

Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives),
Volume 8, March, 1962 India, Portugal, Indian, Portuguese Territories, India, Portuguese, Page
18623

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Indian Occupation of Portuguese Territories in India. - Invasion of Goa, Daman, and Diu. - Incorporation in Indian Union.

The long-standing tension between India and Portugal over the question of the Portuguese territories in India—Goa, and the small enclaves of Daman and Diu—culminated in the Indian invasion and occupation of these territories on Dec. 18-19, 1961, after a brief military campaign lasting barely 24 hours. The stages of the Goa crisis are summarized below, comprising developments prior to the Indian attack on the territories; the invasion and occupation of Goa, Daman, and Diu; post-invasion developments after their incorporation in the Indian Union.

For some weeks before the attack on Goa both the Indian and Portuguese Governments had brought numerous charges and counter-charges against the other alleging border provocations and violations, build-up of troops by the other side, and overflights by hostile planes. For a much longer period, allegations of Portuguese persecution of Indian nationalists in Goa had been made by Indian newspapers and leading Indian politicians—including Mr. Nehru himself, who, in a Bombay speech on Oct. 23, referred to increasing reports of “terror and torture” by the Portuguese authorities in Goa and declared that “the time has come for us to consider afresh what method should be adopted to free Gee from Portuguese rule.” These allegations were denied *in toto* by the Portuguese Government and the authorities in Goa.

Indo-Portuguese tension was heightened by two incidents on Nov. 17 and 24, 1961, in the first of which—as reported by Mr. Nehru to the *Lok Sabha*—a rifle-shot was fired from the Portuguese island of Anjadedev at a passing Indian vessel, the s.s. *Sabarmati*, one of whose crew was slightly wounded by a ricocheting bullet. In the second incident, which occurred in the same area, three bullets were fired from Anjadedev at an Indian fishing boat, killing one member of its crew. Both incidents were stated to have occurred four miles off the Indian port of Karwar, near the southern border of Goa. On Dec. 5 the Indian Ministry of External Affairs announced that “precautionary” troop movements were taking place in view of reports of “intensified oppression and terrorism” in Gee and of the “aggressive action taken by the Portuguese against Indian shipping and fishing vessels.”

In Lisbon, the Portuguese Defence Ministry claimed on Nov. 26 that “a large number of vessels” attempting to approach Anjadedev on Nov. 24-25 had been repulsed by the island's garrison; that the Portuguese Government had received warning some days earlier that an attack on Anjadedev was in preparation; and that “the passage through our territorial waters of merchant vessels which do not give their identity when requested, such as the one to which Mr. Nehru referred, must be considered as a provocative act.”

Mr. Nehru, speaking on Dec. 6-7 in a foreign affairs debate in the *Lok Sabha*, said that the Portuguese firings on Indian shipping were “direct challenges thrown out in an aggressive and insulting way” and had created a situation “which has become progressively intolerable for us to submit to.” He recalled that from the day India had become independent “clear and firm notice was given that Gee is in India and should become part of the Indian Union”; emphasized India's reluctance to resort to force to settle the Goan question; and expressed the hope that “the Portuguese Government will agree to put an end to the colonial status of Gee and depart in peace.” At the same time Mr. Nehru said that the “Portuguese attitude in Gee has been exasperating in the extreme and has made it difficult for us to restrain our feelings or consequent activities.”

During the debate on Dec. 7 **Mr. M. R. Masani** (Swatantra Party) questioned the wisdom of deploying troops on the Goa border at a time when “anything that weakens our position on the Himalayan border and slows down the armed build-up there must be scrupulously eschewed.” While all Indians stood for the ending of Portuguese colonialism, whether in Goa or Angola, “the issue is one of priorities—whether to give priority to the liberation of Goa or to repel Chinese aggression from the national soil.” **Mr. S. M. Bannerjee** (Independent) moved a resolution—subsequently withdrawn—urging that India should send an ultimatum to Portugal to evacuate Goa immediately.

Mr. Nehru emphasized that in the It years since independence India had consistently stood for the settlement of all problems in a peaceful manner. After referring to recent incidents on the Goa border caused, he alleged, by Portuguese troops, and to reports of continued repression and ill-treatment of Indian patriots in Gee, he said that Portuguese interference with Indian shipping had created an “intolerable” situation which it was impossible for India to accept, since Indian ships and fishing vessels had for many years passed unhindered through the waters round Gee. Describing the Portuguese action as “a clear case of aggression and deliberate provocation,” he declared: “We must be ready to meet any development that might take place.... I cannot say what precise steps will be taken, because that will depend on circumstances. But we are prepared for any contingency that may arise.”

As regards Mr. Masani's reference to priorities, Mr. Nehru said that there could be “no priorities between a mouse and an elephant,” nor any question of priorities between Goa and the North-East Frontier; all questions affecting India's borders were of equal importance and received equal consideration. Mr. Nehru also opposed Mr. Bannerjee's suggestion for an ultimatum to Portugal, saying that he “personally did not like ultimatums” and was “never agreeable to banging a door which, if open, might help in settling a question”; he added, however, that “after 14 years’ experience he is a confident man who can say that peaceful negotiations will bring results so far as Portugal is concerned.”

