International Reactions to Indian Attack on Goa. - Soviet Veto of Western Cease-fire Resolution in security Council.

Statements deploring India's resort to force in Goa, Daman, and Diu were made by governmental leaders and official spokesmen in many countries, including the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Western Germany. On the other hand, full support for the Indian action was expressed by the Soviet Union and all Soviet-bloc countries, Yugoslavia, the Arab States, Ghana, Ceylon, and Indonesia.

Mr. Duncan Sandys (Commonwealth Relations Secretary) told the House of Commons on Dec. 18, 1961[see page 18637], that while the British Government had long understood the natural desire of the Indian people to incorporate Goa, Daman, and Diu in the Indian Union, and their feeling of impatience that the Portuguese Government had not followed the example of Britain and France in relinquishing their Indian possessions, he had to “make it plain that H.M. Government deeply deplore the decision of the Government of India to use military force to attain its political objectives.”

After recalling that Britain had appealed to Mr. Nehru to refrain from the use of force when tension between India and Portugal became acute, Mr. Sandys went on: “Other countries who are friendly to India made similar appeals. U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, strongly urged that the matter should at once be brought before the U.N. with a view to stopping the fighting. We greatly regret that these various appeals should have proved unavailing.…

“The House will realize that the outbreak of hostilities between a fellow member of the Commonwealth and a country bound to us by close ties of alliance places H.M. Government in a most painful position. In addition we are particularly concerned about the wider repercussions which the action taken by the Indian Government may have upon other problems that face the world to-day.”

Mr. Gaitskell (Leader of the Opposition) also expressed “profound regret” that India should have resorted to force in her dispute with Portugal, although the Opposition recognized that the existence of Portuguese colonies on the Indian mainland had long been an anachronism and that Portugal should have abandoned them long since in pursuance of the example set by Britain and France.

Mr. Gaitskell asked (1) whether any attempt had been made to secure a combined Commonwealth approach to Mr. Nehru before India took the action she had done, and (2) whether any efforts had been made to persuade Portugal to follow the example of Britain and France.
Mr. Sandys replied: “I do not think it would have been really a case when it would have been suitable to try and get a gauging-up, so to speak, of all the Commonwealth members. I think this was essentially a case when each Commonwealth Government expresses its views to the Indian Government, and we were not the only ones to do so. We have made our views known to the Portuguese Government on a number of occasions, and... we have very recently urged upon them to avoid any action in Goa which might be regarded as provocative.”

Asked by Mr. John Hynd (Lab.) what effect these events would have on the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, Mr. Sandys said that “we made it clear to the Portuguese Government as long ago as 1954 that it would be impossible for Britain to be engaged in hostilities against a fellow member of the Commonwealth.”

Reactions in other countries are summarized briefly below, the countries concerned being given in alphabetical order:

**Arab States.** The U.A.R. expressed its full support for India's “legitimate efforts to regain its occupied territory”; a Moroccan Government spokesman said that “India has been extraordinarily patient and a non-violent country has been driven to violence by Portugal”; while the Tunisian Foreign Minister, Dr. Mokaddem, expressed the hope that “the liberation of Goa will bring nearer the end of the Portuguese colonial regime in Africa.” Similar expressions of support for India were forthcoming from other Arab countries.

**Australia.** Mr. Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, issued a statement (Dec. 18) regretting the use of force by the Indian Government to pursue its claims to the Portuguese territories in India. While recognizing that Indian public opinion felt strongly on this question, he emphasized that it was “the responsibility of nations to seek their objectives through legal processes or by peaceful negotiation in accordance with the U.N. Charter. Under the Charter all members have expressly undertaken to refrain from the threat and use of force in their international relations except in self-defence, individual or collective.”

**Canada.** Mr. Diefenbaker, the Prime Minister, issued a statement on Dec. 18 expressing “grave disappointment and anxiety” at India's resort to military action in Goa. He disclosed that Canada had made representations to India a week earlier expressing the hope that there would be “no recourse to force in an effort to settle the status of these three small areas.”

