

JULY 30—AUGUST 6, 1960

A. SOVIET UNION - UNITED STATES. — The RB-47 Incident. - Soviet Allegation of Further U.S. Intrusion into Soviet Airspace. - Notes to U.S.A., Britain, and Norway. - American Refutation of Soviet Allegation. - Security Council Debate.

On July 1, exactly two months after the U-2 incident which prevented the Summit Conference, an American RB-47 aircraft was shot down by a Soviet fighter over the Barents Sea with the loss of four of her crew of six. The incident was not announced by the Soviet authorities until July 11, when Notes were presented to the U.S.A. (and also to Britain and Norway) alleging that the plane had violated Soviet airspace and been shot down over Soviet territorial waters. The U.S. Government strongly denied that the RB-47 had violated Soviet airspace, declared that it had been shot down over international waters, and protested in strong terms to the U.S.S.R., at the same time demanding the immediate release of two airmen who had been captured.

The RB-47 had been reported missing since July 1, on which date she took off from a U.S. base in Britain (Brize Norton, Oxfordshire) on an electro-magnetic survey flight over the Arctic Ocean. For a week thereafter U.S. and Norwegian aircraft searched the Arctic seas round Spitzbergen for traces of the missing plane, aided by a Soviet salvage vessel which had offered to join in the search. Attempts to locate the missing plane were abandoned on July 7.

Soviet Notes to U.S.A., Britain, and Norway.

As stated above, the Soviet Government presented Notes to the U.S., British and Norwegian Governments on July 11 in connexion with the shooting-down of the RB-47, summaries of which are given below :

Note to United States.

After protesting at a "new gross violation of the airspace of the Soviet Union by a U.S. Air Force plane" the Soviet Note to the U.S. Government went on :

"An unidentified military aircraft heading for the frontier of the Soviet Union was sighted . . . over the Barents Sea in the vicinity of the Kola Peninsula on July 1, 1960. A [Soviet] fighter plane was sent up to identify the nationality of the plane and prevent it from overflying the territory of the U.S.S.R. The pilot of the Soviet fighter established that the unidentified plane was a bomber with the markings of the U.S. Air Force. The American plane violated the state frontier of the U.S.S.R. 22 kilometres (about 12 miles) north of Cape Svyatoi Nos and was moving in the direction of Archangel. Despite the signals given it by the Soviet fighter plane to follow it and prepare for landing, the violating plane continued to move deeper into the airspace of the Soviet Union. In accordance with the orders issued to the armed forces of the Soviet Union on safeguarding the Soviet frontiers, the violator plane was shot down . . . over Soviet territorial waters east of Cape Svyatoi Nos."

The Soviet Note went on to say that two of the crew of six—First-Lieut. John R. McKone and First-Lieut. Freeman B. Olmstead—had been picked up some time later by a Soviet vessel; the body of the commander of the plane (Captain Willard G. Palm) had also been found, but there was no trace of the three other members of the crew. During interrogation, Lieutenants McKone and Olmstead stated that the RB-47—described as a six-engined reconnaissance bomber, armed with two 20-mm. guns and carrying special photographic and radio-electronic equipment—had taken off the same day from the Brize Norton base, in England, "on a route lying along the northern frontiers of Norway and the Soviet Union"; after carrying out its mission, it had been under instructions to return to the same base. Before the take-off, "the crew of the plane had been warned by their unit commander at the Brize Norton base that the flight had to be kept top secret, and the crew were therefore forbidden to maintain regular radio communication with the base."

"It is only two months ago," the Soviet Note continued, "that the aggressive actions of the United States, which found expression in the predetermined intrusion of an American military aircraft into the U.S.S.R. on a spying mission and in the proclamation of such provocative acts to be a matter of the national policy of the U.S.A., and in the wrecking of the Summit Conference by the U.S. Government . . . The new violation of the frontier of the Soviet Union by an American aircraft proves that the U.S.A. is still following a policy dangerous to peace. Everyone sees now what is the real cause of the solemn assurances by the U.S. Government and by President Eisenhower in person about the President's alleged order to discontinue American spying overflights of the territory of the U.S.S.R. . . ."

After stating that Lieutenants McKone and Olmstead would be brought to trial "under the full rigour of the Soviet law," the Note demanded the U.S. Government "in full earnest against the dangerous consequences to which the continuation of the provocative activities of the American Air Force will lead and the responsibility which will rest with the U.S. Government."

Note to Britain

The Soviet Note to Britain accused the U.K. Government of being an "accomplice" of the United States in acts hostile to the Soviet Union, and warned Britain of the "dangerous consequences which may ensue from a continuation of provocative acts by American aircraft operating from British territory."

After giving the Soviet Government's version of the incident as set out in the Note to the U.S.A., the Note to Britain went on : "The Government of the U.S.S.R. cannot overlook the role which the Government of the United Kingdom, on whose territory the American intruder plane was based, played in the act of aggression against the Soviet Union. The U.K. Government, by granting the territory of its country to the U.S.A. for stationing military bases and for carrying out aggressive acts by the American Air Force against the Soviet Union, appears in the capacity of a direct accomplice in such aggressive acts. Thereby it assumes grave responsibility for the possible consequences of such actions. . . ."

"The Soviet Government has previously warned the U.K. Government on several occasions about the gravity of a situation in which the territory of that country is allowed to be used for stationing U.S. military bases. The violation of Soviet airspace by the American RB-47 military plane, which took off from the Brize Norton base on British territory, shows that the U.K. Government has taken no account of the Soviet Union's warning. This policy of complicity in the aggressive and provocative actions of the military circles of the U.S.A. is completely at variance with the statements by leaders of the British Government about their desire . . . to contribute to strengthening peace, relieving international tension, and improving relations between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. . . ."

"The Soviet Government and N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, personally, have declared more than once that they appreciated the statements by the British Government and by Prime Minister Macmillan about their desire to contribute to easing international tension and improving relations between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. But how can the statements of the British Government be reconciled with the position of an accomplice in the provocative actions of the U.S.A., in which Britain has placed herself by allowing the American Air Force to use her territory for acts of aggression against the Soviet Union? . . ."

"The Government of the U.S.S.R. lodges a vigorous protest with the U.K. Government in connexion with the granting of its territory for carrying out aggressive acts against the U.S.S.R. by American aircraft, and most earnestly warns the U.K. Government of the dangerous consequences which may ensue from a continuation of provocative acts by the American Air Force operating from British territory. . . ."

Note to Norway.

The Soviet Note to Norway said that the Norwegian Government had displayed an "incomprehensible lack of responsibility" by giving the RB-47 permission to use bases in Norway if necessary, despite the previous Norwegian assurances after the U-2 incident, and had thereby "put itself into the position of an accomplice" to an aggressive act by the U.S.A.

