

DECEMBER 4-11, 1965.

A. INDIA - PAKISTAN. — Pakistani Infiltration of Indian Kashmir. — Pakistani Posts in "Azad Kashmir" occupied by Indian Forces. — Pakistani Offensive in Jammu. — Indian Invasion of West Pakistan. — Cease-Fire accepted at Security Council's Demand. — Pakistani Threat to leave U.N. — Security Council Debates.

The most serious crisis to date in Indo-Pakistani relations, resulting in large-scale fighting between their armed forces, was precipitated when on Aug. 5 armed infiltrators from "Azad Kashmir" (the Pakistani area of Kashmir) began entering Indian Kashmir in an unsuccessful attempt to foment a revolt. In order to prevent further raiders from crossing the cease-fire line, the Indian forces occupied a number of points on the Pakistani side from Aug. 16 onwards. The Pakistan Army launched an offensive into Jammu on Sept. 1, threatening to cut communications between India and Kashmir, whereupon the Indian Army invaded West Pakistan in three sectors during Sept. 6-8. Fighting continued until Sept. 23, when a cease-fire came into force at the demand of the U.N. Security Council. While the fighting was in progress the Chinese Government, which had announced its full support for Pakistan, delivered an ultimatum on Sept. 16 threatening war unless India dismantled its fortifications on the Sikkim-Tibet border; the ultimatum was withdrawn on Sept. 22, however.

Relations between India and Pakistan remained tense after the cease-fire, as each continued to occupy considerable areas of the other's territory and repeated clashes took place between the two armies. Attempts by the U.N. Secretary-General, U Thant, to negotiate their withdrawal produced no effect, as Pakistan insisted that military disengagement must be accompanied by an attempt to secure a political settlement in Kashmir, this condition being rejected by India. Details of these and related developments are given below.

Pakistani Infiltration of Indian Kashmir.

It was announced in New Delhi on Aug. 7-8 that from Aug. 5 onwards armed infiltrators, mostly belonging to the "Azad Kashmir" forces and generally in civilian clothes, had begun crossing the cease-fire line from "Azad Kashmir" into Indian Kashmir and also entering Jammu from West Pakistan at some points, in order to commit acts of sabotage and foment disturbances.

In Rawalpindi it was claimed that a popular rising had occurred, and a radio station calling itself the "Voice of Kashmir" began broadcasting on Aug. 8, announcing that an armed revolt had broken out in Indian Kashmir, that a "Revolutionary Council" had been set up to lead an "all-out war of liberation," and that all Kashmiris who co-operated with the Indian authorities would be shot. Indian and Kashmir Government spokesmen, however, categorically denied that there was any rebellion, and claimed that the population were actively helping the security forces to round up the infiltrators. The Indian Government stated that the "Voice of Kashmir" was broadcasting from near Muzaffarabad (the capital of "Azad Kashmir").

Mrs. Indira Gandhi (the Indian Minister of Information), who had just returned from a five-day visit to Srinagar, said on Aug. 13 that announcements by the "Voice of Kashmir" were obviously being made in accordance with the programme laid down for the infiltrators. For example, it had referred to anti-Indian posters being stuck up in Srinagar and the Jammu-Srinagar road being cut; in fact there were no such posters in Srinagar, as the infiltrators had been caught on the way and the posters confiscated, whilst the Jammu-Srinagar road was open.

Western correspondents in Kashmir confirmed the Indian claim that there was no revolt in the State. The *New York Times* said on Oct. 12: "Reporters who were in Kashmir at the time saw no evidence of an internal rebellion. The . . . Kashmiris seemed more concerned with selling rugs and renting houseboats to the tourists than in taking up arms for freedom. Some Kashmiris undoubtedly did hide and feed the infiltrators. There is evidence that some also may have helped set up caches of arms in Srinagar. But the uprising that Pakistan apparently counted on never occurred. . . ."