**Ceylon.** Full support for India's action was expressed in Ceylon, where Mrs. Bandaranaike (the Prime Minister) issued an Order on Dec. 18 directing that “transport carrying troops and equipment for the Portuguese in Goa shall not be permitted the use of Ceylon's seaports and airports.”

**China.** Although the Chinese Communist Government issued a statement on Dec. 19 expressing “resolute support” for India's action in Goa, the Hong Kong Communist newspaper *Ta Kung Pao* (regarded as reflecting the views of the Peking Government) described the attack on Goa as “a desperate attempt by Mr. Nehru to regain his sagging prestige among the Afro-Asian nations.” The *Ta Kung Pao* article—which appeared before the Peking statement—conceded that Goa was legitimately part of Indian territory and that the Indian people were entitled to take whatever
measures were necessary to recover it. At the same time, however, the paper ridiculed Mr. Nehru for choosing “the world's tiniest imperialist country” to achieve his aim and asserted that “internal unrest, the failure of Nehru's anti-China campaign, and the forthcoming [Indian] election forced him to take action against Goa to please the Indian people.”

**France.** Government spokesmen at the Quai d’Orsay expressed “astonishment and regret” at India's action and emphasized that it was “the consistent policy of France that all differences between States should be solved by peaceful means.”

**German Federal Republic.** The Federal Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer, said on Dec. 18 that India had been “ill-advised” to resort to force in Goa, adding that it would be “difficult to know what to make of India's professed policy of peace in future.”

**Ghana.** Although there was no official comment in Accra, the Government-controlled radio said that the people of Ghana “hail the liberation of Goa and long for the day when our downtrodden brethren in Angola and other Portuguese territories in Africa are also liberated.”

**Indonesia.** Expressing Indonesia's support for the Indian action in Goa, a Foreign Ministry spokesman in Jakarta said: “We know that India is a peace-loving nation which has been compelled to use force. There can be no compromise with colonialism….”

**Netherlands.** A Foreign Ministry spokesman in The Hague regretted that India, “of all countries,” had resorted to force to gain her ends, particularly as India had always championed the principles of the U.N. Charter and consistently opposed the use of force to achieve national purposes. Fears were expressed in the Dutch Press lest the Indian attack on Goa might encourage Indonesia to make a similar attack on West New Guinea.

**New Zealand.** The N.Z. Prime Minister, Mr. Holyoake, said on Dec. 18 that he was “surprised and disturbed” that India had decided to “force events” in Goa—an action which “cannot but be regretted by countries which, like New Zealand, had come to set great store by India's tradition of non-violence and her firm support for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.” Mr. Holyoake added: “I do not for one moment discount the strength of Indian feelings on this question, nor do I disregard the fact that Portugal has shown all too little willingness to reach a just and amicable solution. Portugal's unyielding determination to maintain these small enclaves on the Indian sub-continent certainly gives India ample ground for grievance…. Nevertheless I cannot believe that this situation is best met by force…. It will be a sad blow for the world if… force should come to be accepted as the means of resolving disputes over colonial territories.”

**Pakistan.** A Foreign Ministry spokesman described the Indian attack on Goa as “naked militarism”; emphasized that Pakistan stood for the settlement of international disputes by negotiation through the United Nations; and said that the proper course was a “U.N.-sponsored plebiscite to elicit from the people of Goa their wishes on the future of the territory.” The Pakistani statement (issued on Dec. 18) continued:

“The world now knows that India has double standards…. One set of principles seem to apply to India, another set to non-India. This is one more demonstration of the fact that India remains
violent and aggressive at heart, whatever the pious statements made from time to tune by its leaders.

“The lesson from the Indian action on Goa is of practical interest on the question of Kashmir. Certainly the people of Kashmir could draw inspiration from what the Indians are reported to have stated in the leaflets they dropped… on Goa. The leaflets stated that it was India's task to ‘defend the honour and security of the Motherland from which the people of Goa had been separated far too long’ and which the people of Goa, largely by their own efforts could again make their own. We hope the Indians will apply the same logic to Kashmir….

