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Occupied by Indian Forces. - Pakistani Offensive in Jammu. - Indian Invasion of West Pakistan. - Cease-Fire accepted at security Council's Demand. - Pakistani Threat to leave U.N. - security Council Debates.

The most serious crisis to date in Indo-Pakistani relations, resulting in large-scale fighting between their armed forces, was precipitated when on Aug. 5 armed infiltrators from "Azad Kashmir" (the Pakistani area of Kashmir) began entering Indian Kashmir in an unsuccessful attempt to foment a revolt. In order to prevent further raiders from crossing the cease-fire line, the Indian forces occupied a number of points on the Pakistani side from Aug. 16 onwards. The Pakistan Army launched an offensive into Jammu on Sept. 1, threatening to cut communications between India and Kashmir, whereupon the Indian Army invaded West Pakistan in three sectors during Sept. 6-8. Fighting continued until Sept. 23, when a cease-fire came into force at the demand of the U.N. security Council. While the fighting was in progress the Chinese Government, which had announced its full support for Pakistan, delivered an ultimatum on Sept. 16 threatening war unless India dismantled its fortifications on the Sikkim-Tibet border; the ultimatum was withdrawn on Sept. 22, however.

Relations between India and Pakistan remained tense after the cease-fire, as each continued to occupy considerable areas of the other's territory and repeated clashes took place between the two armies. Attempts by the U.N. Secretary-General, U Thant, to negotiate their withdrawal produced no effect, as Pakistan insisted that military disengagement must be accompanied by an attempt to secure a political settlement in Kashmir, this condition being rejected by India. Details of these and related developments are given below.

It was announced in New Delhi on Aug. 7-8 that from Aug. 5 onwards armed infiltrators, mostly belonging to the "Azad Kashmir" forces and generally in civilian clothes, had begun crossing the cease-fire line from "Azad Kashmir" into Indian Kashmir and also entering Jammu from West Pakistan at some points, in order to commit acts of sabotage and foment disturbances.

In Rawalpindi it was claimed that a popular rising had occurred, and a radio station calling itself the "Voice of Kashmir" began broadcasting on Aug. 8, announcing that an armed revolt had broken out in Indian Kashmir, that a "Revolutionary Council" had been set up to lead an "all-out war of liberation," and that all Kashmiris who co-operated with the Indian authorities would be shot. Indian and Kashmir Government spokesmen, however, categorically denied that there was any rebellion, and claimed that the population were actively helping the security forces to round up the infiltrators. The Indian Government stated that the "Voice of Kashmir" was broadcasting from near Muzaffarabad (the capital of "Azad Kashmir").

Mrs. Indira Gandhi (the Indian Minister of Information), who had just returned from a five-day visit to Srinagar, said on Aug. 13 that announcements by the "Voice of Kashmir" were obviously being made in accordance with the programme laid down for the infiltrators. For example, it had referred to anti-Indian posters being stuck up in Srinagar and the Jammu-Srinagar road being cut; in fact there were no such posters in Srinagar, as the infiltrators had been caught on the way and the posters confiscated, whilst the Jammu-Srinagar road was open.

Western correspondents in Kashmir confirmed the Indian claim that there was no revolt in the State. The *New York Times* said on Oct. 12: "Reporters who were in Kashmir at the time saw no evidence of an internal rebellion. The... Kashmiris seemed more concerned with selling rugs and renting houseboats to the tourists

than in taking up arms for freedom. Some Kashmiris undoubtedly did hide and feed the infiltrators. There is evidence that some also may have helped set up caches of arms in Srinagar. But the uprising that Pakistan apparently counted on never occurred....”

The Indian Government stated on Aug. 13 that interrogation of captured infiltrators, including two Pakistan Army officers, had established that training for the operation had begun in May, and that a military headquarters had been set up under the command of Major-General Akhtar Hussain Malik, G.O.C. 12th Division, at Murree (West Pakistan), where President Ayub Khan had addressed all officers connected with the operation in July. The infiltrators, who included regular Pakistani soldiers, members of the “Azad Kashmir” battalions of the Pakistan Army, and armed civilian *mujahids* (“fighters for the faith”) from “Azad Kashmir,” had received intensive training in guerrilla tactics, and had been instructed to raid Indian Army headquarters and supply and ammunition dumps, destroy bridges, lay ambushes, disrupt lines of communications, and attack troops, convoys, and pro-Indian leaders.

The infiltrators entered Indian Kashmir in small groups at points all along the 470-mile cease-fire line, and after assembling at predetermined points began operating in units of 50 to 100 men. The main body converged on Srinagar from the north, the north-west, and the south-west; it was believed to be their intention to seize the city on Aug. 9 (the 12th anniversary of the first arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, when the Plebiscite Front planned to hold a *hartal*), and to broadcast a proclamation announcing the formation of a “National Government of Kashmir.” The plan failed because many of the infiltrators were intercepted by the Indian forces within a few miles of the cease-fire line, though a number of them succeeded in reaching Srinagar, where firing occurred on the outskirts on Aug. 10 and 13. Fire was set to an oil depot in the suburb of Batmalu on Aug. 14; about 300 houses were burnt down, and when police and fire engines reached the spot they were fired on. Indian reports stated that the fire had been caused by infiltrators, while official Pakistani statements put the blame on the Indian forces.

According to Indian sources, infiltrators set fire to a village near Gulmarg (west of Srinagar) on Aug. 9 and killed 21 villagers whom they suspected of giving information to the Indian security forces; Indian troops attacked the raiders, killing 36 of them. In the Chhamb sector a police station 40 miles from Jammu was twice attacked unsuccessfully on Aug. 11 and 22 by infiltrators equipped with rocket-launchers, two-inch mortars, and machine-guns. Infiltrators made an unsuccessful attempt on Aug. 18 to blow up the Wuyil bridge 19 miles from Srinagar on the Srinagar-Leh road, by which the Indian forces in Ladakh are supplied; in other attacks by infiltrators on the same road between Kargil and Leh, a bridge was damaged.

The Kashmir Government decided on Aug. 20 to distribute thousands of rifles to villagers living near the cease-fire line for defence against the infiltrators. A village 10 miles from Srinagar was set on fire on Aug. 23, apparently because the villagers had given information to the security forces. Two major clashes between the infiltrators and the Indian forces took place on Aug. 29, when according to Indian announcements 49 infiltrators were killed in the southern sector and 27 in the Kashmir valley.

Further parties of infiltrators were reported to be entering Indian Kashmir from Aug. 18 onwards. The total number of infiltrators, at first given as 1,200, was later estimated at up to 5,000. The Indian Government published on Sept. 15 a document, said to be a communication from General Malik dated Aug. 29, containing directives to a new batch of infiltrators.

The document stated: "I visualize that India will be forced to pull out if a sizable threat is posed in their rear.... You will infiltrate across the cease-fire line to operate behind enemy dispositions in Tangdhar-Tithwal area and cause maximum attrition of enemy potential.... You will not undertake set-piece attacks and tie down own troops unnecessarily, thereby causing casualties. The pattern must be to concentrate at a pro-selected target at a fixed time, carry out raids, inflict maximum casualties, cause maximum damage, and disperse in different directions.... The principle to follow is not to attach importance to ground features but aim at shock actions and creating maximum possible pressure in the area through concerted and continuous

offensive action against his defence headquarters and lines of communication....”

The Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, Mr. Kewal Singh, presented a strong protest against the infiltration of forces from the Pakistan side to the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mr. Bhutto, on Aug. 10. Mr. Singh was reported to have warned Mr. Bhutto that India took a very grave view of the situation, and that unless Pakistan immediately stopped the infiltration “most serious consequences” would result. The protest was rejected by Mr. Bhutto, who declared in a press statement that “by no stretch of the imagination can the blame for whatever is happening in Kashmir be put on Pakistan,” and who claimed on Aug. 12 that India alone was responsible for the “uprising” in Kashmir.

In a broadcast on Aug. 13 the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Shastri, warned Pakistan that “force will be met with force.”

“There is no doubt,” Mr. Shastri said, “that this is a thinly disguised armed attack on our country organized by Pakistan, and it has to be met as such.... Pakistan has on the one hand sought to deny its complicity and on the other has put herself forward as the chief spokesman for the infiltrators. The world will recall that Pakistan created a similar situation in 1947, and then also she initially pleaded innocence. Later she had to admit that her own regular forces were involved in the fighting.

“Pakistan is trying to conjure up the spectre of some people in revolt. It is talking of some 'Revolutionary Council' and a lot of other things. All this is a mere figment of Pakistan's imagination. Pakistani propaganda is blatantly and completely untrue. The people of Jammu and Kashmir have shown remarkable fortitude. They still remember how the Pakistani raiders pillaged and plundered on an earlier occasion. There is no revolution in Kashmir, nor is there any 'Revolutionary Council.' The people of Jammu and Kashmir have in fact themselves given the lie to Pakistan's propaganda.

“The more important question before us now is not that of these infiltrators and their activities, because we are quite clear as to what to do with them. The real question is that of our relations with Pakistan. In April last they committed naked aggression on our Kutch border. We left them in no doubt, however, that if they did not vacate the aggression forthwith, we would have to take requisite military steps to get the aggression vacated. Eventually the armed forces of Pakistan had to go back from Indian soil, and it was reasonable to hope that our mutual relations might take a turn for the better. In this context it is amazing that Pakistan should have embarked upon yet another adventure. On this occasion the method adopted and the strategy used show signs of a new tutelage, possibly a new conspiracy. Only one conclusion is now possible. Pakistan has probably taken a deliberate decision to keep up an atmosphere of tension. Peace apparently does not suit its intentions.

“We have therefore to reckon with this situation in a realistic manner. We have to reorientate our thinking and our policies to deal with the dangers that threaten our country. We have also to state our views categorically so that there are no miscalculations. If Pakistan has any ideas of annexing any part of our territories by force, it should think afresh. I want to state categorically that force will be met with force, and aggression against us will never be allowed to succeed....”

Mr. Shastri said in an interview with the *New York Times* on Aug. 21 that India could not “go on for ever pushing the Pakistanis off its territory,” and that “if this continues we will have to carry the fight to the other side.” This warning was repeated on Aug. 23 by Mr. Y. B. Chavan (Defence Minister), who told the *Lok Sabha* that “whenever it was found necessary even to go across the cease-fire line in order to defend the cease-fire line and other areas we have done so. And if it is found necessary, I have no doubt that we will not fail to do that again.”

The number of incidents on the cease-fire line in Kashmir, which had reached an unprecedented level in May and June and for which responsibility was attributed by the U.N. to both sides, declined after the signing of

the cease-fire agreement in the Rann of Kutch on June 29. Exchanges of fire all along the line became increasingly frequent after Aug. 8, however; Mr. Chavan claimed on Aug. 16 that the Pakistani forces had "stepped up their activities inordinately, as if to give cover to the infiltrators and to distract the security forces from dealing with them."

According to Indian reports, Pakistani troops attacked an Indian post north-east of Poonch on Aug. 8; attempted unsuccessfully to cross the cease-fire line in battalion strength in the Chhamb sector on Aug. 14 under cover of artillery fire; and shelled Indian posts in the Poonch and Tithwal sectors on the same day. U.N. observers reported heavy and prolonged artillery fire across the line from the Pakistani side in the Chhamb sector on Aug. 15-16. Indian sources claimed on Aug. 16 that regular Pakistani troops had taken up positions along certain sectors of the line, replacing the "Azad Kashmir" forces.

On Aug. 16 Indian troops crossed the cease-fire line in the Kargil sector, where Pakistani forces were reported to have tried to cut the Srinagar-Leh road, and occupied two Pakistani posts. India had previously occupied these posts in May, but had withdrawn at the request of the U.N. after receiving assurances that U.N. observers would be posted in the area [see 21065 A]. Exchanges of fire meanwhile continued in the Chhamb, Mendhar, Poonch, Uri, and Tithwal sectors; U.N. observers reported that Pakistani troops had shelled the town of Poonch on Aug. 19, 26, and 28, and that Indian troops in the Chhamb sector had shelled a village in West Pakistan on Aug. 25.

Indian troops occupied two Pakistani posts in the Tithwal sector on Aug 24, and a third on the following day. Mr. Chavan told the *Lok Sabha* on Aug. 25 that the operation had been undertaken "in order to prevent further infiltration and keep watch on the retreat routes of the Pakistani raiders." According to *The Hindu*, "these three posts are located on two separate mountains 8,000 feet high, and it is through the gap between them that one column of Pakistani raiders crossed into the Kashmir Valley early this month."

On Aug. 26 Indian troops crossed the cease-fire line in another area, viz. south of Uri, where *The Hindu* said "the cease-fire line between Uri and Poonch runs along a huge bulge of mountain which projects like a dagger for about 30 or 40 miles inside the Kashmir Valley." Mr. Chavan stated in the *Lok Sabha* on Aug. 30 that Pakistani infiltrators had moved from bases in this bulge towards Gulmarg and the Valley, and were being supplied from these bases. The Indian forces, he added, had occupied the Haji Pir pass (an 8,600-foot defile through the Pir Panjal mountains), which was the main route through which the raiders had been moving, the 12,600-ft. hill feature of Bedore, and seven other posts.

Mr. G. R. Kar, a member of the Kashmir Ministry, announced on Aug. 30, during a visit to 14 villages in the Uri-Poonch bulge which had been occupied by the Indian forces, that Indian civil administration had been extended to them. An Indian Government spokesman said on the following day that India would keep permanent control over the area to prevent further Pakistani infiltration.

"Azad Kashmir" forces backed by Pakistan Army formations and supported by aircraft and about 70 *Patton* tanks crossed the cease-fire line in the early morning of Sept. 1 in the Bimber sector of the Chhamb area, at the southern end of the cease-fire line, under cover of a heavy artillery barrage. It was believed that Pakistan had attacked in this sector, where the flat terrain is suitable for the use of tanks, to enable her to exploit her American-built armour. Pakistani spokesmen claimed that their forces had occupied the posts of Chhamb and Dewa, about seven miles from the cease-fire line, and that four Indian aircraft had been shot down; the Indian Government admitted that two of its aircraft were missing and two damaged, but claimed that 13 Pakistani tanks had been destroyed.

In a broadcast on Sept. 1 President Ayub Khan declared that "the threat of war in Kashmir" was "being forced on us by India." Claiming that the people of Kashmir had "risen in open revolt," he accused the Indian forces of setting fire to villages, shooting men, women, and children, and being responsible for the burning of Batmalu. "India blames us for supporting these valiant fighters against Indian tyranny," he continued. "We are

doing no more than what we have always pledged to do, which is to support the people of Kashmir in exercising their right of self-determination.” He concluded by declaring that “in this supreme hour of their trial the people of Kashmir will rise like one man and give a befitting reply to Indian aggression.”