The Indian Government stated on Aug. 13 that interrogation of captured infiltrators, including two Pakistan Army officers, had established that training for the operation had begun in May, and that a military headquarters had been set up under the command of Major-General Akhtar Hussain Malik, G.O.C. 12th Division, at Murree (West Pakistan), where President Ayub Khan had addressed all officers connected with the operation in July. The infiltrators, who included

regular Pakistani soldiers, members of the "Azad Kashmir" battalions of the Pakistan Army, and armed civilian *mujahids* ("fighters for the faith") from "Azad Kashmir," had received intensive training in guerrilla tactics, and had been instructed to raid Indian Army headquarters and supply and ammunition dumps, destroy bridges, lay ambushes, disrupt lines of communications, and attack troops, convoys, and pro-Indian leaders.

The infiltrators entered Indian Kashmir in small groups at points all along the 470-mile cease-fire line, and after assembling at predetermined points began operating in units of 50 to 100 men. The main body converged on Srinagar from the north, the north-west, and the south-west; it was believed to be their intention to seize the city on Aug. 9 (the 12th anniversary of the first arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, when the Plebiscite Front planned to hold a *hartal*), and to broadcast a proclamation announcing the formation of a "National Government of Kashmir." The plan failed because many of the infiltrators were intercepted by the Indian forces within a few miles of the cease-fire line, though a number of them succeeded in reaching Srinagar, where firing occurred on the outskirts on Aug. 10 and 13. Fire was set to an oil depot in the suburb of Batmalu on Aug. 14; about 300 houses were burnt down, and when police and fire engines reached the spot they were fired on. Indian reports stated that the fire had been caused by infiltrators, while official Pakistani statements put the blame on the Indian forces.

According to Indian sources, infiltrators set fire to a village near Gulmarg (west of Srinagar) on Aug. 9 and killed 21 villagers whom they suspected of giving information to the Indian security forces; Indian troops attacked the raiders, killing 36 of them. In the Chhamb sector a police station 40 miles from Jammu was twice attacked unsuccessfully on Aug. 11 and 22 by infiltrators equipped with rocket-launchers, two-inch mortars, and machine-guns. Infiltrators made an unsuccessful attempt on Aug. 18 to blow up the Wuyil bridge 19 miles from Srinagar on the Srinagar-Leh road, by which the Indian forces in Ladakh are supplied; in other attacks by infiltrators on the same road between Kargil and Leh, a bridge was damaged.

The Kashmir Government decided on Aug. 20 to distribute thousands of rifles to villagers living near the cease-fire line for defence against the infiltrators. A village 10 miles from Srinagar was set on fire on Aug. 23, apparently because the villagers had given information to the security forces. Two major clashes between the infiltrators and the Indian forces took place on Aug. 29, when according to Indian announcements 49 infiltrators were killed in the southern sector and 27 in the Kashmir valley.

Further parties of infiltrators were reported to be entering Indian Kashmir from Aug. 18 onwards. The total number of infiltrators, at first given as 1,200, was later estimated at up to 5,000. The Indian Government published on Sept. 15 a document, said to be a communication from General Malik dated Aug. 29, containing directives to a new batch of infiltrators.

The document stated: "I visualize that India will be forced to pull out if a sizable threat is posed in their rear. . . . You will infiltrate across the cease-fire line to operate behind enemy dispositions in Tangdhar-Tithwal area, and cause maximum attrition of enemy potential. . . . You will not undertake set-piece attacks and tie down own troops unnecessarily, thereby causing casualties. The pattern must be to concentrate at a pre-selected target at a fixed time, carry out raids, inflict maximum casualties, cause maximum damage, and disperse in different directions. . . . The principle to follow is not to attach importance to ground features but aim at shock actions and creating maximum possible pressure in the area through concerted and continuous offensive action against his defence headquarters and lines of communication. . . ."

Indian Protest rejected by Pakistan. — Indian Government Statements on Situation in Kashmir.

The Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, Mr. Kewal Singh, presented a strong protest against the infiltration of forces from the Pakistan side to the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mr. Bhutto, on Aug. 10. Mr. Singh was reported to have warned Mr. Bhutto that India took a very grave view of the situation, and that unless Pakistan immediately stopped the infiltration "most serious consequences" would result. The protest was rejected by Mr. Bhutto, who declared in a press statement that "by no stretch of the imagination can the blame for whatever is happening in Kashmir be put on Pakistan," and who claimed on Aug. 12 that India alone was responsible for the "uprising" in Kashmir.