“Now the Indians can impress their electorate with having achieved military glory. The mask is off. Their much-proclaimed theories of non-violence, secularism, and democratic methods stand exposed.”

It was officially stated in Karachi on Jan. 23, 1962, that Pakistan had interned two Portuguese ships during the Goa hostilities, seized their cargoes of ammunition destined for Goa, and refused landing facilities at Karachi airport for planes carrying Portuguese troops. A Foreign Ministry spokesman said that this disclosure was made to show that Pakistan had observed strict neutrality during the Goa crisis and to “give the lie to insidious Indian propaganda that Pakistan had sympathy with colonial aspirations.”

Soviet Union and Soviet-bloc Countries. President Brezhnev, who was on a State visit to India at the time of the Goa crisis, said in Bombay on Dec. 18 that the U.S.S.R. had “complete sympathy for the Indian people's desire to liberate Goa, Daman, and Diu from Portuguese colonialism.” Mr. Khrushchev sent a telegram to Mr. Nehru saying that “the resolute actions of the Government of India to do away with outposts of colonialism in its territory were absolutely lawful and justified,” and declaring that the Soviet people “unanimously approve of these actions”

Similar expressions of unreserved support for India were made by governmental leaders in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Eastern Germany.

Spain. A Madrid statement (Dec. 18) recalled that Spain had close fraternal links with Portugal; condemned acts of violence against the sovereign territory of another country; and added: “The attack against the Portuguese territory of Goa poses a danger to international order—the more so since it comes from India, which has always called for peaceful solutions to conflicts in other parts of the world. The action against Goa also poses a danger to the United Nations.”

United States. The State Department spokesman (Mr. Lincoln White) said on Dec. 18 that Mr. Dean Rusk had informed the Indian Ambassador in Washington (Mr. B. K. Nehru) that the United States “deeply regrets the use of force” by India in her dispute with Portugal [A strong criticism of the Indian action was made by Mr. Adlai Stevenson in the U.N. anti-colonialist resolutions].

Yugoslavia. A Yugoslav Foreign Ministry spokesman said ca Dec. 19 that India had no other choice than recourse to force “after trying for years to liquidate an abnormal situation by
peaceful means.” “Considered in this light,” the Belgrade statement added, “India's action deserves to be understood and supported as being in complete conformity with U.N. anti-colonialist resolutions.”

The Portuguese delegate at the U.N., Dr. Vasco Vieira Garin, requested on Dec. 18 an immediate meeting of the security Council in view of the Indian attack on Goa, Daman, and Diu, which he described as “the result of cold-blooded premeditation” and “a clear and flagrant violation of the sovereign rights of Portugal and of the U.N. Charter.”

In a letter to the president of the security Council (Dr. Omar Loutfi, of the U.A.R.) Dr. Vieira Garin said that India had launched “a full-scale unprovoked armed attack on the territories of Goa, Daman, and Diu, comprising the Portuguese State of India,” despite U Thant's appeal to Mr. Nehru not to do anything that might “constitute a threat to peace” [see page 18636, second column]. In these circumstances Portugal requested an immediate meeting of the security Council “to put a stop to the condemnable act of aggression by the Indian Union” and to “order a cease-fire and the withdrawal forthwith from the Portuguese territories of Goa, Daman, and Diu of the invading forces of the Indian Union.”

The Portuguese request for a security Council debate was approved by the Council by the bare minimum of seven votes after Dr. Loutfi, as current president of the Council, had expressed his own country's reservations about the Portuguese charges; Mr. Zorin (U.S.S.R.) opposed a debate on the ground that the matter was “exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction” of India and that Goa, Daman, and Diu could not be considered as “other than provisionally under the colonial control of Portugal.” On a vote, seven members supported Portugal's request for a debate (the U.S.A., Great Britain, France, Turkey, Chile, Ecuador, and Nationalist China), two opposed (the Soviet Union and Ceylon), and two abstained (the U.A.R. and Liberia). Dr. Loutfi thereupon invited the Portuguese and Indian representatives (Dr. Vieira Garin and Mr. C. S. Jha) to state their countries’ ease, without a vote.