Replying to President Ayub Khan's allegations, Mr. Shastri said in a broadcast on Sept. 3: "We have dealt successfully with hundreds of infiltrators. As a measure of self-defence, we have had to take military action to occupy strategic posts, crossing the cease-fire line in order to blast the roots of the infiltrators. Some bands of raiders, however, are still attempting to come with the full backing of the Pakistan Army. Pakistan denied responsibility for such infiltrators. The Pakistan Government has endeavoured to create a myth, and this myth has been reiterated in President Ayub Khan's broadcast on Sept. 1, which said that the infiltrators are freedom fighters and there was an internal revolt in Kashmir. The whole world knows that there is no revolt...."

The Pakistani forces continued to advance during Sept. 2-5, though more slowly, and on Sept. 3 crossed the Manawar Tari river, a tributary of the Chenab, after the Indian forces had repulsed one attempted crossing. Air activity meanwhile continued, both sides using fighters to attack enemy vehicles and command posts. Pakistani aircraft bombed the village of Jaurian (18 miles from the cease-fire line) on Sept. 2; according to Indian reports, the village was set on fire, a mosque bombed, and about 50 civilians killed. Pakistani announcements claimed that six Indian fighters had been shot down in air battles over "Azad Kashmir" on Sept. 3-4, whilst Indian spokesmen claimed that four Pakistani *Sabre* jets had been shot down in the battle zone during the same period.

The Pakistani forces captured the key post of Jaurian on Sept. 5. This success brought them within six miles of the road junction of Akhnur, the fall of which would have cut the only road to the Poonch area and threatened the Jammu-Srinagar road.

Efforts by U Thant to secure Cease-fire. security Council Meeting.

U Thant expressed his serious concern to the Pakistani representative at the U.N. on Aug. 9 at the situation created by the crossing of the cease-fire line by the infiltrators, and appealed that the line should be observed. On the same day he asked the Indian representative to convey to his Government an urgent appeal for restraint in any retaliatory action. The Indian Government subsequently gave an assurance that it would respect the cease-fire agreement if Pakistan did likewise; the Pakistani Government did not reply to U Thant's appeal.

In view of the continuing deterioration in the situation, U Thant submitted to the two Governments on Aug. 16 a statement on the cease-fire violations which he proposed to publish. The Indian Government agreed to its publication, subject to certain modifications; the Pakistani Government opposed it, on the ground that the statement dealt only with the current situation without presenting the political background. U Thant accordingly decided against publication, but suggested to the two Governments on Aug. 20 that Dr. Ralph Bunche (U.N. Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs) should visit India and Pakistan to explore ways of preventing any further deterioration in the situation. On Aug. 24, however, he announced that he had abandoned this plan, as "the subsequent responses of the two parties, while not negative, involve in each case conditions which in my view would make the mission not feasible at this time." According to Indian sources, India had insisted that Dr. Bunche should only determine responsibility for the cease-fire violations and means of preventing them, whereas Pakistan maintained that he should consider the whole Kashmir issue.

At U Thant's request, Lieut.-General Robert Nimmo, the head of the U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), visited New York on Aug. 26-30 for consultations. U Thant subsequently published on Sept. 4 a report on developments to date, based on General Nimmo's evidence, which confirmed the Indian account of the origin of the latest fighting.

After stating that "the cease-fire agreement... has collapsed, although I hope only temporarily," U Thant

reported that “there has been a disturbing increase in the number of incidents involving violations of the C.F.L. since the beginning of 1965. In mid-June of this year, for example, General Nimmo reported that during the previous five months a total of 2,231 complaints from both sides charging violation of the cease-fire had been submitted to UNMOGIP. Most of these involved firing across the C.F.L., although some concerned crossings of the line by armed men. As of that date, 377 violations in all categories had been confirmed by investigations of the observers, 218 of which were committed by Pakistan and 159 by India....”

On the origin of the present crisis, U Thant stated: "General Nimmo has indicated to me that the series of violations that began on Aug. 5 were, to a considerable extent on subsequent days, in the form of armed men generally not in uniform crossing the C.F.L. from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side. This conclusion was reached by General Nimmo on the basis of investigation by U.N. observers in the light of the extensiveness and character of the raiding activities and their proximity to the C.F.L., even though in most cases the actual identity of those engaging in armed attacks on the Indian side of the line and their actual crossing of it could not be verified by direct observation or evidence." The report went on to summarize subsequent developments, including the incidents on the cease-fire line, the Indian occupation of Pakistani posts in the Kargil, Tithwal, and Uri areas, the Pakistani offensive in the Chhamb area, and U Thant's negotiations with the two Governments.

“The restoration of the cease-fire and the return to normal conditions along the C.F.L.", the report concluded, "can be achieved only under the following conditions:

- (1) Willingness of both parties to respect the agreement they have entered into;
- (2) Readiness on the part of the Government of Pakistan to take effective steps to prevent crossings of the C.F.L. from the Pakistan side by armed men, whether or not in uniform;
- (3) Evacuation by each party of positions of the other party now occupied and withdrawal of all armed personnel of each party to its own side of the line, which would include withdrawal once more of Indian troops from Pakistan positions in the Kargil area;
- (4) Halt by both parties to firing across the C.F.L. that has been occurring from both sides, in some sectors with artillery and smaller guns;
- (5) Allowing full freedom of movement and access to U.N. observers by both parties on both sides of the line.”

On Sept. 1 U Thant sent identical messages to Mr. Shastri and President Ayub Khan, appealing to both countries to respect the cease-fire line and to withdraw their forces that had crossed it.

“Since Aug. 5,” U Thant stated, “there has been an unprecedented number of acts of violence along or in the vicinity of the cease-fire line in Kashmir. Without any attempt to apportion blame, it may be said that such actions now come from both sides of the line.... India and Pakistan freely entered into a cease-fire agreement at Karachi in July 1949.... That agreement is now being so widely disregarded as to be reduced to little consequence. An outright military confrontation between the armed forces of India and Pakistan is threatened and may be imminent, which can have only the gravest implications for the peace of the world....”

“I fully realize the very great complexities of the Kashmir problem for your Government. I cannot believe, however, that it poses problems which could not be solved ultimately by peaceful processes, or that these problems can ever be really solved by military action.... I appeal to you most earnestly, in the interests of peace in your area and in the world, to indicate immediately your intention henceforth to respect the cease-fire agreement. Essential, of course, to the restoration of the cease-fire would be a cessation of

crossings of the C.F.L. by armed personnel from both sides of the line, the withdrawal of armed personnel of each side that have occupied positions on the other party's side of the line, and a halt to all firing across the C.F.L. from either side of it..."

In his reply, published on Sept. 4, Mr. Shastri emphasized the necessity for Pakistan to withdraw the infiltrators and to prevent further infiltration.

"On the basis of your own assessment," he wrote, "it is clear that the root cause of the present dangerous situation is the undertaking of massive infiltrations of armed personnel from the Pakistan side, well organized and trained in sabotage and subversive warfare, the whole operation being conceived, planned, and executed by Pakistan. The infiltrators are, in fact, members of the Pakistani armed forces. These infiltrations are still continuing. Such action by Pakistan is a clear violation of the Charter of the U.N. and of the cease-fire agreement... It is to meet this thinly disguised invasion that the Government of India, while showing every forbearance, has been forced to take preventive military action.... While I appreciate the motivations of your appeal, I have to point out that the terms of your message are such as might leave the impression that we are responsible equally with Pakistan for the dangerous developments that have taken place. Unless your message is read in the context of the realities of the situation as they have developed, it tends to introduce a certain equation between India and Pakistan, which the facts of the situation do not bear out...."