In a broadcast on Aug. 13 the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Shastri, warned Pakistan that "force will be met with force."

"There is no doubt," Mr. Shastri said, "that this is a thinly disguised armed attack on our country organized by Pakistan, and it has to be met as such. . . . Pakistan has on the one hand sought to deny its complicity and on the other has put herself forward as the chief spokesman for the infiltrators. The world

will recall that Pakistan created a similar situation in 1947, and then also she initially pleaded innocence. Later she had to admit that her own regular forces were involved in the fighting.

"Pakistan is trying to conjure up the spectre of some people in revolt. It is talking of some 'Revolutionary Council' and a lot of other things. All this is a mere figment of Pakistan's imagination. Pakistani propaganda is blatantly and completely untrue. The people of Jammu and Kashmir have shown remarkable fortitude. They still remember how the Pakistani raiders pillaged and plundered on an earlier occasion. There is no revolution in Kashmir, nor is there any 'Revolutionary Council.' The people of Jammu and Kashmir have in fact themselves given the lie to Pakistan's propaganda.

"The more important question before us now is not that of these infiltrators and their activities, because we are quite clear as to what to do with them. The real question is that of our relations with Pakistan. In April last they committed naked aggression on our Kutch border. We left them in no doubt, however, that if they did not vacate the aggression forthwith, we would have to take requisite military steps to get the aggression vacated. Eventually the armed forces of Pakistan had to go back from Indian soil, and it was reasonable to hope that our mutual relations might take a turn for the better. In this context it is amazing that Pakistan should have embarked upon yet another adventure. On this occasion the method adopted and the strategy used show signs of a new tutelage, possibly a new conspiracy. Only one conclusion is now possible. Pakistan has probably taken a deliberate decision to keep up an atmosphere of tension. Peace apparently does not suit its intentions.

"We have therefore to reckon with this situation in a realistic manner. We have to reorientate our thinking and our policies to deal with the dangers that threaten our country. We have also to state our views categorically so that there are no miscalculations. If Pakistan has any ideas of annexing any part of our territories by force, it should think afresh. I want to state categorically that force will be met with force, and aggression against us will never be allowed to succeed. . . ."

Mr. Shastri said in an interview with the *New York Times* on Aug. 21 that India could not "go on for ever pushing the Pakistanis off its territory," and that "if this continues we will have to carry the fight to the other side." This warning was repeated on Aug. 23 by Mr. Y. B. Chavan (Defence Minister), who told the *Lok Sabha* that "whenever it was found necessary even to go across the cease-fire line in order to defend the cease-fire line and other areas we have done so. And if it is found necessary, I have no doubt that we will not fail to do that again."


Fighting on Cease-fire Line. - Indian Crossings of Line and Occupation of Pakistani Posts.

The number of incidents on the cease-fire line in Kashmir, which had reached an unprecedented level in May and June and for which responsibility was attributed by the U.N. to both sides [see below], declined after the signing of the cease-fire agreement in the Rann of Kutch on June 29. Exchanges of fire all along the line became increasingly frequent after Aug. 8, however; Mr. Chavan claimed on Aug. 16 that the Pakistani forces had "stepped up their activities inordinately, as if to give cover to the infiltrators and to distract the security forces from dealing with them."

According to Indian reports, Pakistani troops attacked an Indian post north-east of Poonch on Aug. 8; attempted unsuccessfully to cross the cease-fire line in battalion strength in the Chhamb sector on Aug. 14 under cover of artillery fire; and shelled Indian posts in the Poonch and Tithwal sectors on the same day. U.N. observers reported heavy and prolonged artillery fire across the line from the Pakistani side in the Chhamb sector on Aug. 15-16. Indian sources claimed on Aug. 16 that regular Pakistani troops had taken up positions along certain sectors of the line, replacing the "Azad Kashmir" forces.