Dr. Vieira Garin said that Portugal had consistently shown her peaceful intentions by refraining from any counter-action to India's numerous “provocations” on the Goan border. After recalling earlier Portuguese warnings of a strong build-up of Indian forces on the border, as previously communicated by Portugal to the United Nations, he said that there was “absolutely no truth” in the allegations of a breakdown of law and order in Goa or the flight of Portuguese officials, as alleged by India before the invasion. The Portuguese forces, though “vastly outnumbered by the invading forces,” were putting up “stiff resistance” and “fighting a delaying action and destroying communications in order to halt the advance of the enemy.”

Mr. Jha said that the “elimination of the last vestiges of colonialism in India” was an “article of faith” for the Indian people, “Charter or no Charter, security Council or no security Council.” Describing Goa, Daman, and Diu as “an inalienable part of India unlawfully occupied by Portugal,” he accused the latter country of having “rudely rejected” all previous Indian attempts for a settlement; asserted that Portugal “would not have been able to take such an arrogant stand on this question but for the support rendered by the NATO countries”; and described as a “legal fiction” the Portuguese contention that her possessions in India were part of metropolitan Portugal.
The principal speakers in the ensuing debate were Mr. Adlai Stevenson (U.S.A.), who strongly criticized India's resort to force in her dispute with Portugal, and Mr. Zorin (U.S.S.R.), who defended India's action.

**Mr. Stevenson** spoke as follows: “… Our Charter begins with the determination ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’ and pledges its members to ‘practise tolerance and live together with one another as good neighbours.’ In that connexion it deserves to be said that all of us at the United Nations owe much to India…. Few nations have done more to uphold the principles of the Organization or to support its peace-making efforts all over the world, and none have espoused non-violence more vehemently and invoked the peaceful symbolism of Gandhi more frequently.

“That nation is led by a man whom I regard as a friend–who has been a lifelong disciple of one of the world's great saints of peace–whom many have looked up to as an apostle of non-violence–who only this year addressed the Assembly with a moving appeal for a U.N. year of international co-operation [see page 18625]. These facts make the step which has been taken today [the attack on Goa] all the harder to understand and to condone…. Here we are confronted by the shocking news that the Indian Minister of Defence [Mr. Krishna Menan], so well known in these halls for his advice on peace and his tireless enjoiners to everyone else to seek the way of compromise, was on the borders of Goa inspecting his troops at the zero hour of invasion.

“Let us be perfectly clear what is at stake. It is the question of the use of armed force by one State against another–an act clearly forbidden by the Charter. We [the U.S.A. have opposed such action in the past by our closest friends as well as by others. We opposed it in Korea in 1950, in Suez and Hungary in 1956, and in the Congo in 1950. We do so again in Goa in 1961….

“We are not meeting to decide the merits of this case [but] to decide what attitude should be taken when one of the members of the U.N. casts aside the principles of the Charter and seeks to resolve a dispute by force. What is at stake to-day is not colonialism. It is a violation of one of the most basic principles of the U.N. Charter, stated in Article 2: ‘All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.’

“We realize fully the depths of the differences between India and Portugal concerning the future of Goa. We realize that India maintains that Goa by rights should belong to India. Doubtless India would hold, therefore, that its action is aimed at a just end; But if our Charter means anything, it means that States are obligated to renounce the use of force, to seek a solution of their differences by peaceful means, to utilize the procedures of the United Nations when other peaceful means have failed.

“Prime Minister Nehru himself has often said that no right end can be served by a wrong means. The Indian tradition of non-violence has inspired the whole world, but this act of force mocks the faith of India's frequent declarations of exalted principle. It is a lamentable departure not only from the Charter but from India's own professions of faith. What is the world to do if every State whose territorial claims are unsatisfied should resort with impunity to the rule of armed might to
get its way? The Indian sub-continent is not the only place in the world where such disputes exist….

