The STRUGGLE for KASHMIR

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The whole story of the dispute over the cash balances emerged into the limelight on January 12, 1948, when Patel asserted:

It is the Pakistan representatives who were all the time trying to soft-pedal the Kashmir issue in order to secure concessions from us on the financial issues . . . We were, therefore, fully justified in providing against Pakistan's possible continuance of aggressive actions in regard to Kashmir by postponing the implementation of the agreement (N.H. 14.1.48).

The Pakistani Finance Minister at the time, Ghulam Mohammad, replied the next day, claiming that "no condition was laid down that the settlement (of cash balances) was linked with the Kashmir issue or any other matter," adding, "We would not have signed the agreement had we known that later the Government of India would drag in the Kashmir issue." (P.T. 14.1.48).

The controversy was resolved on January 14, 1948, when New Delhi announced its intention of paying the balance immediately, as Pandit Nehru related, "in the hope that this generous gesture, in accord with India's high ideals and Gandhiji's noble standards, will convince the world of our earnest desire for peace and goodwill."

Further evidence of the link between various Indo-Pakistan disputes was provided early in January, 1948, when it was learned that the Hyderabad Government, whose relations with India were far from cordial, granted a loan of 20 crores of rupees (200 million) to Pakistan—at the very time when India and Pakistan were engaged in mutual recrimination over the disposal of the cash balances. The connection between Hyderabad and Kashmir itself has been revealed by Mr. Campbell-Johnson who wrote on October 29, 1947: "It is noteworthy that the situation in Hyderabad has reacted sharply to the Kashmir crisis. Only twenty-four hours after the Indian acceptance of Kashmir's accession and the fly-in (of troops to the Valley) comes the report of a dramatic hold-up of the Nizam's delegation by an Ittehad-inspired mob on the eve of its departure for Delhi to sign a Standstill Agreement." (M.W.M. p. 227).

Another source of conflict between India and Pakistan, in the transitional period of crisis following the Partition, lay in the fact that the small princely state of Junagadh, like Kashmir and Hyderabad, had not acceded to either Dominion by August 15, 1947, the date of the transfer of power. With an area of only 3,300

^Independence and After, p. 71.
sq. miles and a population of 700,000, it could hardly compare with Kashmir or Hyderabad in size, population, strategic value or economic resources. Nevertheless, it was to assume a position in Indo-Pakistan relations far out of proportion to its actual importance.

In one respect it was a miniature Hyderabad for it had a Muslim ruling family and an overwhelming Hindu majority population—the exact opposite of Kashmir. Moreover, Junagadh's territory was completely encircled by princely States that had acceded to India, it was not contiguous at any point with Pakistan, and its railways, posts and telegraphs were an integral part of the Indian Communications system. Notwithstanding these considerations, it eventually acceded to Pakistan.

This action came as a surprise to New Delhi for at the Chamber of Princes meeting on July 25, 1947, the Prime Minister of Junagadh had indicated that he would recommend its accession to India. Furthermore, Junagadh had stated that it would go along with the policy of the other 279 Kathiawar States, all of which acceded to India. "On August 10th, however . . . there was a coup d'etat. A group of Sindi Moslems (pro-Pakistan) took over the Government . . . and the Nawab (became) a virtual prisoner in his palace."

On September 17, 1947, two days after Junagadh's accession to Pakistan, India decided to encircle the State with its troops. Then, on November 9th, India occupied the State at the invitation of its Prime Minister, at the same time proclaiming its intention of administering Junagadh until an impartial plebiscite would determine its final status. A plebiscite was held on February 24, 1948, under the auspices of the Indian Government, and resulted in an overwhelming vote for accession to India. The following month India informed the Security Council of its willingness to hold a second plebiscite under U.N. supervision but no action has ever been taken on this offer. Finally, in January, 1949, Junagadh was merged with Saurashtra, a Union of Princely States in the Kathiawar peninsula of north-western India.

The relationship of Junagadh to the Indo-Pakistan struggle over Kashmir lay in the fact that Pakistani spokesmen often cited the circumstances of Junagadh's accession to Pakistan, and India's reaction thereto, as being in sharp contrast with New Delhi's policy

"This account is based on material provided by Campbell-Johnson: op. cit, pp. 190-199, 209-210, 228, 237, 241, 243."