection for the Northern regime.

Even though China had successfully defended its borders in the Korean War, the effort imposed a severe strain on Peking's political and economic resources. The war also left a bitter legacy in terms of China's relations with the United States. It created the conditions whereby America became in practice as well as in theory China's most implacable enemy: Washington's decision to defend Taiwan symbolized for China this abiding opposition. America's highly mechanized armed forces had inflicted heavy losses on the Chinese "volunteers" and Peking drew two lessons from this experience. First, it would thenceforth give high priority to the creation of its own heavy armed force (while retaining the tradition of guerrilla warfare). Second, Peking realized that sooner or later it must acquire its own nuclear weapons.[83]

The war also underlined China's ambiguous relationship with the Soviet Union. The Russian security treaty (1950) had proven its worth by preventing the United States from extending its military operation outside Korea; but there were problems as well. China was drawn into an otherwise avoidable conflict either by Moscow's foolishly adventurous policy or by Stalin's inability to cope with the ambitions of his own satellite nation (or that satellite's massive response to provocation from the South). The strain of the war revealed important elements that were to surface in the future break between the two allies. At its best the alliance had proved itself to be a powerful combination in the politics of Asia and of the world, but there were enormous practical differences to paper over. These complex issues were to provide the main theme of China's evolving foreign policy through the two decades that followed.

NOTES

1. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, n.d.), pp. 411-24.

2. John Gittings has recently pointed to the relative moderation of Liu's speech. See "The Great Asian Conspiracy" in America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian American Relations, ed. Edward Friedman and Mark Selden (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), pp. 127-29. For studies that emphasize the revolutionary nature of Liu's address see O. Edmund Clubb, 20th Century China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 336; and R. G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 21. For the text of Liu Shao-ch'i's address see New China News Agency, November 16, 1949. Hereafter N.C.N.A.

3. Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., p. 423. Peking's support for revolutionary action was most commonly seen in its support for "wars of national liberation" not only in Asia but in Africa and Latin America as well. Such support was usually implicit in more general Chinese official statements, although on occasion it was expressed in an explicit and specific manner. This did not imply direct armed support; but in certain cases it could involve the sending of a certain amount of arms and munitions. Most important of all, it implied moral support. But it also could involve training of resistance forces, organizational aid and propaganda support. All this would vary from case to case and depended on the pressure China was under from the West. See Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

4. As translated in H. Arthur Steiner, Chinese Communism in Action (Los Angeles: University of California, 1953), p. 3.

5. Ibid., pp. 34-55. See also James Chieh Hsiung, Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations: A Study of Attitudes and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

6. C. P. Fitzgerald, The Birth of Communist China (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964), pp. 106-7.

7. New York Times, October 8, 1949.

8. Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 506. For text of memorandum see Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Nomination of Philip C. Jessup