

KASHMIR

A DISPUTED LEGACY

1846-1990

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THE SECOND KASHMIR WAR 1965

In 1960 President Ayub Khan was thinking about the possibility of some kind of joint Indo-Pakistani defence arrangement, that British dream in the Mountbatten era. During the Sino-Indian crisis of 1962 the Pakistani attitude towards India was still not entirely unfriendly; and it is possible that an appropriate gesture from Jawaharlal Nehru (as, it may be argued, might have appeared but for Nehru's death in May 1964) could have changed the course of the history of the subcontinent. Yet in 1965 India and Pakistan went to war for a second time over title to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, a war which not only affected the disputed territory but overflowed both by land and in the air (and, even, from the sea) into metropolitan India and Pakistan.

One reason for this rapid deterioration in Indo-Pakistani relations undoubtedly lay in the increasing evidence from 1963 onwards that India intended (as indeed there had been signs since at least the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953), sooner or later, to incorporate all of its part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union as just another State, thus unilaterally declaring the Kashmir issue forever closed. It would have required very clear signals indeed from New Delhi to cancel the effects of this impression, and these were not forthcoming.

As we have already seen in Chapter 11, in October 1963 the retiring Prime Minister of Kashmir, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, announced some changes in the State's Constitution which were to come into effect in February 1964. The Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir would be brought more closely into line with the Governments of the other States within the Indian Union and a more direct system of elections for its representatives to the Indian Parliament (*Lok Sabha*) would be instituted (four members, elected for the first time under the new system in 1967). It was clear that Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which provided for a special status for the State of Jammu and Kashmir, was now under considerable pressure; and to observers in Pakistan, like President Ayub Khan, it appeared

to be India's intention to go ahead and effectively annex the State outright. Jawaharlal Nehru, in a speech in the *Lok Sabha* of 27 November 1963, rather confirmed such impressions. He said that a "gradual erosion" of Article 370 was now in progress (certainly an understatement), and he approved of what was happening though he felt that the initiative should come rather from the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir than from the Government of India. In fact, however, there can be no reasonable doubt that the policy announced by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed had full Indian approval following prior consultation; and both in Pakistan and in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir it was seen, probably correctly, as a declaration of official Indian policy.

It is possible that in 1964 after the outbreak of communal disturbances not only in the State of Jammu and Kashmir but also in India and East Pakistan,¹ which resulted from the temporary disappearance of the *Moe-i-Muqaddas* Relic from the Hazratbal shrine, Nehru may have had second thoughts. As we have seen in Chapter 10, the *Moe-i-Muqaddas* crisis was followed by the release of Sheikh Abdullah; and there were influential figures in Indian politics who thought that, as the only leading Kashmiri politician with a mass following, he should be permitted to attempt to mediate not only with the Government of India but also with the authorities in Pakistan. Jawaharlal Nehru, there is evidence to suggest, sympathised with this view, even though Sheikh Abdullah's present attitude was clear enough. "No solution," he announced on 7 May 1964, "will be lasting unless it has the approval of all the parties concerned, namely India, Pakistan, and the people of Kashmir." Jawaharlal Nehru now seemed to be moving towards a position not too far removed from this opinion; and for the first time he appeared to be willing to admit in public that Pakistan *did* possess a genuine right to be interested in the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Thus he did not oppose Sheikh Abdullah's visit to Pakistan in May 1964 at the invitation of President Ayub Khan.²

There was a real chance that Sheikh Abdullah's efforts would lead to the opening of summit talks between President Ayub Khan and Jawaharlal Nehru in a more promising atmosphere than had prevailed at any time since the Kashmir problem began. Nehru at this late stage, there is much evidence to suggest, realised that the mere reiteration of the moral rightness of the Indian case was unlikely to bring about any solution to a problem which was draining the economies of both India and Pakistan and pushing the two nations ever nearer the brink of war. A number of influential voices were now urging that India was duty bound to show its adherence to international morality less by obstinacy than by negotiation. One such spokesman was Jayaprakash Narayan, the veteran leader of the Praja Socialist Party, who interpreted the Kashmir question as "a moral and a political issue"

and not as a dispute over legal technicalities. It was a question which would never be settled by the winning of debating points unaccompanied by conciliatory action.

Jayaprakash Narayan expressed his point of view in two articles, "Our great opportunity in Kashmir", and "The need to rethink", which the *Hindustan Times* published on 20 April and 14 May 1964. He was scornful of the sincerity of much that India had said about the Kashmir plebiscite. As he put it in "Our great opportunity in Kashmir": he might be lacking in patriotism, but he found it difficult to accept that the people of Kashmir had already voted to integrate themselves into India on the basis of the highly suspect 1957 and 1962 elections. Why not give the Kashmiris a real chance to express their views? If India were so sure of their wishes, then what risk would there be?

Jayaprakash Narayan then turned to an argument much exploited by the Indian side against any concessions to Pakistan in Kashmir. Indian apologists from quite an early stage in the dispute had claimed that to permit any decision on the State of Jammu and Kashmir's future to be made on grounds of religion would not only be a victory for the "Two Nation" theory but also would provide the signal for a major outbreak of communal rioting throughout the Indian Republic, the prelude to the disintegration of the Indian secular state (an argument which is still being raised in India in 1991). But, so Jayaprakash Narayan pointed out, this was indeed a silly argument. It implied that the Indian States were held together by force rather than by a sense of common nationality. If true, then the Indian Union would indeed be no more than a tyrant; and its democracy would be a hollow sham.

Jayaprakash Narayan urged, above all, that the Kashmir question be considered by India in the light of not only its own interests but also those of Pakistan. After all, Pakistan actually held nearly one half of the State, and no peaceful settlement of the State's future could possibly be accomplished without its active co-operation. Pakistan was a fact which could not be denied, however much some Indian politicians might dislike it. Moreover, the history of the subcontinent since the Transfer of Power in 1947 had shown beyond doubt that both India and Pakistan could prosper only if they co-operated and there was friendship between them. Indo-Pakistani conflict only disturbed the balance of power in South and Southeast Asia to the benefit of China, a most undesirable state of affairs.

To conclude this remarkable statement, Jayaprakash Narayan observed that while it was not certain that a solution of the Kashmir question would guarantee that India and Pakistan became firm friends, it would be difficult to deny that it would help remove the current state of tension between the two successors to the British Raj. It would, at all events, be an act of statesmanship on the part of India's

leaders to at least experiment with such a fresh approach to the Kashmir problem.

In this second article, "The need to re-think", Jayaprakash Narayan both clarified his views and answered some of the many outraged criticisms which had greeted "Our great opportunity in Kashmir". He made it clear that he was not condoning Pakistani aggression in Kashmir; and he freely admitted that there were moral issues involved on which India should not give ground. However, the mere fact of the Maharaja's accession to India in 1947 had not ended the Kashmir question in practice: it was absurd, therefore, to treat the matter as if it were for ever closed. As he pointed out, no amount of Indian rhetoric could conceal the fact that Pakistan actually controlled Azad Kashmir and that the old State of Jammu and Kashmir was effectively partitioned by a cease-fire line across which the armies of India and Pakistan faced each other. Meanwhile, minorities in both India and Pakistan continued to live in fear.³

There is considerable evidence that by May 1964 Jawaharlal Nehru, who had become a much changed man in the years following the Indian debacle under Chinese attack in late 1962 (and was also, by the beginning of 1964, seriously ill), was impressed by the kind of argument which Jayaprakash Narayan was advancing. There were other possible approaches to the Kashmir question than the insistence on the absolute rightness of the Maharaja's accession to India in October 1947. It was rather insulting to Pakistan to offer the cynical proposal that the cease-fire line be taken as the *de facto* boundary. Perhaps a constitutional device might be found which placed some at least of the disputed State of Jammu and Kashmir under the joint supervision of India and Pakistan: perhaps some more realistic scheme for the partition of the State might be worked out. We will, however, never really know what lay in Jawaharlal Nehru's mind at this time. On 27 May 1964 he died.