“If it is to survive, if the United Nations is not to die as ignoble a death as the League of Nations, we cannot condone the use of force in this instance and thus pave the way for forceful solutions of other disputes which exist in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. In a world as interdependent as ours, the possible results of such a trend are too grievous to contemplate.

“This action is all the more painful to my country because we have in recent weeks made repeated appeals to India to refrain from the use of force. This has included not only a series of diplomatic approaches in Washington and New Delhi but also a personal message from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Nehru on Dec. 13 indicating our earnest hope that India would not resort to force to solve the Goa problem. As a culmination of these efforts, the U.S. Government on Dec. 16 made an appeal to Prime Minister Nehru, both through the U.S. Ambassador in Delhi and through the Indian Ambassador in Washington, to suspend preparations for the use of force in connexion with a direct offer of U.S. help in seeking a peaceful solution to the problem….”

After emphasizing that the United Nations “cannot apply a double standard with regard to the principle of resort to force,” Mr. Stevenson concluded: “The Council has an urgent duty to bring this dispute from the battlefield to the negotiating table. We earnestly urge India to withdraw her armed forces from the territories they have invaded. We earnestly appeal for a cease-fire. We earnestly urge India and Portugal to enter into negotiations to achieve a solution. We must ask for an immediate cease-fire; we must insist on the withdrawal of the invading forces; and we must insist that the two parties negotiate on the basis of the principles of the Charter.

“The Charter forbids the use of force. There is not one law for one part of the world and another for the rest of the world. There is one law for the whole world, and it is the duty of this Council to uphold it.”

**Mr. Zorin** maintained that the Goan question was wholly within India's domestic jurisdiction and could not be considered by the security Council. If discussion was necessary, however, the subject of discussion should be “the question of the violation by Portugal of the declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples” [i.e. the anti-colonialist resolution adopted at the 15th Assembly session.] “Portugal,” said Mr. Zorin, “does not. fulfil and is not going to fulfil this declaration, and she is thereby creating a threat to peace and security in various parts of the world….”

The Soviet representative went on to say that neither Britain nor America had denounced Portugal when she was “annihilating scores of thousands of people in Angola,” nor had they suggested a cease-fire in Angola and the withdrawal of Portuguese troops from that territory and other Portuguese colonies. As soon, however, as “the question comes up of supporting the liberation from colonial dependence of peoples and territories which constitute an integral part of India, high-falutin pronouncements are immediately made of violations of the U.N. Charter….” After asserting that the U.S.A. and Great Britain “are, acting in solidarity with their NATO ally—the colonial Power of Portugal,” Mr. Zorin expressed the Soviet Union's “solidarity with the people of India and Goa in their fight for liberation from Portuguese colonial domination.”
Sir Patrick Dean (U.K.) said that Britain had been “shocked and dismayed” at the outbreak of hostilities. He urged that the security Council should call for (1) an immediate cessation of hostilities; (2) call upon India to withdraw her forces; (3) encourage India and Portugal to resolve their differences by peaceful means; and (4) invite the U.N. Secretary-General to give all possible hell) to the two parties in bringing about a reconciliation.

The delegates of Liberia, Ceylon, and the U.A.R.–all of whom supported India against Portugal–presented a resolution which: (1) stated that “the enclaves claimed by Portugal in India constitute a threat to international peace and security and stand in the way of the unity of the Republic of India”; (2) asked the security Council to reject the Portuguese charge of aggression against India; and (3) called upon Portugal “to terminate hostile action and co-operate with India in the liquidation of her colonial possessions in India.” This resolution was supported only by the Soviet Union, the other seven members opposing.

After the defeat of the Afro-Asian resolution, a resolution was presented by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Turkey which:

(1) Called for the immediate cessation of hostilities.

(2) Called upon India to withdraw her forces immediately to “the positions prevailing before Dec. 17, 1961.”