After recapitulating the depositions of Lieutenants McKone and Olmstead, the Note continued : "It follows from the depositions of the surviving members of the crew of the RB-47 that they were under instructions to land at a Norwegian airfield if necessary. In addition, they testified that they could communicate by radio with a rescue station on the north-western coast of Norway and that that radio station was to be on receiving duty throughout the flight of the RB-47. These facts prove beyond dispute that Norwegian territory is still being used by the U.S.A. for acts of aggression against the Soviet Union."

"All this has taken place since the Norwegian Government assured the U.S.S.R. on May 27 that all possible steps would be taken to prevent the recurrence of such incidents. The same was stated by the Foreign Minister of Norway, Hr. Lange."

"It follows that the Norwegian Government has allowed Norwegian territory to be used by the RB-47 in the event of its crew finding it necessary to land in Norway. Thereby the Norwegian Government has again put itself in the position of an accomplice in an act of aggression undertaken by the American Air Force against the Soviet Union."

"All this shows that the Norwegian Government is displaying an utterly incomprehensible lack of responsibility in viewing U.S. aggressive actions against the Soviet Union, and the consequences they may entail for the cause of peace in general and for Norway in particular. . . . The Soviet Government lodges an emphatic protest with the Government of Norway and expects it to give the most serious consideration to the situation that has developed and to draw all the necessary conclusions."

At a Kremlin press conference on July 12, Mr. Khrushchev accused the U.S.A. and her allies of "openly provoking a serious war conflict" by continuing "spy flights" over Soviet territory.

After asserting that the RB-47 had violated Soviet airspace near Cape Svyatoi Nos ("Holy Nose"), and had been shot down after "poking its nose into our territory near this nose," Mr. Khrushchev said that this "new flagrant violation of our airspace shows that the U.S. Government has not abandoned the policy of committing acts of aggression against the Soviet Union." He commented that

President Eisenhower's assurances of the discontinuance of "spy flights" were "not worth a farthing"; accused the U.S. Government of "conducting a dangerous game with the destinies of the world"; and reiterated that the two captured airmen would be "handed over to the courts in accordance with Soviet law."

Mr. Khrushchev went on to speak of the "unworthy part" played by the British Government in "this act of provocation"; he alleged that Britain had played the role of "a direct accomplice of the aggressive acts of the U.S. Government against the Soviet Union," adding that "such a role is absolutely incompatible with the official statements of the British Government that it is striving to help ease tension and improve relations with the Soviet Union." As regards Norway, he said that "the question arises whether one can trust the statements of the Norwegian Government, which on May 27 promised to take steps to prevent its territory from being used for aggressive purposes by the U.S.A. against the Soviet Union."

American Protest Notes to Soviet Union.

The U.S. Government sent a Note to the U.S.S.R. on July 12 denying that the RB-47 had at any time flown over Soviet territory, territorial waters, or airspace, and accusing the Soviet Air Force of wantonly attacking the plane over international waters. After describing the Soviet version of the incident as "wilful misrepresentation and mis-statement of fact," the Note continued:

"The U.S. Air Force plane in question, with a crew of six, was proceeding on an entirely legitimate mission over international waters and at no time penetrated Soviet territory or even areas which have been claimed at one time or another as territorial waters or airspace of the Soviet Union. At no time was the plane closer to Soviet land territory than about 30 miles (approximately 48 kilometres).

"It is therefore evident that . . . the Soviet Air Force wantonly attacked the American plane over international waters with the admitted loss of that aircraft and of the lives of at least one of the members of its crew. Two other members of the crew have, according to the Soviet Note, been taken into custody without any legal basis and are to be subjected to trial under what is called 'full severity of Soviet law.' The three other members of the crew remain unaccounted for.

"The [Soviet] Note attempts to establish some kind of link between the flight of an American Air Force plane over international waters and the incident which occurred over Soviet territory on May 1 [i.e. the U-2 incident]. These flights were, as must be known to the Soviet Government, entirely different in character. The Air Force flight on July 1 was one of a continued series of electro-magnetic research flights well known to the Soviet Government to have taken place over a period of more than ten years. Instructions to the crews of these planes rigidly require that the aircraft remain well outside Soviet airspace.

"The U.S. Government rejects the completely unfounded allegations contained in the [Soviet] Note. It solemnly and vigorously protests against the unwarranted shooting down of an American plane over international waters and the cynical failure of the Soviet Government to make its action known for a period of days during which a search for the missing men was known to be in course, in which the Soviet Government was voluntarily participating in what was apparently good faith. It demands the release of the two U.S. Air Force officers admitted to be in Soviet custody. It further demands that a representative of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow be permitted to see these men without delay. Additionally, it demands that the body of Captain Palm be returned immediately.

"The U.S. Government is prepared to undertake, in co-operation with the Government of the U.S.S.R. and such other authority as might be acceptable to both sides, a thorough search for the downed airplane and the missing members of its crew, and examination of such remains of the aircraft as may be located.

"The U.S. Government reserves its right to demand full compensation from the U.S.S.R. for its unjustified action in this matter. It should be clear to the Soviet Government that a repetition of acts of this nature cannot fail to have the most serious consequences, responsibility for which would rest upon the Soviet Government alone."

In a Note presented by Mr. Gromyko on July 15 to the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, the Soviet Government rejected the U.S. version of the incident and asserted that the Soviet Note of July 11 had given the "precise facts regarding the time, place and circumstances under which the Soviet frontier was violated by the RB-47." After describing the U.S. Note as "based on sheer inventions which have the aim of deliberately whitewashing the aggressive actions of the U.S. Air Force by deliberately distorting the facts," the Soviet Government confirmed that the two surviving members of the plane's crew would be "tried according to Soviet law." It was stated that the body of the commander of the RB-47 would be handed over to the U.S. authorities.

A second strong U.S. protest Note was delivered on July 18, wherein the U.S. Government again rejected the Soviet version of the incident as "wholly inaccurate and incorrect." After noting that the Soviet Government had "completely avoided any reference whatsoever" to the U.S. offer of an objective

investigation of the incident, the Note "vigorously" protested at the "illegal" detention of the two American airmen and repeated the demand for their immediate release. In conclusion, the Note said that the U.S. Government "welcomes the opportunity which will be presented by the forthcoming Security Council meeting [see below] to make clear to world opinion the illegality and recklessness of Soviet behavior with regard to the downing of the RB-47 . . . proceeding on a legitimate mission over international waters."

The body of Captain Willard Palm, commander of the RB-47, was handed over to U.S. officials in Moscow on July 25; it was taken on board a Dutch airliner and flown to the United States for burial.

British Note to Soviet Government. - Mr. Macmillan's Letter to Mr. Khrushchev.