"Even on their own admission, as indicated in President Ayub Khan's broadcast of , the Pakistani forces have gone to the assistance of the infiltrators, whom Pakistan chooses to call 'freedom fighters.' There is no pretence in it of any kind of defensive action, and the Pakistani attack clearly constitutes aggression... We have neither the inclination nor is it in our interest to be deviated from the path of peace and economic progress to that of military conflict. Pakistan has, however, by sending armed infiltrators in large numbers across the cease-fire line, brought about a situation in which we have no choice but to defend ourselves and take such preventive action as may be deemed essential. In taking such preventive action we have, in certain sectors, had to cross the cease-fire line for the purpose of effectively preventing further infiltrations...."

"In April this year Pakistan launched a military attack on our territory in the Rann of Kutch.... In spite of such provocation, we showed forbearance and reached an agreement with Pakistan on June 30 for the peaceful settlement of the border question. The hope was solemnly expressed by both sides in the agreement that it would result in better relations between India and Pakistan and in the easing of tensions between the two countries. It is now clear, however, that even when Pakistan was putting its signature to that agreement it was planning and organizing the massive armed infiltrations across the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir, even before the ink was dry on that agreement. We cannot be expected to wait for Pakistan to violate the cease-fire line and to attack us at will, and we cannot go from one cease-fire to another without our being satisfied that Pakistan will not repeat its acts of violation and aggression in the future...."

You have appealed for peace, and we greatly appreciate your anxiety and the sincerity of your efforts.... What is essential, however, today is that Pakistan should undertake forthwith to stop infiltrations across the cease-fire line and to withdraw the infiltrators and its armed forces from the Indian side of the cease-fire line.... Furthermore, we would have to be satisfied that there will be no recurrence of such a situation.... I trust that, in the first instance, you will ascertain from Pakistan if it will accept the responsibility for withdrawing not only its armed forces, but also the infiltrators and for preventing further infiltrations. This, in fact, we take as the basic assumption underlying your appeal."

President Ayub Khan's reply, dated Sept. 7, whilst repeating the claim that there was an uprising in Kashmir, admitted that infiltrators had crossed the cease-fire line from "Azad Kashmir." He also declared that a peaceful settlement was possible only on the basis of self-determination for Kashmir.

“In your message,” the President said, “you seem to consider Aug. 5—when the so-called ‘infiltration’ is alleged to have taken place—as the date when the cease-fire agreement of 1949 between India and Pakistan began to be so widely disregarded by unprecedented acts of violence along or in the vicinity of the cease-fire line as to have reduced that agreement to little consequence. If the cease-fire in Jammu and Kashmir was reduced to a nullity, this process has taken place over a long period of time as a result of Indian designs and provocations. The more recent and grave instance occurred in May last, when the Indian Army crossed the cease-fire line in the Kargil sector....”

“The cease-fire line, it needs to be recalled and emphasized here, was brought about by the U.N. resolutions of Aug. 13, 1948, and Jan. 5, 1949. These resolutions, which were negotiated by the U.N., constituted an international agreement between India and Pakistan to implement the pledge of a plebiscite to the people of Jammu and Kashmir to decide their future. The cease-fire line agreement followed from the obligations accepted by both parties under those resolutions. Since the cease-fire in the State was effected in 1949, India at first stalled on their implementation and subsequently repudiated them....”

“The situation in Indian-occupied Kashmir today is that after 17 years of patient but vain expectation and hope, the people of Kashmir, finding all avenues of peaceful realization for their right of self-determination barred to them, have taken to arms against Indian tyranny.... The people of Azad Kashmir have been enraged for years over India's brutal repression of the freedom movement in Kashmir. If more than six divisions of the Indian Army deployed along the nearly 500-mile-long cease-fire line have been unable to prevent them from moving across the line to aid the armed uprising of their compatriots in occupied Kashmir, how can it be expected that the much fewer troops in the Pakistan Army would be able to seal the line against them?...”

“Failing to suppress the freedom-fighters in the occupied territory of Jammu and Kashmir, India has embarked on a course of unlimited aggression across the cease-fire line.... Simultaneously with these acts of war, India intensified her acts of repression of Kashmiris, which in their scope and nature threaten to assume the proportion of genocide.... In response to this grave situation created by the Indian armed forces and to forestall further aggression by them, the Azad Kashmir forces, backed by the Pakistan Army, were forced in the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence to cross the cease-fire line in the Bhimber sector for the first time since the cease-fire agreement was reached 17 years ago, and after repeated Indian armed attacks and occupation of Azad Kashmir territories by the Indian Army....”

“It is therefore clear from these repeated strikes across the cease-fire line and step-by-step escalation of the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir that India has embarked on a premeditated course of aggression and war to seize the whole of Azad Kashmir territory.... The action which the Pakistan Army has taken in Jammu and Kashmir in support of the Azad Kashmir forces was to defend Azad Kashmir and Pakistan territory against India, who tried to solve the Kashmir dispute by force of arms. This is a purely defensive measure forced on Pakistan....”

“I cannot but be candid and express to you our misgivings. Your appeal seeks nothing more than a return to the *status quo ante*, without any assurance that you and the Security Council will strive to implement the U.N. resolutions pertaining to the right of self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. You say that the quiet which would result from mutual observance of the cease-fire would afford the most favourable climate in which to seek a resolution of political differences, I would like to recall that the cease-fire agreement was observed from 1949 to 1965, when India chose to reduce it to a scrap of paper. Yet, during these 17 years, tranquillity along the cease-fire line did not lead to that result. The Security Council, faced with India's bad faith, intransigence, and growing power, chose practically to wash its hands of the responsibility for a peaceful and honourable settlement.... If a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute is to result from the intervention of the U.N., it is necessary for the world organization to go to the heart of the tragic problem and not merely to deal with its periphery. It must turn its attention to the issue of self-determination and not only to the cease-fire line....”

The U.N. security Council unanimously adopted on Sept. 4 a resolution sponsored by its six non-permanent members (Bolivia, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, Netherlands, and Uruguay) calling upon India and Pakistan to “take forthwith all steps for an immediate cease-fire” and to withdraw all armed personnel to their own side of the cease-fire line, and requesting U Thant to report to the Council on the implementation of the resolution within three days.

Mr. G. Parthasarathi (India) expressed regret that the Council “does not seem able to face up to the simple issue of Pakistan's aggression.” **Mr. Amjad Ali** (Pakistan) stressed that the resolution did not refer to the basis for a cease-fire, viz., demilitarization and a plebiscite.

In his reply to the security Council's resolution, delivered to U Thant on Sept. 7, the Indian Foreign Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh, stated that unless Pakistan withdrew the infiltrators, stopped further infiltration, and withdrew from the Chhamb area, “no proposals can be made to restore peace in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.”

Indian Invasion of West Pakistan.

The Indian Defence Ministry announced on Sept. 5 that Pakistani aircraft had attacked an Indian Air Force ground unit near Amritsar, without causing any damage; the operation was the first reported to have occurred outside Kashmir. On the following day Indian troops, without a declaration of war, launched an offensive across the Punjab frontier into West Pakistan. Mr. Charon stated on Sept. 8 that the object of the attack was to relieve the pressure on Akhnur [see above]; no further advance by the Pakistani forces was in fact reported from this area.

Addressing the **Lok Sabha** on Sept. 6, Mr. Chavan said that the Indian attack had been launched in order to forestall an attack by Pakistan on Indian Punjab.