(3) Urged India and Portugal “to work out a permanent solution of their differences by peaceful means in accordance with the principles embodied in the Charter”; and

(4) Requested the U.N. Secretary-General “to provided such assistance as may be appropriate.”

The preamble recalled that Article 2 of the U.N. Charter obligated all members “(1)to settle their disputes by peaceful means and refrain from the threat or use of force”; (2) deplored “the use of force by India in Goa, Daman, and Diu”; and (3) recalled that Article 1 of the Charter “specifies as one of the purposes of the United Nations the development of friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”

The above resolution received seven votes in favour (the four sponsors and Chile, Ecuador, and Nationalist China) and four against (the Soviet Union, Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic). It was thus defeated by the Soviet veto—the 99th cast by the U.S.S.R.in the security Council.

In a statement after the vote, Mr. Stevenson said that the “fateful” Goa debate might be “the first act of a drama” which could end in the death of the United Nations. After recalling that the League of Nations “died when its members no longer resisted the use of aggressive force,” he declared: “The failure of the security Council to call for a cease-fire in these simple circumstances is a failure of the United Nations. The veto of the Soviet Union is consistent with its long role of obstruction. But I find the attitude of some other members of the Council [i.e. the Afro-Asian members] profoundly disturbing and ominous, because we have witnessed an effort
to sanction the use of force in international relations when it suits one's own purpose. This approach can only lead to chaos and to the disintegration of the United Nations.”

In a speech to the Portuguese National Assembly on Jan. 3, 1962, Dr. Salazar said that the security Council's failure to halt a clear case of aggression against a small country, due to the Soviet veto, showed that effective power in the U.N. had passed to the Communist and Afro-Asian countries; the Indian representative's statement that his country would persist in its policy, “Charter or no Charter, security Council or no security Council,” constituted such a challenge to the United Nations that it would have been “better to consider it defunct on the spot.” While he did not yet know whether Portugal would be the first country to leave the U.N., she would “surely be among the first”; meanwhile, Portugal would refuse all collaboration with the United Nations “in everything that is not in our direct interest.”

While paying tribute to the British and U.S. efforts to persuade India to refrain from military action, Dr. Salazar said that both Powers had “suffered a defeat at the gates of Goa.” As regards the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, Portugal would re-examine it to see if any “positive content remained. In the course of his speech he accused Britain of delaying for a week her reply to Portugal's request to be allowed the use of certain airfields; “had it not been for this delay,” he said, “we should certainly have found alternative routes and we could have rushed to India reinforcements in men and material for a sustained defence of the territory.”

Dr. Salazar's allegation that the British Government had delayed overflights by Portuguese aircraft to Goa was denied by the British Foreign Office. An official spokesman in London explained that Portugal had in fact asked for certain facilities which H.M. Government were not in a position to grant unless the Portuguese Government obtained prior permission from the host Government—as had been pointed out to the Portuguese Government. This meant that Portuguese aircraft could not fly to Goa by way of El Adem (Libya) or Gan (Maldive Islands) without the consent of the Libyan and Maldivian Governments. The Portuguese Government had, however, been informed that if it could work out a satisfactory alternative route, not open to this objection, the British Government would consider the request. On Dec. 14 a new Portuguese request had been received, and this had been under consideration when the Indian attack took place on December 18.

Dr. Salazar's speech to the Portuguese National Assembly was worded as follows:

“Since we do not accept the validity of the Fait accompli, the Goa question has not yet ended and we might truthfully say that it is only just beginning. The reasons which prevented us from negotiating the cession of the Portuguese State of India are the same that absolutely forbid us to recognize the act of their conquest. The Indian Union has been able to wage war on us, but without us it cannot make peace….

“We shall have to wait for the international community to redress the offence done to Portuguese sovereignty and restore to Portugal her legitimate rights before a normal situation can be re-established. That is why a Bill is to be submitted to the National Assembly to assure the functioning of the organs of government of the Province of India in the present circumstances. The first consequence will be that the parliamentary representation of the Portuguese State of
India in the National Assembly will continue to be held by those elected by the people of Goa, Daman, and Diu. In future Parliaments a means will be found of giving a practicable right of choice to those Goans who live outside the territories occupied by the Indian Union and who maintain their devotion to the Portuguese homeland.