Mr. Macmillan read to the U.K. House of Commons on July 19 the texts of (1) the British reply to the Soviet Government's Note of July 11; and (2) a personal letter which he had written to Mr. Khrushchev, and which had been delivered in Moscow on the same day (July 19) by H.M. Ambassador Sir Patrick Reilly. The British reply to the Soviet Note was worded as follows:

" . . . The U.S. Government's Note to the Soviet Government of July 12 states clearly that the U.S. aircraft in question was less than about 30 miles from Soviet land territory. In these circumstances, it appears that the allegations contained in the [Soviet] Note were based on false premises and that the U.S.S.R. Government has no ground for protesting about events which took place on July 12."

"On the contrary, the Government of the U.S.S.R. bears a heavy responsibility for the action of the Soviet pilot who shot down the U.S. aircraft in international airspace. H.M. Government view with the utmost seriousness this unprovoked attack, which illustrates a danger implicit in the present instructions to the Soviet armed forces."

"H.M. Government cannot agree that the use of U.K. territory by the U.S. Air Force for legitimate operations in international airspace can in any way be regarded as aggressive action, and accordingly cannot accept the allegations contained in the [Soviet] Note."

In his personal letter to Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Macmillan expressed his "deep concern over what now appears to be a new trend in the conduct of Soviet policy" since the failure of the Summit meeting. Mr. Macmillan wrote as follows:

"I am sending you separately a formal reply to the Note from the Soviet Government to H.M. Government . . . concerning the shooting down of a U.S. aircraft. This reply sets out clearly the position of our Government in this matter; but I feel that I must in addition write to you personally about my anxieties as to the way in which the world situation is developing.

"I would like to remind you of the conversations we have had from time to time when we have both agreed to seek methods by which the underlying tensions in the world could be reduced. When I had the pleasure of being your guest in Moscow last year, I think we succeeded in setting in motion a sequence of developments which appeared to have great promise. My visit to you, and the subsequent interchange of visits and frank discussions between the members of the proposed Summit Conference, made me hopeful that what we came to the Summit meeting we would make, if not a spectacular advance, at least some forward movement.

"It is not necessary now to go back upon the reasons why the Summit Conference was broken up before it really started. I feel that it would have been better had you been willing to put aside difficulties aside in order to pursue the major purpose for which we were to meet. All acts of intelligence or espionage on either side after all symptoms, not causes, of the world tension which we should both seek to reduce. However, I took some comfort from your statement that when the dust had settled we might be able to meet up again the task.

"Since then, however, a number of events have occurred which have made me less hopeful. First, the action of the Soviet Government in leaving the Committee of Ten on Disarmament at the moment when new U.S. proposals were, with your knowledge, about to be presented. As I told you at the time, I deeply regretted that we should have found it necessary to bring this conference to an end in my view prematurely.

"Now we have the new incident regarding the RB-47 flight. The formal Note . . . gives the reply to the accusations against the United Kingdom in this matter. But I feel I must add that, even if the facts had been as stated by your Government, I do not think the Soviet authorities should have taken so grave an action and would calculated to turn the incident into a major international dispute.

"Then there comes the question of the Congo. I have read the statement which you have distributed which accuses Great Britain in concert with the U.S.A., France, Belgium, and West Germany of organizing a conspiracy to destroy the independent State of Congo. [This and other developments in the Congo situation will be described in later issues.—Ed. K.C.A.] I must ask you, Mr. Khrushchev, whether you really believe such a conspiracy is likely in view of the policies which British Governments of all parties have followed, not only since the last war but for many generations.

"For more than a century it has been our purpose to guide our dependent territories towards freedom and independence. Apart from the older independent countries of the Commonwealth, since the Second World War India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana, Malaya, comprising over 510,000,000 people, have, with our help, reached the goal of independent life and strength. We have aided this process both by our technical assistance and by generous financial contributions. All these States are completely independent members of our free Commonwealth association.

"Nor is this movement at an end. In October this year, Nigeria, with its 35,000,000 people, will be another great independent country. Sierra Leone will become independent in April 1961. The West Indies Federation is moving rapidly in the same direction. And so the process goes on.

"I ask you, Sir, can you really believe that a Government and a people who have pursued these policies so consistently and so honourably are engaged in a conspiracy to destroy the new independent State of Congo?

"But my purpose in sending you this personal message is not to debate in detail the individual issues which have lately arisen between us. Rather, it is to express to you my deep concern over what now appears to be a new trend in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy.

"As I think you will agree, I have consistently welcomed and have given much weight to your assurances of the Soviet Government's desire for peaceful co-existence and *détente* in international relations. I have shown my sympathy with such purposes. It is, however, my firm opinion that these objectives cannot be successfully pursued without the exercise of patience and restraint. Much of my present anxiety derives from the fact that these elements seem to be absent from recent manifestations of Soviet Government policy.

"I write to you so plainly because I have the memory of our frank discussions with you in mind. I simply do not understand what your purpose is today.

"If the present trend of events in the world continues, we may all of us one day, either by miscalculation or by mischance, find ourselves caught up in a situation from which we cannot escape. I would ask you, therefore, to consider what I have said and to believe that I am writing to you like this because I feel it my duty to do so.

"We cannot disguise and we have never attempted to disguise the fundamental differences on political, social and economic questions which divide your country and your associates from our country and our allies. Nevertheless, in the nature of things we are united by the fact that both our people and yours want to live their lives in peace and to build something better for their successors. I have always hoped that if we could have followed the path which we seemed at one time to agree upon, we could have made progress to this end."

The Prime Minister was cheered from all parts of the House after he had read the text of his letter to Mr. Khrushchev. Mr. Gaitskell, Leader of the Opposition, said that the House and the country as a whole would agree with, and welcome, its tone and contents, adding that the Prime Minister had been right to address Mr. Khrushchev with such frankness; the language used by the Prime Minister was "reasonable and courteous," and he (Mr. Gaitskell) hoped that Mr. Khrushchev would "respond in the same spirit."

Norwegian Reply to Soviet Note.

The Norwegian Government's reply to the Soviet Note of July 11, delivered in Moscow on July 22, rejected as "groundless" the Soviet allegation of Norwegian involvement in the RB-47 incident. It denied that the Norwegian Government had given permission for the use of its territory by the plane in case a landing permit had been sought and none given by the Norwegian Government or any other Norwegian authority.

As regards the statement by the two U.S. airmen that they could make radio contact with a rescue station on the north-western coast of Norway, and that this station was to operate as a radio-receiver during the RB-47's flight, the Note said: "This implies no further possibilities for contacting Norwegian airports and rescue- and radio-stations than those open to any aircraft from any country in similar circumstances, and is in complete accordance with international practice. No special arrangement was made for reception by Norwegian radio stations, and it has been established after careful investigation that the plane did not in fact make contact with any Norwegian radio- or rescue-station."