On Aug. 16 Indian troops crossed the cease-fire line in the Kargil sector, where Pakistani forces were reported to have tried to cut the Srinagar-Leh road, and occupied two Pakistani posts. India had previously occupied these posts in May, but had withdrawn at the request of the U.N. after receiving assurances that U.N. observers would be posted in the area [see 21065 A]. Exchanges of fire meanwhile continued in the Chhamb, Mendhar, Poonch, Uri, and Tithwal sectors; U.N. observers reported that Pakistani troops had shelled the town of Poonch on Aug. 19, 26, and 28, and that Indian troops in the Chhamb sector had shelled a village in West Pakistan on Aug. 25.

Indian troops occupied two Pakistani posts in the Tithwal sector on Aug. 24, and a third on the following day. Mr. Chavan told the *Lok Sabha* on Aug. 25 that the operation had been undertaken "in order to prevent further infiltration and keep watch on the retreat routes of the Pakistani raiders." According to *The Hindu*, "these three posts are located on two separate mountains 8,000 feet high, and it is through the gap between them that one column of Pakistani raiders crossed into the Kashmir Valley, and then they moved on to the



The Cease-fire Line in Kashmir.
(*The Hindu*, Madras)

the Indian forces, that Indian civil administration had been extended to them. An Indian Government spokesman said on the following day that India would keep permanent control over the area to prevent further Pakistani infiltration.

Pakistani Offensive in Jammu.

"Azad Kashmir" forces backed by Pakistan Army formations and supported by aircraft and about 70 *Panther* tanks crossed the cease-fire line in the early morning of Sept. 1 in the Bimber sector of the Chhamb area, at the southern end of the cease-fire line, under cover of a heavy artillery barrage. It was believed that Pakistan had attacked in this sector, where the flat terrain is suitable for the use of tanks, to enable her to exploit her American-built armour. Pakistani spokesmen claimed that their forces had occupied the posts of Chhamb and Dewa, about seven miles from the cease-fire line, and that four Indian aircraft had been shot down; the Indian Government admitted that two of its aircraft were missing and two damaged, but claimed that 13 Pakistani tanks had been destroyed.

In a broadcast on Sept. 1 President Ayub Khan declared that "the threat of war in Kashmir" was "being forced on us by India." Claiming that the people of Kashmir had "risen in open revolt," he accused the Indian forces of setting fire to villages, shooting men, women, and children, and being responsible for the burning of Batmalu. "India blames us for supporting these valiant fighters against Indian tyranny," he continued. "We are doing no more than what we have always pledged to do, which is to support the people of Kashmir in exercising their right of self-determination." He concluded by declaring that "in this supreme hour of their trial the people of Kashmir will rise like one man and give a befitting reply to Indian aggression."

Replying to President Ayub Khan's allegations, Mr. Shastri said in a broadcast on Sept. 3: "We have dealt successfully with hundreds of infiltrators. As a measure of self-defence, we have had to take military action to occupy strategic posts, crossing the cease-fire line in order to blast the roots of the infiltrators. Some bands of raiders, however, are still attempting to come with the full backing of the Pakistan Army. Pakistan denied responsibility for such infiltrators. The Pakistan Government has endeavoured to create a myth, and this myth has been reiterated in President Ayub Khan's broadcast on Sept. 1, which said that the infiltrators are freedom fighters and there was an internal

On Aug. 26 Indian troops crossed the cease-fire line in another area, viz. south of Uri, where *The Hindu* said "the cease-fire line between Uri and Poonch runs along a huge bulge of mountain which projects like a dagger for about 30 or 40 miles inside the Kashmir Valley." Mr. Chavan stated in the *Lok Sabha* on Aug. 30 that Pakistani infiltrators had moved from bases in this bulge towards Gulmarg and the Valley and were being supplied from these bases. The Indian forces, he added, had occupied the Haji Pir pass (an 8,600-foot defile through the Pir Panjal mountains), which was the main route through which the raiders had been moving, the 12,600-ft. hill feature of Bedore, and seven other posts.