“On the afternoon of Sept. 5,” said Mr. Chavan, “Pakistani aircraft intruded across the international border at Wagah near Amritsar and fired rockets at an Air Force unit. Anti-aircraft action drove them away. There were further violations over the same border by the Pakistan Air Force, and it was quite apparent that Pakistan's next move was to attack Punjab across the international border. The indication that this was going to happen was building up over some time. In order to forestall the opening of another front by Pakistan, our troops in the Punjab moved across the border in the Lahore sector.” This announcement was greeted by loud and prolonged cheering. The leaders of the Opposition parties met Mr. Shastri in the evening, and pledged their full support for the Government's action.

In a broadcast on the same day President Ayub Khan declared that “we are at war,” and announced that he had proclaimed a state of emergency.

“Indian aggression in Kashmir,” he said, “was only a preparation for an attack on Pakistan. Today they have given final proof of this and of the evil intentions which India has always harboured against Pakistan since its inception. The Indian rulers were never reconciled to the establishment of an independent Pakistan where Moslems could build a homeland of their own. All their military preparations during the last 18 years have been directed against us. They exploited the Chinese bogey to secure massive arms assistance from some of our friends in the West, who never understood the mind of the Indian rulers and permitted themselves to be taken in by India's profession that once they were fully armed they would fight the Chinese. We always knew that these arms would be raised against us. Time has proved this so. Now that the Indian rulers, with their customary cowardice and hypocrisy, have ordered their armies to march into the sacred territory of Pakistan, without a formal declaration of war, the time has come for us to give them a crushing reply which will put an end to India's adventure in imperialism....”

An Indian Government spokesman afterwards stated that neither India nor Pakistan had declared war, adding:

"India is not at war with Pakistan or the Pakistani people. India's operations are intended to destroy Pakistan's military bases from where they attacked India."

India opened offensives in two other sectors on Sept. 8, when one force entered West Pakistan from Jammu in the Sialkot sector, and another advanced into Sind from Rajasthan. The fighting on the three fronts, which continued until Sept. 23, is summarized below.

The Lahore Front. Before dawn on Sept. 6 Indian troops launched an offensive against Lahore along a 50-mile front from three directions—from the north-east across the River Ravi; from the east along the Amritsar-Lahore road towards the Pakistani town of Wagah; and from the south-east against the Pakistani town of Kasur. The Indian advance north of Lahore, however, was quickly brought to a standstill by the Pakistani forces, who blew up the Dera Baba Nanak bridge across the Ravi. The Pakistani forces opened a counter-offensive on Sept. 9, when they claimed to have forced the Indians back over the border in the Wagah sector and to have compelled them to withdraw in the Kasur sector. Mr. Chavan admitted on Sept. 10 that the Indian troops had had to withdraw from their forward positions in the Kasur sector because of very heavy counter-attacks, but the Pakistani claim to have crossed the border in the Wagah sector was officially denied by India.

The most decisive battle of the war took place in the Kasur sector on Sept. 10-11. The 1st Pakistani Armoured Division, with about 225 tanks, pursued the retreating Indian infantry across the frontier, only to find itself encircled by Indian tanks and infantry; an Indian spokesman claimed that in the ensuing battle, which he described as "very grim," 12 Pakistani tanks were destroyed and 17 captured intact. Although their advance was halted, however, the Pakistanis retained possession of a salient stretching about four miles into Indian territory, including the town of Khem Karan.

In the Wagah sector Indian troops occupied the Pakistani town of Burki on the night of Sept. 10; Burki stands on the banks of the Ichogil canal, 100 feet wide and 15 feet deep, which forms the inner line of Lahore's defences. The Indian Defence Ministry claimed on Sept. 16 that Indian troops had fought their way across the canal under heavy artillery fire, and were within six miles of Lahore; this claim was denied by the Pakistani authorities, who maintained that the Indians had been contained 10 to 12 miles from the city. Indian sources reported on Sept. 19 that the Pakistanis were flooding this front as a defence measure.

The Sialkot Front. Indian troops entered West Pakistan from Jammu on Sept. 8, driving towards the military base of Sialkot, about 15 miles from the border. The fighting on this front was described by the *Daily Telegraph* as "one of the biggest tank battles since the desert campaign in the Second World War"; President Ayub Khan stated on Sept. 22 that some 600 tanks were involved. The battle was fought almost entirely by armoured forces, with some aircraft support, infantry and artillery playing little part; each side admitted that it had lost many of its tanks, while claiming to have inflicted even heavier losses on the enemy. The Indians claimed on Sept. 15 to have gained control of the railway line to Pasrur (21 miles south-east of Sialkot), which links Sialkot with Lahore, but this claim was denied by Pakistan. Heavy but indecisive fighting continued on this front until the cease-fire.

The Rajasthan Front. The Indian forces opened a third front about 500 miles south of Lahore on Sept. 8, when they entered Sind from the Barmer area of Rajasthan and occupied the town of Gadra, five miles from the border. Pakistani forces made a number of counter-attacks in other sectors of the 600-mile Rajasthan border, which is largely a desert area, and captured Munabao (five miles inside Indian territory north-west of Gadra) on Sept. 13. An Indian claim to have occupied Dali (18 miles west of Gadra) on Sept. 21 and to have advanced 12 miles beyond it was denied by the Pakistan Government.

Air Activity. Throughout the hostilities both sides, in addition to giving close air support to ground forces wherever possible, carried out air raids on military targets. The Indian Air Force repeatedly attacked Sargodha (north-west of Lahore) and other Pakistani air bases, and on Sept. 31 extended the scope of its raids to

airfields at Peshawar and Kohat, in the former North-West Frontier Province. The Pakistani Air Force similarly attacked Indian air bases in the Punjab and in Jammu and Kashmir. A number of air battles were fought in the course of these operations.

While claiming to have confined its own activities to strictly military targets, each side accused the other of indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets; independent witnesses confirmed that many civilians had been killed by enemy bombing in both India and West Pakistan.

Indian spokesmen alleged that the Pakistani Air Force had bombed Amritsar, Ferozepore, Jodhpur, and other towns in the Punjab and Rajasthan; had unsuccessfully attempted to bomb Delhi on Sept. 8 and Bombay on Sept. 13; and had used American-made napalm bombs in raids on villages in Jammu and Kashmir. The Anglican cathedral at Ambala (Punjab) was reduced to ruins in a Pakistani raid on Sept. 18; Indian spokesmen stated that a military hospital had been bombed and 11 people killed. The Indian Government announced on Sept. 22 that 50 civilians had been killed when Pakistani aircraft bombed and machine-gunned Amritsar, and 32 civilians killed when a prison hospital at Jodhpur was bombed. Total civilian casualties in the Punjab and Kashmir were given on Sept. 29 as 316 killed and 401 injured; about 60,000 people were stated to have been rendered homeless in Kashmir and 20,000 in the Punjab.

The Pakistani Government alleged that the Indian Air Force had indiscriminately bombed Rawalpindi, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and other towns, 57 civilians being killed and two mosques destroyed in a raid on villages near Peshawar on Sept. 13 and 27 in raids on villages near Peshawar and Sargodha on Sept. 16. Indian aircraft were also reported to have attacked passenger trains on Sept. 6 and 15 in the Lahore area, killing 20 civilians on the latter occasion.

