
With the formation on Sept. 16 of the Federation of Malaysia, the anti-British and anti-Malaysian agitation in Indonesia came violently to a head with the burning and sacking of the British Embassy in Jakarta by frenzied mobs, the wrecking and looting of the homes of British nationals, and the seizure of British business concerns. The violence of the Indonesian reaction was attributed by many commentators to the fact that the creation of the Malaysian Federation represented a major diplomatic reverse for Indonesia and for President Sukarno, who had publicly expressed Indonesia's determination to “crush Malaysia”. [see page 19717 second column]

Despite the fact that U Thant had fully endorsed the U.N. Malaysia Mission's findings that the people of Sarawak and North Borneo supported Malaysia, [see pages 19718-19] the Indonesian Foreign Minister announced on Sept. 15 that Indonesia would not recognize the “illegal” Malaysian Federation and that the Indonesian Ambassador had been recalled from Kuala Lumpur. Speaking after a Cabinet meeting presided over by President Sukarno and attended by Service chiefs, Dr. Subandrio said that Indonesia would raise objections at the United Nations to the report of the U.N. Malaysia Mission and would try to obtain a “correction of the flaws” in the U.N. Mission's “assessment.”

Anti-British Mob Violence in Indonesia.

Thousands of Indonesian demonstrators stormed the British Embassy in Jakarta on Sept. 16, tore down the Union Jack, burned the Ambassador's car, and smashed every window in the building before they were dispersed by police reinforcements using tear-gas. At the height of the attack on the Embassy the British assistant military attache, Major Roderick Walker, marched up and down the compound playing the bagpipes under a hail of stone-throwing from the mob, and refusing all offers of police protection. A group of demonstrators headed by Unwar Nasution, a left-wing youth leader and nephew of the Defence Minister, broke into the Embassy and.
allowed to see the Ambassador, Mr. Andrew Gilchrist; they read a document denouncing the report of the U.N. Mission as “not true,” to which Mr. Gilchrist replied in Indonesian, “Hidup U Thant” (Long live U Thant).

Before the attack on the British Embassy the demonstrators had stoned the Malaysian (formerly Malayan) Embassy and smashed its windows; the Malaysian Ambassador had meanwhile been summoned to the Indonesian Foreign Office by Dr. Subandrio, who told him that Indonesia did not recognize the Malaysian Federation and that there was “no Malaysian Embassy” in Jakarta. Outbreaks similar to those in the Indonesian capital also occurred in Medan (Sumatra), where mobs wrecked the British and Malaysian Consulates. Strong protests were made both by Mr. Gilchrist and by the Foreign Office in London. The Indonesian Government later issued a statement “deploring” the attacks on the British and Malaysian diplomatic missions but expressing appreciation of” the militant action of various sections of our society and the fact that our people have shown their indignation at the formation of Malaysia.”

After a lull on Sept. 17, violent anti-British riots again broke out in Jakarta on Sept. 18, when mobs of Indonesianmen, youths, and girls sacked and burned the British Embassy and systematically wreacked and looted the homes of British subjects. Thousands of rioters screaming “Kill the British!” and “Crush Malaysia!” stormed the Embassy, roamed from room to room smashing equipment, dragged furniture into the grounds and set it on fire, and finally set the Embassy itself ablaze, without any interference by the security forces.

During the day three messages were received by the British Foreign Office from Mr. Gilchrist reporting successively a “violent attack” on the Embassy, its forcible entry, and its setting ablaze, and stating that there had been “no preventive action by the forces of law and order.” While the Embassy was burning, 23 men and women members of the Embassy staff were hemmed into a corner of the compound by mobs who for two hours flung stones, bricks, and bottles at them; a dozen Indonesian soldiers struggled to prevent the rioters from getting closer to the British diplomats, who were eventually rescued by police Jeeps. Four Britons—one a pregnant woman—were injured by rioters at the Embassy, suffering cuts, bruises, and shock; the Ambassador himself was twice hit by stones.

Meanwhile gangs of Indonesians had begun a systematic “loot and burn” operation against the homes and property of British nationals in Jakarta. British cars were stopped in the streets and set on fire after their occupants had been evicted; British families were ordered out of their homes at a moment's notice and their furniture and belongings thrown into the street and set on fire; and in several cases the houses themselves were set ablaze, causing fires in different parts of the city.
Late in the evening martial law was imposed in Jakarta and armoured cars began to patrol the city.