Mr. G. R. Kar, a member of the Kashmir Ministry, announced on Aug. 30, during a visit to 14 villages in the Uri-Poonch bulge which had been occupied by

The Pakistani forces continued to advance during Sept. 2-5, though more slowly, and on Sept. 3 crossed the Manawar Tari river, a tributary of the Chenab, after the Indian forces had repulsed one attempted crossing. Air activity meanwhile continued, both sides using fighters to attack enemy vehicles and command posts. Pakistani aircraft bombed the village of Jaurian (18 miles from the cease-fire line) on Sept. 2; according to Indian reports, the village was set on fire, a mosque bombed, and about 50 civilians killed. Pakistani announcements claimed that six Indian fighters had been shot down in air battles over "Azad Kashmir" on Sept. 3-4, whilst Indian spokesmen claimed that four Pakistani *Sabre* jets had been shot down in the battle zone during the same period.

The Pakistani forces captured the key post of Jaurian on Sept. 5. This success brought them within six miles of the road junction of Akhnur, the fall of which would have cut the only road to the Poonch area and threatened the Jammu-Srinagar road.

Efforts by U Thant to secure Cease-fire. - Security Council Meeting.

U Thant expressed his serious concern to the Pakistani representative at the U.N. on Aug. 9 at the situation created by the crossing of the cease-fire line by the infiltrators, and appealed that the line should be observed. On the same day he asked the Indian representative to convey to his Government an urgent appeal for restraint in any retaliatory action. The Indian Government subsequently gave an assurance that it would respect the cease-fire agreement if Pakistan did likewise; the Pakistani Government did not reply to U Thant's appeal.

In view of the continuing deterioration in the situation, U Thant submitted to the two Governments on Aug. 16 a statement on the cease-fire violations which he proposed to publish. The Indian Government agreed to its publication, subject to certain modifications; the Pakistani Government opposed it, on the ground that the statement dealt only with the current situation without presenting the political background. U Thant accordingly decided against publication, but suggested to the two Governments on Aug. 20 that Dr. Ralph Bunche (U.N. Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs) should visit India and Pakistan to explore ways of preventing any further deterioration in the situation. On Aug. 24, however, he announced that he had abandoned this plan, as "the subsequent responses of the two parties, while not negative, involve in each case conditions which in my view would make the mission not feasible at this time." According to Indian sources, India had insisted that Dr. Bunche should only determine responsibility for the cease-fire violations and means of preventing them, whereas Pakistan maintained that he should consider the whole Kashmir issue.

At U Thant's request, Lieut.-General Robert Nimmo, the head of the U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), visited New York on Aug. 26-30 for consultations. U Thant subsequently published on Sept. 4 a report on developments to date, based on General Nimmo's evidence, which confirmed the Indian account of the origin of the latest fighting.

After stating that "the cease-fire agreement . . . has collapsed, although I hope only temporarily," U Thant reported that "there has been a disturbing increase in the number of incidents involving violations of the C.F.L. [cease-fire line] since the beginning of 1965. In mid-June of this year, for example, General Nimmo reported that during the previous five months a total of 2,231 complaints from both sides charging violation of the cease-fire had been submitted to UNMOGIP. Most of these involved firing across the C.F.L., although some concerned crossings of the line by armed men. As of that date, 377 violations in all categories had been confirmed by investigations of the observers, 218 of which were committed by Pakistan and 159 by India. . . ."

On the origin of the present crisis, U Thant stated: "General Nimmo has indicated to me that the series of violations that began on Aug. 5 were, to a considerable extent on subsequent days, in the form of armed men generally not in uniform crossing the C.F.L. from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side. This conclusion was reached by General Nimmo on the basis of investigation by U.N. observers in the light of the extensiveness and character of the raiding activities and their proximity to the C.F.L., even though in most cases the actual identity of those engaging in armed attacks on the Indian side of the line and their actual crossing of it could not be verified by direct observation or evidence." The report went on to summarize subsequent developments, including the incidents on the cease-fire line, the Indian occupation of Pakistani posts in the Kargil, Tithwal, and Uri areas, the Pakistani offensive in the Chhamb area, and U Thant's negotiations with the two Governments.