Security Council Debate on RB-47 Incident. - Soviet Veto of American and Italian Resolutions.

Mr. Gromyko sent a message on July 13 to the president of the Security Council—Señor José Correa, of Ecuador—asking for an urgent meeting of the Council to consider "the new aggressive actions of the U.S. Air Force against the Soviet Union imperilling world peace" (i.e. the RB-47 incident). On the same day President Eisenhower said that the U.S. Government were "ready and willing to go to the Security Council for a full discussion of the Soviet's wanton shooting-down of the RB-47 in international waters."

The Security Council's debate on the RB-47 incident began on July 22 and ended inconclusively on July 26, when the Soviet Union vetoed (1) a U.S. resolution proposing that the incident should be thoroughly investigated by a commission drawn equally from the U.S.A., the Soviet Union, and a government or authority acceptable to both parties, or alternatively that the matter be referred to the International Court for impartial adjudication; (2) an Italian resolution requesting the Soviet Government to allow the International Red Cross, as a "neutral and independent institution," to have access to the two American airmen who were being held by the Russian authorities. The principal speakers in the debate were Mr. Cabot Lodge (U.S.A.), Mr. Vassily Kuznetsov (U.S.S.R.), and Sir Pierson Dixon (Great Britain).

Mr. Kuznetsov (Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister) recapitulated at length the Soviet version of the RB-47 incident; accused the U.S. Government of "playing recklessly with the destinies of the world"; and declared that America, as the "organizer of aggressive actions," had "once again been caught red-handed." Linking the U-2 and RB-47 incidents as "one and the same dangerous chain of deliberate acts of aggression against the Soviet Union," Mr. Kuznetsov claimed that his Government had shown "considerable patience and restraint in not putting rockets and nuclear weapons into action" in face of the American "intrusions"; it should, however, be understood (he added) that the U.S.S.R. was not obliged to limit itself to halting single intrusions whenever they occurred—"we have the full right to take measures that go further than that." After describing the U.S. version of the incident as "only one of the falsehoods to which the U.S. Government is resorting more and more frequently in an effort to cover up the failure of its aggressive policy," Mr. Kuznetsov alleged that the U.S.A. was not only carrying out intrusions into Soviet territory but also "buzzing" Soviet merchant ships and scientific research vessels on the high seas [see below]—actions which, he declared, were "links in the chain of American 'brink of war' policies."

Expressing "regret" at the British Government's reply to the Soviet Note, Mr. Kuznetsov accused Britain of having been an "accomplice" of the U.S.A. in "this hostile act against the Soviet Union"; the British reply, he added, showed that the U.K. Government was "continuing to stand in the position of direct accomplice in the aggressive acts of the United States." In conclusion, Mr. Kuznetsov presented a resolution calling on the Security Council (a) to condemn "these continuing provocative actions by the U.S. Air Force," (b) to describe them as "aggressive acts," and (c) to insist that the U.S. Government take immediate measures to stop such actions and prevent their recurrence.

Mr. Cabot Lodge described the Soviet version of the RB-47's flight as an "unconvincing and sinister fabrication"; insisted that the plane was at no time nearer than 50 miles from Soviet territory; and stressed that it was on an electro-magnetic flight over international waters and carried no armament of any kind apart from two 20-mm. tail guns to protect it from attack in the rear. Producing maps and charts which, he said, showed the RB-47's actual and intended course, Mr. Lodge continued:

"U.S. personnel who monitored this flight could pinpoint the precise location of the plane at 15.22 G.M.T. [on July 1], even though the plane maintained radio silence. At that moment the plane was over international waters, as it had been throughout its flight, and was on its prescribed course approximately 200 miles north-east of the Kola Peninsula. . . . The Soviet allegation that the plane violated the Soviet national frontier at a point 22 kilometres (12 miles) north of Svyatoi Nos, was 'moving in the direction of Archangel,' and was shot down in Soviet territorial waters east of Svyatoi Nos, is a complete fabrication. . . . The plane was never 12 miles north of Svyatoi Nos nor in Soviet territorial waters east of Svyatoi Nos. At no time did it penetrate Soviet territory, and never at any time was it proceeding 'in the direction of Archangel.' The RB-47 did not fall at 15.03 hours either in Soviet territorial waters, as the Soviet Union claims, or into the high seas 50 miles north-east of Svyatoi Nos, where it actually was at that moment. The plane was brought down by the Soviet Union neither at the place nor at the time which the Soviet Union claims.

"What actually happened was this: before it reached the point more than 50 miles north of Svyatoi Nos at which it was scheduled to turn to the north-east, a Soviet fighter pressed in from the seaward side and tried to force the plane off its course and into Soviet territory. The Soviet fighter was successful in forcing our plane off its course and in delaying its planned turn to the north-east. But it was not successful in forcing the plane into Soviet airspace. It caused our plane to make a detour. . . . This astonishing and criminal fact is established beyond doubt by the evidence of our scientific devices, which followed the RB-47 through all the events I have described. [Mr. Lodge did not particularize the nature of these devices, nor did the U.S. authorities disclose the tracking methods used.] It is noteworthy that the plane strove to get back on its prescribed course and succeeded in doing so. In the process of its delayed turn the RB-47 made its closest approach to Soviet territory; this was at a point 30 miles from the tip of the Kanin Peninsula—still far from Soviet territory. Twenty minutes after the time that the Soviet Note says the plane was destroyed, it was 200 miles from Cape Svyatoi Nos, far from Soviet territorial waters. We ask the Soviet Government: what did you do to the plane when it was at this point at 15.22 hours?

"Let me dwell on these events for a moment. The approach of the Soviet fighter, which took place over international waters, was from the seaward side. It prevented our plane from making its prescribed turn to the north-east, which means that it prevented a prescribed turn away from the Soviet coastal region and out toward the open waters of the Barents Sea. If the RB-47 had tried to make its prescribed turn on schedule it would have had to turn toward the Soviet fighter. And note this well: if the RB-47 had turned towards the Soviet fighter, this turn might have been used as an excuse by the fighter pilot to open fire on the U.S. plane. The plane therefore was forced to overshoot its turning-point. Shortly afterwards the Soviet fighter broke off from the RB-47, perhaps because it was running low on fuel. Then finally the RB-47 was able to make a delayed turn—still well outside Soviet airspace—to the north-east and to resume its prescribed course. Through the technical means we have, we were able to follow these events in detail. Only one conclusion can be drawn from this. The Soviet fighter was trying to force the RB-47 to fly southward over Soviet territory. There it could have been shot down on land. But the attempt failed.