After declaring that there could be “no solution to the problem except the Portuguese walking out of Goa,” Mr. Nehru gave an assurance that Goa's culture and individuality would be fully preserved when it became part of the Indian Union, as had been the case with the former French settlements in India. He concluded: “As to what all this will lead to, I cannot at the moment say except that ultimately it must lead to the liberation of Goa.... If it is going to lead to that ultimately, then we must not take any single step without being prepared for the next step, and

the third step. That argument applies not only to Gee but also to the Chinese border. It is not the first step that counts, but the last. It is not a skirmish that counts—it is the winning of a war that counts. Therefore we have to take adequate precautions and be prepared for any emergency or other development.”

Between Dec. 4 and Dec. 11 the Indian authorities reported five separate incidents in which, it was alleged, Portuguese patrols had crossed the Goan border into Indian territory, opened rifle-fire and machine-gun fire on Indian villages, and in one case carried out a house search. Two strong protest Notes were sent to Portugal at these incidents, following earlier protests at the Anjadedev incidents.

On the Portuguese side similar allegations were made of Indian violations of the border, of overflights by Indian planes, and of the machine-gunning of a Goan village from the Indian side of the frontier. It was stated in Lisbon on Dec. 10 that the Portuguese forces had not retaliated against these “provocative acts,” and that the Portuguese Government had invited international observers to visit Goa and observe the situation on the spot. Meanwhile, a strong build-up of Indian forces near the Goan border was reported both in Portugal and in Gee itself.

In a statement on Dec. 11 to the *Rajya Sabha* (Upper House), Mr. Nehru said that “India's patience is certainly exhausted” as a result of the “unprovoked raids” by Portuguese troops on Indian villages; he still hoped, however, that Portugal, either on her own initiative or on the advice of her friends and allies, would “accept the natural culmination of present developments, which is her withdrawal from Goa.”

Dr. H. N. Kunzru (Independent) urged during the debate that the Government should explore all diplomatic means for a peaceful settlement of the Gee question, asking in this connexion if any offers of mediation or good offices had been made by other Powers. Stressing that India should pursue a consistent policy on frontier problems, he declared: “Though the Portuguese attitude has been very provocative, I hope we shall remember that the greatest threat to our security is on our eastern frontier. Let nothing that we may do now interfere with our efforts to strengthen that frontier and to make sure that we are able to meet the challenge when the time comes.”

Mr. Nehru gave an account of the recent frontier incidents, notably on Dec. 7 when Portuguese troops had turned villagers out of their homes at Terekhol, 1 1/2 miles inside the northern Goan border—apparently because they wanted to occupy the houses. The villagers of Terekhol, not knowing what to do, had asked villagers on the Indian side of the border whether they could come over and take shelter, which they had been invited to do. Thereupon (Mr. Nehru alleged) the Portuguese troops had crossed the border and “started firing right and left and exploding bombs to frighten people”; Indian police had arrived on the scene and fired back, the Portuguese retiring across the frontier after one of their number had been wounded. On the night of Dec. 9-10 Portuguese soldiers had again crossed the border and started firing with machine-guns, presumably “to punish the Terekhol villagers for having thought of coming over into India and the Indian villagers for having given them shelter.”

“It is true,” Mr. Nehru continued, “that Goa is a small place and does not count for much compared with the strength of India. But even a small problem has aspects which may make it

bigger than it looks. Therefore preparations have been made to meet any contingency that may arise. In Goa itself the Portuguese have added largely to their armed forces, have brought along some ships, and have got some aircraft.... And—what is really extraordinary—they have been functioning in a most provocative manner, deliberately or for other reasons, as if they wanted us to take steps against them.”

As regards Dr. Kunzru's question, Mr. Nehru said that there had been no formal offer of mediation from any side. “Some reports have appeared in the newspapers,” he added, “and there has been vague talk by one or two countries; it is too vague for me to define, but it was to the effect that if they could help they would try to do so.... But I want to make it perfectly clear that there has been no such offer and no progress made anywhere in that respect. Anyhow, I do not myself see how such an offer could be helpful except in the sense that it can induce the Portuguese to vacate Goa. Then, of course, we would welcome it gladly.”

The Governor-General of Portuguese India, General Manuel Antonio Vassalo e Silva, announced in Goa on Dec. 12 that it had been decided to evacuate European and locally-born women and children from Goa, Daman, and Diu in view of the possibility of an imminent Indian attack; at the same time it was reported that strong Indian troop concentrations were massing on Goa's 180-mile border. Several hundred families were accordingly evacuated by sea and air to Portugal during the next few days, the great majority of the evacuees being wives and children of Portuguese officials and military personnel.

On Dec. 11 the Portuguese Government sent a communication to the U.N. security Council drawing attention to the build-up of Indian troops on the borders of the Portuguese possessions in India and alleging violations of the Goan border by Indian land and air forces. In reply, the Government of India denied that such incidents had taken place; alleged that Portugal had reinforced her land and sea forces “in and around her colonies on the Indian mainland”; and said that India had been “obliged as a consequential precautionary measure to strengthen her defence on the border and on the coast.” After alleging that the Portuguese charges had been put forward “to cover incidents of internal fighting in Goa between Goan freedom fighters and the Portuguese forces of occupation,” the Government of India drew the security Council's attention to the Terekhol incident.