The passing of Jawaharlal Nehru undoubtedly marked a point of no return in the history of the Kashmir dispute, though this was not immediately apparent. The momentum of the steps then in progress during the last weeks of his life continued for some time. President Ayub Khan paid moving tribute to the departed leader. Lal Bahadur Shastri, who took on Jawaharlal Nehru's mantle in June, indicated that the new spirit of moderation on Kashmir must be retained as a memorial to the departed leader who to many was the very personification of independent India. Amidst expressions of Indo-Pakistani good will preparations were made for a summit meeting between President Ayub Khan and the new Indian Prime Minister, to take place in the autumn of 1964.

At the same time Jayaprakash Narayan embarked upon an unofficial good will mission to Pakistan: he visited Rawalpindi and Karachi in early September 1964. He concluded that the Pakistani

stand on Kashmir was not as unbending as it once had been: and he felt that much good might come of face to face discussions between President Ayub Khan and Lal Bahadur Shastri. He was, however, to be disappointed. The two leaders met briefly at Karachi airport on 12 October 1964; but their discussions resulted in no dramatic announcements. There were expressions of mutual good will, and provision was made for further exploration of the question at ministerial level, which would at least provide a cooling off period; but nothing more. The general impression was that further progress would have to wait until Lal Bahadur Shastri had time to find his feet in his new position and establish his control over Congress.

It is most probable that Lal Bahadur Shastri at this moment sincerely desired an Indo-Pakistani *detente* over Kashmir; his political position, however, was just too weak to bring it about. Ever since the Chinese disaster of 1962 there had been detected an increasingly jingoist voice in Indian public life. It was not only the extreme Hindu parties who deprecated any Indian concessions to India's external enemies. In the eyes of self-proclaimed patriots from all parts of the spectrum of Indian political life Pakistan stood doubly damned. On the one hand it was the living symbol of the "Two Nation" theory, the challenge to Hindu dominance. On the other hand, it had acted of late as the collaborator with China, India's deadly foe. Lal Bahadur Shastri evidently concluded that Indian public hostility towards Pakistan was too great to be ignored. By December there were unmistakable signs emanating from New Delhi and Srinagar that yet a further stage in the integration of the State of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Republic was about to begin. On 4 December 1964, as we have seen in Chapter 10, the Government of India announced that Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution, which related to the establishment in certain cases of Presidential rule and to the scope of Indian Parliamentary legislation, would now be applied to Kashmir. It seemed probable that soon Article 370 of the Constitution would formally be abrogated, thus completing once and for all the process of the merger of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with India. The announced increase in Indian constitutional powers in the State was greeted with loud cheers in the *Lok Sabha*. There could be no doubt that many Congress supporters felt that Lal Bahadur Shastri's Government had not gone far enough.

All this in Pakistan was interpreted as proof of Indian treachery. The Indians had now gone back, it seemed, on the tacit understanding of the Shastri-Ayub meeting of October 1964 that Kashmir should be put away in cold storage for a while pending further discussions at ministerial level. This was not an opportune moment for such an impression to be created since Pakistan was in the throes of an electoral contest in which President Ayub Khan was faced with the by no means insignificant candidature of Miss Fatima Jinnah, sister

of the founder of Pakistan. President Ayub Khan certainly could not afford to let the Indian action pass without comment, before, during or after the election campaign.

On 3 January 1965 President Ayub Khan won a clear victory in the Presidential election. He now possessed the mandate he needed to face the next phase of the Kashmir crisis which was rapidly to lead to war between India and Pakistan.

It seems more than probable that a key figure in the escalation of the crisis in Indo-Pakistani relations which was to develop during 1965 was the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.⁴ Still in his 30s, clever, dynamic, charismatic, Z.A. Bhutto had acquired enormous influence over President Ayub Khan during the last five years. With Presidential support he was determined to regain for Pakistan in its foreign policy in general, and above all in the Kashmir question, the initiative which had really been held by India ever since the Indian troops landed at Srinagar airfield on 27 October 1947. By January 1965, it is reasonable to assume, Z.A. Bhutto had advised President Ayub Khan that no amount of Pakistani protest was going to prevent the final integration of Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Republic. There was a clear need for the total rethinking of Pakistani policy towards the Kashmir question.

In essence, President Ayub Khan had three choices before him. First: he could continue along the well trodden path of appeals to the Security Council to bring about a plebiscite. Second: he could try to let the Kashmir issue drop gently out of public view, accepting tacitly that the 1949 cease-fire line would be for ever more the Indo-Pakistani border. Third: he could seek out other means hitherto unexplored, diplomatic, political and military, to force some settlement.

It had become obvious by 1962, if not earlier, that the United Nations had not the power to reunite the old State of Jammu and Kashmir any more than it could end the division of Korea or Vietnam, a conclusion which was reinforced in 1964 when the United Nations Security Council twice discussed Kashmir (in February and May) without even reaffirming previous resolutions: all it could manage was to urge India and Pakistan to negotiate with each other and refrain from initiating any violent actions. It had been castrated since 1957 by the Soviet veto, mainly exercised in the Indian interest. All the Security Council had achieved, it must have appeared to Z.A. Bhutto, was to reinforce India's determination to do away with Article 370 secure in the knowledge that international opposition would be negligible.

The second possibility, to persuade the Pakistani people to just forget about Kashmir, offered as little promise as reliance on the endeavours of the United Nations. In East Pakistan, it is true, the Kashmir issue sometimes seemed a trifle remote; but this was not the

case in West Pakistan where public opinion had been so aroused about Kashmir for so long that any attempt by any Government to bury the question would almost certainly produce serious repercussions. Hence, in fact, Z.A. Bhutto must have pointed out to President Ayub Khan, there was no choice but to explore fresh means to keep the Kashmir question open, even if no simple or certain solution might be in sight.⁵

There were two obvious lines of approach. First: in some way Pakistan's great Asian ally, China, perhaps with Indonesia (a State with which Pakistan also had very close relations at this moment before the fall of Sukarno) acting in diplomatic support, could be used to bring pressure on the Indians, to which New Delhi might show a greater response than it had to the urging of the United Nations. The events of 1962 suggested that the Chinese were more than a match, in military terms at least, for the Indians. Second: Pakistan might in some more active way exploit the growing popular disenchantment with Indian control within Indian-held Kashmir. The affair of the disappearance of the *Moe-i-Muqaddas* had given rise to a great deal of Islamic protest in both Jammu and the Vale of Kashmir which some Pakistani observers, Z.A. Bhutto for one, interpreted as evidence that the State was ripe for rebellion. All it needed was to apply the right pressures and give the appropriate stimuli and Kashmiris would rise up *en masse* against their Indian overlords.

While by the beginning of 1965 the Indian attitude to Kashmir had hardened to a point which made compromise seem most unlikely, yet there were factors in the political and economic situation within India itself which suggested that pressure from two directions, China and the population within the Indian part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, might yield dividends. The Indian economy in 1965 was arguably in difficulties. For the first time since independence the Pakistani Rupee stood higher on the free money markets of the world than did the Rupee of India. Indian industrial development had not been matched by a corresponding increase in agricultural output; and a severe food shortage threatened to give rise to much popular discontent with the administrators in New Delhi. Moreover, the Indian Republic was about to face the stresses of regional protest against its ill-advised language policy. On 26 January 1965, Indian Republic Day, Hindi became the official language of the Union. Hopelessly inadequate preparations had been made for this development. The consequences were to be apparent almost immediately, for on 27 January serious rioting broke out in Madras State (Tamilnadu) where Tamil speakers resented the linguistic policy of the Central Government. Disturbances continued throughout February. During January 1965, therefore, it would not have been surprising had Pakistani Intelligence concluded that Prime Minister Lal Bahadur

Shastri was about to face so many internal problems that he would be reluctant to add to them a fresh crisis in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. He might well be prepared, following the application of some pressure, to make significant concessions.