"We wonder why the Soviets have presented so many distortions about this. Perhaps the Soviet Air Force was reluctant to admit to Chairman Khrushchev that the aircraft could not be shot down over Soviet airspace—for the very good reason that it was not there—and therefore did not inform him of the facts. Perhaps they did not tell him that they had to go 200 miles from Cape Svyatoi Nos to follow the RB-47. Perhaps Chairman Khrushchev has been lied to. That often happens in dictatorships. . . ."

After demanding the release of the detained airmen, and accusing the Soviet Government of "flagrant disregard of the standards of international conduct" by continuing to hold aviators who were "carrying out a legal flight over international waters," Mr. Lodge presented a resolution which called upon the U.S. and Soviet Governments "to resolve their differences arising out of the plane incident of July 1, 1960, either (a) through investigation of the facts by a commission composed of members designated in equal numbers by the U.S.A., the Soviet Union, and by a government or authority acceptable to both parties, charged with inquiring into the incident by inspecting the site, examining such remains of the plane as may be located, and interrogating survivors and other witnesses; or (b) through reference of the matter to the International Court of Justice for impartial adjudication."

Sir Pierson Dixon said that the British Government had "reliable evidence to show that the RB-47 never went within 30 miles of the Soviet coast; we were able to determine the position of this aircraft, and our information fully tallies with the U.S. estimate explained by Mr. Lodge. . . . The fact of the matter is that the entire flight of this plane was, and was planned to be, in international airspace." [Note.—Asked in the U.K. House of Commons on July 26 whether he accepted the U.S. Government's statement that the RB-47 was never less than 30 miles from the Soviet coast, Mr. Macmillan replied: "The aircraft's flight plan did not take it within 50 miles of Soviet territory at any point. We were ourselves able to determine the position of this aircraft and we have reliable evidence to show that it did not go within 30 miles of the coast. Our information fully tallied with the U.S. estimate."]

Stating that it had been known in Britain for a long time that Russian reconnaissance aircraft were carrying out intelligence-gathering flights, Sir Pierson continued: "There is, of course, one difference between these operations and the one which led to the Barents Sea incident. It is that we and our Western allies are not in the habit of shooting down military aircraft carrying out operations in international airspace. Similarly, we are frequently subjected to the annoyance of seeing Soviet trawlers, which we know are fitted with electronic and technical equipment required to intercept radio transmission in the United Kingdom, in close proximity to our own territorial waters, or to areas where naval exercises or Western military research activity is carried out. We do not, however, proceed to sink the trawlers. The same applies to the numerous unidentified submarines recently found lurking in the neighbourhood of U.K. naval exercises and, indeed, in suspicious circumstances which suggest that they are carrying out electronic intelligence operations within 50 miles of the coast."

Rejecting Mr. Kuznetsov's allegation that Britain was a "direct accomplice" of the U.S.A. in alleged "hostile actions" against the Soviet Union, Sir Pierson said: "This is surely extraordinary language, and against it I voice an emphatic protest. I cannot understand how the representative of the Soviet Union can reconcile such threatening language with the professed desire of his Government . . . to do everything possible to avoid involving the world in the calamities of a new war. . . ."

Mr. Kuznetsov described Mr. Lodge's entire statement as a "pure fabrication from beginning to end," designed to "deceive the U.S. people and world public opinion." After saying that the maps produced by Mr. Lodge, however "beautifully plotted," were "theatrical manoeuvres which would deceive no-one," he said that the U.S.S.R. was opposed to an inquiry of any kind as the facts presented to the Security Council clearly testified to the "aggressive nature" of the RB-47's flight into Soviet airspace. A commission of investigation could only confuse a completely clear issue, deceive public opinion, and make it possible for those concerned to evade their responsibility for instigating the flight.

Dr. Mario Amadeo (Argentina) said that the "most benevolent interpretation of intentions could not lead us to believe that the Soviet description of events actually happened that way." The

U.S.A., however, had also made affirmations which required proof before the Council could admit that they had value. He therefore supported Mr. Lodge's proposal for an impartial inquiry into the incident.

Signor Egidio Ortona (Italy) asked why the Soviet Government, if it was so sure of its version, would not allow the two surviving airmen to be interviewed by U.S. authorities in accordance with an elementary rule between States which were not at war. Moreover, he commented that the precise points at which the RB-47 allegedly entered Soviet airspace and been shot down had been "left vague" in the Soviet statements. Taking into account the speed of the aircraft, and the statement that it was brought down no more than 90 seconds after the reported warning, why had it still come down in the sea and not on land if it had been penetrating deeper into Soviet territory? Signor Ortona then introduced a resolution calling on the Soviet Government to allow the International Red Cross to have access to the members of the RB-47's crew held by the Soviet authorities.

The Security Council voted on the three resolutions on July 26, with the following result: (1) the Soviet resolution was rejected by nine votes to two (the U.S.S.R. and Poland); (2) the American resolution received nine votes in favour and two against (the U.S.S.R. and Poland) but could not be adopted because of the Soviet veto; (3) the Italian resolution was defeated for the same reason, the vote being identical with that on the U.S. resolution. The two "neutralist" members of the Council—Ceylon and Tunisia—both voted for the U.S. and Italian resolutions and against the Soviet resolution.

Soviet Allegations of "Buzzing" Incidents.

Apart from the Note exchanges on the RB-47 incident, the Soviet Government sent an *aide-memoire* to the U.S.A. on July 13 protesting against the "provocative buzzing of Soviet ships by American military aircraft on the high seas." Similar complaints were made to Great Britain, Canada, France, Norway, and Denmark.

The Soviet *aide-memoire* to the U.S.A. alleged that American military planes had on numerous occasions "systematically buzzed" Soviet merchantmen and scientific research ships "in the Pacific and the Atlantic, and also in the Mediterranean and other seas." It was stated that the "buzzing" was "done as a rule at mast-head height in dangerous proximity to the ships, with the planes often flying down on the ships, carrying out simulated bomb and torpedo release movements, dropping various moving objects and incendiary devices in direct proximity to the ships, and committing other impermissible actions." Instances were cited of alleged "buzzing" of Soviet vessels (including dates, name of ship, and latitude and longitude) during May and June, 1960, in the Atlantic, the Norwegian Sea, the Sea of Japan, the Mediterranean, the Straits of Gibraltar, and elsewhere. A warning was given that "should these intolerable actions of American aircraft continue, the Soviet Government will have to take other measures necessary to ensure the safety of navigation of Soviet vessels on the high seas."

The U.S. Government rejected the Soviet allegations on July 21 as "without foundation," adding that the Soviet Government's threat "resembles other recent Soviet statements and actions" and that the U.S.A. "will continue to exercise all the rights of and over international waters to which it is entitled under international law and practice."