During the fortnight before the Indian attack on Goa, Notes were exchanged between Portugal and India (through the Brazilian Embassy in New Delhi and the U.A.R. Embassy in Lisbon) wherein the Portuguese Government, to show to the world their “good intent and peaceful purposes,” proposed the despatch of an international mission to study the situation on the Goan border and determine the responsibility for incidents. The Government of India ignored this suggestion, recalled Mr. Nehru's statement to the *Rajya Sabha* that India's patience was “certainly exhausted,” and expressed the hope that Portugal would evacuate her colonies in India” forthwith,” adding that the Indian people were “determined to ensure that their independence is complete and that there are no longer any vestiges of colonial rule on their territory.”

Portuguese Note to India. In this Note, dated Dec. 8, the Portuguese Government denied “in the most categorical and energetic manner” that Portuguese forces had “committed aggressive acts

on the Indo-Portuguese border or assumed provocative attitudes,” as alleged by the Government of India. It continued: “In the face of the provocations endured by Portugal and the violations of Portuguese territory, they have refrained from any reaction—otherwise legitimate—in order to prove their peaceful intentions and make quite clear that theirs is not the responsibility for such provocations and violations. The Portuguese Government wish that there should not remain any doubts about this in world public opinion. For this purpose they formally and solemnly propose that international independent observers be sent to the Indo-Portuguese border with the object of ascertaining the attitude of the confronting forces and determining the nature of and responsibility for any incidents which might occur.... The Portuguese Government thus show their good intent and peaceful purposes,... hope that the Government of the Indian Union may show a similar spirit.”

Indian Note to Portugal. The Government of India's reply, published on Dec. 15, recalled that India had already sent two protest Notes to Portugal with regard to “Portuguese interference with normal Indian shipping and fishing activities on the high seas” and “acts of aggression and raids into Indian territory across the border of Goa.” After alleging that these “acts of aggression have been multiplying with increasing intensity” the Indian Note continued:

“As the Government of Portugal are aware, ever since India became free her Government have been attempting to persuade the Portuguese Government to leave their colonial possessions in India. Portugal has, however, consistently and rudely rejected such appeals and attempts. The Government of Portugal have also ignored U.N. resolutions specifically citing Goa and its dependencies as non-self-governing territories and emphasizing that denial of the freedom of dependent peoples constitutes a serious threat to world peace.... The Portuguese authorities have instead unleashed a mounting reign of terror and repression over the peaceful and freedom-loving residents of their Indian dependencies and have been terrorizing and interfering with the Indian population in the vicinity.

“The Government and people of India have been shocked at these continuing and intolerable measures of oppression and acts of aggression. The Prime Minister of India has on several occasions made public statements of India's decision to ensure the peaceful termination of Portuguese colonialism. Finally, speaking in the *Rajya Sabha* on Dec. 11, he said: ‘Our patience is certainly exhausted. We still hope that the Portuguese, either by themselves or by the advice of their friends... will accept the natural culmination of all this, which is their withdrawal from Goa.’... The Government of India have repeatedly stated that when the colonial regime is ended and Goa joins the Indian Union, Goa will retain its cultural individuality as regards religion, language, customs, etc....

“The Government of India believe that it is never too late to take the right step and hope that, in accordance with the immutable principles of humanity and the irreversible processes of history, the Government of Portugal will leave their Indian colonies forthwith and remove their persistent irritants against international peace. The people of India are determined to ensure that their independence is complete and that there are no longer any vestiges of colonial rule on their territory.”

Meanwhile the acting U.N. Secretary-General, U Thant, had sent messages on Dec. 15 to Dr. Salazar and Mr. Nehru urging them to “ensure that the situation does not deteriorate to the extent that it might constitute a threat to peace,” and to enter into “immediate negotiations with a view to an early solution of the problem... in accord with the principles embodied in the Charter and formulated by the United Nations.” The replies of the Portuguese and Indian Prime Ministers are summarized below.

Dr. Salazar's Reply to U Thant. The Portuguese Prime Minister stated that he was “deeply sensible” of the Secretary-General's appeal and gave an assurance that Portugal, “except in the case of an armed aggression, will do nothing which may constitute a threat to peace and security.” To this end, the Portuguese forces in India had received “rigorous instructions” not to undertake or even reply to any “acts of provocation.” Dr. Salazar continued:

“The Government regrets that the Indian Union, which repeatedly alleges provocations from the Portuguese side, has not thought it possible to accept the proposal... that international observers may follow events on the frontiers. These observers would witness if and how violations of frontiers and provocative acts take place.

“As regards negotiations, the Portuguese Government has always expressed, and confirms, its readiness to negotiate with the Indian Union solutions for all the problems arising from the vicinity between the territories of the Portuguese State of India and those of the Indian Union, including an international guarantee to the latter that Portuguese territory will not be utilized against the security of the Indian Union. Such negotiations can take place where and how the Government in New Delhi may wish.”

Mr. Nehru's Reply to U Thant. After referring to “the serious situation that has developed in and along the borders of the Portuguese colonial possessions of Goa, Diu, and Daman on the Indian continent,” Mr. Nehru said: “We have recently given the security Council some details regarding the sequence of events which have led to this serious situation, and shown how it has been entirely created by Portuguese aggressiveness along the Indian frontiers and an oppressive police regime inside these colonial areas. Portuguese forces continue to shoot indiscriminately at Indian citizens and are committing daily depredations into Indian territory.