Paratroop Operations. The Indian authorities announced on Sept. 7 that Pakistani parachute troops had been dropped in the Pathankot and Jullundur areas of the Punjab, and on the following day that others had been dropped in the Delhi area; Mr. Darbara Singh (Home Minister in the Punjab Government) stated on Sept. 14 that most of the paratroops had been rounded up by armed police, with the co-operation of the peasantry. The Pakistani Government announced on Sept. 8 that Indian parachutists had been dropped at four points in the Lahore sector, including Sargodha and the Wazirabad area.

Naval Operations. Pakistani warships bombarded the Indian port of Dwarka (Gujerat) on Sept. 8. The Pakistani Government claimed that heavy damage had been inflicted and Indian air attacks on the warships repulsed; Indian spokesmen claimed that the attackers had been driven away after causing only minor damage.

The Pakistani Government subsequently claimed that its only submarine, the *Ghazi*, had sunk an Indian frigate in the Arabian Sea on Sept. 22. This report was described as "absolutely false" by the Indian Government, which claimed to possess evidence that the submarine had fired at and hit a Persian frigate by mistake.

Operations in East Pakistan Area. Only minor operations took place in East Pakistan and the adjoining Indian States. Pakistani aircraft attacked Indian air bases in West Bengal and Assam on Sept. 7 and a number of subsequent occasions; on the other hand, Indian air attacks on Kurmitula (near Dacca), Chittagong, and Jessore in East Pakistan were announced by the Pakistani authorities on Sept. 7, though the raids were denied by the Indian Government. Mr. Chavan said on Sept. 8: "We have no quarrel with East Pakistan, and while our troops have taken up positions within our territory in order to meet any threat of aggression by Pakistan, at the present moment I do not visualize our taking any action to escalate the war in that field, except to the extent Pakistan's action compels us to."

General J. N. Chaudhuri, the Indian Chief of Army Staff, explained the Indian strategy at a press conference on Sept. 24.

The Pakistani thrust in the Chhamb sector, he said, could not have been contained by action inside Kashmir alone, and it had therefore been necessary to open another front to relieve the military pressure. India had had only a limited number of troops and tanks in Kashmir, and it was a long way to send reinforcements; for Pakistan, on the other hand, it had been easy to move troops across the international boundary, as all her bases in West Pakistan were only a few miles from the cease-fire line. A Pakistani advance on Akhnur and Jammu would have bottled up all the Indian troops in Kashmir, and achieved the political object which the infiltrators had failed to achieve.

India, he stated, had not intended to capture Lahore, which was very well defended; moreover, an entry into Lahore would only have tied up Indian troops, and the object of causing attrition to Pakistan's armour would have been lost. After the defeat of the Pakistani counter-attack in the Kasur area the situation in the Lahore sector had become one of stalemate, although the Indians had improved their positions and counter-attacked to cause attrition of the Pakistani forces. The diversionary attack in the Sialkot sector had been intended to contain the Pakistani troops in that area; after establishing a salient there the Indian forces had consolidated their position, as the farther they advanced the more they exposed themselves to a flank attack. The attack on the Rajasthan front had also been mainly diversionary, with the object of preventing the Pakistani forces which had taken part in the Rann of Kutch operations from moving north to reinforce the Punjab front.

The *New York Times* on Oct. 12 summed up as follows the military strength and weaknesses of the two sides as displayed in the campaign:

“It is almost impossible to make a judgment on which army performed better. Each side, it scorns, over-estimated the other. Many Pakistanis felt that the much larger Indian force of 825,000 would crush the Pakistani Army of about 200,000. When it didn't, observers in Pakistan interpreted this alone as a major Pakistani victory. In turn, many Indians felt that the Pakistanis, armed with *Pattons* and F-86 *Sabre* jets, might walk through their army, which is equipped with much lighter and older weapons.

“In fact, the opposing forces were much more evenly matched than imagined by either side. India could never mass her superior numbers in the West because so many were committed elsewhere –along the Chinese border in Ladakh and Sikkim, in rebellious Nagaland, and along the East Pakistan border. In turn, the importance of the more modern Pakistani weapons apparently was over-emphasized. In the hands of the relatively uneducated Pakistani soldier the highly complicated *Patton* tanks were virtually useless....”

Estimates of Casualties and Occupied Territory.

Detailed accounts given by either side of specific actions carried out in various sectors of the front showed that the soldiers of both armies had fought with great bravery, and both official and unofficial reports described many acts of courage, initiative, and endurance in which officers and men of the land forces and members of the two air forces had distinguished themselves.

Both sides claimed to have inflicted far heavier losses in men and material than they had themselves suffered. An Indian Defence Ministry spokesman stated on Sept. 25 that 1,333 Indians had been killed, 128 Indian tanks lost, and 35 Indian aircraft destroyed. Against this he estimated Pakistani losses at 4,802 men killed, 475 tanks destroyed or captured, and 73 aircraft destroyed; subsequently it was stated in New Delhi on Nov. 5 that 197 Pakistani tanks had been captured, 115 tanks destroyed, and more than 100 badly damaged. A military spokesman in Rawalpindi, on the other hand, on Sept. 24 gave Pakistani losses in men as 830 killed, compared with 7,000 Indians; overall figures for tank and aircraft losses were not available.

Figures of the enemy territory occupied by each side differed equally widely. India claimed in an official statement on Oct. 7 to have occupied 740 square miles in Pakistan and “Azad Kashmir”—180 square miles in the Sialkot area, 140 in the Lahore area, 150 in Sind, 230 in the Uri-Poonch bulge, 20 in the Tithwal area, and 20 at Kargil. According to the same statement, Pakistan was said to have occupied about 210 square miles of

Indian territory at the time of the cease-fire—190 square miles in the Chhamb area, 20 at Khem Karan, and the post of Munabao on the Rajasthan border.

The Pakistan Government claimed on Sept. 24 that Pakistani forces had occupied 1,617 square miles of Indian territory—340 square miles in the Chhamb area, one square mile in the Lahore sector, 36 at Khem Karan, 40 in the Fazilka area of the Punjab (about 50 miles south of Kasur), and 1,200 in Rajasthan—against 446 square miles of Pakistani territory (including 182 in “Azad Kashmir”) occupied by the Indian Army. These figures were contested by India, which protested on Nov. 8 against a map issued by the Pakistan Government purporting to show in detail the Indian territory held by Pakistani forces.

security Councils Call for Cease-fire. - U Thant's Visit to Pakistan and India.

The security Council unanimously adopted on Sept. 6 a new resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of all armed personnel on both sides to the positions held by them on Aug. 5, and requesting the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to implement the Council's two resolutions, to take all measures possible to strengthen the U.N. Military Observer Group, and to keep the Council promptly informed of the situation in the area.

Mr. Amjad Ali (Pakistan) maintained that underlying India's use of force was her consistent attitude of ignoring every security Council resolution which would have facilitated the implementation of the international agreement of 1949, and demanded that the Council should take action to end “Indian aggression.”

Mr. C. S. Jha (India) contended that Pakistan had “committed aggression against India with the help of weapons obtained from their allies by deceitful means, ostensibly for other purposes.” Pakistan had sent thousands of armed personnel into Kashmir to commit “illegal acts,” and India had merely taken action to seize and destroy the bases from which the attacks had been launched.

U Thant left New York for Rawalpindi and Delhi on Sept. 7, and while passing through London on the following day had a talk with the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Michael Stewart, who gave him the fullest assurance of British support. On arriving in Rawalpindi on Sept. 9 he immediately began consultations with President Ayub Khan and Mr. Bhutto, who were reported to have emphasized that a cease-fire must be accompanied by machinery for implementing the earlier U.N. resolutions on Kashmir. On Sept. 12 he flew to Delhi, where he began talks with Mr. Shastri, Sardar Swaran Singh, and Mr. Chavan.