“The second consequence is that Portuguese citizenship will continue to be recognized in law and in fact for Goans, whether or not they are given a double nationality by the unilateral imposition of the Indian Union.

“It is quite likely that the occupying authorities will at first adopt a policy of allurement and ingratiation. Difficulties will arise for both sides when the programme of the Indianization of Goa begins to clash with the Genus’ culture, and when the Prime Minister [Mr. Nehru] discovers that a definite individuality has been formed there down the centuries by interpenetration of cultures and the crossing of various races.

“I believe that violence will be exerted in direct proportion to the difficulties which will make themselves felt and that, if the reintegration of Goa is not effected soon, spoliation and forced equality in poverty will be followed by a loss of liberty which will lower the Goans in their language, their religion, and their culture. It is therefore to be expected that many will wish to escape from the inevitable consequences of the invasion, and all will be made welcome at any point of the national [Portuguese] territory.

“The [Goa] question was put before the [security] Council on the first day of the invasion of Goa and soon after it had begun. It was a case of unprovoked aggression; in fact, an extraordinarily simple case for the application of the principles embodied in the Charter. The motion which ordered a suspension of hostilities was approved by a majority of seven votes, calling on the invading forces to retire to their initial positions and for negotiations for the solution of the conflict. It was nevertheless vetoed by Russia and was thus nullified.

“The naturally parallel attitudes of the President of the Soviet Union, who [in Bombay] had incited India to invade Goa, and the Russian representative in the security Council, who vetoed the motion approved by a majority, not only drove the Indian Union into the arms of the Soviets but also clearly showed the paralysis of the so-called collective defence system against Russia or any Power protected by her.

“The outcome of the appeal to the United Nations was foreseen, but it alarmed the world. The declaration by the Indian representative that his country would go on with its policy, ‘Charter or no Charter, security Council or no security Council,’ was such a challenge to the aims and legal structure of the Organization that it would have been better to consider it defunct on the spot….

“With the transfer of powers from the [Security] Council to the [General] Assembly, the first dominated by Russia and the second by the Communists and the Afro-Asian countries, the Western Powers—in which I include South America—have lost every possibility of employing their wider experience in conducting the affairs of the international community, moderating certain unthinking impulses, and preventing the government of the world from domination by an intolerable dictatorship of racist passions and irresponsibility…. I do not yet know whether we
shall be the first country to leave the United Nations, but we shall surely be among the first. Meanwhile we shall refuse them our collaboration in everything that is not in our direct interest.

“Between Portugal and Great Britain there exists an old alliance which both Governments consider to be still in force…. It has been the view of the two Governments that the alliance is not automatic; its application depends on the casus foederis—that is, the opinion formed by each of the States on the war situation and the possibilities of intervention therein. This refers to the alliance as such, because the obligation of the British Government to defend the Portuguese overseas territories cannot be legitimately understood by us or by anybody else to be dependent on the casus foederis, since it is expressed in so precise and absolute a manner in the Treaty of 1661….

“The very prudent British school of diplomacy has one special feature that I greatly admire—which is, to make every effort, even in the gravest circumstances, to obtain concrete undertakings in exchange for vague promises. In view of this tendency, a mere Parliamentary declaration, not the result of an agreement between the two Governments, has not seemed to us to be valid as the genuine interpretation of a treaty which contains, furthermore, an express reference to the advantages which Portugal has yielded in exchange for the obligation accepted by Great Britain…."

“In more than 30 years of government I had never appealed to the treaties of alliance, it being my belief that a constant fidelity had transformed them from documents to be invoked into deep feelings and permanent attitudes in the policy of the two nations. But Great Britain has expressly invoked the alliance. One example is the request for facilities in the Azores in 1943 in spite of our declaration of neutrality at the beginning of the war…."