“We have consistently abided by the U.N. Charter. The only solution conforming to the principles and purposes of the Charter, U.N. resolutions, and the irreversible course of history, is for Portugal to leave her colonies in India and allow the people in these territories to join their countrymen in freedom and democracy. We have during the last 14 years been appealing to Portugal to settle this question of ending Portuguese colonial rule on the Indian Continent. Portugal, however, has brusquely rejected all our appeals and also summarily rejected the advice and suggestions in this connexion given by other friendly countries.

“As you know, Portugal has consistently ignored U.N. resolutions on ending colonialism and has refused to send reports to the United Nations. It is hardly possible to negotiate on the basis of the Charter with a Government which takes its stand on 16th-century concepts of colonial conquest by force.

“We understand that many Portuguese officials in Goa are being withdrawn. This is already leading to serious developments and will progressively lead to chaotic conditions and the growth of violence by lawless elements as well as Portuguese soldiery. This will lead not only to grave loss and suffering, but also to powerful reactions in India.

“The situation is very serious and is likely to grow more so. The Government of India, who have shown considerable restraint for many weeks past, cannot tolerate this state of affairs indefinitely.”

Apart from U Thant's efforts to avert hostilities between India and Portugal, there was considerable diplomatic activity in New Delhi and London during the week preceding the invasion; it was emphasized in Delhi, however, and confirmed in London, that no definite offer of mediation had been made by the British or any other Government. The U.K. High Commissioner in New Delhi, Sir Paul Gore-Booth, had a meeting on Dec. 13 with Mr. Nehru and Mr. M. J. Desai, the Indian Foreign Secretary, while the U.S. Ambassador to India, Professor J. K. Galbraith, also saw Mr. Desai the following day. No official statements were issued, but it was understood that Sir Paul Gore-Booth and Professor Galbraith had expressed the anxiety of the British and U.S. Governments at the deteriorating situation and their hope that India would not resort to force in her dispute with Portugal.

The Portuguese Ambassador in London, Senhor Manuel Ferrajota Rocheta, called at the Foreign Office on Dec. 13 at his own request and saw Mr. Edward Heath, the Lord Privy Seal. The following statement was subsequently issued by a Foreign Office spokesman:

“The Lord Privy Seal informed that H.M. Government deplored the tension existing between a member of the Commonwealth and one of their allies. Recent reports suggesting that hostilities might be imminent have caused grave concern. H.M. Government have expressed to the Government of India their earnest hope that there will be no resort to force over this issue.

“H.M. Government have similarly expressed to the Portuguese Government their hope that they will exercise restraint and avoid gestures that might be interpreted as provocative. The Portuguese Government have proposed the dispatch of international observers to Goa. H.M. Government are naturally in favour of any such machinery which is acceptable to both sides.”

In reply to questions, the Foreign Office spokesman indicated that no request for mediation had been received from either party and that Britain therefore had *no locus standi* in the Indo-Portuguese dispute; while prepared to give any assistance in its power, H.M. Government would not take any initiative unless there was clear evidence that the Governments concerned would welcome it. Asked what effect an Indian attack on Goa would have on the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of alliance of 1899, and earlier treaties between the two countries dating back to 1373, the spokesman said that there would “naturally be no question” of Britain engaging in hostilities with India.

In 1373 Edward III of England signed a treaty of mutual military support with Portugal, and it was this treaty which Britain invoked in 1943 when requesting bases in the Azores during the Second World War. In 1386 the two countries entered into a perpetual military alliance (the

Treaty of Windsor) against all Powers except the Pope, the Holy Roman Emperor, and John of Gaunt, “King of Castile.” Under the Treaty of Windsor the alliance was to be confirmed by every sovereign of England and Portugal within a year of their coronation, and this was generally observed throughout the 15th century.

The alliance lapsed during the 60 years in which Portugal was part of the Spanish Empire (1578-1640), but when Portugal regained her independence it was revived in the form of a Treaty of Peace and Commerce signed by Charles I of England and John IV of Portugal in 1642, just before the outbreak of the English Civil War. After the Restoration a Portuguese princess, the Infanta Catherine of Braganza, was married in 1661 to Charles II, bringing Tangier and Bombay as her dowry, and in that year a Treaty of Alliance was signed which remains the basis of Anglo-Portuguese relations to the present day.

The Anglo-Portuguese alliance was defined in a Secret Article to the 1661 treaty which stated that, over and above everything contained in the marriage settlement between Charles II and the Infanta, “... His Majesty of Great Britain, in regard of the great advantages and increase of dominion he hath purchased by the Treaty of Marriage, shall promise and oblige himself... to defend and protect all conquests or Colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal against all his enemies, as well future as present.... It Is concluded and accorded, that there is and shall be for ever, a good, true, and firm peace and amity between the most renowned Kings, Charles, King of Great Britain, and John IV, King of Portugal, their heirs and successors, and their kingdoms, countries, dominions, lands, people, liegemen, vassals, and subjects whomsoever, present and to come....”

In conformity with the 1661 Treaty and the earlier treaties, Britain and Portugal fought side by side against France in the Napoleonic Wars and against Germany in the First World War, when Portuguese troops served on the Western front; as stated, the original treaty of 1373 was invoked by Britain in the Second World War. The 1661 treaty was confirmed in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna; again in 1873, when Portugal received a British guarantee against external aggression; and once more in 1899, when this guarantee was extended to the Portuguese colonies under a secret agreement.