U Thant on Sept. 12 addressed letters to Mr. Shastri and President Ayub Khan proposing an unconditional cease-fire, to take effect at 6.30 p.m. on Sept. 14, and asking for a reply not later than 7.30 a.m. on Sept. 14. “As soon as this request has been acted upon positively,” the letter added, “I am confident that the security Council will wish to provide the necessary assistance in ensuring supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel on both sides back to the positions held by them before Aug. 5, 1965, as called for by the security Council resolution of September 6...”

In their replies both President Ayub Khan and Mr. Shastri stated that they were prepared to order a cease-fire. President Ayub Khan, however, made it conditional on the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir within three months, whilst Mr. Shastri called for assurances against further armed attacks on India.

President Ayub Khan replied on Sept. 13: “The responsibility for unleashing the present war lies squarely on India, which is seeking to perpetuate her stranglehold on the State of Jammu and Kashmir by means of a military decision. It is this Indian design that lies at the root of the present conflict. It was in pursuance of this same design that India attacked Pakistan on Sept. 6. This was an act of naked aggression. It is astonishing that the cease-fire resolution of Sept. 6, which you are urging us to implement, completely ignores this basic fact.

“Nevertheless, Pakistan is not against a cease-fire as such.... But it must be a purposeful cease-fire.... While you propose a 'cease-fire without condition,' you go on to add that the security Council would, soon after the cease-fire, proceed to implement its resolution of Sept. 6. The provisions of the security Council resolutions of Sept. 4 and 6 that the cease-fire be followed immediately by withdrawal of all armed Pakistani personnel to the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and the consolidation of the cease-fire line through the strengthening of the U.N. Observer Group would result in restoring India's military grip over Kashmir. We would thus merely revert to the same explosive situation which triggered the present conflict....

“We would therefore urge that, if the conflict is to be resolved and this sub-continent spared the horrors of an even wider war, the cease-fire must be accompanied by action which would resolve the real cause of this conflict. This would be possible if the cease-fire is followed immediately by complete withdrawal of the Indian and Pakistan forces from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the induction of a U.N.-sponsored Afro-Asian force to maintain order in the State, and the holding of a plebiscite in the State within three months....”

Mr. Shastri replied on Sept. 14: "We accept your proposal for an immediate cease-fire. We would therefore be prepared to order a cease-fire effective from 6.30 a.m. on Sept. 16 provided you confirm to me by 9 a.m. Sept. 15 that Pakistan is also agreeable to do so.... This will, however, be effective only in respect of armed forces in uniform engaged in the present combat. The problem of the thousands of armed infiltrators who have crossed over into our State of Jammu and Kashmir from the Pakistan side will, I am afraid, continue to remain on our hands.... We must urge that Pakistan should be asked forthwith to withdraw these armed infiltrators. Until that is done, our security forces will have to deal with these raiders effectively....

“In the light of our own experience during the last few months, we will have to insist that there must be no possibility of a recurrence of armed attacks on India, open or disguised... When, consequent upon cease-fire becoming effective, further details are considered, we shall not agree to any disposition which will leave the door open for further infiltrations or prevent us from dealing with the infiltrations that have taken place. I would also like to state categorically that no pressures or attacks will deflect us from our firm resolve to maintain the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country, of which the State of Jammu and Kashmir is an Integral part....”

In a second message of Sept. 14, U Thant stated that he had no right to give undertakings on the conditions and qualifications contained in both Governments' replies, which he would immediately refer to the security Council for urgent consideration; meanwhile he again urged both Governments to order a cease-fire from 6.30 a.m. on Sept. 16. Mr. Shastri replied on Sept. 15 stating that he had not asked for any undertakings, and reaffirming his willingness to order a cease-fire as soon as U Thant could confirm that the Pakistan Government had also agreed to do so. As no reply had been received from Pakistan before U Thant left Delhi for New York later the same day, his cease-fire proposals produced no results.

Before leaving India U Thant addressed a third message to President Ayub Khan and Mr. Shastri, recalling the joint statement issued by India and Pakistan on Nov. 29, 1962, with reference to direct talks between their leaders [see 19541 A], and suggesting that urgent consideration be given to a meeting of the heads of the two Governments, with or without his presence. President Auyb Khan replied later the same day, reaffirming his view that machinery must be evolved for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

“While we are agreeable to stop fighting in principle,” the President said, "I must point out that, despite Pakistan's most earnest efforts, the ministerial-level talks that followed the 1962 agreement proved barren and abortive because of India's firm refusal to arrive at an honourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute.... A cease-fire can be meaningful only if it is followed by such steps as would lead to a lasting and honourable settlement in order to prevent the recurrence of a catastrophe such as now threatens India and Pakistan. To bring about such a settlement, it would be necessary to evolve an effective machinery and procedure that would lead to a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute.”

When the security Council met on Sept. 17 to consider U Thant's report on his mission, the Secretary-General put forward the following suggestions:

(1) "The security Council might now do what it has done once before, and successfully, in another dangerous conflict situation: it could order the two Governments concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to desist from further hostile military action and to this end to issue cease-fire orders to their military forces. The Council might also declare that failure by the Governments concerned to comply with this order would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter.

(2) The security Council may wish to consider what assistance it might provide in ensuring the observance of the cease-fire.

(3) The security Council resolution of Sept. 6 also calls for a prompt withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before Aug. 5, 1965, and the Council may wish to study means of assisting in the carrying out of this requirement.

(4) The Council could request the two heads of Government to meet together at the earliest possible time to discuss the current situation and the problems underlying it as a first step in resolving the outstanding differences between their two countries and in reaching an honourable and equitable settlement. Such a meeting might take place in a country, friendly and acceptable to both. In this connexion, I might draw the attention of the Council to my message of Sept. 15 to Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan, the text of which is set forth in my preliminary report. The Council could also consider the possibility of creating and making available a small committee to assist in such talks should its services seem useful and desirable to the two parties.

(5) Finally, I may again assure the Council of my availability and of my desire to continue to be of assistance in this matter in any way which may commend itself to the Council and to the two Governments."

[Article 40 of the U.N. Charter, to Which U That referred, provides that the Security Council may order two countries to and hostilities. This procedure had only been applied on one previous occasion, during the Palestine War of 1948.]

The security Council debated the situation on Sept. 18.

Mr. Radhakrishnan Ramani (Malaysia) stated that he would support a resolution which (1) acknowledged India's readiness to accept U Thant's call for a cease-fire; (2) regretted that Pakistan could not accept the appeal without conditions; (3) deplored armed infiltration into Kashmir by Pakistan; and (4) called on Pakistan to cease hostilities.

Mr. J. G. de Beus (Netherlands) said that the Council should invoke Article 40, and should also help to ensure that no further infiltrations into Kashmir took place by increasing the strength of the Military Observer Group.

Mr. Fedorenko (Soviet Union) proposed that the Council should insist on the suspension of military operations without further delay, and that after a cease-fire the two sides should negotiate a peaceful settlement of their disputes.

Mr. M. C. Chagla (the Indian Education Minister) said that the Chinese were poised for an invasion or a serious attack on India. He claimed that what was happening on the Chinese border was an extension of the Indo-Pakistani trouble, and that the record was too clear for Pakistan to reject the Indian charge of "complicity" between Pakistan and China. Reaffirming India's willingness to accept an unconditional cease-fire, Mr. Chagla added that if Pakistan obtained a plebiscite in Kashmir "at bayonet point" it would be

“a reward for blackmail and aggression.”