"In accordance with common practice," said the American Note, "U.S. patrol planes often seek to identify ships encountered whose position and identity are not otherwise known, particularly in the ocean approaches to the United States. The pilots of these planes are under the strictest instructions not to approach closer than is necessary for this purpose. That the Soviet Government alone should find it necessary to object to such identification gives rise to the question as to just what are the activities of Soviet vessels that require the Soviet Government to protest against such routine identification."

Referring specifically to the activities of the Soviet trawler *Tag* off the U.S. coast in April, at a time when the U.S. Navy was conducting experiments with the *Polaris* missile, the Note said: "Although ostensibly a fishing trawler, it was in fact discovered to be equipped with extensive electronic equipment and to be conducting an intelligence mission along the east coast of the U.S.A. for the days in April of this year. In such circumstances there is every reason for establishing the identity of such a vessel and the nature of its activity."

The British Ambassador in Moscow (Sir Patrick Abernethy) similarly rejected the Soviet allegations that British aircraft had on various occasions "buzzed" Russian ships on the high seas. In an oral reply, presented on July 29, Sir Patrick stated that H.M. Government had investigated all the incidents alleged and could not accept the Soviet assertions; no British plane had flown over Soviet vessels in such a manner as to endanger them or their crews or hinder navigation, nor had any British aircraft flown over Soviet ships at heights below 500 feet. (New York Times - New York Herald Tribune - U.S. Information Service - Soviet Embassy Press Dept., London - Times Daily Telegraph - Guardian - U.N. Information Centre, London - Aftenposten, Oslo) (Prev. rep. U-2 Incident, 17425)

OCTOBER 1-8, 1960

SOVIET UNION - UNITED STATES. — The U-2 Incident. - Trial of Francis Powers. - Ten-year Sentence.

The trial of Francis Gary Powers, the American pilot shot down on May 1 while flying a U-2 plane over the Soviet Union, opened in Moscow on Aug. 17. The indictment, which was announced on Aug. 9, gave full details of the charge and stated that Powers had admitted his guilt.

The indictment said that at 5.36 a.m. (Moscow time) on May 1 a U-2 plane had crossed the frontier 20 kilometres south-east of Dushanbe (Tajikistan) and had been tracked continuously by anti-aircraft defence units. The fact that its route lay over industrial centres and important defence objectives, and that it remained throughout at an altitude of 20,000 metres, at which no flights were made by any civilian planes, had left no doubt that this was a deliberate incursion with hostile aims into Soviet airspace, and the Government had therefore ordered it to be shot down. An anti-aircraft unit had accordingly brought it down with a rocket at the time it was shot at 8.55 a.m., when it was at an altitude of 20,000 metres in the Sverdlovsk area—over 2,000 kilometres from the point where it had crossed the frontier. Powers baled out and was detained.

Examination of the wreckage of the plane and its equipment had established that it was a Lockheed U-2, designed for flights at great altitudes, adapted for intelligence purposes, and equipped for aerial photography and radio reconnaissance from great heights. Films of Soviet airfields and other important military and industrial objectives, and a ferro-magnetic tape with a recording of the signals of Soviet radar stations, had been found among the wreckage.

Preliminary investigation by the State Security Committee (the investigation continued) established that the flight had been organized by a special U.S. intelligence unit known under the code name of detachment "10-10." This unit was based on Incirlik, in Turkey, and was under the command of Colonel Shelton, of the U.S. Air Force. It had been visited in April by the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, General Thomas D. White, on two occasions by General Everest, Chief of the U.S. Air Force in Europe, and by other American generals. Before the flight the U-2 had been flown to Peshawar military airfield, in Pakistan, where it began its flight, which had involved a breach of the sovereignty of Afghanistan. Powers had been told that he could use any airfields in Norway, Pakistan, and Persia as reserve airfields; that after ending his flight he was to land at Bodø military airfield, in Norway, which had been used by the "10-10" detachment on previous occasions; and that if necessary he might land in Finland or Sweden.

During the investigation Powers had testified that he had volunteered for the U.S. Air Force in 1950 and had been recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) in 1956 to fly on special reconnaissance missions in high-altitude aircraft. He had been told that his main job would be flying the aircraft along the U.S.S.R. frontiers "to pick up any information I could about radar and radio stations, and any other information that could be picked up." He had signed a secret contract with the C.I.A., and had been warned that he was liable to 10 years' imprisonment, a \$10,000 fine, or both for divulging information about the activities of the U.S. intelligence service. He had received a monthly salary of \$2,500. After being trained in Nevada, where he was registered under the fictitious name of "Palmer," he had been sent to Incirlik, where the "10-10" detachment was stationed. This detachment was officially subordinated, for the sake of camouflage, to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (N.A.S.A.). From 1956 onwards he had made intelligence flights along the Soviet frontiers with Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan.

On April 27 Powers had been flown to Peshawar. Before taking off on May 1 he had been ordered by Colonel Shelton to fly over the Black Sea, Sverdlovsk, Kirov, Archangel, and Murmansk, landing at Bodø. When flying over certain points he was to switch on the equipment for aerial photography and recording of the operation of radar stations, and was to give special attention to two points at which defence objectives were supposed to be located. He had complied with these instructions and plotted intelligence data on his flight map until he was shot down.

When asked about the circumstances in which he was shot down, Powers had testified: "Quite unexpectedly, I heard a kind of hollow explosion and saw an orange flash. The plane suddenly pitched down and, I think, its wings and tail started falling off. Perhaps the plane was not hit directly and the explosion took place near the plane and it was hit by the burst and fragments. . . . I think it happened at 68,000 feet. . . . I was shot down some 25-30 miles south or south-east of Sverdlovsk. At that moment I was pressed to the central panel and could not use the catapult. I opened the canopy, unfastened the straps, and got out of the plane through the top. The parachute opened automatically."

The indictment stated that the plane was equipped with a device permitting the pilot to blow it up in case of a forced landing on Soviet territory. Powers had been provided with a special needle with lethal poison, which he declared had been given him to enable him to commit suicide if he was tortured. Other equipment taken from him included a silent pistol and cartridges and a dagger, as well as 7,500 Soviet roubles and other valuables, which were to be used for bribery in case of a forced landing. He had identified the wreckage of the plane, which bore no national identification marks. Experts had established that the camera found on the U-2 was designed for

high-altitude photographing of strips of land 160-200 kilometres wide. Photographed on the film removed from the plane, which had been developed, were a number of military and civil airfields and important industrial establishments of the southern Urals.