A three-pronged attack on Goa—heralded, as stated in New Delhi, by “a mighty thunder of guns”—was launched at midnight on Dec. 17-18 by an estimated 30,000 Indian troops under the overall command of Lieut.-General J. N. Chaudhury, with Major-General Kenneth Candeth in operational field command. Other Indian troops simultaneously attacked the Daman and Diu enclaves in Gujerat; the former 75 miles north of Bombay, and the latter a small island off the coast of Saurashtra (Kathiawar) which is linked to the mainland by a causeway.

Mr. Nehru told the Press that India had taken action in Goa reluctantly and “because the Portuguese left us no alternative.” After expressing the hope that “all this will soon be over and the people of Goa will settle down to a free and peaceful life,” he said that India bore no ill will towards Portugal and repeated his previous assurances that the people of Goa would preserve their individuality, culture, and customs within the Indian Union.

Mr. Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister, announced that the 17th Indian Division had moved into Goa, with air support, “in view of the complete breakdown of the civil administration inside Goa” due to the “internal liberation movement” of Indian nationalists. He denied that India had violated the U.N. Charter in any way; asserted that Portugal herself had violated the Charter by repeated “provocations” against India; and said there was “reliable evidence” to indicate that the Portuguese were carrying out an extensive “scorched earth” policy in Goa and blowing up bridges and installations.

The attack on Goa, as stated, was launched from three directions—a southward thrust from the Savantvadi area into northern Goa; a northward thrust from the Karwar area into southern Goa; and an attack south-westwards from the Belgaum area towards Sanqualim and Ponds, the latter town covering the approaches to Panjim (capital of Goa) and the port of Marmagao. The Indian Air Force attacked Goa airport and also the Diu airstrip, while at the same time dropping large numbers of leaflets in Marathi, Konkani, Portuguese, and English bearing the following message:

“The Indian defence forces are with you for your protection. It is their task to defend the honour and security of the Motherland from which you have been separated far too long.... At this critical moment Goans must remain watchful. The Portuguese will do everything to leave Goa in ruins and the Goan people in misery. They do not care what happens to Goa now they must depart. They have nothing to lose by sowing destruction. Their Portugal is at a safe distance. They will try to destroy our bridges, our railways, our temples and churches, our schools and public buildings, our fine and God-given harbour... Goans cannot and must not allow this to happen.”

The Portuguese forces in Goa—who, as subsequently appeared, were outnumbered by nine or ten to one—put up virtually no opposition to the northward and southward Indian thrusts but for some hours offered resistance round Ponds, where the main Portuguese strength was concentrated in an apparent attempt to bar the road to Panjim. Despite mining of roads and destruction of bridges and culverts to delay the Indian advance, this resistance was overcome and Indian forces entered Panjim at 6 a.m. on Dec. 19. An instrument of surrender was signed by the Portuguese authorities and a Sikh battalion commander, and the Indian flag was hoisted over the Governor-General's palace, thus ending Portuguese rule in Goa after 450 years. Governor-General Vassalo e Silva and some Portuguese troops made a last stand at Fort Vasco da Gama, near Marmagao, but surrendered later in the day. The last Portuguese resistance ended at 11 p.m., when troops holding out in Marmagao laid down their arms after Indian warships had entered the harbour. Meanwhile Daman and Diu had surrendered at 8.20 a.m. and 11.10 a.m. respectively on Dec. 19, while Anjadev Island had been occupied by Indian naval detachments during the early stages of the invasion.

The only Portuguese warship in Goan waters, the 1,700-ton frigate *Afonso de Albuquerque*, fought a gallant 45-minute naval action in Marmagao Bay with three Indian warships—the 7,000-ton cruiser *Delhi* and two destroyers—before she was driven aground, badly damaged by shellfire. The commanding officer of the *Albuquerque*—Captain Antonio Cunha Aragon, described by the *Daily Telegraph* Correspondent in India as “the only hero of this whole tragic episode”—was badly wounded and was subsequently reported to be in hospital.

Both Mr. Nehru and Mr. Krishna Menon issued statements on Dec. 19 announcing the end of Portuguese resistance, Mr. Menon declaring that “the unfinished part of the Indian revolution was completed this morning when the Indian Defence Services took over Goa, Daman, and Diu and hoisted the Indian flag on our soil.”

Mr. Nehru said that the extraordinarily light casualties on either side, and the fact that the entire operation was over in 24 hours, showed “the correctness of the Indian assessment of the situation—the colonial administration had cracked up and the people wanted and welcomed India.” After repeating that it had “gone against the grain” to take military action, Mr. Nehru added: “The fact is that there was practically no opposition and that our appraisal of the situation before this action was taken was correct.... If we had not taken some action there would have been a vacuum there [in Goa] and the only persons who would have profited would have been the lawless and anti-social elements. In fact they were beginning to do it.... The justification of this action is that it lasted only 24 hours. The Portuguese could not and did not do anything—it was only a facade with no strength behind.”