Dr. Waleed Sadi (Jordan) maintained that instead of a simple cease-fire the Council should address itself to the Kashmir issue, which lay at the root of the conflict.

Private discussions took place throughout Sept. 19 on a draft resolution, sponsored by the Netherlands, which envisaged the invocation of Article 40 and Chapter VII of the Charter; the reference to Chapter VII, however, which provides for measures to enforce an order issued under Article 40, including the use of economic and military sanctions as a last resort, had to be removed as a result of strong objections from France and the Soviet Union. The latter proposed that the resolution should emphasize that India had accepted proposals for an unconditional cease-fire, whereas Pakistan had in effect rejected them by insisting on conditions unacceptable to India; this version was accepted by the United States and Britain, but opposed by France. The Western Powers, on the other hand, supported the inclusion of a reference to possible future negotiations on Kashmir, but this was opposed by the Soviet Union.

Agreement was finally reached on the following draft resolution:

“The security Council:

(1) demands that a cease-fire should take effect on Wednesday, Sept. 22, 1965, at 0700 hours GMT, and calls upon both Governments to issue orders for a cease-fire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before Aug. 5, 1965;

(2) requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel;

(3) calls on all States to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation in the area;

(4) decides to consider, as soon as operative paragraph 1 of the Council's resolution of Sept. 6 has been implemented, what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict, and in the meantime calls on the two Governments to utilize all peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter, to this end;

(5) requests the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect to this resolution, to seek a peaceful solution, and to report to the security Council thereon.”

The Council debated the draft resolution in the early hours of Sept. 20.

Mr. S. M. Zafar (the Pakistani Minister for Law) appealed to the Council not to adopt the resolution, which, he said, failed to deal with the basic problem. "Should the Council adopt this draft resolution," he added, "we feel bound to warn and put on record that, unless the basic cause of the present conflict is removed, another and wider conflagration is bound to ensue.”

Mr. Chagla said that as India had already accepted a cease-fire, the resolution could only be directed to Pakistan, and commented that even before the cease-fire had been implemented Mr. Zafar had already issued a threat of new conflict.

The resolution was adopted by 10 votes to nil, with Jordan abstaining. After the vote Mr. Chagla said that India would accept a cease-fire, but Mr. Zafar made no comment.

Violent anti-Western demonstrations took place on Sept. 21 in Karachi, where a mob of about 30,000 students and others, carrying portraits of Mr. Chou En-lai (the Chinese Premier), attacked the Indian High Commission offices, set fire to the U.S. Information Centre, wrecked the British Information Service library, stoned the

U.S. Embassy, the Canadian High Commission, and the offices of British, U.S., and Dutch airlines, and tore down the flag from the U.N. building. Following a strong protest from the U.S. Embassy, the Pakistan Government on Sept. 22 closed all colleges and schools indefinitely and banned all public assemblies for a month.

Cease-fire in Force. - Pakistani Threat to leave United Nations.

At Pakistan's request a special meeting of the security Council was held in the early hours of Sept. 22, at which Mr. Bhutto announced Pakistan's decision to order a cease-fire, but warned the Council that if it did not bring about a settlement of the Kashmir question within a limited time Pakistan would leave the United Nations.

Mr. Bhutto read the following message from President Ayub Khan to the Council:

“Pakistan considers security Council resolution of Sept. 20 as unsatisfactory. However, in the interest of international peace and in order to enable the security Council to evolve a self-executing procedure, which will lead to an honourable settlement of the root cause of the present conflict”—viz., the Jammu and Kashmir dispute—“I have issued the following order to the Pakistan armed forces. They will stop fighting as item 12.05 hours West Pakistan Time today. As from that time they will not fire on enemy forces unless fired upon, provided the Indian Government issues similar orders to its armed forces.”

Mr. Bhutto then made the following statement:

“A cessation of hostilities is not enough. The security Council—the most important organ of the U.N.—must now address itself to the heart of the problem. For 18 years it has played and toyed with the future of Kashmir. It can no longer make a plaything or a toy out of 5,000,000 people. It is the moral responsibility of the security Council to address itself to a meaningful, a lasting solution of the problem of Jammu and Kashmir....”

“If now, after this last chance that we are giving the security Council, it does not put its full force, full moral responsibility, and full weight behind an equitable and honourable settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, Pakistan will have to leave the United Nations. We have decided to give the U.N. a last opportunity to determine what it can do towards a purposeful, peaceful, and lasting settlement of the problem of Jammu and Kashmir. We shall give the U.N. a time-limit. Within a certain period of time, if the security Council is not able to act in accordance with the responsibility placed on it, in accordance with its honour under the Charter—which believes in self-determination—Pakistan will have to withdraw from the United Nations....”

President Ayub Khan announced the Government's decision in a broadcast shortly after, in which he praised the “moral support” given to Pakistan by China.

“We have agreed to the cease-fire to prove to the world our determination to pursue the path of peace,” the President said. “World Powers represented in the security Council have given us firm assurance of their awareness of the gravity of the Kashmir dispute and of the urgency to resolve it. I hope that in the interest of international peace they will take immediate steps to translate these assurances into concrete steps which should lead us to an honourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute. In our struggle we received the support of all those who believe in peace and freedom. The moral support which the Chinese Government extended to us so willingly and so generously will for ever remain enshrined in our hearts....” In conclusion, President Ayub Khan also paid tribute to the support which Pakistan had received from Indonesia, Persia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria.

After hearing Mr. Bhutto, the security Council agreed to extend the deadline for a cease-fire to 10 p.m. G.M.T. on Sept. 22 (3.30 a.m. on Sept. 23 by Indian summer time). U Thant informed the Council that about

100 military observers, with logistical and staff support, and 60 supporting civilian personnel would be needed to supervise the cease-fire and the withdrawal of forces to their positions on Aug. 5. General Nimmo and the Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine had agreed to provide observers pending the arrival of new observers.

Announcing the cease-fire in the *Lok Sabha* on Sept. 22, Mr. Shastri revealed that India had rejected a suggestion that she should order a unilateral cease-fire.

Mr. Shastri said that after Pakistan had failed to respond to the security Council's call for an immediate cease-fire, the Government had received a message from U Thant asking India to order a unilateral cease-fire, with the proviso that Indian troops could fire back if attacked. The Government had rejected this suggestion, as it was "just not possible for one side to ask its soldiers to cease firing, leaving the other side to continue the operations."

The cease-fire came into effect as ordered at 3.30 a.m. on Sept. 23. The "Voice of Kashmir" radio announced on the same day, however, that the cease-fire would not be observed by the "Revolutionary Council."

The international reactions to the Indo-Pakistani War, especially the Chinese threat to reopen hostilities on India's northern border—which was, however, later withdrawn—will be described in a subsequent article, together with the further U.N. attempts to enforce the implementation of the cease-fire and to bring about the mutual withdrawal of the forces of both sides to the borders existing before the outbreak of large-scale hostilities.—(Indian and Pakistan High Commissioners' Offices, London - Indian Information Service, New Delhi - Government Press Information Department, Rawalpindi - U.N. Information Centre, London - U.N. Monthly Chronicle - The Hindu, Madras - The Statesman, Calcutta Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - New York Times)

(Prev. rep. Kashmir Cease-Fire Line, 21065 A; Rann of Kutch Fighting, 20927 A; Kashmir, 20917 A.)

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