Powers had testified: "I plead guilty to the fact that I have flown over Soviet territory and over the points indicated on the chart, and turned on and off the necessary controls of the special equipment mounted aboard my plane. This, I believe, was done with the aim of collecting intelligence information about the Soviet Union. . . . In accordance with the contract which was signed by me with the Central Intelligence Agency, I was a pilot of this special air detachment of the U.S.A., dealing with the collection of information about operational radio stations and radars on the territory of the Soviet Union and, as I suppose, about locations of rockets." He was therefore charged with invading the airspace of the Soviet Union with a view to gathering strategic intelligence on the location of missile bases, airfields, radar facilities, and other important defence and industrial establishments.

The Soviet Government did not reply to a U.S. Note of May 10 requesting that a U.S. Embassy official should be permitted to interview Powers, or to an *aide-memoire* of July 11 repeating this request and asking that his family's legal counsel should be granted visas. In reply to a second note of July 30, the Soviet Foreign Ministry stated on Aug. 4 that, in accordance with Soviet judicial legislation, the attorneys mentioned could not be permitted to participate in the case, but that Powers' relatives (who had been granted permission to visit him) would be permitted to meet the defence counsel assigned to him.

Soviet visas were accordingly granted to Powers' parents (Mr. and Mrs. Oliver Powers), his wife (Mrs. Barbara Powers, who had received a letter from her husband saying that he was being well treated), two American legal advisers of the Powers family, and a personal friend. At an emotional press conference in Moscow on Aug. 14, Mr. Oliver Powers (a shoe-maker from Pound, Virginia) said he intended to appeal to Mr. Khrushchev "as one father to another for the sake of my boy"; after saying that he understood that Mr. Khrushchev had himself lost a son in the war, Mr. Powers added: "My son is not the son of a millionaire—he is the son of a working-man from a plain American family like millions of others in your country and my country and throughout the world." Mrs. Barbara Powers also said that she hoped to intercede with Mr. Khrushchev on her husband's behalf.

On the following day the Powers family and their American legal advisers had a long meeting with Powers' defence counsel, Mr. Mikhail Grinev (see below). Mr. Alexander W. Parker, one of the two U.S. lawyers, issued the following statement on behalf of the family after the meeting: "The conference was most useful and we have confidence that he [Mr. Grinev] will do all possible to help our son. We were very favourably impressed by Mr. Grinev's sincerity, his apparent ability, and frankness. He has a heavy and grave job, but he is going to give the best he has got."

The trial of Francis Gary Powers, held in the Hall of Columns of the House of Trade Unions, opened on Aug. 17 before the Military College of the Supreme Court, consisting of Lieut.-General Viktor Borisoglebsky and two other senior officers. Powers was charged under Article 2 of the Law on Criminal Responsibility for Crimes against the State—a charge which, on conviction, could render him liable to death by shooting or to imprisonment for up to 15 years. The Soviet Prosecutor-General, Mr. Roman A. Rudenko, appeared for the prosecution and Mr. Mikhail Grinev (a leading Moscow lawyer and formerly Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in London) for the defence. [Mr. Rudenko was chief Soviet prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals; he became Prosecutor-General in 1953 and conducted the trials of Beria, Abakumov, Bagirov, and others.] Over 1,500 spectators were present, including Powers' wife and parents, their American legal advisers, and some 140 foreign correspondents.

Powers, who pleaded "guilty," was called as the first witness. Cross-examined by Mr. Rudenko, he confirmed in general the account of his flight as set forth in the indictment, but disputed a number of points. He said that he had not seen any identification marks on the U-2, but as all U.S. planes based in Turkey had such marks he assumed that it had one. He denied that he could have released an atomic bomb if it had been on board, as the U-2 had no bomb-racks. During his flight, he admitted, he had marked on his map an airfield, fuel dumps, and "a big cluster of buildings" which were not indicated on it; this, he said, was a "pilot's habit," and he would have done the same thing over U.S. territory. In the event of being forced down he had been ordered to destroy the aircraft by pressing a special lever, and to make for the nearest frontier. The noiseless pistol had been given to him for hunting game, and the poison needle to commit suicide if he were tortured; he had not been tortured, however, but had been treated "very nicely."

In reply to questions, Powers said that he had never had any contact with the N.A.S.A., and he assumed that he had been issued with N.A.S.A. documents as "a cover-up for the intelligence part." His command had seemed more interested in the Black Sea area in 1956, "and then the centre of interest seemed to move to the east." In 1958 he had ferried a U-2 from Adana (Turkey) to Bodø, where he had been met by members of the "10-10" detachment. He had also ferried a U-2 from Gibelstadt (West Germany) to New York.

Cross-examined by Mr. Grinev, Powers said that his father had been a miner until he was nearly killed in an accident, and was now a shoe-repairer. He himself had had to work to help his family pay for his education. He did not belong to any political party, had never voted, and had derived all his knowledge of the Soviet Union from American newspapers. His father had wanted him to become a doctor, but as it was hard to get a good job when waiting to be called up he had volunteered for the Air Force. After finishing his service he had intended to enter civil aviation, but he was already beyond the age-limit. He had not taken any initiative about his entry into the C.I.A., but when he was offered a job with a salary equal to that of first pilot of an airliner he had been happy to get it. He did not receive all his salary, part of which was to be given to him after the expiration of his contract.

The flight of May 1, Powers stated, was the only one he had made over Soviet territory; the plane's special equipment had not been explained to him, and he only knew that he had to carry out instructions. He could not have refused the order to make the flight, as this would have been a breach of his contract. When signing the contract he had not known that he would have to make flights over the Soviet Union, and he had only been told six or seven months later that such flights were part of his duties. In reply to a question by Lieut.-General Borisoglebsky, Powers said that he thought that by his flight he had done his country "a very ill service."

Evidence was given by four witnesses who had helped Powers when he landed, and whom he thanked for their assistance, and by experts who reported on the plane and its equipment. Powers again queried the statement that the U-2 carried no identification marks, and reaffirmed that he had taken the pistol only for hunting purposes, declaring that "I could not kill a person even to save my own life." It was stated in evidence that the poisoned pin had been tested on a dog, which had died within three minutes, and that death would have set in equally quickly for a human being.

Mr. Rudenko, in his final speech for the prosecution, made a bitter attack on the U.S.A., described the U-2 flight over the Soviet Union as an "aggressive bandit raid" and a "dangerous provocation," and maintained that Powers was "no ordinary spy but a specially and carefully drilled criminal" who had "effected his crimes by means fraught with danger for millions of people." After pointing out that the United States attached criminal liability to any infringement of American security, and quoting U.S. legislation in this respect, Mr. Rudenko said that the U-2 flight had been made over big Soviet industrial centres and important defence establishments at the instance of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency—an act of aggression which could have been fraught with terrible consequences for peace and the whole of mankind, as no one could know what further aggressive actions the aircraft portended nor what death-carrying load it had on board. The U.S. Intelligence, envisaging the possibility of its agent failing in his mission, and desiring to prevent his exposure, had "conditioned Powers to the inevitability of suicide in case he should come down alive on Soviet territory." Mr. Rudenko concluded: "I have every reason to request the court to apply the supreme penalty on the defendant. But taking into account the sincere repentance of Powers, I do not insist on the application of the death penalty to him and ask the court to sentence Powers to 15 years' detention."