Mr. Menon, who announced the “swift and bloodless” end of the military operation, said that the Indian forces had carried out their task with a minimum of force and had suffered only eight casualties—four at Anjavev Island, two each in Daman and Diu, and none at all in Goa. Mr. Menon stated that the difficult nature of the terrain and the blowing up of many bridges by the Portuguese had obliged the Army to carry out the greater part of the operation on foot, with the men carrying most of their equipment.

General Candeth, who had been appointed Military Governor of Goa, stated on Dec. 22 that Indian casualties were two officers and one other rank killed and 15 to 20 other ranks wounded. Portuguese casualties were given by the External Affairs Ministry in New Delhi as one officer and 16 other ranks killed and one officer and 38 other ranks wounded; the provisional number of Portuguese prisoners was given as 3,240, comprising 236 officers and 3,004 other ranks, all of whom were Europeans.

British and foreign press correspondents reported that conditions in Goa were completely normal within a few hours of the Portuguese surrender. Mr. Ian Colvin, of the London *Daily Telegraph*, stated in Bombay on Dec. 20 that he had been in Panjim only a few hours after the Portuguese surrender and had been impressed by the “swift, efficient, and orderly” manner in which the Indian forces had carried out the operation and taken over. Life in Panjim was quite normal; public utilities and transport services were functioning almost as usual; and foreign correspondents who toured the town had found everything peaceful and no traces of fighting in the vicinity. All churches were intact and “we found local people waving Indian flags—it was obvious that there was great relief that it was all over so soon.”

For several days before the invasion of Goa there were numerous reports in the Indian Press not only of the breakdown of the Portuguese administration and of growing lawlessness, as alleged by Mr. Nehru and Mr. Krishna Menon, but also of severe repression of Indian nationalists in Goa, widespread arrests, and torture of Indian patriots and political prisoners. Subsequent despatches by press correspondents, however, made it evident that these allegations were either baseless or greatly exaggerated. Moreover, the campaign itself showed that there had been no

Portuguese military build-up in Goa, as previously alleged by Indian political leaders, nor any African reinforcements from Mozambique, as had also been alleged. Whereas authoritative Indian sources had given the strength of the Portuguese forces in India as between 8,000 and 12,000, the campaign showed that their actual number was barely 3,500, none of whom were Africans.

The Special Correspondent of *The Times* stated in a despatch from Panjim on Dec. 20: “The number of actual Portuguese soldiers captured belies the Indian propaganda which before the invasion spoke of ‘massive reinforcement’ of the garrison. Much else of the propaganda which preceded the assault can now be seen to have been baseless. The Indian authorities had said that the colony was falling into ‘anarchy and chaos’ and that the invasion was necessary to save Goa from a mass exodus and extermination, but even after the sporadic shooting of yesterday and the excitement of the invasion Panjim is calm and orderly....”

The Correspondent of *The Guardian*, Mr. Stephen Hugh-Jones, stated in a despatch from Bombay on Dec. 26: “Granted the moral distinction between the ends in view, the whole propaganda operation reminded a British observer irresistibly of Suez. A different story was trotted out each day, and later events have demonstrated that at least some were flatly untrue. Portugal's 12,000 troops have shrunk to a quarter of that number. Negro troops from Mozambique have vanished. A *satyagrahi* tortured to death last month has turned up alive and well. Correspondents near the border at Belgaum were treated to a farrago of anti-Portuguese charges, undetailed (or overdetailed—in one border violation, we learned, the Portuguese had fired 365 rounds), unsubstantiated, and even inconsistent. A day before the attack we learned within the space of 10 minutes both that the Portuguese troops were withdrawing from the borders and that they were massing menacingly. For the massacre and holocaust story no evidence has been produced whatever. As for the breakdown of law and order, perhaps the fewer unflattering parallels drawn the better. The pity is that these trivialities masked and discredited India's real case....”

Among those taken prisoner were Governor-General Vassalo e Silva, who, as stated, commanded one of the last pockets of Portuguese resistance and who signed a formal instrument of surrender with General Chaudhury in Marmagao; Major Antonio da Costa, the Governor of Daman, who was reported to be undergoing treatment in hospital; and Captain Fernando Vasconcelos, the Governor of Diu. General Vassalo e Silva was assigned a residence near Panjim, the Indian Defence Ministry stating that he would be treated with the “courtesy and consideration due to his position.”

General Candeth was appointed Military Governor of Goa immediately after the Portuguese surrender; Mr. R. C. V. Noronha (a senior officer of the Indian Civil Service) was designated Chief Civil Administrator; while Collectors were appointed for Daman and Diu. In a proclamation on Dec. 20 to the people of Goa, General Candeth gave assurances that India had “no hostility to any person, whatever his nationality”; that no violence would be tolerated; that the lives and property of all would be respected; and that everyone was free “to carry out his lawful avocations” without fear. He repeated Mr. Nehru's pledge that India would “maintain the individuality and personality of Goa” in all respects.

Among General Candeth's first measures as Military Governor were an Order whereby both Indian and Portuguese currency were declared legal tender in Goa, Daman, and Diu, the exchange rate being fixed at six escudos to the rupee; a ban on the export of gold, jewellery, and currency from the ex-Portuguese territories; the closing of the Portuguese National Overseas Bank (*Banco Nacional Ultramarine*) and its branches pending examination of its affairs by the Reserve Bank of India; the dissolution of the *Uniao Nacional* (Dr. Salazar's single-party organization) in Goa, Daman, and Diu; and an Order whereby the teaching of Portuguese in schools was made optional, and not compulsory as hitherto.