In view of the paroxysm of anti-British hatred sweeping the Indonesian capital, an airlift of British, Australian, and New Zealand women and children in the Jakarta area began on Sept. 18, with the consent of the Indonesian authorities and after Mr. Gilchrist had recommended all British women and children to leave. Within 24 hours over 400 were flown from Jakarta to Singapore in a shuttle service by R.A.F. transport planes and an Australian Qantas airliner. Eye-witness accounts by evacuated families, many of whom had lost all their possessions, described how Indonesian mobs, acting as if “berserk” and “screaming their heads off,” had ransacked, looted, and burned their homes. No personal violence had been committed against British subjects, but one evacuee described how the children of an Indonesian neighbour had hidden her under their bed to save her from a howling mob which was burning her home down.

The Indonesian Ambassador in London (Mr. B. M. Diah) was twice summoned to the Foreign Office on Sept. 18 by Lord Home (then Foreign Secretary), who demanded immediate and categorical assurances for the safety of the British Ambassador in Jakarta, the Embassy staff, and British nationals in Indonesia. In an exceptionally stern message at the first interview, which lasted only five minutes, Lord Home required Mr. Diah to obtain assurances from the Indonesian Government that its “barbaric” and “uncivilized” behaviour would cease forthwith and that proper measures would be taken to safeguard the lives and property of British diplomats and citizens. At his second interview with Lord Home, Mr. Diah said he had heard from Jakarta that Mr. Gilchrist and the British Embassy staff were under “police protection”; owing, however, to communications difficulties he was not yet in a position to give a categorical assurance as to the safety of British lives and property in Indonesia. Lord Home demanded that Mr. Diah should obtain such an assurance “promptly” from the Indonesian Government.

During the day Mr. Patrick Gordon Walker (the Labour Party's spokesman on foreign affairs) called at the Foreign Office to assure the Government of the Opposition's full support for all measures to protect British lives and property in Indonesia. Noting that no police protection had been given when the British Embassy was burned down, Mr. Gordon Walker said that “it looks as if it was not unwelcome to the Indonesian Government.”

Mr. Diah again called at the Foreign Office on Sept. 19 to convey to Lord Home what was in effect an Indonesian apology. He delivered a communication in which the Indonesian Government(1) “deplored” the “unjustified actions” which had occurred during “the recent demonstrations against the United Kingdom”(2) gave an
assurance that it would “not condone any further mob violence against British nationals and property”; and (3) “guaranteed” the safety of British nationals and property in Indonesia.

Deep concern at the Jakarta riots was expressed in Washington, where the U.S. State Department described the burning of the British Embassy as an “outrage” and said that the U.S. Government's concern would be conveyed directly to the Indonesian Government. The U.S. Ambassador in Jakarta, Mr. Howard Jones, saw President Sukarno on Sept. 19, after which the Indonesian Government issued a statement “deploring” the attack on the British Embassy and on British property but adding that it “fully understood the flaming anger of the people” towards “the side which master-minded Malaysia.”

President Sukarno issued an order on Sept. 20 for the taking-over of all British firms in Indonesia by Government departments “in the interests of their own safety.” It was officially stated that the order was designed not to nationalize the companies but to ensure that production was maintained. British tea, rubber, coffee, and palm-oil estates, banks, import and export firms, and other businesses were affected by the Presidential directive.

During the anti-British riots many British concerns in Indonesia had been taken over by the trade unions, but President Sukarno's directive ordered all regional civil and military governors to prevent the workers from seizing control of British enterprises. The directive specifically ordered the Governor of South Sumatra to end workers’ control of the Shell refinery at Pladju and announced that a Government commissioner would be appointed with powers to protect the plant.[The plandju rofinery is the largest British enterprise in Indonesia.]

In London, two Notes were presented to Mr. Diah during the week-end Sept. 21–22 asking that the Indonesian Government should state definitely when British firms taken over would be returned to their former owners, and what was meant by the “protective custody” to which (according to official Indonesian announcements) some of the British enterprises had been subjected. According to press reports, no satisfactory assurances were received to these questions, the Indonesian reply being described as containing “a number of ambiguities.”

The Times pointed out that the pattern of events was “closely similar to what took place in 1957, when Dutch properties were expropriated. The British community [in Indonesia] has noted… that whereas their offers were left intact (for use by whoever manages the properties in future), it was the homes of British employees which were ransacked and destroyed.”
Because of the importance of oil production to the Indonesian economy, the Shell installations at Pladju were treated as a special case and handed back to the European management early in October. Most other British firms, however, remained under Indonesian control—notably Dunlop Rubber, Ocean Insurance, Harrisons & Crosfield, and J. A. Wattle & Co., the four largest British concerns in Indonesia excluding Shell.