It is probable that these considerations were very much in his mind that President Ayub Khan visited China between 2 and 9 March 1965. The Pakistani leader was enthusiastically, even regally, welcomed in Peking. Discussions were by no means confined to problems relating to the Sino-Pakistani border in the Karakoram Mountains. President Ayub Khan was reported to have sought Chinese economic aid towards Pakistan's third five-year plan. Joint Sino-Pakistani statements were issued on such subjects as nuclear weapons, colonialism and Afro-Asian solidarity. There was, however, also a joint statement on Kashmir in which

the two parties noted with concern that the Kashmir dispute remains unsolved, and consider its continued existence a threat to peace and security in the region. They reaffirmed that this dispute should be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan.⁶

China, in other words, was now making as clear a declaration of support for the Pakistani position that a plebiscite should take place, as the Russians had made in 1955 in support of the Indian position, that the matter had already been decided in India's favour. The fact was certainly noted in New Delhi, whence emerged strong protests against "Sino-Pakistan collusion against India in Kashmir". Indian diplomats doubtless saw their point confirmed when Abdul Hamid Khan, President of Azad Kashmir, publicly thanked Peking for its support.

Shortly after his Chinese visit, in April 1965, President Ayub Khan went to Moscow where he sought to normalise Russo-Pakistani relations and to undermine as far as he could the special relationship which had been growing up between Moscow and New Delhi, a policy which Z.A. Bhutto had been advocating since 1960. At least one observer is convinced that the result was to persuade the Russians to take a more neutral posture in Indo-Pakistani affairs, a decision which was to be of enormous significance in the months ahead.⁷

It is against the background of this "Sino-Pakistani collusion" (in which there can be no doubt many Indian leaders sincerely believed), combined with Russo-Pakistani fence mending, that the next crisis in Indo-Pakistani relations should probably be viewed. During March 1965 there had been a number of shooting incidents between Indian and Pakistani troops along the border between West Bengal and East Pakistan, which indicated the state of tension then prevailing. In April there began a series of far more serious incidents on the border between Indian and West Pakistan in the region of the Rann of Kutch.

The Rann of Kutch separates Sind in West Pakistan from Kutch State in India. For part of the year it consists of dry mud and scrub. During the monsoon it is flooded. The area of the Rann (a word which means "desolate place") is vast, one estimate being 8,400 square miles or a tenth of the area of the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir. Dotted about the mud flats are pieces of higher ground which become islands during the monsoon, some of which are permanently inhabited. In the dry season the Rann is easily crossed by a number of tracks. In the wet it is an impassable barrier.

During British rule there had been a number of disputes between Sind and Kutch State over the Rann, which appears to have had some slight economic value, mainly as a source of salt and a seasonal grazing ground for camels. The British decided on several occasions that the whole area of the Rann fell within Kutch State, the Kutch-Sind border following the southern edge of the Thar Desert. After Partition, Pakistan contested this boundary, maintaining that the Rann was really a sea and that the border between Sind (now part of West Pakistan) and Kutch (now incorporated in the Indian State of Gujrat) should follow a middle line between both shores. This argument is not entirely convincing. Pakistan's claim to the northern part of the Rann, however, should not be dismissed out of hand. The border which the British settled upon between Sind and Kutch was tolerable so long as both regions lay within the same larger political unit, the British Indian Empire. As an international boundary, however, it was quite unsuitable, since it meant, in effect, that the Indo-Pakistani border followed what amounted to a foreshore or beach. As a virtually unpopulated region, there was no good reason why the Rann should not have been partitioned in some way; and such a step would certainly have made Indo-Pakistani relations rather easier. An Indian foothold on the Sind side of the Rann constituted an obvious threat to Karachi, Pakistan's chief port and largest city and, in 1947, Pakistan's capital as well. The Radcliffe Commission of 1947 made no ruling on the Rann of Kutch, which was not included in its brief; but it became the subject of some indecisive Indo-Pakistani argument in 1956.⁸

It is still impossible to say exactly how or why the crisis in the Rann of Kutch began in early 1965. The Indian side has claimed that from the beginning of the year Pakistani forces had been patrolling and establishing posts in Indian territory in the Rann, which, of course, was at that season quite dry. Pakistan, on the other hand, has stated that Indian troops suddenly began intruding north of the line which Pakistan regarded as the legitimate border in the Rann. Whoever started it, there could be no doubt that the result was a series of clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces, including tanks and armoured cars, on a scale which had up to that time only been seen in the Kashmir conflict. Formations of up to brigade strength appear

to have been involved. The Indian side claimed that Pakistan was using in these engagements American made and supplied Patton tanks, weapons which it had been promised would never be used against India. The Pakistan Government denied this allegation, though the Indian Government published photographs which purported to show Patton tanks in use in the Rann.

The real nature of the Rann of Kutch crisis is still obscure. Was Pakistan testing the strength and resolve of the Indian Army here as a kind of dress rehearsal for something contemplated shortly for Kashmir? Was India treating Pakistan to a martial display as a warning against any Kashmir adventures which might at that time be at the planning stage? We do not know. The Rann of Kutch was certainly a battlefield suitable for only the most limited of campaigns. With the coming of the monsoon it turned suddenly from dry ground into a shallow sea. It was a terrain for demonstrations rather than invasions. In the Rann of Kutch affair one has the distinct impression of a reconnaissance in force by both sides, each trying to feel out the other's weakness. Nevertheless, the operations in the Rann carried with them the very real danger of a spread of the conflict to other parts of the Indo-Pakistani border where the monsoon would not guarantee an abrupt termination of hostilities. Rather than risk this, both sides by May were ready for a cease-fire.

British mediation, in which Prime Minister Harold Wilson played a leading part, made a cease-fire possible. On 30 June an agreement was signed by India and Pakistan which brought an end to the Rann of Kutch crisis. The *status quo* as of 1 January 1965 would be restored; and both sides would withdraw to positions which they had occupied before that date. Thereupon Indian and Pakistani officials would meet to discuss some permanent settlement of the disputed Sind-Kutch border. Failing agreement, there was to be reference to a tribunal consisting of an Indian member, a Pakistani member and a neutral Chairman to be nominated jointly by the two parties to the dispute. If India and Pakistan could not agree on the Chairman within a specified period, then they would request the Secretary General of the United Nations to make the selection.

The Prime Minister of India, Lal Bahadur Shastri, experienced some trouble in winning parliamentary support for this agreement. Some members of the *Lok Sabha* made speeches of an extremely bellicose nature, urging, for example, the Indian Government to warn Pakistan that another such crisis would see the Indian Army on the march to Lahore and Karachi. President Ayub Khan, while the cease-fire was being discussed, also delivered himself of grave warnings to India that another Rann of Kutch affair would lead to total war. Once signed, the 30 June agreement proved difficult to implement in full.

Eventually a tribunal was assembled in Geneva with India repre-

sented by a Yugoslav, Ales Bebler, Pakistan by an Iranian, Nasrollah Entezam, presided over by a Swedish Chairman, Gunnar Lagergren. It did not come to a decision until February 1968, when it found rather more in favour of India than of Pakistan (giving India all but 350 square miles out of the 3,500 claimed by Pakistan); but it left Pakistan with just enough to satisfy, or appear to satisfy, honour.⁹ During the course of 1968-69 the adjudicated border in the Rann was demarcated on the ground and formally accepted by both India and Pakistan at a signing ceremony in Rawalpindi in July 1969. The major interest of these proceedings (still in the future in 1965) lies in their demonstration that it is, theoretically at least, possible to submit Indo-Pakistani territorial disputes to international arbitration.