The bulk of the Indian troops in Goa (their number was given by the *Calcutta Statesman* as nearly 20,000) had been withdrawn by the end of December, leaving only a small force for internal security duties, together with a contingent of 1,200 Indian police and the Goan police. All historic buildings and churches—including the ancient Cathedral of Ben Jesus at Velha Goa (Old Goa), where the body of St. Francis Xavier is kept—were found intact and undamaged, while bridges and installations blown up by the Portuguese during the campaign were rapidly repaired by Indian Army engineers. It was reported from Panjim on Jan. 20, 1962, that some 20,000 employees of the former Portuguese administration, among them a number of senior officials, had taken the oath of loyalty to the President and Constitution of the Indian Union and been reinstated in their posts.

At a press conference on Dec. 28, 1961, Mr. Nehru reiterated that he had been extremely reluctant to resort to force but said that the matter had been taken out of his hands by “the compulsion of events.” India had been unwilling to use force, knowing the misgivings it would arouse in the world at large and knowing that it might “open a door to similar action by other Powers”; in the end, however, it had become “a choice of the lesser evil” after 14 years of waiting. As regards the statement, frequently made by Dr. Salazar and the Portuguese authorities, that Portugal had been in India for over 400 years, Mr. Nehru said:

“Why were they here for 400 years? Was it because of the good will of the people or their own strength?... They came and established themselves when the Mogul Empire was breaking up. During the whole of the British period in India—250 or 300 years—they were protected by Britain, the dominating power in India. When the British went, they remained as a shadow; all substance, all reality, went from their presence in Goa.... The point is that they were here simply because of the protection of the British power in India. Once that power went, their departure became inevitable....”

Mr. Krishna Menon said on the same day that India bore “no enmity or ill-feelings” towards Portugal now that the Goa question had been settled, and gave an assurance that all legitimate Portuguese interests and assets in India would be protected. “We waited for years,” he declared; “we argued and gave opportunities for a settlement; we were forced to adopt means which were not of our own choice.” In a speech on Jan. 18, 1962, Mr. Menon strongly denied that India had violated the U.N. Charter by her action, since she had exhausted all possible remedies to persuade the Portuguese to leave Goa. “My answer to this charge,” he said, “is that we have not violated anybody's integrity and we have not attacked Portugal. We have not violated Goa's territorial integrity because it forms part of our own.”

Whilst Indians of all shades of political opinion welcomed the integration of Goa in the Indian Union, it was known that many influential leaders were disturbed at the fact that force had been used, particularly in view of India's consistent opposition to the use of force and her known adherence to the principles of non-violence. In this connexion the following comment was brought by *The Hindu* (Madras) on Dec. 20 after the ending of the Goa campaign:

“It would be presenting a deceptive picture to suggest that everyone is supremely happy over the Goa developments without any reservations. Many in high places did hold a different view on the desirability of using force.... If they remained publicly silent without ventilating their viewpoint, it is because they did not want to embarrass the Government, which had made up its mind, and also because they did not want to give the impression that they were opposed to Portugal's exit from Indian soil. Their fear is that by her action India might have endangered the high esteem in which she has been held all over the world.... These leaders, however, realize that the criticism India must face is not so much about the taking over of Portuguese colonies but of doing it in a way which went against her past professions and principles.”

A public criticism of the Goa action was, however, made by Mr. Chakravarti Rajagopalachari (82), one of India's most respected “elder statesmen,” in an article which appeared on Dec. 27 in *Swarajya*, the organ of the Swatantra Party.

Mr. Rajagopalachari said that India had “totally lost the moral power to raise her voice against militarism” and had helped to undermine the prestige and power of the U.N. security Council. Whilst Portugal's presence in Goa had been “an offence to Indian nationalism,” it was not a greater offence than Communist China's occupation of Indian territory, or the social evil created by untouchability—the treatment of a wide section of the Indian population as outcasts, which Gandhi had denounced as a “deadly sin.” For nearly half a century India had been sustained by the Gandhian principles of non-violence, but the “great adventure” of seizing Goa might prove to be a turning-point in India's devotion to those principles. “The question is,” wrote Mr. Rajagopalachari, “what faith we now profess.... What message does India now carry in a world on the brink of moral collapse? Our nationalism has, I fear, led us into impatience at the wrong moment.... We had a mission for promoting peace and a special qualification for fulfilling it....”

Home Minister in the Union Cabinet, Chief Minister of Madras, and Governor of West Bengal. He was one of the founders of the Swatantra Party in 1959 after leaving the Congress.]

A Goan delegation led by Mr. J. M. D'Souza, president of the Goan National Union, presented a memorandum to Mr. Nehru on Jan. 10, 1962, recalling that he (the Prime Minister) had announced in the *Lok Sabha* in April 1961 that Goa would be “integrated with India as a Centrally-administered area,” and requesting him to introduce the necessary legislation at an early date.

The memorandum urged that the existing administrative divisions of Goa (*conselhos*) should be retained, “since they have been there a long time and people have developed a sentiment within their respective boundaries.” It suggested that Goa should have (a) a Legislative Council of 48 members (four from each of the *conselhos*); (b) an Executive Committee (local Cabinet) comprising 12 representatives of the Legislative Council, one from each of the *conselhos*, and a

Chief Executive elected by the Legislative Council; and (c) a Chief Commissioner or Lieutenant-Governor appointed by the Centre, as the representative of the Central Government.