"The restoration of the cease-fire and the return to normal conditions along the C.F.L.", the report concluded, "can be achieved only under the following conditions:

- (1) Willingness of both parties to respect the agreement they have entered into;
- (2) Readiness on the part of the Government of Pakistan to take effective steps to prevent crossings of the C.F.L. from the Pakistan side by armed men, whether or not in uniform;
- (3) Evacuation by each party of positions of the other party now occupied and withdrawal of all armed personnel of each party to its own side of the line, which would include withdrawal once more of Indian troops from Pakistan positions in the Kargil area;
- (4) Halt by both parties to firing across the C.F.L. that has been occurring from both sides, in some sectors with artillery and smaller guns;
- (5) Allowing full freedom of movement and access to U.N. observers by both parties on both sides of the line."

On Sept. 1 U Thant sent identical messages to Mr. Shastri and President Ayub Khan, appealing to both countries to respect the cease-fire line and to withdraw their forces that had crossed it.

"Since Aug. 5," U Thant stated, "there has been an unprecedented number of acts of violence along or in the vicinity of the cease-fire line in Kashmir. Without any attempt to apportion blame, it may be said that such actions now come from both sides of the line. . . . India and Pakistan freely entered into a cease-fire agreement at Karachi in July 1949. . . . That agreement is now being so widely disregarded as to be reduced to little consequence. An outright military confrontation between the armed forces of India and Pakistan is threatened and may be imminent, which can have only the gravest implications for the peace of the world. . . ."

"I fully realize the very great complexities of the Kashmir problem for your Government. I cannot believe, however, that it poses problems which could not be solved ultimately by peaceful processes, or that these problems can ever be really solved by military action. . . . I appeal to you most earnestly, in the interests of peace in your area and in the world, to indicate immediately your intention henceforth to respect the cease-fire agreement. Essential, of course, to the restoration of the cease-fire would be a cessation of crossings of the C.F.L. by armed personnel from both sides of the line, the withdrawal of armed personnel of each side that have occupied positions on the other party's side of the line, and a halt to all firing across the C.F.L. from either side of it. . . ."

In his reply, published on Sept. 4, Mr. Shastri emphasized the necessity for Pakistan to withdraw the infiltrators and to prevent further infiltration.

"On the basis of your own assessment," he wrote, "it is clear that the root cause of the present dangerous situation is the undertaking of massive infiltrations of armed personnel from the Pakistan side, well organized and trained in sabotage and subversive warfare, the whole operation being conceived, planned, and executed by Pakistan. The infiltrators are, in fact, members of the Pakistani armed forces. These infiltrations are still continuing. Such action by Pakistan is a clear violation of the Charter of the U.N. and of the cease-fire agreement. . . . It is to meet this thinly disguised invasion that the Government of India, while showing every forbearance, has been forced to take preventive military action. . . . While I appreciate the motivations of your appeal, I have to point out that the terms of your message are such as might leave the impression that we are responsible equally with Pakistan for the dangerous developments that have taken place. Unless your message is read in the context of the realities of the situation as they have developed, it tends to introduce a certain equation between India and Pakistan, which the facts of the situation do not bear out. . . ."

"Even on their own admission, as indicated in President Ayub Khan's broadcast of Sept. 1, the Pakistani forces have gone to the assistance of the infiltrators, whom Pakistan chooses to call 'freedom fighters.' There is no pretence in it of any kind of defensive action, and the Pakistani attack clearly constitutes aggression. . . . We have neither the inclination nor is it in our interest to be deviated from the path of peace and economic progress to that of military conflict. Pakistan has, however, by sending armed infiltrators in large numbers across the cease-fire line, brought about a situation in which we have no choice but to defend ourselves and take such preventive action as may be deemed essential. In taking such preventive action we have, in certain sectors, had to cross the cease-fire line for the purpose of effectively preventing further infiltrations. . . ."

"In April this year Pakistan launched a military attack on our territory in the Rann of Kutch. . . . In spite of such provocation, we showed forbearance and reached an agreement with Pakistan on June 30 for the peaceful settlement of the border question. The hope was solemnly expressed by both sides in the agreement that it would result in better relations between India and Pakistan and in the easing of tensions between the two countries. It is now clear, however, that even when Pakistan was putting its signature to that agreement it was planning and organizing the massive armed infiltrations across the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir, even before the ink was dry on that agreement. We cannot be expected to wait for Pakistan to violate the cease-fire

attacked the Indian High Commission offices, set fire to the U.S. Information Centre, wrecked the British Information Service library, stoned the U.S. Embassy, the Canadian High Commission, and the offices of British, U.S., and Dutch airlines, and tore down the flag from the U.N. building. Following a strong protest from the U.S. Embassy, the Pakistan Government on Sept. 22 closed all colleges and schools indefinitely and banned all public assemblies for a month.