Mr. Grinev, in his final speech for the defence, said that although Powers was the direct executor, the main and "invisible" culprits were "the Central Intelligence Agency headed by Allen Dulles, the American military, and with them all those sinister, aggressive forces which strive to touch off another world war." Without absolving Powers of responsibility, Mr. Grinev stressed that he had acted not of his own volition but on the orders of his employers, with none of whom he was directly connected except his immediate superior, Colonel Shelton. His superiors had deliberately misled Powers by assuring him that the flight over Soviet territory was absolutely safe, and he was "not even informed by them of the plans they harboured when sending him to commit this crime."

A survey of Powers' life (Mr. Grinev continued) showed what roads had led him to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and made him "a tool of the American Government's aggressive policy." Mass unemployment and his impending call-up had prevented him from finding a steady job, and for these reasons he had volunteered for the Air Force; having finished his air course, his main aim in life had been to get a good job, and consequently "it was not ideological motives or ill-will that led Powers to commit this perfidious, aggressive act, but the business ethics in which he was brought up." Powers' written testimony, and the evidence which he had repeatedly given of his own free will, testified to some inner change in him which, perhaps, he had begun to experience from the moment he came into contact with the Soviet people and realized that much of what he had been told about them in America was in sharp contradiction with reality.

Appealing for a lenient sentence on Powers, Mr. Grinev asked the court to take into consideration the youth of the defendant; the fact that, when signing the contract with the C.I.A., he had not known the real purpose of the tasks assigned to him; and Powers' "truthful and sincere" testimony, both during the preliminary investigations and in court. "I do not know whether Powers has told all the truth," said Mr. Grinev, "but there is no doubt that what he did say is true."

Powers made the following final statement to the court: "I realize that I have committed a grave crime and that I must be punished for it. I ask the court to weigh all the evidence and take into consideration not only the fact that I committed the crime, but

also the circumstances which led me to do so. I also ask the court to take into consideration the fact that no secret information reached its destination. It all fell into the hands of the Soviet authorities. I realize the Russian people think of me as an enemy. I can understand that, but I would like to stress the fact that I do not feel, nor have I ever felt, any enmity whatsoever toward the Russian people. I plead with the court to judge me not as an enemy, but as a human being who is not a personal enemy of the Russian people, who has never had any charges brought against him in any court, and who is deeply repentant and profoundly sorry for what he has done."

After the judges had considered the case for over four hours, Lieut.-General Borisoglebsky sentenced Powers on Aug. 19 to ten years' confinement, the first three years of which would be served in prison. The Powers family were told unofficially that after completing his prison term he would be assigned to work in a designated area of the Soviet Union, where his wife might be allowed to live with him.

Powers was allowed to see his wife and parents immediately after the trial, while Mrs. Barbara Powers was permitted to see her husband in prison on two more occasions before she left Moscow on Aug. 25. A personal appeal for clemency for her husband was sent by Mrs. Powers to Mr. Khrushchev, and it was understood that a similar appeal would be made to President Brezhnev by the Powers family.—(Soviet Embassy Press Department, London - New York Times)

(Prev. rep. 17425 A)

A. SOUTH AFRICA. — The Pondoland Disturbances.

Serious disturbances occurred from May onwards in Pondoland, which forms part of the Transkei native reserve in eastern Cape Province. Repeated attacks were made on the chiefs nominated by the Government and their supporters, and on June 6 at least six Africans were killed when the police opened fire on a crowd.

The main causes of the unrest were reported to be as follows:

- (1) A long-standing feud, extending over 20 years, between supporters of the former Paramount Chief of East Pondoland, Nelson Sigama, who was deposed by the Smuts Government, and those of his brother, Botha Sigcau, who was installed in his place and became chairman of the Transkei territorial authority in 1959.
- (2) Pondo resentment of the fact that their chiefs had accepted the Government's Bantu authorities system without consulting them, contrary to tribal custom.
- (3) Opposition to the appointment of chiefs and headmen by the Government without consultation with the Pondo people.
- (4) Allegations that chiefs and other officials had imposed excessive fines and demanded bribes in return for making allotments of land.
- (5) Discontent with the Government's land betterment scheme, whereby the amount of land allotted to heads of families and the number of livestock they were allowed to keep had been reduced.
- (6) Raising of the poll tax by 50 per cent, thus forcing more men to seek work in industry or mining or on farms; this in turn had led to discontent over the pass laws.

The first outbreak of violence, in which several thousand tribesmen were officially stated to have been involved, occurred in May; two headmen were murdered, kraals and headmen's huts set on fire, and some chiefs were reported to have fled from their homes and sought Government protection. In consequence strong police reinforcements, equipped with *Saracen* armoured cars and helicopters, were sent to Pondoland, and on June 6 the police fired on a meeting at Ngqema Hill, about 30 miles from Lusikisiki. The Minister of Justice (Mr. Erasmus) stated on June 8 that "organized bands" had fired on the police, who had returned fire in self-defence, killing six Africans. Pondo spokesmen, however, alleged that the police had fired on a peaceful meeting, although a white flag had been raised, and that the number of casualties was much heavier. Sentences of 18 to 20 months' imprisonment were passed on June 14 on 19 Africans involved in the incident. An administrative commission consisting of three senior Bantu commissioners was appointed on June 20 to inquire into the causes of the disturbances.

Further acts of violence occurred in August and September, and result of which more police reinforcements were drafted into Pondoland from the Durban area. The unrest assumed an anti-European aspect for the first time on Sept. 3, when a white trader's store was burned down near Lusikisiki. From Pondoland the disturbances spread south to Tembuland (also in Transkei), where on Sept. 10 armed tribesmen raided the kraal of a Government-appointed headman.

Mr. R. I. Arenstein, a Durban lawyer participating in the defence of 39 Pondo tribesmen charged with arson, was banned on Oct. 2 from attending any gathering in the Union for the next five years, and also from leaving the Durban magisterial district during the same period; orders to this effect were issued by Mr. Erasmus under the Suppression of Communism Act and the Riotous Assemblies Act. Mr. Arenstein will be precluded from taking any further part in the trial of the Pondo tribesmen and from continuing his legal representation at an inquiry (being held at Lusikisiki) into the death of 11 Africans shot in an encounter with the police.—(Cape Times)

(Prev. rep. Transkei, 16865 A)