Wives and children of Shell Company employees at Balikpapan (Borneo), about 140 in all, were flown to Singapore on Oct. 2 at their own request. The British Consul in Jakarta, Dr. Clara Grace Thornton, had previously visited Balikpapan and recommended the evacuation of British women and children because of the tense situation there. On reaching Singapore the evacuees described how they and their families had been confined to their homes for 10 days as virtual prisoners and had been forbidden to do any shopping or to take any exercise. There had, however, been no looting or burning and all their homes had been well stocked with good and water. The Shell manager in Balikpapan had been put under “house arrest” for a short time for allegedly tearing up an anti-(1)Malaysia poster, but all European executives in the refinery were now back at work.

Mr. Gilchrist arrived in London by air on Oct. 21 for consultations with the British Government.

Malaysia breaks off Relations with Indonesia. - Anti-Indonesian Demonstrations in Kuala Lumpur.

The breaking-off of Malaysian relations with Indonesia, and also with the Philippines, was announced in Kuala Lumpur on Sept. 17 by the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, after a Cabinet meeting. The Tunku issued a statement saying that: Malaysia had no alternative but to break off relations with Indonesia “in view of the fact that Indonesia has broken off relations with Malaysia for no apparent reason” (2) the Malaysian Ambassador and his staff had accordingly been recalled from Jakarta, and the Consulate in Medan closed down; (3) the Malaysian diplomatic mission had also been recalled from Manila in view of the Philippine Government's request that the status of its embassy in Kuala Lumpur should be reduced to that of a consulate, a proposal which was “not acceptable to the Malaysian Government”; (4) Thailand had agreed to represent Malaysia in both Indonesia and the Philippines.

The U.N. Malaysian Mission's report had caused much disappointment in Manila, in view of the Philippine claim to Sabah (North Borneo). There were, however, no outbreaks of mob violence such as occurred in Jakarta; Philippine official comment was restrained, while the consensus of opinion as expressed in Manila newspapers was that the U.N. report would eventually have to be accepted. The request for the
reduction in status of the Philippine Embassy in Kuala Lumpur was regarded as symbolic of the Philippine Government's disappointment and, as stated above, was not acceptable to the Malaysian Government. There were reports in November, however, of pourparlers between Kuala Lumpur and Manila aimed at the resumption of diplomatic relations.

Following the Indonesian attacks on the Malaysian Embassy in Jakarta and the Consulate at Medan, about 1,000 demonstrators stoned the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur on Sept. 17, smashing the windows and setting fire to a wooden outhouse in the grounds. The shield bearing the Indonesian State emblem was torn off the building and dragged through the streets to the Prime Minister's residence; when the Tunku came out and asked the demonstrators to disperse peacefully, he was lifted up bodily and stood on the Indonesian shield.

On Sept. 19, as a further demonstration against the anti-Malaysian outbreaks and the burning of the British Embassy in Jakarta, some 80 Malaysians broke into the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur in the small hours, threatened to burn down the building if police or troops intervened, seized three Indonesian diplomats as hostages, and threatened to kill them unless Malaysian diplomats and their families returned safely from Jakarta. The diplomats were held for eight hours before they were released on the personal intervention of the Tunku, who assured their captors that Malaysian diplomats and their families in Indonesia were unhurt and on their way home.


The official Antara news agency announced on Sept. 23 that all shipments of Indonesian oil and natural gas to Malaysia had been banned by ministerial ordinance (applying also to foreign firms operating in Indonesia), and that tin concentrates would in future be sent to Europe for processing instead of to Penang. It was reported on the same day from Kuala Lumpur that Malaysian Airways had been informed that they would no longer be allowed landing rights at Jakarta and Medan.

The seizure of all Malaysian-owned or backed rubber mills in Sumatra was ordered by President Sukarno by a decree issued on Nov. 6. According to press dispatches from Jakarta, the President's move against Malaysian rubber-milling companies in Sumatra—of which there were about 15—was understood to have been caused by reports that Chinese middlemen were “planning extensive smuggling of milled rubber across the Malacca Straits to Singapore and Penang.”
President Sukarno issued another decree on the same day making it illegal for anyone to listen-in to the Malaysian radio. Any Indonesian caught listening to a Malaysian station became liable to a year's imprisonment, while persons listening-in for purposes of “espionage or sabotage” became liable to the death penalty or to life imprisonment.