Cease-fire in Force. - Pakistani Threat to leave United Nations.

At Pakistan's request a special meeting of the Security Council was held in the early hours of Sept. 22, at which Mr. Bhutto announced Pakistan's decision to order a cease-fire, but warned the Council that if it did not bring about a settlement of the Kashmir question within a limited time Pakistan would leave the United Nations.

Mr. Bhutto read the following message from President Ayub Khan to the Council:

"Pakistan considers Security Council resolution of Sept. 20 as unsatisfactory. However, in the interest of international peace and in order to enable the Security Council to evolve a self-executing procedure, which will lead to an honourable settlement of the root cause of the present conflict"—viz., the Jammu and Kashmir dispute—"I have issued the following order to the Pakistan armed forces. They will stop fighting as from 12.05 hours West Pakistan Time today. As from that time they will not fire on enemy forces unless fired upon, provided the Indian Government issues similar orders to its armed forces."

Mr. Bhutto then made the following statement:

"A cessation of hostilities is not enough. The Security Council—the most important organ of the U.N.—must now address itself to the heart of the problem. For 18 years it has played and toyed with the future of Kashmir. It can no longer make a plaything or a toy out of 5,000,000 people. It is the moral responsibility of the Security Council to address itself to a meaningful, a lasting solution of the problem of Jammu and Kashmir. . . ."

"If now, after this last chance that we are giving the Security Council, it does not put its full force, full moral responsibility, and full weight behind an equitable and honourable settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, Pakistan will have to leave the United Nations. We have decided to give the U.N. a last opportunity to determine what it can do towards a purposeful, peaceful, and lasting settlement of the problem of Jammu and Kashmir. We shall give the U.N. a time-limit. Within a certain period of time, if the Security Council is not able to act in accordance with the responsibility placed on it, in accordance with its honour under the Charter—which believes in self-determination—Pakistan will have to withdraw from the United Nations. . . ."

President Ayub Khan announced the Government's decision in a broadcast shortly after, in which he praised the "moral support" given to Pakistan by China.

"We have agreed to the cease-fire to prove to the world our determination to pursue the path of peace," the President said. "World Powers represented in the Security Council have given us firm assurance of their awareness of the gravity of the Kashmir dispute and of the urgency to resolve it. I hope that in the interest of international peace they will take immediate steps to translate these assurances into concrete steps which should lead us to an honourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute. In our struggle we received the support of all those who believe in peace and freedom. The moral support which the Chinese Government extended to us so willingly and so generously will for ever remain enshrined in our hearts. . . ." In conclusion, President Ayub Khan also paid tribute to the support which Pakistan had received from Indonesia, Persia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria.

After hearing Mr. Bhutto, the Security Council agreed to extend the deadline for a cease-fire to 10 p.m. G.M.T. on Sept. 22 (3.30 a.m. on Sept. 23 by Indian summer time). U Thant informed the Council that about 100 military observers, with logistical and staff support, and 60 supporting civilian personnel would be needed to supervise the cease-fire and the withdrawal of forces to their positions on Aug. 5. General Nimmo and the Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine had agreed to provide observers pending the arrival of new observers.

Announcing the cease-fire in the *Lok Sabha* on Sept. 22, Mr. Shastri revealed that India had rejected a suggestion that she should order a unilateral cease-fire.

Mr. Shastri said that after Pakistan had failed to respond to the Security Council's call for an immediate cease-fire, the Government had received a message from U Thant asking India to order a unilateral cease-fire, with the proviso that Indian troops could fire back if attacked. The Government had rejected this suggestion, as it was "just not possible for one side to ask its soldiers to cease firing, leaving the other side to continue the operations."