In Indian minds the Rann of Kutch affair was somehow related to President Ayub Khan's dealings with the Chinese. Parallels were drawn between Chinese moves on the eve of the great Himalayan crisis of 1962 and the actions of Pakistan in the Rann. Many Indians, including Cabinet Ministers, were convinced that somehow the Chinese had got at the Government of President Ayub Khan. All this was not entirely rational, but it was easy enough to understand as an inevitable consequence of the Chinese blow to Indian pride in late 1962. In this atmosphere Lal Bahadur Shastri deserves much credit in having been able to convince his own followers of the wisdom of a cease-fire. However, there was a definite limit to Lal Bahadur Shastri's patience and powers of persuasion; and this limit, while the Rann of Kutch crisis had not yet reached the world's headlines, was definitely passed by Sheikh Abdullah.

While away on his *Haj* to Mecca, Sheikh Abdullah visited Algiers. Here, as we have already seen in Chapter 10, on 31 March 1965 he had an interview with the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, during which the Kashmir question was discussed and Sheikh Abdullah received an invitation to visit China. Sheikh Abdullah is said to have accepted, but not to have fixed the date. All this was interpreted in India as evidence that Sheikh Abdullah had now become "a tool of the Pindi-Peking conspiracy against India", to quote one journal or rather extreme views.¹⁰ It simply could not be overlooked.

On his return to India on 8 May 1965, Sheikh Abdullah and his companion Mirza Afzal Beg were arrested and immediately removed to internment in South India. Rioting at once broke out in Srinagar and elsewhere in the Indian part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. On 5 June the two main opposition groups on the Indian side of the cease-fire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Plebiscite Front (which supported Sheikh Abdullah's policy) and the Awami Action Committee (which, as noted in Chapter 10, under the leadership of Mirwaiz Mohammed Farooq had emerged at the time of the *Moe-i-Muqaddas* crisis in 1963-64 to turn into the major

Kashmiri political opposition to Sheikh Abdullah's faction, apparently favouring some form of union with Pakistan) initiated a non-violent civil disobedience campaign (*satyagraha*) for Sheikh Abdullah's release. It was all powerful evidence of an extremely strong surge of popular opinion, at least in the Vale of Kashmir, against the process of the incorporation of the Indian controlled portions of the State into the Republic and the end of Article 370, a process which had been going on steadily throughout the first half of 1965.

By the middle of 1965 it was possible to argue that there was prevailing within Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir a situation which could in some ways be compared to that of the autumn of 1947. In the remoter rural districts of Poonch which remained on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, and in the Vale of Kashmir, opposition to union with India had begun to be reinforced by armed resistance which was, it was appreciated at the time, undoubtedly much encouraged from the Azad Kashmir side of the cease-fire line, whence came not only arms and ammunition but also instructors and volunteers. One immediate consequence was a great increase in tension between the Indian and Pakistani regular forces all along the cease-fire line. The Indians were now on the lookout for parties of "infiltrators", supporters of the Kashmiri "freedom fighters" (terminology from other Cold War and anti-colonial episodes was borrowed to meet the requirements of the Kashmir dispute). A major clash between Indian and Pakistani troops guarding the cease-fire line appears to have occurred on 19 May 1965, when over forty Pakistanis were reported killed. Such incidents became ever more common during June and July 1965.

What was going on? The official Pakistani version is that the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir took to arms against the increase of Indian control in the State; and, but not until August 1965, "freedom-fighters from Pakistan joined in their struggle". These "freedom-fighters", or "mujahidin", were evidently acting on their own initiative.¹¹

The evidence rather suggests that this was by no means the whole truth. In 1947 the Pakistan Government had been accused of officially sending in the Pathan tribesmen and, thereby, precipitating the first Indo-Pakistani Kashmir War. As we have seen, the facts do not support this. The Pathan intervention was a complex business which emerged out of a state of insurrection within the State of Jammu and Kashmir prior to the Maharaja's accession to India. Individual Pakistanis may have been aware of what was happening and have given the process a helping hand; but the Pakistan Government, as such, was innocent of the charges made against it by India at the time and subsequently. In 1965, however, we can definitely see *official* Pakistani policy at work, to a great extent inspired through President Ayub Khan by Z.A. Bhutto.

The full story of Operation Gibraltar (the name which can provide a convenient label for this episode) has yet to be told.¹² What is clear is that a circle of Presidential advisers, in which Z.A. Bhutto was the dominant figure, having been convinced that the State of Jammu and Kashmir was ripe for revolt and being determined to profit by the lessons of 1947, persuaded a group within the Pakistan Government to precipitate matters by sending into Indian controlled territory across the cease-fire line trained guerrillas who would provide both the inspiration and the professional nucleus for a general Kashmiri rising.¹³ This would, perhaps, be supported by the intervention (according to some sources named Operation Malta) of the Armed Forces of Pakistan who, it seemed after the dismal Indian showing against the Chinese in 1962, would be more than a match for any opposition they might encounter. The Indians might be forced to abandon their positions in at least the Vale of Kashmir, or, failing that, be induced to open a meaningful dialogue with Pakistan on the whole problem which, unlike previous discussions, might actually produce results of value.

The name selected for the operation, Gibraltar, is in itself instructive, since it clearly referred to "Tariq", the *nom de guerre* adopted in 1947 by Akbar Khan after the Arab conqueror for whom Gibraltar is in fact named. Planning for Operation Gibraltar may well have started as early as 1964, not long after the *Moe-i-Muqaddas* crisis. A number of training camps were eventually established, mainly in Azad Kashmir (but also in the Punjab), and volunteers recruited (from the Pakistan Army as well as from Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir and elsewhere in Pakistan). The first "mujahidin", it would seem, began to cross the cease-fire line in very small, and experimental, numbers during the winter of 1964-65. The tempo of infiltration increased during the first half of 1965 to reach a climax in July and August. It is not clear on quite what scale all this was planned. Probably the figure 3,000 represents a reasonable estimate of the maximum number of "mujahidin" who could possibly have been recruited and trained (the Indians have not claimed more); and somewhere in the region of 1,000 might be nearer the truth. The Indian side from time to time maintained that there were Chinese specialists behind the training of these guerrillas: of this no firm evidence has ever come to light.

The whole scheme of Gibraltar and its associated Operations suffered from a number of serious flaws.

First: the Kashmiri population on the Indian side of the cease-fire line was not at this period prepared to rise up in rebellion. Demonstrations over Islamic issues, as in the case of the missing *Moe-i-Muqaddas*, were one thing: taking on the might of the Indian Army was quite another matter.

Second: security was defective and Indian Intelligence had a fair

picture of what was being planned long before the summer of 1965.

Third: knowledge of the planned operations was restricted to a very small circle among the Pakistani establishment. Air Marshal Asghar Khan, for example, who commanded the Pakistan Air Force until 23 July 1965, by which time Gibraltar had been running for months, had no idea at all as to what was afoot. This was no way to *prepare for what could well turn out to be a major war*.

Fourth: the planners seriously underestimated the effectiveness of the Armed Forces of India, who had improved enormously since 1962.

Fifth: it was assumed by the planners that, just as in the first Kashmir War in 1947 and 1948, the Indian side would restrict operations to the soil of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and would undertake no offensive against the provinces of metropolitan Pakistan both West and East.