Indonesian-sponsored Guerrilla Attacks in Sarawak and Sabah.

The 970-mile jungle frontier between Malaysian Borneo (Sarawak and Sabah) and Indonesian Borneo had meanwhile been the scene of increasingly numerous “hit-and-run” raids by guerrillas operating from the Indonesianside, involving in some cases deep penetrations of Malaysian territory by armed bands which included Indonesianregulars as well as so-called “volunteers “– in nearly all cases Chinese from Sarawak. The frequency of these raids necessitated an increasingly strong local build-up of British, Gurkha, and Malaysian forces.

After a period of quiescence following the suppression of the Brunei revolt. [see 19261 A] an armed band of 60 uniformed men overran a police post on April 12 at Tebedu (Sarawak), three miles from the Indonesian border, killed a police corporal, and escaped into Indonesian territory with a quantity of carbines and automatic weapons. From August onwards clashes with terrorist bands became increasingly frequent in remote jungle areas, with Gurkha troops and local security forces engaged in hunting down Indonesian-based units which in some cases had infiltrated over 40 miles into Malaysian territory. Some 15 terrorists were killed in mid-August in a clash in the Sungal Bangkit area (180 miles east of Kuching) in which a British subaltern also died of wounds, while over 20 terrorists were killed by Gurkhas in an operation at the remote Dyak village of Long Jawi which began on Sept. 28 and continued for several days after.

Reporting on the “hide-and-seek war” in the jungles of Sarawak and Sabah, a dispatch from a correspondent of The Guardian (Nov. 20) stated: “Since August 1 there have been 69 armed incursions from Indonesia, four of them major ones which have resulted in operations that are still in progress. Fifty-eight Indonesians have been killed, eight reported killed, and 20 captured. British casualties are less than double figures. Two operations are still in progress. The first results from the attack on Long Jawi on Sept. 28, when some 30 to 40 Indonesian regulars supported by the same number of volunteers penetrated 40 tories into Sarawak…. Twenty-six Indonesians were ambushed on Oct. 1 in a ‘long boat’ and killed. The operation is still in progress in an effort to pick up the rest of the Indonesians who disappeared into the jungle…. The second operation in progress is an attempt to mop up the remnants of a small band of men, about 50 or 60, who are in Brunei…. Meanwhile the hit-and-run activity continues unabated to the south of Kuching…. “
The Indonesian Defence Minister, General Nasution, had openly admitted that Indonesia was giving training to “guerrillas” aimed at “liberating North Kalimantan” (Malaysian Borneo) from the “neo-colonialists”; in a speech to university students on Sept. 25 he said that Indonesia would not prevent” volunteers” from joining the “guerrillas,” while on the same day it was announced in Jakarta that crack Indonesian parachute. troops had been flown to the Borneo border and were “combat ready.”

It was disclosed in Kuala Lumpur on Sept. 27 that there were 6,000 British, Gurkha, and Malaysian troops in Sarawak under the command of Major-General W. C. Walker, commanding British military forces in Borneo. They included a Royal Marine Commando, a squadron of the Queen's Royal Irish Hussars, the 1st Green Jackets, the 1st Bn. Royal Leicestershire Regiment, and the 1/2nd and 1/10th Gurkha Rifles. Aircraft operating in the Borneo territories included two squadrons of R.A.F. helicopters, two of Royal Navy helicopters, and a squadron of the Special Air Service Regiment.

In Brunei, the security forces had obtained a major success on April 18 with the capture of two brothers of the rebel leader, A. M. Azahari. They were Sheikh Osman bin Mahmud, the third-ranking leader of the revolt which broke out in December 1962, and Sheikh Salleh bin Mahmud. Acting on information from a member of the public, police and Gurkhas raided a house five miles from Brunei Town where the rebel leaders were in hiding. Sheikh Osman was severely wounded in an exchange of fire and died in hospital a few days later. A British officer, Captain Keith D. F. Burnett, was also killed in the gun battle; a military spokesman said that if Sheikh Osman had lived he would have been charged with the murder of Captain Burnett.

Malaysian Defence Measures.