The cease-fire came into effect as ordered at 3.30 a.m. on Sept. 23. The "Voice of Kashmir" radio announced on the same day, however, that the cease-fire would not be observed by the "Revolutionary Council."

The international reactions to the Indo-Pakistani War, especially the Chinese threat to reopen hostilities on India's northern border—which was, however, later withdrawn—will be described in a subsequent article, together with the further U.N. attempts to enforce the implementation of the cease-fire and to bring about the mutual withdrawal of the forces of both sides to the borders existing before the outbreak of large-scale hostilities.—(Indian and Pakistan High Commissioners' Offices, London - Indian Information Service, New Delhi - Government Press Information Department, Rawalpindi - U.N. Information Centre, London - U.N. Monthly Chronicle - The Hindu, Madras - The Statesman, Calcutta - Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - New York Times) (Prev. rep. Kashmir Cease-Fire Line, 21065 A; Rann of Kutch Fighting, 20927 A; Kashmir, 20917 A.)

A. UNITED KINGDOM. — National Health Service. - Big Increase in Prescriptions.

The Minister of Health, Mr. Kenneth Robinson, stated in the House of Commons on Nov. 22 that during the period Feb. 1 to Aug. 21, 1965, chemists in England and Wales had dispensed 23,000,000 more prescriptions under the National Health Service than in the corresponding period of 1964, an increase of about 19 per cent; the cost was about £13,000,000, or 22 per cent higher.

Mr. Robinson had been asked by Mr. John Hall (C.) what had been the increase to date in the number and cost of prescriptions under the National Health Service issued since the abolition of prescription charges. The Minister said that, although the increase in the number of prescriptions was a good deal more than had been anticipated before the charge was taken off, the average cost per prescription was lower than anticipated, which seemed to be mainly due to prescribing smaller quantities.

In reply to a further question by Mr. Richard Wood (C.), Mr. Robinson said that it was difficult to analyse the complex causes which led to changes in the size of the drug bill; that perhaps "the degree of deterrence, and perhaps a degree of hardship, which the existence of the charges brought about" had been underestimated; and that there was "no doubt that these figures are not solely the result of the abolition of the charges."

The Ministry of Health said on Nov. 23 that other factors in the unexpected increase in the size of the drug bill might have been changes in the number and age distribution of the population, a continuing trend towards prescribing newer and more expensive drugs, and more cases of illness.

A comment in *The Times* pointed out, however, that changes in the number and age distribution of the population were unlikely to have made more than a marginal difference; that the cost of a prescription had risen only slightly in the past 2½ years; and that the prices of some more expensive drugs had in fact dropped in recent months. On the other hand, figures provided by the Ministry of Pensions showed that there had been a big increase in 1965 in the number of applications for sickness benefit.

A chart published in *The Times* in the same connection showed that the total prescription figures for 1964 were only marginally higher than in 1963, but that from February 1965 onwards the monthly totals had shown a sharp rise. It was also pointed out that in the financial year 1963-64 the 2s. prescription charge accounted for some £22,000,000, or approximately 20 per cent of the total costs, but that since the Exchequer no longer received this contribution it would have to provide altogether about £35,000,000—£40,000,000 more than in 1964.

The General Practitioners' Association suggested on Nov. 23 that indications were that the additional cost to the Exchequer over the financial year would be not far short of £50,000,000. (Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian) (Prev. rep. 20567 C.)

B. NEW ZEALAND. — New Leader of Opposition.

Mr. Norman E. Kirk (42), M.P. for Lyttelton and president of the New Zealand Labour Party, was elected leader of the N.Z. Parliamentary Labour Party on Dec. 9 by a secret ballot of the 35 Opposition members, the voting being 25 to 10; he replaced Mr. Arnold Nordmeyer (64), a former Minister of Finance, who became Leader of the Opposition in 1963 *vice* Sir Walter Nash. Mr. Kirk was elected party leader for a three-year term which will cover the next general elections in 1966; he had been a member of Parliament for only eight years, having entered the House in 1957.

Mr. Hugh Watt (53), a former Minister of Works, was re-elected deputy leader of the N.Z. Parliamentary Labour Party.—(N.Z. High Commissioner's Office, London)

(Prev. rep. 19266 C.)