Sixth: no allowance was made for the possibility that the Indians might riposte by persuading their good friends, the Afghans, then in dispute with Pakistan over title to "Pakhtunistan", to open up a second front directed across the North-West Frontier towards Peshawar. This last did not occur in the event; but the threat became real enough.¹⁴

In early August it would seem that the second phase of the plan, to which Indian Intelligence referred as Operation Malta, began to be implemented. Pakistani regular troops embarked upon an intervention on a significant scale in the worsening situation in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir. By this date incidents on the Indian side of the cease-fire line had become so frequent as almost to warrant the description of rebellion or civil war, even if there was scant evidence of armed activity other than that by infiltrators from the Pakistani side. Both in Pakistan and in Azad Kashmir there was now enormous public enthusiasm for the Kashmiri "freedom struggle" which at last, after so many years, seemed to be beginning to show results. It looked as if what the Azad Kashmir forces and the Pathan tribesmen failed to do in 1947 might after all be achieved in 1965. In these circumstances it would have been very difficult for the Pakistani authorities to call the operation off even if they had so wished. In the event, it is clear that President Ayub Khan had no intention at this juncture of trying to slow down the rate of escalation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

In August 1965 the plan seemed to be going well. Press reports made it clear that a serious campaign of sabotage and ambush was now going on in the Indian-held part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Bridges were being blown up and police stations attacked. Shots were even fired in Srinagar itself. All this, the Pakistan Government declared, demonstrated that a state of rebellion existed across the fire-line; and on 8 August the "Voice of Kashmir" radio

went on the air to announce the formation of a Kashmir Revolutionary Council to lead a war of liberation from Indian oppression.

The Indian Government, of course, denied that there was any rebellion. It blamed all the troubles on Pakistan which had been committing continued "aggression" by dispatching the "infiltrators", some of which it was said had been identified as Pakistani regular army officers. While India no doubt possessed more than sufficient force in to retain control in Kashmir, perhaps as many as 100,000 troops and police in all, yet there could be little question that the present situation was unpleasant, obliging the Indian authorities to undertake some drastic measures of repression in the interests of security which would not enhance the Indian image abroad; and it threatened, if not to drive India out of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, at least to damage severely the Kashmiri tourist industry. Few foreigners would be willing to spend good hard currency to hire houseboats in the line of fire of Kashmiri snipers.

The growing Kashmir crisis presented Lal Bahadur Shastri's Government with two choices. It could either bring about a *detente* by opening discussions with Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute or it could endeavour to meet force with force, and in the process run the risk of uncontrolled escalation. In view of the opposition to his Rann of Kutch cease-fire, it is clear that Lal Bahadur Shastri felt that he could at this stage afford no more. It is likely that he was not only under political pressure but also faced demands from the leaders of the Indian Army that he refuse to let the State of Jammu and Kashmir turn into a repetition of the Rann of Kutch affair; and, of course, Indian Intelligence could provide ample details about Operation Gibraltar to demonstrate that all the difficulties were the direct result of Pakistani policy. Hence Lal Bahadur Shastri gave in to the military who saw that the way to stop "infiltration" from Azad Kashmir and the West Punjab was to advance across the cease-fire line and hold certain key passes.

Implementation of this active policy began, in fact, on 14 or 15 August with an Indian attack on Pakistani positions in the Kargil sector to the north (an application of counter pressure towards the Northern Areas whence any potential threat from Pakistan to the Srinagar-Leh road could be averted, and the main line of communication to the Sino-Indian front line in Ladakh and the Northern Frontier correspondingly made more secure);¹⁵ but there was no official announcement of the intention to cross the cease-fire line until 24 August when Lal Bahadur Shastri made a statement to this effect in the *Lok Sabha*. It had now become abundantly clear that such a robust policy would be most popular in India: on 16 August a vast crowd, over 100,000 it was estimated, marched on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi to demonstrate against any more weakness in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

The Indian Army appears at first to have concentrated on the main "infiltration" route in the Tithwal region; and by 25 August it declared that it had effectively shut the door here by occupying certain passes across the cease-fire line. On 26 August Indian forces turned their attention to the salient of Azad Kashmir territory between Uri and Poonch which by 31 August they had almost completely pinched out. Meanwhile there had been fighting and shelling along most of the western half of the cease-fire line.

India announced that its operation in Kargil, Tithwal and the Uri-Poonch salient were purely defensive, to shut off the routes used by Pakistani "infiltrators". There can be little doubt that this represented a true description of the Indian Army's strategy at this juncture (with the possible exception of operations in the Kargil region where one can detect the constant shadow of geopolitical considerations). However, the measures taken were certainly rather violent; and it is open to argument that India could have coped easily enough with the "infiltration" problem without tearing up the 1949 Kashmir cease-fire agreement. Moreover, it was extremely unlikely that the Pakistani military leaders would be prepared to believe in the stated limited objectives of the Indian offensives. In the prevailing atmosphere of distrust they had no choice but to act on the assumption that India was beginning a campaign for the total conquest of Azad Kashmir. Pakistan had to take some immediate countermeasures. At this point, one suspects, the planned objectives for Operation Gibraltar and its associated schemes had been left far behind.

What Pakistan now planned to do became clear on 1 September with the opening of a major attack by Azad Kashmir troops with Pakistani regular units, including armour, in support. The scene was the Chhamb district, right at the end of the cease-fire line where Jammu touches on West Punjab. The evident intention was to cut the main Indian line of communication along the road from Pathankot through Jammu to Srinagar by way of the Banihal Pass (following a plan which Akbar Khan had unavailingly advanced in 1947). By 5 September the Pakistani forces had captured Jaurian and were almost in Akhnur which controlled Indian communications with Uri and Poonch. They were less than twenty miles from Jammu City itself.

So far the fighting, with the possible exception of the occasional stray aircraft, had been confined to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. India, now facing a major setback in the disputed territory, resolved to spread the conflict to Pakistan proper.

On 6 September, without any declaration of war or other warning, two Indian columns were launched across the international border (the line of Sir Cyril Radcliffe's 1947 award) towards Lahore while a third column later crossed from near Jammu into the West Punjab in the direction of Sialkot. Thus the Kashmir problem at last gave rise

to a general Indo-Pakistani war. Jawaharlal Nehru had warned Liaquat Ali Khan in late 1947 that in certain circumstances India might have to take just such action in order to control the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir; but it had taken India eighteen years to make good its threat. On 8 September India further widened the conflict with an attack from Rajasthan towards Sind in Pakistan directed along the axis Gadra-Hyderabad (and directly threatening Karachi).

These offensives were accompanied by Indian Air Force raids on Pakistani air bases. The Pakistanis also resorted to air attacks (and they even undertook yet another escalation, the naval bombardment of an Indian radar station at Dwarka on the Gujrat coast). Pakistan claimed that Indian air raids were carried out against East Pakistan as well as West Pakistan; but India has denied this. The story of the air war is still most confused. However, it remained secondary to the land battles raging on the Sialkot and Lahore fronts. Here, again, the story remains rather vague. Both sides claimed improbable victories. On balance it rather looks as if a stalemate was quickly reached in which neither side was strong enough to defeat the other. India was unable to break through to Lahore. Pakistan failed both to cut the Indian line of communication in Kashmir and to start the long expected tank promenade down the Grand Trunk Road to Delhi.

Within a week it must have been abundantly clear to the military staffs of both India and Pakistan that neither side was going to win an outright victory. Indeed, neither side was now seeking the kind of victory which could possibly be gained on the battlefield. India had attacked across the cease-fire line because it felt that the Kashmir situation was getting beyond its control; and its main objective was certainly to maintain the security of its established positions. The Pakistani Operation Gibraltar project had now clearly run into severe trouble; and the problem was no longer to find the way forward but, rather, the way out. It seems reasonable, therefore, to suppose that both sides were really quite eager to obtain a cease-fire if they could do so without appearing to their respective publics to have surrendered to the enemy. They must have appreciated that the longer the fighting went on the more public opinion would be inflamed and the harder would it be to call a halt.

The outside world had watched the mounting crisis between India and Pakistan with ever-increasing alarm. No party in the Cold War stood to benefit at this moment from a major armed conflict in the subcontinent. The United States feared the result would be an increasing alignment of Pakistan with China and a serious blow to those alliances, CENTO and SEATO, of which Pakistan was a member. The Soviet Union likewise had no wish to see an increase of Chinese strength in the subcontinent: indeed, during 1965 there had been a remarkable thaw in the relations between Pakistan and Russia.