After saying that British obligations under the alliance were “without any possible argument those enshrined in the treaties of 1661 and 1899” [the later extended the British guarantee to the Portuguese colony—see page 18637], Dr. Salazar continued: “We therefore based our request to Great Britain concerning Goa on those two undertakings. My personal dislike of asking for the services of others, even when they are due by contract, had to give way before the gravity of the cause. On the basis of our interpretation of the 1899 treaty… the Portuguese Government asked the British Government on Dec. 11 to indicate what measures it could adopt to co-operate with the Portuguese forces to stem the Indian aggression.

“The reply of H.M. Government consisted, in essentials, of the following: ‘In the eventuality of an attack on Goa there would be inevitable restrictions on the aid the British Government would be in a position to give the Portuguese Government in a struggle with another member of the Commonwealth.’ This euphemistic reference to ‘inevitable restrictions’ had to be interpreted as meaning that the British Government was excusing itself from carrying out its obligations under the treaties.

“I am convinced that the British Government made many more efforts and much more urgent appeals in this emergency to prevent the Indian aggression than those reflected in the Press or directly communicated to us. The reason for this is a simple one. Although Goa could never represent for the British what it means to us—an integral part of the Portuguese nation—it is
extremely disagreeable for the honour and prestige of a great Power to avoid fulfilling definite obligations which were duly balanced by benefits conceded by Portugal.

“But if the ‘inevitable restrictions’ invoked mean that it is impossible for Great Britain to act effectively in the case of armed attacks by members of the Commonwealth on Portuguese territories, there is another aspect of the matter to consider. Given the extension of the Commonwealth and the aggressiveness and expansionist ambitions of its new members, the Portuguese Government should now study what positive content still remains in the Declaration of Windsor of 1899. On its conclusions it should base its future attitude towards the obligations that exist between the two countries….

“We also asked the British Government for permission to use some airfields necessary for connexions with Goa. I am sorry to say that the British Government took a week to inform us that we could not use them. Had it not been for this delay we should certainly have found alternative routes, and we could have rushed to India reinforcements in men and material for a longer sustained defence of the territory.

“The United States was very active, both in Washington and Delhi, in its attempt to dissuade the Indian Union from attacking Goa. It seems that President Kennedy even wrote to the Indian Prime Minister, while a last appeal to dissuade Mr. Nehru was made by the American Ambassador in Delhi no more than two hours before the order to attack was given.

“We cannot doubt the force of these requests and those made by Great Britain…. Both were afraid that the pacifist legend of the Indian Union would finally and completely disappear, and also that it would be recognized how fragile and ineffective was the edifice they had so lovingly built and maintained for the preservation of peace. But in that case we must realize that today in India there is a small country deprived of its territories by force, and that at the gates of Goa two great Powers, Great Britain and the United States, were also defeated, foreshadowing a fearful catastrophe for the world.”

As indicated by Dr. Salazar, a Bill was published in Lisbon on Jan. 4 providing (1) that Goans would have the right, wherever they might be, to elect their own deputies to the Portuguese National Assembly; (2) for the continued existence of a Governor-General of the “Portuguese State of India”; (3) for the seat of government of the “Portuguese State of India” to be in Lisbon as long as the territories were “occupied by foreign forces”; and (4) that all damage resulting from the military operations in Goa, including that done by the Portuguese authorities in the exercise of their legitimate defence, would be the “responsibility of the invading forces and of the representatives or agents of the foreign administration.”

It was reported from Panjim on Feb. 18 that the three Goan representatives in the Portuguese National Assembly had sent their resignations to Dr. Salazar; according to the Press Trust of India, they had sent copies of their resignations to the Military Governor of Goa, General Candeth, and had informed him that they wished to be citizens of the Indian Union.

The Portuguese Minister for Overseas Territories, Dr. Adriano Moreira, assumed the duties of Governor-General of the “Portuguese State of India” under a decree issued in Lisbon on March