The Malaysian Cabinet decided on Sept. 18 to put the country in a “state of preparedness” by setting up a Malaysia Defence Council, calling up reserves, increasing: the strength of the armed forces, extending them to Sarawak and Sabah, and strengthening the police and Civil Defence organizations. It was announced that Tun Abdul Rahman would preside over the Defence Council, the other members of which would include Tun Abdul Razak (Deputy Premier and Defence Minister), Mr. Tan Siew Sin (Finance), Dr. Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman (Internal security), and the Service chiefs. Mr. Sandys (U.K. Commonwealth Relations and Colonial Secretary), who was in Kuala Lumpur for the Malaysia celebrations, assured the Tunku that Britain would help to defend Malaysia's independence and integrity.
It was announced in Kuala Lumpur on Sept. 24 that the entire 5th battalion of the Royal Malay Regiment would leave for Sarawak and Sabah within a month under the command of the Malaysian Chief of General Staff, Major-General Tunku Osman, who had been urgently recalled from a tour of military installations in Pakistan. In addition, the 3rd battalion would be sent to the Borneo territories later, while the Sarawak Rangers—hitherto a British Army unit—would form the nucleus of a 1st battalion which would be ready for service after being trained at Sungei Patani (Kedah) by British officers and N.C.O.s.

All male Malaysian citizens between the ages of 21 to 28 became liable to call-up for service with the armed forces under a proclamation signed on Nov. 18 by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.

The U.K. First Lord of the Admiralty (then Lord Carrington) visited Kuala Lumpur on Oct. 8–9 to discuss Malaysia's defence, with special reference to a possible sea threat from Indonesia, with the Tunku and British and Malaysian Service chiefs, including Admiral Sir Varyl Begg, C.-in-C., Far East Fleet.

The Tunku was reported to have raised the possibility of Royal Navy assistance against Indonesian “pirates” in the Malacca Straits, following complaints by Malaysian fishermen and small traders that their vessels had been seized, looted, and burned by Indonesian gunboats. Sweeps by Malaysian parcel boats and aircraft failed to catch any marauders at work, and only one “sea confrontation” was reported—on Oct. 8, when two Indonesian gunboats in the Malacca Straits turned back in the direction of Indonesia on being approached by two Malaysian patrol vessels. Both gunboats were outside Malaysian waters.

Australian and New Zealand Pledges to Malaysia.

In a statement to the Federal House of Representatives on Sept. 25, Sir Hobert Menzies said that Australia would give “military assistance to defend Malaysia in the event of any armed invasion or of subversive activity supported, directed, or inspired from outside Malaysia.” After saying that this pledge applied to all the constituent States of Malaysia; that the Governments of Malaysia, Britain, New Zealand, “and others concerned “had been informed of Australia's determination to defend Malaysia's integrity and political independence; and that Australia's existing defence arrangements with Malaya would apply to Malaysia, Sir Robert went on:

“So far back as April 1955, the Government emphasized the importance of Malaya to the security of the zone in which we live and pointed out that, in consequence, Malayan integrity and defence were matters from which we could not stand aloof…. The establishment of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, of SEATO
(to the functions of which the Reserve wont relevant), of the Anzus Pact, are all in the same pattern—a Pattern not of aggression but of defence: of common effort for the common security.

“There has been some suggestion that our forces in Malaya went there primarily for purposes of internal security. This is not so. They went there and are there as part of a Strategic Reserve with the United Kingdom and New Zealand and as a contribution to the defence of the South-East Asia area…. In all these arrangements, and in any to be made, the usual rule will apply that the employment of Australian forces remains under the control of the Australian Government. We have acted and will continue to act consistently with the U.N. Charter.

“Malaysia, the new nation, is here. The processes of its creation have been democratic. The U.N. Secretary-General, having appointed examiners, reported that the people of North Borneo and Sarawak desired incorporation into Malaysia…. We publicly and unambiguously support Malaysia, which is a Commonwealth country just as our own is…."

In statements on July 30 and Aug. 1, the New Zealand Prime Minister (Mr. Holyoake) described Malaysia as “an imaginative and constructive contribution to the security and stability of South-East Asia” which would have New Zealand's full support. After recalling that New Zealand had maintained forces in Malaya since 1955, that she was associated with the 1957 U.K.-Malayan defence agreement, and that she expected to continue to maintain forces in the Malaysian Federation under the modified agreement, Mr. Holyoake declared: “While there is no formal treaty obligation, the New Zealand Government would deal promptly with any request for assistance in the event of aggression against the area.” (Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - New York Times Australian News and Information Bureau - New Zealand External Affairs Department, Wellington) (Prev. rep. Malaysia, 19715 A)