The British were much disturbed at the outbreak of war, even if undeclared, between two members of the Commonwealth. Even the Chinese, whom the Indians were inclined to see as the real villains in the melodrama, were extremely reluctant to be dragged into a war with India on behalf of their Pakistani friend. The few Afro-Asian States which were prepared to align themselves with one side of the other, like Indonesia with Pakistan and Malaysia with India, did so for reasons quite unconnected with events in the subcontinent; and they stood to gain nothing from an escalating Indo-Pakistani war. Here, indeed, was one of the few occasions in recent history when world opinion was almost unanimously behind a single course of action, namely a cease-fire in the subcontinent.

Three main initiatives were made to bring that cease-fire about, those of Britain and the United States, of the United Nations and its Secretary-General U Thant, and of China.

The United States and Britain, two of the principal suppliers of arms to the subcontinent, had an obvious means at their disposal whereby to endeavour to oblige both sides to cease fighting. On 8 September both countries announced a cessation of military aid to India and Pakistan so long as hostilities continued. This would certainly have had an effect in the long run, since the Indians were mainly using British tanks and aircraft and the Pakistanis tanks and aircraft from the United States.¹⁶ With the wastage of operations a critical spare parts situation would soon develop on both sides. However, the action of Britain and the United States did not, in itself, provide the occasion for a cease-fire. Indeed, it was so resented by public opinion on both sides as to increase for the moment the will to go on fighting.

The only outside proposals for a cease-fire which India and Pakistan could accept with honour were those of the United Nations, a body which both sides had recognised as possessing a legitimate interest of some kind in the Kashmir dispute. The Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, had been watching closely the Kashmir situation since the early days of crisis in August. On 1 September he appealed to Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan to respect the cease-fire line and to arrange for a withdrawal behind it of Indian and Pakistani forces. Both leaders, in effect, rejected U Thant's request. On 6 September the Security Council unanimously resolved that India and Pakistan should be called upon "to take forthwith all steps for an immediate cease-fire"; and it instructed U Thant to go out to the subcontinent immediately to report on the situation.

U Thant visited Rawalpindi on 9 September and was in New Delhi on 12 September. After talks with leaders on both sides he sent letters to Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan calling for a cease-fire to take effect by the early morning of 14 September. India

declared that it would be ready for a cease-fire if Pakistan withdrew all its forces from the State of Jammu and Kashmir and if the United Nations guaranteed that never again would Pakistan commit acts of aggression. Pakistan said it would agree to a cease-fire if it were immediately followed by a complete withdrawal of all Indian and Pakistani forces from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, their place to be taken by a United Nations force, recruited from Afro-Asian countries, the task of which would be to prepare the ground for a plebiscite within three months. On 14 September, on the expiry of U Thant's time limit, Lal Bahadur Shastri said that India would accept a cease-fire; but he made it conditional upon Pakistan doing likewise without preconditions, which Pakistan was clearly not prepared to do at this point. U Thant had failed to stop the fighting.

On his return to the United Nations headquarters in New York the Secretary General desperately explored all the means at his disposal to bring about some kind of settlement. On 17 September U Thant suggested to the Security Council that it might consider the use of the powers which it possessed under Article 40 of the Charter which enabled it to *order* the two parties to desist from fighting, and authorised it to back its demands with force if required. The prospect of the use of United Nations forces in the subcontinent was not welcomed by the Security Council: it was clearly impracticable. On 20 September, however, the Security Council adopted by far the most strongly worded resolution yet to have emerged from the Kashmir story. The Security Council, the resolution began,

demands that a cease-fire should take effect on Wednesday, September 22, 1965, at 0700 hours GMT, and calls upon both Governments to issue orders for a cease-fire at that moment, and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to positions held by them before Aug. 5, 1965.

This was the first time that the Security Council had ever *demand*ed that India or Pakistan do something. The resolution concluded with the expression of hope that, once a cease-fire had been secured, the Security Council would be able to carry out useful exploration of possible solutions for the political problems which underlay the present conflict. The deadline for the cease-fire was subsequently extended for a few hours. Both India and Pakistan agreed to stop fighting, and the war came to a halt at 3.30 a.m. Indian summer time on 23 September 1965.

There were a number of reasons why India and Pakistan should agree to a cease-fire at this point. India, basically, was aiming at no more than maintaining its position in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It no longer was particularly interested in internationally supervised settlements and it refused to agree that the status of its own part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was still a proper subject for Indo-Pakistani negotiation. As far as it was concerned the

Kashmir issue was now closed. Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India. It had become so before the outbreak of fighting and, with the cease-fire, it would remain so.

Pakistan, on the other hand, was hoping to keep the Kashmir question alive. Quite early in the fighting it must have become obvious that there was little chance of driving India from the State by force of arms: and whatever might have been the objectives of Operation Gibraltar, they were no longer attainable. The Security Council resolution carried within it the implication that the Kashmir dispute was still a matter requiring discussion. Such international recognition, partial though it might be, of the Pakistani position was better than nothing; and, perhaps, the practical demonstration of the danger to world peace inherent in the present situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir might well lead world opinion to be more forceful in its advocacy of an effective solution. One imagines that President Ayub Khan hoped that with the cease-fire he had a slightly better prospect of securing a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir than he had had in August 1965. The prospect, however, was still very remote.

Other things being equal, Pakistan might perhaps have gained from a few more days of fighting and the possibility of a more dramatic repulse of the Indian attacks. One military argument for a cease-fire, it has been suggested, was that Pakistan was rapidly running out of ammunition, spare parts and, above all, fuel for its tanks and aircraft. This is certainly a possibility. There can be little doubt, however, that the critical element in the decision is to found neither in the military and political situation nor in the resolution of the United Nations, but in the intervention of China.

Pakistan entered the conflict with India with, in theory at least, a number of allies on its side. It was a member of two multilateral treaty organizations, SEATO and CENTO. The other members of SEATO made it clear to Z. A. Bhutto, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, that they refused in any way to be involved in the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Two members of CENTO, however, Iran and Turkey, while by no means prepared to join the fight on the side of Pakistan, yet were clearly sympathetic to the Pakistani cause. There is some evidence that by the time of the cease-fire considerable quantities of war material from Iran and Turkey were entering Pakistan overland via the Iranian railhead in Zahedan on the borders of Baluchistan. SEATO and CENTO were not, however, in the context of the present conflict the most important friends of Pakistan. China was clearly in a physical position, being in control of such a vast tract of Tibet along India's northern border, to make a direct intervention against India; and, in view of the prevailing state of Sino-Indian relations, might well be prepared to take active steps to relieve the pressure on the Pakistani front.

The Chinese did not let Pakistan down; but they intervened in a rather strange, indeed enigmatic, manner. They avoided any threat of direct involvement in the Indo-Pakistani conflict as such, perhaps because they realised that to do so might lead to rather drastic American reactions. Instead, they exploited one of the many small border questions which had for some years been the subject of Sino-Indian argument, making a minor issue the excuse for an ultimatum to the Indian Government. Since early 1963 the Chinese had been protesting against the Indian erection of "military structures" on the Chinese side of the border between Sikkim and Tibet at the Nathu La and other passes leading into the Chumbi Valley in Chinese territory. A study of the voluminous and acrimonious correspondence on this question rather suggests that the Indian Army in Sikkim had established a number of forward defences and observation posts just on the northern side of the crest of the pass. The frontier here had been defined clearly enough by treaty between British India and China in 1890.¹⁷ It followed the watershed. It is possible, even likely, that the Indian positions were just on the Chinese side of the watershed; but, if so, the trespass could only have involved a few square yards at the most of Chinese territory.¹⁸