The *Lok Sabha* unanimously adopted two Bills on March 14 declaring Goa, Daman, and Diu to be part of the Indian Union, and providing for the administration of the territories by the Central Government. Under an Ordinance which had been promulgated on March 5 by President Prasad, the ex-Portuguese territories will be known as the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu.

Following the attack on Goa, the Portuguese Government ordered the internment of all Indians living in Portuguese overseas territories and the freezing of their assets and property; according to British and U.S. newspapers about 12,000 Indian nationals were believed to be resident in Portuguese territories, the great majority in Mozambique and Macao, although Indian newspapers gave the number as about 3,500. Five Indian citizens who were in transit through Lisbon at the time of the Goa invasion were taken off British, Swiss, and Brazilian planes at the airport and held in custody for several weeks; they were eventually released in February through the intermediary of the U.A.R. Embassy and allowed to leave Portugal.

The Indian External Affairs Ministry announced on Dec. 21 that India would be glad to repatriate all Portuguese nationals in Goa, Daman, and Diu "if the Government of Portugal so desires," including both captured military personnel and civilians; it was emphasized that the Government of India did not intend to hold any Portuguese as hostages for the Indians interned in Mozambique and elsewhere, and that the two questions were regarded as completely distinct. Through the U.A.R. and Brazilian Governments, several Notes were exchanged between India and Portugal during January on the repatriation of Portuguese troops and civilians from India, the Portuguese Government being requested to make the necessary transport arrangements at an early date.

The External Affairs Ministry stated on Jan. 30, 1962, that Portugal had accepted in principle two Indian suggestions: firstly, that all Portuguese civilians and military personnel in Goa, Daman and Diu, including Goans who regarded themselves as Portuguese, should be repatriated to Portugal at any time after the Portuguese Government had made arrangements to pick them up at Bombay; and secondly, that Portugal should release all Indians interned in her overseas territories, allow them to resume their normal pursuits, and return their assets and property. The Ministry had previously stated that the Government of India were in contact with the British, U.S., and Brazilian Governments with a view to arranging sea and air transport for the repatriation of Portuguese from India.

The Apostolic Internuncio in New Delhi (the Most Rev. James Knox) was allowed to visit the Portuguese military detainees in Goa; he reported on Jan. 9 that they were housed in three camps at Ponda, Fort Vasco da Gama, and Navelin, that they were being well cared for by the Indian authorities, and that those who had been wounded were receiving medical attention. It was emphasized in New Delhi that the approximately 3,500 interned Portuguese troops and 70 civilians were not regarded as prisoners of war (the Government of India had stressed from the beginning of the Goa operation that India was not at war with Portugal) and were free to leave without hindrance whenever transport could be arranged. According to Indian press reports, all the detainees were Europeans with the exception of two African civilians.

General Vassalo e Silva—who, as stated above, had been assigned a residence near Panjim—gave an interview on Feb. 13 to an Indian press correspondent (reported in *The Hindu*) in which he said that he would “not return home to Portugal without my soldiers.” Commenting on the campaign, he said that his troops had been unable to offer prolonged resistance owing to the great numerical superiority of the Indian forces; consequently, he had only been able to fight a delaying action by blowing up more than thirty bridges. (The Statesman, Calcutta - The Hindu, Madras - Hindustan Times, New Delhi - Indian High Commissioner's Office, London - Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian)

Historical, Demographic, and Economic Note. A coastal enclave 1,400 square miles in area, Goa is about 300 miles south of Bombay and is bordered by Maharashtra and Mysore States, with a 62-mile coastline on the Arabian Sea. The population numbers about 620,000, almost wholly of pure Hindu stock except for some 1,500 Europeans and persons of mixed descent; by religion, 61 per cent are orthodox Hindus, 37 per cent Christians (mainly Roman Catholics), and two per cent Moslems. The predominant language is Konkani, a dialect of Marathi.

Goa was acquired from local sultans in 1510 by Afonso de Albuquerque, becoming a trading station and later a centre of Portuguese power on the Malabar coast. Daman and Diu were acquired from a Mahratta ruler in the 18th century. After the decline of Portuguese sea power in the 17th and 18th centuries the three territories remained Portuguese enclaves in British India, and subsequently within the Indian Union after the ending of British rule in 1947. Like the other Portuguese overseas territories, they were given the status of integral parts of metropolitan Portugal under the name of the Portuguese State of India.

Goa has important deposits of iron and manganese ore, which were not exploited on any considerable scale until after the Second World War. In recent years, iron-ore production has risen from about 3,000,000 tons annually in 1957-59 to 4,700,000 tons in 1960 and over 5,000,000 tons in 1961, while manganese ore production was over 100,000 tons in 1960. Total ore exports in the latter year were valued at 977,000,000 escudos (about £12,000,000), and during the first six months of 1961 at 590,000,000 escudos. About 40 per cent of Goa's iron-ore exports go to Japan, about 30 per cent to Western Germany, and some 15 per cent to Italy. The port of Marmagao has one of the best harbours on the west coast of India.—(Times - Financial Times - Indian High Commissioner's Office, London)