During August 1965, as the Kashmir crisis intensified, so did the Chinese begin to deliver increasingly strongly worded protests against this Indian "aggression". The Indian Government, evidently reluctant to provoke the Chinese at this juncture, replied in a tone of moderation quite unusual in the Sino-Indian correspondence of this period. It denied that there had been any trespass on Chinese territory and, on 12 September, it proposed that a neutral observer be allowed to carry out an inspection on the ground. The Chinese, who had themselves at an earlier stage proposed inspection, now refused to accept anything less than an Indian withdrawal, what India in terms of the Kashmir dispute would have called a "vacation of the aggression". On 16 September China delivered an ultimatum to the Indian Government. If the Indians did not dismantle their "military structures" and withdraw to their own side of the Sikkim-Tibet border within three days, they would face unspecified "grave consequences". The ultimatum would expire on 19 September. Just before it did in fact expire the Chinese extended the time limit for a further three days, that is to say to midnight on 22 September. At the same time, the Chinese added to their previous conditions the demand that India hand back to China four Chinese frontier inhabitants (presumably Tibetans), 800 sheep and 59 yaks which, it was claimed, India had kidnapped. On 21 September, when it seemed more or less certain that both India and Pakistan would agree to the cease-fire demanded by the Security Council, the Chinese began cool off the crisis by reporting that the Indians had fled from their positions and dismantled the "military structures" in order to

destroy the evidence of their "crimes". Thereupon the Chinese tacitly withdrew their ultimatum.

In retrospect the Chinese intervention might perhaps appear ludicrous. There was subsequently to be much merriment in New Delhi about the 800 sheep and 59 yaks. The *Economist* in London made great fun of the Chinese performance in a leading article entitled "Thanks for muffing it".¹⁹ At the time, however, the Chinese threats alarmed India to an extraordinary degree. It may be that fear of a Chinese invasion tied up large bodies of Indian troops away from the Pakistan front. It seems certain that the Chinese intervention enabled President Ayub Khan to agree to a cease-fire from a position which could be made to seem to the Pakistani public to be one of strength, whatever the realities of the situation might have been.

Quite what degree of co-ordination there existed between Peking and Rawalpindi at this point it is impossible to say. It is worth noting, in passing, that Marshal Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, had discussions in Karachi with the Pakistani Foreign Minister on 4 September, that is to say on the eve of the Indian offensive towards Lahore. It seems likely that some contingency planning was carried out on this occasion. Most foreign commentators have tended to see in the Chinese intervention an attempt to prolong the Indo-Pakistani conflict. In fact, it is far more likely that it was a means to bring it to a rapid end; and for once the Peoples' Republic of China and the Security Council of the United Nations saw eye to eye.

Major fighting between India and Pakistan stopped on 23 September; but the cease-fire line separating the two armies continued for several months more to be the scene of spasmodic incidents which served to keep alive the tensions which had resulted in the September crisis. The war had produced no political settlement: nor had it indicated that such settlement might be secured easily by peaceful methods. It was obvious that there were voices on either side advocating a resumption of hostilities. Z.A. Bhutto, it seems more than probable, believed that the fighting should go on a while yet with more forces committed: but he was, apparently, to his great chagrin overruled.

Both sides, moreover, now felt that they had been deserted or betrayed by many people in their hour of need. For example, the Malaysian representative at the United Nations, Mr. Ramani, a man of Indian origin, in the Security Council debate of 18 September delivered himself of an extremely pro-Indian oration. Pakistan was furious and demanded an apology from the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman. The Tunku decided to support his old friend Ramani, who had certainly exceeded his instructions. Pakistan then broke off diplomatic relations with Malaysia. While this crisis was developing, Z.A. Bhutto was virtually presenting the United Nations with an ultimatum: either a proper discussion of the Kashmir

question were held in the very near future or the Pakistani delegation would be withdrawn. At the same time, in Pakistan there continued to swell a feeling of hostility to Britain and the United States, two Powers who, it was widely believed, had deserted Pakistan at a crucial moment by cutting off arms shipments. India, too, considered that British and American declarations of neutrality were, in fact, declarations of hostility to India; and in New Delhi it was felt that the United Nations would probably continue to show its pro-Pakistani bias by making yet more proposals for a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Once the cease-fire had been arranged, in fact, neither those Western Powers usually prepared to offer mediation in the sub-continent, like Britain and the United States, nor the United Nations retained sufficient credit with the two sides to be in a position to do anything further. No Afro-Asian State, for that matter, could do better. Those that had sided with Pakistan, like Indonesia, were certainly not in favour with New Delhi; and those that had sided with India, like Malaysia, could exert no influence in Rawalpindi. Those that had remained to a greater or lesser degree neutral were regarded with grave suspicion by both sides. The greatest Asian Power of them all, China, having made its gesture now appeared to have retired for the time being from the fray. In any case, China, not represented in the United Nations, could make no serious contribution to peaceful Indo-Pakistani discussions. The only power in a position to do this, in fact, was the Soviet Union.

In the era of Khrushchev, the Soviet Union had publicly declared itself a supporter of the Indian stand on Kashmir. In 1962 a Russian veto had defeated a Security Council resolution on the plebiscite issue. By 1965, and after the fall of the Khrushchev regime, Russian attitudes were significantly modified. When President Ayub Khan visited Moscow in early April 1965, Aleksei Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, showed himself far more flexible in outlook on Kashmir than had ever been Khrushchev. No doubt he was looking for some means to reduce Chinese influence in Rawalpindi. Thus, during the great Indo-Pakistani crisis of August and September 1965 the Russians, while in fact suppliers of military equipment to India, yet managed to retain an attitude of neutrality with such skill as to earn the hostility of neither side.

On 20 August Kosygin wrote to both President Ayub Khan and Lal Bahadur Shastri requesting that Pakistan and India should refrain from taking any step which would serve to widen the conflict then developing in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. On 4 September he urged both sides to agree to an immediate cease-fire and offered Russian good offices for a negotiated settlement between the two nations. At this time both President Ayub Khan and Lal Bahadur Shastri turned the Russians down.

Kosygin, however, did not despair. On 17 September he proposed that the Indian and Pakistani leaders should meet in Tashkent or some other Russian city to talk over their differences under his chairmanship. Lal Bahadur Shastri announced on 22 September that he had accepted the Russian offer. President Ayub Khan wrote non-committally to Kosygin on 25 September, expressing interest but clearly preferring that Russian influence should be exerted in the Security Council rather than in direct Indo-Pakistani discussions. Such bilateral talks had not been particularly fruitful in the past and President Ayub Khan doubted whether they would be so in the immediate future. When the Security Council, which debated Indo-Pakistani relations in late October and early November, showed itself unlikely to produce anything useful on Kashmir (India refused to participate in these deliberations which, it claimed, concerned domestic matters beyond the Council's scope), President Ayub Khan finally made up his mind to experiment with Soviet mediation. He had, after all, nothing to lose by it. On 25 November, Z.A. Bhutto, then in Moscow, announced that Pakistan had accepted without conditions Kosygin's offer. It was then arranged that President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri should meet at Tashkent in early January 1966. Prime Minister Kosygin would endeavour to steer the discussions into fruitful channels and generally strive to bring about some resolution of the major causes of Indo-Pakistani hostility.

The three parties at the Tashkent conference were all playing for high stakes against the most unfavourable odds. Kosygin, could he but bring about significant measure of Indo-Pakistani agreement, would have demonstrated beyond question Russia's role as an Asian Power able to deal with other Asian Powers in a manner untainted by colonialist motives. President Ayub Khan and Lal Bahadur Shastri, were they to come to any agreement whatsoever, would run the risk of serious protest at home since in both India and Pakistan there was a powerful body of opinion violently opposed to negotiations and urging that the war go on until some more definite conclusion be reached. On the other hand, it was clear that, should the Tashkent talks fail completely, the result might well be such an increase of hostility between the two nations as to make a further outbreak of fighting a virtual certainty, and with consequences which none could foretell.

The Tashkent conference, when it opened on 3 January 1966, appeared to have little prospect of success. The Indian and Pakistani positions were too far apart. By 9 January it looked as if the talks were on the point of collapse. However, suddenly and dramatically on 10 January it was announced that an agreement had been reached. On the following day Lal Bahadur Shastri unexpectedly died. The Tashkent agreement thereby was invested, if only for the time being,

with an aura of sanctity which gave it far more effect than might otherwise have been the case. There can be little doubt that Lal Bahadur Shastri's greatest contribution to world peace was made at the very moment of his death.

The Tashkent declaration of 10 January 1966 did not deal with the Kashmir dispute other than to note its existence. In effect, it suggested that the issue should be put into cold storage while other more urgent problems were being solved. Pakistan and India accepted that their mutual relations should be restored to their normal state. The armies of both sides should withdraw to the positions they had occupied before the crisis began to erupt in August 1965. Full diplomatic relations should be re-established between the two States, and there should be an attempt to put a stop to the flood of hostile propaganda which was then being poured out by both Governments. Prisoners of war should be repatriated. There should be continuing discussions at a high level between the two States "on matters of direct concern to both countries".²⁰

The most urgent item in this Declaration, the withdrawal of the armies behind the established international borders and the 1949 Kashmir cease-fire line, was implemented by late February 1966.

1. Serious anti-Muslim riots broke out in Calcutta on 6 January 1964, which were immediately followed by anti-Hindu outbreaks in the Khulna and Jessore districts of East Pakistan where substantial Hindu minorities had survived the traumas of Partition in 1947.
2. Sheikh Abdullah's travels on this occasion have already been referred to in Chapter 10. Immediately after his release from prison (in Jammu) on 8 April 1964, he visited Srinagar. He was in New Delhi on 29 April, then travelled elsewhere in India including Madras, talking to politicians of various persuasions. On 24 May, after his invitation to visit Pakistan, he arrived at Rawalpindi for talks with President Ayub Khan. On 25 May he shared the platform at a public meeting at Rawalpindi with Chaudhuri Ghulam Abbas, his old rival of the days of competition between the National Conference and the revived Muslim Conference. On 27 May he was at Muzaffarabad on the first stage of a tour of Azad Kashmir when he heard of Nehru's death. He at once ended his Pakistani visit and returned to New Delhi where, on 3 June, he called on the new Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri. He maintained that he had persuaded President Ayub Khan to start a fresh round of talks with Nehru: he now hoped that these would take place with Shastri instead.
3. Jayaprakash Narayan's two articles have been reproduced in full as appendices in: A.G. Noorani, *The Kashmir Question*, Bombay 1964.
4. Bhutto had replaced Mohammed Ali Bogra as Pakistani Foreign Minister in January 1963 after the latter's death. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was born in 1928. His father was Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, who was Dewan (Chief Minister) of Junagadh at the time of the Transfer of Power in 1947. The Bhutto family, of immense wealth, had its power base in Sind.

The whole question of the late Z.A. Bhutto's role in the history of Pakistan in

- this period is still extremely controversial. I had the opportunity in 1972-73 to discuss this subject with him in Rawalpindi; and much of what appears in this and the following Chapter is based on my interpretation of what Z.A. Bhutto told me.
5. Bhutto was certainly not the only person to advocate this kind of action. He is used here to some degree as a symbol for one trend in official Pakistani thought at this period.
 6. Quoted, for example, in: R.K. Jain, ed., *China South Asian Relations 1947-1980*, Vol. II, New Delhi 1981, p. 54.
 7. See: Choudhuri, *Relations with India*, *op. cit.*, p. 278.
 8. For some account of the Rann of Kutch, though very much from the Indian point of view, see: Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, *Pakistan's Aggression in Kutch*, New Delhi 1965. Appended to this pamphlet is a most useful map.
 9. For a map showing the 1968 Rann of Kutch award, see: M.K. Chopra, *India. The Search for Power*, Bombay 1969, p. 291. The main features of the award were: the elimination of two Indian salients in the region of Nagar Parkar at the eastern end of the Sind-Kutch border; the concession to Pakistan of a tract some twenty miles long and up to eight miles deep in the region of Dharbani and Chhadbet in the middle stretch of the border; and some minor modifications in Pakistan's favour at the extreme western end near Rahim Ki Bazar.
 10. *Link*, 11 April 1965.
 11. See, for example: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *White Paper on the Jammu and Kashmir Dispute*, Islamabad 1977, p. 81.
 12. Most Pakistani writers tend to be rather coy, not surprisingly, about anything touching on Operation Gibraltar. Saraf's magisterial study has a brief mention of the subject; and he attributed the devising of the guerrilla plan to Lt.-General Akhtar Hussain Malik, which he dates to after the Rann of Kutch fighting in early 1965. See: Saraf, *Kashmiris Fight*, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1148.
 13. During the course of conversation with the author in 1973, the late Z.A. Bhutto admitted that he had been to some degree influenced by the example set by Jawaharlal Nehru in the techniques employed for his acquisition of Goa from the Portuguese at the end of 1961.
 14. The literature on Operation Gibraltar leaves a great deal to be desired. The following, one from the Pakistani side and the other from the Indian, throw some light on the story: M. Asghar Khan, with a foreword by Altaf Gauhar, *The First Round. Indo-Pakistan War 1965*, London 1979; Hari Ram Gupta, *India-Pakistan War 1965*, Vol. I, Delhi 1967, Vol. II, Delhi 1968. In 1966 President Ayub Khan admitted that he had been much influenced by the threat from Afghanistan when he agreed to the Tashkent settlement. See: Herbert Feldman, *From Crisis to Crisis. Pakistan 1962-1969*, London 1972, p. 149.
 15. It is highly unlikely that many "infiltrators" came across the cease-fire line by way of Kargil. The Indian side was taking advantage of the situation to strengthen its general geopolitical situation.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XII

16. *Newsweek*, under the caption "Arms: who supplied what", published the following table on 20 September 1965. While perhaps not completely accurate, yet it is probably as good a reflection of the true state of affairs as any.

<i>United States:</i>	<i>India</i>	<i>Pakistan</i>
F86 Sabre jets	0	100
F104 Starfighters	0	50
B57 Bombers	0	30
C130 Transports	0	4
C119 Transports	25	0
Patton tanks	0	200
Sherman tanks	30	0
 <i>Great Britain:</i>	 <i>India</i>	 <i>Pakistan</i>
Hunter jet fighters	150	0
Vampire jet fighter	100	0
Gnat jet fighters	100	0
Canberra bombers	80	50
Canberra photo planes	8	0
Viscount transports	5	0
Centurion tanks	210	0
Stuart tanks	80	0
 <i>Soviet Union:</i>		
MIG21 jet fighters	6	0
Ilyushin transports	2	0
Antonov transports	24	0
 <i>France:</i>		
Mystere IV fighters	100	0
AMX13 tanks	40	0

From this table it would seem that India had done rather better than Pakistan in the matter of military equipment. Both sides, of course, were not supposed to use this material against each other; but both sides, not surprisingly, did so use it.

17. For the background to the Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890, see: Alastair Lamb, *British India and Tibet 1766-1910*, London 1986, Chapter VIII. Despite having been agreed by treaty, the Tibetans contested the validity of the border in the 1890s; and there are hints that they were still doing so in the 1930s. See: Alastair Lamb, *Tibet, China & India 1914-1950*, pp. 383-384.

18. For some of the earlier correspondence on this question, see Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China, July 1963 to January 1964, White Paper No. X and January 1964 to January 1965, White Paper No. XI*, New Delhi 1964 and 1965. See also: Jain, *China South Asian Relations, op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 71-93.

19. *The Economist*, 25 September 1965.

20. The text of the Tashkent Declaration has been reprinted frequently. See, for example: Government of India, External Publicity Division, *Tashkent Declaration*, New Delhi 1966, which includes a number of other related documents.